42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

For a circumstantial race discrimination claim, an employee must show that someone outside the protected class replaced him or that similarly situated employees outside the class received more favorable treatment.

Adams v. Superior Energy Services · filed 2022-09-15(a)(1)

There is no evidence in the summary judgment record that Adams was replaced by another person outside his protected group; nor is there evidence in the record that Adams was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside of his protected group.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show intentional discrimination through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Fernandez v. Hotwire Communications, LLC · filed 2022-09-30(a)(1)

In both types of cases, the plaintiff “must establish that the employer intended to discriminate against the protected group.” ... Fernandez fails to offer either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

A disparate treatment claim without direct evidence of discrimination is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Dodson v. United States Capitol Police · filed 2022-09-30(a)(1)

Where a plaintiff, as here, lacks direct evidence of discriminatory decision-making, courts evaluate Title VII disparate treatment claims using the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show that the employer treated people less favorably because of a protected characteristic.

Evans v. The Hillman Group · filed 2022-09-30(a)

Under the disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff must show that the employer has treated some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

A race-based disparate treatment claim must plausibly allege an adverse employment action and less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected group because of race.

Noakes v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2022-10-12(a)(1)-(2)

However, Noakes does not plead sufficient factual content on the remaining two ultimate elements of a disparate treatment case—namely, that she suffered some adverse employment action by her employer, and that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside her protected group because of her protected characteristic—for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Noakes was subjected to disparate treatment based on her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to survive dismissal when the employee plausibly alleges an adverse employment action because of race, including through more favorable treatment of identified employees of other races.

Papa v. Capital One N A · filed 2022-10-25(a)(1)

This Court finds that Papa has sufficiently plead facts to survive the motion to dismiss with respect to the disparate treatment claim, and thus Capital One’s motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment claim to plausibly allege an adverse employment action motivated by a protected characteristic.

Cabrera-Cardona v. Labor · filed 2022-12-19(a)

There is no suggestion that the choices offered for her return to work, including the “voluntary demotion,” were motivated by her sex or her religion. Therefore, I must dismiss any Title VII disparate treatment claim.

A disparate treatment claim requires evidence that an adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on a protected trait.

JACKSON v. NEW JERSEY JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION · filed 2023-01-03(a)(1)

Although Plaintiff has arguably proven that he belonged to a protected class, he was qualified for the position in question, and he was subject to an adverse employment action, he has not satisfied the fourth element of his disparate treatment claims—that the adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of race or religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts supporting an inference that an employer treated an employee differently because of race; the employee’s race alone is insufficient.

Poindexter v. Starbucks York Roasting Plant · filed 2023-01-13(a)

Although Plaintiff alleges she is black, the fact of an employee’s race, without more, does not raise an inference of discriminatory animus.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot show pretext through proposed comparators whose conduct differs in material ways from the plaintiff’s conduct.

Diaz v. City of Somerville · filed 2023-02-01(a)(1)

Consequently, the district court did not err in determining that proposed comparators lacking both the elements of aggression and mendacity were not similarly situated and, thus, that Diaz's proposed comparators were insufficient to ground a finding that the City's reasons for terminating him were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when an employee plausibly alleges that he was terminated under harsher procedures than white coworkers in the same department.

Shaw v. University of Maryland, College Park · filed 2023-02-03(a)(1)

Here, by alleging a difference in termination procedures—which included the revocation of his security clearance—between himself and white coworkers that worked in the same department and section, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently established a connection between the adverse employment action and his membership in a protected class.

A disparate treatment claim requires an adverse employment action and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

Jones v. Jefferson County Commission · filed 2023-02-09(a)(1)

But Jones has not provided enough information for the court to conclude that she suffered an adverse employment action, nor has she alleged that the County treated similarly situated employees outside of her class more favorably.

A disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that the adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Irwin v. Fry Communications, Inc. · filed 2023-02-13(a)(1)

Because Irwin has not provided any evidence of similarly situated individuals who received disparate treatment, she has failed to establish an inference of unlawful discrimination. Failing to establish this fourth element, she does not raise a prima facie claim of disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to show discriminatory treatment or intent; equal safety conditions for all vaccination-exempt employees do not suffice.

Leake v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation · filed 2023-02-27(a)(1)

All vaccination-exempt employees were treated the same, regardless of the reason for exemption. The vaccination mandate never mentioned religion and was therefore facially neutral, and Plaintiffs have not established that Defendant had a discriminatory intent in either issuing the vaccination mandate or implementing the health and safety protocols for vaccination-exempt employees.

A Title VII wrongful termination claim can plausibly allege discriminatory motive through more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

Valdez v. Enlarged City School District of Middletown · filed 2023-03-28(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Molloy, the Caucasian comparator, had the same job title, the same responsibilities, and also trained Plaintiff how to complete her work. (See FAC ¶¶ 16–17, 24–25, 27.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at this early stage to raise an inference of discriminatory motivation.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employers from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual’s race or sex.

Gaines v. Baltimore City, Maryland · filed 2023-04-07(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer, inter alia, from discriminating against “any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2; see Wormuth, 54 F.4th at 210; Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 2021).

A race or national origin discrimination claim requires facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer treated the employee differently because of that protected status.

Jacques v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2023-05-02(a)(1)

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege disparate treatment based on his protected classes, so Plaintiff’s discrimination claims must be dismissed.

An individual Title VII disparate treatment claim based on overtime allocation requires evidence that the plaintiff personally suffered discrimination; group statistics alone are insufficient.

Bernardi v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision / Bedford Hills Correctional Facility · filed 2023-05-03(a)(1)

This is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff as an individual suffered from a discriminatory allocation of overtime.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) supports a disparate treatment claim at the pleading stage when an employer fires a qualified worker but gives a similarly situated worker outside her protected class only a warning for the same conduct.

GILLIS v. NORRISTOWN STATE HOSPITAL · filed 2023-05-15(a)(1)

Ms. Gillis may now proceed on her claim of disparate treatment relating only to the Hospital’s January 10, 2019 decision to fire her while it issued a warning to a white man allegedly engaging in the same conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; an employee cannot establish disparate treatment when the evidence cannot support a finding that the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Goodwin v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC · filed 2023-05-26(a)(1)

Goodwin has not produced evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could reject Newcomb Oil’s justification for his termination. For this reason, a reasonable jury could not find that it was more likely than not that Newcomb Oil’s justification for Goodwin’s termination was merely pretext for discrimination. Therefore, Newcomb Oil is entitled to summary judgment on Goodwin’s Title VII disparate treatment claim and KYCRA claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment complaint to plausibly connect an adverse employment action to the plaintiff’s protected status.

WILSON v. COLUMBIA GAS OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2023-06-07(a)(1)

Despite its length, the Amended Complaint does not plead sufficient facts to establish a plausible nexus between Wilson’s membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action of placing him on leave and requiring an examination. ... Thus, he has failed to plead a claim for disparate treatment under Section 1981, Title VII and the PHRA.

A direct religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly showing that the employer treated the employee differently because of religion.

Shane v. Bio-Techne Corporation · filed 2023-06-09(a)(1)

As pleaded, Dr. Shane cannot plausibly claim that Bio-Techne treated him and other religious objectors differently from non-religious objectors.6 That component of his Title VII claim (to the extent Dr. Shane means to pursue it) is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

A race-based disparate-treatment complaint must allege facts that plausibly connect an adverse employment action to the plaintiff’s protected status.

Broadway v. University of Maryland Global Campus · filed 2023-07-07(a)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that even when construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a claim of disparate treatment as the Second Amended Complaint contains no more than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which precludes the Court from drawing a reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for disparate treatment on the basis of Plaintiff’s race.

Title VII disparate treatment claims may be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Sagers v. Panchanathan · filed 2023-08-14(a)(1)

Here, the parties agree that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to all three disparate treatment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory intent for a disparate treatment claim, through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Derrick James Williamson, Jr. v. Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation · filed 2023-08-17(a)(1)

These kinds of claims require proof of discriminatory intent either through direct or circumstantial evidence.

A sex-based disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that the employee was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside the protected group.

Pittman v. J.H.O.C., Inc. · filed 2023-08-31(a)(1)

As she notes, an essential element of a disparate-treatment claim is proof that she “was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” ... The Court therefore concludes that Pittman has not met her burden to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to allege discrimination because of religion; different treatment based on vaccination status alone is insufficient.

Anderson v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2023-09-05(a)(1)

Anderson specifically alleges in his complaint that he was treated differently "as compared to similarly situated employees who received one of the three" COVID-19 vaccines, Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 233, not because of his religious beliefs. Anderson has therefore not alleged a viable disparate treatment claim.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim must plead facts plausibly linking an adverse employment action to the employee’s protected status.

Newton v. Illinois Central Railroad Company · filed 2023-09-15(a)(1)

Accepting all of Newton’s claims as true, he failed to plead facts which show a causal link between his protected status and IC’s adverse employment action to nudge his claims from conceivable to plausible.

A disparate-treatment claim based on a comparator requires facts showing that a coworker outside the plaintiff’s protected class was treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances.

Harris v. Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2023-09-28(a)(1)

Harris attempts to identify a white co-worker as a comparator, but he does not allege that their conduct was nearly identical to his own.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim based on reassignment to materially less responsible duties only when the plaintiff alleges facts linking that action to a protected characteristic.

Richards v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation · filed 2023-11-14(a)(1)

Despite Plaintiff suffering an adverse employment action in his reassignment to mailroom duties, he has fallen short of his burden of showing that this action was because of discriminatory animus. Indeed, the SAC is completely devoid of any allegation that the treatment Plaintiff experienced in his two years in Defendant’s employ—and specifically relating to his demotion to mailroom duties—occurred because of his race or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an individual disparate treatment plaintiff to use pattern or practice evidence alongside evidence of discrimination against herself.

Livingston v. City of Chicago · filed 2024-01-22(a)

Because Plaintiffs have not sought to solely rely on pattern and practice evidence in support of their disparate treatment theory, but instead have provided evidence of individual discrimination, the Court finds it appropriate to consider this evidence in connection with determining whether their disparate treatment theory may go to a jury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars termination because of race or gender; a claim fails when the evidence cannot support an inference that either trait motivated the decision.

Sheppard v. Mercedes Benz US International Inc · filed 2024-01-22(a)(1)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Sheppard, she has not established that race or gender was the real reason for her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed when evidence that comparable employees outside the protected classes received lighter discipline could show the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Al-Mohamad v. State of Washington State Patrol · filed 2024-02-08(a)(1)

Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the WSP’s termination of the Plaintiff for using profanity to describe a coworker and supervisor when it did not terminate other non-Muslim, non-Arab people, for using profanity to describe their coworkers is evidence that their proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference that an employer took an adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic.

Pandya v. Bank of America · filed 2024-02-09(a)(1)

Mr. Pandya falls well short of stating an employment discrimination claim under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. The complaint is silent as to whether Mr. Pandya belongs to a protected class; he raises no factual allegations related to his sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference that an adverse employment action was motivated by sex.

SCRUGGS v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2024-01-31(a)(1)

Scruggs fails to establish a nexus between sex discrimination and her termination. The circumstances of Scruggs’ termination do not give rise to an inference of discrimination.

A Title VII discriminatory-termination claim cannot survive summary judgment when no reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reasons pretextual and the plaintiff offers no other convincing evidence of discrimination.

Hill v. Barr · filed 2024-02-09(a)(1)

Because no jury could find that Defendants’ reasons for removing Hill were trumped up, and because Plaintiff offers no other convincing evidence of pretext, her claim of discriminatory termination does not survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges an adverse employment action because of race or sex.

Richoux v. Chevron Oronite Company, LLC · filed 2024-02-28(a)(1)

In the context of a Rule 12 motion, plaintiff’s allegations suffice to allow him to proceed on his claims of discrimination based on age, race and gender.

A sex-based disparate treatment claim requires plausible facts showing that similarly situated employees of another sex received more favorable treatment; hypothetical comparators are insufficient.

Waleyko v. Del Toro · filed 2024-02-28(a)(1)

Without more, his conclusory allegations based on hypotheticals of similarly situated comparators does not state a claim.

A disparate-treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence requires proof that similarly situated employees outside the protected group received more favorable treatment because of the plaintiff’s protected trait.

Cavanaugh v. United States Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2024-03-01(a)(1)

Plaintiff must show that she (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group because of her protected trait.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to allege that the employer treated employees of a different religion or no religion more favorably.

Dean v. Acts Retirement Life Communities · filed 2024-03-06(a)(1)

These allegations do not satisfy the fourth element because she does not allege that other employees of a different religion, or no religion, received more favorable treatment from Acts.

A sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2 fails when the complaint does not plausibly allege satisfactory work performance or more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees.

Mitchell v. Hamilton · filed 2024-03-07(a)(1)

In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege that she exhibited satisfactory work performance while employed by Defendant and fails to allege similarly-situated comparators received more favorable treatment than her.

To state a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff must plausibly allege different treatment from similarly situated people outside her protected class.

Blount v. Flemmings · filed 2024-03-13(a)(1)

For purposes of Title VII, Blount does not allege that she was treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment complaint to plausibly allege that an employer acted because of a protected trait; unfavorable treatment alone is insufficient.

Duckworth v. Georgia Department of Human Services · filed 2024-03-31(a)(1)

The allegations, taken as true for purposes of his motion, show that Duckworth received unfavorable treatment at work and that certain female employees did not. But those are not the elements of a Title VII disparate-treatment claim, under which Duckworth must prove that he was terminated because of his sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to present evidence supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination, either directly or through the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Watson v. City of Henderson · filed 2024-04-05(a)(1)

A plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by introducing evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination and may do so by providing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or through the McDonnell Douglas framework. ... Here, Watson has not produced direct evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a link between alleged discriminatory remarks and an adverse employment action for the remarks to support an inference of disparate treatment.

Connaughton v. Mount Vernon City School District · filed 2024-04-18(a)(1)

In sum, Plaintiff is unable to clearly demonstrate a nexus between Doggett’s alleged comments and the adverse employment action of his termination, and therefore the remarks do not support the inference of discrimination necessary for a prima facie disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to allege that the employer treated the employee differently because of religion.

Finn v. The Humane Society of the United States · filed 2024-04-24(a)(1)

As to the fourth element, Finn and Muldoon have failed to show that the Humane Society treated them differently than other employees on the basis of religion.

Section 2000e-2 permits a disparate treatment claim based on discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, or religion; an ultimate employment decision is not required.

Quamar v. Houston Housing Authority · filed 2024-05-08(a)(1)

As such, Quamar need not plead that he sustained an ultimate employment decision but may state a claim for disparate treatment by adequately alleging that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his race, color, or religion.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires facts plausibly linking an employee’s discharge to race to state a racial disparate treatment claim.

Cunningham v. Southwest Airlines · filed 2024-05-15(a)

Because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Southwest terminated her employment because of her race, her disparate treatment claim based on race is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A plaintiff relying on differential treatment under § 2000e-2(a) must present evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Reid v. MJ Logistics L.L.C. · filed 2024-05-21(a)

Even assuming arguendo that any of the above purported actions constituted adverse employment actions sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding element (3) of Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, Plaintiff has set forth no evidence regarding differential treatment of similarly situated employees outside of Plaintiff’s protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a religious disparate treatment claim to proceed when an employee plausibly alleges that coworkers with different religious beliefs received more favorable treatment; the complaint need not identify their positions or supervisors.

Escamilla v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2024-05-28(a)(1)

Finally, Escamilla does not need to provide more detail regarding these disparately treated co-workers (e.g., their positions, supervisors, etc...) to allege that they were similarly situated. Again, this goes to the elements of a prima facie case, which Escamilla is not required to plead.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to allege that similarly situated employees outside the protected religious class received more favorable treatment.

Wilhoit v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP · filed 2024-06-05(a)

The FAC, however, does not allege facts showing that similarly situated employees who are non-members of Plaintiffs’ protected religious class were subject to favorable treatment.

For a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a mandatory vaccination policy can become a condition of employment relevant to whether an employee is qualified for a position.

French v. Albany Medical Center · filed 2024-06-12(a)(1)

Although, as Plaintiff contends, this policy was not in place prior to 2019, see id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, it became a condition of employment when Defendant implemented the policy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to reach a jury when comparable employees received different discipline and the employer’s explanation is genuinely disputed.

Saville v. Northwestern Regional Jail Authority · filed 2024-06-10(a)(1)

Accordingly, a jury will decide Saville’s claims for non-pay-based disparate treatment under Title VII and the VHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment claim based on comparators to identify employees who were similarly situated and treated differently.

Cox v. Valley Health System · filed 2024-06-28(a)

Here, Cox offers three individuals as comparators, but she does not clearly establish meaningful similarities between herself and any comparator. ... Because of the lack of similarly situated comparators, Cox has failed to plead a disparate treatment claim.

A disparate treatment claim based on indirect evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Sheil v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2024-07-05(a)(1)

Because there is no direct evidence of discrimination in this case, the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test applies to Mr. Sheil’s claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to plausibly allege that religion was a factor in the employer’s decision.

Schmidt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America · filed 2024-07-11(a)(1)

The Complaint does not plausibly allege Plaintiff’s religion was used as a factor for termination. The sole reason for Plaintiff’s termination was his failure to comply with the vaccine mandate.

Section 2000e-2 permits a race or color disparate treatment claim based on alleged denials of training and benefits and an unfavorable shift transfer.

Mills v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2024-06-27(a)(1)

Defendant’s motion is denied as to plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment on the basis of race and color under the OADA (part of counts | and 2), Title VII (counts 5 and 6), and § 1981 (part of count 8), and retaliation on the basis of race and color under § 1981 (part of count 8).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim when alleged race discrimination plausibly alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

McWilson v. Bell Textron Inc. · filed 2024-07-30(a)(1)

Consequently, McWilson sufficiently alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2 requires facts connecting an adverse employment action to a protected trait; different treatment alone does not make a discrimination claim plausible.

Butler v. Garland · filed 2024-08-02(a)(1)

The fact that Plaintiff, a member of a protected class, was treated differently from other employees does not automatically create a plausible employment discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment, and a disparate treatment claim may proceed when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that sex caused the challenged action.

BAUGH v. FOR BARE FEET, LLC · filed 2024-08-02(a)(1)

Because Ms. Baugh has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she was subjected to disparate treatment due to her sex, the Court DENIES FBF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her Title VII sex discrimination claim based on disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to plead facts supporting a plausible inference that an adverse employment action was taken because of her protected status.

Anderton v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 2024-08-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, to survive DISD’s motion to dismiss, Dr. Anderton must plead sufficient facts for the court to draw the reasonable inference that there was “(1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against [her] ‘because of her protected status.’” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766 (emphasis in original). ... These factual allegations are insufficient to nudge her race-based discrimination claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 768 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to identify a similarly situated coworker outside the plaintiff’s protected class who was treated more favorably.

Gibbons v. Brookside Properties, Inc. · filed 2024-08-09(a)(1)

The “similarly situated” prong requires a Title VII claimant to identify at least one coworker outside of his protected class who was treated more favorably “under nearly identical circumstances.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious disparate-treatment claim to proceed without detailed allegations about comparable employees or every element of a prima facie case.

Spencer v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2024-08-12(a)(1)

Finally, Spencer does not need to provide more detail regarding these disparately treated co-workers (e.g., their positions, supervisors, etc...) to allege that they were similarly situated. Again, this goes to the elements of a prima facie case, which Spencer is not required to plead.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed when alleged unequal treatment plausibly supports an inference of discrimination based on a protected trait.

Khayal v. Trustees of Dartmouth College · filed 2024-08-20(a)

Taken as a whole, Dartmouth’s alleged actions allow an inference that Khayal suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of her race or religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment plaintiff to plausibly allege a protected class and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside that class.

Matthews v. Legacy Health · filed 2024-08-26(a)(1)

As Plaintiff has failed to establish neither his membership in a protected class, or how similarly situated individuals outside that class were treated differently, the Court can dismiss his disparate treatment claim theory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected traits; a disparate treatment claim requires evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory motive.

Maxius v. Mount Sinai Health Systems Inc. · filed 2024-09-12(a)(1)

Title VII makes it unlawful for employers “to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” in his or her employment “because of such individual’s . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. ... But the record does not support an inference that MSBI took these steps because of Plaintiff’s race, religion or alienage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly showing that an employer took an adverse employment action because of the employee’s race or sex.

Goodkin v. University of Texas Rio Grande Valley · filed 2024-09-18(a)(1)

As a result, the Court finds that Goodkin fails to properly allege that UTRGV demoted him because of his race or gender.

A plaintiff alleging sex-based disparate treatment must show that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Devine v. Shulkin · filed 2024-09-23(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory hiring based on race or national origin; a failure-to-hire claim requires evidence connecting the decision to that protected status.

Romero v. Tucson Unified School District · filed 2024-09-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff has similarly failed to produce evidence that Dr. Trujillo refused to submit his name to the Governing Board or interfered with his applications because Plaintiff is Mexican American and Yaqui.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations when the employer took the adverse action.

Boyd v. Flexaust, Inc. · filed 2024-09-26(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case, she must show that she met expectations at the time her employer made the decision to demote her and then fire her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a reasonable inference that an adverse employment action was caused by a protected trait; an unsupported assertion about similarly situated employees is insufficient.

Holmes v. Austin, III · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to their “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Ms. Holmes does not sufficiently allege that similarly situated employees of a different race or age were treated more favorably, nor does she allege any other facts that would support a reasonable inference of discrimination.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) needs facts supporting a plausible inference of discrimination; a general assertion that employees of another race received better treatment is insufficient.

Mills v. Billington · filed 2024-11-06(a)(1)

These generalized factual assertions are insufficient to state disparate treatment claims.

Circumstantial evidence that raises a factual issue about whether an employer’s stated reason is pretextual can prevent summary judgment on a Title VII disparate treatment claim.

Post v. City of Parma · filed 2024-11-22(a)

Because the City acknowledges it will have to try Post’s other claims—including her claims of sexual harassment and emotional distress—and because the law in the Ninth Circuit is unsettled, the Court concludes Post has produced sufficient evidence to create a factual issue regarding pretext which precludes summary judgment for the City on her disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a reasonable inference that an adverse employment action occurred because of an employee’s protected status; an isolated remark with no apparent connection to the action is insufficient.

Nielsen v. Sevier County · filed 2024-11-08(a)(1)

The lone comment of a County Commissioner, without context or additional facts, is insufficient to permit a reasonable inference that Defendant took any of the alleged adverse employment actions against Plaintiff because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a disparate treatment claim to allege severe or pervasive conduct; an employment action need only affect an identifiable term or condition of employment.

Hansley v. DeJoy · filed 2024-12-03(a)

Employment actions don’t need to be severe or pervasive to be actionable as disparate treatment—they need only affect “an identifiable term or condition of employment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex-based termination, but a disparate-treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for firing her was pretextual.

WALLS v. ABINGTON SURGICAL CENTER · filed 2024-12-09(a)(1)

As discussed above, Walls has failed to provide any evidence to show that ASC’s justification for firing her was pretextual. Absent such evidence, no jury could reasonably conclude that ASC fired Ms. Walls because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a circumstantial disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Moreno v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2024-12-12(a)(1)

The record contains no evidence that any coworker—let alone a coworker of a different race, gender, religion, or national origin—was treated differently than Moreno was under nearly identical circumstances.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race-based disparate treatment claim to proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges harsher discipline than a similarly situated white coworker or denial of a promotion given to a less qualified white coworker.

Dyer v. New Orleans City · filed 2024-12-20(a)

But Dyer’s race-based disparate treatment claim arising out of the February 2022 discipline and the denied promotion shall be allowed to proceed.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment complaint to allege facts plausibly suggesting discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Reynolds v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-01-03(a)

At the motion to dismiss stage, of course, Plaintiff need not have “legally sufficient evidence,” but he must allege specific facts suggesting disparate treatment sufficient to transform his conflict with STSO Paulin into a plausible discrimination claim. He has not done so here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious disparate treatment claim to proceed when alleged facts support a reasonable inference that the employer treated an employee differently because of her religious beliefs.

Barnett v. INOVA Health Care Services · filed 2025-01-07(a)(1)

Such allegations by Barnett sufficiently demonstrate that INOVA treated her differently than other employees because of her religious belief, and thus, support a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent at this stage. Hence, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Barnett’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII and the VHRA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment complaint to plausibly link an adverse employment action to the employee’s protected class.

Girard v. City of Corsicana · filed 2025-02-19(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's sex discrimination claim survives dismissal, but his national origin discrimination claim, as currently pleaded, does not.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer acted because of an employee’s race or sex to establish disparate treatment.

Parker v. United States · filed 2025-02-28(a)(1)

Because Parker presented no evidence any action was taken “because of” her race or sex, all of her discrimination claims fail. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

A disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting unequal employment terms or different treatment from a similarly situated employee outside the plaintiff's protected class.

Munene v. Noem · filed 2025-03-07(a)(1)

In this case, Munene has conclusorily alleged he was subject to unequal terms and conditions of his employment, but has not alleged any facts showing this inequality.

A religious disparate treatment claim is plausible when an employer terminates employees while granting exemptions to similarly situated employees outside their protected religious class.

Elliott v. Shriners Hospitals for Children · filed 2025-03-11(a)(1)

Plaintiffs’ allegation supports a reasonable inference of discriminatory intent because Plaintiffs aver that other unvaccinated employees who do not share their religious beliefs were granted religious and/or medical exemptions and were not terminated for their refusal to receive the vaccine – i.e. similarly situated employees outside of their protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires disparate treatment to be motivated by the employee’s membership in a protected class.

O'Horo v. Boston Medical Center Corporation · filed 2025-03-12(a)(1)

Such discrimination must be motivated by the plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to plead facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer took an adverse employment action because of protected status.

Noakes v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2025-03-12(a)(1)

To survive a motion to dismiss a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must plead facts that tend to show that the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff because of her protected status, raising her right to relief above the speculative level.

Section 2000e-2 allows a religious disparate treatment claim when an employee plausibly alleges discrimination against him, even if the employer accommodated other employees with similar beliefs.

Tansill v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP · filed 2025-03-17(a)(1)

To state a claim for disparate treatment, plaintiff is not required to allege that all employees with his religious beliefs were discriminated against, only that he was.

Without direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Wilson v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2025-03-20(a)(1)

Absent direct evidence, as is the case here, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination complaint to plausibly allege that the employer treated the employee adversely because of sex.

RAY v. BELL PARTNERS, INC. · filed 2025-03-21(a)(1)

Accordingly, to state a claim of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her gender or age. ... The Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that similarly situated employees outside of Plaintiff’s protected class were subject to disparate treatment by Cannon.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to survive dismissal when alleged adverse employment actions and more favorable treatment of employees outside the protected class support an inference of discrimination.

Glenn v. McDonough · filed 2025-03-26(a)(1)

This Court finds that these actions, when considered in the context of her protected status and the lack of similar treatment of comparators outside her protected class, are sufficient to establish adverse employment actions under Fifth Circuit precedent (Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019)).

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed when the alleged circumstances plausibly support an inference of discrimination; a plaintiff need not plead a similarly situated comparator.

Martin v. Arizona School for the Deaf and Blind · filed 2025-03-26(a)

The Court finds that Reichman’s vague criticism, refusal to provide additional feedback when asked, and actions to circumvent the Board and hire Tkatchov, create a plausible inference of discrimination. As such Defendant’s motion will be denied as to Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment claim to allege facts supporting an inference that the employer discriminated because of a protected trait.

CRADDOCK v. MCDONOUGH · filed 2025-03-31(a)

Other than merely alleging that Plaintiff is a Caucasian female of European descent and a Jehovah’s witness, the Complaint provides no specific facts to suggest that Defendant discriminated against her because of her color, race, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) supports a plausible race discrimination claim when an employee alleges lower pay and harsher discipline than similarly situated white coworkers.

THOMAS v. THE WELLINGTON AT HERSHEY MILLS · filed 2025-05-05(a)

Accepting all inferences in Thomas’s favor, he therefore alleges a plausible disparate treatment claim against the Wellington sufficient to pass statutory screening.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to plausibly allege an adverse employment action because of protected status.

Moore v. Innova Solutions Inc · filed 2025-05-07(a)(1)

Moore fails to state a claim for discrimination—she does not plausibly allege that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her protected status.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer treated an employee adversely because of race; conclusory beliefs and vague comparator allegations are insufficient.

Uzoigwe v. Verizon Maryland LLC · filed 2025-05-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting disparate treatment sufficient to transform his conflict with Mr. Christian or any other Verizon supervisor or CWA employee into a plausible discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plausible allegation of adverse treatment because of protected status; an employer’s failure to respond as an employee wishes to an offensive remark does not itself establish disparate treatment.

Gaudette v. Angel Heart Hospice · filed 2025-05-16(a)(1)

Gaudette argues his “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” were affected by New Century’s failure to “protect” him from discrimination, by its “denial of equal access to investigations that are supposed to follow complaints of discrimination,” and by its “denial of truthful communications.” The facts alleged, however, are not equivalent to the kinds of discrimination that we have held support a disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that an employee of another race received more favorable discipline.

Richardson v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2025-06-03(a)(1)

To be sure, this single comparator may not ultimately carry the day for Ms. Richardson, but it is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

A race or sex discrimination claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for firing the employee and the employee cannot show that reason was pretextual.

Powell v. Transdev Alternative Service Incorporated · filed 2025-06-12(a)(1)

Even assuming Powell could make out a prima facie case for race and sex discrimination, she has not established Transdev’s articulated non-discriminatory reason for firing her was pretextual. Her Title VII and ACRA discrimination claims therefore fail and summary judgment is granted for Transdev.

A sex discrimination claim can survive dismissal without a similarly situated comparator when other alleged facts support an inference of discrimination.

Ruggles v. Arizona, State of · filed 2025-06-24(a)(1)

But this argument overlooks that identification of a similarly situated comparator is only one way to establish discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination to show that the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Bogle v. Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services · filed 2025-06-27(a)

To establish a prima facie case, however, Ms. Bogle must also show that “the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination.” Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 491–92 (citation omitted).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race discrimination complaint to allege facts supporting an inference that the employer acted because of race.

Tamakloe v. Vertex Aerospace, LLC · filed 2025-07-02(a)

Nor does he allege a sufficient factual basis to show that the employer’s motivation to discriminate was based on Tamakloe’s race.

A Title VII disparate-treatment claim requires allegations of protected-class membership, satisfactory job performance, adverse employment action, and different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

El-Haggan v. Board of Education for Montgomery County · filed 2025-07-16(a)(1)

To state a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege facts to show: “(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer disciplined an employee because of race, color, or sex.

Seabrook v. Driscoll · filed 2025-08-04(a)(1)

First, Seabrook does not allege facts to plausibly state a claim that the Army disciplined her because of her race, color, or sex.

An employee adequately alleges adverse action discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by alleging protected status, satisfactory job performance, an adverse employment action, and different treatment from a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Munene v. Noem · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)

The Court finds Munene adequately alleges he is in a protected class, performed his job satisfactorily, suffered an adverse employment action, and was treated differently than a similarly situated employee who did not belong to the same protected class as Munene.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to plead facts making it plausible that the employer acted because of the plaintiff’s protected status.

Ibrahim v. Johnson · filed 2025-08-28(a)(1)

The proposed amended complaint alleges discrimination based on race and religion, but it does not identify Ibrahim’s religion or allege facts that, if true, would show that the employer’s conduct was because of his race or religion.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a religious disparate treatment claim to plead facts supporting a plausible inference that religion motivated the employer’s adverse action.

Scodtt · filed 2025-09-03(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege facts that raise a plausible inference of discrimination, and thus her disparate treatment Title VII religious discrimination claim must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to plead facts supporting a causal connection between an adverse employment action and a protected characteristic; a bare assertion that others were treated better is insufficient.

Grays v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2025-09-15(a)(1)

Ms. Grays does not sufficiently allege that similarly situated employees of a different race or religion were treated more favorably, nor does she allege any other facts that would support a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts connecting alleged disparate treatment to a protected characteristic; unfair treatment alone does not state a discrimination claim.

Cooper · filed 2025-09-18(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff's disparate treatment discrimination claim fails because she has not alleged facts directly showing discrimination or supporting an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that an employer’s stated reason for an employment decision was a pretext for discrimination.

Rosas v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 2025-09-23(a)(1)

Here, the Board has offered nondiscriminatory explanations for each employment action it took against Plaintiff, and so the only question for the Court is “whether there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the explanation is pretext for illegal discrimination or retaliation.” Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2025).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment complaint to plausibly allege facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.

Kittle v. Mavis Discount Tire, Inc. · filed 2025-09-24(a)(1)

In sum, the Complaint fails to state a plausible disparate treatment claim under either Title VII or the NYSHRL because it fails to plead facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a uniform hair-height limit when employees can comply by binding their hair.

BRIGHT v. MEDICAL CENTER NAVICENT HEALTH · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

An employment policy that limits hair height, like hair length, does not discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to plead protected class membership, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two.

Phelan v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-09-25(a)(1)

A plaintiff bringing a claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between his protected characteristic and the adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting a plausible inference that an employer treated an employee differently because of religion; an unsupported assertion that medical exemptions received more lenient treatment is insufficient.

Campbell v. Bowser · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

None of those allegations support an inference that KIPP handled medical exemption requests more leniently than religious exemption requests, so Campbell has not “nudged” this claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim by showing that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable discipline.

Perkins v. City Shield Security Services · filed 2025-09-30(a)(1)

The Court finds that this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff and Kitter were similarly situated employees. Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when allegations of more favorable treatment of white coworkers and racist remarks support an inference of discrimination.

Luckey · filed 2025-09-30(a)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for race discrimination in violation of Title VII and race discrimination in violation of the FEHA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to survive dismissal when the complaint plausibly alleges that a similarly situated employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class received more favorable treatment.

Garcia v. Broward County Public Schools · filed 2025-10-06(a)(1)

This Court finds that these allegations, which are taken as true at this stage, are sufficient to identify a similarly situated individual outside Garcia’s protected class who was treated more favorably in order to withstand the School Board’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to allege facts plausibly connecting an adverse employment action to a protected characteristic.

Brown v. Talavera · filed 2025-10-10(a)(1)

She sets forth absolutely no factual allegations from which the Court may draw the reasonable inference that her termination was based on race or color. As such, she has failed to state a claim as necessary to defeat Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to establish Title VII discrimination must identify employees outside her protected class who were similarly situated and treated better.

Sutton · filed 2025-11-06(a)(1)

Thus, because Sutton “gives only a conclusory explanation” regarding why the unknown individuals are appropriate comparators, she fails to make out a prima facie case of sex- or race-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence requires circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Wons · filed 2025-12-09(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against someone because of his religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... However, the Court also finds Plaintiff has not established the third element of his prima face case because he has not shown circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(m) requires a Title VII disparate treatment complaint to plausibly allege that race or sex was a motivating factor in the challenged employment action.

BROOKS · filed 2025-11-17(m)

For these reasons, even reading the allegations of the Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude that the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that racial or sexual animus was a motivating factor behind, much less the but-for cause of, the alleged adverse employment actions on which Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims rests.

A plaintiff plausibly alleges race and color discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by alleging that he was passed over for positions despite superior qualifications and was told managers did not want to hire him because of his race and color.

Pendergraft · filed 2025-12-22(a)(1)

Upon consideration, Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for relief under Title VII and the ADEA. ... At this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a disparate treatment claim based on age, race, and color.

Section 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)’s disparate impact standard does not apply retroactively to employment decisions made before its enactment.

Davey v. City of Omaha · filed 1997-02-24(k)(1)(A)

We have no difficulty concluding that § 105 attaches new consequences to prior conduct and significantly alters the legal terrain that employers must traverse. Consequently, we hold that § 105 does not apply retroactively.

Section 2000e-2(k)'s 1991 disparate impact rules do not apply retroactively to conduct before November 19, 1991.

Matthews v. Runyon · filed 1994-06-15(k)

However, because the changes in Title VII disparate impact law codified in section 105 affect the liability of defendants by restoring their burden of proving business necessity, re-establishing that proof of business necessity is not a defense to intentional discrimination, and restoring the pre-Wards Cove definition of “alternative business practice,” they cannot be retroactively applied in cases, such as this one, where alleged discriminatory conduct occurred prior to November 19, 1991.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor standard does not apply to conduct before its 1991 enactment.

Hook v. Enrst & Young · filed 1994-06-28(m)

We conclude that section 107 does not govern this case because that section does not apply to conduct occurring prior to its enactment in 1991.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor standard does not apply to employment conduct that occurred before the 1991 Act was enacted.

Debra v. Hook, an Individual v. Ernst & Young, a Partnership · filed 1994-06-28(m)

We conclude that section 107 does not govern this case because that section does not apply to conduct occurring prior to its enactment in 1991.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor standard does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued before the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

Linville v. State of Hawaii · filed 1994-12-02(m)

As amended by the 1991 Act, Title VII now provides that a plaintiff establishes an unlawful employment practice when the plaintiff "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); ... Nonetheless, the Court notes that the 1991 Amendments are not applied retroactively. ... Thus, since Plaintiff's action accrued in 1988, the original Price Waterhouse standard would be applicable to this case.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) does not bar challenges to employment practices arising before its effective date.

Maitland v. University Of Minnesota · filed 1994-12-13(n)(1)

Having held that Sec. 108 has a true retroactive effect in this case, we apply the Supreme Court's "traditional presumption" against retroactive application of a statute and hold that Sec. 108 "does not govern" in cases that arose before the statute became effective.

Section 2000e-2(n)(1) does not apply retroactively to cases arising before the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

William Rafferty Sharman Simon Robert Kuti Daniel Mikus David Bernat Cynthia Dellick v. City of Youngstown · filed 1995-05-23(n)(1)

However, we agree with the court in Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357 (8th Cir.1994) that section 108 is not to be applied retroactively, and, therefore, we do not consider it in regard to the present case.

Section 2000e-2(m) does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted.

Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital · filed 1997-11-18(m)

We recognize that Price Waterhouse has been abrogated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). ... Because plaintiffs claims here accrued before the CRA was enacted her case is controlled by Price Waterhouse.

Section 2000e-2(m)’s mixed-motive rule does not apply retroactively to employment decisions made before the 1991 Act.

Vails v. Police Dept. of City of New York · filed 1999-07-15(m)

Section 107(a) of that Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), provides that an employment practice is unlawful if there are both legitimate and illegitimate motivations for it. ... Because Vails’s employment was terminated in 1989 and the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively, ... if the NYPD demonstrates that it would have taken the same action regardless, Vails would not be entitled to any relief, even assuming she proved that her gender was a motivating factor in the NYPD's decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects any individual discriminated against by a covered employer, even if the employer later discovers employee misconduct.

Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co. · filed 1994-08-01(a)

Those statutes grant standing to "any individual" discriminated against by a covered employer.

Section 2000e-2 allows Title VII claims against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs.

Fullman v. Philadelphia International Airport · filed 1999-05-10

Title VII authorizes a cause of action only against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, just as the ADA similarly covers only employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).

Section 2000e-2 addresses acts by employers, so only defendants classified as employers may face a Title VII claim under it.

Evans v. Port Auth · filed 2006-02-23

Though plaintiffs in their pleadings indicate that a Title VII claim may be brought against all defendants, Title VII only addresses acts by the “employer.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. PATH and the Port Authority are the only defendants in this suit that may be classified as “employers.”

Section 2000e-2 permits a worker to recover for discrimination by a company other than his employer only if the worker meets the common-law test for an employment relationship with that company.

Ware v. Ball Plastic Container Corp. · filed 2006-06-02(a)(1)

If not an employee in fact, recovery is only permissible where the plaintiff meets the common-law test of an employment relationship.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not cover an applicant for an uncompensated volunteer position because the required employment relationship is absent.

Pinchas v. USA Deaf Sports Federation, Inc. · filed 2006-10-12(a)

Eighth Circuit law is clear that volunteers are not employees for purposes of Title VII. As a non-employee, Pinchas does not have standing to bring a Title VII claim against the USADSF, and the USADSF is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 permits Title VII claims against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs, but not individual employees.

Tani v. FPL/Next Era Energy · filed 2011-09-15

Title VII authorizes a cause of action only against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, just as the ADA covers only employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee claiming discrimination to show that the employer acted because of the employee's own protected characteristic.

Tovar v. Essentia Health · filed 2017-05-24(a)

Tovar has not alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her own sex; rather, she alleges that she was discriminated against because of her son's sex. By its terms the protections of Title VII do not extend to such discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 permits Title VII claims against employers and other covered entities, but does not impose liability on individual employees.

Ray · filed 2025-11-18(a)

Title VII only provides for the liability of an employer and other covered entities, such as an employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. ... Individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.

When a discharged employee’s duties are absorbed by workers outside the protected class, a Title VII prima facie case does not require proof that similarly situated employees were treated better.

Elizabeth C.O. Bellaver v. Quanex Corp./nichols-Homeshield · filed 2000-01-18(a)

The plaintiff in a single-discharge case does not need to make a showing that “similarly situated” employees were treated better because the inference of discrimination arises from the fact that they were constructively “replaced” by workers outside of the protected class.

In a reduction in force, a race-discrimination plaintiff can make a prima facie case by showing discharge, qualification for another position, and evidence supporting an inference that race motivated the employer's failure to consider the plaintiff for that position.

Wilson v. Aaa Plumbing Pottery Corporation · filed 1994-10-11(a)(1)

Altering the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test for application to reduction in force cases, permits a prima facie showing of discrimination if the plaintiff: (1) demonstrates membership in the protected group; (2) proves discharge; (3) shows qualifications for another position at the time of discharge; and (4) produces evidence which allows a fact-finder to reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of race in failing to consider the plaintiff for another position.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination under Title VII by showing that she belongs to a protected class, was qualified for her job, was terminated, and was replaced by someone outside that class.

Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company · filed 1994-11-03

To present a circumstantial case of discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. Cooper-Houston made this showing by setting forth evidence that she is black, that she was qualified for her job, that she was terminated and that she was replaced by a white person.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge based on national origin must show membership in a protected class, satisfactory job performance, discharge, and replacement by someone outside the class.

Von Der Luhe v. Terrence Golden United States General Services Administration · filed 1994-11-17

To make a prima facie showing of discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner; (3) he was discharged; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class. ... He failed to present any evidence that he had been performing his job satisfactorily before his discharge. Von der Luhe also failed to present any evidence that he was replaced by a person outside his protected group, or any other evidence suggesting that his termination was related to his national origin, accent, speech impediment, or prior exercise of his rights under Title VII. ... Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the district court did not err by concluding that Von Der Luhe failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory termination under § 2000e-2(a) must establish a prima facie case, including evidence that the employer hired or sought applicants to replace the plaintiff.

Tomsic v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1994-12-09(a)

Accordingly, since plaintiffs have not proffered sufficient evidence to establish the fourth element, they have not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

A rejected applicant states a prima facie failure-to-hire discrimination claim by showing protected status, qualifications, rejection, and continued recruitment for the position.

Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital · filed 1994-12-19(a)(1)

In a suit for failure to hire based on disparate treatment, in order to state a prima facie claim, plaintiff must show: “(i) that he belongs to a protected [class]; (ii) that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complaintant’s [sic] qualifications.”

A plaintiff challenging a discharge as sex discrimination under § 2000e-2 must have a reasonable expectation of proving that she could perform the job at an acceptable level.

Beal v. Board of Selectmen · filed 1995-02-21(a)(1)

As a result, we are content that the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of demonstrating that she would be capable of performing her duties as a police officer at an acceptable level in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and G. L. c.. 151B.

A gender discrimination claim based on reassignment requires evidence that the employee was qualified for the position denied and that the reassignment supports an inference of sex discrimination.

McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corporation · filed 1995-03-13(a)

McLaughlin fails to establish that she was denied a position for which she was qualified. Moreover, she fails to establish that her reassignment was motivated by gender discrimination rather than legitimate business reasons. Therefore, she has not made out a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must first establish a prima facie case.

Lazukic v. Desert Palace, Incorporated, Dba Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino · filed 1995-04-04(a)(1)

To establish discrimination under either Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

For a pregnancy discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), the plaintiff need only show membership in a protected class at the prima facie stage; the employer’s knowledge is relevant to proving discriminatory causation later.

Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc. · filed 1995-04-10(a)(1)

However, at this stage, plaintiff's burden is limited to showing that she is a member of a protected class. Defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's pregnancy and related medical conditions is not relevant until the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, when plaintiff is required to show that defendant terminated her because of her medical conditions.

A plaintiff relying on indirect evidence of discriminatory discharge under § 2000e-2(a) must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations for the job.

Evans v. Jay Instrument and Specialty Co. · filed 1995-04-26(a)

Nonetheless, Evans has failed to establish that she met the legitimate business expectations of her employer to be qualified for the position at issue.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging discriminatory hiring to show pretext after the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; a minimal prima facie case alone does not raise a triable issue.

Ramos v. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin · filed 1995-05-05(a)(1)

Because the Secretary articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Ramos, and because Ramos' "case consist[ed] of no more than the minimum necessary to create a presumption of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas," Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the Secretary.