42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice unless an employer shows that reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship.

Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company · filed 1972-10-18(j)

One of those amendments incorporates the substance of EEOC Regulation 1605.1. This appears in the following definition of religion: ... "(j) The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." ... This subsequent congressional affirmation strengthens our conclusion about the validity of the regulation.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practice unless doing so would cause undue hardship.

Padon v. White · filed 1979-02-14(j)

The Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal have made it clear that an employer has an affirmative obligation under Title VII to attempt to accommodate his operations to his employee’s religious beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to make good faith efforts to accommodate an employee’s religious practice unless reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship.

McGinnis v. United States Postal Service · filed 1980-12-16(j)

In sum, based on the government’s failure even to attempt an accommodation of Petitioner’s beliefs and on the likelihood that the Postal Service could reasonably arrange some accommodation without undue hardship, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated at least a high probability of ultimate success on the merits of her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(j) requires reasonable accommodation of religious observance or practice absent undue hardship, but a request withdrawn before the employer decides it does not establish a denial of accommodation.

Goldschmidt v. New York State Affordable Housing Corp. · filed 2005-08-08(j)

Although White and Drillings might have discouraged plaintiff from taking leave for the pilgrimage, plaintiff withdrew his request for accommodation before the agencies decided it, and before any alleged denial of a reasonable accommodation occurred. Plaintiffs claim for religious discrimination by denial of a reasonable accommodation is dismissed as a matter of law.

A religious accommodation claim requires the employee to show discharge or discipline for failing to comply with a conflicting work requirement; unpaid leave alone does not suffice.

Tepper v. Potter · filed 2007-10-15(j)

Tepper is simply not being paid for the time he does not work; he has not been disciplined or discharged.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious observance and practice within the definition of religion unless an employer cannot reasonably accommodate them without undue hardship.

Weber v. City of New York · filed 2013-09-29(j)

An individual’s “religion” includes not just religious beliefs, but “all aspects of religious observance and practice,” unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate that observance or practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

Section 2000e(j) includes religious observance and practice within the definition of religion and requires reasonable accommodation unless it would cause undue hardship.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. JBS United States, LLC · filed 2018-09-24(j)

The term "religion" encompasses "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate ... [a] religious observance or practice without undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Section 2000e(j) requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious observances unless doing so would impose undue hardship.

Brennan v. Deluxe Corp. · filed 2019-01-18(j)

Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), "an employer has a 'statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship.' " ... In this case, plaintiff satisfies each element of a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious practice in its definition of religion and requires reasonable accommodation unless the employer shows undue hardship.

Billings v. Murphy · filed 2024-02-06(j)

“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j). ... As alleged, Billings timely rejected the condition that she remove her hijab in front of a male, explained the conflict with her religious practice, and requested a female supervisor, which can be construed as either a request for modification to the original accommodation or a separate accommodation request.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the federal government from Title VII’s general definition of “employer.”

Shirley DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otto E. PASSMAN, Congressman of the United States, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-04-18(b)

In Section 701, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress excluded the federal government from the general definition of “employer,” thus denying federal employees a statutory damage action under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)(1) excludes Indian tribes from the definition of employer when they act as employers.

Eeoc v. Peabody Coal Co. · filed 2005-03-09(b)(1)

Under § 2000e(b), an Indian tribe is specifically exempt from the definition of "employer," and thus Title VII does not apply to Indian tribes when they act as employers.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida · filed 2014-08-20(b)

Because Title VII, by its own terms, does not apply to the Tribe, Congress did not authorize suits against the Tribe under the Act, and the district court therefore lacked subject – matter jurisdiction as to the Tribe.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the federal government from Title VII’s definition of employer, preventing an employer-based interference claim against it.

Eghbali v. Department of Energy at Savannah River National Lab · filed 2015-03-02(b)

Finally, the Bender opinion provided that only an “employer” under Title VII may be liable on an interference claim; however, Title VII expressly excludes the federal government from its definition of employer.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee · filed 2015-05-21(b)

Without such facts, the Tribe cannot face an. action for Title VII violations when Congress expressly excluded them from Title VIPs definition of “employer.”

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Thurmond v. Church · filed 2020-01-30(b)

But Title VII specifically says that “the term ‘employer’ . . . does not include . . . an Indian tribe.” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b). Thus, a person cannot sue an Indian tribe for violating Title VII, even if the tribe discriminated against him in his employment based on his race.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of “employer”.

Seamon v. Navajo Nation Gaming Enterprise · filed 2024-06-26(b)

Relevant here, that immunity extends to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (exempting “Indian tribe[s]” from the definition of “employer” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(b)(i) (exempting “Indian tribe[s]” from the definition of “employer” under Title I of the ADA).

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of “employer” in discrimination cases.

Barker v. Menominee Nation Casino · filed 1995-07-26(b)

Nor has Congress statutorily waived the Tribe’s immunity in Title VII employment cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (specifically excluding Indian tribes from the definition of “employer” in discrimination cases).

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

PENOBSCOT NATION, Appellant, v. Cynthia A. FELLENCER, Appellee · filed 1999-01-19(b)

The district court incorrectly expanded on the holding in Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Maine Human Rights Commission, 960 F.Supp. 449 (D.Me.1997) in determining that the Penob-scot Nation is not exempted from Title VII's coverage.

Section 2000e(b) excludes federal agencies from the definition of “employer,” so Title VII’s opposition clause does not apply to them directly.

King, William v. Jackson, Alphonso · filed 2007-05-29(b)

Although Title VII’s opposition clause itself has no applicability to federal agencies, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” to exclude federal agencies), we have held that a provision of the statute that does apply to federal agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), incorporates the statutory prohibitions that apply to private employers.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer, so the EEOC cannot obtain injunctive relief against the Navajo Nation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Co. · filed 2010-06-23(b)

In our view, this is the better reading of the boilerplate language in the complaint, given that the explicit premise of our holding in Peabody II was that EEOC has no cause of action against the Nation under Title VII and that, as a necessary corollary, EEOC can obtain no injunctive relief against the Nation.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employers.

Nanomantube v. Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas · filed 2011-01-31(b)

It is clear that Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity with regard to Title VII. Indeed, rather than expressing any intention to abrogate tribal immunity, Congress specifically exempted Indian tribes from the definition of “employers” subject to Title VII’s requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)(1) excludes District of Columbia agencies from the employer definition only if they are subject to the full range of competitive service requirements.

Bethel v. Jefferson · filed 1978-11-09(b)(1)

Indeed, the parenthetical qualifier to the definitional phrase relied upon indicates that Section 706, by way of Section 701, leaves out only those units subject to the full panoply of competitive service requirements.

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce that has at least fifteen employees for the required number of calendar weeks.

Royal v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1980-09-16(b)

Defendant is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and at all times herein relevant has employed fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in more than twenty (20) calendar weeks.

Section 2000e(b) covers General Motors as a Title VII employer.

Mosley v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1980-09-30(b)

Defendant General Motors is a Delaware corporation doing business in the State of Missouri. It is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(a), as amended in 1972, brought governments and their agencies and subdivisions within Title VII effective March 24, 1972.

Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education · filed 1981-12-17(a)

Title VII became applicable to governments and their agencies and subdivisions on March 24, 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No.92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970)). Thus the Board was subject to Title VII at the time it notified Schwabenbauer of its decision to deny her tenure and terminate her employment.

Section 2000e’s coverage of government employers applies prospectively from the 1972 amendments; governments are not subject to suit for earlier discrimination.

Manning v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction · filed 1983-02-01

Pri- or to the 1972 amendments, governments were not entities subject to suit under § 2000e. The 1972 amendments have only been applied prospectively.

A village can qualify as a person and employer under Title VII, and a suit against its officials in their official capacities is a suit against the village.

Bertoncini v. Schrimpf · filed 1989-05-04(a), (b)

There is no question that the Village is both a person and an employer under the statute, and therefore a proper defendant here. ... Thus, the court finds that plaintiff has sued the defendants in their official capacities, and accordingly that the only real defendant in this case is the Village.

Section 2000e defines persons to include units of government, a definition the ADA incorporates when defining employers.

Melinda Erickson, United States of America, Intervenor v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Nort · filed 2000-03-27(a)

By incorporating 42 U.S.C. sec.2000e, the ADA defines persons, and thus employers, to include units of government.

The 1972 amendment to § 2000e(b) brought state and local governments within Title VII’s employer definition prospectively, effective March 24, 1972.

Schwabenbauer v. Board Of Education Of The City School District Of The City Of Olean · filed 1985-11-22(b)

Prior to March 24, 1972, Title VII was inapplicable "to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-1 (1970)) or to "a State or political subdivision thereof" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) (1970)). These exceptions were eliminated, effective March 24, 1972, by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, Sec. 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) (1970)) and Sec. 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-1 (1970)). ... Those decisions establish that however the Board be viewed, the 1972 Act did not retroactively apply to it.

Section 2000e defines “person” and “industry affecting commerce” to include governments and governmental activities.

Zimmerman v. State of Oregon Department of Justice · filed 1999-03-18(a), (h)

Completing the picture of who is covered, the statute defines “person” and “industry affecting commerce” to include a governmental “industry, business or activity.”

Section 2000e’s employer requirement is an element of a Title VII claim, not a limit on the court’s jurisdiction.

Claussen v. Muchowski · filed 2022-09-26(b)

Thus, just as the numerosity threshold constitutes a non-jurisdictional requirement, the scope of employer requirement constitutes a non-jurisdictional question as well.

Section 701 defines terms for Title VII and does not confer subject matter jurisdiction.

Wigginess Inc. v. Fruchtman · filed 1979-12-28

Moreover, Civil Rights Act § 701 has nothing to do with jurisdiction; it merely defines terms for the purposes of title VII.

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer and an employee under Title VII.

Tillman v. Holy Cross Hospital · filed 1987-03-31

The Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Plaintiff is an employee within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Section 2000e defines who is an employee and who is an employer for Title VII purposes.

Graham v. Texasgulf, Inc. · filed 1987-06-18(b), (f)

For purposes of Title VII, the plaintiff is an “employee” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) and the defendants Tex-asgulf and Elf Aquitaine are “employer[s]” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines which employers and labor organizations are covered by Title VII.

Donnell v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1987-07-28(b), (e)

3. GM is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and U.A.W. is a labor organization within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and (e).

Section 2000e(b) defines the employers subject to Title VII and covers a public park and planning commission.

Hughley v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission · filed 1987-08-13(b)

Defendant Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (“the Commission”) is an employer subject to Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definitions cover the plaintiff as an employee and Exxon as an employer under Title VII.

Wood v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1987-11-23

Plaintiff is an employee and Defendant (hereinafter also “Exxon” or the “Company”) is an employer as those terms are used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) and in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”).

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include political subdivisions.

Opinion No. · filed 1991-10-16(a)

The term "person" as used in this statute includes political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a).

Section 2000e defines employees and employers for Title VII purposes.

Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. · filed 1993-05-14(b), (f)

The named plaintiffs are employees within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 16. ... Eveleth Mines is an employer within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 17.

Section 2000e defines employers to include governmental entities and excludes policy-making appointees from the employee definition.

Attorney General Opinion No. · filed 1993-05-17(a), (b), (f)

"Employer" includes governments, governmental agencies, and their agents. 42 U.S.C.S. sec. 2000e (a) and (b). ... An applicant for employment is an "employee" for purposes of title 7 unless an exemption applies. ... Therefore, it is our opinion that an applicant for a vacancy on the Kansas appellate courts is not an "employee" for purposes of title 7 and would not be afforded coverage under the act because of the exemption for appointees on a policy making level.

Section 2000e does not itself provide federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction.

Cinotti v. Adelman · filed 2016-05-06

She also alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 134(3), 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. However, these statutes do not provide for federal court subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer coverage requirement is an element of a Title VII claim, not a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.

Dalton v. Sweet Honey Tea, Inc. · filed 2023-11-30(b)

But contrary to Defendants’ repeated assertions in their briefing, the question of whether an employer (or employee) is covered under Title VII is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather goes to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.

Section 2000e(b) defines an “employer,” and subsection (f) defines an “employee” for Title VII coverage.

Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp. · filed 1973-11-07(b), (f)

The defendant Tri-State Container Corporation (Tri-State) is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and each of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs is an “employee” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employee and an employer under Title VII.

Burroughs v. Marathon Oil Co. · filed 1978-02-28

Plaintiff is an employee and defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. 2000e.

Section 2000e(k) permits retroactive compensation when an employer’s health plan covers employees’ pregnancy expenses but excludes comparable expenses incurred by employees’ spouses.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Puget Sound Log Scaling and Grading Bureau, and Northwest Log Scalers Associa · filed 1985-01-29(k)

Puget Sound chose to provide minimal coverage, knowing that the minimum might be found to be unlawful; it cannot now complain that it is being required retroactively to compensate the employees for risks it had opportunity and good reason to insure from the beginning.

Section 2000e(k) defines discrimination because of sex to include discrimination based on pregnancy, making pregnancy-based employment policies facial sex discrimination after October 31, 1978.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways · filed 1981-06-22(k)

The 1978 Amendment incorporating pregnancy discrimination into Title VII's definition of sex discrimination makes Pan Am's Start Policy facial sex discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) defines “because of sex” to include discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky · filed 1981-05-11(k)

As of April 29, 1979, Title VII was amended to provide that the term “because of sex” would include the meaning “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Pub.L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to include pregnancy disabilities in employee benefit plans.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky · filed 1980-01-28(k)

The effect of the amendment is to require employers, such as those suing here, to include pregnancy disabilities in their employee benefit plans.

Section 2000e(k) does not require an employer to provide a benefit program merely because employees might seek pregnancy-related benefits.

National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Bell · filed 1980-01-15(k)

Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to provide programs in and of itself does not violate the PDA.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnancy-related conditions to receive the same treatment as other conditions under employment fringe benefit programs, even if that produces a disparity in benefits received by men and women.

Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission · filed 1980-03-06(k)

Since the enactment of the Gilbert amendment, the extent to which a disability plan covering pregnancy may result in a “benefit package” worth more to female employees than to male employees must be viewed as a congressionally mandated disparity.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy-related conditions within sex discrimination and requires employers to bring pregnancy-leave policies into compliance.

Communications Workers of America v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1980-05-05(k)

Based on this amendment, an employer’s policies regarding pregnancy-related leaves must be modified where necessary to conform to this explicit “broadening [of] the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination.”

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions and requires equal treatment for similarly able or unable employees.

Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1980-12-23(k)

The legislative history, as well as the statutory language itself, make clear that after October 31, 1978, “distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.”

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy related discrimination as sex discrimination and requires pregnant employees to receive the same employment treatment as similarly able employees.

Fancher v. Veterans Administration Medical Center · filed 1981-02-10(k)

Ms. Fancher’s post-amendment claims, namely, that she was not reinstated to the position which she held prior to becoming pregnant, will be considered pursuant to the standard set forth in § 2000e(k). These claims appear to fall squarely within the language of the statute, in that the plaintiff is contending that she was not treated similarly to others returning from a leave of absence who were gone for reasons other than pregnancy.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act defines sex discrimination to include discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, and requires equal treatment for affected women.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1981-02-25(k)

The PDA altered this only with respect to female employees and applicants for employment, leaving intact the principles previously enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gilbert. Therefore, based on the existing principles of Title VII as set forth by the Supreme Court in Gilbert and set out in the Opinion of this Court, we HOLD that the disability plan of the plaintiff, which provides disability coverage for dependents of employees but limits that coverage with respect to pregnancy-related expenses of spouses of employees does not constitute gender-based discrimination.

Section 2000e(k) includes pregnancy and related medical conditions within Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination for all employment purposes.

Thompson v. Board of Education of the Romeo Community Schools · filed 1981-11-20(k)

On that date, legislation was enacted and became effective that defined Title VII’s proscription against discrimination “on the basis of sex” and “because of sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, to include pregnancy and its related medical conditions for all employment purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). ... Therefore, in evaluating employment practices subsequent to October 31, 1978, policies which create distinctions or discriminate on the basis of pregnancy are in violation absent a showing of a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers that provide travel and per diem benefits for comparable medical conditions to provide them to employees obtaining abortions.

Peace Corps Employment Policies for Pregnant Volunteers · filed 1981-11-20(k)

We conclude that under the PDA the Peace Corps must continue to pay travel and per diem expenses for volunteers evacuated to have an abortion, so long as it provides such compensation for other volunteers evacuated for comparable medical conditions.

Section 2000e(k)'s pregnancy protections do not apply to employment events before the amendment took effect.

Rose Schwabenbauer v. Board Of Education Of The City School District Of The City Of Olean · filed 1981-12-17(k)

As of April 29, 1979, Title VII was amended to provide, in relevant part that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, Act of October 31, 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979). Since Congress provided that the amendment would take effect on the date of its enactment, Act of 1978, § 2(a) (except as to certain benefit programs in effect on the enactment date, as to which effectiveness was delayed 180 days, id. § 2(b)), there is no basis for applying the 1979 amendment to Schwabenbauer's experiences in 1968-72.

Section 2000e(k) defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n · filed 1982-02-09(k)

Title VII was amended in 1978 to specifically incorporate the philosophy of this regulation into the Act. Known under the popular name of “The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,” the amendment specifically includes discrimination based on the fact or condition of pregnancy within the definition of sex discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), 1964, as amended, 1978.

Historical rule, superseded by Newport News (1983): Section 2000e(k) was read to exclude health plans for employees' dependents.

EEOC v. Emerson Elec. Co. · filed 1982-03-31(k)

Therefore, the Court holds that the PDA does not apply to the facts of this case. The PDA applies only to employees and applicants for employment.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers that provide disability benefits for comparable conditions to provide pregnancy disability benefits to women whose leave began before the Act took effect.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Group Hospital Service, Inc. · filed 1982-05-14(k)

The plainest reading of the Act, and the reading which this Court adopts, requires employers to begin compensating women for pregnancy-related disabilities on April 29, 1979, if they were already compensating men for “similar” disabilities.

Section 2000e(k) treats employment distinctions based on pregnancy as sex discrimination under Title VII.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-08-18(k)

The statute clearly indicates that distinctions among employees that are based upon pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to treat pregnancy-related inability to work the same as comparable nonpregnancy disabilities when granting leave.

Conners v. University of Tennessee Press · filed 1982-12-20(k)

The denial of a leave of absence because of temporary pregnancy complications violates Title VII when leaves are generally granted for non-pregnancy related disabilities.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal employment opportunity for women affected by pregnancy and permits states to guarantee pregnancy disability leave.

California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra · filed 1985-04-16(k)

The PDA does not require states to ignore pregnancy. It requires that women be treated equally. ... It necessarily follows that Title VII does not preempt a state law that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII.

Section 2000e(k) measures equal treatment of pregnant employees by employment opportunity and coverage of actual disability needs, rather than identical leave benefits.

California Federal Sayings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra · filed 1985-04-16(k)

Thus, equality under the PDA must be measured in employment opportunity, not necessarily in amounts of money expended — or in amounts of days of disability leave expended. Equality in the disability context compares coverage to actual need, not coverage to hypothetical identical needs.

Section 2000e(k) prohibits pregnancy-based distinctions in employment-related disability benefits, including benefits for employees’ spouses.

Schiffman v. Cimarron Aircraft Corp. · filed 1985-08-08(k)

This Court holds that the disability insurance plan made available to employees of the Defendant does not comply with the PDA and, therefore, discriminates against the Plaintiff by making an unlawful distinction based on pregnancy.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy benefit terms as sex discrimination when they give married male employees a more favorable medical benefits package than married female employees.

Hillesland v. Paccar, Inc. · filed 1986-07-16(k)

We find that defendant's plan discriminates against plaintiff because of her sex, because the package of benefits she, as a married female employe, receives is less comprehensive than the package of benefits the married male employe receives. The latter's wife, if pregnant at the time of his discharge, is covered for medical costs associated with that pregnancy for which plaintiff, pregnant at the time of her discharge, is not covered.

Section 2000e(k) permits states to require pregnancy disability benefits above the federal minimum, subject to limits on treatment based on stereotypes.

California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra · filed 1987-01-13(k)

Accordingly, subject to certain limitations, [17] we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above which they may not rise." 758 F. 2d, at 396.

Section 2000e(k) reaches pregnancy benefits for employees’ dependents, and that interpretation applies to earlier conduct absent sufficient grounds for prospective application.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Vucitech · filed 1988-03-16(k)

At all events, all of the parties assume, and so shall we, that once the Pregnancy Discrimination Act had been interpreted to apply to dependents’ benefits, the baby bonus plan was unquestionably in violation of the Act. ... Prospective-only application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act would leave some of the Act’s intended beneficiaries without remedy, while retroactive application would neither injure innocent third parties nor be inequitable to the defendants, who have shown no substantial detrimental reliance on what turned out to be an erroneous view of the law.

Section 2000e(k) requires pregnancy-related expenses to be treated on the same terms as other medical expenses under an employment benefit plan, including its preexisting conditions rule.

Vance v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1989-06-08(k)

Thus, subjecting pregnancy-related expenses to the preexisting conditions rule, which applies to other disabilities and diseases, conforms with both the PDA and the EEOC regulations.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers to give pregnant employees the sick leave benefits commonly available to similarly situated temporarily disabled workers and prohibits firing them for using those benefits.

Miranda BYRD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKESHORE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-09-01(k)

The effect of our decision today is simple: it is a violation of the PDA for an employer to deny a pregnant employee the benefits ... commonly afforded temporarily disabled workers in similar positions, or to discharge a pregnant employee for using those benefits.

Section 2000e(k) requires employers that provide disability leave to provide pregnancy disability leave on the same terms.

Johnson v. University of Iowa · filed 2004-12-16(k)

Therefore, if an employer provides disability leave to employees disabled to a similar extent as pregnancy, the employer must provide biological mothers the same disability leave.

Section 2000e(b)’s Indian-tribe exemption can cover a tribal school board even if it is incorporated under state law.

Stathis v. Marty Indian School Board Inc. · filed 2021-09-17(b)

Under Jim and Giedosh, the Board would fall within Title VII’s Indjan-tribe exemption even if it were still a South Dakota nonprofit corporation.

A private corporation can qualify as an Indian tribe under § 2000e(b)’s Title VII exception.

Jim v. Shiprock Associated Schools · filed 2020-11-10(b)

On de novo review, we conclude that the corporation constitutes an “Indian tribe” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes and consortia controlled by their member tribes for the tribes’ benefit from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Montella v. Chugachmiut · filed 2017-09-25(b)

While Defendant itself is not a tribe, it is nonetheless exempt under Title VII because it is a consortium organization controlled by its member tribes and operated to benefit those tribes.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer, including a business enterprise legally inseparable from a tribe.

Johnson v. Choctaw Management/Services Enterprise · filed 2005-09-20(b)

Regardless of CM/SE’s immunity status, it is clear that CM/SE is an “Indian tribe” for purposes of Title VII and therefore exempt from its coverage.

Section 2000e excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Tomsky v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 2005-07-14(b)(1)

However, the Mohegan Tribe expressly has not consented to the applicability of Title VII, ... and Title VII ... expressly excludes Indian tribal employers from its coverage.

Section 2000e(b)(1) excludes Indian tribes from the definition of “employer,” so Title VII does not apply when they act as employers.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Company · filed 2005-03-10(b)(1)

Under § 2000e(b), an Indian tribe is specifically exempt from the definition of “employer,” and thus Title VII does not apply to Indian tribes when they act as employers.

Section 2000e(b)(1) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Bethel v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 2000-06-15(b)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, specifically excluded Indian tribes, such as the Mohegan tribe and the MTGE, MTGA, from the definition of an “employer” for the purpose of that Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l).

Section 2000e(b) excludes from Title VII a tribal agency controlled by tribal authorities that performs traditional and vital functions for its member tribes.

Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes · filed 1985-05-30(b)

Because CERT is directly accountable to established tribal authorities that control its operations, and it performs traditional and vital functions on behalf of its tribal members, I find and conclude that CERT is a tribal agency exempt from Title VII.

Section 2000e excludes Indian tribes from the definition of employer, exempting them from Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory discharge.

Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe · filed 1980-06-17(b)(1)

On the other hand, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e specifically exempts Indian tribes from compliance with the prohibition against discriminatory discharge from employment.

Section 2000e exempts Indian tribes from Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory discharge from employment.

Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Florida · filed 1985-04-22(b)

Such a declaration can be found in Title VII, which permits the Tribes to prefer tribal members over non-members in their employment practices, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; or in section 1303 of the ICRA, which provides that the writ of habeas corpus is the only remedy available for those tribal members who wish to contest the legitimacy of their confinement by a tribal court.

Section 2000e(b)’s Indian tribe exemption from the definition of employer covers a council composed and controlled by member tribes pursuing a common economic purpose.

Nancy J. DILLE, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-09-19(b)

Congress certainly could not have intended to withdraw the exemption anytime a group of Indian tribes coalesce for a common purpose related to economic development. Because the council is entirely comprised of the member tribes and the decisions of the council are made by the designated representatives of those tribes, CERT falls directly within the scope of the Indian tribe exemption that Congress included in Title VII.

A corporation incorporated under state law and majority-owned by an Indian tribe does not fall within the Indian tribe exception to Title VII’s definition of employer.

Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1989-06-29(b)

First, DLSMC argues that plaintiffs Title VII claim should be dismissed because it falls within the Indian Tribe exception as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and that the ADEA claim should be dismissed because the ADEA does not apply to businesses on the Reservation. These arguments are without merit.

Section 2000e(b)’s exclusion of Indian tribes from the definition of employer does not apply in Maine when it would preempt the state’s civil employment laws.

Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Maine Human Rights Commission · filed 1997-04-02(b)

As made clear by this statute, no federal law that grants a special status to an Indian group and preempts the civil law of the State of Maine shall apply within the State. Thus, the Title VII exemption of Indians from its definition of “employer” does not apply to Indians residing in the State of Maine.

A nonprofit corporation created and controlled by Indian tribes to run a collective enterprise falls within Title VII’s Indian tribe exemption from the definition of employer.

Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc. · filed 1998-10-06(b)

Like the collection of tribes in Dille, Modoc was organized to control a collective enterprise and therefore falls within the scope of the Indian Tribe exemption of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Thomas v. Dugan · filed 1998-12-31(b)

An Indian tribe is specifically excluded from the definition of "em- ployer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Therefore, the district court properly held that Appellants' Title VII claims fail for that rea- son.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of “employer”; the exemption applies to the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians.

Shannon v. Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians · filed 1999-06-03(b)

Persuaded that the Title VII exemption, a law generally applicable to Indian tribes that grants a special status to Indian tribes, neither affects nor ' preempts Maine law, the Court holds that the Title VII exemption applies to the Band and that therefore Plaintiffs Motion to Amend her Amended Complaint to add a cause of action under Title VII would be futile.

Section 2000e excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Boudman v. Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians · filed 1999-06-16(b)

In light of the statutory evidence, discussed above, that Defendant is to be treated like the Maliseet Indians, the Court concludes that Defendant also is exempt from Title VTI.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Fillion v. Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians · filed 1999-06-16(b)

For the reasons explained in Shannon, the Band is exempt from Title VII and Plaintiffs Motion to Amend to add a Title VII claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes, including a tribally controlled housing authority organized under state law, from Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Duke v. Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority · filed 1999-12-20(b)

Because Congress expressly exempted Indian tribes from Title VII and ASHA qualifies as a tribe under our case law, the statute does not create a cause of action against the housing authority so as to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Charland v. Little Six, Inc. · filed 2000-08-31(b)

The statutes upon which Plaintiff relied forbid discrimination by “employers.” Both statutes expressly provide that “an Indian tribe” is not an employer. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i).

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer, so an employee cannot bring a Title VII claim against a tribe.

Hines v. Grand Casinos of Louisiana, LLC · filed 2001-02-22(b)

The text of Title VII defines an “employer,” and Congress clearly and unequivocally removed Indian tribes from that definition.

Section 2000e excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of an employer, so a tribe cannot be joined as a defendant on a Title VII claim.

Hines v. Grand Casinos L L C · filed 2002-01-08(b)

Title VII explicitly excludes Indian tribes from its scope, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and thus the Indian Tribe can- not be joined.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes and a tribally controlled casino commission from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Tenney v. Iowa Tribe of Kansas · filed 2003-01-07(b)

The exclusion of Indian tribes from the definition of employer under Title VII has been applied to other entities and corporations of Indian tribes. ... The court sees no reason not to apply this exclusion here where the Tribe has established a Commission to conduct a gambling casino.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes, including their economic enterprises, from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Hartman v. Golden Eagle Casino, Inc. · filed 2003-01-08(b)

Title VII does not allow private employment discrimination claims against Indian tribes because it specifically exempts Indian tribes from the definition of employer. ... The exclusion of Indian Tribes from the definition of employer has been applied to economic entities of Indian Tribes.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Ryan · filed 2005-12-05(b)

Section 2000e(b) of title 42 of the United States Code defines “employer” and expressly provides that “such term does not include... an Indian tribe.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(emphasis added). The Commission does not dispute that the Band is not subject to Title VII. ... Nothing in MICSA or AMBSA undermines the Band’s claim that it is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Per the statute’s plain meaning that is uncontested here, I conclude that the Aroostook Band of Micmacs is not subject to suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer, so Title VII claims cannot be brought against tribes or their agencies or businesses.

Ferguson v. SMSC Gaming Enterprise · filed 2007-02-15(b)

However, Title VII explicitly states that the term “employer” does not include “an Indian tribe.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2003). Therefore, Title VII claims cannot be brought against Indian tribes or their agencies or businesses.

Section 2000e(b) excludes an Indian tribe from Title VII’s definition of employer, but the Lumbee Tribe did not qualify for that exclusion.

Cummings v. Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina · filed 2008-12-08(b)

In applying this standard to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina cannot be considered an Indian Tribe excluded from the definition of “employer” for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes American Indian tribes and their arms and agencies from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino · filed 2015-04-07(b)

The district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII claim was proper because Title VII expressly excludes American Indian tribes from its definition of covered employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The exclusion extends to the arms and agencies of an American Indian tribe.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employers, so Title VII does not abrogate their sovereign immunity.

Sanders v. Anoatubby · filed 2015-11-23(b)

“Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity with regard to Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Bruguier v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians · filed 2017-02-21(b)

A second reason to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII claims against- the Tribe is that an Indian tribe is not an “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Toahty v. Kimsey · filed 2019-10-11(b)

To the extent the complaint can be construed to assert a claim for employment discrimination, Title VII excludes Indian tribes.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Dutchover v. Moapa Band of Paiute Indians · filed 2021-05-03(b)

In addition to being dismissed due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, Dutchover’s Title VII claims are also dismissed because Title VII “specifically exempts Indian tribes from its coverage.” E.E.O.C. v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the Tribe is exempt from Title VII claims, Dutchover’s claims for Title VII violations and retaliation against the Tribe are dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Butler v. Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe · filed 2021-06-28(b)

Butler’s claims arise under three federal statutes – the ADEA, the EPA, and Title VII. None of those statutes applies to Indian tribes when the matters at issue are purely internal, as here.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Cooper v. Forest County Potawatomi Hotel & Casino · filed 2024-04-22(b)

Not only has the Tribe’s sovereign immunity not been abrogated or waived, the Tribe is expressly exempt from suits under the plain language of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Lau v. Becarra · filed 2024-08-27(b)

Congress has exempted Indian tribes from the definition of “employer” as used in Title VII and the ADA.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII's definition of employer.

Arizona Public Service Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations · filed 1990-10-08(b)

APS goes to great lengths to argue that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 preempts Navajo law. APS does so despite the fact that Congress specifically exempted Indian tribes from coverage in the Act and specifically permitted preferential employment of Indians on or near Indian reservations.

The 1972 amendment removing § 2000e(b)'s exclusion for states and political subdivisions does not apply retroactively to earlier employment decisions.

Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education · filed 1985-11-22(b)

These exceptions were eliminated, effective March 24, 1972, by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970)) and § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1970)). ... Those decisions establish that however the Board be viewed, the 1972 Act did not retroactively apply to it.

Section 2000e(k)'s pregnancy discrimination amendment does not apply retroactively to conduct before its enactment.

Condit v. United Air Lines · filed 1980-09-10(k)

There is nothing to indicate that the amendment should have retroactive application. To the contrary, section 2(b) expressly provides that it shall not apply to any fringe benefit program in effect on the date of enactment until 180 days thereafter.

Section 2000e(k) does not apply to conduct before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s October 31, 1978 effective date.

Rita ZUNIGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KLEBERG COUNTY HOSPITAL, KINGSVILLE, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-12-06(k)

The events in our case all occurred prior to October 31, 1978, the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub.L. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The Act amended Title VII through the addition of section 701(k), which prohibits discrimination in employment “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979). ... The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not apply to the present case.

Section 2000e(k)'s pregnancy discrimination requirements apply from the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's effective date, including to benefits for employees' spouses.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Texas Industries · filed 1986-02-14(k)

Finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983), should be applied retroactively to the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, we affirm.

Section 2000e(k) requires equal pregnancy-related benefits for employees’ spouses from the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s effective date.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Texas Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-02-14(k)

Because the Supreme Court found that Congress clearly intended to change the relevant law, its ruling should be applied retroactively to the effective date of the Act.

Section 2000e(k) does not require employers to grant full service credit for pregnancy leaves taken before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act became effective.

Hulteen v. At&t Corporation · filed 2006-03-07(k)

The PDA, effective in 1979, was intended to prohibit future use of that accounting distinction.

Section 2000e(k)’s pregnancy definition does not govern conduct that occurred before the 1978 amendment.

Wambheim v. J. C. Penney Co. · filed 1981-04-20(k)

The Civil Rights Act was amended in 1978 to include pregnancy as a factor in the definition of “on the basis of sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Because the facts in this section took place before 1978, this case is not controlled by the amendment; accordingly, we do not consider it.

Section 2000e(k) treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination but does not require employers to recalculate service credit for pregnancy leave taken before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act took effect.

Ameritech Benefit v. Communications Work · filed 2000-07-13(k)

Moreover, the PDA has not been treated as a retroactive statute, ... and so Ameritech would have had no reason to think it had to reshuffle its NCS list after the Act was passed.

Section 2000e(k) does not retroactively require employers to revise service credit for pregnancy leaves taken before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act took effect.

Ameritech Benefit Plan Committee v. Communication Workers of America, Annette Foster-Hall, and Bernadette Bernabei v. Am · filed 2000-07-13(k)

Moreover, the PDA has not been treated as a retroactive statute, see ... and so Ameritech would have had no reason to think it had to reshuffle its NCS list after the Act was passed.

Section 2000e(k) permits a state pregnancy leave requirement when an employer can comply with both laws by extending comparable leave to other workers.

Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry · filed 1981-06-08(k)

The MMLA does not require plaintiff to violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The MMLA does mandate that employers such as plaintiff grant a reasonable leave to employees who are disabled due to pregnancy. Plaintiff, however, can comply with both the MMLA and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by amending its policy for its Montana stores to allow reasonable leaves of absence to any first year employees who miss work due to any sickness or disability.

Section 2000e(k) does not preempt state tort claims for fetal injuries caused by a negligent employer when the employer can comply with both state law and Title VII.

Asad v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 2004-06-04(k)

In conclusion, where, as here, state law does not render employers incapable of compliance with the mandates of the PDA and Title VII, the state law is not preempted.

Title VII’s definition of employee excludes an elected official’s personal staff; the source of the worker’s salary alone does not determine whether the exclusion applies.

Brisbane v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee · filed 2022-02-22(f)

Nor can the Court, on its own, find that the source of Plaintiff’s salary has any impact on the applicability of this exemption.

Whether an elected official’s aide falls within § 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception can require factual development before dismissal.

TRUSH v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2021-12-06(f)

Under Title VII and the PHRA, a plaintiff must fit within the statute’s definition of employee to be subject to its protections. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Because these highly factual questions would be better answered after the parties have had an opportunity to generate a record, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exemption does not exclude a staff attorney who plausibly alleges that he worked through several supervisors rather than directly for an elected judge.

GIORDANO v. THE UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2021-03-30(f)

Based on the Teneyuca factors and Giordano’s allegations in the Amended Complaint, Giordano has sufficiently alleged that he did not fit within the “personal staff” exemption.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Lockwood v. McMillan · filed 2017-02-24(f)

Therefore, the Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ms. Lockwood qualifies as the personal staff of an elected official. Accordingly, Ms. Lockwood is not an “employee” within the meaning of the statute, and the City is entitled to summary judgment on her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a person chosen for an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of “employee”.

Crain v. Butler · filed 2005-12-09(f)

Because Koenig was a member of Butler’s personal staff, she does not fall within the definition of “employee” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes from Title VII’s definition of employee a person outside state civil service who serves on an elected official’s personal staff or is appointed at the policymaking level.

Wanda Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court John J. Donnelly, Presiding Judge · filed 2004-12-01(f)

Upon consideration of these factors, we hold as a matter of law that Birch is exempt from Title VII as a member of Judge Donnelly's "personal staff." ... Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Birch's Title VII claim on the independent ground that she is exempt from the statute's protections as a policymaking employee.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a deputy sheriff serving on an elected sheriff’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Walker v. Connecticut · filed 2000-07-07(f)

Further, Walker himself is not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII. ... The High Sheriff is an elected official of a political subdivision of the State. ... Each High Sheriff has the right to hire deputies, such as Walker, and advise him of any and all work assignments, to which it is then the duty of the deputy to accede. ... The Court believes this reasoning is well-founded and now follows same. Accordingly, summary judgment on Walker’s Title VII claim against the Estate of Mak in his official and individual capacities, is granted.

Section 2000e(f) excludes certain policymaking appointees and personal staff from Title VII's definition of employee.

Patrick v. City of Florala · filed 1992-03-06(f)

The defendants seek dismissal of Patrick’s Title VII claim on grounds that, as Chief of Police, Patrick occupied a poli-cymaking position exempt from the coverage of Title VII. ... See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (exempting from Title VII coverage appointees on policymaking levels and members of “personal staff” directly accountable to elected officials). Patrick’s status as an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII is a question of federal, rather than of state, law. ... The court construes this exemption narrowly. ... The Eleventh Circuit has identified several factors that the court may consider to determine whether a plaintiff falls within the “personal staff” exception to Title VIPs definition of employee. ... The court finds that this question cannot be resolved based solely on the allegations in the pleadings. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss Patrick’s Title VII claim will be denied.

Section 2000e(f) excludes specified public officials and staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, but a clerical worker is not excluded merely because a county labels the position exempt.

Carter v. Sedgwick County · filed 1988-02-16(f)

Here, it is uncontroverted that plaintiff’s responsibilities were purely clerical. She made no policy and was not considered to be working at a “policymaking level.” Therefore, this court must conclude that she falls within the definition of a Title VII “employee”, despite her “classified exempt” designation.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Brewster v. Pike · filed 1985-05-13(f)

The statutes are meaningless when they refer to the “personal staff” of a public official if they do not apply in this case. Therefore, the court holds that Mrs. Brewster was not an employee within the meaning of either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exception excludes an undersheriff whose position requires a close working relationship with an elected sheriff from Title VII coverage.

Owens v. Rush · filed 1981-06-29(f)

Considering the nature of the Undersheriff's position and the close working relationship required to perform effectively in the position, we must conclude that plaintiff was in the type of job which Congress intended to be within the personal staff exception of § 2000e(f) and thus outside Title VII coverage.

Section 2000e(f) does not exclude juvenile court staff attorneys from Title VII coverage as an elected official's personal staff or immediate advisers when they lack a close advisory relationship with the judge.

Marafino v. ST. LOUIS CTY. CIRCUIT COURT · filed 1982-03-29(f)

The Court concludes that the position of staff attorney in the Juvenile Court was not that of "an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office" of a person elected to public office in the State of Missouri or a political subdivision of Missouri, or a member of such an official's personal staff, so as to except the position of staff attorney from Title VII coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f)'s employee exemption is narrowly construed and does not cover a staff director who lacks the immediate, personal advisory relationship with an elected official that the exception requires.

Anderson v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1982-10-12(f)

In sum, considering the facts of this case and construing the exemption narrowly, we conclude that the staff director does not formulate policy or advise the mayor so as to create the immediate and personal relationship required by the exception. Accordingly, we hold that the exemption provided by section 2000e(f) does not apply to the position at issue here.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointee on a policy-making level from Title VII's definition of employee.

Cronovich v. Dunn · filed 1983-10-11(f)

I am not satisfied that the “serve at pleasure” quality of a position is necessary to exempt it from Title VII under Section 701(f).

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee; the nature of the working relationship determines whether a deputy qualifies.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1984-03-21(f)

Thus, although the construction of the language of the Act is to be narrow, I conclude that the position of deputy sheriff of Patrick County is precisely the sort of job Congress envisioned to be within the “personal staff” of an elected official and thus exempt from Title VII. The exclusive powers of selection and retention by sheriff, the legal authority of the deputy to perform all functions and duties of sheriff, the public’s perception of a deputy, the nature of the personal accountability between a deputy and sheriff, the size of the sheriff’s staff, and the rural nature of Patrick County indicate to me that sheriff’s deputies in Patrick County are not “employees” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal-staff exception depends on a deputy sheriff's actual duties and working relationship with the elected sheriff.

CURL v. REAVIS · filed 1984-08-01(f)

Whether Curl is to be treated as a member of the Sheriff's personal staff requires a careful examination of the nature and circumstances of her role in the Sheriff's Department. ... We cannot conclude that Curl was a member of the Sheriff's personal staff, and as an employee she is entitled to pursue her remedies under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes probation officers who serve on an elected judge’s personal staff and lack civil service protection from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Clark v. Tarrant County, Tex. · filed 1985-03-20(f)

The Court holds the position of probation officer within TCAPD is that of a member of the “personal staff” of an elected official, that such position is not a civil service position, and thus as a matter of law Plaintiffs have no claim under the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exception is construed narrowly in light of the employment relationship with the elected official.

Sharyl TENEYUCA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEXAR COUNTY, Bill White, and Charles T. Conaway, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1985-08-02(f)

This Court’s consideration of these factors must be tempered by the legislative history of this provision which indicates that the exception is to be narrowly construed.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exception does not exclude a deputy sheriff whose correctional officer duties did not place her in an intimate or high-level role on the sheriff's staff.

Brewster v. Barnes · filed 1986-04-10(f)

Our holding that Brewster was not a member of Shockley's "personal staff" and, thus, was an "employee" under the Equal Pay Act, similarly requires us to hold that Brewster was an "employee" under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exception does not exclude road deputies who lack a highly intimate working relationship with the sheriff and do not advise on policy.

United States v. Gregory · filed 1987-05-19(f)

We therefore reverse the district court's conclusion that the road deputy position fell within the personal staff exception to Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exemption is narrow and does not cover a deputy who neither makes policy nor closely advises the elected official.

Starrett v. Wadley · filed 1989-05-22(f)

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff did not “formulate policy or advise [Wadley] so as to create the immediate and personal relationship” that is required for the “narrow exemption intended by Congress.” Anderson, 690 F.2d at 801.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee, even if a different person later holds the elective office.

Rose Walton and John Walton v. State of Michigan, State Judicial Council, and Judge Adam A. Shakoor · filed 1990-11-23(f)

In excluding from the coverage of Title VII a staff person chosen by an elected official, the statute makes no exception for the situation where there happens to have been a change in the identity of the individual holding the elective office. The statute excepts one chosen for a personal staff job by "any" elected officer, without qualification; this cannot mean that a staff member automatically comes within the protection of Title VII whenever the appointing officeholder is replaced.

Title VII’s employee definition narrowly excludes an elected official’s personal staff; whether the exclusion applies depends on the employee’s relationship with that official.

Rabouin v. Colorado Department of Law · filed 1990-12-20(f)

The personal staff exception is narrowly construed. ... I conclude that plaintiff has established a genuine factual dispute as to whether her position was to “formulate policy or advise [Woodard] so as to create the immediate and personal relationship” required for the “narrow exception intended by Congress.”

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official's personal staff from the definition of employee, subject to the civil service exception.

Paxton v. Bearden · filed 1992-02-18(f)

The term “employee” is subsequently defined as “an individual employed by an employer_” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). This definition contains an important exception: ... The court thus finds that although Doyle’s action in terminating Paxton was blatantly violative of Title VII, Paxton was a member of Doyle’s personal staff and thus outside the coverage of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)'s personal staff exception requires an intimate and personal employment relationship; an elected official's power to hire and fire alone is insufficient.

Johnson v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS FOR CTY. OF FREMONT · filed 1994-07-29(f)

The mere fact Cheek had the exclusive power to hire and fire Plaintiffs does not establish the intimate and personal employment relationship that is necessary between an elected official and his personal staff.

Section 2000e(f)’s personal staff exception requires a factual basis for deciding whether the employee’s position is excluded from Title VII coverage.

Dubisar-Dewberry v. Folmar · filed 1995-04-14(f)

Hence, the court finds that at this stage of the litigation, there is not an adequate factual basis to determine whether the plaintiffs employment position falls within the “personal staff’ exception to Title VII’s definition of “employee.” Accordingly, the court finds that the motion to dismiss is in this regard due to be denied.