42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A plaintiff claiming national origin or religious discrimination must show less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Mani v. Becerra · filed 2025-01-07(a)(1)

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the fourth element of a prima face case, which requires him to demonstrate that he received less favorable treatment than employees outside the protected class, for two reasons: (1) he does not identify a specific person outside of his protected class; and (2) he does not provide evidence of less favorable treatment.

A plaintiff claiming discrimination must show, among other things, that someone outside her protected group replaced her or that similarly situated employees outside the group received more favorable treatment.

Shahrashoob v. Texas A&M University · filed 2025-01-08(a)(1)

To meet her initial burden, she must show that she (1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside her protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside her protected group. ... As a result, we cannot conclude that Dr. Shahrashoob has met her initial burden to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on replacement.

A qualified employee in a protected class can establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination by showing that she was fired and her job was not eliminated.

Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board · filed 2025-01-14(a)(1)

In sum, a plaintiff alleging wrongful termination may raise an inference of unlawful discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was fired, and (4) the job was not eliminated.

For a race discrimination claim, evidence that the employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the protected class satisfies the fourth element of the prima facie case.

McDonald v. Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority · filed 2025-02-06(a)(1)

Element four requires that Plaintiff establish he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or treated differently that similarly situated employees. Plaintiff has provided evidence to show that he was replaced by someone outside the protected class. Therefore, this element is satisfied.

A prima facie religious discrimination claim does not require evidence of a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment.

Washington v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC · filed 2025-02-13(a)(1)

However, whether a similarly situated comparator exists is not an element of a prima facie of religious discrimination under Title VII.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination must show she was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence.

Brown v. Kroger Co · filed 2025-02-18(a)(1)

The Court finds that Brown fails to overcome summary judgment on her race discrimination claim because she cannot successfully establish the prima facie case. ... The Court finds that Brown does not assert sufficient evidence showing she was qualified as a full-time employee at Kroger.

An employee relying on comparators to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Barnes v. 3M Company Inc · filed 2025-03-12(a)(1)

For the reasons discussed below, Blackburn is also not a valid comparator. Therefore, Barnes has failed to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination.

A Title VII race discrimination claim may proceed when a reasonable jury could find the employee qualified despite disputed performance metrics.

HARRELL v. PEOPLESHARE LLC · filed 2025-03-24(a)(1)

Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Harrell was qualified for the position she sought to retain.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination; an unfair termination alone does not suffice.

Hutchison v. Ranch and Home Supply, LLC · filed 2025-03-27(a)(1)

Ms. Hutchison must raise a genuine issue as to whether she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation. Because she fails to do so, Ms. Hutchison cannot meet her prima facie burden. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment for Murdoch’s on Ms. Hutchison’s Title VII claim.

A discrimination plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case without evidence that he met his employer’s legitimate expectations or that a similarly situated employee outside his protected class was treated better.

Brown v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

The Court therefore must assess whether a genuine dispute of material fact remains that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that (2) Brown met CTA’s legitimate expectations, and (4) another similarly situated employee not in Brown’s protected class (i.e., a cisgender employee) was treated better by CTA. As the Court explains next, the answer to both those questions is “no,” and so it grants CTA’s motion for summary judgment on Brown’s Title VII discrimination claim.

A Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff cannot infer discriminatory termination from employees whose conduct and disciplinary histories differ materially from the plaintiff’s.

EUBANKS v. FOOT LOCKER RETAIL, INC. · filed 2025-04-21(a)(2)

The Court holds that they are not appropriate comparators. Eubanks provides no relevant comparator evidence giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.

A plaintiff can establish the fourth element of a prima facie race discrimination claim by showing replacement outside the protected class or different treatment from similarly situated employees outside it.

Jones v. Aludyne US LLC · filed 2025-05-22(a)(1)

Because the plaintiff has presented no evidence on this issue and has made no effort to call into question the evidence presented by the defendants, the court finds that he has not established a prima facie case of race discrimination. On this basis, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981.

A plaintiff seeking default judgment on a Title VII race discrimination claim must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Johnson v. Brede Washington, Inc. · filed 2025-07-16(a)(1)

To prevail on his motion, the Plaintiff must, among other things, establish that he can make a prima facie case of employment discrimination upon the basis of race in this case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin; a discrimination claim requires facts showing different treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Khalaf v. Saint Louis University · filed 2025-07-31(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Furthermore, there are no allegations of disparate treatment from similarly situated employees outside of his protected class.

For a race discrimination claim based on more favorable treatment of other employees, the plaintiff must identify a similarly situated employee of another race who received that treatment.

Narayanan v. Midwestern · filed 2025-08-05(a)

Because Narayanan cannot provide a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably, he cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie disparate treatment case by showing protected status, job qualification, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Zelton v. FedEx Express Corporation · filed 2025-08-26(a)(1)

Under this prong, Plaintiff must show “either that ‘similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or that other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.’”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie race discrimination claim, including evidence of replacement by someone outside the protected class or different treatment of a similarly situated employee outside it.

Ferrer v. Detroit Club Management Corp · filed 2025-08-27(a)(1)

Even if the Court assumes that Lisée satisfies the first three requirements, there is no evidence that he was replaced by a non-Caucasian individual or that he was treated differently than similarly situated, non-Caucasian employees.

A plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework for a sex discrimination claim must show satisfactory job performance at the prima facie stage.

Watrous v. Airtec, Inc. · filed 2025-08-28(a)(1)

At the prima facie stage, the burden is on the plaintiff to show satisfactory job performance, and Watrous has not done so here.

A plaintiff relying on indirect evidence of race or national origin discrimination must show that someone outside the protected class replaced the plaintiff or was treated more favorably.

Santarossa v. P & A Industries, Inc. · filed 2025-09-02(a)(1)

Santarossa fails to establish his prima facie case because, among other things, he has not pointed to any evidence that he was replaced by or treated less favorably than an employee outside of his protected class.

A sex discrimination plaintiff must show circumstances supporting an inference of intentional discrimination; an employee of a staffing company who reports to different supervisors does not establish that inference as a comparator.

AVERYTT v. MAGEE-WOMENS HOSPITAL OF UPMC · filed 2025-09-22(a)(1)

However, the evidence of record, unrefuted by Ms. Averytt, demonstrates that Gil was not similarly situated. The record demonstrates that Gil was a temporary employee of a staffing company, and he did not report to Ms. Averytt’s supervisors.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that race or sex played a role in an adverse employment action; replacement by people of another race or sex alone does not establish an inference of discrimination.

TANAI · filed 2025-11-04

Race and sex discrimination claims require that race and sex played a role in the adverse employment action. The record here is devoid of any evidence suggesting race or sex played any role in Tanai’s departure from Bryn Mawr. Tanai therefore has not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case.

A plaintiff can establish the replacement element of a prima facie discrimination case when her position is eliminated and its duties are assumed by someone outside her protected class.

Green · filed 2025-12-10(a)(1)

Green can show she was “replaced” when others not in her protected class assumed her duties. Because the record reflects that only Green’s specific position was eliminated and her duties were assumed by someone outside her protected class, she has established for summary judgment purposes that she was “replaced.”

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment through protected status, satisfactory performance, an adverse employment action, and circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Ali · filed 2026-01-09(a)

Mr. Ali must establish that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was performing according to his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.

A university hiring decision can violate Title VII when bias by faculty involved in the selection process influences the decision.

Lam v. University of Hawai'i · filed 1994-10-11(a)(1)

The hiring process is therefore not insulated from the illegitimate biases of faculty members.

A university may be liable under § 2000e-2(a)(1) for discriminatory bias at any stage of its hiring process; an applicant need not prove bias at every stage.

Lam v. University of Hawai'i · filed 1994-12-14(a)(1)

Accordingly, a plaintiff in a university discrimination case need not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of the decisionmaking process; impermissible bias at any point may be sufficient to sustain liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a rejected applicant to present evidence that an employer’s stated reason for not hiring him was a pretext for discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Leroy Griffin, AKA Lee Griffin v. Lockheed Aeromod Center, Inc. · filed 1995-11-02(a)(1)

To survive the summary judgment motion, Griffin must provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that Lockheed was motivated by a discriminatory reason or that Lockheed's proffered explanation is unbelievable. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Griffin has not satisfied his burden.

In a failure-to-hire claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), an applicant must show that they met the position’s objective qualifications.

Watson v. City of Salem · filed 1995-11-09(a)(1)

In analyzing the second element of the prima facie case, this court must confine its inquiry to the objective qualifications related to the position of police officer.

A refusal to rehire a qualified applicant can violate § 2000e-2(a)(1) when evidence of pretext and disparate hiring raises a triable issue of sex discrimination.

Boisvert v. Sears, Roebuck & C o . · filed 1998-03-24(a)(1)

Based on the record here, Boisvert has presented a triable issue as to whether Sears, acting through Emond, did not rehire her for unlawful discriminatory reasons.

An applicant challenging a hiring decision under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer's stated legitimate reason is false and a pretext for discrimination.

EEOC v. MCI Telecommunications · filed 1999-07-28(a)(1)

If MCIT offers a plausible explanation for its hir- ing decision, the EEOC must demonstrate that this articulated justification is both false and a pretext for illegal discrimination. ... This the EEOC has failed to do, and so we affirm the grant of summary judgment for MCIT.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers discriminatory decisions about promotions to higher-ranking positions.

Oden v. Oktibbeha County MS · filed 2001-03-27(a)

Regardless of which standard applies, Sheriff Bryan’s appointment was an ultimate employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring; a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence from which gender bias can be inferred.

Lakshman v. University of Maine System · filed 2004-08-06(a)(1)

This Court concludes the Dr. Lakshman’s evidence of sex discrimination in the University’s 1997 decision to fill the mycology position is inadequate to withstand summary judgment.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer can rebut a race discrimination claim by producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision; the plaintiff then bears the burden of showing pretext.

Barron v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlant · filed 2005-04-19(a)(1)

We conclude that FRBA’s decision to hire Jadwin as a Check Collections Supervisor is not evidence of discrimination because FRBA’s explanation that there were no qualified internal candidates was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason and Barron failed to argue that the reason was pretext on appeal.

A hiring decision does not violate Section 2000e-2(a)(1) merely because it may depart from employer policy; the applicant must show how the decision was discriminatory.

Trujillo v. Board of Education of Albuquerque Public Schools · filed 2009-01-09(a)(1)

Second, even if Ms. Trujillo is correct and Mr. Griego flouted APS policy by only hiring from pre-screened candidates provided by the Air Force, Ms. Trujillo presents no argument as to how such action could be discriminatory. She makes no claim that she has any less opportunity than any other candidate to be nominated by the Air Force.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) reaches the discriminatory elimination of a candidate during hiring, even if later decisions about the remaining candidates are unbiased.

Belyakov v. Leavitt · filed 2009-01-21(a)(1)

Certainly, a search process that eliminates candidates because of discriminatory animus is not insulated under Title VII by virtue of the fact that non-discriminatory personnel decisions are later made with respect to remaining candidates. In this case, however, there is no evidence that Tabak, who was allegedly acting with discriminatory animus, was responsible for the decision not to select Belyakov.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination when an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for selecting another applicant.

Beyah v. DODARO · filed 2009-10-26(a)(1)

Even if the supposed failure to consider plaintiff for the position on the Visitor’s Center project constituted an adverse action, ... defendant has proffered the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that James was the more qualified applicant, and based on the undisputed evidence, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to create a reasonable inference that this was not the true reason for his supposed non-selection.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated hiring reasons to present evidence from which a factfinder could find those reasons pretextual.

Lloyd Norman, III v. Reading Sch Dist · filed 2011-08-02(a)

We agree with the District Court that Norman has not provided a genuine issue of material fact that RSD’s reasons for its employment decisions were a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discriminatory hiring claim when an employer substantially delays hiring someone because of sex, even if it eventually hires that person.

Fisher v. Town of Orange · filed 2012-02-24(a)(1)

Even if plaintiff was eventually hired, a substantial delay in the decision to hire her that was attributable to her gender could constitute a discriminatory practice under the statute.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim based on earlier hiring decisions even if the employer eventually hires the applicant.

Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina · filed 2014-03-28(a)(1)

The fact that Garayalde-Rijos was eventually hired does not mean there was not unlawful discrimination in the hiring decisions for the first seven firefighter positions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex or religion; a passing reference to an applicant’s religion alone may be insufficient to prove discriminatory hiring.

Meyer v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 2017-03-10(a)(1)

The district court found, and we agree, that Grandi’s alleged statement about Meyer’s religion during the 2011 interview was the only evidence that the Defendants-Appellants’ decision not to re-hire Meyer was based on religious discrimination. We also agree that that statement alone was insufficient here to satisfy Meyer’s burden.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars national origin discrimination in hiring; an applicant relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated reasons for rejection were pretextual.

Mojica v. Florida Department of Revenue · filed 2017-08-21(a)(1)

Here, the district court did not' err granting summary judgment to the FDOR because Mojica failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the FDOR’s proffered reasons for not selecting him — salary constraints and candidate qualifications — were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race and sex discrimination in hiring, and a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated hiring reasons as pretext must present evidence that discrimination was the real reason.

Zinnerman v. Worthington Industries, Inc. · filed 2019-04-05(a)(1)

The district court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of Worthington and against Zinnerman’s complaint of discrimination based on her race and gender. Zinnerman failed to present evidence that the reasons proffered by Worthington were pretextual.

A qualified member of a protected class establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory non-selection by showing that she applied for an available position, was rejected, and the position was filled.

Moss v. Billington · filed 2020-07-15(a)(1)

Moss easily clears this bar because (1) she is a black woman over forty who suffers from Spasmodic Dysphonia; (2) she applied for the SSPC position, and Defendant concedes that she was qualified; (3) she was not selected; and (4) the position was filled by MacNeil.

A rejected applicant cannot establish race or national origin discrimination through comparators whose prior misconduct was materially less serious, or without evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Nobrega v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc. · filed 2021-05-11(a)(1)

Accordingly, Nobrega has failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the decision to terminate her conditional employment was based on racial or national origin animus. Moreover, defendant has provided sufficient unrebutted evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the reasons given for terminating plaintiff's employment were not pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in hiring; a plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretext for discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Ayers v. Area Agency on Aging of Pasco-Pinellas Inc. · filed 2021-06-04(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s proffered evidence fails to meet her burden of showing pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit hiring a candidate because the employer knows his family without evidence that race drove the choice.

Paige v. Equity Group Eufaula Division, LLC · filed 2021-09-16(a)

Indeed, neither Title VII nor § 1981 prevents an employer from hiring a candidate because he knows his family.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory hiring to plead facts connecting the defendant to the denied job and discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Lopez v. U.S. Department of the Interior · filed 2022-12-19(a)

Plaintiff does not name the former governor as a defendant, however, and she alleges no facts suggesting that any of the named Defendants played a role in denying her a job, discriminated against her based on a characteristic protected by Title VII, or retaliated against Plaintiff based on protected activity. Plaintiff thus fails to state a Title VII claim.

A neutral arbitrator’s decision upholding a termination can support summary judgment on a Title VII discrimination claim by weakening an inference of discriminatory intent.

Vargas v. City of Peekskill · filed 2023-03-27(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee based on that employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Given this, the Court finds that Arbitrator Edelman’s “findings amount[] to probative evidence in support of summary judgment on discrimination and retaliation claims.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits hiring decisions based on race or national origin; when an employer gives a legitimate reason, the plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could find discrimination.

Bonilla v. Garland · filed 2023-09-29(a)(1)

A review of the ROI shows that plaintiff’s characterizations of the record are inaccurate, and that the material cited does not supply evidence from which a reasonable jury conclude he was not interviewed or hired for a discriminatory reason.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a discrimination claim requires facts suggesting discriminatory motive.

Ventura · filed 2026-01-12(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate” based on an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Here, Plaintiffs allegations fail to suggest discriminatory motive on the part of any Defendant. ... Accordingly, his discrimination claims fail as to all Defendants.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim when the removal of supervisory duties is plausibly linked to race or sex.

Joseph v. McFerran · filed 2024-03-20(a)(1)

Based on these alleged facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court finds Joseph plausibly alleged that the removal of the agency’s highest-ranking African American woman from the top of the HR division was the product of an illicit desire to pare back her duties—either because of her identity or because of her prior EEO complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) generally does not treat a suspension with pay as an adverse employment action.

Jones v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 2015-08-12(a)(1)

We therefore agree with our sister courts that a suspension with pay, “without more,” is not an adverse employment action under the substantive provision of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII plaintiff to show an adverse employment action affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Jaramillo v. TX Wichita County · filed 1995-12-04(a)

After Landgraf, it remains the case that a plaintiff must show some adverse employment action, i.e., unlawful discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," as a predicate for recovery.

A lateral transfer may satisfy Title VII’s adverse employment action requirement at the prima facie stage if it reduces prestige or advancement opportunities, even without a pay cut.

de la Cruz v. New York City Human Resources Administration Department of Social Services · filed 1996-04-12(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on account of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis supplied). ... Although de la Cruz’s case is in this respect quite thin, the transfer arguably altered the terms and conditions of his employment in a negative way. This is sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action.

Williams v. EI duPONT De NEMOURS & CO. · filed 1996-07-03(a)

Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim fails because she has not alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race or sex. Specifically, she has not alleged that she was subject to an adverse employment action within the relevant time period.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse change in employment conditions for a disparate treatment claim; exclusion from important job duties may qualify.

Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 1996-07-31(a)(1)

Here, we are satisfied that Payne Brown’s decision to exclude Mr. Johnson, one of the four Assistant Fire Chiefs in the Department’s upper level command, presents, on this summary judgment record, a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether the exclusion is a “materially adverse employment action.”

A temporary shift transfer combined with temporary retraining, with no other change, is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Daulo v. Commonwealth Edison · filed 1996-09-11(a)(1)

Based on that finding, as alluded to above, the Court does not believe that a temporary shift transfer combined with a temporary retraining program—and nothing more—qualifies as an adverse employment action.

A Title VII plaintiff in a reduction in force must show an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Tarango v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc. · filed 1996-12-19(a)(1)

Since the court finds that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action as a matter of law, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case under either the ADEA or Title VII, summary judgment for Defendant on these two claims is proper.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action, which may include an unwanted transfer even without a change in pay or rank.

LULAC COUNCILS 4433 & 4436 v. City of Galveston · filed 1997-10-07(a)(1)

Plaintiffs here allege discrimination based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); no ultimate employment action need be established under this section, only adverse employment action need be shown.

A reassignment with lost employment benefits can be an adverse employment action supporting a prima facie sex-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Rosenbaum v. Southern Manatee Fire & Rescue District · filed 1997-10-14(a)(1)

Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment (sexual discrimination). Plaintiff, a female, is a member of the protected class. Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, a change in her job assignment and loss of employment benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) provides the employment discrimination standard from which the concepts of tangible job detriment and adverse employment action derive.

Jones v. Clinton · filed 1998-04-01(a)(1)-(2)

The concept of "tangible job detriment” as used in quid pro quo cases and the concept of "adverse employment action” as used in retaliation cases both derive from the basic prohibition of employment discrimination set forth in § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2), ... and thus correspond to one another.

A religious disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action; ending a workplace radio broadcast did not qualify where it did not affect the employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Gunning v. Runyon · filed 1998-04-17(a)(1)

Inconvenience and loss of enjoyment of life, while certainly meaningful to Plaintiff, are not cognizable under Title VII absent some adverse employment action, and we find that Plaintiff has failed to show any such action.

An undeserved negative performance evaluation alone is not an adverse employment action sufficient to support a discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2.

Lopez v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY · filed 1998-06-01(a)(1)

The answer is, it is not. Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1996) holds that undeserved negative performance evaluations alone are not adverse action sufficient to sustain a discrimination action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory employment actions including discharge, demotion, refusal to hire or promote, and reprimand.

Young v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. · filed 1998-06-24(a)(1)

Adverse employment actions based on discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(l) encompass a broader range of conduct than those under Title VII’s retaliation provision. They include discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.

A Title VII discrimination claim requires an adverse employment action that materially changes the terms or conditions of employment; a poor evaluation with no detrimental effect does not qualify.

Enowmbitang v. Seagate Technology · filed 1998-07-02(a)(1)

Because the poor evaluation did not change the terms or conditions of Enowmbitang's employment, it was not an adverse employment action, and is therefore not actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a material adverse change in employment for a discrimination claim based on an employer’s failure to investigate an incident.

Jenkins-Allen v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. · filed 1998-08-19(a)(1)

Ms. Jenkins-AIlen has not pointed to any material adverse change in her employment as a result of the failure to investigate. Consequently, this claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim; directions about eating at work, equipment use, and tardiness do not qualify.

Clemons v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1998-11-25(a)

Based on this case law, the Court finds that the plaintiffs complaints regarding eating in the work place, misusing the “mule,” and tardiness do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action affecting the terms or conditions of employment.

Wright v. Department of Corrections · filed 1998-12-14(a)(1)

The court finds that Wright has failed to prove that she has suffered an adverse employment action.

A change in contract title without a reduction in privileges, responsibilities, compensation, or benefits does not establish an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

McNair v. Computer Data Sys · filed 1999-01-26(a)(1)

We agree with the district court that appellant failed to satisfy her burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination because the change in her GSA contract title was not attended by a commensurate reduction in privileges, responsibilities, compensation, or benefits.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats a transfer to worse working conditions as an adverse employment decision even when pay and benefits stay the same.

Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp. · filed 1999-02-17(a)(1)

Enduring cold temperatures while packaging crates and preparing them for shipment, in contrast to ordering supplies for shipping in the pleasant environment of an office, in the Court’s view, amounts to an adverse employment decision.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers discrimination affecting employment terms and conditions, including adverse actions short of firing or denial of promotion.

Lewis v. McDade · filed 1999-07-13(a)

An employee does not have to be the victim of an ultimate employment decision such as a wrongful termination or a discriminatory promotion to be the victim of an unlawful adverse employment action. Title VII not only prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire or discharging an individual based on a protected characteristic, but it also prohibits employers from otherwise discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Gerstenberger’s allegations of discriminatory conduct by McDade that affected the terms and conditions of her employment fall squarely within the latter category of unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-2(a) can cover sex discrimination in working conditions when an employer deprives an employee of adequate support services.

Bilow v. MUCH SHELIST FREED DENENBERG AMENT · filed 1999-10-18(a)

Although the Firm may have had any number of legitimate reasons for its decision, the caselaw clearly establishes that depriving a person of adequate support services, see, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996), can constitute an adverse employment action. ... Because Bilow has adequately pleaded discrimination in working conditions, we deny the Firm's motion to dismiss this claim.

Moving a coworker into an employee’s building, without a change to the employee’s work, does not itself establish discrimination in employment terms.

Volpone v. Caldera · filed 1999-10-26(a)

Furthermore, Plaintiff was not subject to any “adverse” personnel action. The action that forms the basis of the complaint is that Cline was moved into the same building he worked in. This is not an adverse personnel action by Title VII standards.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers the reassignment of a sales account when the reassignment carries a prospect of a significant commission.

Antle v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. · filed 1999-10-29(a)(1)

The court concludes that an employer’s reassignment of an account from one salesperson to another, with an accompanying prospect for a significant sales commission, falls within the “terms, conditions and privileges of employment” covered by the federal anti-discrimination laws.

A transfer that limits promotion eligibility and a suspension without pay can be adverse employment actions under § 2000e-2(a), while a reprimand without a material effect on employment cannot.

Stembridge v. City of New York · filed 2000-03-24(a)

Of the four alleged adverse actions claimed by plaintiff — the reprimand, transfer, suspension and constructive discharge-only plaintiffs transfer and suspension qualify as actionable adverse employment actions in satisfaction of the third element of the prima facie case.

A prima facie Title VII sex discrimination claim requires an adverse employment action.

Stipetich v. Grosshans · filed 2000-04-06(a)(1)

We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the respondents on Stipetich's sex discrimination and retaliation claims. Stipetich did not present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that she established the prima facie case required under McDonnell Douglas. Viewed in the light most favorable to Stipetich, there- is no evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action as required in both sex discrimination and retaliation cases.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race discrimination claim based on a drug test imposed to harass or humiliate an employee, but a reasonable test under an employer’s published policy is not an adverse employment action.

Stockett, Huston v. Muncie IN Transit · filed 2000-07-21(a)

This reasonable and legitimate request made pursuant to MITS’s published Drug Policy does not constitute the type of adverse employment action that Title VII is designed to prevent.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a reasonable drug test under an employer’s policy an adverse employment action when the test is prompted by evidence of drug use and is not used to harass or humiliate the employee.

Stockett v. Muncie Indiana Transit System · filed 2000-09-01(a)

In this case, however, Stockett does not show that requiring him to submit to a drug test was the type of harassing act that constitutes an adverse employment action. MITS only requested that Stockett take the test after it had received a report that Stockett was using drugs and after a trained observer determined that Stockett exhibited the signs of a person who was under the influence of a controlled substance. This reasonable and legitimate request made pursuant to MITS’s published Drug Policy does not constitute the type of adverse employment action that Title VII is designed to prevent.

A shift transfer that substantially reduces pay is a tangible employment action for purposes of employer liability for sexual harassment.

Johnson v. Washington · filed 2000-11-29(a)(1)

The transfer from midday to late night resulted in an alleged $8000.00 pay decrease; therefore the transfer to late night was obviously a tangible employment action.

Suspensions and termination are adverse employment actions under § 2000e-2(a)(1); other workplace actions must be materially adverse to be actionable.

Oest, Faye M. v. IL Dept Corrections · filed 2001-02-14(a)(1)

It is undisputed that Ms. Oest’s suspensions and ultimate termination are adverse employment actions. Yet Ms. Oest mentions several other incidents that do not constitute adverse employment actions under our case law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat denial of a preferred work schedule as an adverse employment action without a material effect on employment conditions.

Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 2001-03-20(a)(1)

Mingo presents no evidence that the denial of a change in shift to a seven-on/seven-off schedule materially affected her employment. While she may have preferred a different schedule, Roadway’s denial of the change in work shift is not an actionable employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a religious discrimination claim based on an employer’s refusal to accommodate Sabbath observance.

Stone v. West · filed 2001-03-21(a)

Accordingly, because Plaintiff complied with the schedule imposed by her supervisors, her employer had no occasion to penalize any non-compliance, leaving this Court with no adverse employment action to scrutinize for indicia of unlawful discriminatory animus.

An English-use policy does not support a national origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without a showing that it affected the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.

Aguilar v. St. Anthony Hospital · filed 2001-04-04(a)(1)

First, the English policy cannot be considered an adverse employment action. With the exception of being threatened with termination, plaintiff provides no support for the idea that the policy affected the terms or conditions of her employment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action as part of a prima facie case.

Boyd v. Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York · filed 2001-04-17(a)

Plaintiff fails, however, to meet the third prong, a showing that Plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment action.

A demotion with significantly reduced duties can be an adverse employment action under Title VII even when pay stays the same.

McGregory v. Crest/Hughes Technologies · filed 2001-04-25(a)

McGregory’s demotion in January 1999 resulted in a job with significantly reduced duties. Although his salary remained the same after the demotion as it was before, McGregory no longer supervised employees. Having no job description, McGregory received instruction on a semi-daily basis concerning his assigned tasks. These indices are sufficient to establish the third element of McGregory’s claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a prima facie discrimination claim; an employee’s preference for a different shift does not alone make denial of a transfer adverse.

Craven v. Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division · filed 2001-05-30(a)

An employment action that is neutral or beneficial is insufficient to establish the prima facie case. That Craven expressed a preference for the day shift is insufficient to conclude that denial of her transfer request was an adverse action.

A downgraded performance evaluation can be an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) if it may impair future employment opportunities.

Vernon v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JER. · filed 2001-08-07(a)(1)

Because the PPR downgrade may lead to Vernon’s inability to secure future employment, he suffered an adverse employment action, thus fulfilling the third prong of the prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make an unfavorable performance evaluation actionable without concrete consequences affecting the benefits or demands of work.

Menchaca v. Ottenwalder · filed 2001-08-29(a)

An unsatisfactory performance evaluation, however, is not itself a “change in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” and, absent some evidence that the performance evaluation led to other more concrete consequences affecting the benefits and demands of work, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; requiring an employee to use a sign-in board does not qualify when it does not affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.

Kun v. Berkeley County Government · filed 2001-09-27(a)(1)

While plaintiff may have believed that use of the sign-in board was unnecessary or a hassle, he has not shown it to be an adverse employment action and has therefore not established a claim under Title VII.

A Title VII discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 requires an adverse employment action by the employer.

Sims-Eiland v. Detroit Board of Education · filed 2001-10-05

A prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA all require that the employee is subjected to an adverse employment action. In this case, liberally construing her Complaint, the underlying EEOC charge and the documents submitted by Plaintiff in response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff has not pointed to any adverse employment action by Defendant since Plaintiff was placed on medical leave on April 22, 1991.

Faulty equipment alone does not constitute a materially adverse employment condition under the section’s sex-discrimination rule.

Geer v. Marco Warehousing, Inc. · filed 2001-10-16(a)(1)

Inasmuch as Title VII is not a vehicle to be used by employees to compel their employers to upgrade their technology, the court refuses to find that faulty equipment constitutes a materially adverse employment condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a discrimination claim based on a negative performance evaluation when the evaluation may materially affect the employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Bostic v. AT & T of the Virgin Islands · filed 2001-09-25(a)(1)

In addition, of course, the favorable treatment must pertain to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... I have, in effect, found that discrimination in rendering the evaluation was discrimination that rose to the levels of terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment.

A Title VII sex-discrimination plaintiff must prove an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case.

Rose v. Buckeye Telesystem, Inc. · filed 2001-12-04(a)(1)

Because I find that plaintiff cannot prove that she suffered an adverse employment action and, therefore, cannot prove her prima facie case under Title VII or the ADEA, I decline to address defendants’ remaining arguments.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; a voluntary resignation without constructive discharge does not qualify.

Laprise v. Arrow International, Inc. · filed 2001-12-05(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff was not constructively discharged but voluntarily resigned, no adverse employment action has occurred.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate discipline claim to involve an adverse employment action affecting the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.

Skipper v. Giant Food, Inc. · filed 2002-02-20

Because this claim is time barred, and because other allegations by Plaintiff of disparate discipline do not constitute adverse employment actions, I will grant Defendant’s motion as to the disparate discipline claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex-discrimination plaintiff to show an adverse employment action.

Spain v. City of Winston-Salem · filed 2002-03-25(a)(1)

She has simply failed to provide any evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action, as is required to establish a prima facie case.

A denied promotion or assignment to a particular work route can be an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a).

Figueroa v. City of New York · filed 2002-04-24(a)

On the other hand, defendants’ failure to promote Figueroa to the position of enforcement officer, and the failure to assign her to a particular sweeping route are tangible adverse employment actions that may form the basis of a prima facie case of discrimination.

A denied transfer to a lower-paid, lower-ranking position does not constitute an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Williams v. R.H. Donnelley Inc. · filed 2002-05-06(a)(1)

While we do not doubt plaintiffs stated desire to return to Las Vegas, defendant’s failure to transfer her immediately to her prior Account Executive position in December 1999 does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race disparate treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action.

Joyce Jacob-Mua etc. v. Veneman · filed 2002-05-08(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from treating an employee differently because of race with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Because Jacob-Mua did not establish she was the object of adverse employment action, her disparate treatment claim must fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to show an adverse employment action.

Islamic Society of Fire Department Personnel v. City of New York · filed 2002-06-11(a)(1)

As the discussion above makes clear, in order to prove their discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, Plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that they suffered an “adverse employment action.”

Section 2000e-2(a) covers adverse employment actions affecting an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or limiting employment opportunities.

Lumhoo v. Home Depot USA, Inc. · filed 2002-09-26(a)

Under Title VII, an adverse employment action is actionable when it relates to an employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or involves a classification which “[w]ould deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim, including one based on direct evidence of discrimination.

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, Erroneously Sued as Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors · filed 2002-09-30(a)(1)

Although this court has not expressly stated that an adverse employment action is part of any prima facie case, including those cases based on direct evidence of discrimination rather than the McDonnell Douglas factors, such is clearly the case.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers demotion and reassignment that affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Metzger v. Martinez · filed 2002-10-10(a)

HUD has conceded, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, that Metzger’s demotion and reassignment to Anchorage, Alaska were adverse employment actions which affected a “term, condition, or privilege of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). We agree.

A purely subjective preference for one job over an objectively equivalent job does not make a transfer an actionable employment action under Title VII.

Herrnreiter, S. v. CHA · filed 2002-12-30(a)(1)

What remains are cases of purely subjective preference for one position over another—which is this case. An auditor’s job is not objectively inferior to an investigator’s job that has identical financial terms; nor is an accountant who is transferred from investigations to audits deprived of the opportunity to use the skills for which he is trained— the opposite is the case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats discharge as a materially adverse employment action, but a transfer between objectively equivalent jobs is not actionable merely because the employee prefers one.

Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority · filed 2002-12-30(a)(1)

Although the transfer of Herrnreiter back to the audit division was not actionable under Title VII, we must consider the discharge that followed; obviously that was a materially adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate-treatment claim; race-related comments unconnected to a significant change in employment do not qualify.

Valentine-Johnson v. Roche · filed 2003-01-09(a)(1)

Based on the case law, the court finds that the plaintiffs complaints regarding comments made about her race do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats denial of a post as an adverse employment action when the post would materially better suit an employee’s skills and prospects for advancement.

Fullard v. City of New York · filed 2003-06-19(a)(1)

A transfer or other change in employment conditions may therefore be deemed adverse based on the unique qualifications and career path of a particular employee. ... Captain Fullard’s situation parallels these cases: he was denied the opportunity of a post that would have matched his education and training and thus would have maximized his chances for success and advancement. He was therefore subjected to an adverse employment action.

A pregnancy-based change to an employee’s duties can be an adverse employment action when it reduces her ability to earn commissions, even without proof that she lost commissions.

Davis v. Emery Worldwide Corp. · filed 2003-06-23(a)(1)

This situation fits the definition of an adverse employment action. The fact that the plaintiff offers no evidence that she actually lost commissions as a result does not insulate the defendant, which understandably makes no attempt to argue that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the plaintiffs pregnancy, from liability under these circumstances.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim; inconvenience and offensive remarks alone do not suffice.

Howard v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools · filed 2003-07-01(a)(1)

Even assuming that each of the foregoing events transpired as recounted by Howard and were adequately established through evidence at trial, we find that none of the foregoing incidents constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a failure to promote as an adverse employment action.

Volovsek, Judith v. WI Dept Agriculture · filed 2003-09-18(a)

The failure to promote is an adverse employment action with respect to discrimination and to retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats a failure to promote as an adverse employment action.

Volovsek v. Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection · filed 2003-09-18(a)

The failure to promote is an adverse employment action with respect to discrimination and to retaliation claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging race, religion, or national origin discrimination to plead an actionable adverse employment action.

Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems · filed 2003-11-25(a)(1)

Consequently, inasmuch as Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Complaint require proof of an actionable adverse employment action, Plaintiffs’ claims fail to aver a cause of action upon which this Court can grant them relief, and each will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat an employer’s refusal to demote an employee as an adverse employment action.

Wynn v. Paragon Systems, Inc. · filed 2004-01-26(a)(1)

An employer’s failure to demote an employee does not qualify as an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a sex discrimination claim; temporary inconveniences do not qualify.

Rhodes, Donna M. v. IL Dept Trans · filed 2004-02-26(a)(1)

Rhodes’ allegations, if true, constitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a sex discrimination claim based on disparate treatment; temporary inconveniences do not suffice.

Rhodes v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2004-02-26(a)(1)

Rhodes' allegations, if true, constitute mere temporary inconveniences and do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action.

A race disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when required training causes no adverse employment effect.

Shalow v. Henderson · filed 2004-03-04(a)(1)

Shalow fails to show that requiring him to participate in four-digit keying training amounted to or led to an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a materially adverse change in employment terms; a negative evaluation with no proven effect on those terms need not qualify.

Sanders v. New York City Human Resources Administration · filed 2004-03-16(a)

We define an adverse employment action as a "materially adverse change" in the terms and conditions of employment. ... A jury could therefore reasonably find that the evaluation did not, on its own, constitute a materially adverse action by her employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers denial of bonus eligibility, denial of a requested transfer, and termination as adverse employment actions.

Stern v. Cintas Corp. · filed 2004-03-23(a)(1)

Thus, the adverse employment actions Plaintiff can legitimately point to are the denial of eligibility to participate in Defendant’s bonus plan, the denial of her request to be made a NAE, and her termination.

Denying an employee a position that would pay more than the position it would replace is an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Geraldine Fuhr, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Ppellant v. School District of the City of Hazel Park, Defendant-Appellant/cros · filed 2004-03-24(a)(1)

The relevant inquiry is therefore not whether the boys’ varsity position would have resulted in an increase in pay over that of the girls’ varsity position, but rather whether it would have resulted in an increase in pay over that of the junior varsity position. Clearly it would have. Contrary to Hazel Park’s assertion, Fuhr did suffer an adverse employment action.