42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-conscious affirmative action plan addressing a manifest imbalance when it does not unnecessarily trammel nonminority applicants’ interests.

Honadle v. University of Vermont & State Agricultural College · filed 1999-06-01(a)(1)

Because a manifest imbalance existed in the job group at issue, and UVM’s affirmative action activities in response did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minorities, UVM’s AAP with its MFIF/ FIF passes Title VII review.

Section 2000e-2 does not require an employer to adopt a race- or sex-conscious corrective program in the absence of discrimination.

Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose · filed 2000-11-30

There is also no duty under federal statutory law to take corrective action in the absence of discrimination. ... It did not find Title VII mandates such programs.

Section 2000e-2(j) does not always require special efforts to correct past employment inequities, but permits them where appropriate.

United States v. State of NY · filed 1979-09-06(j)

It is therefore appropriate, although not always required, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), that special efforts be taken to correct these past inequities and injustices in our employment patterns.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race; a temporary affirmative action plan may permit race-conscious hiring while it remedies a manifest racial imbalance.

Martinez v. City of St. Louis · filed 2005-02-24(a)(1)

The United States Code provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). ... The Court hereby reconsiders this aspect of the law of the case, however, holding that the City should have moved for the amendment or dissolution of the consent decree upon noticing the changing circumstances set out above. ... The City of St. Louis's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 128) is DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff Deeken's motion for summary judgment, joined by plaintiff Martinez, as to the City's liability (Doc. 130) is GRANTED IN PART.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat an employer’s refusal to extend an affirmative employment plan as discriminatory hiring.

King, William v. Jackson, Alphonso · filed 2007-05-29(a)

But even if, as King suggests, HUD used its AEP to prevent discrimination, that does not convert the Department’s refusal to extend the AEP into an act of discriminatory hiring. Therefore, because King does not allege that he opposed an act of discriminatory hiring, he may not use subsection e-2(a) as the basis for his opposition clause claim.

Section 2000e-2 allows an employer to justify race-conscious hiring by showing compliance with a valid affirmative action plan; the challenger must then show the plan is invalid.

Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse · filed 2008-04-09

Thus, if an employer asserts its compliance with an affirmative action plan as its legitimate nondiseriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the plan is invalid.

Section 2000e-2 places the ultimate burden of proving an affirmative action plan invalid on the plaintiff challenging it.

Shea v. Powell · filed 2013-05-10

The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing the invalidity of the affirmative action plan.

Challenges to affirmative action plans under § 2000e-2(a)(1) continue to follow the Weber and Johnson standards after Ricci.

Shea v. Kerry · filed 2015-08-07(a)(1)

For nearly thirty years, we have examined Title VII challenges to affirmative action programs under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987). Shea argues that those standards have been displaced by the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009), such that Johnson and Weber no longer guide the analysis of reverse-discrimination claims under Title VII. We are unpersuaded.

Section 2000e-2(m)'s motivating-factor rule does not displace affirmative action programs that were lawful before the 1991 amendments.

Officers For Justice v. Civil Service Commission Of The City And County Of San Francisco · filed 1992-11-05(m)

The City properly argues that a more natural reading of the phrase "in accordance with law" is that affirmative action programs that were in accordance with law prior to passage of the 1991 Act are unaffected by the amendments. The language of the statute is clear, and the City's interpretation is consistent with that language. ... Therefore, we conclude that the 1991 Act does not alter existing affirmative action case law.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a discriminatory treatment claim when race was a motivating factor in an employment practice, even if other factors also motivated it.

Shanks v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers · filed 2025-04-18(m)

A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, but must raise an inference “that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added); see Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

A race or national origin discrimination claim requires facts supporting an inference that the adverse employment action was related to the employee’s protected status.

TUMMALA v. WORMUTH · filed 2024-03-07(a)

Consequently, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title VII and so this claim must be dismissed.

A race discrimination complaint need not establish a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, but it must allege facts that make the claim plausible.

Black v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2020-01-21(a)

Therefore, while the Plaintiff is not required to allege facts to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, she has still failed to sufficiently plead a plausible claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination complaint to allege a protected trait and facts connecting an adverse employment action to that trait.

Xie v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2020-01-02(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff fails to allege her race, national origin, color, religion, or gender, and does not allege any facts to connect an adverse employment action to any protected status, she has failed to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plausible allegation that an employer took adverse action because of an employee’s protected characteristic.

Jackson v. Beacon City School District · filed 2019-11-14(a)

Plaintiff's allegations of discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA are insufficient to state plausible claims under these statutes. Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that his employer took any adverse action against him based on his membership in a protected class.

A plaintiff alleging discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) may use circumstantial evidence and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to prove intentional discrimination.

Laul v. L. Alamos Nat'l Labs. · filed 2016-09-27(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not come forward with any direct evidence of LANS' discriminatory intent; therefore, the Court will analyze all of Plaintiff's claims using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that race motivated a discharge; a dispute over whether the employer correctly assessed the employee’s conduct does not alone warrant a trial.

Thomas v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-09-16(a)(1)

Nothing in the record suggests that the decision to terminate Thomas was tainted by discrimination. The Court therefore finds that the factual disputes concerning the initial shooting are not material, and do not entitle Thomas to a jury trial.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated a challenged employment action; a demotion supported by an admitted workplace offense, without evidence of racial motive, does not establish discrimination.

Faulk v. Shinseki · filed 2016-10-25(a)(1)

Thus, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of proving that discrimination was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to demote her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects an employee from sex discrimination even when the employer treats other women favorably.

Gonzales v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2015-11-05(a)(1)

The court thus cannot find that the fact that Marriott affords breaks to women expressing breast milk for their own children defeats Gonzales’s claim as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make nepotism actionable as race discrimination.

Powell v. American Remediation & Environmental, Inc. · filed 2015-07-07(a)(1)

The District Court correctly concluded that “[n]epotism is not actionable under Title VII or Section 1981.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based differences in employment terms and conditions; the employee must show that race caused the difference.

Wright v. St. Vincent Health System · filed 2013-09-18(a)(1)

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the district court properly found that Wright failed to adduce sufficient evidence that any difference in the terms and conditions of Wright’s employment “was a product of discrimination based on race.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits different treatment of employees when the reason for the difference is lawful.

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, Ala. · filed 2000-04-24(a)(1)

Employers may legally engage in “differential treatment” of employees without violating the law, so long as the reason for the difference is not illegal.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff using the indirect method to prove race discrimination must show that he met his employer’s legitimate performance expectations.

Campbell v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. · filed 2000-03-08(a)(1)

It is clear that Campbell’s absenteeism, in and of itself, prevented him from meeting Dominick’s legitimate performance expectations as to Plaintiff’s claims related to such absenteeism discipline.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, including work schedules, assignments, evaluations, and promotion decisions.

Gaynor v. Martin · filed 1999-11-29(a)(1)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was subjected to discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment to survive a motion to dismiss.

In a race discrimination claim based on comparator evidence, the plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably.

Holifield v. Reno · filed 1997-07-02(a)(1)

Holifield has failed to produce sufficient affirmative evidence to establish that the non-minority employees with whom he compares his treatment were similarly situated in all aspects, or that their conduct was of comparable seriousness to the conduct for which he was discharged. Having failed to meet his burden of proving he was similarly situated to a more favorably treated employee, Holifield has not established a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race-discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method to show that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment; employees with substantially different complaint records do not establish that comparison.

Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. · filed 1997-07-14(a)(1)

There is also a fourth requirement for a prima facie case, that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment. The evidence would not support a finding that Simpson met the requirement. He offered proof that others generated customer complaints but were not discharged. None, however, had a record close to Simpson's.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory demotions.

Casseus v. ELIZABETH GENERAL MED. · filed 1996-02-16(a)(1)

It is also true that demotions are cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed to trial when evidence raises a factual question about the employer’s stated reason for a demotion.

Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp. · filed 1996-01-24(a)(1)

In any event, the plaintiff has produced enough evidence to survive summary judgment on the matter of pretext. ... Regardless, this court is of the opinion that the plaintiff should' be allowed the opportunity to present evidence in support of his claims at trial. The defendants are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and their motion for summary judgment shall be denied on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show that similarly situated employees were treated differently because of the plaintiff’s sex.

Torre v. Federated Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-05-31(a)

Under a disparate treatment theory, Mrs. Torre must show that, compared with other similarly situated employees, she was treated differently because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a), as incorporated for federal employees, permits a disparate treatment claim to proceed when material facts remain disputed.

Callanan v. Runyun · filed 1994-08-24(a)

Further, we find the merits of the Plaintiffs disparate treatment claims to be surfeited with genuine issues of material fact, which preclude a Summary Judgment, but we conclude that the Plaintiffs abusive work environment and reprisal claims fail, as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment decisions; a disparate treatment claim requires evidence of discriminatory intent.

Roderick v. Flowers v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1994-09-22(a)(1)

Nevertheless, the single statement of a low level supervisor indicating discriminatory intent is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the City's motivations.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars sex discrimination in employment terms and conditions; evidence that similarly situated male employees received less severe discipline can support a disparate treatment claim.

Henry v. Gehl Corp. · filed 1994-10-19(a)

Even so, the production and attendance records show there were similarly situated male employees who were not as severely reprimanded and were given more chances at improving. In addition, Du-ryea’s attitude about women having a difficult time being telemarketers raises the inference that he looked for the plaintiff to fail and, therefore, was quick to reprimand her on any perceived problem with production or attendance. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence creates genuine issues of material fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to reach the jury when the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor.

Castle v. Bentsen · filed 1994-11-02(a)(1)

With respect to the Plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination under Title VII, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury could find in her favor. Accordingly, the Court shall deny the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law regarding that claim.

A race discrimination plaintiff must offer evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext to survive summary judgment under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Jones v. World's Finest Chocolate Inc. · filed 1994-11-09(a)(1)

Because plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that the reason for defendant’s refusal to place her on light duty work status without a doctor’s note was a pretext for discrimination, she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of a material fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim to reach a jury when evidence could show that discriminatory denial of workplace support caused the poor performance cited as the reason for demotion.

Portis v. First National Bank of New Albany, Ms · filed 1994-11-10(a)(1)

We cannot say that a reasonable jury would not under any circumstances find that Portis’ poor performance was a product of FNB’s earlier discriminatory deprivation of a secretary. Given that standard, Portis has adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to warrant presentation of her case to a jury.

Section 2000e-2 permits a sex discrimination claim when a supervisor’s discriminatory actions cause an employee’s discharge, even if the managers who approve it lack discriminatory animus.

Taylor v. Ncr Corporation · filed 1994-11-28

Taylor need not show that upper management acted with discriminatory animus in discharging her so long as she can show that Good was motivated by discriminatory animus toward her and that Good's sex-based actions led upper management to discharge her.

A supervisor’s job responsibilities can be relevant when deciding whether employees are similarly situated in a sex discrimination claim, because supervisory harassment can expose the employer to different liability.

Tom PIERCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Capital Holding Corporation, Defendants-Appe · filed 1994-11-29(a)(1)

We hold that, in a sexual harassment context, the harasser’s title and/or job responsibilities could be considered a “relevant aspect of his employment situation.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; harsher discipline does not establish pretext when the employees offered for comparison lack a similar disciplinary history.

Smith v. Chevron USA, Inc. · filed 1995-02-16(a)(1)

That Mr. Smith received a more severe punishment is quite reasonable, and can hardly be interpreted as a pretext for discrimination. In other words, Mr. Smith failed to point to any employee, white or black, with a similar disciplinary history who was afforded more lenient treatment. Mr. Smith was disciplined fairly and in accordance with the company’s procedures. As a result, we conclude that Mr. Smith has failed to prove that he was terminated on account of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to show an adverse employment action motivated by race; an employee's voluntary transfer is not an adverse action.

Charles C. Hooper, Jr. v. State of Maryland, Department of Human Resources Carolyn W. Colvin, and Lois Whitaker Henry Pr · filed 1995-01-10(a)(1)

If the employment action was voluntarily taken by the employee, the action can not be said to have been motivated by racial discrimination on the part of the defendant employer, and no reasonable jury could find for plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment claimant to produce specific evidence of pretext when the employer offers legitimate reasons for its decision.

Araya Wolde-Giorgis, Dr. v. Arizona Department of Transportation, and State of Arizona · filed 1995-01-10(a)(1)

This evidence was insufficient to carry Wolde-Giorgis's burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the ADOT's reasons for its interview decision were a pretext for discrimination. See Forsberg, 840 F.2d at 1419. Summary judgment for the ADOT on Wolde-Giorgis's Title VII claim therefore was proper.

Section 2000e-2 covers discriminatory employment practices; claims that do not address employment practices fall outside its coverage.

Cofield v. Banc One Corporation/bank One of Arizona · filed 1995-03-09(a)(1)

Moreover, Cofield's new claims do not address employment practices and therefore are beyond the scope of Title VII's coverage. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2 requires proof of discriminatory intent for a disparate treatment claim.

Armstrong v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1995-05-02

This admission is fatal to Plaintiffs claims of race and sex discrimination because he concedes that no impermissible factor motivated the employment decisions made by his supervisors. For a plaintiff to prevail under a disparate treatment theory, there must be proof of “intent to discriminate” on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

An employer’s honest belief that an employee falsified records can provide a legitimate reason for discharge even if the belief is mistaken.

Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc. · filed 1995-04-20(a)(1)

An honest belief Plair falsified time records provides Brach with a legitimate reason to discharge him, whether Plair actually falsified the records or not.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, but a consistently applied rule against sex outside marriage can provide a legitimate reason for discharge if the employee does not prove it is a pretext for discrimination.

Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc. · filed 1995-05-31(a)(1)

Based on Dr. Bowie’s testimony, the fact that Dr. Bowie was the only person with the authority to terminate plaintiff, and the fact that Harding Academy has consistently discharged both male and female employees who engaged in sex outside of marriage, whether or not pregnancy resulted from the conduct, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to show that defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination was mere pretext for gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a factfinder to infer discriminatory intent from unequal discipline, but does not require that inference.

William E. ELMORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPSTAN, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-06-19(a)(1)

While we agree such evidence can be the basis from which a trier of fact may infer discriminatory intent, such an inference is not compelled as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to offer specific, substantial evidence that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for race discrimination.

Wilton v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1995-07-07(a)(1)

Even if Wilton did present a prima facie case, the City's asserted reason for the reprimand was legitimate and nondiscriminatory; indeed, Wilton does not contest the fact that he engaged in excessive talking on the job. Wilton has not presented specific, substantial evidence that the City's reason was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race or sex; more lenient treatment of employees in materially different circumstances does not necessarily establish intentional discrimination.

United States v. Crosby · filed 1995-07-27(a)(1)

The record contains no direct evidence of intentional discrimination, and the circumstantial evidence—incidents of more lenient treatment involving white males—is not conclusive. None of the occurrences was substantially similar to the events leading to Burbridge's termination because none involved a supervisor who was absent from duty for an entire day knowing that leave had not been granted.

A plaintiff alleging intentional race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present probative evidence of discriminatory intent to survive summary judgment; conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences are insufficient.

Ward v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., Inc. · filed 1995-07-28(a)(1)

To survive a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff in an age or race discrimination ease must produce probative evidence that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic. A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences but must generate a genuine dispute of material fact. Because the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gulf-stream intended to discriminate on the basis of age or race, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for the Defendant Gulfstream.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex-based disparate treatment in a specific incident to show that similarly situated employees of another sex were treated more favorably.

Sarff v. Continental Express · filed 1995-08-11(a)(1)

However, to show a causal connection for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Sarff must produce evidence that Continental, in terminating him, treated similarly situated females more favorably than it did him.

In a sex discrimination claim, an employer meets its burden of production by proffering a reason unrelated to gender without proving that reason.

White v. Wells Fargo Guard Services · filed 1995-09-29(a)(1)

The court stresses that "the defendant must merely proffer non-gender based reasons, not prove them.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits treating an employee differently because of religion; unequal treatment alone does not establish religious discrimination.

Cohen v. Austin · filed 1995-10-11(a)(1)

Thus, Title VII does not mandate that all similarly situated employees be treated in a like manner, but instead prohibits the employer from treating an employee differently on the basis of the employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based differences in compensation; an employee challenging an employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation must show that it is pretextual.

Hudson v. Joseph B. Fay Co. · filed 1995-10-12(a)(1)

Defendant’s explanation of its pay procedures is sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden of stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Having articulated its reasons, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that his employer’s explanation is pretextual. ... Plaintiff has offered no evidence to refute defendant’s proffered explanations for its actions. Thus, the Court finds that there is no basis upon which a jury could find that plaintiff has met his required burden of proof.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when unequal light duty requirements and remarks about pregnancy support an inference of discriminatory treatment.

Ascolese v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1995-11-02(a)

Evans’s alleged skepticism about the status of pregnancy as a disability could be interpreted to suggest that As-colese’s sex was a factor in this occurrence. This suffices to establish Ascolese’s prima facie case under Burdine.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits intentional sex discrimination in employment; a supervisor’s reprimand does not violate it without evidence of sex-based discrimination.

McCarter v. West · filed 1995-12-04(a)(1)

The court concludes that Col. Hart and Col. Zanini’s employment actions involving plaintiff were not discriminatory. Title VII only prohibits intentional discrimination based on an employee’s protected class characteristics and does not protect the plaintiff from being reprimanded in the presence of co-workers if her supervisors believe that she is not performing her job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a disparate treatment claim based on undefined assertions of harsher treatment without an adverse employment action.

Moore v. Grove North America, Inc. · filed 1996-04-16(a)(1)

However, such undefined assertions of disparate treatment find no support in the law. Plaintiff has not cited a single case where an employee advanced a claim for disparate treatment based on treatment that was “different” where no adverse employment action was taken.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory intent in a sex discrimination claim; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its action, the employee must show that reason is pretextual.

Fortner v. State of Kansas · filed 1996-06-10(a)(1)

The plaintiff does not offer evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Major Schaaf was more likely motivated by the plaintiff’s gender or that Major Schaafs reason is unworthy of belief.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to proceed when a comparable employee’s different treatment raises a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Sykes v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center · filed 1996-09-04(a)(1)

Accordingly, there is at least one genuine issue of material fact concerning whether defendant’s articulated reason for terminating plaintiff is pretextual: i.e., whether plaintiff has shown that a “similarly situated” employee, who is not black, was retained for engaging in the same or similar conduct as plaintiff while plaintiff was terminated.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to link an adverse employment action or unequal work conditions to race or national origin.

Bodoy v. North Arundel Hospital · filed 1996-11-20(a)

A successful disparate treatment claim, under Title VII, requires a plaintiff to establish that she or he has been subjected to some negative employment action, or to unequal terms and conditions of employment, on the basis of race or national origin, when compared with the treatment of other employees of a different race or national origin.

In an individual disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2, pattern and practice evidence has little, if any, relevance.

McClosky v. Prince George's Cnty · filed 1996-12-18

Moreover, pattern and practice evidence has little, if any, relevance in an individual disparate treatment action such as this one.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination plaintiff to compare her treatment with a similarly situated employee outside her racial group, even if that employee is also a minority.

Cross v. CCL Custom Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1997-01-13(a)(1)

Whether it be in favor of a non-minority or another minority, intentional discrimination on the basis of race is violative of Title VII.

A plaintiff claiming discriminatory denial of an employment benefit must show that a similarly situated employee was treated better before the burden shifts to the employer.

Burau v. Runyon · filed 1997-03-20

However, if a plaintiff cannot clear this preliminary hurdle, it would be error to put the defendant to his proofs. In this case, Plaintiff asks the court to shift the burden before she herself has cleared that preliminary hurdle. The court must decline that request.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious disparate treatment, which requires proof that an employer treated an employee differently because of the employee’s religious beliefs.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. · filed 1997-04-15(a)(1)

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a jury to infer intentional sex discrimination from more favorable treatment of similarly situated men and evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Lori-Ann MOLLOY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Wesley BLANCHARD, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants · filed 1997-06-10(a)(1)

Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI.

Differential application of tenure procedures can support a plaintiff’s qualification for a gender disparate treatment claim despite her temporary appointment.

Morrow v. Auburn University at Montgomery · filed 1997-08-18(a)(1)

Thus, given this differential application of the polling procedure for Barksdale and plaintiff, the court cannot find that plaintiffs appointment as temporary deemed her unqualified for attaining' tenure.

A sex-based disparate-treatment claim requires evidence that comparable employees received different treatment.

Gazda v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc. · filed 1997-09-10(a)(1)

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine question of fact that Defendant treated comparably situated employees differently.

A prima facie claim of disparate treatment requires showing that an employer treated people less favorably because of race, sex, or national origin.

Malladi v. Brown · filed 1997-12-01(a)(1)

The prima-facie case of disparate treatment based on race, sex, or national origin is established when an employee shows that an employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race discrimination claimant relying on another employee’s better treatment to show that the employees were similarly situated in relevant respects.

Moody v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 1998-01-27(a)(2)

Given that the relevant aspects of Emeott’s and Moody’s respective employment situations were dissimilar, the Court finds that the comparables here were not similarly situated and plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination, therefore, fails as well.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when unequal access to workplace toilet and shower facilities creates a genuine factual dispute about disparate treatment.

Stapp v. Overnite Transportation Co. · filed 1998-02-05(a)(1)

These incidents create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff faced disparate treatment because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discriminatory discipline claim based on comparison with other employees to rest on materially comparable misconduct.

Wooten v. Department · filed 1998-06-25(a)(1)

The two incidents are sufficiently different that, as a matter of law, Mr. Campbell’s incident with Mr. White cannot be used to show disparate treatment of appellant.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show that an adverse employment action was based on a protected characteristic such as race.

Daniel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · filed 1998-07-17(a)

Thus, because Daniel failed to establish that he was demoted because of his race, we affirm the magistrate judge's order granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim requires an adverse employment action in circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Querry v. Messar · filed 1998-07-27(a)

To make out a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must first show that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse employment action occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. ... We therefore conclude that Querry has presented sufficient evidence of pretext at this stage in the proceedings to withstand defendants’ motion for summary judgment, except as to her “special duty assignment” claim, which, as discussed hereinafter, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on sex to show that she suffered an adverse employment action and was treated less favorably than male employees.

Aleman v. Sharp · filed 1998-08-07(a)(1)

In establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment gender discrimination, plaintiff must show: (1) she belonged to the protected class; (2) she was adversely affected by the employer’s action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was treated less favorably than her male counterparts.

A sex-discrimination plaintiff may show pretext by comparing the employer's treatment of employees whose misconduct was comparably serious, even if their offenses differed.

Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center-West Campus · filed 1998-11-17(a)(1)

To show that employees are similarly situated, a plaintiff need only establish that he or she was treated differently than other employees whose violations were of "comparable seriousness."

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for termination must present evidence that the reason is pretextual.

Toth v. Gates Rubber Co. · filed 1998-12-15(a)(1)

Plaintiff has presented no evidence or affidavits that suggest that Gates’ reasons for her termination are pretext or stated otherwise, unworthy of belief.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show that employees in nearly identical circumstances received preferential treatment based on a discriminatory motive.

Villarreal v. Horizon/CMS Hlthcare · filed 1999-01-15(a)

In order to establish his Title VII claim, Villarreal must prove that Horizon treated other non-male, non-Hispanic employees in “nearly identical circumstances” preferentially based on a discriminatory motive.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination in employment because of national origin; a disparate treatment claim fails when the employee does not prove that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual or discriminatory.

Chaboya v. American National Red Cross · filed 1999-04-16(a)

Plaintiff establishes a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, if he can show that the Red Cross discriminated against him in the terms, conditions or privileges of his employment because of his national origin, Hispanic. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a); Arizona Revised States (hereinafter “A.R.S.”) §§ 41-1463(B) and 41-1464(A). ... The Court finds that Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons proferred by the Red Cross for terminating Plaintiff were inconsistent or pretextual or based on any discriminatory motive. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff was not discriminated against on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII or the Arizona Civil Rights Act when he was terminated from his employment with the Red Cross on December 10,1993.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based differences in employment terms; a disparate-treatment claim requires specific evidence of less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees received.

Stanback v. Best Diver. Products · filed 1999-05-10(a)(1)

In this case, Stanback's disparate treatment claim cannot succeed because she did not produce "specific, tangible evidence" showing a disparity in the treatment of similarly situated employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires discriminatory intent for a disparate treatment claim; designing a uniformly applied test to lessen its adverse impact on minority applicants does not itself establish that intent.

Hayden v. County of Nassau, United States of America and Nassau County Guardians Association, Defendants-Interve · filed 1999-06-09(a)(1)

Appellants also allege that Nassau County violated § 703 of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... As discussed earlier, appellants fail to establish any intent to discriminate against them in Nassau County’s efforts to craft an exam which lessens the discriminatory impact on minority candidates. Accordingly, appellants are unable to establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying a promotion or position upgrade because of an employee’s sex.

Brennan v. City of White Plains · filed 1999-10-05(a)(1)

In defending the instant motion against White Plains, Brennan has presented sufficient evidence that White Plains failed to promote her or upgrade her position because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex disparate treatment to show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received better treatment.

Lowry v. Powerscreen USB, Inc. · filed 1999-10-20(a)(1)

The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating she has a prima facie case of disparate treatment. She has utterly failed to show any male who was similarly situated was treated better than she.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of intentional discrimination; a claim fails when the employee cannot establish a prima facie case or show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Van Nguyen v. Dobbs International Services, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10(a)(1)

Therefore, because Nguyen cannot establish a prima facie case or pretext, Dobbs’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to Nguyen’s claim that Dobbs discriminated against Nguyen by forcing him to work harder than non-Asian employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits hiring discrimination based on race or sex; a plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated legitimate reason is pretextual.

Cannon-Atkinson v. Cohen · filed 2000-04-26(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits any employer from failing or refusing “to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment because of such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that a discriminatory reason motivated Defendant to not hire Plaintiff. Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate (either directly or indirectly) that Defendant’s proffered reason is not true.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats an appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women as sex-based disparate treatment.

Frank v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2000-06-21(a)(1)

A sex-differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is disparate treatment that must be justified as a BFOQ.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action and was not treated differently from similarly situated employees.

Mohankumar v. Kansas State · filed 2000-07-26(a)(1)

Even assuming that graduate students in receipt of stipends qualify as employees for purposes of § 2000e-2(a)(1), we find no evidence in the record that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action or that defendants treated her differently than similarly situated employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts supporting an inference of discrimination; conclusory allegations of harassment and better treatment of other employees do not suffice.

Dean v. Westchester County District Attorney's Office · filed 2000-11-03(a)(1)

However, plaintiffs claim must be dismissed because the general, conclusory allegations concerning the harassment of her and the treatment of similarly situated white, male employees fails to create an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based differences in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; a disparate treatment claim requires an adverse employment action linked to the employee’s protected status.

Bradley v. Sheila Widnall etc. · filed 2000-11-13(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer not only from discharging an employee because of her race but also from treating an employee differently by reason of her race with respect to the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Because Bradley has been unable to establish that she was the object of an adverse employment action or that there was a causal relationship between her membership in a protected class and the alleged adverse action, her disparate treatment claim must also fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action linked to protected status.

Bradley v. Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force · filed 2000-11-13(a)(1)

Because Bradley has been unable to establish that she was the object of an adverse employment action or that there was a causal relationship between her membership in a protected class and the alleged adverse action, her disparate treatment claim must also fail.

A sex-based disparate treatment claim requires the plaintiff to show that she was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and was replaced by someone outside her protected class or treated differently from similarly situated employees outside that class.

Burns v. Jacor Broadcasting Corp. · filed 2001-01-19(a)(1)

Thus, in order to prove a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, this Plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against her; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that an adverse employment action was motivated by race or sex.

Harper v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 2001-03-16(a)(1)

Having reviewed and weighed the evidence disclosed at trial, the court concludes that, while the plaintiff has succeeded in her prima facie case and has shown that the defendant’s articulated reasons for the actions condemned are not entirely worthy of belief, she has nevertheless failed to convince the court that such actions were motivated by her race and/or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging national origin disparate treatment to present evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action is pretextual.

Fekade v. Lincoln University · filed 2001-04-03(a)

No evidence made part of the record presents a triable issue of fact regarding whether this reason is pretextual. Accordingly, even if Fekade had presented genuine issues of material fact concerning each element of her prima facie case, she would not succeed because she has not met her burden of refuting the legitimacy of the Defendants’ proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

A plaintiff may show race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by comparing discipline imposed on similarly situated employees outside the protected class for comparable misconduct.

Crosby v. DALLAS COUNTY, TX · filed 2001-04-17(a)(1)

Given the varying circumstances and charges involved in each incident, the Court finds that the examples of disciplinary action cited by Plaintiff are not sufficiently similar to raise an inference that Chief Forsyth punished Crosby more harshly than other employees because of his race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) requires a disparate treatment claimant to show that the employer treated the employee less favorably because of sex.

Mukaida v. Hawaii · filed 2001-07-12(a)(2)

Because Mukaida has failed to show that she was treated less favorably than others because of her sex, summary judgment is granted in favor of UH and the State (to the extent the claims arise from acts or omissions occurring before July 1, 1998).

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based discharge; a plaintiff alleging harsher discipline must show that an employee of another race engaged in comparable conduct and received lighter discipline.

Wall v. City of Durham · filed 2001-10-15(a)

He therefore cannot show that anyone of a different race was disciplined in a different fashion.

A plaintiff relying on disparate discipline to show discrimination must identify employees whose misconduct was nearly identical; differences that explain the employer’s different treatment defeat the comparison.

Wallace v. The Methodist Hospital System · filed 2001-11-07(a)

Or put another way, the conduct at issue is not nearly identical when the difference between the plaintiffs conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment received from the employer.

A sex-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons for termination are pretextual.

Reloynne K. Villiarimo Joseph Harvest v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., Dba Island Air Rosie Nenezich Richard Hee · filed 2002-02-28(a)

Because Villiarimo has not shown that the reasons Aloha offers for her termination are pretextual, then, her claim for gender-based discrimination in. violation of Title VTI must fail.

A disparate treatment plaintiff must present evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for adverse employment actions are pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Flores v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 2002-03-08(a)

For these reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact about the pretextual nature of Defendant’s proffered explanations for the adverse employment actions against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming religious disparate treatment to show that a comparable employee outside the plaintiff’s religion was treated differently.

Wilshin v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2002-05-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case on the basis of disparate treatment by comparing his treatment to that of a member of the same protected class.

Section 2000e-2 requires a racial disparate treatment plaintiff to show that similarly situated non-minority employees were treated differently.

Ray v. Libbey Glass, Inc. · filed 2002-06-21

For disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff must produce evidence which establishes that: 1) he was a member of a protected class; and 2) he was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees.

At the pretext stage of a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must present specific and substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons conceal racial discrimination.

Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. · filed 2002-07-18(a)

Aragon has not presented the substantial and specific evidence required to demonstrate that Republic’s reasons for the lay off were a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual or that the action was based on sex.

Richard v. U.S. Postal Service · filed 2002-08-21(a)(1)

Richard has not demonstrated that defendants’ non- discriminatory reasons for their actions are pretextual. Nor has he produced any evidence suggesting that Richard was denied the accommodations sought because of his sex. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Richard’s sex discrimination claim even if I assume for purposes of analysis that he has pleaded a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed to trial when differences in employees’ evaluations and rankings raise a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual.

Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Company, a California Company Authorized to Do Business in the State of Colorado · filed 2002-09-25(a)(1)

Based on these differences, we hold Mr. Garrett has raised a genuine dispute of material fact that HP’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2 requires allegations linking the employer’s treatment to the plaintiff’s membership in a protected group.

Phillips v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico · filed 2003-01-29(a)

Phillips’s Notice lacks even the faintest suggestion that his treatment by his employer is in any way related to his membership in a protected group. Thus, Phillips’s Notice, as currently drafted, is inadequate to raise a claim of disparate treatment discrimination under § 2000e-2.

In a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a), an employee must present specific and substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

Wakefield v. Providence Health System-Oregon · filed 2003-10-28(a)

Having carefully considered all of the evidence submitted, we conclude that Wakefield has not produced specific and substantial evidence showing that Providence’s asserted non-discriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. The District Court correctly granted Providence summary judgment on Wakefield’s Title VII claim.

A disparate treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for a transfer was pretextual.

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, Erroneously Sued as Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors · filed 2004-01-02(a)(1)

Vasquez's disparate treatment claim fails because he failed to show that Leeds' reason for transferring him was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting a reasonable inference that an employee was terminated because of religion to sustain a religious disparate treatment claim at summary judgment.

Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., a Corporation · filed 2004-01-06(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment on his disparate treatment claim, Peterson must establish that his job performance was satisfactory and provide evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support a reasonable inference that his termination was discriminatory.

For an individual disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a), Diaz could use the McDonnell Douglas method of proof but could not prove his claim by analyzing numerical disparities.

Diaz v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-01-29(a)

Given the nature and purpose of the pattern and practice method of proof, and the precedents established by other circuits, this Court finds that the McDonnell Douglas method is the only method available to Diaz.

When an employer offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for a hiring decision, a sex discrimination plaintiff must show that the reason was pretextual.

Mackey v. Shalala · filed 2004-03-16(a)(1)

Because HHS offered a legitimate non-discriminatory explanation for hiring Bain, Mrs. Mackey must demonstrate that the reason for hiring Bain advanced by HHS was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision, the employee must raise a genuine factual dispute about whether that reason is pretextual.

Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc. · filed 2004-05-05(a)

Hence, Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext on this issue. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that she was denied rehiring as General Manager because of age or gender discrimination.

A disparate treatment claim based on employment terms and conditions requires an adverse employment action and evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Sallis v. University of Minnesota · filed 2004-06-18(a)(1)

Because Sallis has failed to show either an adverse employment action or generate an inference of discrimination, he has not established a prima facie case on the terms and conditions of his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim to prove intentional discrimination.

Mehus v. Emporia State University · filed 2004-06-30(a)(1)

To prevail on her disparate treatment claim under Title VII, plaintiff must show that the discrimination complained of was intentional.

When an employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action, a Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff must present evidence that could support a finding of discriminatory pretext to avoid summary judgment.

Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortgage Group of Fleet Bank · filed 2004-08-12(a)

Although there is a considerable question whether Ungerleider can establish a prima facie case ... , summary judgment is nevertheless proper because Ungerleider has failed to present any evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the FMG’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination claim to connect the alleged treatment to a protected category.

Jointer v. Potter · filed 2004-10-22(a)

Without connecting the alleged discrimination with his protected class, Jointer has merely alleged that he was treated differently without pointing to a motive — a claim that is not actionable under Title VII.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated.

Campo v. Slater · filed 2005-03-01(a)(1)

In sum, Campo has not come forward with evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that he met his “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated” against him.

A national-origin disparate-treatment claim requires an adverse employment action and more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Piquion v. Walgreen, Co. · filed 2005-04-29(a)(1)

As such, the record is void of facts upon which a reasonable juror could find that Piquion suffered adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII and Piquion has failed to identify a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably. Therefore, the Court finds that Walgreen is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Piquion’s disparate treatment claim.

An employee alleging racially unequal discipline under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present evidence that similarly situated employees of another race were treated more favorably.

Sasser v. Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2005-06-09(a)(1)

Plaintiff simply has presented no evidence of a non-Caucasian similarly situated employee who engaged in the same conduct but was treated favorably. Having failed to do so, he has not established a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based termination; a disparate-treatment claim based on another employee’s treatment requires nearly identical circumstances.

Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc. · filed 2005-06-16(a)(1)

To establish disparate treatment, Bryant must show that Chartwells gave preferential treatment to another employee under “nearly identical” circumstances. ... Moreover, since Ortiz never admitted the theft to the police or anyone else, no reasonable jury could conclude that the two events are “nearly identical.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers disparate treatment in promotions and pay because of an employee’s protected status.

Andujar v. Nortel Networks, Inc. · filed 2005-10-28(a)(1)

Electronic ORDER entered adopting Judge Dein’s Report and Recommendations. ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Claims of disparate treatment on the basis of an employee’s protected status fall squarely within the purview of these statutes.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a racial disparate treatment plaintiff relying on comparators to show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Dickinson v. Springhill Hospitals, Inc. · filed 2005-11-10(a)

Thus, in the absence of any evidence to reflect that the defendant treated similarly situated employees who are not members of the plaintiffs class more favorably, the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that similarly situated workers received different treatment under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Duggan v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice MacHine, Air Conditi · filed 2005-11-21(a)(1)

Plaintiffs statistical analysis does not suffice to demonstrate that plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated non minority union members under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in hiring to prove purposeful discrimination.

Foxworth v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2005-11-29(a)(1)

It is unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must demonstrate purposeful discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment through circumstantial evidence must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class to establish a prima facie case.

Hendrix v. Snow · filed 2006-02-08(a)(1)

Because Hendrix failed to identify in her amended complaint or her response to the Secretary’s summary judgment motion a comparator employee, much less explain why the employee was similarly situated, the court did not err in concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

A poorly designed performance policy does not violate § 2000e-2(a) when it is neither racially discriminatory nor enforced in a discriminatory manner.

Brown v. Bank One, N.A. · filed 2006-02-14(a)

The evidence reflects that, although the PVC program was likely an example of bad policy, it was not in any way racially discriminatory and the Bank did not enforce it in a discriminatory manner.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a disparate-treatment plaintiff relying on comparators must identify employees who are similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Hammons v. George C. Wallace State Community College · filed 2006-03-16(a)

Simply put, neither of these proposed comparators was “similarly situated in all relevant respects” or “nearly identical” to Hammons.

An employee alleging discriminatory termination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretext and that discrimination was the real reason.

Douglas v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 2006-03-30(a)(1)

In this case, the totality of Plaintiffs evidence is simply insufficient to meet Plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that Defendant’s articulated reason for Plaintiffs termination was pretext and that the real reason was discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence connecting an alleged discriminatory termination to a protected characteristic.

Rutenschroer v. Starr Seigle Communications, Inc. · filed 2006-06-29(a)(1)

While Plaintiff states that she feels she was discriminated against, there is insufficient evidence that her treatment was related in any way to her gender or race.

In a disparate-treatment discipline claim, an employee can establish a prima facie case by showing that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably for similar conduct.

Campbell v. University of Akron · filed 2006-10-17(a)(1)

The district court correctly held that Campbell did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to his discipline for insubordination because he failed to demonstrate that a similarly-situated white employee was treated less favorably for a similar act of insubordination.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action and the employee offers no evidence of pretext.

Hodson v. Alpine Manor, Inc. · filed 2007-05-21(a)(1)

Even if she could be said to have established a prima facie case (under any of the proffered legal theories), she has not shown that IHS had anything other than a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, business reason to terminate her position: Hodson disobeyed a direct order by her supervisor, walked out of the facility, and abandoned her patients.

A Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff opposing summary judgment must show that he was qualified for the job and that similarly situated employees outside his protected group were treated more favorably.

Lopez v. Country Insurance & Financial Services · filed 2007-10-23(a)

To survive a summary judgment motion on his disparate treatment claim, Lopez was required to show that: 1) he was a racial minority; 2) he was qualified to remain in his job; 3) he was terminated; and 4) other similarly situated (non-minority) individuals were treated more favorably. ... Lopez did not show that he was qualified to remain in his job or that other non-minority employees were treated more favorably.

In a disparate-treatment suit under § 2000e-2(a)(1), once the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action, the court should assess whether a reasonable jury could find that reason pretextual and the action discriminatory.

Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms · filed 2008-03-28(a)(1)

In a Title VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not – and should not – decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.

A disparate-treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show satisfactory job performance or circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Manko v. Deutsche Bank · filed 2008-03-28(a)

Here, Manko has demonstrated neither that her job performance was satisfactory nor that the circumstances surrounding the adverse employment actions occurring after September 16, 1998 give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

A plaintiff must show satisfactory job performance to establish a prima facie disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a).

Samuel v. Williamsburg-James City County School Board · filed 2008-03-31(a)

In order to establish a prima fa-cie case of disparate treatment, Ms. Samuel must show: “(1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for her job and her job performance was satisfactory; (3) that, in spite of her qualifications and performance, she was fired; and (4) that the position remained open to similarly qualified applicants'after her dismissal.” ... Because her job performance was unsatisfactory, Ms. Samuel cannot satisfy the standard’s second element.

A plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) must prove intentional discrimination.

Lewis v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-06-30(a)

The case law is clear that in a disparate treatment case like this one, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits summary judgment on a disparate treatment claim when the record conclusively shows a nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision.

Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities · filed 2008-07-07(a)

On a disparate treatment claim, the “employer [is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively reveal[s] some ... nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision.”

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must provide competent evidence that employees of another race in nearly identical circumstances were treated more favorably.

Jackson v. Dallas County Juvenile Department · filed 2008-07-30(a)(1)

The district court found that Jackson failed to produce any competent evidence, apart from those conclusory allegations, to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he received disparate treatment as compared to other employees of a different race in nearly identical circumstances. After a review of the record, we agree and hold that the district court did not plainly err in finding that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie case for race discrimination and granting summary judgment for the Defendants.

A sex-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee offers no evidence rebutting the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Gaujacq v. Electricite De France International North America, Inc. · filed 2008-08-21(a)(1)

Gaujacq does not produce any evidence to rebut these legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Nadal’s assignment to the position of President of EDFINA. Therefore, this claim of discrimination fails.

Once an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, the employee must show that the reason was pretextual and that the true reason was discriminatory.

Thompson v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-08-28(a)

Once a defendant has presented a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual and that the true reason was discriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race discrimination plaintiff to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Wills v. Postmaster General · filed 2008-11-21(a)

Thus, because Wills did not show that he was treated differently than any other similarly situated employees, the USPS was entitled to summary judgment on his Title VII disparate treatment claims.

A race or gender disparate-treatment claim under Section 2000e-2 can survive a motion to dismiss without identifying a particular similarly situated person who was treated differently.

Borum v. Village of Hempstead · filed 2008-12-22

Defendants seek dismissal of the Title VII claims of disparate treatment on the ground that Plaintiff cannot point to any particular case where Defendants treated a similarly situated person differently. At this early stage of the proceedings, the court holds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled disparate treatment on the grounds of race and gender to survive a motion to dismiss.

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of race discrimination must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Longs v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2009-08-10(a)(1)

The Court need not determine which, if any, of these alleged actions were materially adverse because Longs has not pointed to any similarly-situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits summary judgment on a discrimination claim when the employer demonstrates a nondiscriminatory reason for each challenged adverse action.

Courtney v. Oregon State Police · filed 2009-10-21(a)(1)

Even if Courtney could establish a prima facie case of discrimination or disparate treatment, summary judgment would still be appropriate because Appellees have demonstrated a nondiscriminatory reason for each of the adverse actions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discipline even when the employer’s motive is benign.

Bouknight v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-01-15(a)(1)

Thus, even if Captain Tompkins acted from a benign motive, that fact would not diminish the defendant’s liability under Title VII’s disparate treatment provisions.

A plaintiff alleging gender based disparate treatment under § 2000e-2 must show that similarly situated people outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Panelli v. First American Title Insurance · filed 2010-03-30

Molnar fails to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination because she fails to show that similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were treated more favorably.

A plaintiff pursuing a disparate treatment race claim through indirect evidence must identify similarly situated employees outside the protected group who received more favorable treatment.

Clark v. HOOPS, LP · filed 2010-04-01(a)(1)

Plaintiff must therefore satisfy his burden of identifying similarly-situated non-protected employees who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff to proceed under a theory of disparate treatment. Having not met this burden, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as it relates to Plaintiffs claim of disparate treatment race discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a disparate treatment plaintiff must show that an employer’s supported nondiscriminatory reasons are pretext for discrimination.

Garcia v. Peake · filed 2010-04-21(a)(1)

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting regime, plaintiff is required to establish that those articulated reasons are pretext for discrimination. ... Plaintiff has failed to make any argument or submit any evidence to that effect. Accordingly, these two disparate treatment claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2 must allege facts permitting an inference of discrimination; an unexplained undesirable reassignment alone is insufficient.

Jackson v. NYS Department of Labor · filed 2010-04-26(a)(1)

Here, however, Jackson makes no allegations to support her claim, including any facts identifying her race or religion, except that “she was transferred to an undesirable work reassignment.” (Complaint ¶ II.E.) Without any indication of Jackson’s race or religion, or allegations relating to her treatment at DOL, the Court finds that Jackson fails to allege facts that establish an inference of discrimination or even indicate the “possibility of discrimination.”

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discriminatory termination plaintiff relying on comparators to show that similarly situated employees of other races were treated more favorably.

McCray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2010-05-05(a)

McCray has not made a prima facie case for discriminatory termination because she has identified no evidence indicating that Wal-Mart treated employees of other races who were confronted with evidence of theft any differently.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination must identify similarly situated employees outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment; vague assertions about coworkers do not establish a prima facie case.

James v. Fiesta Food Mart, Inc. · filed 2010-08-27(a)(1)

James claims that his Hispanic co-workers received preferential treatment from Fiesta because they were allowed to consume non-free items without adverse action. However, James has failed to identify with particularity any actual person who meets this vague description. Nor did he properly allege – much less produce evidence showing – that any relevant management officials from Fiesta knew about the alleged actions taken by James’ Hispanic co-workers. Without more, James has failed to carry his initial burden in making out a prima facie case.

A plaintiff challenging a contract nonrenewal under Section 2000e-2 must show that gender or national origin motivated the decision rather than the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons.

Alvarado-Santos v. Department of Health of Commonwealth · filed 2010-09-08

We agree that, based on the evidence presented at trial, no reasonable jury could find that the nonrenewal of Alvarado-Santos' contract was based on her gender and/or national origin.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 requires evidence that the employer acted because of the employee’s religion or national origin.

Eldeeb v. AlliedBarton Security Services, L.L.C. · filed 2010-09-16

Eldeeb points to no evidence that AlliedBarton did so because of his religion, his national origin, or his earlier complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in compensation and employment conditions; a disparate treatment claim requires comparison with employees similarly situated in relevant respects.

Albizu-Rodriguez v. Carlos Albizu University · filed 2010-08-09(a)(1)

To successfully allege disparate treatment, plaintiff must show that others similarly situated in all relevant aspects were treated differently by the employer; the comparison case need not be perfect replicas but must closely resemble one another in respect to relevant facts and circumstances.