42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exclusion does not remove a chief deputy from the employee count without evidence that the deputy qualifies for the exclusion.

Wendy Lee Wilson, Stevie Burns v. Leon "Buddy" Nutt, Sheriff of Wayne County, Tennessee · filed 1995-10-30(f)

Nutt has argued that the chief deputy should not be counted as an employee because he purportedly serves on the sheriff's "personal staff." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(f) (person chosen by elected official to serve on "personal staff" is excluded from Title VII's definition of "employee"). ... At trial, Nutt presented no evidence regarding the duties of the chief deputy. Accordingly, he has failed to show that the chief deputy should not be counted as an employee for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, based on the nature of the appointment and working relationship.

Dubisar-Dewberry v. District Attorney's Office of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit · filed 1996-03-28(f)

The Office of the District Attorney argues that Ms. Dubisar-Dewberry’s employment with their office falls within the ambit of the “personal staff” exception to Title VII as set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Because the court finds the argument of the Office of the District Attorney regarding the personal staff exception to be compelling and dispositive of this action, it is unnecessary to address the second argument proffered in support of its motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exclusion depends on the employee's actual role and relationship with the elected official; it excluded Cromer as a captain but not as a lieutenant.

Cromer v. Brown · filed 1996-07-15(f)

Together, the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Cromer was not a member of Sheriff Brown's personal staff during his service as a lieutenant. ... Different facts establish, as a matter of law, that during his service as captain Cromer was on Sheriff Brown's personal staff.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee when they are not covered by state civil service laws.

Lococo v. Barger · filed 1997-03-24(f)

Thus, having determined that Lococo falls within the personal staff exemption to the definition of employee, the Title VII claim must be dismissed.

Section 2000e(f) narrowly excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee; the exception depends on the employee’s actual duties and relationship with the official.

Frazier v. Smith · filed 1998-06-26(f)

Within the definition of “employee,” Congress has provided an exception for the personal staff of qualified elected officials. This exception should be construed narrowly. ... Since Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence for the Court to find as a matter of law that Plaintiff falls within the personal staff exception of Title VII, summary judgment is inappropriate on this exception.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Snyder v. City of Lima · filed 1999-05-14(f)

As shown by the discussion above, each of the six Teneyuca factors weighs toward the conclusion that plaintiff falls within the “personal staff’ exemption to the definition of “employee.” ... I find that plaintiff is not an “employee” under Title VII; consequently, her Title VII claims shall be dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(f) excludes staff attorneys who serve on an elected judge's personal staff from Title VII's definition of employee.

Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2000-03-15(f)

Accordingly, the staff attorneys are not "employees" within the meaning of Title VII because they serve on the "personal staff" of their appointing elected officials.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception does not exclude a city manager who is accountable to a city council rather than to an individual elected official.

Gomez v. City of Eagle Pass · filed 2000-03-20(f)

Because the city manager is accountable not to an elected official, but to a collective decision-making body, it is found that she does not fit within the personal staff exception.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Biggs v. Logan Bd Cty Comm · filed 2000-04-12(f)

Based upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the pertinent law, we conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s claims for uncompensated overtime under the FLSA and for gender discrimination under Title VII based on those statutes’ respective personal staff exceptions.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official's personal staff and immediate advisers from the employees counted toward Title VII's fifteen-employee threshold.

Laurie v. Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals · filed 2001-07-12(f)

Third, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by finding that the staff attorneys and junior staff attorneys employed by the ACCA were "personal staff" and "immediate advisers," rather than "employees" for purposes of Title VII. We disagree, and affirm on the basis of the district court's well-reasoned opinion, published at 88 F.Supp.2d 1334.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Bland v. New York · filed 2003-03-07(f)

Thus, based on the language of the statute, its structure, and its legislative history, plaintiff falls within the terms of the exemption for an elected official’s personal staff.

An elected official’s personal staff is excluded from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Taplin v. Johnson · filed 2004-02-11(f)

Because Taplin qualifies as a member of the Sheriffs personal staff, she is not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Brazoria County v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2004-11-19(f)

Christian was an elected official; Knight, a member of his personal staff. ... Therefore, any relief was under GERA and its administrative procedure.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a magistrate from Title VII’s definition of employee when she serves on an elected judge’s personal staff and is not subject to civil service laws.

Birch v. Cnty · filed 2004-12-01(f)

Based on the totality of the factors, we hold that Birch is exempt from Title VII’s coverage as a member of Judge Donnelly’s personal staff.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exemption does not warrant summary judgment when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether an assistant city attorney held the close, sensitive role the exemption covers.

Kelley v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2004-12-30(f)

Kelley presents sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the assistant city attorney position is not the “highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibility on the staff of the elected official” that Congress contemplated when it created the personal staff exemption under § 2000e(f). ... While the parties dispute whether Kelley is a policymaker, in light of the undisputed facts adduced herein, and the governing law on the issue, Kelley has raised a genuine issue of material fact whether she is an “employee” within Title VII’s meaning and entitled to Title VII’s protections. The City, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception did not exclude Horne from Title VII coverage.

Horne v. Russell County Commission · filed 2005-07-15(f)

the court concludes that this exception does not apply to preclude Horne from asserting Title VII or EPA claims.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exemption is an affirmative defense that an employer waives by omitting it from a responsive pleading.

Hindman v. Thompson · filed 2008-03-04(f)

The State therefore waived the personal staff exemption, as it failed to include such defense in both its original and Amended Answer (See Docs. 7 & 77).

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee; an executive secretary can fall within that exception.

Saddler v. Quitman County School District · filed 2008-05-16(f)

Accordingly, we find no reversible error in the district court’s ruling that Saddler, as Towner’s executive secretary, fell within Title VII’s personal staff exception.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee; a chief deputy sheriff in a close, sensitive position of trust falls within that exclusion.

Townsend v. Shook · filed 2009-04-24(f)

Here, a fact-specific examination of Plaintiff’s role as Chief Deputy Sheriff, focusing on whether she worked in an intimate and sensitive position of trust, close to Sheriff Shook, results in our conclusion that Plaintiff falls under Title VII’s exclusion of protection for the personal staff of an elected official.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee; a judge’s law clerk can fall within that exemption based on the nature of the position.

Gupta v. FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. OF PA. · filed 2010-12-23(f)

Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact, Plaintiff cannot carry her burden to show that she was a covered employee under Title VII rather than exempted personal staff to an elected official. Accordingly, Plaintiff is excluded from the protections of Title VII, and judgment as a matter of law for Defendant is appropriate.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, but the exemption requires a narrow, fact specific inquiry.

Smith v. Grady · filed 2013-01-23(f)

Accordingly, this Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII claims on the basis of the “personal staff’ exemption in Section 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, but the exclusion requires evidence of the actual working relationship.

Johnson-Mosley v. Alabama Unified Judicial System · filed 2013-05-09(f)

Based on the present record, the defendants have not presented sufficient evidence for the court to find as a matter of law that the CJPO position falls within the “personal staff’ exception of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a staff attorney from Title VII’s definition of employee when the attorney is a member of an elected judge’s personal staff.

Horen v. Judge Stacy Cook · filed 2013-10-10(f)

In the aggregate, the relevant factors support a finding that Horen is exempt from Title VII as a member of Judge Cook’s “personal staff.”

Section 2000e(f)’s personal-staff exemption depends on the facts of the employment relationship and may require further factual development.

Smith v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2014-05-15(f)

Upon review of the allegations of the complaint and the various matter submitted by the parties, the Court finds that a determination of whether Smith falls within the personal-staff exemption cannot be determined as a matter of law and should await further factual development.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception requires a factual inquiry; an assistant or secretary’s job title alone does not establish the exception at the motion to dismiss stage.

Croci v. Town of Haverstraw · filed 2016-03-31(f)

But even if there is a compelling case to be made that elected officials’ secretaries are, as a general matter, “personal staff,” that does not mean that it is appropriate to apply that exception at the motion dismiss stage to any plaintiff whose job title suggests that he or she is the assistant, secretary, or even confidential secretary to an elected official.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Kennedy v. New York · filed 2016-03-04(f)

Thus, upon review of the allegations of the Amended Complaint and the affidavit submitted by Kennedy in response to Defendants’ motion, this Court finds that she falls within the personal-staff exemption to Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exclusion requires evidence about the employee’s actual duties and could not be resolved from her job description at the pleading stage.

BUKA v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVAINA · filed 2021-03-30(f)

ACC also argues that Plaintiff is not an “employee” under Title VII because the definition of “employee” excludes “any person chosen by” an elected public official “to be on such officer’s personal staff.” 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(f). Again, this matter is best suited to be decided after the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to gather sufficient record evidence as to what plaintiff’s position entailed, in addition to those duties as stated in her job description.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exemption does not exclude a college president who serves a board of elected officials rather than a single elected official.

Douglas v. Cloud County Community College, Board of Trustees · filed 2022-05-16(f)

The plain language of the “personal staff” exemption does not apply to Dr. Adrian as College President, and she has plausibly alleged that she was an employee for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, including a judge’s personally appointed secretary.

Klymn v. Monroe County Supreme Court · filed 2022-11-15(f)

Plaintiff, while serving as Rosenbaum’s secretary, fit the definition of “personal staff’ set forth in the statute.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception does not cover someone employed by a multimember board rather than an individual elected official.

Arnold v. Weld County School District RE-5J · filed 2023-06-14(f)

Simply put, a multimember body does not have “personal staff” in the way that an individual elected official does.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia · filed 2025-04-01(f)

Accordingly, Younge was not an “employee” under Title VII, and she cannot invoke Title VII’s protections. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1242.

An employee of a Louisiana political subdivision can be treated as a private sector employee for Title VII purposes.

Johnson v. Iberia Medical Center Foundation · filed 2023-01-27(f)

Although Defendant is a political subdivision of Louisiana and therefore outside the purview of § 1981, Plaintiff is still considered “private sector employee” for the purposes of Title VII.

For Title VII, the employer is the state agency with actual hiring and firing responsibility, rather than the state as a whole.

Coleman v. State Of Illinois · filed 2020-11-16(b)

So, here, the Court concludes that the proper target of the employment-discrimination suit is the IDOC, not the State of Illinois, and the Title VII and ADEA claims against the State are thus dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions in its definitions of “person” and “employer.”

Manikhi v. Mass Transit Administration · filed 2000-08-24(a), (b)

By Public Law 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), Title VII was amended to include within the definition of "person” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), and hence of "employer,” § 2000e(b), governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions.

Section 2000e's definitions bring public employers, including states and their official agencies, within Title VII.

Britton v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 1985-10-21(a), (b), (h)

Title VII applies as well to public employers, including states and their official agencies.

Section 2000e(a) brought public employees within Title VII’s coverage on March 24, 1972; employees who retired before that date could not receive relief for unequal pension benefits.

Retired Public Employees' Association of California v. State of California · filed 1982-05-17(a)

We affirm that part of the district court's order granting relief to members of the class who retired after March 24, 1972, the date Title VII became effective as to public employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(b) did not cover public employers before March 24, 1972.

Williams v. City of New Orleans · filed 1982-06-11(b)

An important limitation on Title VII’s coverage is relevant here: the statute did not apply to public employers until March 24, 1972.

Section 2000e(a) and (f) bring state civil service employees within Title VII’s coverage.

La Riviere v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-05-19(a), (f)

States and their official agencies are equally subject to Title VII. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-261, §§ 2(1), (5), 86 Stat. 103, brought state civil service employees within the ambit of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), (f).

Section 2000e(a) includes state agencies among the entities that may be sued under Title VII.

Maxey v. Thompson · filed 1982-06-16(a)

It is clear from this method of styling Johnson in the complaint that the plaintiff wanted to sue him in his official rather than personal capacity-wanted, in other words, to sue the Department of Revenue, as of course he could since state agencies are suable under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a), 2000e(h), 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e(f) includes state judicial department employees who are neither elected officials nor members of an elected official’s personal staff, policymakers, or immediate advisers.

Hall v. Lowery · filed 1982-08-25(f)

They were not elected by anyone, they were not on the Chief Justice’s personal staff, and did not make policy, and they were not immediate advisers with respect to the exercise of the constitutional powers of the Chief Justice. The personal-staff exception should be narrowly construed, but even if it were broadly interpreted, it could not cover this case.

Section 2000e includes state and local governments among employers covered by Title VII.

Curler v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1984-06-29

In 1972 Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to include state and local governments under the rubric of employers subject to that Act.

Section 2000e includes public employers in its definition of employer without changing the substantive Title VII standard that governs them.

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. · filed 1987-03-25(b)

While public employers were not added to the definition of “employer” in Title VII until 1972, there is no evidence that this mere addition to the definitional section of the statute was intended to transform the substantive standard governing employer conduct.

Section 2000e includes state governments within Title VII’s coverage.

Werthman v. Illinois Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities · filed 1993-08-24

The Eleventh Amendment does not shield the state from damage claims brought under Title VII, however, because Congress explicitly included state governments within the purview of the statute.

Section 2000e’s definitions cover state governments and their agencies, allowing Title VII claims against them despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Rourke v. NY STATE DEPT. OF CORRECT. SERVICES · filed 1995-11-27(a), (b)

It has been stated herein, and the defendants do not contest, that Congress unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate the state government immunity provided by the eleventh amendment by the express language of Title VII. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra ; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) & (b). Accordingly, the defendants are not immune from suit with respect to the plaintiff's Title VII claim.

Section 2000e's definitions bring state governments within Title VII, allowing Title VII claims against them despite Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Rourke v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1995-11-27(a), (b)

It has been stated herein, and the defendants do not contest, that Congress unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate the state government immunity provided by the eleventh amendment by the express language of Title VII. ... Accordingly, the defendants are not immune from suit with respect to the plaintiffs Title VII claim.

Section 2000e’s definitions include state governments among the Title VII respondents from whom a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages.

Iris I. Varner, and United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee v. Illinois State University · filed 1998-10-13

These definitional provisions establish that the States, as potential “respondents,” see supra at 717, are within the class of employers from which a “complaining party” under § 1981a may recover compensatory damages, and they are not elsewhere expressly excluded from that class.

Section 2000e(f) covers employees subject to civil service laws even when their positions are classified as exempt within the civil service system.

Burtnick v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City · filed 2002-10-23(f)

The City placed this new position in the "Civil Service Exempt Class," but again the City never exempted the position from its civil service laws. Accordingly, the position at issue here — in all of its permutations — was subject to the City civil service laws and thus to the requirements of Title VII.

For Title VII’s definition of employer, North Dakota is the employer of a classified employee hired by its securities commissioner, despite the commissioner’s authority to hire and supervise her.

Ferderer v. North Dakota · filed 2006-08-22(b)

The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from these points as a matter of state law is that Ferderer became an employee of the State once she was hired by the securities commissioner. ... Further, for Title YII purposes; the court can discern no reason for reaching a different conclusion.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee broadly enough to cover workers regardless of immigration or visa status, although that status may limit their remedies.

Iweala v. Operational Technologies Services, Inc. · filed 2009-07-14(f)

Following the reasoning of Agri Processor, because neither Title VII nor IRCA clearly expresses Congress’s intent to exclude foreign nationals without proper work visas from Title VII’s coverage, Iweala’s visa status and eligibility for employment with OTS should not preclude her from protection under Title VII, although her visa status and eligibility for employment may limit her remedies.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination.

DINGER v. BRYN MAWR BANK CORPORATION · filed 2022-10-11(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII to expand protections against employment discrimination based on sex to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... The Bank was also aware at the time of Dinger’s termination that her requested absence was due to a medical condition related to pregnancy because the form her doctor submitted to Cigna on December 19 stated her diagnosis was “Postpartum psychosis” and her husband informed her supervisor that she was having issues transitioning back to work following maternity leave.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex under Title VII to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.

VASOLI v. YARDS BREWING COMPANY, LLC · filed 2022-05-05(k)

The term “sex” includes “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on pregnancy-related medical conditions, including postpartum depression.

Navarro v. Robert J. Young Company, LLC · filed 2022-04-18(k)

Defendant’s argument overlooks that the pregnancy discrimination need not be based on pregnancy itself but may also be based on related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Belov v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc. · filed 2021-10-13(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII, as relevant here, to make clear that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

Pregnant and nonpregnant employees are similar in their inability to work when their lifting restrictions prevent both from performing a job’s required lifting, even if the restrictions differ.

Durham v. Rural/Metro Corporation · filed 2020-04-17(k)

Here, as in Young, Durham’s temporary inability to lift more than 50 pounds and her colleagues’ inabilities to lift more than 10 or 20 pounds rendered Durham, and her colleagues injured on the job, equally unable to perform the 100-pound lifting duties of an EMT. Thus, Durham and her colleagues who were injured on the job were “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Under § 2000e(k), once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, the employer must give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying an accommodation.

Townsend v. Town of Brusly · filed 2019-11-08(k)

If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence and presents a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, then the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with a “‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reason[ ] for denying her accommodation.”

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on lactation as sex discrimination because lactation is a medical condition related to pregnancy.

Lampkins v. Mitra QSR KNE, LLC · filed 2019-06-04(k)

Lactating is a medical condition related to pregnancy and therefore "discriminating against a woman who is lactating or expressing breast milk violates Title VII and the PDA."

Section 2000e(k) prohibits adverse employment action based on breastfeeding and requires equal treatment with workers similar in their ability or inability to work.

Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, Alabama · filed 2017-09-07(k)

Taking adverse actions based on woman’s breastfeeding is prohibited by the PDA but employers are not required to give special accommodations to breastfeeding mothers.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to accommodate workers affected by pregnancy or related medical conditions to the same extent as similarly situated workers, absent a nondiscriminatory reason.

Gonzales v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2015-11-05(k)

While the statute does not expressly mandate that employers make reasonable accommodations for pregnant workers, as FEHA does, it does require that employers accommodate pregnant women or those affected by related medical conditions to the same extent that they accommodate other workers, absent a nondiscriminatory reason for doing so.

Section 2000e(k) requires courts assessing a pregnancy accommodation claim to consider whether an employer treats pregnant workers less favorably than nonpregnant workers with similar work limitations.

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2015-03-25(k)

In our view, the Act requires courts to consider the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats nonpregnant workers similar in their ability or inability to work.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy or childbirth as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin · filed 2011-12-09(k)

For purposes of Title VII, discrimination based upon pregnancy or childbirth are included within the terms “ ‘because of sex’ ” or “ ‘on the basis of sex.’ ” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).)

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions and requires affected women to be treated like others with similar ability to work.

Zambrano-Lamhaouhi v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2011-11-21(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to make clear that the phrase “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) can protect an employee affected by childbirth or a related medical condition even if she is no longer pregnant when terminated.

Briggs v. Women in Need, Inc. · filed 2011-08-24(k)

One need not be pregnant at the time of termination to be a member of the PDA’s protected class; rather, this determination is made on a case by case basis.

Section 2000e(k) requires a male employee claiming discrimination related to a partner’s pregnancy to show that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his sex.

Griffin, Charles J. v. Sisters of St. Franc · filed 2007-06-06(k)

That is not to say that all claims relating to pregnancy must be brought by women, but male plaintiffs, like their female counterparts, must prove that they suffered adverse employment actions because of their sex.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.

Bergman v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. · filed 2006-01-18(k)

The PDA requires employers to treat “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Id.

A jury could find that a worker unable to meet a lifting requirement was not similarly situated to drivers who lost their licenses for a § 2000e(k) claim.

Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing Co. · filed 2005-12-22(k)

Given the difference between a male driver who is terminated due to the loss of his license and a female driver given eighteen months of unpaid leave due to an inability to meet the lifting requirement, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a reasonable jury could have found that Walker was not similarly situated to male drivers terminated by Nesbit due to the loss of their CDLs.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with a similar ability or inability to work; it does not require special treatment.

Mullet v. Wayne-Dalton Corp. · filed 2004-09-27(k)

Employers are not required to treat pregnant employees in any special way. Rather, such employees must be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their “ability or inability to work.”

Section 2000e(k) treats the exclusion of prescription contraceptives from an employee health plan as sex based when it burdens women, allowing a disparate treatment claim to proceed.

Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2003-03-28(k)

Under the PDA, seemingly neutral classifications that in fact burden women constitute facial sex discrimination. Further, as only women have the potential to become pregnant, denying a prescription medication that allows women to control their reproductive capacity is necessarily a sex-based exclusion.

Section 2000e(k) covers conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth without requiring the condition and termination to be close in time.

Torres v. Cooperativa De Seguros De Vida De Puerto Rico · filed 2003-02-26(k)

Title VII clearly encompasses conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth without requiring a strict temporal proximity between the condition and the date of termination.

A pregnancy-discrimination claim requires evidence that the employer knew of the pregnancy when it took the challenged employment action.

Riding v. Kaufmann's Department Store · filed 2002-08-08(k)

Plaintiffs counter statement of facts seriously muddies the waters in an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact as to management’s knowledge of her second pregnancy at the time Kaufmann’s demoted her in May 1998, but the record is clear enough to show the evidence does not support an essential element of her claim for pregnancy discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) does not protect an employee from discharge for pregnancy-related absences unless the employer overlooks comparable absences by nonpregnant employees.

Dormeyer, Jennifer v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-08-30(k)

But the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.

Section 2000e(k) does not protect an employee from discharge for pregnancy-related absences unless the employer overlooks absences of nonpregnant employees.

Dormeyer, Jennifer v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-07-24(k)

But the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.

Section 2000e(k) permits an employer to apply the same attendance rules to pregnant and nonpregnant employees, even when absences are caused by pregnancy.

Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois · filed 2000-07-24(k)

But the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of nonpregnant employees are overlooked.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal treatment of employees affected by pregnancy and does not require leave unavailable to other employees.

Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2000-07-14(k)

Plaintiffs argument that pregnant probationary employees should be afforded leave time when other probationary employees are not contradicts the expressly stated purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which is to assure that pregnant women “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) requires evidence supporting a prima facie pregnancy discrimination claim.

Gonzales v. Sea-Mar, Inc. · filed 2000-05-30(k)

In addition, the plaintiff did not offer any evidence to controvert Sea-Mar’s evidence or to support her claims under the PDA and the Equal Pay Act. Based on the undisputed facts, Gonzales has failed to establish a prima facie case under either the PDA or the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e(k) permits an employer to fire a pregnant employee for excessive absences unless it overlooks comparable absences of nonpregnant employees.

Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc. · filed 2000-04-20(k)

The PDA is not violated by an employer who fires a pregnant employee for excessive absences, unless the employer overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees.

Section 2000e(k) protects against discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, but does not cover breast-feeding or child-rearing concerns after pregnancy.

Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. · filed 1997-04-25(k)

I conclude that the PDA only provides protection based on the condition of the mother — not the condition of the child. Also, I conclude that breast-feeding and child rearing concerns after pregnancy are not medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth within the meaning of the PDA.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnant employees to be treated the same as employees with a similar ability or inability to work.

Lang v. Star Herald · filed 1997-03-06(k)

Thus, as the prima facie elements enumerated above demonstrate, Lang must have evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees. In fact, the PDA specifically states that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (emphasis added).

Section 2000e(k)'s pregnancy protection does not cover leave to care for an adopted child.

Pearlstein v. Staten Island University Hospital · filed 1995-04-28(k)

As Pearlstein adopted her child, her leave would not be a pregnancy leave protected under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) does not require employers to treat employees absent because of pregnancy as though they were present at work.

Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Systems Corp. · filed 1993-03-31(k)

What Crnokrak fails to appreciate is that the PDA does not force employers to pretend that absent employees are present whenever their absences are caused by pregnancy.

Menstrual cramps are not a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth under § 2000e(k).

Jirak v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 1992-10-27(k)

While the PDA prohibits discrimination in employment “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), menstrual cramps are not a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.

Section 2000e(k) protects pregnant employees from discrimination without requiring them to show medical necessity.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc. · filed 1991-02-20(k)

A pregnant employee is not required to show medical necessity in order to fall within the protection of Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) does not treat breast-feeding, weaning, or difficulties arising from them as related medical conditions.

Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co. · filed 1990-08-27(k)

We believe these factors indicate Congress’ intent that “related medical conditions” be limited to incapacitating conditions for which medical care or treatment is usual and normal. Neither breast-feeding and weaning, nor difficulties arising therefrom, constitute such conditions.

Section 2000e(k) treats distinctions based on pregnancy or potential pregnancy as overt sex discrimination, which an employer may justify only by showing that infertility is a bona fide occupational qualification.

Grant v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1990-07-20(k)

Accordingly, the PDA transforms distinctions based on pregnancy or potential pregnancy into overt sex discrimination violative of Title VII absent a showing that infertility is a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1983-06-20(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions.

No. · filed 1983-06-30(k)

This statute includes discrimination which is "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child birth or related medical conditions" within the definition of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e(k)'s pregnancy amendment applies prospectively only.

Felippa C. FIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William F. BOLGER, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant · filed 1984-01-06(k)

Note that this amendment was intended to be prospective only in application.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex.

Sylvia HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHELBY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1984-03-16(k)

Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, our analysis of this case must follow the same type of analysis used in any other Title VII sex discrimination suit.

Section 2000e(k) defines pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1984-04-30(k)

The addition of the Pregnancy Amendments in 1978 explicitly defined sex discrimination to comprehend discrimination by reason of pregnancy, so that any pregnancy-regarding policy would thereafter be held to effect disparate treatment of women.

Section 2000e(k) treats adverse employment decisions based on pregnancy as sex discrimination.

Felts v. Radio Distributing Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-14(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes clear that women are discriminated against when their pregnant conditions forms the basis of an adverse employment decision. Defendant conceded that had Shirley Felts not earlier taken maternity leave, there would have been no reason to remove her in July 1982. She was, therefore, discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy, hence sex.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related conditions the same as other conditions that similarly affect an employee’s ability to work.

Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc. · filed 1985-05-06(k)

Because defendant would have allowed a leave of absence of an equivalent duration for any other health condition of comparable severity, plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within discrimination on the basis of sex.

Salazar v. Furr's, Inc. · filed 1986-01-23(k)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), "on the basis of sex” includes "because of or on the basis of pregnancy.”

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy as discrimination based on sex.

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club · filed 1986-02-11(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), infra note 33 treats discrimination on the basis of pregnancy the same as discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with comparable anticipated disabilities; a voluntary advance notice request made of both groups does not violate that rule.

Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc. · filed 1986-09-10(k)

Title VII prohibits employers from treating pregnant employees differently than other employees with predictable future disabilities. ... Moreover, Globcom’s policy makes no request of pregnant employees that it does not also make of all employees, male or female, who anticipate being disabled at some predictable point in the future.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination, including a pretextual demotion when an employee returns from maternity leave.

Lana E. Garner, Cross-Appellant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1987-01-08(k)

It appears to us from the record, the district court had ample grounds to find that Garner had sustained her burden of proving a prima facie case of sexual discrimination under Section 701(k) of Title VII. ... Thus, the Court finds as the District Court found, that on September 12, 1983, a technical act of sex discrimination occurred when Wal-Mart failed to give Garner a position substantially similar to the position which she had occupied on June 17, 1983.

Section 2000e(k) covers discriminatory discharge because of pregnancy and discriminatory refusal to rehire.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Old Dominion Security Corporation · filed 1987-04-14(k)

This case concerns alleged violations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k). ... For the reasons stated by the court below we affirm the conclusion that under either the test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or a standard of overt intent to discriminate, Old Dominion discriminatorily discharged Williams because of her pregnancy and then discriminatorily refused to rehire her.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination because of sex.

Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc. · filed 1987-05-08(k)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and Section 701(k) of the Act provides that "The terms 'because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

A pregnancy-related nonrenewal can establish a prima facie case under § 2000e(k), but an employer can rebut it with a legitimate explanation.

Monroe-Lord v. Hytche · filed 1987-08-19(k)

Plaintiff established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination because she was pregnant in the summer of 1984 when her contract terminated, and defendants failed to renew it. Defendants, however, successfully rebutted plaintiffs prima facie case.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy-related medical conditions as sex discrimination, including when an employer places an employee on unpaid leave because of such a condition.

Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc. · filed 1987-08-27(k)

The first clause of the PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), defines sex discrimination as discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” ... Thus, we agree with the plaintiff that she presented direct evidence of discrimination by establishing that the defendant placed her on unpaid medical leave as a result of a “related medical condition,” and we find that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas test under these circumstances.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination, including when employment-related health insurance excludes pregnancy coverage.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. South Dakota Wheat Growers Ass'n · filed 1988-03-11(k)

That Act included discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, within the definition of sexual discrimination. ... Therefore, if a fringe benefit of employment is health insurance coverage, and the policy does not provide coverage for pregnancy-related conditions, the health insurance coverage is discriminatory on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e(k) applies to pregnancy-related benefits denied before the Supreme Court clarified that it covers employees’ pregnant dependents.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Profile Gear Corporation · filed 1988-03-16(k)

The presumption remains strongly in favor of retroactive application, however, and is not rebutted by anything in the record of this case. Prospective-only application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act would leave some of the Act's intended beneficiaries without remedy, while retroactive application would neither injure innocent third parties nor be inequitable to the defendants, who have shown no substantial detrimental reliance on what turned out to be an erroneous view of the law.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy and pregnancy-related medical conditions within sex discrimination, so employers may not base employment decisions on them.

Estrada v. Donnelly Corp. · filed 1988-06-22(k)

However, an employer may not make employment decisions on the basis of sex, pregnancy, or pregnancy-related medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k), 2000e-2(a); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 37.2101 et seq.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination and protects employees from discriminatory pregnancy leave practices.

Lunsford v. Leis · filed 1988-06-24(k)

For the foregoing reasons, including defendant’s failure to oppose plaintiff’s motion, we conclude that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment that her termination violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, is well taken and should be and is hereby granted.

Section 2000e(k) applies the pregnancy discrimination definition throughout Title VII, allowing claims based on either disparate treatment or disparate impact.

Scherr v. Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 · filed 1988-11-01(k)

Placed where it is within the Act as section 701(k), the PDA supplements the meaning of “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” within Title VII as a whole. ... Because the PDA is part of Title VII and derives its substance and procedures from the Act as a whole, a claim of pregnancy discrimination, like any other claim of discrimination under Title VII, may be based either on a theory of disparate treatment or a theory of disparate impact.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy discrimination within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Sanchez v. Banco Santander—Puerto Rico · filed 1989-10-31(k)

First, she has shown that she was pregnant at the time of her dismissal, and hence a member of the class protected by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

Wilma Cumpiano A/K/A Wilma Cumpiano Sanchez v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico · filed 1990-05-04(k)

Since 1978, gravidity has been so “protected,” that is, the ban on gender-based discrimination has applied explicitly to discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions as sex discrimination.

United States v. Bd. of Educ. of Consol. High Sch. D. 230 · filed 1990-09-06(k)

The PDA, enacted by Congress in 1978 as an amendment to Title VII, defines all discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions” as discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal treatment for employees affected by pregnancy and does not require preferential treatment.

Massie v. Indiana Gas Co. · filed 1990-10-30(k)

Thus, reference to the PDA does not serve as a defense to the plaintiffs charge, as the PDA does not evince a congressional intent to accord better treatment to pregnant workers than is given to other medically disabled employees.

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within sex discrimination.

Porter v. State of Kan. · filed 1991-02-28(k)

Thus, this amendment clarifies that the sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes discrimination based upon pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant and potentially pregnant women like other employees with similar ability to work.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 1991-03-20(k)

Women who are either pregnant or potentially pregnant must be treated like others “similar in their ability ... to work.”

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

O'Loughlin v. Pinchback · filed 1991-05-08(k)

The PDA specifies that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination, and therefore violative of Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) treats employment decisions that adversely affect a woman because of pregnancy as sex discrimination.

Timus v. Secretary of Labor · filed 1991-05-15(k)

The passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), makes clear that sex discrimination includes decisions that adversely affect a woman because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy or related medical conditions as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 1991-05-24(k)

An amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 specifically defines discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy as unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky & Co. · filed 1991-07-11(k)

Section 2000e(k), added in 1978, defines “because of sex” to include pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) requires women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to be treated the same for employment-related purposes as other persons similar in their ability or inability to work.

Rebecca Maganuco, on Behalf of Herself and Numerous Others Similarly Situated v. Leyden Community High School District 2 · filed 1991-08-06(k)

The plain meaning of the PDA, its legislative history, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent discussions of the origins and purposes of the Act all suggest that its scope is limited to policies which impact or treat medical conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth less favorably than other disabilities.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions and requires equal treatment for women affected by them.

Fleming v. Ayers & Associates · filed 1991-11-01(k)

The purpose of the 1978 amendment, as evidenced by its language, was to clarify the scope of Title VII to cover virtually any distinction by employers based on pregnancy-related conditions of employees. This does not encompass adverse employment actions based upon the medical condition of a child simply because the child's condition is present at birth.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions without limiting protection to the pregnant employee.

Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc. · filed 1991-09-30(k)

The first clause of the Act plainly states: “The terms ‘because of sex' or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). ... Therefore, under the terms of the Act itself, Mr. Nicol need not be the pregnant employee to have standing.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination because of sex and requires equal treatment for employment purposes.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Detroit-Macomb Hospital Corp. A/K/A MacOmb Hospital Center · filed 1992-01-27(k)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating among employees on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnant persons to be compared with other persons similar in their ability or inability to work, rather than with men.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ACKERMAN, HOOD & McQUEEN, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1992-02-10(k)

The clear language of the PDA requires the court to compare treatment between pregnant persons and “other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The comparison is, therefore, between pregnant and nonpreg-nant workers, not between men and women.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Card v. Sielaff · filed 1992-03-26(k)

Congress responded to the General Elec, decision by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (the PDA; 42 USC § 2000e [k]) which specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of pregnancy or related medical conditions as sex discrimination.

Adams v. Nolan · filed 1992-04-23(k)

On its face, the order strongly suggests an intent to discriminate against women who are pregnant or have pregnancy-related conditions, which is precisely the type of discrimination expressly prohibited by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy and calls for affected women to be treated like others with a similar ability to work.

Davis v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General · filed 1992-05-11(k)

Pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, sex discrimination includes discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by [these conditions] shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with a similar ability or inability to work.

Atwood v. City of Des Moines · filed 1992-05-13(k)

For purposes of deciding plaintiffs claims, we glean two requirements from this federal legislation: (1) pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees; and (2) if pregnant women are not able to work for medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges, and other benefits as other workers who are disabled from working to the same extent.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination because of pregnancy as discrimination because of sex.

Vigars v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin, Cal. · filed 1992-05-20(k)

In response to several restrictive Supreme Court decisions, Congress amended Title VII to state that "the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy_” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). This amendment, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, expressly prohibits employers from discriminating against women on the basis of pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination; assigning work a pregnant employee cannot perform in the name of equal treatment may show discriminatory intent.

Kelber v. Forest Electric Corp. · filed 1992-07-07(k)

Contrary to Forest Data-com’s claims, nothing in Johnson Controls justifies an employer deliberately giving a pregnant employee an assignment which she cannot and should not perform simply because the employer wants to treat her “the same as” male or non-pregnant female employees. Such a failure to accommodate a pregnant employee's physical limitations might indicate an intent to discriminate against that employee based on her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related disabilities the same as comparable disabilities when providing employment benefits.

United States v. Board Of Education Of The Consolidated High School District 230 · filed 1993-01-07(k)

The provision, therefore, automatically excluded maternity benefits as the sole nonelective medical disability, whereas the provision gave the Board discretion to consider all other illnesses.

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

United States v. Board of Education of Consolidated High School District 230 · filed 1993-01-07(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), which amended Title VII, extends the prohibition in Title VII against gender-based discrimination to include discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions within discrimination on the basis of sex.

Wood v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service · filed 1993-02-03(k)

Under Title VII, the definition of discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Even though Mrs. Woods' seniority and rate of pay remained unchanged, the reduction in her hours following her return from maternity leave raises an inference that this reduction was because of her pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) treats discrimination based on pregnancy as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc. · filed 1993-02-09(k)

Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnant employees with medical work limits to receive the same treatment as other employees with comparable limits.

Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. · filed 1993-04-13(k)

It is undisputed that the PDA: [EJmphasizes that pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same condition as other employees; and when they are not able to work for medical reasons ... [they] must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other benefits, as other workers who are disabled from working.

Section 2000e(k) bars an employer from removing a pregnant employee who can perform her job because of concerns for her health or the employer’s liability.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Corinth, Inc. · filed 1993-06-28(k)

In other words, under the PDA, a pregnant employee’s ability or inability to work is the only factor the employer may consider. Terminating a pregnant employee, or forcing her to take leave, because of concern for her health or concern for the employer’s potential liability, are employment decisions based upon impermissible factors.

Section 2000e(k) requires employees affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to be treated the same as employees with other temporary disabilities.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-09-17(k)

Title VII requires that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions be treated the same as other employees who have temporary disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination, and direct evidence that pregnancy motivated a discharge can defeat summary judgment.

Thompson v. La Petite Academy, Inc. · filed 1993-11-23(k)

In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was added to the definitional section of Title VII. ... Claims under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act are subject to the samé analysis applicable to disparate treatment cases under Title VII. ... Plaintiff has presented sufficient direct evidence in support of such a finding to present a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment.

Section 2000e(k) requires employees affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions to be treated the same as employees with other temporary disabilities.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-11-24(k)

Title VII requires that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions be treated the same as other employees who have temporary disabilities. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions within sex discrimination under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Continuity Programs Inc. · filed 1993-12-23(k)

Discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth or related conditions is expressly included in the definition of actionable sex discrimination, by virtue of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, passed in 1978 to amend Title VII, and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnancy to be treated no less favorably than comparable medical conditions.

LaFleur v. Westridge Consultants, Inc. · filed 1994-02-24(k)

Plaintiff must prove that her employer treats pregnancy less favorably than other medical conditions. ... Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that Defendant treated pregnant employees such as herself less favorably than other employees with comparable medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) defines pregnancy and related conditions as impermissible bases of discrimination under Title VII but creates no separate cause of action.

Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A. · filed 1994-02-28(k)

As a definitional section to Title VII, the Act provides no separate cause of action for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. The Act defines pregnancy and related conditions as among the impermissible bases of discrimination outlined in § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e(k) protects employees from discharge for having, intending to have, or considering an abortion.

Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc. · filed 1994-01-27(k)

For purposes of Title VII analysis, I see no rational distinction between an employee’s communication of the fact that she has had an abortion, that she intends to have an abortion, or that she is considering having an abortion. Discharge on the basis of either of these statements violates federal law.

Section 2000e(k) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because she is considering an abortion.

Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc. · filed 1994-03-08(k)

Because it is a “medical aspect of pregnancy,” the PDA forbids employers from treating an employee differently on the basis of her consideration or use of abortion.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same as similarly affected nonpregnant employees; it does not require employers to offer maternity leave.

Troupe v. The May Department Stores Company, Doing Business as Lord & Taylor · filed 1994-03-31(k)

Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees, even to the point of “conditioning the availability of an employment benefit on an employee’s decision to return to work after the end of the medical disability that pregnancy causes.”

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnant employees to receive the same employment benefits as others with similar ability to work; conditions on benefits available only to pregnant employees do not violate that rule.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Elgin Teachers Association · filed 1994-06-17(k)

Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), provides that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”. Limitations on the benefits available only to pregnant women — such as the rule that a teacher must return to work in order to receive six weeks’ pay without establishing actual inability to teach during that time — do not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal treatment for employees affected by pregnancy, but does not require preferential treatment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-07-19(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, after all, require employers to give preferential treatment to pregnant women.

Section 2000e(k) covers discrimination based on potential or intended pregnancy.

Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. · filed 1994-07-27(k)

There is a first level of analysis, however: whether discriminating against employees based on intended or potential pregnancy is covered by the PDA. The court holds such a classification based on potential or intended pregnancy is covered.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related medical conditions the same as other conditions for employment purposes, including sick leave.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lutheran Family Services · filed 1994-08-31(k)

Accordingly, the only relevant inquiry is whether defendant gave Savage’s leave request consideration and treatment under its “Sick Leave” policy equal to that which defendant would give any other medically-related leave request. ... With respect to the alternative scope of the fourth prong, the court finds that plaintiff has made a satisfactory showing that Savage was treated less favorably than other similarly disabled but nonpregnant employees.

Section 2000e(k) requires a plaintiff claiming discrimination based on a pregnancy-related medical condition to make a prima facie showing that the condition was related to pregnancy.

Brinkman v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 1994-09-13(k)

She must at least make a prima facie showing that her medical conditions at or near the time of her termination were, in fact, related to her pregnancy. Plaintiff has not made such a showing.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within discrimination because of sex.

Kelly v. K.D. Construction of Florida, Inc. · filed 1994-10-26(k)

Title VII defines the term “because of sex” to include “because of pregnancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Kelli Lyn Metz, and v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Cross-Appellee · filed 1994-11-08(k)

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act makes it clear that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination and bars an employer from considering potential future pregnancy leave when deciding a current leave request.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lutheran Family Services · filed 1994-12-05(k)

In 1978, the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter “PDA”), amended Title VII to include discrimination based on pregnancy within the coverage of its general prohibition on sex based discrimination. ... LFS, through its officer and agent Larry Paul, impermissibly considered Savage’s pregnancy and its potential future impact on Savage’s continued ability to work when evaluating her request for leave.

Section 2000e(k) protects pregnancy-related medical conditions, but a plaintiff must show that the condition was related to pregnancy to fall within that protection.

Brinkman v. State of Kan., Dept. of Corrections · filed 1994-11-23(k)

Rather, the court found that absent any evidence of a causal relationship between plaintiff's pregnancy and the degenerative arthritis from which she allegedly suffered at the time of her termination, and which condition she alleged would continue indefinitely, plaintiff could not be considered a member of the class of “pregnant women” protected by the PDA.