42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(f)’s employee definition is assessed under the Clackamas control-factor analysis when deciding whether a partner is covered by Title VII.

Solon, James D. v. Kaplan, Larry S. · filed 2005-02-15(f)

Title VII defines “employee,” subject to exceptions not relevant here, as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... In sum, the analysis presented in Clackamas applies to the question presented here: whether a partner is an employee entitled to sue for retaliation under Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Wortham v. American Family Insurance Group Dave Vore, Bob Carnine · filed 2004-11-19(f)

Independent contractor status is not protected under the ADEA, Title VII, or the ICR A. Employees are protected under these acts. Thus, Wortham’s claims brought pursuant to these statutes fail as a matter of law.

Title VII protects employees but does not cover independent contractors.

Wortham v. American Family Ins. · filed 2004-10-08(f)

Independent contractor status is not protected under the ADEA, Title VII, or the ICRA. Employees are protected under these acts. Thus, Wortham’s claims brought pursuant to these statutes fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee applies to graduate research assistants under the economic realities test.

Sandy Cuddeback v. FL Board of Education · filed 2004-08-25(f)

We hold that the economic realities test should be used to determine whether a person acting as a graduate research assistant is an employee for the purposes of Title VII. Applying that test to this case, we conclude that Cuddeback was an employee.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII; an independent contractor is not covered as an employee.

Kakides v. King Davis Agency, Inc. · filed 2003-09-18(f)

Title VII defines “employee” somewhat obscurely as “any individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Consistent with the facts of these decisions, the court finds that Kak-ides worked as an independent contractor for Hunneman from at least December 1, 1999, and therefore, was not covered by Title VII with respect to claims based on conduct by Hunneman or its employees after that date.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors who have no employment relationship with the defendant.

Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2003-10-10(f)

The Court also finds that plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination are not legally cognizable under Title VII because plaintiff is an independent contractor, and has no employment relationship with Dixie, Crown, or Cora-Texas.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Sutphin v. United American Insurance · filed 2000-12-13(f)

In addition, Daniel’s conduct is not subject to remedial action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because, although it protects workers who are “employees,” it does not protect independent contractors.

Title VII excludes independent contractors from employee protections, and worker status is determined under common-law agency principles.

Lindquist v. Condra · filed 1998-07-06(f)

We determine whether an individual is a protected employee or an unprotected independent contractor by examining the working relationship using the common law of agency.

Section 2000e(f) requires an individual to receive compensation from an employer to qualify as an employee under Title VII.

Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc. · filed 1998-12-28(f)

We believe, however, that only individuals who receive compensation from an employer can be deemed "employees" under the statute.

An asserted employee relationship supported by employment contracts, payroll records, and evidence of employer control is substantial enough to withstand dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc. · filed 1999-03-29(f)

In view of Santerre’s proffer of three employment contracts between Agip and Santerre, her inclusion in Agip’s payroll, and other evidence suggesting Agip’s exercise of control over her activities, it cannot be said that Santerre’s assertion that she is a Title VII employee of Agip is frivolous or insubstantial.

A volunteer firefighter who receives significant job-related benefits may qualify as an employee under Title VII even without a salary.

Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners of the Farmingville Fire District · filed 1999-06-18(f)

We conclude, in accord with Haavistola, that a non-salaried volunteer firefighter’s employment status under Title VII is a fact question when that firefighter is entitled to significant benefits.

Title VII uses the common-law agency test to determine whether a worker is an employee of the defendant.

Rodriguez v. Lauren · filed 1999-12-03(f)

In order to determine if an individual is an “employee” for the purposes of Title VII, we look to the “common-law” test the Supreme Court endorsed in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992). ... On the undisputed facts of this case, Polo cannot be Rodriguez’s employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using common-law agency principles to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. · filed 2000-03-23(f)

The statute’s nominal definition of an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), “is completely circular and explains nothing.” ... The combined weight of all these factors, however, when considered together in light of common-law agency principles, convinces us that the working relationship constituted an independent contractor arrangement.

Section 2000e’s employee definition excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection; courts use common law agency factors to determine worker status.

Hannon v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. · filed 2000-06-16(f)

The primary issue before the court with regard to Hannon’s Title VII claim is whether Hannon was an employee or an independent contractor with Avis. While Title VII protects employees, it does not apply to independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee incorporates common law agency principles and excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Peck v. Democrat and Chronicle/Gannett Newspapers · filed 2000-08-15(f)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... After reviewing the facts presented by the parties, the Court concludes that the plaintiff was an independent contractor.

Section 2000e(f) covers workers who qualify as Title VII employees, with special weight ordinarily given to the hiring party’s control over how the work is done.

Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc. · filed 2000-12-26(f)

We hold that, in determining whether a worker is an employee within the meaning of Title VII and the NYHRL, courts ordinarily should place particular weight on the extent to which the hiring party controls the manner and means by which the worker completes her assigned tasks, rather than on how she is treated for tax purposes or whether she receives benefits.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII purposes and excludes independent contractors from that protection.

Lutfi v. Brighton Community Hospital Ass'n · filed 2001-05-10(f)

There must, however, be some connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply. Thus, Title VII protects employees, but does not protect independent contractors. Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir.1999). Under Title VII, "employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e’s definition of employee turns chiefly on the employer’s right to control the worker’s actions, considered alongside the other factors distinguishing employees from independent contractors.

Worth, Lisa v. Tyer, Robert H. · filed 2001-12-27(f)

The employer’s right to control the worker’s actions is the most important factor.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors, with employee status determined under the common law of agency.

Anyan v. New York Life Insurance · filed 2002-04-03(f)

Title VII and the other anti-discrimination employment statutes cover employees, not independent contractors. ... Hence, Anyan was not an employee of New York Life for purposes of the employment statutes, as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII purposes, excluding independent contractors from employee status.

West v. MCI Worldcom, Inc. · filed 2002-06-05(f)

Applying these factors, the Court finds that West was an independent contractor and not an employee of MCI for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII using the common-law employment relationship, which excludes independent contractors.

Zhengxing v. Nathanson · filed 2002-08-05(f)

Title VII defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... In sum, the court concludes that the plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee and thus was not entitled to the protection of Title VII.

Section 2000e requires an employment relationship, assessed through multiple factors with the employer’s control over the worker’s performance carrying the most weight.

Rockefeller v. United States Court of Appeals Office, for the Tenth Circuit Judges · filed 2003-02-07(f)

The analysis used to determine whether an employee-employer relationship exists requires the Court to weigh numerous factors regarding the work relationship. Although no one factor is determinative, the extent of the employer’s right to control the “means and manner” of the worker’s performance is the most important factor to review. ... Applying each of these factors to the instant case, it is abundantly clear that the plaintiff has never been an employee of the defendants, but was merely a party to a lawsuit presided over by the defendant judges.

Section 2000e(f) uses the common law agency test to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia · filed 2003-03-06(f)

In both Title VII and the ADA, Congress adopted a circular definition of “employee” -- an employee is an “individual employed by an employer.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4). In such cases, the Supreme Court applies the general common law of agency to determine whether a hired party is an employee or an independent contractor.

Section 2000e(f) can cover work experience program participants who receive cash payments and substantial benefits for useful work.

United States v. City Of New York · filed 2004-02-13(f)

Title VII itself defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... We conclude that the relationship alleged here — which includes the cash payment, the related benefits, and the requirement that the plaintiffs' work be useful — if proved, establishes the plaintiffs as employees for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee under the common law agency test and excludes independent contractors.

Alberty-Vélez v. Corporación De Puerto Rico Para La Difusión Pública · filed 2004-03-02(f)

We see no reason to apply a different test under Title VII and ... therefore will apply the common law test to determine whether Alberty was WIPR's employee or an independent contractor.

Section 2000e(f) uses common-law control factors to determine whether a partner is an employee entitled to bring a Title VII retaliation claim.

Solon v. Kaplan · filed 2005-02-23(f)

The factor test announced in Clackamas applies to this case. ... Under the facts of this case, he was an employer as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(f) permits a worker to plead employee status by alleging facts showing the employer’s right to control her work.

Moret v. Harvey · filed 2005-08-02(f)

Based on the aforementioned, Moret has alleged sufficient facts, which if proven, may demonstrate that Defendant exercised a right of control over her employment, and therefore Moret was not an independent contractor.

Title VII’s employee coverage excludes independent contractors; courts assess the working relationship as a whole, focusing on the employer’s right to control how the work is performed.

Edwards v. Creoks Mental Health Services, Inc. · filed 2007-01-25(f)

Examining the totality of circumstances, the Court finds that plaintiff was an independent contractor. Despite the fact that Black acted as her “supervisor” in some respects, plaintiff retained much control over the means and manner of her employment. Most importantly, by signing an employment contract entitled “Subcontractor Agreement,” plaintiff consented to her status as an independent contractor. Because she was an independent contractor, plaintiff cannot bring claims under either Title VII or the ADA.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, and employee status is an element of a Title VII claim rather than a jurisdictional requirement.

Xie v. University of Utah · filed 2007-07-05(f)

Like the fifteen-or-more-employees requirement, the Title VII provision that extends the statutory protections to employees but not independent contractors is set forth in the definitional section of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). As w ith the fifteen-or-more employees requirement addressed in Arbaugh, there is no indication that Congress considered employee status to be a threshold jurisdictional requirement. W e therefore conclude that Dr. Xie was not required to prove as a threshold jurisdictional requirement that she was an employee of the University. Instead, her alleged employee status is an element of her Title VII claims.

When deciding whether a volunteer is an employee under Title VII, compensation must be considered before applying the economic realities or common law agency tests.

Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. · filed 2008-03-26(f)

Upon examination of these cases, the Court finds compensation analysis is an antecedent inquiry that must be examined prior to application of the economic realities or common law agency tests. The Court is mindful of its obligation to apply Sixth Circuit law and finds that an antecedent inquiry into the whether an individual has been hired is rational, necessary and does not conflict with, but rather complements, the common law agency test currently used by the Sixth Circuit. Furthermore, its application is limited solely to the issue of employee versus volunteer, an issue that has not yet been address by the Sixth Circuit in the Title VII context.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII; allegations of work, compensation, and supervision can plausibly establish employee status.

Krause v. Turnberry Country Club · filed 2008-04-17(f)

Under Title VII, an employee is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... At this time, however, Krause has provided sufficient allegations to plausibly suggest that Turn-berry employed Krause.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an independent contractor from Title VII employee status when the alleged employer lacks sufficient control over the worker’s performance and employment terms.

Simms v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2008-11-26(f)

Accordingly, under either the Spirides analysis or the Brouming-Ferris joint employment test, plaintiff was an independent contractor and thus not an “employee” for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from Title VII’s definition of employee; employment status is determined using common-law agency factors.

DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP · filed 2009-01-26(f)

“Title VII ... cover[s] ‘employees,’ not independent contractors.” ... The Court is convinced, then, that the Plaintiff was an independent contractor, not an employee.

A volunteer is not an employee under Title VII when the benefits available do not create economic dependence on the organization.

Evans v. Wilkinson · filed 2009-03-23(f)

Accordingly, applying these legal principles to the facts in the record before the Court on summary judgment, the Court concludes that Plaintiff was not an “employee” under Title VII or the ADEA because, viewing the entire factual situation, the “economic reality” is that Plaintiff was not dependent upon the Volunteer Rescue Squad, to which she rendered volunteered EMT-Basic service.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee status using traditional agency principles; an independent contractor is outside Title VII’s protections.

Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc. · filed 2009-09-11(f)

The term "employee" is defined in Title VII as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... In sum, Brown was not an employee of Craftmatic for purposes of Title VII or the PHRA. Therefore, her termination did not fall within the protections of either statute.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee status using common law agency principles, with particular weight on who controls the worker’s performance.

Harris v. Ashcroft · filed 2009-09-24(f)

In determining whether plaintiff was an "employee" of EOUSA, the Court relies heavily on standards developed under the common law of agency, as applied in the Title VII context. The statute sets forth only a nominal definition of employee -- "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Therefore, notwithstanding the contract's statement that IMSI contractors are not to be considered employees of EOUSA, the level of control exercised by EOUSA over plaintiff and the economic realities of the workplace demonstrate that plaintiff was an "employee" within the meaning of Title VII.

Title VII applies only to employees of covered entities.

White v. Monarch Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2009-09-28

Moreover, Title VII applies only to employees, see Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir.2008), and White did not allege that she was an employee of a covered entity.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Khaksari v. Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors · filed 2010-02-11(f)

Her attempts to cast the non-renewal as retaliatory or discriminatory are to no avail because her work as an independent contractor was not protected under Title VII or the ADEA.

Section 2000e(f)’s employee definition sets a requirement for a Title VII claim, not a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.

Levin v. Madigan · filed 2010-03-10(f)

Nevertheless, based on the clear rule stated by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh, and its application by other circuits to identical facts, the Court holds that the question of Plaintiffs “employee” status is nonjurisdictional.

Section 2000e(f) covers a worker whose relationship with the company is an employment relationship under common-law agency principles, even if an agreement calls the worker an independent contractor.

Russell v. BSN MEDICAL, INC. · filed 2010-06-11(f)

With the evidence and its inferences viewed in her favor, Russell was an employee of BSN, and she may assert claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e’s employee definition excludes a shareholder-director who participates in firm governance and shares its profits, losses, and liabilities.

Kirleis v. Dickie McCamey & Chilcote · filed 2010-07-15(f)

As a Class A Shareholder- Director of DMC, Kirleis has the ability to participate in DMC’s governance, the right not to be terminated without a 3/4 vote of the Board of Directors for cause, and the entitlement to a percentage of DMC’s profits, losses, and liabilities. ... For these and all of the other reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinion, we find that Kirleis is an employer at DMC as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee uses the common law of agency to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Pavlik v. International Excess Agency, Inc. · filed 2011-03-16(f)

The term “employee” is defined in Title VII as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). When evaluating whether a person is an employee in a master-servant relationship for purposes of Title VII and ADEA, the common law of agency applies. ... Based upon these facts, we conclude that Pavlik was an employee of IEA from October 2006 through January 2008.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII coverage.

Tani v. FPL/Next Era Energy · filed 2011-09-15(f)

Title VII and the ADA do not cover independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors; worker status depends on the full employment relationship.

Glascock v. Linn County Emergency Medicine, PC · filed 2012-01-09(f)

When the foregoing considerations are viewed in light of the applicable standards, the court concludes that there exists no disputed issue of material fact, and that the working relationship between plaintiff and defendant constituted an independent contractor relationship. As independent contractor status is not protected under Title VII or the ICRA, defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; a plaintiff must allege an employment relationship with a defendant to state a Title VII claim against it.

Williams v. California · filed 2012-03-23(f)

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they were “employees”... of any of the Defendants such that they could state a claim against Defendants under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee calls for a common-law agency analysis; disputed facts about a hospital’s control over a physician’s work can require a trial.

Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital · filed 2012-04-03(f)

In sum, because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether OLV controlled the manner and means of Plaintiffs medical practice, as a matter of law, summary judgment is precluded.

Section 2000e limits Title VII employment discrimination claims to people who can allege an employment relationship with the defendant.

Petrossian v. Collins · filed 2012-05-08

As the District Court noted, to state a claim for relief under Title VII, Petrossian must at the very least allege that he was an MSU employee and that he suffered some employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. He has done neither.

Section 2000e(f) requires a plaintiff bringing a federal employment claim under Title VII to have a direct employment relationship with the government employer.

Talley v. Shah · filed 2012-07-23(f)

Talley references Title VII no less than eight times in his Complaint, but the provisions he relies upon all require a plaintiff to be “in a direct employment relationship with a government employer.” Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Talley does not meet this threshold requirement because he readily admits that he was employed not by USAID, but rather by non-party Public Health Institute (“PHI”) as part of its Global Health Fellows Program.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII’s protection.

Glascock v. Linn County Emergency Medicine · filed 2012-10-31(f)

Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibit employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but independent contractors are not protected under either statute. ... We therefore conclude that Glascock was an independent contractor and that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to LCEM.

Section 2000e determines employee status under Title VII from the practical working relationship, rather than the terms of a contract alone.

Vahid v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2013-02-01(f)

The determination of whether Vahid is an “employee” for purposes of Title VII and the ADEA is ultimately broader than what is contained in a contract, as this Court must consider the functional, day-to-day relationship between the alleged employee and the alleged employer.

Section 2000e’s employee definition requires an employment relationship with the defendant, including a qualifying joint-employer relationship, for a Title VII claim.

Lunts v. Rochester City School District · filed 2013-03-20(f)

First, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Rochester City School District (“RCSD”) on the ground that Ms. Lunts was not an employee of the RCSD, nor could the RCSD be viewed as her “joint employer.”

Section 2000e(f) uses common law agency principles to distinguish employees from independent contractors; the contract’s label is not conclusive.

Ocasio v. RAAD Broadcasting Corp. · filed 2013-06-24(f)

Common law agency principles determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor under Title VII.

Under § 2000e(f), substantial benefits can support a volunteer’s status as an employee under Title VII.

Enriquez v. City of Sierra Madre CA2/7 · filed 2013-10-16(f)

Enriquez’s situation is very different from that of the volunteer firefighter in the EEOC example. Enriquez did not receive any retirement, health care, insurance, tuition reimbursement or other similar benefits that would support a finding that she was an employee.

Title VII employee status depends on the hiring party’s control over the worker; a staffing agency’s client that lacks sufficient control and does not share authority over employment terms is not a joint employer.

Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc. · filed 2014-01-23(f)

Moreover, for reasons explained above, Tuesday Morning did not have sufficient control over the terms and conditions of plaintiffs employment and did not share or co-determine those matters with Labor Ready, to be considered a joint employer for purposes of Title VII, in any event.

Section 2000e(f) can cover a physician with hospital privileges when the hospital’s control over her work plausibly establishes an employment relationship.

Levitin v. Northwest Community Hospital · filed 2014-08-12(f)

It therefore would be inappropriate to dismiss the Title VII claim on the ground that Levitin is not NCH’s employee.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII purposes; a plaintiff must allege an employment relationship with a defendant to state a Title VII claim against that defendant.

Robert Williams, Sr. v. State of California · filed 2014-08-19(f)

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they were “employees” 9 of any of the Defendants such that they could state a claim against Defendants under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII purposes; a volunteer’s status depends on the full common law agency test, with remuneration considered as one factor.

Sister Michael Marie v. American Red Cross · filed 2014-11-14(f)

For purposes of Title VII, an employee is “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012). ... Since Sister Marie and Sister Cabrini cannot show themselves to be employees under the common law agency test, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to their claims under Title VII.

Title VII uses a common law test to determine whether a person is an employee, and that test is narrower than the FLSA’s definition.

Yu v. McGrath · filed 2014-12-30(f)

To the extent Yu is claiming discrimination while working at BMS, she lacks standing to bring such a claim, because if BMS was not her employer under the FLSA’s more expansive definition, it follows that BMS was not her employer under the narrower common law definition used for Title VII cases.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using common law agency factors, including the putative employer’s control over the worker’s job performance and employment opportunities.

Phillips v. UAW International · filed 2016-02-26(f)

Darden’s common ’law agency test, applied to the undisputed facts disclosed by the record in this case taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not support the plaintiff’s contention that she was an employee of the UAW within the meaning of Title VII, Therefore, the plaintiff may not proceed on a claim against the defendants for creating á hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e(f) uses a common-law agency test to determine employee status; a partner with real ownership and control is not an employee under Title VII.

Bowers v. The Ophthalmology Group · filed 2016-05-16(f)

Title VII defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Because this definition is “completely circular and explains nothing,” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992), we apply a common-law agency test to ... determine whether an individual is an “employee” under the statute.

Section 2000e’s employee definition is assessed under common law agency principles, including the alleged employer’s control over the worker.

Crenshaw v. Diamond State Port Corp. · filed 2016-08-11(f)

When a statute containing the term “employee” does not define the term, or defines it in a completely circular fashion, the court should apply the common law definition. ... In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the evidence of record supports only one conclusion, and that is that Plaintiff was not employed by Defendant.

Title VII uses the common-law Darden test to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Hill-Keyes v. Commissioner of United States Social Security Administration · filed 2016-08-16(f)

To determine whether Hill-Keyes was an employee of SSA, the test of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), applies.

A medical resident may qualify as an employee under Title VII’s definition based on the Darden factors, even if the resident is also a student.

Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center · filed 2017-03-07(f)

We rely on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), to decide if a person is an “employee” under Title VII, see Covington, 710 F.3d at 119. Applied to Doe’s complaint, Darden’s factors indeed suggest she was an employee under Title VII.

A Title VII plaintiff must establish employee status under the common law agency factors; the defendant need not prove another classification.

Knight v. State University of New York at Stony Brook · filed 2018-01-29(f)

It is rather the plaintiff's burden to establish, to the satisfaction of the fact-finder that he is an employee within the meaning of the statute.

Title VII requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; a self-employed vendor cannot bring an employment-discrimination claim against the agency administering the vendor program.

Calvette Brown v. IL Dept of Human Services · filed 2018-04-04(f)

An employment relationship is required under each of the familiar anti‐discrimination statutes that she invokes for ... employment discrimination. ... But Brown is not employed by the Department; she is self‐employed. ... Because the Department did not employ her, Brown failed to state a claim that the Department violated these federal anti‐discrimination laws.

Section 2000e(f) requires substantial remuneration to establish employee status; travel and hair and makeup costs incidental to television appearances do not suffice.

Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. · filed 2018-04-24(f)

But these benefits fall short of the "minimum level of significance or substantiality" required to establish employee status in the absence of a salary.

Under Section 2000e(f), an unpaid intern must receive sufficient remuneration to qualify as an employee under Title VII; speculative prospects for certification and employment do not suffice.

Sacchi v. Ihc Health Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-03-26(f)

In each of the Acts, “employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an(y) employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (ADEA definition); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f) (Title VII definition); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (ADA definition).1 ... We conclude that Ms. Sacchi’s intern relationship with the Hospital fails to satisfy the threshold-remuneration test as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the claimed benefits were not provided directly by the hospital, and they did not resemble traditional employment benefits like a pension or insurance. Second, the claimed benefits were attenuated: they would only be realized if subsequent events occurred independently of the internship relationship, thereby rendering them too insubstantial or insignificant.

Section 2000e(f)'s employee definition requires substantial remuneration; free drinks, show tickets, and exposure to casting directors do not establish an employment relationship.

Glaser v. Upright Citizens Brigade, LLC · filed 2019-03-28(f)

All of Glaser's claims brought under Title VII require that he establish that he was an "employee" of UCB LLC.... The Court concludes that the compensation alleged by Glaser does not "meet [the] minimum level of 'significance,' or substantiality, [required] in order to find an employment relationship in the absence of more traditional compensation."

Employee status under Title VII depends chiefly on the putative employer’s control over the worker; investigating a complaint and barring access to a facility alone do not establish that status.

WILLIAMS v. STATE OF INDIANA · filed 2019-07-11(f)

In determining whether a plaintiff is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of Title VII, the most important consideration is whether the putative employer exercised sufficient control over the plaintiff. ... Her additional allegations—that the IDOC investigated her complaint and entered a gate lock order against her—are insufficient to support a claim that Ms. Williams was an employee of the IDOC.

Section 2000e(f) requires a Title VII plaintiff to allege facts showing employee status rather than independent contractor status.

Mckinney v. Ramsey · filed 2019-07-12(f)

Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to show, for the purpose of determining whether he is protected under Section 1981 or Title VII, that he was an employee, and not an independent contractor, until he was fired. The Court therefore grants him leave to file an amended complaint to allege such facts.

A person who has not alleged being an employee of the defendant cannot maintain a Title VII hostile work environment claim.

Bonner v. Medical Board of California · filed 2019-08-09(f)

Regarding plaintiff’s hostile work environment argument, because plaintiff has not alleged he was an “employee” of the Board within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, he may not maintain a suit under the theory of hostile work environment.

Section 2000e(f) defines who qualifies as an employee under Title VII; disputes about a hiring party’s right to control the worker can prevent judgment on employee status.

Pamela M. Perry, M.D. v. The Schumacher Group of Louisiana · filed 2020-04-07(f)

Title VII defines “employee” circularly: an employee is “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Genuine disputes of material fact regarding a hiring party’s right to control or ... degree of control over the manner and means of performance preclude summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law.

Employee status under Title VII depends on the hiring party’s control under the Darden factors; a contract disclaiming employment is not dispositive.

Bowman v. Barclays Bank of Delaware · filed 2020-05-26(f)

Applying these same Darden factors here, a reasonable jury could likewise find that Barclays was Bowman’s employer.

Section 2000e defines the employment relationship required for a Title VII claim.

Jolly v. Excelsior College · filed 2020-06-12

Because there are no allegations that plaintiff was ever defendant's employee, her Title VII claims must both be dismissed.

Section 2000e(f)'s employee definition does not make a candidate for federal office an employee of state officials who administer ballot access.

ACOSTA v. WOLF · filed 2020-06-30(f)

But they are not his employer.18 He is not even an applicant for a job with them or the Commonwealth.19 He seeks to run for public office in the federal government.

Section 2000e(f) covers a worker who receives remuneration and qualifies as an employee under common-law agency factors; an independent-contractor label does not alone resolve employee status.

Hernandez v. Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC · filed 2020-07-13(f)

Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). ... Accordingly, Hernandez alleges sufficient facts to make a plausible claim that she was an employee of PMF for purposes of this motion.

Title VII employee status is assessed through a multifactor test that considers pay, work hours, and the employer’s control over the work.

Farmer v. Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC · filed 2020-07-21(f)

Taken together, these allegations adequately allege Farmer’s employee status under the multi-factor test above.

Section 2000e(f) uses the Clackamas control factors to determine whether physician-shareholders count as employees under Title VII; a contract calling them employees does not decide their status.

Lemmon v. Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology · filed 2020-08-25(f)

Viewing the undisputed facts presented on summary judgment in light of the six Clackamas factors, the court concludes the physician-shareholders are not employees of RMA for purposes of Title VII.

Title VII employee status depends on agency law factors, especially the hiring party’s control over the work, rather than the worker’s contractual label.

Moore v. U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Tourism · filed 2020-08-31(f)

The Darden factors and principles of agency law determine who is an employee for purposes of Title VII claims, not the label given to a party’s status in the contract governing the parties’ relationship.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from the employees counted for Title VII coverage; disputed facts about worker status can preclude summary judgment.

Long v. Diamond Dolls of Nevada, LLC · filed 2020-10-29(f)

In determining whether an employer has fifteen employees, courts must not include independent contractors. ... So here, considering the factors in Darden, triable issues of fact exist regarding whether the dancers at Diamond Dolls are employees or independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from Title VII’s protection as employees.

Shubitidze v. Boxer Property · filed 2021-03-12(f)

We hold Plaintiff to his allegations and find that Plaintiff is Defendant’s independent contractor, not employee.

A temporary worker may qualify as a client’s employee under Title VII when the client can remove the worker from its jobsite and controls the worker’s daily activities.

LAZARD v. ALL RESTORE, LLC · filed 2021-03-29(f)

Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the FAC plausibly alleges that Defendant had control over the employment with Plaintiffs because it could: (1) fire them from its premises; and (2) control their daily work activities.

A temporary worker may have more than one employer under Title VII, but a host company was not this worker’s employer where the staffing agency hired, assigned, and paid him and the host controlled only how he performed the work.

Pittman v. Nice-Pak Products Inc · filed 2021-09-03(f)

But, considering the parameters of Mr. Pittman’s work, Nice-Pak was not a second employer. All Nice-Pak really controlled was the manner in which Mr. Pittman’s production-line work was accomplished. Mr. Pittman readily admits that he was hired by, worked for, was given weekly assignments by, and was paid by Express—not Nice-Pak.

Section 2000e(f) requires substantial remuneration for a person without a clear employment contract to qualify as an employee under Title VII.

Eckhart v. Fox News Network, LLC · filed 2021-09-09(f)

This remuneration need not be a salary, but it must convey a “substantial benefit[]” to the putative employee. ... In sum, Areu has failed to plausibly allege that she was ever an employee of Fox News and is thus unable to make out a Title VII discrimination claim.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; a store patron does not qualify for Title VII’s employment protections.

McArthur v. Grab N Go Mart · filed 2022-02-23(f)

An employee is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Taken together, McArthur is not an employee of Grab N Go Mart, which means that he cannot not avail himself of the protections afforded by Title VII.

Title VII covers employees but excludes independent contractors; employee status can determine whether its protections apply.

Gangadharan v. GNS Goods And Services · filed 2022-03-18(f)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff was an employee of GNS Defendants, not an independent contractor, and therefore is covered by Title VII and the NYHRL.

Section 2000e(f) does not specify when an applicant becomes an employee; that status depends on the facts of the employment relationship.

DOE v. MCDONALD'S USA, LLC · filed 2022-06-02(f)

This definition does not expressly prescribe the moment when one becomes an employee. ... In light of these genuine issues of fact, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff’s claim fails here.

A voluntary intern must receive remuneration to qualify as an employee under Title VII.

Eagan v. Vibrant Church · filed 2022-09-20(f)

She therefore cannot satisfy the first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s threshold-remuneration test because she makes no assertion that she received remuneration in any form from the defendants.

Section 2000e(f) permits a plaintiff to plead employee status through facts that plausibly establish an employment relationship under the hybrid test.

Hampleman v. TJT Enterprises LLC · filed 2022-09-28(f)

The Court finds that, accepting the facts as true, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient factual content under the hybrid test to plausibly establish an employment relationship with Defendants, either jointly or as an integrated enterprise.

Section 2000e(f) requires a plaintiff to establish an employment relationship for a disparate-treatment claim, but an applicant may bring a failure-to-hire claim regardless of current employment status.

Wallace v. Mary Baldwin University · filed 2023-02-24(f)

Without more, the court cannot conclude that Wallace’s allegations support any inference that MBU was her employer for the purposes of Title VII. Thus, she cannot state a colorable disparate-treatment claim against MBU based on the current allegations. But because Wallace can still bring a failure-to-hire claim regardless of her employment status, the court will now consider whether her complaint supports a plausible inference of a discriminatory failure to hire.

Discounted groceries are too insignificant a benefit to qualify as remuneration for employee status under § 2000e(f).

Ferguson v. Park Slope Food Co-op · filed 2023-03-10(f)

This Court agrees with Defendants that discounted groceries, like free drinks and admission to shows, provide too insignificant a benefit to qualify as remuneration.

Title VII employee status under § 2000e(f) requires facts establishing an employment relationship with the organization.

Fiscus v. Big Bass Lake Community Association, Inc. · filed 2023-05-05(f)

Accordingly, we cannot conclude at this time that the complaint sets forth sufficient facts to show that Fiscus was an “employee” of the Association entitled to the protections of Title VII and the PHRA.

An offer of employment alone does not make someone a Title VII employee when the person has not begun work or received pay or benefits.

Talukder v. State of New York · filed 2023-05-26(f)

The Second Circuit applies a two-part test in determining whether an individual is an employee, as defined by Title VII. First, a plaintiff “must show [he] was hired by the putative employer by establishing that [he] received remuneration for the work [he] performed.” ... Although there is no dispute that DOCCS offered Talukder employment in July 2021 to become a corrections officer trainee, it is also abundantly clear that he is not currently a DOCCS employee.

Section 2000e defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; Title VII does not cover a claim without an employment relationship.

Wade v. Rodriguez · filed 2023-08-01(f)

Wade’s claims do not arise under Title Vil because Wade and defendant were not in an employee-employer relationship. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Title VII states that “[t]he term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer[.]”); see Felder v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 27 F.4th 834, 838 (2d Cir. 2022) (where “a plaintiff is found to be an independent contractor and not an employee ... the Title VII claim must fail”).

At the pleading stage, facts showing a company directed and controlled the worker’s work can establish employee status under § 2000e(f).

Watson v. Blaze Media LLC · filed 2023-08-03(f)

At the pleading stage, however, a plaintiff need only allege facts that could support the conclusion that she is an employee.

Section 2000e(f) requires an employment relationship; an unpaid volunteer board chair does not qualify as an employee without facts showing that the organization supervised or controlled her work.

Fiscus v. Big Bass Lake Community Association, Inc. · filed 2023-08-11(f)

After careful consideration of these factors, we conclude that the amended complaint still fails to set forth facts from which we can infer that, as the unpaid CEO and Chair of the Association, Fiscus qualified as an “employee” of the Association.

Section 2000e requires a Title VII plaintiff to allege an employment relationship with the defendant; whether that relationship exists may require a fact-intensive inquiry.

SWARTZWELDER v. JUNIPER COMMUNITIES, LLC · filed 2024-03-19

As a threshold matter, a plaintiff asserting claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the PHRA, must allege an employment relationship with the defendant. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(a), 12112; 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 954, 955. ... Following de novo review, the Court concurs with Judge Eddy’s well-reasoned Report and Recommendation that the potential relationship among Senior Living Corporation, Juniper, and Ms. Swartzwelder involves a fact-intensive inquiries that are best developed in fact discovery and not at the pleading stage.

Section 2000e(f) requires a Title VII plaintiff to be or have been an employee of the institution they sue.

Clark v. Williams · filed 2024-07-09(f)

But to bring a Title VII claim, the plaintiff themselves must be or have been an employee of the institution they attempt to hold accountable for any alleged wrongdoings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Burch v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151, 157 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff never claims to have been an employee of either Defendant, so she cannot sue under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee,” and courts use the common law agency test to determine whether a person qualifies.

Huang v. Ohio State Univ. · filed 2024-08-28(f)

Because that definition “is completely circular and explains nothing,” we apply the common law meaning of the term and have adopted an agency test to help us answer the legal question of whether an individual is an “employee” for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using common law agency principles, with the hiring party’s control as the principal guidepost.

McDaniel v. Preserve Property Management Company, LLC · filed 2025-04-17(f)

Although these principles look at the totality of the circumstances, the “element of control” by the alleged employer over the alleged employee is the “principal guidepost that should be followed.” DeLia, 656 F.3d at 4 (quoting Lopez, 588 F.3d at 84-85). Applying these principles to the undisputed facts of the parties’ business relationship leaves no doubt that McDaniel was not an employee of either PBH or PPMC.

Title VII’s definition of employee requires remuneration as a first step in establishing an employment relationship.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2025-09-22(f)

Even if a live controversy, the record does not support Plaintiff’s request for judgment as a matter of law on remuneration.

A volunteer may qualify as an employee under Title VII when the defendant controls the manner and means of the volunteer’s work.

Estes v. University Of Cincinnati · filed 2025-09-30(f)

These are all indications that UC exercised effective control over the manner and means of Plaintiff’s work. Therefore, at this stage in litigation, the Court will presume that Plaintiff was employed by UC.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII claims.

Turner-Pugh · filed 2026-01-14(f)

As a matter of law, Turner was an independent contractor and as such her work relationship cannot serve as the basis for claims under Title VII or the ADA.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using common law agency principles, with employer control central to the inquiry.

HOWLAND · filed 2026-03-16(f)

Under the common law agency test, the relevant factors focus on the employer’s control over the employee.

Section 2000e(f) uses the common law of agency to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Jewel A. Farlow,plaintiff-Appellant v. Wachovia Bank of North Carolina, N.A. · filed 2001-08-06(f)

Whether a person is an employee depends on the common law of agency definition of employee.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee status by the actual work relationship and the employer’s degree of control; an independent contractor is outside Title VII’s employee protections.

Dixon v. Burman · filed 1983-08-12(f)

Unfortunately, resort to the statute will not provide that answer either, as Title VII broadly defines “employee” to mean “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Therefore, to resolve whether plaintiff’s agent affiliation was one of employee-employer, the court must look beyond the “contract” and the Act itself to focus upon the realities of that actual relationship and the degree of control defendants exercised over plaintiff.

Section 2000e(f) requires a fact-intensive inquiry into the working relationship; calling a worker a contractor or consultant does not alone defeat employee status at the pleading stage.

Teegarden v. Gold Crown Mgmt. LLC · filed 2018-11-05(f)

While Plaintiff referred to herself as a “contractor” or “consultant” in other places, the nature of Plaintiff’s employment cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee by an employment relationship assessed under common law agency principles.

Kaul v. Christie · filed 2019-02-25(f)

An "employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an employer[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). To determine whether a person is an employee of an employer, courts look to common law master-servant agency principles. ... No defendant acted as Dr. Kaul's employer. To the contrary, the record suggests that Dr. Kaul was self-employed and ran his own surgical center. There is no employer-employee relationship here that could give rise to a Title VII violation.

A Title VII employment discrimination claim requires an employee relationship with the entity accused of discrimination.

In re: SILVERIO ARENAS, JR. and EMILDA NAVA · filed 2021-11-19(f)

Similarly, the 42 U.S.C. § 2000e claim, which ... does concern employment discrimination, failed because Dr. Arenas is not an employee of L&I and did not file a complaint with the EEOC before filing his complaint in the district court, a prerequisite for relief.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Kitchen v. Developmental Services of Nebraska, Inc. · filed 2023-01-18(f)

In this regard, independent contractors are not protected under Title VII. ... The Court likewise determines that there is no showing on the part of the plaintiff that she is anything but an independent contractor.

Section 2000e requires an employment relationship for Title VII liability; the alleged employer’s control over the worker is a key factor in determining whether one exists.

Nelson v. Argyropoulous · filed 2020-03-16

Because the complaint does not contain any facts that point towards an employment relationship between Plaintiff and MMNA, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s discrimination claims against MMNA.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes uniformed members of the armed forces from Title VII coverage.

Jackson v. Modly · filed 2020-02-14(f)

Those differences show that, at least in the context of Title VII, uniformed members of the armed forces are not “employees” as defined by the statute.

Section 2000e does not cover sexual harassment claims arising from a patient’s relationship with nurses and a health care facility.

Wilson v. Ashley · filed 2011-04-27

Consistent with his arguments in the district court, Wilson insists that jurisdiction is proper because he suffered sexual harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. This argument is unavailing because the plain language of that statute shows that it is inapplicable in this case due, inter alia, to the relationship between Wilson and the defendants.

An independent contractor is not an employee, and the contractor’s client is not the contractor’s employer under § 2000e.

Brackens v. Best Cabs, Inc. · filed 2005-07-28(b), (f)

We conclude that, considering the Lambertsen factors, under the totality of the circumstances the district court properly concluded that Mr. Brackens was an independent contractor and Best Cabs was not an employer as defined under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee includes managerial employees, who receive the same Title VII protection as other employees.

Galdamez v. John Potter, Postmaster General · filed 2005-07-15(f)

Title VII prohibits racial and national origin discrimination by an employer “against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added), and makes no relevant distinctions between managerial and other employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” subject to certain exceptions inapplicable here); ... Galdamez is as entitled as any other employee to the protections of Title VIL.

Section 2000e(f) includes managerial employees in its definition of employee.

Galdamez v. Potter · filed 2005-07-14(f)

Title VII prohibits racial and national origin discrimination by an employer “against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added), and makes no relevant distinctions between managerial and other employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” subject to certain exceptions inapplicable here); see also Little, 301 F.3d at 964 (holding employer liable for failing to address rape of management-level employee).

Volunteer firefighters whose benefits are too minor to constitute compensation do not count as employees toward Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Scott v. City of Minco · filed 2005-05-25(b), (f)

When compared to the type of remuneration ordinarily derived from an employment relationship, the benefits received by the City’s volunteer firefighters are simply too minor to rise to a level that can be characterized as compensation. ... Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that the firefighters were employees of the City. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Scott’s Title VII claims.

Shareholders who own and manage a professional corporation count as employers rather than employees when determining whether it has the fifteen employees required for Title VII coverage.

Ziegler v. Anesthesia Associates of Lancaster, Ltd. · filed 2003-08-29(b), (f)

Because the District Court’s findings in this case establish that AAL’s shareholders were employers and not employees under the test articulated in Clackamas, and because AAL, therefore, had less than 15 employees, we will affirm.

Section 2000e(f) covers employment relationships under Title VII, including relationships where a statutory employer controls access to employment opportunities.

Caston v. Methodist Medical Center of Illinois · filed 2002-08-20(f)

A plaintiff may unquestionably bring a Title VII claim against an employer with whom he shares a direct employer-employee relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); ... Therefore, our analysis of Title VII liability must extend beyond the analysis of a direct employment relationship to “employers” who are merely in a position to interfere with the plaintiffs employment relationship with some third party employer.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; a customer does not qualify as an employee.

Townes v. Finkelstein · filed 2001-11-13(f)

Section 2000e(f) defines the term "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." Plaintiff alleges that she is a customer of Defendants and not an employee.

Section 2000e(f) excludes noncitizens employed abroad from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Iwata v. Stryker Corp. · filed 1999-08-05(f)

Ergo, it seems apparent that unless a United States citizen, a person employed abroad is not an “employee” under Title VII.

An entity is a Title VII employer only if it controls at least some of the worker’s conditions of employment; the national organization did not employ a local post’s worker where it lacked that control.

Brown v. American Legion Cortland City Post 489 · filed 1999-08-31(b)

The American Legion has provided ample documentation evincing that a Title VII employer-employee relationship did not exist between it and plaintiff. There was no integrated economic relationship between it and Post 489, nor did it enjoy authority or control over the post’s employment practices affecting plaintiff.

Section 2000e(f) defines employees for Title VII protection; relatives of a person who experienced discrimination do not qualify solely because of that relationship.

Lopez v. Padilla · filed 1999-09-30(f)

Note also that Title VII extends its protection only to "employees” and other victims of discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), not to relatives of the discriminated individual. Plaintiffs Tamaris, Guillermo and Myrelys Ju-sino Figueroa have never been employed by any of the Co-defendants. Thus, Plaintiffs Tamaris, Guillermo and Myrelys Jusino Figueroa lack standing to sue under Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make Fire District personnel individually liable under Title VII; claims against them in their official capacities are dismissed when the Fire District is also sued.

Rhyce v. Martin · filed 2001-04-09(b)

The Court finds Ms. Rhyce’s argument precluded by Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir.1998). ... Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Ms. Rhyce’s Title VII claims against the Fire District personnel in their individual and official capacities.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII purposes, and the court applied an economic realities test to determine that the physician was not an employee.

Savas v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2002-08-13(f)

A prerequisite to maintaining an action under either Title VII or Elliott Larsen is that a plaintiff be an “employee” of the defendant. ... In cases where the dispute centers on determining whether a plaintiff is either an employee or an independent contractor, the Court must apply the “economic realities test.” ... Thus, the Court adopts the majority position, and GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII and ElliotL-Larsen claims since Plaintiff was not an “employee” of Beaumont.

An entity’s status as a Title VII employer depends on whether it controls the manner and means of the plaintiff’s work.

Sutherland v. Michigan Department of Treasury · filed 2003-11-25(b)

The determination of whether a particular entity is an employer of a Title VII plaintiff involves an examination of whether the alleged employer exercises control over the manner and means of the plaintiffs work.

Section 2000e(b) uses employer control under the hybrid economic realities and common-law test to decide whether an entity is a worker’s Title VII employer.

Yowman v. Jefferson County Community Supervision & Corrections Department · filed 2005-01-28(b)

Because ultimate control over JCCSCD staff lies with the district judges, JCCSCD does not satisfy the control component of the hybrid economic realities/common law control test to constitute Yowman’s employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employs fifteen or more employees, along with the person's agents.

Cruz v. Piccari Press · filed 2007-10-24(b)

prior to discovery there is insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether a parent company is an “employer” for purposes of Title VII liability.

An unpaid intern may be a volunteer rather than an employee under Title VII, while compensation and control over the work can support employee status.

Doe v. Forest Park Police Officer Lee · filed 2013-05-06(f)

Title VII does not meaningfully define the term “employee.” ... However, when, the issue is whether an unpaid worker is an employee or a volunteer, as in this case, the employer control factor has limited relevance. ... Thus, plaintiff was not a Title VII employee when she worked as an intern. ... This evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was a Village employee when she did stings.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Minor v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2014-10-07(f)

It is well settled that the statute’s protections extend only to employees and not to independent contractors. ... Minor does not claim that he was an employee of Tyson, and his complaint lacks sufficient facts to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

Section 2000e(f) can cover a student in a clinical training program when promised benefits provide remuneration and the school controls the student's work.

Consolmagno v. Hospital of St. Raphael School of Nurse Anesthesia · filed 2014-12-18(f)

Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Consolmagno was not their employee and thus is not entitled to Title VII’s protection is denied.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer liability to a plaintiff’s employer or an agent of that employer.

Phifer v. Sevenson Environmental Service · filed 2015-07-27(b)

With regard to Phifer’s claims under Title VII and the WPCA in particular, the District Court determined that DWSA could not be liable to Phifer under those statutes because he failed to set forth facts from which one could conclude that DWSA was either his employer or an agent of his employer. ... Additionally, for the reasons stated in its dismissal order, the District Court properly dismissed Phifer’s Title VII and WPCA claims against DSWA.

Under Title VII, an entity that administers payroll and benefits is not an employer when it does not control the worker’s work, discipline, or termination.

Nardi v. ALG Worldwide Logistics · filed 2015-09-21(b)

As explained below, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that TLC was her employer.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee is applied using traditional agency law principles to determine whether an employment relationship exists.

Casey v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2015-12-07(f)

Title VII defines an "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), an elucidation that the Supreme Court has generously described in a similar context as being "completely circular and explain[ing] nothing," Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). Where, as here, the statute contains the word "employee," but does not plainly define it, we "must presume that Congress has incorporated traditional agency law principles for identifying 'master-servant relationships.'" Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 83 (1st Cir. 2009).

Companies may qualify as joint employers or a single employer under Title VII when their shared ownership, management, operations, labor relations, and financial controls support an inference that both employ the plaintiff.

Anderson v. Finley Catering Co. · filed 2016-10-28(b)

Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs allegations that Finley Catering and Union Trust are both owned by Steve Finley, share common management and operations, and have centralized control of labor relations and common financial controls are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to give rise to a reasonable inference that the two companies are either joint employers or a single employer under the relevant tests.

An entity that cannot fire, assign, or supervise a worker is not that worker’s employer under Title VII.

Stinnett v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2017-09-30(b)

In any event, Plaintiffs gender discrimination claim against Quest is meritless because Quest is not Plaintiffs employer and, thus, is not covered by the statute.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, excluding independent contractors from Title VII's coverage.

Wheatley v. W. Cent. Mich. Emp't & Training Consortium, Inc. · filed 2018-09-18(f)

The act defines "employee" to mean "an individual employed by an employer[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). And while Title VII is construed liberally, the Sixth Circuit has held that the protections of Title VII (and other federal employment discrimination statutes) do not extend to independent contractors because they do not meet the definition of "employee."

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII, and the court applies that definition to potential liability of affiliated or parent companies.

Cole v. Nabors Corporate Servs., Inc. (In re CJ Holding Co.) · filed 2019-02-08(b)

Nabors Corporate and Nabors Industries are potentially liable to Cole because, as the debtor's affiliate or parent company, each could be liable as an employer under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) ; Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5 , 717 F.3d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying the "economic realities/common law control test" to determine the employment relationship).

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee can cover a temporary worker as a client’s joint employee when the client’s payment arrangement and control over the worker support an employment relationship despite contrary contract language.

Thange v. OXFORD GLOBAL RESOURCES, LLC · filed 2022-06-07(f)

Although the contract language is strong evidence that Plaintiff is an independent contractor, the Faush factors support his status as an employee. Thus, a reasonable jury could find the existence of an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Atlantic.

Section 2000e(b) defines who is an employer under Title VII; the court held that the plaintiff had no Title VII remedy against defendants who did not employ him.

Logan v. Rolling Greene Village · filed 2024-01-22(b)

Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Therefore, Plaintiff does not have a remedy against Defendants under Title VII or the SCHAL for their alleged conduct.

A corporation may qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Brooks v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1978-03-31(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(j)’s religious accommodation rule rests on Congress’s commerce power, not its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.

Patricia Holmes, and United States of America, Intervening v. Marion County Office of Family and Children · filed 2003-11-19(j)

So in the absence of some need to use accommodation to counteract evasions of the antidiscrimination principle, § 701(j) cannot be called an ancillary rule that is congruent with the constitutional norm that Congress is entitled to enforce.

Section 2000e(a)’s definition of “person” does not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity from constitutional claims.

Shirley v. Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife · filed 2025-05-09(a)

And the provision Plaintiffs cite, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), provides no such statement. It provides that “[f]or the purposes of this subchapter . . . The term ‘person’ includes . . . governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a). This cannot abrogate [state’s] sovereign immunity.

Section 2000e(b) includes states in the definition of employer and abrogates their Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title VII claims.

Prince v. Nessel · filed 2025-07-09(b)

And it abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title VII claims when it included states in the statutory definition of “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Freeman v. Michigan Dep’t of State, 808 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1987).

Section 2000e defines “person” and “employee” to include state governments and certain state workers, making Congress’s intent to subject states to Title VII suits unmistakably clear.

Ussery v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals · filed 1998-08-05(a), (f)

As the Court recognized in Fitzpatrick, Congress made its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity unmistakably clear when it amended Title VII’s definition of “person” to include governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), and simultaneously amended the definition of employee to include individuals “subject to the civil service laws of a State government, government agency, or political subdivision,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Separate government entities are presumed distinct when counting employees under Title VII’s employer definition; evidence must clearly outweigh that presumption to count them as one employer.

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach · filed 1999-02-11(b)

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we readily conclude that Lyes has not produced evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the presumption that the CRA and the City are separate entities is clearly outweighed and that they should therefore be treated as a single employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees; employees of sufficiently integrated entities may be counted together to meet that threshold.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Interventional Pain Management Associates, PLLC · filed 2025-01-29(b)

In light of this liberal construction, courts permit the consolidation of separate entities to meet § 2000e(b)’s threshold numerosity requirement.

Section 2000e prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religious affiliation, but does not prohibit discrimination based on disability.

Thomas v. Northern Telecom, Inc. · filed 2000-10-11

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religious affiliation. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The statute makes no mention of prohibiting discrimination based on disability.

State agencies responsible for their own hiring can be separate employers and respondents under Title VII.

Easterling v. State of Connecticut · filed 2011-05-05(b), (n)

Although the DOC, the State Police, and the Department of Public Safety are all part of the Connecticut state government, each agency is responsible for its own hiring and fairly characterized as a separate “employer” and “respondent,” as those terms are defined in Title VII.

Section 2000e defines respondent and employer so that Indian tribes are exempt as employers and the EEOC cannot sue them as respondent governments.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Coal Co. · filed 2002-09-26(n), (b)

The EEOC’s interpretation of these two statutes together is mistaken, as contrary to their plain meaning. The Attorney General clearly has exclusive authority to file suit whenever a government such as an Indian tribe is involved.