42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(b) treats an employee as an employer’s agent when the employee can take or substantially influence tangible employment actions or direct another employee’s daily work in ways that affect assignments.

Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc. · filed 2001-02-15(b)

The court finds that an employee is a supervisor or “agent” for purposes of Title VII if he has the actual authority to take tangible employment actions, see Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257, or to recommend tangible employment actions if his recommendations are given substantial weight by the final decisionmaker, see id., or to direct another employee’s day-to-day work activities in a manner that may increase the employee’s workload or assign additional or undesirable tasks, see Johnson, 234 F.3d at 513.

A Title VII claim against someone who is not the plaintiff’s employer cannot proceed.

Hervey v. Metlife General Insurance Corp. System Agency of Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2001-03-15(b)

Defendant Schmidt has moved to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII claim against him on the basis that he was not plaintiffs “employer”. That aspect of the motion is well taken and will be granted.

A sheriff who controls deputies’ promotions qualifies as their employer under Title VII.

Oden v. Oktibbeha County MS · filed 2001-03-27(b)

Because Sheriff Bryan was the elected official who made all decisions concerning promotions within the Sheriff’s Department, he was Deputy Oden’s employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) requires a person without a clear employment contract to receive substantial benefits beyond those incidental to volunteer activity to qualify as an employee under Title VII.

York v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York · filed 2002-04-03(f)

In the absence of a clear contractual employer-employee relationship, a party claiming to be an employee under Title VII must come forward with substantial benefits not merely incidental to the activity performed in order to satisfy this Circuit’s remuneration test.

An entity with at least fifteen employees in an industry affecting commerce qualifies as an employer and may be liable under Title VII for interfering with a worker’s employment even if it does not directly employ that worker.

Vogan v. US Oncology, Inc. · filed 2003-10-30(b)

Likewise, USO is clearly an employer because it has fifteen or more employees and is engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The question is whether Vogan must be an employee of USO before it can be liable under Title VII. The answer is no. If USO interfered with Vogan’s employment in contravention of Title VII, USO can be liable even though it did not directly employ Vogan.

A school union is not a teacher’s employer under Title VII merely because its superintendent signed her contracts or its employees can be counted with those of the school district.

Johnson v. SCHOOL UNION, 107 · filed 2003-12-11(b)

That fact alone does not make School Union # 107 Johnson’s employer under either Title VII or the Maine Human Rights Act. In his dealings with Johnson, Superintendent McLaughlin was at all times acting on behalf of the Princeton School Department as authorized by statute and not on behalf of his own employer, the school union. Johnson had no employment relationship with School Union # 107.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make individual employees, including supervisors or managers, personally liable under Title VII.

White v. Pacific Media Group, Inc. · filed 2004-06-16(b)

Individual employees, including supervisors or managers, are not personally liable as employers under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII; a complaint must allege an employment relationship with a defendant to maintain a Title VII claim against it.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2004-08-09(b)

The Diocese contends that the plaintiff is unable to maintain a Title VII action against it because it is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. The Court agrees. The complaint does not allege that the Diocese is her employer or even that an employment relationship exists between it and the plaintiff or to any other party in this action. Thus, the complaint must be dismissed as to the Diocese.

A North Carolina county sheriff who controls hiring, discharge, and supervision is an employer under Title VII.

Efird v. Riley · filed 2004-11-01(b)

The issue is more accurately framed in terms of whether Plaintiff has properly named the “Sheriff of Cabarrus County” as Plaintiffs “employer” within the meaning of Title VII. It is clear to this court that she has.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII workplace discrimination liability to employers.

Lenoble v. Best Temps, Inc. · filed 2005-01-14(b)

Also, the language of Title VII makes it clear that only “employers” are liable for acts of workplace discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), whereas the same limitation cannot be found in § 1981.

Title VII requires a person seeking relief to be an employee and applies the same employee test as the ADEA.

Blankenship v. City of Portsmouth · filed 2005-06-01(f)

Additionally, like the ADEA, Title VII also requires that an individual seeking relief be an employee. Title VII’s definition of employee is the same as the ADEA’s in all relevant respects and the analysis to determine whether an individual is an employee is the same under both the ADEA and Title VII.

Title VII liability does not extend to a county that is legally distinct from the plaintiff’s direct government employer.

Nicholson v. Jefferson County · filed 2005-06-08

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Jefferson County from the case because it is an entity distinct from plaintiff’s employer and, thus, was not a proper defendant here. We agree.

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer, and a Title VII complaint must allege an employer-employee relationship with the defendant.

Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island · filed 2005-07-05(b)

The Plaintiffs amended complaint fails to allege that the Church of the Advent is an employer or that there was an employee-employer relationship between the parties.

Title VII does not permit an employment discrimination claim against a defendant who is not the plaintiff’s employer.

McAdoo v. Texas · filed 2005-09-27(b)

Finally, the only remaining statutory claim would be Title VII, but, as acknowledged by McAdoo, such a claim cannot be brought against a non-employer.

The record permitted a finding that the state agency was a Title VII employer for entry-level firefighter and police hiring.

Bradley v. City of Lynn · filed 2005-12-06(b)

Accordingly, the current record on summary judgment supports a finding that the HRD constitutes a Title VII employer of plaintiffs with respect to the entry-level hiring of firefighters and police officers, and the Court denies State defendants’ motion.

A company with no employees does not qualify as a Title VII employer absent evidence that it and an affiliated company are a single or joint employer.

Emerson v. Wembley USA Inc. · filed 2006-06-01(b)

Title VII also provides “[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). ... Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact to rebut Defendant Wembley’s substantiated evidence that it was her not employer under either Title VII or common law standards.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee for Title VII, whose protections apply to a defendant’s direct or indirect employees.

Lemmings v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2007-05-15(f)

The term “employee” means “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f). ... The evidence is not sufficient to raise an inference of an indirect employment relationship.

Section 2000e(f) limits Title VII to employees and defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer.

Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital · filed 2008-01-16(f)

Title VII, by its terms, applies only to “employees,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), but the statute defines an employee circularly as “an individual employed by an employer.”

Section 2000e(b) allows more than one entity to qualify as an employee’s employer for Title VII liability when an entity controls the challenged aspect of employment.

Tamayo, Jeannette v. Blagojevich, Rod R. · filed 2008-05-27(b)

Such allegations, if true, suggest that the IDOR functioned as Ms. Tamayo’s employer for the purposes of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

A volunteer who is neither an employee nor an applicant for employment lacks standing to sue under Title VII.

Ramsey v. Principi · filed 2008-07-09(f)

The magistrate judge reasoned that Mrs. Ramsey repeatedly asserted in her complaint that she was a volunteer at the cemetery, and she therefore lacked standing to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because she was not an employee or applicant for employment. ... We are unpersuaded by Mrs. Ramsey’s arguments on appeal, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons as those stated by the magistrate judge in his two recommendations and adopted by the district court.

A corporate parent is not an employee’s Title VII employer when it does not supervise the employee or decide her discipline and termination.

Caskey, Tracy L. v. Colgate-Palmolive · filed 2008-07-24(b)

Colgate was Hill’s corporate parent, and Caskey presents no evidence to suggest that Colgate supervised Caskey’s work or was the decision-maker regarding Caskey’s discipline and termination. We have previously held in almost identical circumstances that the proper employer- defendant would be Hill’s, and not Colgate.

Section 2000e(b) limits employer status to the entity that employs the plaintiff; a correctional facility and unrelated state offices are not employers when the correctional department employs the plaintiff.

Brown v. NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF CORREC. SERVICES · filed 2008-10-29(b)

Plaintiff's claims against Elmira Correctional Facility, the New York State Comptroller's Office, and the Department of Civil Service must be dismissed on the ground that those parties are not proper defendants in this suit, as none of them is plaintiff's "employer."

An entity with control over a worker’s compensation may qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Bernstein v. Seeman · filed 2009-01-09(b)

Based on this allegation, it is plausible that Munich Re could be considered an “employer” under the common law of agency used to interpret that term for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines who is an employer under Title VII; related entities may be treated as a single employer when their ownership and operations are highly integrated.

Reeves v. DSI Security Services · filed 2009-06-03(b)

We liberally construe the term “employer” when determining whether a complainant may pursue his Title VII charge and may construe two “highly integrated” entities, “with respect to ownership and operations,” to be an individual’s single employer for Title VII liability. ... With regard to ABC, the evidence showed Reeves did not have an employment relationship with ABC, thus he could not obtain relief from it pursuant to Title VII.

Title VII uses the common law agency test to determine whether a franchisor is a prospective employer.

Dipilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2009-08-25

Similarly, because Title VII also does not have a broad definition of “employ” like the FLSA has, the common law agency test would also be the appropriate employer test for Title VII employment discrimination claims.

A state agency that administers municipal police promotion exams is not the officers’ Title VII employer when it lacks control over their work and has no continuing relationship with them.

Lopez v. Massachusetts · filed 2009-12-03(b)

It is clear that plaintiffs are not HRD's employees, and HRD is therefore not their "employer" for Title VII purposes, based on these factors.

Section 2000e(f) defines who is an employee protected by Title VII.

Hubbell v. World Kitchen, LLC · filed 2010-02-24(f)

During the applicable period of time, Hubbell was an “employee” entitled to statutory protection under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee”; the court held that a former employee who submitted materials to an EEO investigator after leaving his job did not qualify.

Schmidt v. Shah · filed 2010-03-17(f)

First, Schmidt was no longer employed by USAID when he submitted the materials to the EEO investigator and therefore does not qualify as an “employee” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines who qualifies as an employee under Title VII; the court held that Schmidt did not qualify when he participated in an EEO investigation after leaving USAID.

Schmidt v. Fore · filed 2010-03-17(f)

First, Schmidt was no longer employed by USAID when he submitted the materials to the EEO investigator and therefore does not qualify as an “employee” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee”).

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as an entity with at least fifteen employees for the required number of weeks; employees of separate government entities cannot be combined to meet that threshold under the single employer theory.

Myers v. Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel · filed 2010-05-28(b)

Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Significantly, however, the Fifth Circuit does not apply “single employer” analysis to governmental employers. ... Having failed to create a jury question as to the MOCPCC’s “employer” status, Plaintiffs Title VII claim must be dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) requires facts showing that a parent company acted as the plaintiff’s employer before it can be held liable under Title VII.

Oxford v. LINC GROUP, INC. · filed 2010-06-30(b)

Oxford does not allege facts to indicate that Line, the parent company of OSS and LGS, acted as Oxford’s employer. ... Accordingly, Oxford’s Title VII claim against Line is dismissed.

An institution may qualify as a Title VII employer when its relationship with an affiliated entity raises factual questions about the plaintiff’s employment.

Emmons v. City University of New York · filed 2010-07-02(b)

CUNY and RFCUNY are not such disparate entities that this Court can determine, without the benefit of a factual record, that CUNY per se cannot qualify as Emmons’s “employer.”

An employer under Title VII must meet the statutory definition and have an employment relationship with the plaintiff, determined chiefly by its right to control the worker.

Justo Roque, Jr. v. Harrah's Casino New Orleans, e · filed 2010-07-22(b)

Two steps are required to determine whether a defendant is an employer under the statute: (1) the defendant must fall within the statutory definition, and (2) there must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. ... Therefore, although Roque was working in Jazz Casino’s physical plant, neither Jazz Casino nor Newell exercised the requisite control over Roque to establish an employment relationship.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using the Darden common law test, which considers the hiring party’s right to control the work.

Murray v. Principal Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2010-07-27(f)

Both ERISA and Title VII define “employee” in a circular manner as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). There is no reason why the Darden test would be inappropri- ate in the Title VII context.

An entity can be a Title VII employer when it controls employees and their workplace, even if another entity issues their paychecks.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. · filed 2010-08-31(b)

Thus, Flipmeastack was an “employer” of Shisler and Powell, even though it did not sign their paychecks.

Title VII’s employer and employee definitions are applied using common law agency principles, with control over the worker’s duties as the principal guide.

Delia v. Verizon Communications Inc. · filed 2011-08-24(b), (f)

We have construed Supreme Court decisions as establishing the proposition that "the terms 'employer' and 'employee' under Title VII are to be defined with reference to [ ] common law agency principles." ... But even taken together, DeLia has failed to demonstrate that Verizon had any control over the "manner and means" by which she performed her job.

Medical residents are employees under Title VII and may bring discrimination claims against their employers.

Latif v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center · filed 2011-12-02(f)

Having reviewed the available cases, this court concludes that medical residents are employees for the purpose of suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer definition requires a plausible basis for treating a defendant as the plaintiff’s employer under Title VII; a conclusory allegation of joint employment is insufficient.

Harris v. Board of Trustees University · filed 2012-02-27(b)

Based on the totality of the Complaint and the undisputed facts before the court that unequivocally demonstrate UAB Health System’s status as Plaintiffs actual employer, the court cannot plausibly conclude that the Board of Trustees is also her employer for Title VII and ADEA purposes.

Section 2000e(b)'s employer definition requires an employment relationship, assessed primarily by the entity's right to control the worker's conduct.

Hazzard v. Express Services, Inc. · filed 2012-09-27(b)

Based on the case law cited above and the economic realities/common law control test, Express Services, Inc., was not Plaintiffs employer. Therefore, Express’ Motion for Summary Judgment [65] is granted.

Section 2000e(b) uses common law agency principles and the employment relationship to determine whether a defendant is an employer.

Scott v. NH Police Standards · filed 2013-03-08(b)

In determining whether a defendant qualifies as an employer, a court must look to common law agency principles to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

A volunteer is an employee under Title VII only if remuneration first establishes a plausible employment relationship; benefits merely incidental to the volunteer service do not suffice.

Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5 · filed 2013-05-30(f)

For reasons discussed below, we adopt the threshold-remuneration test and hold that Juino is not an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII.

An individual without an ownership interest or authority in the employing business is not an employer subject to personal liability under Title VII.

Wilson-Richardson v. Regional Transit Service, Inc. · filed 2013-06-10(b)

It is well settled that individuals lacking an ownership interest or authority in a business which employs others are not “employers” for purposes of Title VII or the ADA, and thus are not subject to liability in their personal capacities under those statutes.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee by reference to an employer; courts use common law agency principles, especially control and supervision, to determine whether a worker is the defendant’s employee.

Mays v. BNSF Railway Co. · filed 2013-09-09(f)

Title VII circularly defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... BNSF’s lack of supervision and control over Mays requires the conclusion that BNSF was not his employer or joint employer.

Section 2000e limits individual liability under Title VII to people who qualify as employers under the statute.

Weathersbee v. Baltimore City Fire Department · filed 2013-09-10(b)

Defendants correctly note that individual supervisors are not liable under Title VII. An individual person can only be liable under Title VII if that person qualifies as an “employer” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 2000e(b) excludes an entity from Title VII’s employer definition when its relationship with the worker does not amount to employment.

Nissenbaum v. NNH Cal Neva Services Co. · filed 2013-11-22(b)

As the Court already determined that the “economic realities” of Nissenbaum’s relationship to NHH does not support a finding of an employment relationship, summary judgment in favor of NHH on Nissenbaum’s Title VII claim is appropriate.

Section 2000e(f)’s employee definition turns on actual control: a physician-shareholder with an equal vote and a share of the corporation’s profits is an employer even if an agreement calls her an employee.

Bluestein v. Central Wisconsin Anesthesiology, S.C. · filed 2014-10-15(f)

But the definition of “employee” in each statute is vague and circular. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (same). ... Taking all six factors as a whole, we conclude that Bluestein was an employer as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers subject to Title VII liability.

Eaton v. WCA Waste Corporation · filed 2014-12-02(b)

First, we conclude that the summary judgment evidence showed WCA Waste Corporation was not a proper defendant under Title VII, and therefore judgment in its favor was appropriate.

Section 2000e(f) defines who qualifies as an employee for purposes of Title VII.

Weinberg v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2015-01-22(f)

Summary judgment in favor of ConEd was appropriate because the record and case law reveal that, as the district court correctly found, Weinberg was an independent contractor and not an employee of ConEd.

Title VII can treat a related entity as an employer under the single-employer or joint-employer doctrines, but common ownership alone is insufficient.

Shiflett v. Scores Holding Co. · filed 2015-02-19(b)

After conducting an independent review of the record and the case law, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Shiflett has not raised a material issue of fact as to whether Scores Holding can be deemed her employer for purposes of Title VII under either the single employer doctrine or the joint employer doctrine.

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer” does not make an employee or supervisor individually liable under Title VII merely because they work for the employer.

Rigg v. Urana · filed 2015-06-25(b)

Urana is not an “employer” as defined by this statute. Rigg’s complaint makes it clear that both she and Urana are simply employees of Ralph Lauren.

An entity does not qualify as an employer for a Title VII claim merely because it oversees the plaintiff’s workplace; its relationship to the plaintiff and the challenged employment decisions matters.

Canon v. Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2015-09-22(b)

That said, for reasons which follow, the court is of the opinion that in view of the allegations in Canon’s complaint and in light of the specific employment decisions he challenges as violative of Title VII, as a matter of law, IHL could not be found to be his employer under any theory.

Section 2000e’s employer definition can cover a business that controls a worker’s employment even when it pays the worker through her corporation.

Kology v. My Space NYC Corp. · filed 2016-04-11(b)

These principles compel the conclusion that My Space was Kology’s employer (or, technically, joint employer) and therefore subject to liability under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. ... The formation of Atlantis — an entity whose sole purpose was to receive Kolo-gy’s compensation — was a change in form, not substance; it does not immunize My Space from liability under the employment discrimination laws.

An entity may be treated as an employer under Title VII when it controls aspects of a plaintiff’s employment, but the complaint must allege facts supporting that relationship.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2017-05-19(b)

... the Court finds that Plaintiffs Title VII claims against UBNS fail for the basic reason that the amended complaint lacks any factual allegations about the degree to which UBNS played a role in any aspect of his employment or shared employment decisions with the University and/or Kaleida.

Section 2000e(b) treats a successor business with at least fifteen employees as a Title VII employer when it continues the prior employer’s operations.

Mercado-Reyes v. Vazquez Home Care, CRL · filed 2017-06-05(b)

Accordingly, the court finds that VHC is a successor employer. Because VHC was a successor employer and had fifteen or more employees, it qualifies as an employer pursuant to Title VII.

For purposes of § 2000e(b), a parent corporation is an employer only when it and its subsidiary are sufficiently integrated that the subsidiary is the parent’s mere instrumentality.

Patrick v. Werner Enterprises · filed 2018-08-13(b)

To establish a prima facie Title VII claim, a plaintiff “must allege an employment relationship with the defendant[].” Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approve Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013). A parent corporation will be held responsible as an employer under Title VII only where it and the subsidiary are “so interrelated and integrated in their activities, labor relations and management” that we should pierce the corporate veil. Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The relationship between the parent and the subsidiary must be one where the subsidiary is the “mere instrumentality of the parent corporation.”

Section 2000e(b)’s employer definition requires facts supporting an employment relationship, including whether the alleged employer controlled the plaintiff’s day-to-day work.

Penz v. Washer · filed 2019-04-30(b)

There are no facts to support this conclusory assertion, including, for instance, whether the State hired plaintiff, paid her wages, or—most importantly—exercised direct, obvious, and concrete control over plaintiff’s day-to-day activities.

Section 2000e(b) treats a supervisor acting as an employer’s agent as an employer only in her official capacity, so individual employees are not personally liable under Title VII.

Wilson v. Northeast Wendys Management · filed 2019-11-20(b)

Although, under certain circumstances, an immediate supervisor may be considered an “agent” and therefore an “employer” under Title VII, the supervisor faces liability solely in her official, not individual, capacity. ... Here, Wilson has alleged no facts that would impose personal liability on these individual Defendants. Therefore, Defendants James R. Fuller, Jr.; Rebecca Fuller; and David Burkett are also entitled to summary judgment dismissing Wilson’s claims against them on this basis.

A sheriff may qualify as a Title VII employer despite a compliance director’s authority over employment decisions if the sheriff retains authority over those decisions.

Sutherland v. Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-03-11(b)

Given Sutherland’s position and the circumstances surrounding his alleged gender discrimination complaints and transfer, the court cannot conclude without some factual development that the Sheriff lost the authority over employment decisions related to Sutherland as a result of the appointment of the Compliance Director.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes, and Title VII claims may be brought against the employer rather than individual supervisors or coworkers.

Tatum v. Delaware North Sports Service N.Y. · filed 2020-04-20(b)

Title VII only provides a remedy against an “employer,” who is a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.”

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer limits Title VII liability to defendants whose employer status is plausibly alleged.

Henderson v. Howard's Inc. · filed 2020-09-17(b)

Plaintiff has not pleaded facts demonstrating that Therrell Woullard was his “employer.” It’s not clear from Plaintiff’s pleading whether Woullard was even his supervisor, much less whether he exercised the traditional powers of an employer. Therefore, according to Plaintiff’s version of the facts, Woullard can not be liable under Title VII, and the Court grants his Motion to Dismiss [50].

Title VII requires a defendant to be the claimant’s employer; a joint employer may satisfy that requirement.

Wiggins v. SSA Atlantic, LLC · filed 2020-09-30(b)

Therefore, as a threshold matter, and as Local 1422 correctly states in its motion to dismiss, to state any Title VII claim against Local 1422, the amended complaint must allege plausibly that Local 1422 is Plaintiff’s employer.

An indirect employer may face Title VII liability, with its control and supervision of the worker the most important factor in determining employer status.

McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Services, LLC · filed 2020-10-15(b)

Similarly, and using the same test, an indirect employer may face Title VII liability. ... McCurry has put forth no argument that Hartford controlled or supervised her during her employment. It merely disbursed benefits to Kenco’s employees. Accordingly, by the most important measure of the Love test, Hartford is not McCurry’s joint or indirect employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer as a person in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees; allegations of a joint or integrated employer relationship can suffice at the pleading stage.

BENDER v. AVON EDUCATION FOUNDATION · filed 2021-02-18(b)

Title VII similarly excludes small employers, defining an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees." 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b). ... Bender's second amended complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations of a joint, possibly integrated, employer relationship to survive the Foundation's motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer and may be sued under Title VII; a county and its facility may both qualify if both employ the plaintiff.

HILLS v. County of Lehigh · filed 2021-02-19(b)

The inquiry into a proper defendant in a Title VII case solely involves whether the putative defendant is an employer as the term is used within Title VII. ... Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Hills has sufficiently alleged that she was employed by both the County and Cedarbrook, and it is entirely possible that such is the case.

Title VII’s definition of employer includes agents, but an insurer administering employee benefits is not an employer without an employment or agency relationship.

Doe v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania · filed 2021-03-31(b)

We find the lack of an employment relationship or anything approaching an agency relationship to be dispositive, and therefore do not consider the parties’ additional arguments regarding administrative exhaustion.

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer” excludes individual employees and supervisors from Title VII liability.

MCCURDY v. PIAZZA OF WEST CHESTER INC. · filed 2021-07-06(b)

Defendant Rowe was McCurdy’s manager and was not McCurdy’s employer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has declined to extend liability under Title VII to individuals, such as Defendant Rowe, holding the term “employer” as used in Title VII does not encompass individual employees.

Section 2000e(b) does not treat a county board of commissioners as an employer when the plaintiff did not allege that the board employed him.

Murphy v. Cleveland County · filed 2021-08-26(b)

Furthermore, the Cleveland County Board of Commissioners is not an employer as defined by Title VII, Plaintiff has not alleged in his Complaint that the Board was his employer, and the Board is not subject to suit in this matter.

Section 2000e(f) requires a plausible employment relationship with a defendant; a bare assertion that the defendant employed the plaintiff is insufficient.

Washington v. NYC Madison Avenue Medical P.C. · filed 2021-09-03(f)

To establish a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must plead a sufficient employer-employee relationship. Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer. . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (Westlaw through P.L.117-38.) ... For these reasons, Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations in the Complaint that she worked for the Moving Defendants and that they were her employers are the kinds of “labels and conclusions” that are insufficient to give rise to a facially plausible claim that the Moving Defendants were her employers under Title VII and the NYCHRL.

Section 2000e requires an employment relationship with a Title VII defendant; supervision by another entity’s officers does not itself make that entity or its supervisor the plaintiff’s employer.

Ramirez v. Oxford · filed 2021-12-13

But the fact that Oxford may employ DESPP officers to supervise its police department does not plausibly suggest that an Oxford police officer like the plaintiff is an employee of DESPP or of any DESPP supervisor such as Sergeant Semosky.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes; owning or supervising an employer does not, by itself, make a person individually liable as an employer.

Mejia v. Ayala · filed 2021-12-22(b)

The court concludes that these allegations are insufficient to plausibly plead that Ayala and Zavala were individually Mejia’s employers within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e’s employee definition limits Title VII’s employment discrimination protections to employees.

Kifor v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · filed 2022-01-03(f)

But Kifor is not an employee of any of the defendants. “[C]ourts have limited Title VII’s protections to employees only.” ... Thus, Kifor’s claim for discrimination in violation of Title VII will be dismissed.

An affiliated entity cannot be treated as a Title VII employer when the complaint does not allege facts showing that it and the direct employer form a single employer.

Stubblefield v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health Systems · filed 2022-02-23(b)

Thus, the Court still lacks any basis to determine that Franciscan Missionaries was the “final decision-maker in connection with the employment matters underlying the litigation,” and Franciscan Missionaries must (again) be dismissed from this action.

Section 2000e’s employer definition covers an employer, joint employer, or agent, but does not cover a leave administrator without control over the employee’s employment.

Milligan v. GREEKTOWN CASINO, L.L.C. · filed 2022-03-21(b)

The Court will therefore dismiss the Title VII and PDA claims against FMLA Source because it was not Plaintiff’s employer, a joint employer, or Greektown’s agent.

Title VII requires facts showing that a defendant controlled the terms or conditions of the worker’s employment before that entity can be treated as the employer.

Kemp v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene · filed 2022-04-29(b)

Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims against DCAS must be dismissed, because the facts alleged do not suggest that she has or ever had an employment relationship with DCAS. Plaintiff does not allege that she was employed by, or sought employment from DCAS, or that DCAS controlled the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment or compensation such that it should be considered Plaintiff’s employer.

For Title VII employer status through an agent, the principal must manifest that the agent acts on its account.

Farmer v. City of Greenwood, Mississippi · filed 2023-01-27(b)

However, the difference is critical because an agency relationship requires a manifestation by the principal that the agent act on its account.

Section 2000e(b) includes governmental entities and agencies employing 15 or more employees within the definition of employers under Title VII.

Sanders v. San Francisco Public Library · filed 2023-09-05(b)

Title VII imposes liability on employers, including governmental entities and agencies, who employ 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees during the required period, including the person's agents.

Harris v. PeaceHealth · filed 2023-09-28(b)

Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of that individual’s religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... The term “employer” means “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... This falls far short of establishing the requisite degree of control necessary to show that PeaceHealth was Plaintiff’s joint employer for purposes of Title VII. As an employer-employee relationship is essential to the Title VII claim, PeaceHealth’s motion to dismiss is granted and this claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer subject to Title VII liability; individual supervisors and coworkers do not qualify.

Hood v. Asset Living · filed 2024-01-17(b)

The Report concludes that Plaintiff fails to sue an “employer” who is subject to Title VII liability. ... see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (definition of “employer” under Title VII). ... Having considered the EEOC Complaint, Complaint, Report, file, and record in this case, the court determines that the magistrate judge’s finding and conclusions in the Report are correct and accepts them as those of the court.

Title VII claims may be brought only against an employer; individual managers and supervisors are not employers under the statute.

Kuether v. Posley · filed 2024-01-19(b)

A plaintiff may assert a Title VII claim only against an employer. As Kuether acknowledges in response (ECF No. 26 at 2), individuals, even managers or supervisors, are not employers under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer can include a county whose sheriff’s office employs the plaintiff, as plausibly alleged at the pleading stage.

Schoonover v. Hamilton County · filed 2024-02-15(b)

Both Title VII and the Ohio Revised Code define “employer” in a similar way. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01(A)(2). ... Based on the pleadings, it is plausible that Hamilton County was Plaintiff's employer. ... So, the Court can infer that Hamilton County is the employer of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office’s employees. Thus, at this time, the Court will presume that the Hamilton County, which is being sued through the BOCC, is Plaintiff's employer.

A defendant must meet Title VII’s definition of an employer and exercise substantial control over significant aspects of the plaintiff’s employment.

DALE v. NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS FOUNDATION · filed 2024-09-16(b)

To be subjected to liability under Title VII, a defendant must (1) fall within the Title VII statutory definition of “employer,” and (2) have exercised substantial control over significant aspects of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiff’s employment. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Foundation is her employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e limits primary Title VII liability to an employer; a law firm that did not employ the plaintiff is not liable on that basis.

Roethel v. Softheon, Inc. · filed 2024-09-30(b)

To the extent that the Complaint asserts primary discrimination and retaliation claims against CMM, those claims fail because CMM was not Plaintiff’s employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII; an employee is not a proper defendant without allegations that the employee was the plaintiff’s employer or its agent.

Marin v. TVS Supply Chain Solutions North America, Inc. · filed 2024-11-19(b)

Title VII defines employers as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Plaintiff merely alleges that the Individual Defendants are employees of TVS. Without allegations that the Individual Defendants were his employer or agents of his employer, the Individual Defendants are not proper defendants in this action.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer liability to an employer; individual defendants who are not the plaintiff’s employer are not proper defendants.

Jackson v. Board of Trustees of the Institutions of Higher Learning · filed 2025-01-06(b)

Because Mays Jackson’s Title VII retaliation claim is alleged against the individually named defendants, in their official capacities, and because the individually named defendants are not considered her employer, the individually named defendants are not proper Title VII defendants.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer requirement makes an employment relationship necessary for Title VII liability; control over the employee is central to determining whether a defendant is an employer or joint employer.

Burns v. State of New York · filed 2025-08-01(b)

Although it is plausible to infer from the complaint that the State of New York and New York State Civil Service Commission establish the pay grade for nurse practitioners (Grade 24), there are no facts suggesting that either Defendant otherwise has any control over Plaintiffs’ employment. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the complaint fails to allege that the State of New York or the New York State Civil Service Commission are Plaintiffs’ employers or joint employers under Title VII.

Whether a county is a plaintiff’s Title VII employer requires examination of the employment relationship and cannot be resolved from state law alone.

Vaughn v. Oktibbeha County, Mississippi · filed 2025-09-19(b)

However, as the Fifth Circuit explained in Muhammad, the Court cannot rely on state law alone in determining whether an employment relationship exists. To the extent the County is asking for this Court to find as a matter of law, pursuant to Oden, that the County is not Vaughn’s employer, Muhammad forecloses that too.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make individual employees liable under Title VII.

Tobin · filed 2025-10-15(b)

Thus, Boone and Jane Doe, in their individual capacities, are not “employers” under Title VII. Accordingly, Tobin’s Title VII claims against Boone and Jane Doe in their individual capacities are dismissed.

An affiliated entity qualifies as a Title VII employer if it directed the alleged discrimination or exercised sufficient control over the plaintiff’s employment relationship.

Singleton · filed 2025-11-18(b)

Though the Court recognizes that determining Title VII employer status is fact-intensive and generally requires discovery, a plaintiff must still plead sufficient facts to support a theory that a defendant directed the purported discriminatory conduct or exercised enough control to qualify as a Title VII employer.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and defendant for a Title VII claim; alleging that relationship suffices at the motion to dismiss stage.

Jackson v. Volunteers of America · filed 2026-04-09(b)

“[A]n employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is a prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action.” Lavergne v. HCA Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). However, in the Volunteers Charge, Plaintiff does allege that he “began [his] employment with Volunteer of America in December 2024, most recently as a Monitor, earning $ 10.00 per hour[.]” R. Doc. 1-1 at 1. At the motion to dismiss stage, this suffices as an allegation that an employment relationship between Plaintiff and VOASELA, misnamed by Plaintiff as Volunteer of America, existed.

For Title VII purposes, whether an entity employs a worker depends on its control over the worker’s job, including authority to hire and fire.

Lykes · filed 2026-06-11(b)

That question, in turn, depends on “whether the alleged employer exercises control over the manner and means of the plaintiff ’s work,” including through the “authority to appoint, hire, fire, and promote.” ... Without this link, nothing supports an inference that the AOC employed her for Title VII purposes. And given that, Lykes’s claim against that Defendant fails as a matter of law.

A company may qualify as an employer under Title VII even when the worker is technically employed by a temporary staffing agency.

Reynolds v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 1997-06-20(b)

We reject CSXT's argument that Reynolds cannot recover under Title VII since she was technically employed by Olsten Temporary and not by CSXT.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Downey v. J. C. Penney Co. · filed 1979-02-27(b)

Defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees for the required twenty weeks, and that person’s agents.

Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Services, Inc. · filed 1999-06-03(b)

Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calender weeks in the current or preceding calender year, and any agent of such a person[.]”

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer to include a qualifying entity and its agents, but individual employees cannot be held liable in their personal or official capacities.

Hawkins v. County of Oneida, NY · filed 2007-07-24(b)

Title VII defines the term “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (2003). ... Thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII and NYSHRL claims against the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities will be granted.

Title VII's definition of employer excludes individual employees who do not themselves qualify as employers.

Nyenhuis v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 2009-03-17(b)

The plaintiff concedes that Harding and Danville do not fall under the definition of “employer” in Title VII. ... Nyenhuis wants these federal claims kept alive solely for the purpose of searching for a basis for a state claim she has not pled. This is not proper. Therefore, these counts are being dismissed as to Harding and Danville.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty or more weeks; employees of related entities may be counted together under the single or joint employer doctrines.

Echevarria v. Insight Medical, P.C. · filed 2014-12-22(b)

Title VII imposes liability for employment discrimination only on an “employer,” which is defined by the statute as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Finally, courts have allowed plaintiffs raising claims under both the NYCHRL and Title VII to aggregate employees of different entities in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement, pursuant to what has come to be known as the “single employer” (or “single integrated employer”) and the “joint employer” doctrines.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not cover a vendor that supplies information used to set an employee’s pay but does not control the employee’s benefits or wages.

Dittmann v. Quest Diagnostics, Incorporat · filed 2019-01-03(b)

Alam relied on Title VII’s provision defining an employer to include “any agent” of the employer. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). ... These circumstances are absent here. Although Quest gave information to Xerox, Quest did not “control” Dittmann’s benefits. Dittmann himself admits that Xerox determined what to do with that information. Thus, even under Alam, Dittmann faces the same problem as before: he has alleged that Quest affected his wages by supplying information that Xerox used to set his pay. This is not the type of “control” that creates an employment relationship under the federal employment-discrimination laws.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes, and a plaintiff seeking relief against an entity must allege facts connecting it to his employment.

Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc. · filed 2021-10-08(b)

Under both Title VII and the ADA, a plaintiff may only seek relief against his “employer,” which is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). ... Here, Plaintiff does not provide any information on Oasis Outsourcing, such as its relationship with Pearlgreen — his former employer — that would make Oasis Outsourcing liable for the alleged discriminatory conduct. The Court therefore dismisses Oasis Outsourcing from this action, without prejudice.

Section 2000e(f) excludes appointees on the policymaking level from Title VII's definition of employee; whether a position qualifies may require factual analysis when its duties are not clearly defined by law.

RUGGLES v. HAMILTON COUNTY · filed 2025-09-17(f)

Rather, it finds that Hamilton County has not shown that there are no disputed issues of material fact regarding whether the Executive Director was an appointee on the policymaking level and so not considered an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointed policymaking employee from Title VII’s definition of employee unless the employee is subject to state civil service laws.

Prosper v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2021-02-08(f)

Comparing the deposition and the Assistant Prison Warden description with the definition of employee, it is clear that Plaintiff is an exempt appointee on the policy making level. Plaintiff’s use of V.I. legislation to argue otherwise ignores the facts gleaned from documents offered in the Defendants’ Motion and the plain language of § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f) excludes appointees to policymaking positions from Title VII’s definition of employee.

O'Connor v. Lafayette City Council · filed 2020-03-02(f)

However, the statute provides that the term “employee” does not include, among other things, “an appointee on the policymaking level.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not afforded the protections of Title VII in this case.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a policymaking appointee from Title VII’s definition of employee only if an elected official directly appoints the person.

Runkel v. City of Springfield · filed 2019-09-09(f)

Because the City’s purchasing agent is not directly appointed by an elected official, the purchasing agent is not excluded from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Section 2000e(f) excludes a deputy city attorney in a policymaking position from Title VII’s definition of employee even if the mayor did not directly appoint her.

Marnocha v. City of Elkhart · filed 2019-08-27(f)

In either event, I just don’t think whether Marnocha was “hired” or “appointed” to her position is relevant in deciding whether she has a policymaking position under Title VII or the ADEA.

Section 2000e(f) excludes policymaking appointees from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Michalowski v. Rutherford · filed 2015-03-06(f)

For these reasons and the others discussed previously, the court finds that Michalow-ski was a policymaking appointee within the meaning of Title VII, and therefore, his claim for sexual harassment under Title VII must be dismissed.

Section 2000e(f) excludes elected officials’ personal staff and policy-level appointees from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Conley v. City of Erie, Pa. · filed 2007-09-28(f)

the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office ... or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level ... These exemptions, commonly referred to as the “personal staff’ and “policy making” exemptions, are to be narrowly construed. ... Upon consideration of these factors as applied to the facts of this case, we find, as a matter of law, that plaintiff is exempt from Title VII as a member of the Mayor’s personal staff. ... Based on the totality of the factors, we hold that plaintiff is exempt from coverage as an appointee on the policy making level.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s appointee serving on the policymaking level from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Board of County Commissioners v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2005-04-15(f)

While in this position, Janssen served the Board on the policymaking level, and was, therefore, protected by GERA, rather than Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s policymaking appointee from Title VII’s definition of employee when the appointee works closely with the appointing official.

Beckmann v. Darden · filed 2004-12-08(f)

Title VII excludes from the scope of its protections any elected official’s “appointee on the policy making level.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... In light of this record, the court finds that the Plaintiff was an appointee on the policymaking level, and is therefore not an “employee” covered by Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s policy-making exception applies only when an elected official appointed the person, the person makes policy, and the person is not subject to civil service laws.

Beaven v. Kansas · filed 2003-09-23(f)

To fit into this policy-making exception, the plaintiff must (1) be appointed by an elected official, (2) make policy, and (3) not be subject to civil service laws.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a Deputy Bureau Chief appointed by an elected attorney general from Title VII’s definition of employee when the position can require close work with the attorney general.

Butler v. New York State Department of Law, Dennis C. Vacco and William Flynn · filed 2000-05-03(f)

We hold only that Butler, who as Deputy Bureau Chief was in a higher position than other AAGs and could be required to work closely with the AG, was an appointee on the policymaking level under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointee on the policy making level from Title VII’s definition of an employee; a deputy prosecuting attorney falls within that exclusion.

Bibbs v. Newman · filed 1998-02-27(f)

As a deputy prosecuting attorney, Bibbs was “an appointee on the policy making level” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) and was not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal treatment of pregnant employees and similarly affected nonpregnant employees, even when that treatment is unfavorable.

Gina PIRAINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION RESOURCES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-03-03(k)

The PDA does not require that employers treat pregnant employees well; “[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees.”

A union representing only USPS employees is not a labor organization that can be sued under Title VII because the USPS is excluded from the definition of employer.

Lohf v. Runyon · filed 1998-03-06(b), (d)

A “labor organization” is generally defined under § 2000e(d) as an organization representing “employees” against “employers.” However, “employer” is defined to exclude the United States and any corporation owned by the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is undisputed that the APWU does not represent employees against any other employer but the USPS, an entity of the United States. Therefore, the APWU is not a “labor organization”- which can be sued under Title VII because it does not represent employees against “employers” as the term is defined in Title VII.

A union representing only Postal Service employees is not a Title VII labor organization because the Postal Service is excluded from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Luttrell v. Runyon · filed 1998-03-06(b), (d)

A “labor organization” is generally defined under § 2000e(d) as an organization representing “employees” against “employers.” However, “employer” is defined to exclude the United States and any corporation owned by the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is undisputed that the NALC does not represent employees against any other employer but the USPS, an entity of the United States. Therefore, the NALC is not a “labor organization” which can be sued under Title VII because it does not represent employees against “employers” as the term is defined in Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) protects the timing of a religious observance when the employee proves that the timing is part of a bona fide religious belief.

Tiano v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1998-03-18(j)

In a case such as this, however, where an employee maintains that her religious beliefs require her to attend a particular pilgrimage, she must prove that the temporal mandate was part of the bona fide religious belief.

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on childbirth, including discharge after an employee has given birth while she is on maternity leave.

Shafrir v. Association of Reform Zionists of America · filed 1998-03-26(k)

The plain language of the PDA includes “childbirth” as a basis upon which the plaintiff can demonstrate discrimination. Such is the case here: Even though plaintiff was neither pregnant nor ill at the time she was discharged, she had recently given birth and was on maternity leave. Because she claims she was discharged because of childbirth, the PDA is properly invoked.

Section 2000e(f) excludes appointees on the policymaking level from Title VII’s definition of employee; an assistant attorney general in a policymaking position falls within that exclusion.

Schallop v. New York State Department of Law · filed 1998-09-14(f)

Because Schallop’s position as an AAG was that of a policymaker under Vezzetti her employment falls within the exception under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes policy making appointees from Title VII’s definition of employee unless they are subject to state civil service laws.

Dyer v. Radcliffe · filed 2001-03-30(f)

Because Dyer’s position was an appointee on the policy making level, and he is exempt from the civil service laws of Ohio, he is not an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s policymaker exclusion requires direct appointment by an elected official; a deputy director appointed by an agency director remains an employee.

O'Neill v. Indiana Commission on Public Records · filed 2001-04-17(f)

For the following reasons, the court concludes that the policymaker must be directly appointed by an elected official. ... The court concludes that the position of Deputy Director is not “an appointee on a policymaking level” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and therefore O’Neill is entitled to seek relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) does not exclude a policymaking appointee from the definition of employee merely because an elected official must consent to an appointment made by another official.

Crumpacker v. Kansas Department of Human Resources · filed 2002-05-16(f)

Accordingly, we must conclude that plaintiff can seek relief under Title VII because she is an employee under the definition set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). She was not appointed by an elected official to her position. The mere fact that the governor had to consent to her appointment does not compel the conclusion that she was an appointee of an elected official.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a policy making appointee from Title VII protection only if an elected official appointed that person; the official’s consent to another official’s appointment does not suffice.

Crumpacker v. State of Kansas · filed 2007-01-10(f)

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that neither Kansas law nor the facts presented at trial compel a finding that Crumpacker was appointed by an elected official as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Crumpacker is, therefore, not subject to the policy maker exemption to Title VII, and her discrimination claims were properly considered by the jury.

Section 2000e(f) excludes certain policymaking appointees chosen by elected officials from Title VII’s definition of employee; when the position’s duties are unclear, a factfinder must decide whether the exclusion applies.

Strong v. Delaware County · filed 2013-09-30(f)

The term “employee” for purposes of Title VII does not include any person chosen by an elected public officer “to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Thus, the question of whether Mr. Strong was an employee or an appointee at the policymaking level cannot be determined as a matter of law and must be left to the finder of fact to make the determination.

Section 2000e(f)’s policymaking-level exception requires analysis grounded in its language and intent; the Elrod-Branti test cannot be applied in every case.

Reardon v. Herring · filed 2016-06-03(f)

The Court emphasizes the distinctions between the two doctrines only to demonstrate why the' Elrod-Branti test cannot be universally substituted for an analysis properly derived from the language and intent of the statutory exception at issue in this case.

Section 2000e(f) excludes North Carolina magistrates from Title VII's definition of employee as appointees on the policy making level.

Crowder v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts · filed 2019-03-19(f)

Title VII broadly defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). But Title VII excludes from that definition any "appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." ... Accordingly, North Carolina magistrates are appointees on the policy making level, and Title VII does not apply to them.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointee from Title VII’s definition of employee only if the position allows meaningful input into governmental decisions; the exclusion may depend on the position’s actual duties.

Badanish v. Lake County Juvenile Detention Center · filed 2020-05-20(f)

However, not all appointees fall outside of Title VII’s definition of employee; rather, an appointed individual is not an employee for the purpose of Title VII only if “the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementations.” Americanos, 74 F.3d at 141 (quoting Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1993)). ... Indeed, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court is only vaguely aware of what the Plaintiff’s position entailed; thus, it is impossible to determine whether her position involved any governmental decision making that would exempt her from Title VII coverage.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointee at the policy making level from Title VII’s definition of employee; a judicial commissioner for the Williamson County General Sessions Court falls within that exclusion.

Cotton v. Williamson County Government · filed 2023-01-13(f)

The court finds, based on the record now before it, that a judicial commissioner for the Williamson County General Sessions Court is an “appointee on the policy making level” and therefore exempt from the protections of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointed policymaker from Title VII’s employee definition when the person is outside state or local civil service.

Prosper v. Government of the Virgin Islan · filed 2023-03-29(f)

Policymakers are not protected by Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. A policymaking role is one filled by a person who is appointed by an elected officer to serve on a policy making level and who is not in the state or local civil service.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a magistrate judge appointed by an elected official from Title VII’s definition of employee when the judge serves as a policymaking appointee.

MATTINGLY v. MARION SUPERIOR COURT · filed 2023-03-31(f)

Relying on the plain language of the text of the public official staff exemption, the Court concludes that, as a Marion County magistrate judge, Ms. Mattingly was a policymaking appointee who was appointed by an elected official. Therefore, she was not an "employee" under the ADEA or Title VII and her remaining ADEA and Title VII claims against the Judges in their official capacities, the Marion Superior Court, and the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration, must be and are DISMISSED.

Section 2000e(f)’s policy making appointee exemption requires a policy making role; a person who was not a policy maker does not qualify.

Arnold v. Weld County School District RE-5J · filed 2023-12-05(f)

While Defendants provide attorney argument about the nature of Ms. Arnold’s various responsibilities as Superintendent, [Doc. 81 at 19–20], they fail to reckon with how their admission that “Ms. Arnold was not a District policymaker” renders the Crumpacker inquiry over before it can begin.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a city judge appointed by an elected mayor from Title VII’s definition of employee as an appointee on the policy making level.

Mora v. NY State Unified Ct. Sys. · filed 2026-03-30(f)

Like the judge in Gregory, Mora – as a city judge appointed by an elected official (in this case, his city’s mayor) – falls within the exception for an “appointee on the policy making level” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but a Title VII claim against an agent cannot proceed alongside a claim against the employer.

Berry v. Houston Health Department · filed 2024-07-02(b)

“Congress’s purpose in extending the definition of an employer to encompass an agent in Section 2000e(b) was simply to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII. Thus, a Title VII suit against an employee is actually a suit against the corporation.” ... To the extent Berry asserts Title VII claims against both the City and the individual defendants, whether in their individual capacities or official capacities as agents of the City, the claims against the individual defendants are dismissed, with prejudice.

Section 2000e(b) treats an entity delegated responsibility for employee health insurance as an employer when it acts as the employer’s agent.

Lange v. Houston County, Georgia · filed 2024-05-13(b)

In accepting such a ... delegation, Houston County qualified themselves as an agent and employer under Title VII, and therefore assumed liability stem- ming from this delegated role.

Section 2000e(b) includes agents in the definition of employer, so agency principles govern an employer’s liability for a supervisor’s harassment.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth · filed 1998-06-26(b)

We turn to principles of agency law, for the term "employer" is defined under Title VII to include "agents." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b); see Meritor, supra, at 72. In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles.

Title VII imposes liability on employers, not supervisors sued in their official capacities.

McBride v. Routh · filed 1999-08-24(b)

As supervisors, they have no liability for Title VII violations under the Tomka decision.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, allowing supervisory conduct to be attributed to the employer.

Grey v. City of Norwalk Board of Education · filed 2004-02-04(b)

Under Title VII, an “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ..., and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added); ... By Grey’s facts, then, the Board was explicitly aware of the discrimination and allowed it to continue, then ratified her constructive discharge.

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer” to include agents, so an employee’s knowledge of coworker harassment may be imputed to the employer when that knowledge is important to the employee’s duties.

Huston v. Gamble · filed 2009-06-09(b)

In this endeavor, “[w]e turn to principles of agency law, for the term ‘employer’ is defined under Title VII to include ‘agents.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). . . . In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles.” ... The relevant agency principles here are those governing when to impute an agent’s knowledge of particular facts to the agent’s principal.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer includes agents, but a worker’s authority to oversee coworkers’ assignments alone does not make that worker management level for imputing knowledge of harassment to the employer.

Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp. · filed 2009-06-08(b)

We clarify that mere supervisory authority over the performance of work assignments by other co-workers is not, by itself, sufficient to qualify an employee for management level status.

Section 2000e(b) includes as an employer’s agents outside professionals to whom the employer delegates hiring authority.

Jimenez v. Dyncorp International, LLC · filed 2009-07-13(b)

Given the liberal interpretation afforded to Title VII definitions, and given the common-law principles governing agency, the Court holds that Dr. Andrasik and Frontline were Defendant’s “agents” when determining whether Plaintiff was psychologically suited to perform her mission in Afghanistan.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make an alleged agent liable for denying an independent contractor a business opportunity when the agent neither controls the plaintiff's employment nor limits access to employment opportunities.

Alam v. Miller Brewing Comp · filed 2013-02-27(b)

But Alam fails to convince us that “agent” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) has a broad enough reach to hold MillerCoors liable as an “agent” of Miller Brewing for the conduct alleged here.

Section 2000e(b) makes employers liable for their agents’ acts under Title VII but does not make the agents individually liable.

Aku v. Chi. Bd. of Educ. · filed 2017-11-14(b)

And it is irrelevant whether any of the Non-Board Defendants could be seen as "agents" of the Board because Title VII and ADA violations by an agent are imputable only to the employer, and not to the agent itself.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but a local union’s representatives do not automatically make an international union liable for their conduct.

Riley v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association · filed 2022-03-23(b)

While an “employer” also includes “any agent” of the “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), that Lopez and Pena were employees of Local 104 does not necessary make Defendant, the International Union, liable for their conduct.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make an employer liable for the acts of a neutral hearing officer who is neither its employee nor its agent.

Williams v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2023-04-03(b)

Under all of the circumstances, there is no reasonable argument that Hearing Officer Wilson acted as an agent for NYCHA at the plaintiff’s June 2017 Local Hearing, or that her alleged comment can be imputed to NYCHA. Similarly, there is no evidence that the outcome of the Local Hearing, the Hearing Officer’s issuance of a reprimand, can be attributed to NYCHA. Therefore, the Hearing Officer’s comment and adverse determination cannot support a viable claim of retaliation against NYCHA pursuant to Title VII or the NYSHRL.

Title VII’s definition of employer includes agents, but a board is not liable through an elected commissioner over whom it has no controlling authority.

Blair v. Frenchko · filed 2023-06-28(b)

For such a relationship to exist, one party must have controlling authority over another. The specific facts alleged to have been engaged in by Frenchko, coupled with the fact the Board has no authority over Frenchko, compels the conclusion that Frenchko was not acting as the Board’s agent when engaged in the conduct alleged by Frenchko.

A supervisor must have authority to bind the employer as its agent under Title VII.

Blair v. Frenchko · filed 2024-02-02(b)

Instead, under Title VII, a supervisor must have authority to bind her employer as an agent.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but a customer who does not act on the employer’s behalf and under its control is not an agent.

Bivens v. Zep, Inc. · filed 2025-08-08(b)

Because Title VII defines “employer” to include “any agent” of the company. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In so doing, the law incorporates background agency law principles. ... This understanding plays a critical role here, as the client who harassed Bivens was not Zep’s agent. For their relationship to be deemed one of principal-agent, Zep (as the purported master) and the client (as the purported servant) each had to give their mutual “consent” to the notion that the client would “act” both “on [Zep’s] behalf” and “subject to [its] control.” See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (A.L.I. 1958). There was no such agreement here.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, making a supervisor a proper Title VII defendant.

Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp. · filed 1992-05-26(b)

Even though, as plaintiffs supervisor and one with authority regarding employment practices, his failure to respond to her repeated admonitions regarding sexual harassment is similarly onerous, his liability, if any, can only arise under Title VII. See Rush v. McDonald’s Corp., 760 F.Supp. 1349, 1356 n. 9 (S.D.Ind.1991) (under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), “any agent” of an employee is likewise an “employer” for Title VII purposes, and thus an employee’s supervisor is a proper defendant).

A Title VII racial discrimination claim requires the plaintiff to have been employed by the defendant.

Rahaman v. Spine Specialist of Michigan · filed 2024-08-13(f)

However, the complaint lacks any allegation that Plaintiff was employed by SSC.

A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing her employment status.

Britt v. MS Farm Bureau Cslty Ins · filed 2022-12-06(b)

Indeed, under both Title VII and Mississippi state law, Britt, and not the Insurance Companies, bears the initial burden of establishing her employment status.

Section 2000e(f) requires an employment relationship; a public agency does not become an employer merely because its licensing decision affects someone’s job.

Bazargani v. Radel · filed 2015-03-03(f)

Title VII protects against religious discrimination by employers against current or prospective employees, not religious discrimination generally.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee is assessed using traditional agency principles, and independent contractors are outside Title VII's protection.

Laredo v. CRST MALONE, INC. · filed 2011-09-26(f)

Because the term employee is not more specifically defined by the Civil Rights Act, courts have concluded that “traditional principles of agency law” should be used in determining whether someone is an employee. ... When considered together, even in light of those issues about which Plaintiff and CRST disagree, the weight of factors tilts decidedly in favor of finding that Plaintiff would have been an independent contractor had she been a driver for CRST. Independent contractors are not protected by the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII, making it unnecessary for the Court to consider whether CRST or its employees had a discriminatory motive in not hiring or terminating Plaintiff.

Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors; the hiring party’s control over how the work is performed is central to that distinction.

Smith v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2011-05-23(f)

“In order to prevail on a Title VII[] claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of an employment relationship,” as Title VII protects only “employees,” not independent contractors. ... Neither Plaintiffs complaint, nor her formal statement provide support for her allegation that the USACE controlled the manner and means by which she performed her work. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Title VII.