42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a materially significant disadvantage threshold; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) permits a race discrimination claim when alleged treatment plausibly puts an employee at a material disadvantage in job performance and compensation.

James v. Countrywide Financial Corp. · filed 2012-02-02(a)(2)

The Court finds it plausible to infer that this conduct, which is alleged by plaintiff to have negatively impacted his work performance and resulting compensation, “was a materially significant disadvantage with respect to the terms of [plaintiffs] employment.”

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory reassignment can qualify upon some harm to an employment term or condition even if salary and benefits are unchanged.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a race or sex discrimination claim; a temporary emergency reassignment with unchanged salary and benefits does not qualify.

Anthony v. Donahoe · filed 2012-02-14(a)

Anthony cannot show that she was subject to an adverse employment action. Her reassignment to the Port Allen facility was temporary and part of ... a larger emergency plan in the wake of Hurricane Gustav. During her time there, she received the identical salary and benefits she received at her prior position.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory transfer need cause some harm to an employment term or condition, without requiring a significant or material loss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse change in employment terms or conditions; another employee’s temporary acting appointment does not qualify without a tangible adverse effect.

Webb v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2012-02-28(a)(1)

Accordingly, the asserted adverse employment action does not meet the threshold level of substantiality required by Title VII because Webb suffered no “materially adverse” change in the terms or conditions of his employment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) unless it causes a serious and material change in employment terms, conditions, or benefits.

Shepard v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2012-03-14(a)(1)

Without considering his later medical restrictions, UPS’s decision to move him from the office to the warehouse was a lateral transfer that did not involve a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, and benefits of his employment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An unfavorable schedule is not an adverse employment action under Title VII when it does not reduce wages or job responsibilities.

Albuja v. National Broadcasting Co. Universal · filed 2012-03-16(a)(1)

Where the change in schedule does not occasion a reduction in wages or job responsibilities, unfavorable schedules are a “mere inconvenience” and not an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory transfer need cause some harm to an employment term or condition, without requiring an ultimate employment decision; the ruling about these comments still depends on their effect.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an ultimate employment decision for a race-discrimination claim; racial slurs and workplace comments alone are not adverse employment actions.

Harrison v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2012-05-10(a)

There is evidence in the record showing that Harrison was subjected to a racial slur by a CCA employee and that he overheard racial comments in his workplace prior to this incident, but these do not constitute actionable adverse employment actions because they are not the equivalent of the ultimate employment decisions listed above.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory employment change need cause some harm to an employment term or condition, without requiring a material loss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim; a minimal loss of potential tips does not qualify.

Arafi v. Mandarin Oriental Hotel Group · filed 2012-06-06(a)(1)

Therefore, even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the court cannot conclude that his loss of potential tips from the eighth and ninth floor during three days in December 2010 amounts to a materially adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-harm threshold for a discriminatory transfer; each challenged action still requires some harm to an employment term or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action to establish a discrimination claim.

Peters v. Wal-Mart · filed 2012-06-25(a)(1)

The first seven of those allegations — that defendants would not allow her to modify her schedule, reprimanded her rudely, failed to train her on certain equipment, required her to take a drug test, kept plaintiff under “close surveillance,” gave her a written coaching, and gave her difficult work assignments — fail to establish an adverse employment action as a matter of law.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires only some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition; the harm need not be significant.

Denial of training is an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) only when it causes tangible harm to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Casey v. Mabus · filed 2012-07-20(a)(1)

Likewise, even assuming that the denial of training opportunities made the plaintiff a suboptimal worker, such denial is still not an “adverse employment action” under Title VII absent some concrete factual allegation that her training deficit imposed a tangible harm on the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition; a significant or tangible job consequence is not required.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) generally does not treat an employee reprimand as unlawful discrimination unless it has tangible job consequences.

Jones v. Spherion Atlantic Enterprise, LLC · filed 2012-10-17(a)(1)

However, criticisms of an employee’s performance, whether written or oral, which do not lead to tangible job consequences, are generally not sufficient to constitute a violation of Title VII.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse change in employment terms or conditions for a disparate treatment claim.

Lewis v. Erie County Medical Center Corp. · filed 2012-11-01(a)(1)

The court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in that she has not shown that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition; a materially adverse change is not required.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an action that materially alters the terms or conditions of employment.

Latice Porter v. City of Chicago · filed 2012-11-08(a)(1)

Porter fails, however, to put forth evidence that either of these actions materially altered the terms or conditions of her employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) removed the materiality threshold for discrimination claims; an employee must show some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a racial disparate treatment claim; this parking restriction did not qualify.

Paschal Anyanwu v. Brumos Motor Cars, Inc. · filed 2012-11-13(a)(1)

The district court in this case correctly found that Brumos’s prohibition on Anyanwu parking his Ferrari in the employee lot, and later permitting him to do so only if he signed a release of liability, were not adverse employment actions, and thus, Anyanwu had not made out a prima facie discrimination case.

Law changed since The serious-and-material-change threshold for a discriminatory transfer does not govern after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024), which requires some harm to an employment term or condition, without a significant-harm requirement.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a serious and material change in employment terms for a discriminatory work assignment to qualify as an adverse employment action.

Hall v. Dekalb County Government · filed 2013-01-09(a)(1)

The district court did not err in concluding that Hall’s and Jackson’s allegedly limited use of the BAS was not an adverse employment action. They put forth no evidence that any limitations of their ability to train on and use the BAS affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment as HVAC mechanics, or that limited access to the BAS constituted a “serious and material” change in their employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) displaced the significant-harm requirement for a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition is enough.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim; workplace actions that, individually or together, do not significantly affect employment status, benefits, working conditions, or earning potential do not qualify.

Scott v. Sunoco Logistics Partners, LP · filed 2013-01-09(a)(1)

None of Sunoco’s actions individually or combined, with the exception of its failure to promote Scott to the Administrative Assistant position, significantly changed Scott’s employment status, altered her benefits, disrupted her working conditions, or decreased her earning potential.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) displaced the serious-and-material-change threshold for a discriminatory job transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition is enough.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a serious and material change in employment terms for an adverse action in a discrimination claim; four additional months on a night shift without a change in pay, benefits, or workload does not meet that standard.

Foster v. Thomas County · filed 2013-02-22(a)(1)

While it may have been inconvenient to be on the night shift for an additional four months, the shift change simply does not rise to the level of a “serious and material change” in Plaintiffs terms of employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-harm threshold; a discriminatory change must cause some harm to an employment term or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat a reprimand as an adverse employment action unless it materially affects the employee’s job, pay, benefits, or work hours.

Weng v. Solis · filed 2013-08-15(a)(1)

Nevertheless, just as the Warning Memorandum did not constitute an adverse employment action, the Letter of Reprimand cannot constitute an adverse action because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the disciplinary action directly affected her job title, duties, salary, benefits, or work hours in any material manner.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a tangible or significant-harm threshold; some harm to an employment term or condition remains required.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a tangible effect on employment for a disparate-treatment claim based on an adverse employment action; exclusion from an award photograph alone does not qualify.

Mallik v. Sebelius · filed 2013-08-28(a)(1)

The Court is at a loss to see how failure to appear in a photograph could affect Plaintiffs pay, promotion opportunities, or responsibilities on the job, and Plaintiff has not provided any assistance, as he has not alleged that his exclusion from the photograph impacted him in any tangible way. The decision by his supervisor to exclude Plaintiff from the photograph of the award ceremony may have been insensitive, even cruel, but it did not amount to an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-change threshold for discriminatory transfers; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat an unwanted reassignment as an adverse employment action when it causes no material change in employment terms.

Jimenez v. Donahoe · filed 2013-09-11(a)(1)

Jimenez’s reassignment to a different work section therefore does not give rise to a Title VII violation.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-adversity threshold for discriminatory transfers; a change causing some harm to an employment term or condition can qualify.

A loss of supervisory responsibilities without a loss of pay or benefits does not establish an adverse employment action when the change is not materially adverse to a reasonable employee.

Kidd v. Mando American Corporation · filed 2013-09-27(a)

The touchstone is instead whether the allegedly adverse employment action was “materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. Kidd’s demotion claim — grounded on a loss of supervisory responsibility of the accounts payable department, not a loss of salary or benefits — does not rise to that level. Nor is it “unusual.”

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition, without requiring financial loss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat critical performance memoranda as adverse employment actions when there is no evidence that they caused financial harm.

Francis v. Solis · filed 2013-10-07(a)(1)

In this case, plaintiff provides no evidence that either the February 7 or May 28, 2008 memorandum resulted in any financial harm to her. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could not conclude that these memoranda constitute “adverse actions.”

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a separate significant-harm threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a material effect on employment terms or conditions for a discrimination claim based on an adverse employment action.

McKinney v. Johnson · filed 2014-02-03(a)

Two of the actions McKinney points to as discriminatory do not qualify as adverse employment actions. The fact that Grathen told her boss about the hotel disturbance had no impact on the terms or conditions of McKinney’s employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition; the absence of a change in pay, benefits, or duties alone does not decide the claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; limiting promotion opportunities without affecting job duties, compensation, or benefits does not qualify.

Stone v. Louisiana Department of Revenue · filed 2014-02-12(a)(1)

As such, an adverse employment action, for purposes of Title VII, does not include decisions made by an employer that serve only to limit an employee’s opportunities for promotion but do not affect his job duties, compensation, or benefits.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) allows a transfer claim when the transfer causes some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without requiring a significant injury.

A purely lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action for a Title VII discrimination claim.

Munoz v. Seton Healthcare, Incorporated · filed 2014-02-18(a)(1)

Consequently, Munoz’s allegations regarding her transfer fall short of a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, or age under Title VII and the ADEA.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a significant-injury threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides relief for discrimination only when it seriously and tangibly affects an employee’s ability to perform the job or the employee’s job benefits.

Walker v. Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc · filed 2014-02-19(a)(1)

Title VII and § 1981 thus do not provide relief for unpleasantness that may be encountered in the work place. Rather, they provide a remedy only if discrimination seriously and tangibly altered the employee’s ability to perform the job or impacted the employee’s job benefits.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a separate materiality threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action that materially affects employment; on these facts, termination of employment and benefits qualified, but warnings and a brief pay deduction did not.

Deans v. Kennedy House, Inc. · filed 2014-02-25(a)(1)

Therefore, the only action taken by the Kennedy House that can be considered an “adverse action” as a matter of law is the termination of Deans’s employment and health benefits.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a separate material-detriment threshold.

A denial of overtime supports a Title VII discrimination claim only if it causes a material detriment.

Henry v. NYC Health & Hospital Corp. · filed 2014-03-10(a)(1)

But Henry fails to allege facts plausibly indicating that she suffered any material detriment as a result of being denied overtime, such as opportunities for career advancement. Her conclusory allegation that she was denied overtime, without more, is insufficient to substantiate an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a separate materiality threshold.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action; alleged denial of time off requires evidence that a request was denied.

Batchelor v. City of New York · filed 2014-04-01(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not shown that she suffered an adverse employment action. ... Even assuming that denial of a vacation request was a material adverse employment action, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that she was in fact denied a vacation or holiday request.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) allows a transfer claim when the transfer causes some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without significant injury.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case under § 2000e-2(a).

Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Department · filed 2014-04-17(a)

Even assuming that Plaintiff timely filed his complaint, Plaintiff fails to state a pri-ma facie case for race and age discrimination because he has not produced enough evidence to demonstrate that the 2011 reassignment from his Inspections position to Community Safety and Education was an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, without a separate materiality threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action to support a race discrimination claim.

Warr v. Hagel · filed 2014-04-18(a)(1)

Warr cannot establish his prima facie case for racial discrimination or retaliation with respect to his oral admonishment for time and attendance issues, his “minimally successful” performance rating, and his placement on a PIP because these are not materially adverse actions as a matter of law.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a significant-harm threshold for discriminatory transfers; the older ultimate-employment-decision formulation no longer controls that question.

Section 2000e-2 requires an ultimate employment decision for a race discrimination claim; denial of training or a special assignment without an effect on employment status does not qualify.

Uneeda Reed v. Cook Children's Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2014-05-29(a)(1)

Title VII and chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code were designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not every action that occurs in the workplace that makes an employee unhappy.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition for a discriminatory transfer, without a significant-harm threshold; this older tangible-harm formulation must be read in that light.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a poor performance evaluation to show that it caused objectively tangible harm.

Gibbs v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2014-07-09(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiffs do not establish a similar causal link between their evaluations and an objectively tangible harm. Plaintiffs do not contend that their evaluations played a role in their termination, nor do they allege any change in employment status or salary that was caused by (or was blocked by) these evaluations.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory transfer need cause some harm to an employment term or condition, but the harm need not be significant; this earlier significant-and-material threshold no longer governs transfers.

A significant loss of material job responsibilities can constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas · filed 2014-09-03(a)(1)

This does not mean that a change in or loss of job responsibilities can never form the basis of an actionable discrimination claim, however. In certain instances, a change in or loss of job responsibilities—similar to the transfer and reassignment contexts—may be so significant and material that it rises to the level of an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of significant harm from a discriminatory transfer; some harm to a term or condition of employment suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a racial discrimination plaintiff to show a tangible, adverse employment action; a reassignment that causes no material harm does not suffice.

Williams v. Phillips 66 Co. · filed 2014-11-03(a)(1)

In conclusion, Williams has failed to establish that he suffered a tangible, adverse employment action during the statutorily relevant time period. Accordingly, Phillips 66 is entitled to summary judgment on Williams’s claim for racial discrimination.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of material harm from a discriminatory transfer; some harm to a term or condition of employment suffices.

Section 2000e-2 requires a materially adverse change to the terms and conditions of employment for a discrimination claim.

Hopkins v. Board of Education · filed 2014-11-14

For Hopkins’ Title VII discrimination and both § 1981 claims, an actionably adverse employment action requires a material change to the “terms and conditions” of employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement that a discriminatory transfer cause serious or material harm; some harm to a term or condition of employment suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a serious and material change in employment terms for a work assignment to qualify as an adverse employment action.

Jenkins v. Tuscaloosa City Board of Education · filed 2014-12-09(a)(1)

Accordingly, because the court concludes the alleged differences in work assignments between Plaintiff and Pate are neither serious nor material, the differences are insufficient to rise to the level of an actionable adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of objectively tangible or significant harm from a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats denial of a volunteer assignment as an adverse employment action when it causes tangible harm by limiting career advancement opportunities.

Martin v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2015-01-23(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Martin’s evidence is sufficient to support a finding of “objectively tangible harm” because it suggests that the volunteer Relief Supervisory Investigator position was a “stepping-stone” for promotion to Supervisory Investigator, see Cruz, 2014 WL 2547541, at *5, and that she had thus been denied tangible “career advancement opportunities,” Trachtenberg, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 468.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of materially adverse harm from a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

A discrimination claim based on work assignments requires a materially adverse change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

English v. Board of School Commissioners · filed 2015-01-27(a)(1)

The Court looks to the fact that there are approximately thirty other school and rotating nurses who are also subject to the same type of job assignments and performing the same type of work as are the Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs failed to allege an adverse employment action, they have failed to meet their prima facie case.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of significant harm for discriminatory changes to employment terms; a telework denial now requires analysis of whether it caused some such harm.

Section 2000e-2 requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; denial of a telework request, without more, does not qualify.

Redmon v. United States Capitol Police · filed 2015-02-18

The Court agrees with the cited opinions that a denial of a request to telework, without more, does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action, as it does not involve “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.”

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of material harm for a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers an initial denial of tenure that causes material harm, even if the employer later grants tenure.

Barron v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac · filed 2015-03-13(a)(1)

The initial denial of tenure in this case constitutes adverse employment action, despite the subsequent grant of tenure, because the initial denial caused Plaintiff to materially suffer.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a requirement of significantly different responsibilities for a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Additional job duties do not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII unless they significantly change the employee’s position.

Washington v. Office of the State Appellate Defender · filed 2015-03-23(a)(1)

Simply put, Plaintiffs primary role of Investigator, coupled with certain responsibilities associated with mitigation, did not result in a new position “with significantly different job responsibilities” such that it could be considered an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a significant-harm threshold for discriminatory changes in employment terms; some harm suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; reassigning courses without a significant detrimental effect does not suffice.

Al-Deen v. Trustees of University of North Carolina Wilmington · filed 2015-04-06(a)(2)

In order to establish that she was the subject of discriminatory action in employment in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that she suffered adverse employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (prohibiting employment actions which deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect employment status on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,, or national origin). ... Perhaps more importantly, plaintiff has failed to allege that the reassignment of courses she taught has resulted in “any decrease in compensation, job title, level .of responsibility, or- opportunity for promotion.” Thus she has- failed to sufficiently allege a claim for religion or national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected the requirement of a substantial loss to make a discriminatory transfer actionable; some harm to an employment term suffices.

Denying a requested transfer is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the employee remains in the same position without a loss of pay, prestige, or responsibility.

Hawkins v. BBVA Compass Bancshares Inc. · filed 2015-06-02(a)(1)

But there is no failure to promote claim at issue here, and Defendant’s failure to grant Plaintiff’s request for a transfer is not adverse for Title VII purposes.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a significant-harm threshold for discriminatory employment changes; some harm to an employment term suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to allege an adverse employment action; a performance improvement plan without a significant change in employment terms does not qualify.

Jensen-Graf v. Chesapeake Employers' Insurance Company · filed 2015-06-26(a)

Jensen-Graf’s complaint fails to state a plausible discrimination claim because she has not alleged any action that could reasonably be considered an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a serious or material harm threshold for discriminatory changes in employment terms; some harm suffices.

A performance improvement plan is not an adverse employment action unless it seriously and materially changes the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Redd v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2015-06-26(a)(1)

We conclude that Redd failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his placement on the MPIP constituted an adverse employment action. Redd did not present any evidence that the MPIP resulted in a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-disadvantage threshold for discriminatory employment actions; some harm to an employment term suffices.

A training suspension or denial of a positive recommendation is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2 unless it materially disadvantages the employee.

Huynh v. United States Department of Transportation · filed 2015-07-24

We conclude that the only adverse employment action taken against Huynh was his termination from the training program.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a significant-harm threshold for discriminatory transfers; a change in duties may suffice if it causes some harm to an employment term.

A slight change in job responsibilities alone is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Howard v. Office of the Chief Administrative Officer of the United States House of Representatives · filed 2015-08-04(a)(1)

A slight change in responsibilities alone does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a significant-loss threshold for discriminatory transfers; a shift change can be actionable if it causes some harm to an employment term.

A lateral shift transfer with no change in title, pay, benefits, or job duties does not establish an adverse employment action for a sex-discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Leach v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2015-09-03(a)(1)

But such a “lateral transfer, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action” for purposes of a discrimination claim, particularly since her title, pay, benefits, and job duties remained the same.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but the harm need not be significant; the earlier material-change test no longer controls.

Section 2000e-2 requires a materially adverse employment change for a disparate-treatment claim; a written reprimand alone does not suffice.

Deasfernandez v. Beaumont Health System · filed 2015-12-22

Regardless, there is no evidence to suggest a write-up is a “material adverse change” akin to “a demotion” or “a material loss of benefits.” Accordingly, the Plaintiffs Disparate Treatment claim fails.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant; the earlier material-change test no longer controls.

A supervisor’s verbal reprimand does not qualify as an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when it does not materially change the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

Sullivan v. NYC Department of Investigation · filed 2016-02-17(a)(1)

Plaintiff argues that the reprimand she received from Wright — when Wright threw work back at plaintiff and told plaintiff that she wrote like a six year old— constitutes an adverse employment action. However, this conduct does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A disciplinary warning does not establish an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) without a material change in employment terms.

Rio v. NHC/OP, L.P. · filed 2016-02-25(a)(1)

Similarly, without a showing of a material change in the terms of her employment, the May 31 no-call no-show disciplinary write-up also fails to qualify as a materially adverse action.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A single rescheduled telework day is not a materially adverse employment action for a discrimination claim.

Boss v. Castro · filed 2016-03-18(a)(1)

Losing one day of telework hardly constitutes the “significant change in benefits” needed to trigger Title VII liability.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A workplace transfer supports a discrimination claim only when facts plausibly show an adverse change in employment, such as a demotion or loss of benefits.

Boza-Meade v. Rochester Housing Authority · filed 2016-03-21(a)(1)

In other words, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts plausibly supporting that her transfer was an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition, but the harm need not be significant; the earlier material-change test no longer controls.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to show a serious and material change in employment terms or another tangible adverse effect.

Medearis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2016-04-01(a)(1)

Specifically, a Title VII claim requires the employee to establish that he experienced “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ... Here, the district court properly granted summary judgment to CVS because the evidence showed that Medearis suffered no adverse employment action.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race discrimination claimant to show that the employer materially changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Smith v. City of Greensboro · filed 2016-04-12

For his race discrimination claims under Title VII or § 1983, Smith must prove that his employer took actions that materially changed the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. ... Thus, Smith failed to show he suffered an adverse employment action to support his race discrimination claim under Title VII or § 1983.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action; reprimands without alleged collateral consequences do not qualify.

Hinton v. Virginia Union University · filed 2016-05-05(a)(1)

The August and September 2013 reprimands, absent allegations of collateral consequences, do not rise to the level of “adverse employment action,” and cannot support a claim for discrimination under Title VII.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition from a discriminatory transfer, without the earlier materially adverse threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a materially adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; an unsupported assertion that a denied lateral transfer would improve promotion prospects does not suffice.

Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2016-08-02(a)

Under our Circuit precedent the action complained of must be “materially adverse” to support a discrimination claim. ... But, even if so, Ortiz-Diaz offered only a bare assertion that his transfer would enhance his promotion prospects.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition from a discriminatory transfer, without a significant-change requirement.

A lateral reassignment with no significant change in employment conditions is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Chung v. El Paso School District 11 · filed 2016-08-11(a)(1)

Based on the evidence properly before the court, there is no genuine dispute that Chung’s assignment to teach drama for the 2013-2014 school year was not an adverse employment action. We therefore agree with the district court that Chung failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a material-harm threshold; a discriminatory transfer needs only some harm to an employment term or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a material adverse change in employment conditions for a discrimination claim; relocating an employee’s desk without such a change does not qualify.

Conforti v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. · filed 2016-08-15(a)

Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendants’ alleged decision to relocate the Plaintiffs desk, standing alone, does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition from discrimination, without the earlier significant-change requirement.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a significant change in employment status for a disparate discipline claim; counseling and a working suspension without such a change do not qualify.

Presley v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction · filed 2017-01-06(a)(1)

The counseling and working suspension that Presley received as part of the progressive disciplinary system do not rise to the level of “a significant change in employment status,” which the adverse employment action element requires.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition from a discriminatory transfer, but no significant harm.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee’s belief that a reassignment carried less prestige does not, without evidence of worse working conditions, establish an adverse employment action.

Chavez v. Colorado, Department of Education · filed 2017-03-24(a)(1)

In her response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserts that she relies upon two adverse employment actions;- (1) reassignment to the call center, and (2) assigning her duties in excess of her medical restrictions for “almost five months in 2013.” (ECF No. 85 at 4.) The Court agrees with the latter, but not the former. With respect to the former, the sum total -of plaintiffs purported evidence is her personal belief that her work prior to being reassigned held more “prestige.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A lateral transfer that leaves an employee’s title, duties, pay, and hours materially unchanged is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Addison v. Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2017-03-27(a)(1)

Ms. Addison has not shown that her transfer to Gulf Main amounted to an adverse employment action because there is no evidence that her title, duties, pay, or hours changed in any material way (if at all).

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected the ultimate employment decision requirement; a discriminatory transfer need cause some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits discrimination claims only for ultimate employment decisions.

Vincent v. College of the Mainland · filed 2017-07-07(a)(1)

In McCoy v. City of Shreveport, we concluded that Burlington did not apply to discrimination claims and continued hold that only “ultimate employment decisions” are actionable. ... We are bound by a prior panel’s determination, and Vincent has failed to identify a superseding change in law that would warrant our revisiting that decision.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected a heightened materiality requirement for a discriminatory transfer; some harm to an identifiable employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2 requires a reassignment to have materially adverse consequences to support a sex discrimination claim.

Richardson v. District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services · filed 2017-09-22

Moreover, her reassignments did not constitute adverse employment actions because they did not involve “materially adverse consequences,” such as a change in grade or salary.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected the rule that a transfer must cause materially significant harm; a transfer must cause some harm to an employment term or condition.

A sex-discrimination claim under subsection (a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action; a lateral reassignment without a demotion does not qualify.

Keen v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp · filed 2018-03-05(a)(1)

A lateral transfer to a position that does not involve a demotion in form or substance is not a materially adverse employment action.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected the older materially significant harm threshold for discriminatory transfers; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a stricter showing of adverse employment action for a discrimination claim than the standard for a retaliation claim.

Morris v. Baton Rouge City Constable's Office · filed 2018-03-13(a)(1)

The Court notes that while this quote applied to the plaintiff's retaliation claim in Ogden , it applies with equal force in the discrimination context, because the applicable standard for determining whether an adverse employment action has occurred in a retaliation case is less stringent than that needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) rejected the older tangible and significant harm threshold for discriminatory transfers; some harm to an employment term or condition suffices.

Section 2000e-2 discrimination claims require an adverse employment action affecting compensation, employment opportunities, or material terms or conditions of employment.

Grossberg v. Hudson County Dept Human Ser · filed 2018-07-06(a)

Grossberg does not contend, nor does she present any evidence showing that she suffered a loss of compensation from either promotion decision. She also does not show any tangible and significant deprivation of any employment-related opportunity attributable to these decisions. Finally, beyond the assignment of a broken chair and dirty desk, she offers no evidence of a material change in the terms or conditions of her employment resulting from Hudson County’s action. We conclude that the record Grossberg created lacks any basis to reasonably infer any adverse employment action by Hudson County.

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) held that a discriminatory transfer needs some harm to an employment term or condition, but the harm need not be materially adverse.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege an employment action that materially affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.

Boney v. Trs. of Cape Fear Cmty. Coll. · filed 2019-03-05(a)(1)

As discussed, Boney has not plausibly alleged that Cape Fear's actions had a material adverse effect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment.

Law changed since The rule stated in this note reflects the pre-Muldrow material-change standard; Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition, without a significant-harm threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a jury to find that disproportionately assigning an employee undesirable shifts materially changes the terms or conditions of employment.

Mills v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2019-03-26(a)(1)

Though Ms. Mills's allegedly unfavorable schedule did not reduce her compensation, this court concludes that a jury could find that having to work more than her fair share of weekend closing shifts constitutes a material change to "the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." That is, the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment could reasonably include an employee's expectation that the workload will be allocated equally among all employees in the same position. So the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ms. Mills suffered adverse employment action by having to work more weekend closing shifts than her coworkers.

Law changed since The objective-tangible-harm threshold reflects pre-Muldrow law; Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) requires some harm to an employment term or condition, without a significant-harm threshold.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers sex-based preferential treatment that plausibly causes tangible harm to an employee’s current or future employment opportunities.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. George Washington University · filed 2019-05-08(a)(1)

The Commission has plausibly pled a course of preferential treatment for Mr. Aresco, to the detriment of Ms. Williams, that supports a reasonable inference of “materially adverse” effects on Ms. Williams’ career in the Athletics Department resulting in “objectively tangible harm.”

Law changed since Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) ended the significant-harm threshold for discriminatory changes to employment terms; some harm still must be shown.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim; a weekend work assignment that does not significantly alter employment terms does not qualify.

Renfroe v. Iac Greencastle, LLC · filed 2019-05-09(a)(1)

And although Renfroe may have disliked IAC's requirement for weekend work, as already noted, he fails to show how this request constitutes a materially adverse employment action that significantly altered his employment terms. For these reasons, this claim fails as a matter of law and IAC is entitled to summary judgment.