42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat denial of a requested transfer to a lower-paid, lower-ranked position, without more, as an adverse employment action.

Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp. · filed 2004-05-13(a)(1)

Clearly, an employer’s denial of a transfer request that would have resulted in a reduction in pay and the employee’s demotion within the organization, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; emotional distress from a rescinded suspension alone does not qualify.

Gibbs v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2004-06-28(a)

While we may assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gibbs did suffer emotional distress from her brief suspension, Title VII does not provide a remedy for actions that do not affect an employee’s terms of employment.

Section 2000e-2 treats an employer’s practice of forcing only employees of a certain race to use a grievance procedure to obtain opportunities they are entitled to as an adverse employment action, even if their grievances succeed.

Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., a Delaware For-Profit Corporation · filed 2004-07-06

We hold that it is an adverse employment action when an employer knows its employees are entitled to certain opportunities, but forces only employees of a certain race to use the grievance procedure to obtain them. The fact of successfully grieving an adverse employment action does not preclude an employee from pursuing a claim of discrimination.

A prima facie sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action.

Weigold v. ABC Appliance Co. · filed 2004-07-07(a)(1)

We find that Weigold cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she has failed to show that ABC took any adverse employment action against her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action affecting the terms or conditions of employment; denial of a preferred lunch location without a penalty does not qualify.

Clapp v. Potter · filed 2004-08-18(a)(1)

Neither is there any evidence that USPS demoted or otherwise penalized Ms. Clapp for any reason related to her restaurant choice. Because Ms. Clapp has not demonstrated that she suffered an adverse employment action, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED and this case will be DISMISSED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action; purely subjective harms such as dissatisfaction or humiliation do not qualify.

Ware v. Billington · filed 2004-10-26(a)(1)

This means that actions imposing purely subjective harms, such as dissatisfaction or humiliation, are not adverse.

Section 2000e-2(a) ordinarily does not treat a scheduling change as an adverse employment action when pay and work hours remain the same.

Johnson v. United Parcel Ser · filed 2004-11-10(a)

Regarding scheduling, this does not appear to be an adverse employment action. Case law indicates that, absent changes in salary or the number of hours of work, scheduling matters would not normally classify as potential adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a transfer made an employee’s position objectively worse to establish an adverse employment action.

Pickens v. Shell Technology Ventures Inc. · filed 2004-12-22(a)(1)

Without such evidence, it is impossible to find that being moved from team leader to team member was an adverse employment action within the scope of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats an evaluation that denies an employee a significant raise as an adverse employment action.

Gillis v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections · filed 2005-02-18(a)(1)

We hold that an evaluation that directly disentitles an employee to a raise of any significance is an adverse employment action under Title VII.

A demotion that reduces salary and responsibilities and hinders advancement qualifies as an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Salami v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University · filed 2005-04-13(a)(1)

As such, the facts here are distinguishable from Mitchell and the Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established that he suffered an adverse employment action.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action that changes the employee’s conditions of employment.

Burgoon v. Potter · filed 2005-05-16(a)(1)

Plaintiff has alleged four specific acts of discrimination, yet none of them can be considered “adverse employment actions,” for the simple fact that none of them resulted in a change in plaintiffs employment condition.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats denial of a merit award that permanently increases base salary as an adverse employment action when the award is a raise.

Farrell, Grace v. Butler University · filed 2005-09-01(a)(1)

With all of these considerations in mind, on the balance, we agree with the district court’s determina- tion that the PEP award is best characterized as a raise. As all the requirements for a prima facie case are thus satis- fied, we hold that Dr. Farrell has met her initial burden under McDonnell Douglas.

A warning letter is an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a) only if it materially affects the employee’s employment.

Santa Cruz v. Snow · filed 2005-09-06(a)

A mere warning of possible future disciplinary action, however, does not constitute an independent adverse employment action simply because the employer later followed through on the warning.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat an unpaid suspension that an employee never serves as an adverse employment action.

Whittaker, Susan v. Northern IL Univ · filed 2005-09-21(a)(1)

Simply put, a suspension without pay that is never served does not constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(d) prohibits discrimination in on-the-job training, but a temporary shift between jobs with essentially the same benefits, duties, and responsibilities is not an adverse employment action.

Ryburn v. Potter · filed 2005-10-07(d)

A temporary shift from the FSM 1000 to the AFSM 100 or VCS room does not amount to an adverse employment action, especially where, as here, the jobs entailed essentially the same benefits, duties, and responsibilities as the old position.

A proposed demotion that never takes effect and leaves benefits unchanged is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Roberson v. Game Stop/Babbage's · filed 2005-10-14(a)(1)

This case is similar; and Roberson’s potential demotion, which also brought no drop in any benefits, cannot be considered adverse either.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; minor changes in working conditions do not suffice.

DE JESUS v. Potter · filed 2005-10-26(a)

Mindful of the distinction articulated in Marrero, we find that Plaintiff alleges only minor changes in her working conditions that do not constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers substantial denials of training or overtime opportunities that affect employment conditions or compensation.

Albright v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2005-10-28(a)(1)

For the reasons stated above, deprivation of both training and overtime opportunities can be adverse employment actions, and Albright has alleged that she suffered both under circumstances suggestive of discrimination. Therefore, Albright has presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on her claims that the City engaged in race and gender discrimination against her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action affecting the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.

Bullard v. Panasonic Corp. of North America · filed 2006-02-02(a)(1)

However, Plaintiff did not introduce evidence that her proximity to Carlos-Cooke affected the terms, conditions or benefits of her employment, nor is there any evidence that any ultimate employment decision was impacted by these events, such as failing to receive a promotion or the like.

A warning letter with no loss of pay or benefits and no later tangible effects is not an adverse employment action for a prima facie discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a).

Rodriguez v. Potter · filed 2006-02-15(a)

Although Plaintiff alleges that Postmaster Alvarez was irate and vaguely threatening during the issuance of the warning letter, the warning was not accompanied by any loss in pay or benefit, nor did it serve as precedent to a subsequent, more tangible adverse employment action. Neither the warning letter itself nor Postmaster Alvarez’ allegedly angry issuance of the letter satisfy any standard articulated anywhere in the judicial canon for what might be considered an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits denying firefighters adequate protective clothing and facilities because of sex when the denial materially affects their working conditions.

Wedow v. City of Kansas City · filed 2006-03-24(a)(2)

Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the juries' findings that the failure to furnish the necessary correct gear and facilities on the basis of sex was an adverse employment action prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat every involuntary transfer as an adverse employment action; the effect of the transfer depends on the circumstances.

Vann v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 2006-05-03(a)(1)

Taking all of these factors into account in the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that Vann has failed to establish that her retreat qualifies as an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII.

A warning notice placed in an employee’s file, standing alone, does not affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment protected by Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Edwards v. Niles Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 2006-06-27(a)(1)

Title VII and § 1981 protect against actions taken “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); Cooley v. Great So. Wood Preserving, 138 Fed-Appx. 149, 156 (11th Cir.2005), and Defendants’ action of placing a warning notice in Plaintiffs file did not, standing alone, affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of Plaintiff’s employment, see, e.g., Embry v. Callahan Eye Found. Hosp., 147 Fed.Appx. 819, 828-29 (11th Cir.2005); Cooley, 138 Fed.Appx. at 158; Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir.2001).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a sex discrimination damages claim, whether the plaintiff relies on direct or circumstantial evidence.

Turley v. SCI of Alabama · filed 2006-07-24(a)(1)

Thus, without an actionable adverse employment action, there can be no claim for damages for alleged discrimination based on either direct or circumstantial evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers actions short of termination when they adversely affect the terms, conditions or benefits of employment.

Podkovich v. Glazer's Distributors of Iowa, Inc. · filed 2006-08-10(a)

Rather, the challenged action must result in an adverse effect on the terms, conditions or benefits of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate treatment claim; a lateral transfer that retains the employee’s salary, benefits, position, duties, and responsibilities does not qualify.

Njie v. Regions Bank · filed 2006-09-22(a)(1)

This lateral transfer with full retention of benefits could not be described as an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat an internal investigation or paid administrative leave pending its outcome as an adverse employment action in a discrimination claim.

Dendinger v. State of OH · filed 2006-11-14

We have repeatedly held, however, that neither an internal investigation into suspected wrongdoing by an employee nor that employee’s placement on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of such an investigation constitutes an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2 allows the effect of removal from an employer’s advancement program to establish an adverse employment action.

Kim v. Harvey · filed 2006-11-15

Notwithstanding the unusual factual circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Kim did suffer an adverse employment action.

A national origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of an adverse employment action.

Roney, Gul v. IL Dept Trans · filed 2007-01-18(a)(1)

As detailed above, Roney cannot show that he suffered an adverse employment action; therefore, his claim of national origin discrimination likewise fails.

A national origin discrimination claim under the indirect method requires an adverse employment action.

Roney v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2007-01-18(a)

As detailed above, Roney cannot show that he suffered an adverse employment action; therefore, his claim of national origin discrimination likewise fails.

An employer’s investigation or discipline of a coworker is not an adverse employment action against an employee when it does not affect that employee’s employment status.

Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2007-01-23(a)(1)

As to his disparate treatment claim, the court explained that M r. Cooper’s dissatisfaction with American’s efforts to investigate the incident and punish M r. M cDonald did not constitute an adverse employment action, which is one element of the prima facie case for such a claim, see Trujillo v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 157 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998). ... W e agree and affirm the district court’s disposition of both of M r. Cooper’s Title VII claims for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s April 27, 2006, order and opinion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can cover racially unequal job requirements when they could materially disadvantage an employee.

Seals v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2007-01-30(a)(1)

Seals has produced evidence that she was required to perform more tasks in less time at work than white nurses. Such a disparity in job requirements could produce a “material employment disadvantage” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats progressive discipline that adversely affects an employee’s job position as an adverse employment action in a race discrimination claim.

Honeycutt v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 2007-02-15(a)(1)

Accordingly, I find that the discipline received by Plaintiffs Harris and Honeycutt was “adverse employment action.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) may cover a denied transfer when the positions differ substantially in duties, even if the transfer appears lateral.

Piercy v. Maketa · filed 2007-03-27(a)(1)

W e think the differences in duties between the two prisons are sufficiently substantial to preclude the district court’s finding that a transfer to M etro from CJC would be purely lateral.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can make the denial of a transfer actionable when the sought position is objectively better, even without an increase in pay or benefits.

Alvarado v. Texas Rangers · filed 2007-07-16(a)(1)

Adapting this analysis to the promotion context, we conclude that the denial of a transfer may be the objective equivalent of the denial of a promotion, and thus qualify as an adverse employment action, even if the new position would not have entailed an increase in pay or other tangible benefits; if the position sought was objectively better, then the failure to award the position to the plaintiff can constitute an adverse employment action.

A denied assignment may be an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) when it could materially affect recurring overtime or career opportunities.

Lewis v. City of Chicago · filed 2007-07-26(a)(1)

In turn, she can argue that she has lost the potential to earn many hours of overtime, not just the mere two days that she lost in September 2002. Consequently, we conclude that Lewis can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she has experienced an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a criticism or disciplinary measure to affect compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to qualify as an adverse employment action.

Pantoja v. American Ntn Bearing Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2007-08-06(a)(1)

But not every criticism or disciplinary measure is an “adverse employment action” for Title VII purposes. Here, Pantoja made no showing that the disciplinary measures NTN imposed, whether consistently with its own internal policies or not, affected his “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). There is no evidence of a constructive demotion or a loss of pay or other benefits.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action and evidence of discriminatory motive.

Marchant v. Tsickritzis · filed 2007-08-07(a)

UL is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Marchant has not established that he suffered an adverse employment action or that UL was motivated by discriminatory animus.

Termination qualifies as an adverse employment action under Title VII’s prohibition on national origin discrimination.

Wilks v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. · filed 2007-08-28(a)(1)

The Plaintiffs termination obviously qualifies as an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action for a disparate-treatment claim; low performance scores that merely influence later decisions do not satisfy that requirement.

Anderson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2007-09-11(a)

On this record, the magistrate judge’s finding that the QPR scores, “at most, bore some influence on the various decisionsmakers,” but did not directly result in the challenged employment decisions, was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not err by concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate an adverse employment action, for purposes of establishing their prima facie case.

Under Title VII, refusing to let an employee leave ten minutes early once a month is not an adverse employment action sufficient to establish a prima facie race discrimination claim.

Wills v. Pennyrile Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. · filed 2008-01-09(a)

We find no error in the district court’s conclusion; indeed, in our view, the action of which Wills complains may not rise to the level of de minimis. Because Wills cannot show that she suffered an adverse employment action, she cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. We therefore hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Pennyrile.

A delay in correctly recording sick leave is not an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) absent consequential harm.

West v. Potter · filed 2008-03-03(a)(1)

Because West does not show that she suffered any consequential harm from the delay in accurately designating her leave hours, she fails to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on the events surrounding her sick leave request. These events do not constitute an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination to show an adverse employment action as part of a prima facie case.

Martin v. Pachulski, Stang, Ziehl, Young & Jones, P.C. · filed 2008-03-10(a)(1)

Turning to the facts of the present case, the court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Martin suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) treats removal from a branch assignment as an adverse employment action when it potentially affects compensation or employment conditions.

Mitchell v. Wachovia Corp. · filed 2008-05-05(a)

Moreover, Mitchell’s removal from the Prices Corner branch was an adverse employment action because the removal potentially affected his compensation and conditions of his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a change in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to support a discrimination claim.

Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2008-07-30(a)(1)

The non-discrimination provisions of Title VII require a plaintiff to show a change in the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment” in order to prevail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; recording unauthorized absences without tangible effects on employment does not qualify.

De La Rama v. Illinois Department of Human Services · filed 2008-09-02(a)(1)

In this case, de la Rama has not alleged any material change in the conditions of her employment — she was not fired or demoted, she suffered no financial consequences and her responsibilities have not changed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; recorded unauthorized absences with no effect on employment terms do not qualify.

Delarama, Elizabeth v. IL Dept Human Servic · filed 2008-09-02(a)(1)

Pursuant to the agreement reached by de la Rama and her employer at the third-level grievance hearing, the UAs on her record do not have any effect on the terms or conditions of her employment.

A change in job title and loss of training access do not establish an adverse employment action without a change in employment terms or evidence of a lost promotion.

Vaughn v. Louisville Water Company · filed 2008-11-24(a)(1)

Vaughn has failed to establish that the change in her job title from administrator to coordinator in 2002, and her resulting inability to attend Leadership Institute training, resulted in any adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats termination because of sex, religion, or national origin as an adverse employment action even when a contract permits termination on notice.

Hussain v. Gutierrez · filed 2008-12-01(a)(1)

Many of Hussain’s allegations do not fit this definition, but her allegation that she was terminated due to her gender, religion, or national origin, even if her contract specified that she could be terminated at any time with notice, does.

A written reprimand is not an adverse employment action under Title VII unless it alters the terms or conditions of employment or puts the employee’s position in jeopardy.

O'Hazo v. Bristol-Burlington Health District · filed 2009-02-12(a)(1)

The Century Buffet Incident also cannot be considered an adverse employment action because O’Hazo has not demonstrated that the written reprimand resulted in an alteration of the terms or conditions of his employment or that these actions put his position in jeopardy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action; requiring a salaried employee to use a time clock and work regular hours does not qualify.

Slater v. Town of Exeter et al. · filed 2009-03-20(a)(1)

What Slater did experience before her confrontation with Chief Kane was not, as a matter of law, an adverse employment action under Title VII or RSA 354-A:7.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers employer decisions affecting compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Mischel v. Caithness Operating Co. · filed 2009-05-05(a)(1)

Adverse employment actions may include any decision by an employer affecting “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ... Mischel fails to show how her employers’ actions affected her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment when allegedly she was not provided a uniform shirt that fit, male employees used “her” bathroom, male employees viewed pornography at work, she was counseled regarding interpersonal relationships, or she argued with a male co-worker.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat minor workplace restrictions as adverse employment actions in a gender discrimination claim.

Keller v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration · filed 2009-09-18(a)(1)

Here, many of the alleged wrongs Plaintiffs have cited as disadvantages that they were forced to endure simply do not constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of their gender discrimination claims. Not being permitted to bring in electronic equipment, play cards, or wear shorts at work, for example, clearly do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic; a discrimination claim fails when the employee shows neither such an action nor evidence rebutting the employer’s legitimate reason.

Williams v. Tapella · filed 2009-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff neither suffered an adverse employment action because of his race, sex or physical disability, nor rebutted the GPO’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to hire him as a Police Officer. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination to show an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic; an employee who cannot perform the duties of the position has not shown a discriminatory refusal to hire him for it.

Williams v. Turri · filed 2009-09-30(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not shown he is qualified for the position of GPO Police Officer and, accordingly, that he has suffered an adverse employment action.

An employer’s ultimatum requiring an employee to resign or accept an immediate demotion and transfer can qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Barone v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2009-12-07(a)(1)

Because a reasonable jury could find that these consequences amounted to an adverse employment action, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her gender discrimination claim.

A negative performance evaluation is not an adverse employment action unless it affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Kelly v. Barreto · filed 2010-01-06(a)(1)

Without a showing that the evaluation had an effect on the “terms, conditions or privileges” of his employment, plaintiff’s negative performance evaluation does not amount to an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action by the defendant employer; a client's termination of an assignment does not establish one when the staffing agency keeps the worker employed and eligible for other assignments.

Shah v. Adecco · filed 2010-02-05(a)(1)

The only possible adverse action was the premature termination of plaintiffs assignment, which was done by BOA (as it was entitled to do) and not by defendant. As a result, the court finds no adverse employee action on the part of defendant under Title VII or Third Circuit case law.

A negative performance evaluation qualifies as an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) only if it has adverse consequences affecting the terms of employment.

Kaur v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. · filed 2010-02-19(a)(1)

In the disparate treatment context, a negative performance evaluation only qualifies as an adverse employment action if there are accompanying adverse consequences affecting the terms of employment.

Section 2000e-2 treats an employee’s involuntary removal from a directorship as an adverse employment action, even if the employee had said he did not want to serve under the dean.

Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work · filed 2010-03-12(a)(1)

Regardless of Plaintiffs comments, the Court finds that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because he did not willfully leave the position-he was asked to step down.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits adverse employment actions because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Lawson v. Plantation General Hospital, L.P. · filed 2010-03-30(a)(1)

Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Thus, an employer may not take an adverse employment action against an employee on the basis of that employee’s protected status.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action; requiring an employee to work a previously scheduled day does not satisfy that requirement.

O'Neill v. City of Bridgeport Police Department · filed 2010-05-25(a)(1)

But being forced to work on a day that he was scheduled to work is not an adverse employment action, despite Mr. O’Neill’s objection to working on Saturdays.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination to allege employment or an application for employment and an adverse employment action.

Cornish v. Dudas · filed 2010-06-04(a)(1)

Cornish’s employment discrimination claims will be dismissed because Cornish has failed to allege that he ever was employed by or sought employment with the defendants, or that he suffered any adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat the alleged interference with an employee’s duties as an adverse employment action when the employee was required to follow the supervisor’s authority.

Cannon v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2010-07-26(a)

No adverse action exists to the extent that plaintiff claims Greenleaf frustrated plaintiff's ability to perform the duties of her employment by forcing her to mandate Bungy to work an extra shift (D.I. 37, Tab 20 at 29:1-31:4, 97:14-100:15), refusing to hire Brown and another African-American nurse for full-time positions {Id. at 37:9-38:21, 95:24-96:11), attempting to impose discipline on plaintiff {Id. at 101:15-22), and refusing to discipline Gebhart-Brown and other Caucasian nurses {Id., at 89:24-90:9, 90:12-22, 23:21-24:7). Under CMS' organizational structure, plaintiff was required to submit to the HSA's authority.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats disciplinary measures as adverse employment actions when they materially change an employee’s conditions of employment.

Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT & T WIRELESS · filed 2010-08-05(a)(1)

It is thus evident that the “material change in employment” resulting from letters of admonishment was also accomplished in this case by AT & T Wireless’s disciplinary measures.

Minor differences in sales lead assignments that have no tangible adverse impact on employment do not establish an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim.

Matias v. Sears Home Improvement Products · filed 2010-08-09(a)(1)

Merklin’s allegedly discriminatory assignment of leads therefore does not constitute an “adverse employment action” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a sex discrimination claim; denied training does not qualify without evidence that it affected the employee’s work, advancement, or pay.

Pagan v. Holder · filed 2010-10-05(a)(1)

There is no evidence that Plaintiffs work suffered as a result of her lack of training as a personal trainer or that such training was necessary for advancement in status or pay.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits unequal pay to qualify as an adverse employment action in a discrimination claim.

Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club · filed 2011-01-26(a)(1)

Subjecting an employee to unequal pay can, of course, constitute a materially adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat a less favorable offer of voluntary severance benefits made after termination as an adverse employment action supporting a sex discrimination claim.

Gerner v. COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, VA. · filed 2011-02-16

In surveying the pertinent legal landscape, it is important to distinguish between cases where severance benefits are a contractual entitlement from those in which an employer offers them as a voluntary benefit. Unquestionably, disparate treatment in the former may constitute an adverse job action, but no reported case appears to support such contention in the latter.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action to support a discrimination claim; denial of an equivalent secretarial assignment does not qualify.

Gaskins v. Williams & Connolly LLP · filed 2011-03-31(a)(1)

The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to state a claim of discrimination on this basis because she has wholly failed to identify an “adverse employment action” that resulted from the defendant’s failure to select her for one of these other secretarial positions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a materially adverse change in employment conditions; a paid suspension pending investigation does not qualify without evidence of such a change.

Teklehaimanot v. Park Center, Inc. · filed 2011-04-12(a)(1)

They do not have evidence to show that they suffered adverse employment actions when they were placed on paid suspension pending investigation.

A job evaluation does not establish a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence that it was an adverse employment action.

Ruffin v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation. · filed 2011-04-29(a)(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that Ruffin failed to establish that her 1997 evaluation was an adverse employment action under Title VII and, therefore, failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to job evaluations under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim when an alleged constructive demotion constitutes an adverse employment action and the circumstances support an inference of discrimination.

Tressler v. National Passenger Railroad Corp. · filed 2011-05-13(a)(1)

Because the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff took a position as a yard engineer for lower pay rather than face continued harassment, was removed from regular assignment and placed on the “extra” list, and was denied pay for two months, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged reassignment constituted an adverse employment action and that the circumstances alleged give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim when return-to-duty requirements may materially alter employment terms and differ from those imposed on similarly situated employees of another sex.

McCann v. City of Eugene · filed 2011-06-21(a)(1)

The issue of whether the return-to-duty protocols were materially adverse and not required for similarly situated male employees should be reserved to the trier of fact.

An isolated order to perform an irregular task during one shift is not an adverse employment action for a race discrimination claim.

Hunter v. County of Albany · filed 2011-07-01(a)(1)

This lone instance of being ordered to perform an irregular task during a single shift does not qualify, even arguably, as an adverse action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats termination as an adverse employment action, while minor workplace slights do not qualify.

Blackmon v. City of Chicago · filed 2011-07-20(a)(1)

Of this list, the only action that qualifies as materially adverse is the termination of Plaintiffs probationary employment because it constitutes a “significant change in employment status.”

A performance improvement plan that does not alter an employee’s job responsibilities or benefits is not an adverse employment action under Title VII’s discrimination provision.

Bullock v. Brandywine School District · filed 2011-08-18(a)(1)

Dr. Bullock does not allege, and the record does not suggest, that the PIP issued to her altered her job responsibilities or employment benefits. Thus, Dr. Bullock fails to establish that the PIP constituted an adverse employment action.

A negative performance evaluation alone is not an adverse employment action under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) unless it changes the terms or conditions of employment.

Palermo v. Clinton · filed 2011-08-31(a)(1)

A negative performance evaluation alone is not an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim because it does not necessarily change the terms or conditions of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats sending an employee home without pay on a slow day as an adverse employment action.

Mason v. Mitchell's Contracting Service, LLC · filed 2011-09-12(a)(1)

Therefore, the court finds that sending an employee home without pay on a slow day is an adverse employment action for Title VII purposes.

A substantial reduction in supervisory duties can be an adverse employment action under Title VII even without a formal demotion.

Hutchinson v. Holder · filed 2011-10-03(a)(1)

As a result, although Plaintiff may not have been techinically demoted from the Unit Chief position, she has provided sufficient evidence of the abrogation of her supervisory duties and other responsibilities to establish an adverse employment action for purposes of surviving summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats denial of overtime pay as an adverse employment action, and an employer that gives no legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason cannot obtain summary judgment after the employee establishes a prima facie discrimination case.

Johnson v. Manpower Professional Services · filed 2011-10-05(a)(1)

Denial of overtime pay is an adverse employment action because it relates to Johnson’s compensation. ... Such a showing requires the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, and where no such reason is given the employer cannot be awarded summary judgment.

A religious disparate-treatment claim under Title VII cannot rest on alleged adverse employment actions that the plaintiff fails to prove occurred.

Price v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 2011-11-03(a)(1)

As an initial matter, the first four actions enumerated above cannot serve as adverse employment actions in support of Plaintiffs claim because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the actions occurred.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires an adverse employment action for a claim based on racial segregation of employees.

Williams v. Lovchik · filed 2011-11-17(a)(2)

However, § 2000e-2(a)(2) still requires an adverse employment action.

Assigning an instructor fewer classes is an adverse employment action under Title VII; assigning different classes is not a demotion.

Maddox-Jones v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia · filed 2011-11-22(a)(1)

Thus, being assigned to teach different classes is not a demotion, but being assigned fewer classes is an adverse employment action.

An attempted demotion does not violate § 2000e-2(a)(1) when it does not alter the employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

White v. Mabus · filed 2011-11-28(a)(1)

The court notes that Title VII does not provide a private right of action to employees who experience job-related stress. Rather, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate with respect to an individual’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff simply does not identify any terms, conditions, or privileges of employment that were altered as a result of the attempted demotion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; denial of vacation on an employee’s preferred schedule does not, by itself, qualify.

Beltran v. University of Texas Health Science Center · filed 2011-11-29(a)(1)

Therefore, Beltran has failed to meet his prima facie burden that denial of vacation time on the schedule he wished constituted an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat requiring a medical resident to repeat or remediate a rotation as an adverse employment action.

Latif v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center · filed 2011-12-02(a)(1)

However, as established above, requiring a medical resident to repeat or remediate a rotation is not an adverse employment action under Title VII.

Voluntary retirement does not constitute an adverse employment action for a Title VII race discrimination claim.

Jolly v. University of North Carolina · filed 2011-12-08(a)(1)

As discussed above, however, Plaintiffs voluntary retirement does not constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII or the ADEA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action for a discrimination claim; a workplace slight does not qualify merely because it concerns a condition of employment.

Baird v. Gotbaum · filed 2011-12-13(a)(1)

But “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,” Douglas, 559 F.3d at 552, and the many workplace slights that we have in other cases found to fall below the requisite threshold all related to conditions of employment. Although necessary for her discrimination claims, merely being such a condition in itself is plainly not sufficient.

An unfavorable performance evaluation does not establish an adverse employment action under § 2000e-2(a)(1) unless it changes the terms or conditions of employment.

Palermo v. Clinton · filed 2011-12-21(a)(1)

The district court did not err in finding that Palermo’s performance evaluation was not an adverse employment action, as required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.

A changed supervisory reporting structure does not establish a § 2000e-2(a)(2) claim without evidence that it adversely affected the employee’s status.

Homel v. Centennial School District · filed 2011-12-21(a)(2)

Homel fails to establish that Turnbaugh’s ordering the district’s elementary school principals to report directly to him rather than to Homel “adversely affect[ed] [her] status as an employee.”