42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(e)(2)’s filing rule for discriminatory seniority systems does not apply retroactively on appeal when the alleged injuries and lawsuit predated the 1991 Act.

Ruth v. American Airlines · filed 1992-09-29(e)(2)

Under the reasoning of Mozee and Luddington, Section 112 cannot be applied retroactively on appeal in this case.

Section 2000e-5’s administrative process does not exempt a Title VII claim from res judicata when the claimant could have preserved it in earlier litigation.

Lucille Qualls Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corporation · filed 1992-08-11(f)(1)

Although we have not previously had occasion to address this issue, and while this Court is committed to giving full effect to the Title VII administrative scheme set up by Congress, we are of the opinion that the language and policy of Title VII do not undercut the application of res judicata, and we see no reason militating against application of well-settled claim preclusion principles.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows after-acquired evidence to limit Title VII remedies, but backpay ends early only if the employer proves it would have discovered the evidence during the backpay period without the unlawful act and ensuing litigation.

Becky Wallace, Annette Neil v. Dunn Construction Company, Inc. · filed 1992-08-17(g)

We agree with the abstract proposition, espoused by the Summers Court, that after-acquired evidence is relevant to the relief due a successful Title VII plaintiff under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1981). ... With regard to the period of Title VII backpay for the allegedly retaliatory discharge, the boundary between the competing concerns shifts such that Neil's backpay period should not terminate prematurely unless Dunn proves that it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence prior to what would otherwise be the end of the backpay period in the absence of the allegedly unlawful acts and this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a court to deny reinstatement and front pay and limit backpay to the date an employer independently discovers misconduct that would have led to termination.

Castle v. Bentsen · filed 1994-11-08(g)

Accordingly, the Court finds, in the exercise of its discretion to determine equitable relief, that the after-acquired evidence of the Plaintiffs plagiarism precludes front pay and reinstatement, and limits the Plaintiffs recovery of backpay to the date the OCC discovered the evidence.

A Title VII employee may seek relief despite job application misrepresentations discovered after hiring, although that evidence may limit the remedy.

Becky Wallace, Annette Neal v. Dunn Construction Company, Inc. · filed 1995-08-30(f)(1)

Likewise, the objectives of deterrence and compensation would not be served if an employee lacked standing to seek relief under these statutes because he or she misrepresented information on his or her job application.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits after-acquired employee misconduct to limit reinstatement and front pay when the employer shows it would have fired the employee for that misconduct alone.

Flores v. Buy Buy Baby, Inc. · filed 2000-10-25(g)

There remain material issues of relevant fact as to whether BBB would have fired Flores solely on the basis of her falsified employment application. Defendant’s motion to strike plaintiffs claim for front pay and reinstatement is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes equitable relief for employment discrimination, but after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing can affect whether that relief is available.

Kapche v. Holder · filed 2012-04-13(g)

Although evidence of the plaintiff’s wrongdoing acquired subsequent to an employer’s discriminatory hiring decision does not negate liability, it is relevant in determining whether equitable relief is available to the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides remedies for employees who establish a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a).

Eneje v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-06-19(g)

Though 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides remedies for employees who suffer an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it also provides the same remedies for those who make out a claim under § 2000e-3(a), which prohibits employers from harassing or retaliating against an employee for claiming that he was discriminated against.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides equitable relief for ADA retaliation claims, which therefore carry no right to a jury trial.

Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co. · filed 2009-12-11(g)(1)

Because such claims are limited to the equitable relief specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), the district court correctly concluded that Alvarado was not entitled to a jury trial on his ADA retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides equitable remedies, including reinstatement and back pay, for ADA retaliation claims against employers.

Riggs v. Bennett County Hospital & Nursing Home · filed 2019-03-31(g)(1)

Joyce’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages on her retaliation claim must be dismissed. If the retaliation claim is proven at trial, Joyce’s remedies are limited to reinstatement and back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides equitable remedies for ADA retaliation claims, including backpay, reinstatement, and injunctions.

Peters v. Mundelein Consolidated High School District No. 120 · filed 2022-02-09(g)(1)

Section 2000e-5(g)(1), in turn, permits remedies “equitable in nature,” such as backpay, reinstatement, or an injunction.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits relief for ADA retaliation claims to equitable remedies, excluding compensatory and punitive damages.

Howell v. Washoe County · filed 2025-03-24(g)(1)

Retaliation claims are limited to equitable relief as outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)'s remedies do not apply retroactively to conduct predating the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Brown v. Walt Disney World Co. · filed 1992-11-03(g)(2)(B)

Although retroactive application of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) presents slightly different issues than retroactivity of the damages and jury trial portions of the Act, this Court will follow its prior decision and will not apply § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) retroactively.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue even without a direct employment relationship with the defendant.

Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. · filed 1992-12-02(f)(1)

Similarly, in providing for a private right of action, Title VII does not refer to an “employee,” but to “the person aggrieved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This term has been construed “as comprehending individuals who do not stand in direct employment relationship with an employer.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a person aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice to sue after exhausting administrative remedies if the person satisfies Article III standing requirements.

Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Bmc Marketing Corporation, T/a Snelling & Snelling Personnel Cons · filed 1994-07-19(f)(1)

Congress specifically permitted any “person claiming to be aggrieved” by an unlawful employment practice to file suit (after exhausting certain other potential avenues of relief). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). This language, we have held, opens the courts to “anyone who satisfies the constitutional requirements”.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits actions against specified entities; its remedies, when incorporated into the ADA, do not authorize retaliation claims against individuals who are not employers.

Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose · filed 1999-09-22(b)

The enforcement provision of Title VII permits' actions against an “employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b). ... Because Title VII does not authorize a remedy against individuals for violation of its provisions, and because Congress has made the remedies available in Title VII applicable to ADA actions, the ADA does not permit an action against individual defendants for retaliation for conduct protected by the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits enforcement actions against covered entities, including employers, but does not provide a remedy against individuals who are not employers.

Baird v. Rose · filed 1999-10-07(b)

The enforcement provision of Title VII permits actions against an "employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b). ... Because Title VII does not authorize a remedy against individuals for violation of its provisions, and because Congress has made the remedies available in Title VII applicable to ADA actions, the ADA does not permit an action against individual defendants for retaliation for conduct protected by the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a Title VII cause of action only for a person injured by an unlawful employment practice.

Marion v. The Slaughter Co. · filed 1999-12-29(f)

The district court’s ruling, quoted above, correctly states that Title VII only provides a cause of action to a person who is “aggrieved” by an unlawful ... employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). One who is not injured is not aggrieved.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit against a direct or indirect employer, but a state’s purely regulatory control does not make it an indirect employer.

Conroy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2006-03-15

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, allows an aggrieved person to bring suit against an “employer, employment agency, labor organization, or [in some cases a] joint labor-management committee.” ... Whether or not the Commonwealth defendants qualify as indirect employers for the purposes of a Title VII claim depends on whether the State is deemed to have “extensive control” or to have played a purely regulatory role. ... In sum, the City’s ability to place its own requirements upon the hiring process, ... its control over the rate of hiring, and its authority vis á vis firings, all militate against finding that the Commonwealth has an indirect or de facto employment relationship with Ms. Conroy. Therefore, Ms. Conroy’s claims against the State will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person whose interests are arguably protected by Title VII to sue, but excludes someone whose interests are unrelated to its prohibitions.

Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP · filed 2011-01-24(f)(1)

We hold that the term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute,” ... while excluding plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a civil action by a person claiming to be aggrieved, but a bystander outside Title VII’s zone of interests cannot sue for a hostile work environment.

Cochran v. Five Points Temporaries, LLC · filed 2012-09-28(f)(1)

Although the Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff endured a hostile work environment based on race and that she was injured by defendants’ conduct, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff fails to state a claim for racial discrimination hostile work environment because she is not a “person aggrieved” within the “zone of interest” of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person claiming to be aggrieved to sue under Title VII only when that person’s interests fall within the interests Title VII protects.

Jackson v. Deen · filed 2013-08-12(f)(1)

In this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is not an aggrieved party under Title VII because her interests are not those arguably sought to be protected by that statute.

Section 2000e-5 permits an injured employee whose interests fall within Title VII’s zone of interests to pursue a claim.

Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Foundation v. Billington · filed 2013-12-13(f)(1)(A)

Title VII permits a “person claiming to be aggrieved” by an unlawful employment practice to pursue a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1)(A). ... As employees, the individual plaintiffs’ interests obviously cannot be deemed “marginally related to or inconsistent with” the purposes of Title VII. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (allowing Title VII suit by injured employee over prudential standing objection). The individual plaintiffs in this case therefore have satisfied the zone of interests requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue, but an employee’s injuries arising from alleged discrimination against her nonemployee child do not make her aggrieved.

Tovar v. Essentia Health · filed 2016-05-11(f)(1)

Title VII provides, that “a civil action may be ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); ... The Court finds Tovar’s alleged injuries are similarly vicarious in nature and do not make her an aggrieved person under the law.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a disparate impact plaintiff to have been personally injured by the challenged employment policy.

Ross v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2017-07-28(f)

Furthermore, and notably, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she was personally injured as a result of an employment policy with a disparate impact in order to be able to challenge the policy under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) and (e)(1) allow claims on behalf of people who faced employment discrimination but give a nonemployee representative no separate cause of action against an administrative agency.

Notz v. Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities · filed 2021-02-13(b), (e)(1)

Notz points to provisions that allow Title VII claims to be made “on behalf of” other individuals, but those provisions relate to the rights of those who have faced discrimination in an employment context; they do not create a separate cause of action for a non-employee third party against an administrative agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person aggrieved by retaliation to sue, but does not permit an employee to sue for an injury to a union.

Threat v. City of Cleveland, Ohio · filed 2021-07-26(f)(1)

But it does not permit an individual not aggrieved to sue for someone else’s injury.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows an employee fired alongside her daughter because of the daughter’s protected activity to sue as an aggrieved person.

Mason v. Helping Our Seniors, LLC · filed 2022-10-13(f)(1)

The Court also finds that Dolores Mason has standing to sue under Title VII because she is an “aggrieved” person under the Act due to her close association with her daughter Melanie. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (conferring the right to file a civil action on persons “aggrieved” under the statute).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a civil action by a person claiming to be aggrieved; a plaintiff must allege an adverse employment action to qualify.

Gallagher v. Hawaii Symphony Orchestra · filed 2024-03-27(f)(1)

And a plaintiff who fails to allege an “adverse employment action” is not a person “claiming to be aggrieved” under Title VII, which provides in pertinent part that “a civil action may be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” Storey, 390 F.3d at 764 & n.12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).

Section 2000e-5 permits a person to recover under Title VII only if the person is aggrieved and falls within the statute’s zone of interests.

LASKA v. KELLEY MANUFACTURING CO · filed 2019-09-26(f)(1)

Only a “person aggrieved” may recover under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). ... Where, as here, a plaintiff contends that she suffered an adverse employment action because of ... her association with another employee who engaged in statutorily protected conduct, to recover under Title VII the plaintiff first must demonstrate that she falls within the “zone of interests” in order to receive the protection of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not allow consequential damages for wages lost from a second job because of an employer’s discrimination.

Kaiser v. Buckeye Youth Center · filed 1993-02-04(g)

In summary, the Court HOLDS that should Mr. Kaiser prevail on the merits of his employment discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) does not provide him with the remedy of consequential damages for the wages he lost from a second job.

Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2000e-5(g) did not permit compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII.

Sample v. Schuller International, Inc. · filed 1993-10-22(g)

Before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII did not permit recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1529 (11th Cir.1991); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir.1982), and did not provide for a jury trial, Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979); Hill v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir.1991).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to request a right-to-sue notice after the EEOC charge has been pending for 180 days.

Dennis · filed 2026-02-06(f)(1)

At this point, after the 180 day period had expired, at least Plaintiff Wingfield was entitled to request a right to sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person who filed an EEOC charge to request a right-to-sue notice after the charge is dismissed or 180 days pass without an EEOC suit or conciliation agreement.

Turlington · filed 2026-02-11(f)(1)

Accordingly, a plaintiff may request a right to sue notice from the EEOC after filing a charge of discrimination if the charge was dismissed by the Commission, or if the Commission has not filed a civil action or entered into a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the filing of the charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Wilkins · filed 2026-02-13(f)(1)

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring claims to be filed within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter); 29 U.S.C. § 626e (same). ... For the reasons stated above, the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 20) is ADOPTED and APPROVED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Notice of Right to Sue before a plaintiff brings a Title VII employment discrimination suit while the administrative investigation is pending.

Spencer · filed 2026-02-17(f)(1)

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring an unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 before the investigation of his claim has concluded, he must first obtain a Notice of Right to Sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require dismissal at initial review when the pleadings leave the status of enforcement proceedings and right-to-sue notice unclear.

Rajapakse · filed 2026-01-16(f)(1)

It is not apparent from Plaintiff’s pleadings that EEOC proceedings have terminated, or that she has requested or received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or an equivalent notice from the Attorney General. ... These claims will be allowed to proceed for further development of the record, including clarification of the status of enforcement proceedings before the EEOC and/or the Attorney General since the filing of the Complaint and Supplement.

A Title VII plaintiff generally must obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing suit; failure to do so warrants dismissal without prejudice.

Stephens v. Brown Wood Preserving Company, Inc. · filed 2025-03-03(f)(1)

If a plaintiff has not obtained a notice of right-to-sue before bringing suit, Courts will generally dismiss Title IIV claims. ... As such both Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED without prejudice as to the Title IIV claim of Count III.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant who receives a right-to-sue letter to file suit within 90 days.

Walenciej v. E. Ohio Corr. Ctr. · filed 2025-03-12(f)(1)

If the agency declines to pursue the claim and issues a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff must sue within ninety days. ... The Amended Complaint alleges that Walenciej filed an administrative charge with the EEOC and received the attached right-to-sue letter on May 24, 2022. And she sued on August 19, 2022—within 90 days of receiving her right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing suit and gives her ninety days to sue in federal court.

Brown v. Brickyard Healthcare Fountainview Care Center · filed 2024-07-17(f)(1)

Next, she must receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, at which time she has ninety days to file suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Ms. Brown has not submitted a copy of any right-to-sue letter with her second amended complaint or with any of her other filings. ... Accordingly, the court will dismiss her Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue requirement may be satisfied through equitable amendment when the EEOC issues the letter while a Title VII suit is pending.

Thomas v. Michigan City Area School Transportation · filed 2023-06-20(f)(1)

Equitable modification is appropriate when a right-to-sue letter has been received after commencement of a Title VII action and while the action is still pending.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to receive a right-to-sue notice before bringing a Title VII suit.

Parker v. Garda World Security Services · filed 2023-05-22(f)(1)

However, not only must a plaintiff file a charge of discrimination, but he must also receive a right-to-sue letter.

A Title VII claimant who receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter while an already-filed lawsuit is pending satisfies the administrative-exhaustion requirement.

Taillon v. New Orleans City · filed 2023-05-05(f)(1)

Following longstanding Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, receipt of a Right to Sue letter after the commencement of this Title VII claim, but while the lawsuit is still pending satisfies the precondition that a plaintiff exhausts her statutory administrative remedies.

A Title VII plaintiff may cure the absence of an EEOC right-to-sue letter after filing suit by obtaining the letter and amending the complaint to allege its receipt.

O'Connor v. Soul Surgery LLC · filed 2023-05-11(f)(1)

“[T]he requirement of a right-to-sue letter is curable after commencement of the action.” Salfingere, 971 F. Supp. at 1309. Plaintiff has now partially cured the defect Soul Surgery identified by filing the EEOC’s right to sue letter, and the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to further amend the latest proposed amended pleading to allege receipt of the EEOC right to sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a person suing a government entity under Title VII to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General, but the requirement is not jurisdictional.

Garrett v. City of Houston TX · filed 2004-06-29(f)(1)

“Under this statute, a person seeking to file a Title VII lawsuit against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, must first be issued a right-to-sue letter by the Attorney General of the United States.” Solomon v. Hardison, 746 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1984). Although not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, see id., Appellant does not offer, nor do we find, any basis for disturbing this portion of the judgment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars a Title VII suit filed more than ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Matthews v. Freedman · filed 1989-08-17(f)(1)

Indeed, all that Mr. Kramer had to do was read the right-to-sue letter (and, if that was not satisfactory to him, conduct the most rudimentary legal research) to learn that a Title VII action not filed within ninety days after receipt of the right-to-sue letter is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a plaintiff who has received a right-to-sue letter to bring a Title VII action.

Zervas v. District of Columbia · filed 1993-03-17(f)(1)

Moreover, on December 11, 1992, plaintiff received a right-to-sue-letter and he is entitled to file an action seeking permanent relief under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit after the EEOC dismisses the charge or 180 days pass without action; an earlier right-to-sue letter requires suspension of the claim and remand to the EEOC.

Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center · filed 1993-04-30(f)(1)

However, given the Congressional mandate that Title VII claims can only be filed after a dismissal of the charges by the EEOC or the lapsing of 180 days without action by the EEOC, this Court has no alternative but to grant the relief sought by defendants on the Title VII cause of action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to sue before 180 days have elapsed when the EEOC ends its involvement and issues a right-to-sue letter.

Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc. · filed 1994-11-15(f)(1)

The EEOC farther indicated that it was terminating its involvement with plaintiffs’ claims, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) (1993), thereby abrogating plaintiffs’ need to' await the running of the full 180-day period before commencing this action.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to plead receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice before bringing a federal lawsuit.

Thomas v. St. Luke's Health Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-11-21(f)(1)

He alleges that he received a right-to-sue notice from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, but not such a notice from the EEOC. Thomas has therefore failed to plead the procedural prerequisites for a federal lawsuit under Title VII. The court cannot construe a plausible claim under Title VII to establish federal question jurisdiction over this lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(f) treats a claimant’s administrative remedies as exhausted once the claimant is entitled to a right-to-sue letter, even if the letter has not issued.

Patterson v. County of Fairfax · filed 1995-01-04(f)

The district court erred in requiring the actual issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Patterson's administrative remedies are deemed to have been exhausted--and jurisdiction thus conferred on the district court--when she became entitled to such a letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before bringing a Title VII action in federal court.

Benoza v. Hewlett Packard Company · filed 1995-03-29(f)(1)

The district court did not err in finding that Benoza's failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission barred her Title VII action in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before bringing a Title VII action in federal court.

Keenan v. Allan · filed 1995-05-12(f)(1)

A plaintiffs failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to her bars her Title VII action in federal court. ... Keenan’s Title VII claim must also be dismissed on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s right-to-sue letter requirement is a condition precedent that may be modified on equitable grounds.

Tang v. Rhode Island, Department of Elderly Affairs · filed 1995-08-21(f)(1)

I am not persuaded that this Court should waive the statutory right-to-sue letter requirement. Plaintiff will not be permitted to pursue her Title VII claims in this Court without the benefit of said letter. Thus, plaintiffs Title VII claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) makes a right to sue letter a prerequisite to suit; the letter does not create the discrimination claim.

McSherry v. TWA · filed 1996-03-07(f)(1)

Similarly, under Title VII the right to sue letter is merely a jurisdictional prerequisite, and does not create a claim. Instead, as discussed above, the claim was created under Title VII when McSherry was terminated.

A right to sue letter is a prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII, but it does not create the discrimination claim.

McSherry v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1996-03-07(f)(1)

Similarly, under Title VII the right to sue letter is merely a jurisdictional prerequisite, and does not create a claim. Instead, as discussed above, the claim was created under Title VII when MeSherry was terminated.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a prematurely filed suit to proceed once the plaintiff becomes entitled to and receives a right-to-sue notice.

Causey v. Balog · filed 1996-06-17(f)(1)

Causey clearly is now entitled to a right to sue notice: the Department of Justice granted him one on July' 27, 1994. Although Causey initially filed claims related to his second EEOC charge too soon (and defendants accordingly could have moved to dismiss these claims at any time from February 28, 1994, when this suit was filed, until July 1994), “[h]ere ... the proper time has arrived for the plaintiff is entitled to, and has in fact received, a ‘right to sue’ notice.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue notice requirement is subject to equitable modification, but receiving notice while a suit is pending does not automatically satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Forehand v. Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee · filed 1996-08-06(f)(1)

Because the issue is one requiring consideration of the equities, we readily conclude that there is no per se rule that receipt of a right-to-sue letter during pendency of the suit always satisfies the exhaustion requirement. ... The district court properly applied this rule to Berry; Berry’s failure to cooperate with the EEOC disentitled her to equitable modification.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a notice of right to sue before 180 days have passed.

Figueira v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc. · filed 1996-11-01(f)(1)

The issuance of an early notice of right to sue is not prohibited by Title VII and does not prevent this court from exercising jurisdiction over this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue letter requirement may be waived in exceptional circumstances when a claimant diligently tries to comply but cannot do so through no fault of her own.

Farrell v. State of NY · filed 1996-11-25(f)(1)

Title VII further provides that “a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved” within 90 days of receipt of what is known as a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... This ease presents exceptional circumstances favoring application of equitable modification. Accordingly, this Court holds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action, and will waive the procedural requirement under the statute.

A plaintiff entitled to a right-to-sue letter may bring a Title VII claim against a government entity even if the EEOC issued the letter instead of the Attorney General.

Thayer v. Washington County School Board · filed 1996-12-18(f)(1)

This entitlement, despite whether the Attorney General issued the letter, is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) entitles an eligible Title VII claimant to a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.

O'Grady v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation · filed 1996-12-17(f)(1)

While O'Grady had not yet received his right to sue notice from the EEOC, he was entitled to one under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1996).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter from the DOJ for a charge against a government employer when the EEOC has not reached the case.

Kane v. State of Iowa Department of Human Services · filed 1997-02-19(f)(1)

The statute thus provides for a right-to-sue letter from the DOJ, not the EEOC, in cases where the EEOC has been “unable” to obtain a conciliation agreement, which this court reads to include situations, present in this case, in which the EEOC simply has not reached the case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a notice of right to sue before 180 days have passed when it determines that it cannot complete its process within that period.

Woelbling v. RC Wilson Co. · filed 1997-04-28(f)(1)

The undersigned is persuaded that Congress did not foreclose the EEOC from issuing an early Notice of Right to Sue.

A plaintiff’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter after filing can cure a premature Title VII action when the early filing does not hamper the administrative process or prejudice the defendant.

Salfingere v. Latex · filed 1997-06-12(f)(1)

Accordingly, given the issuance of the right-to-sue letters in September 1996, the amendment of the complaint to so reflect, and following the caselaw discussed above, any jurisdictional defect has been cured by that issuance, and the Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII and ACRA claims. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit before the 180-day EEOC period expires when the EEOC has issued an early right-to-sue letter.

Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1997-09-10(f)(1)

Plaintiff requested, and received, a right to sue letter before the expiration of the 180-day period specified in the statute. ... This Court sees no reason to penalize a Plaintiff seeking to vindicate their rights under a civil rights statute, who has followed the dictates of the administrative scheme of the very agency charged with implementing that statute. Thus, the Court concludes that it did have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims.

Filing a Title VII suit before a right-to-sue letter is issued does not defeat exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Bew v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-09-29(f)(1)

However, given the date of the request of the Right-to-Sue letters, June 30, 1996, it appears that the suit commenced before the letters were issued. This fact does not undermine the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC right-to-sue letter before a court has jurisdiction over a Title VII claim.

Dalton v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. · filed 1997-09-30(f)(1)

... the right to sue letter is a prerequisite to this Court having jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII claimant to obtain a right-to-sue letter after 180 days, allowing the claimant to add the claim to a pending suit.

Heyliger v. State University and Community College System of Tennessee, Allen Spritzer and John Smith · filed 1997-10-03(f)(1)

Here, the significant date was 180 days after the date on which Heyliger filed his complaint with the EEOC, at which point Heyliger could have requested, and been entitled to receive from the Attorney General forthwith, a right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a charging party to demand a right-to-sue letter after 180 days; it does not require the EEOC to process the charge within that period.

Stordeur v. Computer Associates International, Inc. · filed 1998-02-09(f)(1)

As a practical matter, § 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the charging party to demand a right-to-sue letter after 180 days rather than to create an obligation for the EEOC to process a claim within 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) makes a right-to-sue letter a condition precedent to a Title VII action, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Gwendolyn M. RIVERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARBERTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-05-11(f)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the right-torsue letter is a condition precedent and not a jurisdictional requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue letter requirement is nonjurisdictional, and receiving the letter shortly after filing can cure the defect when the delay causes no prejudice.

Portis v. State of Ohio · filed 1998-05-12(f)(1)

The right-to-sue letter was obtained a week after the complaint was filed. ... We see no reason to bar Portis’s claim solely on the grounds of a non-jurisdictional requirement whose brief absence caused Ohio no prejudice in this ease.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC right-to-sue letter before a claimant may bring a Title VII claim in federal district court.

Pledger v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1998-06-08(f)(1)

If the EEOC dismisses an aggrieved person’s action, it will notify that person and issue a right to sue letter allowing that person 90 days in which to file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1). ... Therefore, as the EEOC never issued plaintiff right-to-sue letters on these issues, the federal district court may not exercise original jurisdiction over the issues raised in plaintiffs petitions. Therefore, these claims will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to request a right-to-sue letter if the EEOC has not dismissed the charge or brought a civil action within 180 days.

Churchill v. Star Enterprises · filed 1998-06-22(f)(1)

If the EEOC has not dismissed the charge or instituted á civil action within 180 days after receipt of the charge, the plaintiff may request, and the EEOC must issue, a right to sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person to sue within 90 days of an EEOC right-to-sue notice, including a notice issued before 180 days under the EEOC’s regulation.

Menchaca v. American Medical Response of Illinois, Inc. · filed 1998-06-03(f)(1)

And Complaint Ex. A expressly includes EEOC’s determinations that it “will be unable to complete its process within 180 days from the filing of the charge” and that it “is terminating its process with respect to this charge.” Those determinations comply directly with the regulation and hence authorize Menchaca’s bringing of this action within 90 days after issuance of the right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing a Title VII lawsuit.

Szarka v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 1998-08-26(f)(1)

The 1997 Complaint against the Union is defective because plaintiff had not obtained a “right to sue” letter prior to filing the lawsuit.

A Title VII plaintiff must obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before suing, unless waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling applies.

White v. Martin · filed 1998-10-13(f)(1)

Even if the plaintiff did in fact file with the EEOC, it is undisputed that he never obtained a right-to-sue letter. ... Plaintiff offers no explanation that would justify invocation of the principles of waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. ... Accordingly, we hold that, because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, his Title VII claims set forth in Counts Four and Five are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing suit.

Calinescu v. Pegasus Management Company, No. Cv98 262742 (Dec. 30, 1998) · filed 1998-12-30(f)(1)

Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII claims in counts four and five of the complaint is granted, as the plaintiff has not received a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, as required by 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter before bringing a Title VII civil action.

Calinescu v. Pegasus Management Co., No. Cv 98-262742 (Dec. 30, 1998.) · filed 1998-12-30(f)(1)

Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs Title Vll claims in counts four and five of the complaint is granted, as the plaintiff has not received a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue notice requirement is not jurisdictional, and a notice issued after the complaint is filed can satisfy it.

Blanke v. Rochester Telephone Corp. · filed 1999-02-05(f)(1)

Since issuance of a right-to-sue notice is not a jurisdictional requirement, however, the EEOC's subsequent issuance of the notice satisfies the statutory requirements in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing suit, subject to waiver or tolling if the plaintiff tried to obtain one or raised its nonissuance with the EEOC.

Dollinger v. State Insurance Fund · filed 1999-04-19(f)(1)

The plaintiff has an obligation to produce a right to sue letter as a prerequisite to filing a Title VII action. ... To waive or toll the statutory requirement, plaintiff must show or allege that he made an effort to procure the right to sue letter or that he raised the failure to issue a right to sue letter with the EEOC prior to filing this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to receive a right-to-sue letter after filing an administrative charge before suing in federal court.

Fullman v. Philadelphia International Airport · filed 1999-05-10(f)(1)

Rather, after filing with the appropriate administrative agency, in this case the PhilaCHR, a plaintiff must await the agency’s determination and issuance of a right to sue letter before filing suit in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires Title VII complainants whose charges remain pending before the EEOC to wait 180 days after filing before suing in federal court; an early right-to-sue letter does not excuse the wait.

Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1999-06-18(f)(1)

We thus hold that Title VII complainants must wait 180 days after filing charges with the EEOC before they may sue in federal court.

A plaintiff’s failure to obtain an EEOC notice-of-right-to-sue letter is a waivable precondition to a Title VII action, not a jurisdictional bar.

Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners of the Farmingville Fire District · filed 1999-06-18(f)(1)

Every circuit before us that has faced the question has held that a plaintiffs failure to obtain a notice-of-right-to-sue-letter is not a jurisdictional bar, but only a precondition to bringing a Title VII action that can be waived by the parties or the court. ... We agree with these holdings and find no jurisdictional bar to this Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved party 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Davis v. Virginia Commonwealth University · filed 1999-06-29(f)(1)

Upon notification, i.e. a right to sue letter, the aggrieved party has 90 days to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff three days to collect an unsuccessfully delivered EEOC right-to-sue letter after receiving a postal notice identifying the sender, before the 90-day filing period begins.

Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 1999-07-07(f)(1)

Taking these considerations into account, we agree with the Second Circuit in Sousa v. N.L.R.B., 817 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir.1987), that a plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable time to pick up the letter upon receipt of a notice of delivery and therefore conclude that a three-day period, analogous to the federal rule governing time for taking action after service by mail, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e), provides an appropriate period for a plaintiff to act to receive an unsuccessfully delivered letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a right-to-sue notice after the EEOC dismisses a charge or 180 days pass without a civil action or conciliation agreement; equitable considerations can allow a claim based on an earlier notice to proceed.

Lemke v. International Total Services, Inc. · filed 1999-07-16(f)(1)

The regulation providing for early right to sue letters, especially as applied in this case, contravenes both the statutory language and the purpose of Title VII. ... Accordingly, it would not be equitable to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII claim, particularly where the regulation she followed has not been found to be invalid in this Circuit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period presumptively begins when a plaintiff actually receives a certified right-to-sue letter, if the plaintiff picks it up within the time allowed by the Post Office.

Houston v. Sidley & Austin · filed 1999-07-26(f)(1)

We therefore hold that when the EEOC sends a right-to-sue letter by certified mail, the 90-day limitations period presumptively begins to run on the day the plaintiff actually received the letter, so. long as she picks it up within the time that the Post Office’s notice gives her before it will be returned to the sender.

The 90-day deadline to file a Title VII suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional and may be tolled.

Smith v. Raleigh District of the North Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church · filed 1999-07-27(f)(1)

The court notes, however, that Title VTI’s requirement that a plaintiff properly file a complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to sue letter is not jurisdictional.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when a right-to-sue notice is delivered to a claimant’s home and collected by a neighbor designated to receive the claimant’s mail.

Nguyen v. Inova Alexandria Hos · filed 1999-07-30(f)(1)

In this matter, we hold that the limitations period began to run when the Notice of Right to Sue was delivered to Nguyen's home and picked up by a designated neighbor.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc. · filed 1999-08-12(f)(1)

Section 2000e — 5(f)(1) requires that claims brought under Title VII be filed within ninety days of the claimant’s receipt of the EEOC right to sue letter.

Absent dismissal, § 2000e-5(f)(1) prohibits the EEOC from issuing a right-to-sue letter within 180 days after a charge is filed.

Stetz v. Reeher Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1999-08-18(f)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, absent dismissal, the 180-day requirement in section 2000e-5(f)(l), read in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b)’s mandate that an investigation be conducted, clearly prohibits the issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days following the filing of the administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private suit based on an EEOC right-to-sue letter issued before the 180-day period expires.

Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/BrettCo, Inc. · filed 1999-09-01(f)(1)

The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also squarely addressed this issue, however, they found that an early right to sue letter comports with Congress’ intent underlying the 180-day provision. ... However, without some direction from the Fourth Circuit on this issue, this Court finds the reasoning as set forth in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ opinions to be convincing. Thus, both defendants’ supplemental motions to dismiss will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires the EEOC to wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue notice, except in highly unusual circumstances.

Rodriguez v. Connection Technology Inc. · filed 1999-09-09(f)(1)

The EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter, only 39 days after the filing of the complaint, was unwarranted and in violation of the 180 day mandatory waiting requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) and the duty imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) that the EEOC “shall make an investigation [of the complaint].”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an EEOC right-to-sue notice before 180 days have passed when the agency dismisses the charge, allowing the claimant to exhaust administrative remedies.

Connor v. WTI · filed 1999-10-01(f)(1)

The Court therefore is persuaded by the findings made by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that the early right-to-sue regulation is consistent with the purposes of Section 2000e — 5(f)(1) of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1), read with subsection (b), prohibits the EEOC from issuing a right-to-sue letter within 180 days after a charge is filed unless the charge is dismissed.

Stetz v. Reeher Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1999-10-07(f)(1)

[AJbsent dismissal, the 180-day requirement in section 2000e~5(f)(l), read in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b)’s mandate that an investigation be conducted, clearly prohibits the issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days following the filing of the administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant receives actual or constructive notice of the right to sue.

Nowell v. Harrison, Walker, & Harper, L.L.P. · filed 1999-10-08(f)(1)

Viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that Plaintiffs lawsuit was timely filed within the statutorily prescribed 90-day period. The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence establishes that Plaintiff did not receive notice of his right to sue from the EEOC until April 29, 1999.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not bar the EEOC from issuing a right-to-sue letter on request less than two years after a state agency’s final determination.

Anderson v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1999-10-15(f)(1)

While it is certainly regrettable that the NYSDHR took so many years to dispose of Anderson’s claim, and that the EEOC did not soon thereafter automatically issue Anderson a right-to-sue letter, under the language of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(1) this Court cannot say that the EEOC thereby violated its statutory mandate. This Court therefore finds that the EEOC did not exceed its authority in issuing Anderson a right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the claimant actually receives a right-to-sue letter delivered to her temporary residence and first received by someone else.

Simon v. City of Naperville · filed 1999-10-20(f)(1)

Ms. Simon has satisfied these conditions. The letter was delivered to Ms. Simon’s sister’s home, where Ms. Simon was staying and where she had directed the Post Office to send her mail. This was Ms. Simon’s temporary residence.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing a Title VII action begins when the claimant receives the right-to-sue notice.

Perry v. Gallaudet University · filed 1999-10-21(f)(1)

As the moving party, Gallaudet’s failure to show the date that the right-to-sue letter was received, the operative date for determining timeliness of the claim, in itself, precluded summary dismissal of the claim on this ground.

A later EEOC charge that does not mention earlier retaliation does not revive those earlier Title VII claims under § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Strouss v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1999-11-29(f)(1)

Plaintiff, thus, had, at most, 270 days from the date of filing her August 8, 1994 charge (i.e., until May 6,1995) to prosecute her Title VII claims of retaliation concerning her 1994 activities. Plaintiff did not file her Complaint in this action until June 24, 1999 more than three years after the statute of limitations had run.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; a mailed complaint is filed when the clerk receives it.

Nearhood v. Tops Markets, Inc. · filed 1999-11-29(f)(1)

Under Title VII, an aggrieved person has ninety days following the issuance of a right-to-sue letter in which to commence an action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). An action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. F.R.C.P. 3. An action not filed within ninety days must be dismissed, absent the application of equitable tolling. ... It is well established, however, that when papers are mailed to the clerk’s office, filing is complete only upon the clerk’s receipt of those papers, and that filings reaching the clerk’s office after a deadline are untimely, even if they are mailed before the deadline.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue notice after 180 days of EEOC inaction but does not bar the EEOC from issuing one earlier.

Berry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-12-01(f)(1)

The statute only says that if the EEOC has not acted in 180 days, it must issue a right-to-sue letter; it does not expressly make agency inaction for six months a condition precedent to the issuance of all right-to-sue letters.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter; the letter need not be attached to the complaint within that period.

Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa · filed 1999-12-06(f)(1)

Thus, the requirement is that Mercer file suit within the specified period after receiving a right-to-sue letter, see Winbush, 66 F.3d at 1486; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), not that she file a complaint with a right-to-sue letter attached within the required period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter; mailing the complaint before the deadline does not make a late filing timely or justify equitable tolling.

Crawford-Mulley v. CORNING INC. · filed 1999-12-21(f)(1)

In essence, Crawford-Mulley’s primary argument was that her complaint was timely filed or should be deemed timely filed because her counsel mailed it prior to the expiration of the ninety day period. That does not justify equitable tolling, and there are no facts in the record that would otherwise justify that doctrine’s application. Thus, Crawford-Mulley’s Title VII claims are untimely and must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within 90 days after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter.

Garrett v. The Stroh Brewery Co · filed 1999-12-28(f)(1)

The law requires, and the right-to- sue letter clearly stated, that Garrett had 90 days to file suit after the EEOC issued its letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days when it determines that it cannot process the charge within that period.

Fernandes v. TPD, Inc. · filed 2000-01-07(f)(1)

In light of the deference due an administrative agency’s interpretation of statutes, the court finds the early right-to- sue regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), to be a permissible construction of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and therefore valid.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to issue a valid right-to-sue letter before 180 days have passed when it dismisses the charge.

Tesfaye v. Carr Park, Inc. · filed 2000-02-01(b)

I find that the plain language of section 2000e-5(b) permitted the issuance of a valid right to sue letter before the expiration of 180 days after the complaint was filed because the EEOC dismissed Mr. Tes-faye’s complaint in its June 28, 1999 letter.

An EEOC right-to-sue letter issued before the 180-day period expires does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction.

Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Intl. · filed 2000-03-08(f)(1)

The early issuance of a right-to-sue letter in this case therefore would not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require 180 days of EEOC inaction before a person may sue after receiving a valid right-to-sue notice.

Seybert v. West Chester University · filed 2000-02-11(f)(1)

While there are two instances in which the EEOC is obligated to issue a right to sue notice—after 180 days have passed without conciliation or filing suit, or upon dismissal of the charge— these jurisdictional contours are not explicitly exclusive.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 180-day waiting period is a nonjurisdictional condition that may be excused when equitable considerations warrant it.

Commodari v. Long Island University · filed 2000-03-31(f)(1)

Accordingly, I hold that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC prior to the expiration of the 180-day administrative review period does not operate as a jurisdictional bar to bringing a Title VII action in federal district court; rather, like .a statute of limitations, it is a condition precedent to bringing suit that may be excused when doing so is warranted by relevant equitable considerations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a complainant to request a right-to-sue letter after 180 days and requires the EEOC to issue it upon request.

Dowdell v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey · filed 2000-04-20(f)(1)

Thus, while the statute requires that the complainant institute administrative proceedings through the EEOC, it does not require a complainant to wait indefinitely for an EEOC conclusion — the right-to-sue letter may be requested at any point after 180 days have passed, and the EEOC must issue the letter upon such request.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days have elapsed when it determines that it is unlikely to finish processing the charge within that period.

West v. Merillat Industries, Inc. · filed 2000-04-12(f)(1)

The statute does not by its plain terms prohibit the EEOC from issuing a notice of right to sue before the 180-period has expired.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days have elapsed when it cannot investigate the charge within that period.

Parker v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2000-05-05(f)(1)

The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that Title VII does not impose upon the EEOC a mandatory 180-day waiting period before issuing right-to-sue letters. ... In view of the well-known fact that the EEOC and state administrative agencies are so overwhelmed with charges that they could not possibly investigate more than a small fraction of them within 180 days, I find the Sims-Saulsbury line of cases to be the more persuasive. I therefore decline to grant Defendants’ motions on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a plaintiff to sue before 180 days have passed when the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice and terminates its processing of the charge.

Hall v. FlightSafety International, Inc. · filed 2000-07-11(f)(1)

To require plaintiff to wait the 180 days to amend his complaint would not only have been futile, but also contrary to the stated intent of Title VII — the expeditious resolution of claims.

A right-to-sue letter received after a Title VII action is filed validates the prematurely filed action.

Shanks v. Walker · filed 2000-08-21(f)(1)

In line with this policy, issuance of a right to sue letter validates a Title VII action commenced prior to the receipt of the notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter before 180 days have elapsed when it has completed its inquiry.

Lauricia v. MicroStrategy Inc. · filed 2000-09-13(f)(1)

In sum, neither Title VII’s plain language, nor its plain purpose preclude the EEOC from issuing the right-to-sue letter prior to the end of the 180 day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days when it certifies that it is unlikely to finish processing the charge within that period.

Richardson v. Valley Asphalt, Inc. · filed 2000-08-21(f)(1)

Nothing in Title VII appears to prohibit the EEOC from issuing an early right-to-sue notice prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. ... This court agrees with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and finds that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII is a permissible construction of the statute, read in light of both the language and the legislative history.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require a claimant to wait 180 days to sue when the EEOC issues an early right-to-sue letter under its regulation.

King v. Dunn Memorial Hospital · filed 2000-11-16(f)(1)

This court is not persuaded that Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue — whether an “aggrieved person” under Title VII can obtain a right-to-sue letter and bring suit before the EEOC has processed his charge for 180 days. ... The EEOC regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), is a reasonable response to rapidly growing caseloads that is consistent with the policy balance struck by Congress in Title VII.

An employer waives an objection to an ADA plaintiff’s failure to obtain an EEOC right-to-sue letter if it does not raise the issue.

Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc. · filed 2000-11-30(f)(1)

There is no indication, however, that Plaintiff ever received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). ... Because, however, Defendant failed to raise this issue, it has been waived.

The right-to-sue letter requirement applies to ADA claims and is a curable condition precedent, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc. · filed 2000-12-29(f)(1)

Although this Court finds that Plaintiffs failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to commencing this action was not a jurisdictional defect, but rather a condition precedent which Plaintiff cured, we nevertheless conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment as there was no genuine issue of fact and Plaintiff failed to produce evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that he was terminated in violation of the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a governmental employer to proceed when the EEOC, rather than the Attorney General, issued the right-to-sue letter.

Marion v. City of Philadelphia/Water Department · filed 2001-03-28(f)(1)

Following the rationale of the Moore court, as discussed above, this Court concludes that plaintiffs claim will not be dismissed due to the fact that she has not received a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney Gen: eral.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars a Title VII claim when the EEOC charge was filed more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination.

McNair v. NYC Health & Hospital Co. · filed 2001-04-09(f)(1)

Because the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a necessary prerequisite to bringing a legal action, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(1) and (f)(1), this court lacks jurisdiction to hear McNair’s Title VII claim against the Union.

Section 2000e-5’s right-to-sue-letter prerequisite may be excused when the EEOC fails to act on timely discrimination charges.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 580 · filed 2001-04-18(f)(1)

Eighteen months later, the EEOC has neither filed an Order to Show Cause nor issued a right to sue letter. Therefore, the court finds that, except for Trancoso, union members’ noncompliance with section 2000e-5 is excused by the EEOC’s inaction.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge and obtain a right-to-sue letter before filing suit; the letter requirement is a waivable condition precedent.

Dickerson v. Associates Home Equity · filed 2001-06-15(f)(1)

Because “the right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent” to filing suit, rather than a jurisdictional requirement, “the requirement of obtaining a right-to-sue letter may be waived by the parties or the court.” ... Unlike the situation in Party, however, there is nothing in Dickerson’s pleadings to suggest that she has ever filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

A right-to-sue letter received after a Title VII suit is filed cures the initial pleading defect without requiring an amended complaint within 90 days.

Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. · filed 2001-08-09(f)(1)

Accordingly, the court concludes that any pleading deficiency in the original complaint was cured when Mr. Dennis received his right-to-sue letter. Neither his individual Title VII claim, nor those asserted on behalf of the class, should be dismissed on this ground.

An EEOC right-to-sue letter covering the claim is a prerequisite to filing suit, but the parties or court may waive that requirement.

Newsome v. Berman · filed 2001-11-14(f)(3)

The district court correctly dismissed Newsome’s racial discrimination claims, Newsome’s right to sue letter from the EEOC did not include her racial discrimination claims. The right to sue letter is a necessary prerequisite to filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 29 C.F.R. 1601.28(e)(1). This prerequisite may be waived by the parties or the court. ... However, Newsome offers no explanation for her failure to obtain a right to sue letter that would support such a waiver.

Section 2000e-5 permits a claimant who receives an early EEOC right-to-sue notice to satisfy the exhaustion requirement before 180 days have elapsed.

Lawyer v. Eck & Eck MacH. Co., Inc. · filed 2002-01-28(f)(1)

Shortly after defendant’s initial brief was filed, the Tenth Circuit rejected the reasoning of Martini and concluded that the EEOC’s regulation permitting early right-to-sue notices was valid and consistent with Title VII. ... The court thus finds that plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies on the claim of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an EEOC right-to-sue notice before 180 days have passed when the EEOC determines it probably cannot finish processing the charge within that period.

Carson v. Giant Food, Inc. · filed 2002-02-20(f)(1)

Each plaintiff was issued a right-to-sue notice fewer than 180 days after he filed a charge of discrimination. Giant argues in its motions for summary judgment that the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims are invalid because Title VII does not allow the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice fewer than 180 days after the plaintiff files a charge of discrimination. For the reasons stated below, I find that the early right-to-sue notices provided by the EEOC are valid.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires notice of the right to sue before a Title VII complaint is filed, but does not require the plaintiff to attach the notice to the complaint.

Raymond v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-02-05(f)(1)

Although Title VII requires that a claimant be notified of her right to sue before filing a complaint, it does ... not state any requirement that a plaintiff attach the right to sue letter to her complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not make Title VII’s abrogation of state immunity depend on the Attorney General issuing a right-to-sue letter.

Stewart v. State of Oklahoma, and James Saffle, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Department of Cor · filed 2002-06-12(f)(1)

Similarly, the statute that purportedly directs the Attorney General to issue right-to-sue letters, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), contains no express or implied connection to the abrogation provision.

Section 2000e-5 does not require the EEOC to wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue letter.

Bryant v. Dan River, Inc. · filed 2002-07-03(f)(1)

However, nowhere in the plain language of § 2000e-5 does the statute require the EEOC to wait 180 days prior to issuing a right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s right-to-sue letter requirement for ADA claims can be satisfied after a lawsuit begins.

Tlush v. Manufacturers Resource Center · filed 2002-07-24(f)(1)

Tlush’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter at this early stage of the lawsuit is sufficient to cure his failure to obtain such a letter before seeking relief from the courts. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs ADA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit based on an EEOC right-to-sue letter issued before the 180-day waiting period expires under the EEOC’s early-letter regulation.

McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp. · filed 2002-07-29(f)(1)

Accordingly, it is improper to dismiss McGrath’s Title VII claims on grounds that the early right-to-sue letter is defective because: (1) the EEOC regulation permitting early right-to-sue letters comports with § 2000e — 5(f)(1); (2) dismissing early right-to-sue letter cases is unsound as a policy matter; and (3) dismissing McGrath’s Title VII claims based on the early right-to-sue letter would be inequitable.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant entitled to a right-to-sue notice to proceed when the EEOC fails to issue a complete notice.

McInnis v. North Carolina Department of Environment & Natural Resources · filed 2002-09-18(f)(1)

If a charge filed with the EEOC is dismissed or the EEOC fails to take any action within 180 days, the EEOC shall notify the complainant of her right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), 12117(a). ... Accordingly, she was entitled to a “right to sue” letter with regard to her ADA claim and should not be charged with the EEOC’s failure to issue a complete “right to sue” letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not prohibit the EEOC from issuing a right-to-sue notice before 180 days when it determines it cannot finish processing the charge within that period.

Marston v. AT & T Corp. · filed 2002-10-23(f)(1)

In the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition of “early” right-to-sue letters, the balance of factors merits upholding the validity of Section 1601.28(a)(2).

An employer forfeits an objection to a Title VII suit filed before the plaintiff receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter if it fails to raise the issue in its motion to dismiss.

Butland v. NH DOC · filed 2002-10-30(f)(1)

The record indicates that plaintiff brought this action one day prior to obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC. But, because defendant did not raise the issue in its motion to dismiss, the point is forfeited.

An objection to filing a Title VII suit before receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter is forfeited if the defendant does not raise it in a motion to dismiss.

Butland v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections · filed 2002-10-30(f)(1)

The record indicates that plaintiff brought this action one day prior to obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC. But, because defendant did not raise the issue in its motion to dismiss, the point is forfeited.

Section 2000e-5(e) and (f), incorporated into the ADA, require a timely EEOC complaint and a right-to-sue letter before a claimant may sue in federal court; the EEOC complaint must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act.

Pilman v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2003-05-12(e) and (f)

Under both Title VII and the ADA, a claimant may bring suit in federal court only if she has filed a timely complaint with the EEOC and obtained a right-to-sue letter.

A Title VII plaintiff must receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter before bringing a claim in federal court.

Canty v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp. · filed 2003-04-07(f)(1)

Nevertheless, while the complaint alleges that a grievance was filed with the EEOC, it does not state that Canty obtained a right-to-sue letter. Thus, she has not demonstrated that she has exhausted her administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff suing a state to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General, but equitable relief can excuse that nonjurisdictional requirement when compliance is beyond the plaintiff’s control.

Hiller v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Used Motor Vehicle & Parts Commission · filed 2003-05-06(f)(1)

Accordingly, because Ms. Hiller does not have a letter from the Attorney General, she has not complied with the statute. ... We agree with the Eleventh Circuit and the district court in Townsend that it would work an injustice on Ms. Hiller to deprive her of a remedy for failure to meet a nonjurisdictional requirement that is beyond her control.

A right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to filing suit that can be obtained after the action begins.

Kent v. Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and Division of Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 1993-03-17(f)(1)

The district court dismissed the action without prejudice because Kent had not received a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting filing requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). Since filing this appeal, Kent has received a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri commission, an agent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under a work-sharing agreement. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c) (1990). The department concedes that Kent has now exhausted his administrative remedies. Thus, we remand for reinstatement of Kent's action. See Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1988) (receiving a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an action, but rather, is a condition precedent curable after the action has commenced).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a timely Title VII action after the claimant receives a right-to-sue notice.

Rice v. City of St. Louis · filed 1978-12-26(f)(1)

After plaintiff's application for examination had been rejected, she filed timely charges of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) and later received a notice of right to sue entitling her to institute this action. The present action was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to receive an EEOC right-to-sue notice before filing suit and to sue within ninety days of receiving it.

Shabazz v. Texas Youth Commission · filed 2003-09-30(f)(1)

The Court agrees with Defendants. Even if Plaintiff were able to prove all the facts alleged in the Complaint, they do not show that Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficiently that he has exhausted all administrative remedies. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot assert a Title VII claim based on the allegations included in the Complaint. Plaintiffs Title VII claim against Defendant TYC is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

A right-to-sue letter is required before filing a Title VII claim, but a plaintiff awaiting the letter can seek a stay to preserve related claims from preclusion.

Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit · filed 2004-08-27(f)(1)

A right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to filing a Title VII claim. ... To prevent their claims from being precluded, Appellants could have requested a stay in Davis I until they received their letters.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to receive the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice before a court may resolve the merits of the claim.

Wright v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2005-12-05

The EEOC proceeding concerning the 2004 non-selection apparently is ongoing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (and perhaps 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)). ... Accordingly, because the record does not reflect that Wright has received the Commission’s notice of a right to sue, the court cannot resolve the merits of a 2004 non-selection in this litigation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private Title VII suit based on a right-to-sue letter only when the letter concerns a timely filed administrative charge.

McPherson v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2006-07-13(f)(1)

We therefore hold that a right-to-sue letter enables a private suit only if it is issued in connection with an administrative charge that is timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to bring suit; the notice does not establish the merits of the claim.

Martin v. General Electric Co. · filed 2006-07-03(f)(1)

A right-to-sue letter has no bearing on the merits of a complaining party’s claim. The letter, instead, certifies that the complaining party has exhausted her administrative remedies, acknowledges that the EEOC does not want to pursue the action on her behalf, and gives her ninety days “after the giving of such notice” to bring suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) & (f)(1).