42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit.

Shortey v. Kansas City Shippers Association · filed 2024-07-25(f)(1)

After reieving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, a plaintiff has 90 days to file. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Yet this lawsuit was not filed until 93 days later on September 13, 2023. As a result, her claim is time barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the EEOC gives notice that a right-to-sue letter has been issued and the filing period has begun.

FARROW v. PITTSBURGH PUBLIC SCHOOLS · filed 2024-07-25(f)(1)

Accordingly, under Hayes, an EEOC email will alone serve as sufficient notice under Title VII when that email informs the claimant or the claimant’s representative that a final decision on the claimant’s charge has been rendered and that the 90-day filing window has commenced.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Kline v. United Airlines, Inc · filed 2024-07-31(f)(1)

“Under Title VII, the plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC.” ... Because the undisputed and uncontroverted evidence produced by United shows that Kline did not timely sue about claims arising from the First Charge, those claims are now barred.

A Title VII plaintiff has ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file a civil action.

Wallace v. FIMCO Inc. · filed 2024-08-01(f)(1)

Under statute, a person aggrieved of an unlawful employment practice may bring a Title VII civil action up to ninety days after the giving of their right-to-sue notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee ninety days after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to sue the employer.

Davis v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. · filed 2024-08-01(f)(1)

TriStar is correct in that “[o]nce the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the employee has ninety days to sue the employer.” Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). However, here, Davis filed her complaint on September 10, 2023, alleging that the EEOC issued Davis her right-to-sue letter on June 14, 2023. (See Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13). Taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the complaint was filed within the 90-day window.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a charging party to sue after receiving a right-to-sue letter; provisions requiring a reasonable-cause determination do not apply when the EEOC makes no such determination.

Cunningham v. Weinstein · filed 2024-08-08(f)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff now has a right to file her own lawsuit based on the allegations in her charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Plaintiff premised her Petition on other provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(1), which apply where the EEOC makes a determination of reasonable cause. Dkt. 1. Those provisions do not apply here, where the EEOC has declined to make a determination of reasonable cause.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file a timely EEOC complaint, obtain a right-to-sue letter, and sue within ninety days of receiving it; submitting the letter with an opposition brief can defeat a motion to dismiss based on its absence from the complaint.

Ramirez v. City Of New York · filed 2024-08-22(e)–(f)

Title VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust available administrative remedies by filing a timely complaint with the EEOC, obtaining a right-to-sue letter, and filing suit within ninety days of the receipt of that letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)–(f). ... Defendants say that Ramirez’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because Ramirez did not attach the right-to-sue letter to her complaint. Since Ramirez attached her letter as an exhibit to her opposition brief, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied on this basis.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing suit in federal court.

Blain v. Milwaukee County · filed 2024-10-29(f)(1)

As a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court, Title VII requires a plaintiff to receive a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. ... Accordingly, the County is also entitled to summary judgment based on Blain’s undisputed failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing suit; a letter issued after dismissal does not cure the failure to obtain one first.

Blain v. Milwaukee County · filed 2024-12-11(f)(1)

But the EEOC issued this letter after this Court had already dismissed his case, and the law requires a plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing suit. ... Accordingly, Blain’s after-the-fact letter does not alter the fact that he filed his case without having first obtained the letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit; on a motion to dismiss, the court credits the claimant’s alleged receipt date.

Agapov v. UBIF Franchising Co. · filed 2024-12-16(f)(1)

Accordingly, at this stage, the Court accepts as true that Plaintiff received the right-to-sue letter in mid-September 2022. Ninety days from September 15, 2022 is December 14, 2022. Plaintiff filed this action on December 6, 2022.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Sobolewski v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2024-12-26(f)(1)

According to the right-to-sue letter, Ms. Sobolewski had ninety days to file a lawsuit. ... She filed the present lawsuit on August 15, 2024, over three years after her ninety days had elapsed. ... Therefore, Ms. Soboleski’s claim is untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period begins when the EEOC gives notice that unambiguously communicates its final decision and the claimant's time to sue; an email linking to a right-to-sue letter must itself convey that information.

Garcia-Gesualdo v. Honeywell Aerospace of P.R., Inc. · filed 2025-04-24(f)(1)

Although we agree that providing a link (as opposed to an attachment) via email could be sufficient to provide notice, as we have explained, the transmitting email must also provide information with respect to the link that would satisfy the notice requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing a Title VII claim; in a Texas state-court suit against a state entity, failure to plead receipt is a jurisdictional defect.

Sharma v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center El Paso · filed 2025-04-24(f)(1)

As we concluded in Reeves, the failure to allege “the filing of a timely charge [with EEOC] or the receipt of a right to sue letter [from EEOC] deprived the trial court of jurisdiction” of a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after notice of the right to sue to file a civil action; an emailed notice may be presumed delivered when the EEOC posts it and sends an alert.

Nascimben v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2025-05-02(f)(1)

Applying the presumption, the NRS is presumed to have been delivered on August 28, 2023, the date it was posted, and an email was sent to Plaintiff informing him it was available for download, Dkt. 35-1 at 19—meaning Plaintiff filed 135 days after receipt, well outside of the ninety-day window.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an ADA claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit.

Kanter v. Behlen Mfg. · filed 2025-05-13(f)(1)

In ADA cases, the charging party has 90 days from the receipt of the right-to-sue notice to file a civil complaint based on her charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not authorize the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter before 180 days have passed unless it has dismissed the charge.

Prichard v. Long Island University · filed 2025-07-30(f)(1)

As that passage makes clear, the statute does not authorize the EEOC to issue a RTS letter for a charge it has not dismissed less than 180 days after the charge is filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII plaintiff who is entitled to a right-to-sue letter to proceed when the EEOC has not issued one.

Hussey v. Vantage Financial, LLC · filed 2025-08-13(f)(1)

This exception comes from language in Title VII that requires the EEOC to notify the employee if it has not filed a civil action or entered into a conciliation agreement to which the employee is a party within 180 days of the filing of a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... The Court finds that when a plaintiff can demonstrate that they are entitled to a right-to-sue letter, but a letter has not been issued, the plaintiff need not obtain a right-to-sue letter and may proceed with their Title VII claim.

After 180 days from filing an EEOC charge, a Title VII claimant may request a right-to-sue letter and file suit in federal court.

Zurek v. Marshall Field & Company · filed 1994-03-08(f)(1)

Zurek's counsel should have known that she could have requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC 180 days after filing the charge, and then filed suit herself in federal district court.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a timely Title VII suit after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Town of East Haven · filed 1998-03-25(f)

Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint and suit after receipt of a ... right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue letter requirement can be satisfied after an ADA action is filed.

Smith v. Horton Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-09-02(f)(1)

Horton has abandoned the failure to exhaust claim as Smith, subsequent to filing this action, received a right to sue letter, thus establishing the condition precedent to bringing an ADA action.

A Title VII claimant who receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter after dismissal may reopen the action and proceed when reopening causes no prejudice.

Timmons v. UPS · filed 2022-04-18(f)(1)

Instead of filing a new case, Plaintiff has moved to reopen his case and submitted his Right-to Sue letter. (Doc. 25.) ... Therefore, the court finds that reopening the case and allowing Plaintiff to proceed on his Title VII and ADA claims are in the interest of judicial economy and would not result in prejudice to Defendants.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice after dismissing a charge without waiting 180 days.

HAMMOND v. STRIP DISTRICT MEATS, INC. · filed 2022-09-29(f)(1)

While the statute provides two instances in which the EEOC must issue a notice of suit rights, the language of the statute has been interpreted as not requiring that the EEOC wait the full 180 days until issuing a notice. ... Under the circumstances presented, the Court therefore finds that Plaintiff did not fail to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing the present action.

A Title VII plaintiff may proceed when her EEOC charge gave notice of her claims, even if the right-to-sue notice mentions only an ADEA claim.

Bowen · filed 2026-03-05(f)(1)

As both reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies have been satisfied by Plaintiff’s administrative charge, the fact that the attached EEOC Notice referred to the ADEA claim alone does not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing her Title VII claims at this juncture.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to receive an EEOC right-to-sue notice before filing suit; a premature suit may be dismissed without prejudice.

Galloway · filed 2026-03-16(f)(1)

Because the plaintiff has clearly stated that she has not exhausted her administrative remedies, the court will dismiss this case without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter before pursuing a Title VII claim in federal court.

Drayton · filed 2026-06-23(f)(1)

Here, because the record does not demonstrate that Drayton has received a right-to-sue letter, at this time, he cannot pursue his Title VII and ADA claims in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over an EEOC suit to enforce a Title VII conciliation agreement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bay Ridge Toyota, Inc. · filed 2004-07-15(f)(3)

Here, EEOC’s suit to enforce the Andujar Conciliation Agreement is brought directly under Title VII and, therefore, this Court has subject matter ... jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over an employee’s claim to enforce a settlement agreement resolving a Title VII charge.

Morigney v. Engineered Custom Plastics Corp. · filed 1993-05-13(f)(3)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that this action is “brought under” Title VII, and the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim for a breach of the settlement agreement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Garus v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-12-16(f)(3)

Thus, for Title VII venue purposes, Congress has determined that no distinction is to be drawn between districts in multi-district states based on the location of the district vis-a-vis the place where the alleged misconduct occurred: location within the same state as the alleged misconduct is sufficient.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over actions brought under Title VII, but not private contract claims to enforce settlements of Title VII suits.

Louie Morris, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. City of Hobart, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 1994-11-04(f)(3)

The jurisdictional grant embodied in Title VII states only that federal courts have jurisdiction over actions “brought under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f) does not provide federal jurisdiction to enforce a private settlement that was not reached through the statutory conciliation process.

Cook v. City of Pomona · filed 1995-04-11(f)

While the EEOC acted to facilitate the settlement negotiations, this does not make the product of those negotiations a conciliation agreement reached following the procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal district courts jurisdiction over actions to enforce EEOC predetermination settlement agreements.

Owens v. West · filed 2001-10-18(f)(3)

Accordingly, this Court concludes that enforcement of an EEOC pre-determination settlement agreement is a civil action brought directly under Title VII and, therefore, governed by its relevant procedural requirements.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not give federal courts jurisdiction over a claim for breach of a discrimination settlement negotiated by a state agency.

Hunter v. Ohio Veterans Home · filed 2003-06-26(f)(3)

However, there is no indication that Congress intended to provide a federal forum for enforcement of all conciliation agreements involving Title VII issues, especially those mediated by state administrative agencies. ... Because this is a state cause of action for the breach of a contract negotiated by a state agency, it should be handled by the state courts of Ohio.

An action to enforce a Title VII settlement agreement is an action brought under Title VII.

Klein v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System · filed 2003-05-15(f)(3)

Accordingly, we conclude that Klein's action is part of her initial Title VII claim, and as such, sovereign immunity does not lie.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not provide district court jurisdiction over a federal employee’s suit to enforce a predetermination settlement agreement.

Munoz v. Mabus · filed 2010-12-27(f)(3)

In other words, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over such claims because they are not “brought under” Title VII § 706(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over disputes concerning Title VII settlements negotiated through EEOC mediation.

Liberty of Oklahoma Corporation v. Tobiason · filed 2024-07-22(f)(3)

The court therefore concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Liberty’s complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Before the 1991 amendments, § 2000e-5(g) allowed equitable relief such as reinstatement and back pay, but not compensatory damages for emotional distress.

Small v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. · filed 1994-01-20(g)

Plaintiffs allegations that Defendant’s conduct caused Plaintiff “deep[ ] distress,” (Compl. at ¶ 11), and “acute emotional distress,” (Compl. at ¶26) are irrelevant to Plaintiffs Title VII claim because the pre1991 version of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII provide for equitable relief such as reinstatement or back pay, and not for recovery of compensatory damages for such things as pain and suffering and emotional distress. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1981).

Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act, § 2000e-5(g) authorized equitable relief but not compensatory damages for Title VII retaliation.

Berry v. Chevrolet · filed 1996-01-19(g)

We now address whether the compensatory damages awarded Mr. Reynolds were available under Title VII prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. We hold that they were not. ... Title VII, on the other hand, clearly states the remedy available. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5 does not itself provide compensatory or punitive damages.

Boe v. AlliedSignal Inc. · filed 2001-02-15

Section 2000e-5, in turn, does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5 does not itself provide compensatory or punitive damages.

Johnson v. Ed Bozarth 1 Park Meadows Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 2004-01-14

Section 12117 leads me to Title VII remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits equitable relief, including injunctions and back pay, but does not provide compensatory or punitive damages.

Arredondo v. S2 YACHTS · filed 2007-07-25(g)(1)

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages.

Section 2000e-5 does not authorize compensatory or punitive damages for ADA retaliation claims that incorporate its remedies.

Infantolino v. Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry · filed 2008-10-01

Section 12117 in turn adopts the remedies set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, in particular, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Section 2000e-5 does not authorize compensatory or punitive damages. ... I agree with this analysis, and therefore conclude that compensatory and punitive damages are not available for claims brought pursuant to the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s deadline for filing a private Title VII suit cannot be shortened in advance by an employment agreement.

Thomas v. EOTech, LLC · filed 2026-03-04(f)(1)

We hold that parties may not prospectively render untimely a lawsuit that would otherwise be timely under Title VII or the ADEA.

Section 2000e-5’s filing deadlines, incorporated into ADA claims, cannot be shortened by an employment contract.

Scott v. Guardsmark Security · filed 1995-01-20

The Defendant’s contract would shorten a time limit established by federal mandate. This is abhorrent to public policy and defeats federally-protected rights of workers. This Court would not enforce a contract that required an employee to waive his or her federal protections. Similarly, this Court will not enforce a contract that reduces the time limits to assert a federal cause of action.

Section 2000e-5 sets short deadlines for filing employment discrimination charges and court complaints, reflecting a policy against delay.

Sanders v. Venture Stores, Incorporated · filed 1995-05-23

It requires charges to be filed within 180 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), and the court complaint to be filed within 90 days after receipt of the EEOC “right-to-sue” letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Implicit in this legislation is a policy that there should be no delay in employment discrimination cases.

A six-month contractual filing deadline cannot bar a Title VII claim when the EEOC’s period of exclusive jurisdiction would prevent the employee from suing in time.

Lewis v. Harper Hospital · filed 2002-12-23(f)(1)

Were this Court to uphold the six month limitation of action clause as to Plaintiffs Title VII claim, the EEOC’s period of exclusive jurisdiction would have the effect of abrogating Plaintiffs ability to bring a Title VII suit. ... For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s right-to-sue requirement makes a six-month contractual deadline unenforceable against claims that require an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton Homes, Inc. · filed 2013-08-02(f)(1)

The Court therefore agrees with the majority view of the lopsided split in the federal courts on this issue, and holds that a six-month limitations period is unenforceable against claims that require an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC charge and right-to-sue procedures make a six-month contractual deadline to file a Title VII suit unreasonable.

Njang v. Whitestone Group, Inc. · filed 2016-05-18(f)(1)

Thus, merely by complying with the administrative exhaustion requirements of Title VII, plaintiffs are typically precluded from bringing their claims in court within six months of the challenged conduct, which means that a six-month limitations period has the practical effect of waiving employees’ substantive rights under Title VII. ... For this reason, this Court finds that a six-month limitations period amounts to “a practical abrogation of the right of action” under Title VII, ... and thus is unreasonable as applied to Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5’s filing periods cannot be prospectively shortened by an employment agreement.

Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino · filed 2019-09-25

The limitation period of Title VII is part of an elaborate pre-suit process that must be followed before any litigation may commence. Contractual alteration of this process abrogates substantive rights and contravenes Congress’s uniform nationwide legal regime for Title VII lawsuits.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s deadline for filing suit applies to ADA employment claims and cannot be prospectively shortened by contract.

Thompson v. Fresh Products, LLC · filed 2021-01-15(f)(1)

As in the Title VII context, permitting parties to shorten the period in which an employee may bring a civil action under the ADA risks “removing the incentive of employers to cooperate with the EEOC,” undermining the value of pre-suit cooperative processes, and frustrating the uniform application of the statute. ... Because it incorporates Title VII’s self-contained limitations period, the ADA’s time limitation is a substantive right that may not be waived.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit, and an employment contract cannot prospectively shorten that period.

Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co. · filed 2022-04-26(f)(1)

Title VII required Boshaw to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). He did so. Nonetheless, Midland argues that Boshaw’s suit is untimely because he did not bring it within 180 days of his termination, as required by his employment contract. But because Title VII’s statute of limitations is a substantive statutory right that an employee may not prospectively waive, the contractual provision at issue is unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5 empowers the EEOC to investigate employment discrimination charges; state law cannot obstruct those investigations by requiring a court order for every subpoena.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Orange · filed 1995-11-28

As the federal agency with primary responsibility in this area, EEOC is empowered by statute to investigate charges of discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Accordingly, the Texas statute is preempted to the extent that it thwarts the EEOC’s efforts to carry out the manifest intent of the Congress.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit; equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from invoking that deadline when its active steps cause the plaintiff reasonably to miss it.

Webb v. Playmonster Group · filed 2025-11-20(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff has 90 days after receiving her right-to-sue letter to file a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... At the pleading stage, it is reasonable to infer from Webb’s allegations, both that New Playmonster took active steps in the form of contacting Webb’s counsel to tell them that Webb was suing the wrong party, and that Webb reasonably relied on New Playmonster’s conduct by amending her complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing deadline is not equitably tolled when a plaintiff unreasonably delays accessing a right-to-sue letter despite having time to file.

Gray v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 2025-03-10(f)(1)

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s lack of diligence and unreasonable delay tip the scales against equitable tolling in this case. Plaintiffs Complaint was therefore filed 79 days too late and must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days to file after receiving a right-to-sue letter; equitable tolling requires wrongful conduct or extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control that prevented timely filing.

Sonya Heath v. GoHealth, LLC · filed 2025-01-27(f)(1)

Heath received her right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on January 10, 2023, so she had until April 10 to file her complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing 90-day deadline). ... Thus, Heath failed to show that she was prevented from timely filing her Title VII claim due to wrongful conduct by GoHealth or extraordinary circumstances beyond her control.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when an employer sufficiently misleads an employee; plausible allegations of that conduct can defeat a futility objection to amendment.

BYRD v. MOTT MACDONALD GROUP INC · filed 2025-01-28(e)(1)

The allegations could plausibly support a finding that Defendant sufficiently misled Plaintiff to sustain an equitable tolling determination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day deadline to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter is subject to equitable tolling.

Gortemiller v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2024-05-15(f)(1)

Title VII’s requirement that a charging individual file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional and may therefore be equitably tolled. ... Given that Tyson has not demonstrated any prejudice, the Court will allow the required one day of equitable tolling needed to make the filing timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice is subject to equitable tolling in rare circumstances outside a diligent plaintiff’s control.

Timmons v. Southwest Research Institute · filed 2024-04-29(f)(1)

However, the 90-day limit is subject to equitable tolling. ... These are rare and exceptional circumstances that were outside Plaintiff’s control. For that reason, a strict application of the 90-day statute of limitations would be inequitable, and thus tolling is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days to file a civil action after notice that the EEOC dismissed a charge, subject to equitable tolling.

Horning v. Raimondo · filed 2023-10-23(f)(1)

If the EEOC dismisses the charge, the plaintiff must file a civil action within 90 days of the dismissal of the charge. ... The 90-day statute-of-limitations is “subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling.” ... None of these circumstances warrant equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit; equitable tolling does not cover ordinary attorney filing errors.

RUDY v. TAPESTRY SENIOR HOUSING MANAGEMENT · filed 2023-09-14(f)(1)

“A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5. Pursuant to that provision, a Title VII complainant has 90 days from the receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter to bring an action in court.” ... The Court finds that counsel’s inability to navigate the electronic filing system of the court of common pleas does not rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance required for equitable tolling but merely amounts to an attorney error. ... As Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the circumstances justifying equitable tolling are present here and certainly are not asserted in the SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling. As such, the Court finds that this civil action is time-barred and will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period can be equitably tolled when a plaintiff plausibly alleges that the employer’s conduct induced the delay.

Ring v. Denton County Emergency Services District 1 · filed 2023-09-27(f)(1)

On September 15, 2021, Ring received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, which began a ninety-day window within which he was required to file suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... At this stage, Ring must only show that his proposed equitable tolling pleading is plausible. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Ring’s equitable tolling assertion survives Rule 12(b)(6)’s standards.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit after notice of a right to sue may be equitably tolled when reasonable grounds exist.

Pitts v. Baltimore City, Maryland Baltimore Police Department · filed 2023-04-28(f)(1)

Accordingly, reasonable grounds exist for an equitable tolling of one day and the Complaint shall be deemed to have been timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives employees in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge, and that deadline may be equitably tolled when an employer’s failure to post required notices leaves an employee unaware of her rights.

Hammer v. Cardio Medical Products, Inc. · filed 2005-05-18(e)(1)

In a deferral state, such as Pennsylvania, a plaintiff is required to file a Title VII or ADEA charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... Thus, she asserts the failure to post as a ground for tolling and, accordingly, the District Court should give her the opportunity to demonstrate the existence of these factors.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge filing deadline may be equitably tolled when an employer fails to post required notices and the employee lacks knowledge of complaint procedures; active misleading is not required.

Mercado v. The Ritz-Carlton · filed 2005-05-31(e)(1)

After careful review of the case law, however, we conclude the court erred in utilizing the "actively misled" standard in the context of a failure-to-post claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when a later state-court decision could shorten the applicable period despite the claimant’s diligence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. · filed 2005-06-01(e)(1)

Because Mr. Moses pursued his rights diligently, within the parameters of the governing federal law, equity is served by tolling the filing period from the time the 180 days elapsed (around February 15, 2002) until the time he filed his charge (April 8, 2002). His charge was timely filed, and Defendant’s motion must therefore be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a diligent plaintiff initially names the wrong employer and the correct employer has notice without prejudice.

Yowman v. Jefferson County Community Supervision & Corrections Department · filed 2005-01-28(f)(1)

Here, the ninety-day limitations period for proceeding against JCCSCD is subject to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period is not tolled while an employee gathers information to substantiate a discrimination claim.

Asbedian v. New York City Human Resources Administration · filed 1998-03-12(e)

Accordingly, the limitations period is not tolled during the time when plaintiff was seeking information. As a result, his claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day deadline for filing an administrative discrimination charge can be equitably tolled when required notice of filing rights is not given.

Carter v. District of Columbia · filed 1998-08-04(e)(1)

Furthermore, because the only incident of discrimination alleged took place on September 24, 1991, plaintiff would have had to file her Title VII-based administrative complaint with the EEOC or with the DCHR within 300 days of the incident, or by approximately July 24,1992. ... Any delays in filing her Title VII discrimination claim either with the DCHR or with this Court therefore are not the fault of plaintiff and should be excused regardless of any pre-existing time-bar.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 180-day EEOC charge deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but a claimant who retained counsel during that period and gives no reason the charge could not be filed cannot justify tolling based on mental incapacity.

Hood v. Sears Roebuck & Co · filed 1999-03-04(e)(1)

This fact indicates that her mental state did not prevent her from pursuing her legal rights under Title VII during the filing period. Hood offers no reason for arriving at a contrary conclusion. She, therefore, cannot justify equitable tolling and her Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to file a timely EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day EEOC charge deadline is not tolled by a claimant’s mistaken belief that she filed a charge unless the EEOC lulled or affirmatively induced her into inaction.

Rios v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1999-03-11(e)

Even if plaintiff mistakenly believed that she had filed a charge on April 14, 1994, the court finds that plaintiff was not “lulled” into this belief by Davidson, and further finds that Davidson’s alleged behavior does not rise to the level of “affirmative inducement” contemplated by the Seventh Circuit. Because equitable tolling does not apply, this court finds that plaintiffs complaint is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when employees rely on a pending class action to protect their claims.

Smith v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 2000-03-07(e)

The court finds that any deficiencies in plaintiffs’ filing of EEOC charges are cured by equitable tolling. ... Thus, the charges are deemed timely filed since the plaintiffs in this case relied on the earlier filing of the Roberts plaintiffs to protect their interests.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets a 300-day filing period for a discrimination charge; equitable tolling does not excuse a failure to investigate possible discrimination with due diligence.

Jackson, James F. v. Rockford Housing · filed 2000-05-23(e)

In this case, Jackson filed his complaint some eight years after Title VII’s 300-day statute of limitations had expired. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(e). ... However understandable Jackson’s inaction was, we cannot toll the statute of limitations in this case.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge may be equitably tolled while an employer leads an employee to believe it is seeking another position for her.

England v. United Insurance Co. of America · filed 2000-05-31(e)

As a condition precedent to the right to file a civil action under Title VII for employment discrimination, a plaintiff must file a charge alleging unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... Thus, in this case, the 180-day filing period would be tolled during any time that Carraway led the Plaintiffs to believe that he was trying to place them in another job. ... Accordingly, summary judgment would be improper on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s filing limit is nonjurisdictional and may be equitably tolled when the defendant misled or deceived the plaintiff to prevent timely filing.

Peterson v. West · filed 2000-10-27(f)(1)

However, the statute of limitations provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) is not jurisdictional. ... Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit has rarely found equitable tolling of the filing period to be appropriate, noting that such relief is only available where the defendant misled or deceived the plaintiff in order to prevent timely filing. ... The undersigned therefore finds that the Plaintiffs complaint was not timely filed and there is no reason to apply equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Fils-Aime v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 2001-01-04(e)(1)

While it is clear that Fils-Aime failed to file a charge with the EEOC within three hundred days of her termination, the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is “a requirement that ... is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”

Section 2000e-5(e), incorporated into the ADA, requires an EEOC complaint within 300 days of an allegedly discriminatory act, including a failure to accommodate.

Schapiro v. New York City Department of Health · filed 2001-01-10(e)

Moreover, as the City contends, any of Schapiro’s claims arising prior to July 31, 1993 are time-barred. A complainant must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory actions, including failure to make reasonable accommodation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling, but delayed receipt of an EEOC notice does not warrant tolling when the plaintiff’s own failure to update his address caused the delay.

Day v. Lincoln Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2001-01-10(f)(1)

Day’s delay in informing the EEOC of his correct address caused the delay in his actual receipt of the right-to-sue letter, *524 and he thus cannot claim the benefit of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is tolled while a complaint and in forma pauperis motion are pending; if the motion is denied, the period resumes, subject to a reasonable time to pay the filing fee.

Scary v. Philadelphia Gas Works · filed 2001-05-25(f)(1)

The Court holds that the filing of an ifp motion with a complaint tolls the statute of limitations until the ifp motion is decided. If the ifp motion is denied, the statutory period begins running again; however, the plaintiff will have a reasonable time after the denial of the motion to pay the filing fee.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, subject to equitable tolling in limited circumstances.

Raymon Bledsoe, Sr. v. Nucor-Yamato Steel · filed 2001-08-30(e)(1)

Title VII requires a claimant to file an administrative charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1). It is undisputed that Mr. Bledsoe did not file a timely claim. ... Further, nothing approaching affirmative misconduct occurred on the part of the EEOC. Thus, we hold the Court did not err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Bledsoe's Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives claimants 300 days to file an EEOC charge, but that filing period is subject to equitable tolling.

Schele v. Porter Memorial Hospital · filed 2001-09-04(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), claimants have 300 days from an alleged discriminatory act to file a charge with the EEOC. Nevertheless, filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs time to file an EEOC charge is subject to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely Title VII charge; equitable tolling requires government conduct that misleads the claimant and diligence in preserving her rights.

Curtis v. Radioshack Corp. · filed 2002-02-28(e)(1)

Equitable tolling is appropriate only when a court or agency of the government has misled the plaintiff to believe to his detriment that he or she has done everything required. ... The DCHCR did not mislead plaintiff into believing that she has done everything necessary to preserve her claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day EEOC charge filing deadline may be equitably tolled when a claimant diligently pursues a charge but EEOC delay causes a late filing.

Jacobs v. SUNY at Buffalo School of Medicine · filed 2002-03-09(e)(1)

Considering the equities of the excuse offered to explain the delay in filing, and plaintiffs diligence in pursuing her claims, the court finds that Dr. Jacobs is entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling. Thus, her Title VII claims stand.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s EEOC charge filing deadline may be equitably tolled, but lack of diligence and unreasonable ignorance of the deadline weigh against tolling.

Black v. Columbus Public Schools · filed 2002-05-08(e)(1)

In addition, Plaintiffs lack of diligence in pursuing her rights and her unreasonableness in remaining ignorant of the limitation period for filing an EEOC charge weigh heavily against the application of equitable tolling. ... The Court therefore declines to equitably toll the limitation period for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period was not equitably tolled when the plaintiff learned that a right-to-sue letter had been issued but waited months to file.

Doyle v. Masonic Home of MO · filed 2002-07-22(f)(1)

We agree with the District Court that Doyle provided no valid basis for equitable tolling. Among other reasons, Doyle does not dispute that he received the EEOC’s October 2000 letter stating that his Missouri Commission on Human Rights charge was being dismissed as duplicative of his EEOC charge and that an EEOC right-to-sue letter had been issued in May. Thus, he had notice well before June 2001 that the EEOC had issued its right-to-sue letter in May 2000, yet he waited until September 2001 to file his complaint.

An FMLA filing with the Department of Labor does not toll the 300-day deadline for filing an ADA charge with the EEOC.

Peter v. Lincoln Technical Institute, Inc. · filed 2002-10-07(e)(1)

In answer to this question, apparently one of first impression, we find, as discussed below, that an FMLA filing with the Department of Labor is not sufficient to require equitable tolling of the 300-day limitation period for filing an ADA charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days, or within 300 days when the plaintiff has instituted state or local proceedings; these limits are subject to equitable tolling.

Williams v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 2002-12-18(e)

To exhaust administrative remedies, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or, if the plaintiff has instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, within 300 days. ... These time limits do not constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit, but are subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. ... The sparse allegations of the complaint provide no basis sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) extends the EEOC charge filing period to 300 days in a deferral state.

Dressler v. Daniel · filed 2003-01-09(e)(1)

In a deferral state, such as New Hampshire, the filing period is extended to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing period may be equitably tolled until a diligent employee should have realized that they had a discrimination claim.

Allen, Annette v. Chicago Transit · filed 2003-01-06(e)(1)

Equitable tolling delays the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff by exercise of due diligence should have realized that he had a claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge for each discrete discriminatory or retaliatory act, subject to equitable tolling; older acts may serve as background evidence for a timely claim.

Shorter v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Co. · filed 2003-03-25(e)(1)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff is prohibited from premising his claims for retaliation or discrimination on any discrete acts occurring prior to April 18, 2000 — 300 days before his initial filing of an EEOC charge — absent the application of equitable tolling. ... As such, the Court finds that equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot premise his claims for discrimination or retaliation on discrete acts occurring before April 18, 2000. Such acts, however, may be considered as background evidence in support of a timely claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing deadline is equitably tolled until a diligent employee should have realized that they had a discrimination claim.

Annete M. Allen, Shelley S. Burnette, Rahpre Newberry, and Earnest Leonard v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2003-02-07(e)(1)

Lebron’s promotion was not within the 300-day statute of limitations for a Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), and so the district court held the women’s complaint about his being promoted ahead of them to be time-barred. That was an error. Until they were again passed over in favor of a white person, they had no reason to believe that race had played a role, for Lebrón unlike Reilly was not a surprise choice. Equitable tolling delays the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff by exercise of due diligence should have realized that he had a claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an employee to file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice, but the deadline may be equitably tolled.

Birdsong v. City of Memphis · filed 2003-02-13(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), an employee must file a civil action within ninety days of the receipt of the notice of right to sue. The time limits for filing a Title VII action in court under the statute are not jurisdictional and may be tolled.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires filing within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter; an unsupported claim of difficulty obtaining EEOC documents does not justify equitable tolling.

Skibinski v. Zevnik, Horton, Guibord, McGovern, Palmer & Fognani, LLP · filed 2003-03-04(f)(1)

As for Skibinski’s claim against her former employer, the Zevnick firm, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a plaintiff must file an ADEA complaint within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. When Skibinski filed her initial complaint, she was 29 days beyond the statutory deadline. ... However, upon refiling and on appeal, Skibinski has alleged only, and without specifics, that she had difficulty obtaining documents from the EEOC. This is insufficient to obtain equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s administrative filing deadline is not waived when the employer raises the defense in its answer, and a later summary judgment motion does not justify estoppel or tolling without a causal link to the late filing.

Schultz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-07-02(e)(1)

As Schultz argues in the alternative, Wal-Mart should be considered to have waived its time bar defense, Wal-Mart should be estopped from asserting the defense or we should equitably toll the requirement on Schultz to file her administrative complaint timely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), all because WalMart postponed its summary judgment motion. We decline, as the district court did, to provide such relief. There was clearly no waiver of Wal-Mart’s time bar defense since Wal-Mart first raised that defense in its answer to Schultz’s complaint. ... Moreover, WalMart’s delay in filing its summary judgment motion simply had nothing to do with Schultz’s failure to file her administrative complaint on time. Indeed, the deadline for filing Schultz’s administrative complaint fell more than two years before Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion was filed. The lack of causation makes estoppel or tolling inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling when court action leads a claimant to believe she has satisfied the filing requirements.

LeClair v. Wells Fargo Bank Iowa, N.A. · filed 2003-07-09(f)(1)

It is important to note, however, that the ninety-day limitations period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is not jurisdictional, and therefore is subject to equitable tolling. ... Plaintiffs ADA claim is deemed timely filed.

The EEOC filing deadline may be equitably tolled for illness only if the claimant acted with reasonable diligence during the period to be tolled.

Davis v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2003-09-08(e)(1)

Although such tolling may be appropriate “where a plaintiffs medical condition or mental impairment prevent[s][him] from proceeding in a timely fashion,” it is only appropriate if the plaintiff “has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period [he] seeks to have tolled.” ... Given this testimony, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of equitable tolling.

In a deferral state, an ADA plaintiff ordinarily must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, but the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.

Merit v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority · filed 2003-08-06(e)(1)

In a deferral state such as Pennsylvania, the ADA requires that plaintiffs file charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination before bringing suit. ... In light of these considerations, and because Plaintiff was only twenty-three days late in filing her EEOC charge of discrimination, the Court will not dismiss any portion of Plaintiffs complaint on the basis of untimeliness.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ordinarily gives a Title VII plaintiff ninety days to file suit after receiving a dismissal and right-to-sue notice, but the deadline is subject to equitable tolling.

Seay v. TVA · filed 2003-08-06(f)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff ordinarily must file a civil action within ninety days of receiving a notice of dismissal and right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... We therefore hold that equitable tolling should have been granted and that the district court abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

The filing deadlines in § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) can be tolled when confusion occurs without the claimant’s fault, and disputed timing facts can preclude summary judgment.

Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., Inc. · filed 1993-05-25(e), (f)(1)

The precise timing of relevant documents, which may be important in determining whether plaintiffs suit is timely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f)(1) is unclear from the parties’ submissions, is dependent upon conflicting inferences, and appears to admit of genuine dispute. At this juncture I cannot determine that no genuine issue of material fact in regard to timeliness exists.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit after an EEOC dismissal is not tolled by a complaint later dismissed without prejudice.

Soto-Rivera v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2005-09-22(f)(1)

The First Circuit has unequivocally ruled that the ninety (90) day prescription period for ADA claims is not tolled by filing a complaint that is subsequently dismissed without prejudice. ... That is the case here. ... Since Soto-Rivera filed her ADA Complaint well after the expiration of the ninety (90) day limitations period (in light of the April 25th, 2003, EEOC dismissal), her ADA complaint is time barred, and must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period begins when the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice; a state agency's notice does not start that period.

Albright v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-10-28(f)(1)

The right-to-sue letters that the PHRC sent to Albright do not constitute final agency action by the EEOC. They include no mention of making claims under federal law or filing in federal court, and do not say anything about a ninety day period in which to file suit in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within 90 days after receipt of notice of the administrative decision; a plaintiff cannot delay the start of that period by failing to retrieve a decision after receiving notice that it is available.

Christmas v. Spellings · filed 2005-11-22(f)(1)

A Title VII action must be filed “within ninety days” after receipt of notice of an administrative decision on plaintiffs EEO complaint. ... Because she received both actual and constructive notice that her final agency decision was available on several dates prior to January 7, 2005, however, I cannot find that January 7, 2005 is the appropriate start date for the 90-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period permits a hostile work environment claim when at least one harassing act occurs within 300 days before filing.

Strauss v. New York State Department of Education · filed 2005-12-15(e)(1)

As an initial matter, we are unpersuaded by Drago’s argument on appeal that plaintiffs claims are barred by title VII’s 300-day limitations period (see 42 USC § 2000e-5 [e] [1]). ... Plaintiff filed her discrimination claim with the Division of Human Rights on November 16, 2001; thus, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to allege at least, one act of sexual harassment occurring after January 20, 2001. Plaintiff presented evidence that Drago referred to her, in the presence of other DOL employees, in sexually offensive terms at the State Apprenticeship and Training Council held in July 2001. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs claims were timely made.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge, and the filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling.

Joshua Liam Josephs, AKA Joshua Liam Joesphs, Joshua Liam Josepths v. Pacific Bell, and Does, 1-30, Inclusive · filed 2005-12-27(e)

Because California is a "deferral" state, the claim must be filed within 300 days of the claimed event of discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (2003). The filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit, but is a requirement subject to equitable tolling. ... Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying equitable tolling to the filing of Josephs' EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day deadline to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter may be equitably tolled when a diligent plaintiff is reasonably confused by overlapping agency proceedings.

Ghosh v. New York City Department of Health · filed 2006-02-06(f)(1)

Title VII requires that a plaintiff file a complaint of discrimination in a United States district court within 90 days of receiving an EEOC Right To Sue Letter. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that equitable tolling is appropriate in the instant ease and that Ghosh is permitted to sue with regard to those claims which are encompassed by his EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days, subject to an equitable exception when an EEOC representative misleads an unrepresented claimant into missing the deadline.

Joshua Liam Josephs, AKA Joshua Liam Joesphs, Joshua Liam Josepths v. Pacific Bell, Does, 1-30, Inclusive · filed 2006-04-10(e)

Because California is a "deferral" state, the claim must be filed within 300 days of the claimed event of discrimination. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (2003). ... An equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement is available when an EEOC representative misleads the plaintiff concerning his claim. ... Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding an equitable exception to the exhaustion requirement for Josephs' EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the complained-of conduct.

Genao v. City of New York Department of Parks & Recreation · filed 2006-04-25(e)(1)

The conduct Genao complains of occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of a complaint with the EEOC. As such, Genao’s claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s ninety-day deadline for filing suit after an EEOC right-to-sue letter is subject to equitable tolling when a plaintiff promptly corrects an omitted complaint signature.

Memisevich v. St. Elizabeth's Medical Center · filed 2006-08-09(f)

Since the ninety-day rule of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) is a “related Title VII provision,” the district courts must treat the ninety-day rule as a limitations period subject to equitable tolling. ... Therefore, the ninety-day limitations period for timely filing of plaintiffs complaint is tolled, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint as time-barred will be denied.

The 90-day period to file a Title VII suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter is subject to equitable tolling, but pursuing state-court review does not itself justify tolling.

Wakefield v. Cordis Corporation · filed 2006-11-20(f)(1)

That Wakefield sought review of the Notice of Determination in Florida state court instead of filing a complaint under Title VII in federal court does not give him grounds for equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars claims filed with an authorized state agency more than 300 days after a discriminatory act unless a narrow equitable exception applies.

Belgasem v. Water Pik Technologies, Inc. · filed 2006-10-17(e)(1)

The circumstances Belgasem recounts do not constitute the kind of “active deception” necessary for equitable tolling. The claims regarding failure to promote are time barred under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged action; equitable tolling requires a demonstrated basis, such as affirmatively wrong information from the EEOC.

Tillison v. Trinity Valley Electric Cooperative Inc. · filed 2006-10-23(e)

Tillison’s failure to file within 300 days should not be excused because she has not met her burden of demonstrating a basis for equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows equitable tolling of the Title VII filing deadline when circumstances beyond the complainant’s control cause a missed deadline.

Taal v. Hannaford Bros. · filed 2006-11-08(f)(1)

Equitable tolling may be appropriate when a complainant misses a deadline because of “circumstances effectively beyond her control,” Bonilla, 194 F.3d at 279, which the record shows is not the case here. Taal understood that her case had been transferred to the EEOC, and she wrote directly to the EEOC’s regional office in Boston in order to obtain her right to sue letter. Ensuring that the EEOC had her correct and current address was not a circumstance beyond Taal’s control.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days, and the EEOC’s failure to advise a claimant of that deadline does not by itself justify equitable tolling.

Harrison v. Estes Express Lines · filed 2006-11-30(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. ... The EEOC did not affirmatively mislead Harrison by failing to advise him of the applicable limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an ADA claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; knowledge of the termination, ignorance of the law, and pro se status do not justify equitable tolling.

Stewart v. Domtar Industries · filed 2007-03-23(e)(1)

As a prerequisite to filing a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must file with the EEOC a charge of discrimination within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001). Stewart concedes he did not timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, but argues his ignorance of the law and pro se status justify equitable tolling. Such factors, however, fail to justify equitable tolling because Stewart was aware of his own termination and could have timely filed a charge of discrimination, and he does not allege otherwise.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but infancy alone does not excuse an untimely filing without reasonable diligence.

Catone v. Brink · filed 2007-04-30(e)(1)

Here, Plaintiff waited more than 230 days after her eighteenth birthday to file a charge, and offers no reasonable explanation for the delay. Without making any attempt to account for her delay, this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to act with reasonable diligence and therefore equitable tolling is not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of each discrete failure to promote.

Thomas v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. · filed 2007-05-17(e)

Title VII also requires an employee aggrieved by discriminatory acts to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... Thus, with respect to the Wood, Casella and Devilla promotions, which all occurred prior to the 180-day limitations period, Thomas’ EEOC Charge was untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period may be equitably tolled when the EEOC fails to send a requested copy of the right-to-sue letter to the claimant’s attorney, even if the claimant did not report an address change.

Coleman v. Talbot County Detention Center · filed 2007-07-12(f)(1)

We therefore conclude that, as in Stallworth, the primary fault is that of the EEOC for not--as both counsel and Coleman reasonably expected--sending a copy of the right-to-sue letter to counsel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline for filing suit, which applies to ADA employment claims, may be equitably tolled while an in forma pauperis application is pending and until a plaintiff receives adequate notice that the deadline has resumed.

Celestine v. Cold Crest Care Center · filed 2007-07-16(f)(1)

When equitable tolling is justified due to the inadequacy of notice afforded a litigant, that tolling period continues until the proper notice is given and the problem is remedied. Since Celestine never received adequate notice regarding the running of the 90-day limit, there was no occasion for the running of the limitations period to recommence. Thus, this Court finds the 90-day limit to have been tolled from June 1, 2004 until December 19, 2004, at which point Celestine’s complaint was officially filed. The statute of limitations, therefore, did not expire prior to the payment of the filing fee. Hence, Celestine’s complaint was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge deadline is not equitably tolled merely because a claimant was unaware of the filing requirement, absent a showing that the employer intended to actively mislead him.

Castaldo v. Denver Public Schools · filed 2008-05-05(e)(1)

We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to apply equitable tolling on this ground. The statements in Mr. Castaldo’s EEOC charge reveal that it was not his alleged incapacity that prevented him from filing a timely charge but the fact that he was unaware of his obligation to do so until he consulted an attorney. And without a showing that DPS intended to actively mislead him, his ignorance of the filing requirement does not entitle him to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII claimant 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file suit; equitable tolling requires diligent pursuit of the claim and rare, exceptional circumstances.

Baldwin v. Barre · filed 2008-11-18(f)(1)

As the EEOC informed Baldwin in 2003, Title VII allows claimants 90 days to file suit after receipt of a statutory notice of right to sue. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2003). ... Here the district court was within its discretion to conclude that equitable tolling should not apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit; lack of diligence in updating an address with the EEOC does not justify equitable tolling.

Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute · filed 2009-01-22(f)(1)

After receiving the right-to-sue letter, the employee has ninety (90) days to file a complaint in federal court. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). ... Dr. Abraham’s lack of diligence in filing a change of address with the EEOC as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b) is sufficient to reject his equitable tolling claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires timely filing of a Title VII charge with the EEOC; equitable tolling applies only in exceptional circumstances, and the claimant must show entitlement to it.

Nedeltchev v. Sheraton St. Louis City Center Hotel & Suites · filed 2009-07-01(e)(1)

After careful de novo review, see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006), we conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment on the Title VII claim, because it was not timely exhausted and Nedeltchev failed to show entitlement to equitable tolling of the applicable time limit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1) (time limit for filing Title VII claims with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); T.L. ex rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2006) (party claiming equitable tolling has burden to show entitlement to it; doctrine applies only in exceptional circumstances); United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (ineffective assistance has not generally been considered extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling, but unsupported allegations of incapacity do not justify tolling.

Long v. Paulson · filed 2009-10-14(f)(1)

When the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dismisses a claim, it must inform the claimant and that he has ninety days to bring a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d). The 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations and is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. ... Long is not entitled to equitable tolling and his complaint is therefore time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter may be equitably tolled when circumstances beyond a diligent claimant's control prevent timely filing.

Crabill v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education · filed 2010-04-14(f)(1)

A charging party has 90 days from the day of receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter within which to file an action in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling. Thus, her Complaint — although filed more than 90 days after issuance of the right-to-sue letter — shall be deemed timely, and the Court will proceed to consider the merits of her claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s filing deadline may be equitably tolled when the plaintiff demonstrates extraordinary circumstances; a failure to act diligently does not justify tolling.

Pugh-Perry v. New York City Human Resources Administration · filed 2010-11-30(f)(1)

Having conducted a de novo review, we conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, Pugh-Perry v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., No. 07-CV-4050 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009), that Pugh-Perry has not demonstrated the type of extraordinary circumstances that would merit the application of equitable tolling in this case. ... We therefore hold that the District Court correctly dismissed her Title VII claim as time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; ordinary attorney or staff negligence does not warrant equitable tolling.

Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc. · filed 2010-12-20(f)(1)

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action be commenced within ninety days after the plaintiff has received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. ... Merely because the negligence was on the part of her attorney and his staff does not entitle Harris to equitable tolling—a party is bound by the acts of her lawyer.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day EEOC charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when claimants diligently pursue their claims and exceptional government delay contributes to a late filing.

Granger v. Aaron's, Inc. · filed 2011-03-24(e)(1)

Granger and Descant did not file charges of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of their resignation from Aaron’s. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... In light of their actions, the government’s considerable errors and neglect, and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to Aaron’s, this case presents sufficiently rare circumstances (we trust) to support the district court’s application of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s filing deadline is not subject to equitable tolling or estoppel unless circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control denied a reasonable opportunity to file on time.

Muñoz v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 2011-04-01(e)(1)

But as UDC notes, neither doctrine has any application unless the plaintiff has been denied a reasonable opportunity to file on time by circumstances not of his or her own making.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled when circumstances beyond a claimant’s control prevent receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice.

Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education · filed 2011-04-20(f)(1)

After a complainant files a charge with the EEOC, the ADA requires the EEOC to “notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... We are persuaded that Crabill’s failure to receive the letter was the result of circumstances external to her own conduct.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC filing requirement, which the ADA incorporates, is subject to equitable defenses even when a plaintiff never filed an agency charge.

Dahlman v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons (AARP) · filed 2011-06-13(e)(1)

The ADA incorporates the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, including the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Although the D.C. Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of whether equitable defenses are available to plaintiffs who bypass the administrative filing requirement altogether, this Court concludes that they do.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge filing deadline may be equitably tolled at the pleading stage when the claimant plausibly alleges that the EEOC delayed preparing the charge after receiving an intake questionnaire.

Fulmore v. City of Greensboro · filed 2011-07-06(e)(1)

In the absence of any authority advanced by the City and given the apparent lack of a clear rule putting the onus on an aggrieved party to ensure the timely filing of a charge once he invokes the EEOC’s assistance, the court finds that Fulmore has plausibly alleged equitable tolling in the SAC and attached Intake Questionnaire.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is tolled while an in forma pauperis application is pending and for a reasonable period afterward to allow notice of the court’s decision.

Nkengfack v. American Ass'n of Retired Persons · filed 2011-10-14(f)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the statutory time limit should be tolled not only for the five-day pendency of the plaintiff’s application, but also for an additional five-day presumptive notice period to account for notice of the Court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s IFP application.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a limitations period for filing a civil action that is subject to equitable tolling.

Rucker v. Sacramento County Child Protective Services · filed 2011-12-21(f)(1)

The commencement of the civil action was thus outside the limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1). See Stiefel, 624 F.3d at 1245. Nor has Rucker presented any facts that would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file a Title VII action; the period is tolled while an in forma pauperis application is pending.

Uzoukwu v. Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments · filed 2012-02-28(f)(1)

Plaintiff’s complaint in the present law suit, filed 174 days after she claims to have received her right to sue letter, was clearly untimely. However, the 90 day limitations period was tolled during the time her IFP application was pending.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge, and equitable tolling does not excuse a plaintiff’s lack of diligence in identifying her employer.

Hazzard v. Express Services, Inc. · filed 2012-09-27(e)(1)

Thus, the time for filing her EEOC charge against Griffin is not properly tolled and was untimely. Griffin’s Motion to Dismiss [84] is granted as Plaintiff failed to file a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against Griffin within the statutory time period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge may be equitably tolled when the claimant diligently pursues her rights and extraordinary circumstances prevent timely filing.

Dyson v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-05(e)(1)

On this record, we hold that Appellant easily could have satisfied the March 12, 2008 deadline but failed to do so. She is therefore not entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling when a claimant acts diligently and extraordinary circumstances cause a late filing.

Walker v. Linklaters LLP · filed 2013-06-11(e)(1)

The Court, therefore, does not find that the affirmative defense of late filing warrants dismissing Plaintiffs claim at this stage of the proceedings, insofar as Plaintiffs claim relates to his termination.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled only when a reasonably diligent person could not discover the basis of a claim.

Butler v. American Foods Group LLC · filed 2013-11-04(e)(1)

But equitable tolling applies only when a reasonable person acting with due diligence could not have discovered the basis of a potential claim. ... Butler does not explain how or why, after Green Bay hired him, he could not through reasonable diligence learn the basis of a potential failure-to-hire claim against American Foods Group. Thus, absent any evidence to support equitable tolling, the district court correctly concluded that his failure-to-hire claim was untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit, and Washington’s pre-suit claim tolling provision does not extend that deadline.

Trizuto v. Bellevue Police Department · filed 2013-11-18(f)(1)

The court holds that the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020 does not apply to Officer Trizuto’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day charge-filing period is not equitably tolled when a plaintiff had the information needed to file but delayed because of strategic choices.

Seoane-Vazquez v. The Ohio State University · filed 2014-08-18(e)(1)

Before Plaintiff could initiate a Title VII suit in district court, he was required to file a charge of discrimination “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... Equitable tolling is not designed to save litigants from the foreseeable consequences of their own strategic choices. Plaintiff’s claims arising out of pre-2009 conduct are therefore time-barred and were properly dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when serious attorney impairment coincides with the filing period and a brief delay causes no prejudice.

Giddens v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions · filed 2014-09-30(f)(1)

The Court finds that the circumstances presented here warrant tolling of the ninety-day statutory period for filing suit under Title VII. ... The Court will therefore accept as timely Plaintiffs Title VII claim as set forth in the complaint filed on July 12, 2011.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s filing deadline may be equitably tolled, but a plaintiff must establish a basis for tolling an untimely Title VII claim.

Vlad-Berindan v. Life Worx Inc. · filed 2015-04-28(f)(1)

Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Vlad-Berindan’s complaint, substantially for the reason stated in its thorough and well- reasoned April 28, 2014 opinion—namely, Vlad-Berindan failed to establish that her untimely Title VII claims were entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within 90 days after notice of the right to sue; ordinary attorney negligence does not justify equitable tolling of that deadline.

Simmons v. Methodist Hospitals · filed 2015-05-01(f)(1)

Therefore, because “equitable tolling does not apply to normal situations of attorney negligence or inadvertence,” the Court finds that Simmons has not carried his burden in establishing that the limitations period of his retaliation claim should be equitably tolled.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling, but a mistaken appeal of a severance order does not justify tolling without extraordinary circumstances and diligence.

Mesidor v. Waste Management, Inc. of Florida · filed 2015-03-26(f)(1)

Title VII’s ninety-day filing requirement is subject to equitable tolling. ... Their mistaken belief to the contrary is not an extraordinary circumstance entitling the Appellants to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter; timely delivery to the clerk can count as filing even if the clerk records it later.

Dawn Moore-Ahmed v. McHugh · filed 2015-04-14(f)(1)

In this case, however, the district court expressly determined that Moore-Ahmed failed to establish that the complaint had been delivered to the clerk on October 7 to overcome the “clear record of the [October 9] filing date” evidenced in the docket and on the face of the complaint itself. Moore-Ahmed’s argument is thus unavailing.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is not equitably tolled when a complainant misses the right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or failed to update it.

Maggio v. Wisconsin Avenue Psychiatric Center, Inc. · filed 2015-07-24(f)(1)

We will not do so because we agree with the many decisions of other courts of appeals refusing to toll the running of the ninety days in circumstances like Maggio’s. These decisions hold that when a complainant fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline to file suit may be equitably tolled when the EEOC misleads a diligent plaintiff about when to sue and the equities favor tolling.

Alvarado v. Mine Service, Limited · filed 2015-07-30(f)(1)

Even assuming the district court correctly held that limitations began running upon issuance of the first letter, we conclude that equitable tolling is warranted.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s EEOC charge deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but an employer’s mere failure to explain a firing does not justify tolling based on concealment.

DeBlanc v. St. Tammany Parish School Board · filed 2016-02-18(e)(1)

In the same way, we think that the mere failure of De-Blanc’s supervisor in this case to provide DeBlanc with a reason for her firing did not constitute an “affirmative act[]” that “misle[d]” DeBlanc and “induce[d] [her] not to act within the limitations period.”

The ninety-day period for filing a Title VII suit is not equitably tolled when the claimant’s incorrect address causes him to miss the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter.

Panicker v. Compass Group U.S.A. Inc. · filed 2017-10-23(f)(1)

Panicker’s failure to receive the right-to-sue letter was due to his declaration that the address on the charge he filed with the EEOC was correct when in fact it was not. Because that failure was attributable solely to him, we conclude that equitable tolling does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving the EEOC’s notice of right to sue to file suit; equitable tolling requires diligent pursuit of her rights.

Joye v. Secretary Department of Navy · filed 2018-06-13(f)(1)

A plaintiff has 90 days to file an employment discrimination lawsuit after receiving the EEOC’s notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Joye thus has ... failed to show that she diligently pursued her rights when she waited until the 90th, and last, day of the deadline to complete her complaint and research how to file it. ... The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the Navy.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely EEOC charge for an ADA employment claim; reliance on prior counsel did not excuse the failure to file one.

Bullington v. Bedford Cty., Tenn. · filed 2018-09-25(e)(1)

To exhaust administrative remedies, a plaintiff must file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). ... Bullington, however, relied on the statements and actions of her prior counsel, who did not have similar power to enforce the ADA. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Bullington’s ADA claim.