42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on comparator evidence for a religious disparate-treatment claim to identify a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment.

Oakley v. Orthopaedic Associates of Allentown, Ltd. · filed 2010-09-28(a)(1)

Because plaintiff can point to no similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination and summary judgment will be granted to defendant on her disparate treatment claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to allege facts showing that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Hopkins v. St. Lucie County School Board · filed 2010-10-13(a)

None of his filings allege facts to support the fourth requirement of such a claim¯that the St. Lucie School Board or the individual defendants treated similarly situated employees who were not members of his protected class differently.

A Title VII sex discrimination complaint must allege facts making disparate treatment plausible; alleging membership in a protected class alone is insufficient.

Sablan v. Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport Authority, Guam · filed 2010-12-09(a)(1)

In sum, as to her Title VII disparate treatment claim, the only element Plaintiff adequately alleges is her membership in a protected class. There are no well-plead facts suggesting that she was qualified for her position, that she was subject to an adverse employment action, or that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory intent.

Bernard v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA · filed 2011-02-03(a)(1)

In sum, Bernard has failed to submit evidence providing any basis on which a reasonable jury could conclude that her termination was the result of discriminatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a racial disparate treatment claim to proceed when the alleged facts plausibly show that similarly situated white employees received more favorable treatment because of race.

Harper v. Tyco Electronics Corp. · filed 2011-04-12(a)(1)

Thus, in the light most favorable to Harper, the allegations in the complaint plausibly allege that Tyco treated Harper less favorably because of her race in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race; an employer may answer a disparate treatment claim with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Parks v. Board of Trustees of the California State University · filed 2011-04-25(a)(1)

With respect to being removed and suspended from class, being investigated, and receiving a reprimand in July 2008, the Trustees have produced non-discriminatory reasons for these actions.

A race-discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment on conclusory allegations of discriminatory motive alone.

Robinson v. Duncan · filed 2011-04-07(a)

Plaintiff has presented nothing aside from conclusory allegations from which a reasonable jury could infer that Ms. Schagh acted with discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination because of sex; a disparate treatment claim requires circumstances supporting an inference of intentional discrimination.

Heneghan v. Northampton Community College · filed 2011-08-01(a)(1)

Mr. Heneghan has failed to allege conduct giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a qualified member of a protected class to show an adverse employment action causally connected to that class.

Bhatti v. Trustees of Boston University · filed 2011-10-03(a)(1)

A prima facie case for discrimination based on disparate treatment presents a four-part test: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class; (2) she must be qualified for her job; (3) she must suffer an adverse employment action at the hands of her employer; and (4) there must be some evidence of a causal connection between her membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action, e.g., in the case of a firing, that the position was filled by someone with similar qualifications.

A plaintiff using comparators to establish a prima facie race-discrimination claim must identify employees whose misconduct was nearly identical.

Bentley v. Orange County, Florida · filed 2011-10-28(a)(1)

Despite Bentley’s arguments to the contrary, we generally require that the plaintiff provide comparator employees whose misconduct was ‘nearly identical’ to the plaintiff’s, and this panel is bound to follow that precedent.

An employee can show pretext for unlawful discrimination through inconsistencies in an employer’s reasons for termination.

Eldridge v. Municipality of Norristown · filed 2011-11-10(a)(1)

Eldridge demonstrates that Norris-town’s reasons are pretextual by emphasizing the inconsistencies surrounding Norristown’s termination of Eldridge.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim must satisfy a three-part burden-shifting test to survive summary judgment.

Zambrano-Lamhaouhi v. New York City Board of Education · filed 2011-11-21(a)(1)

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a disparate treatment claim — that is, a claim of intentional discrimination — a Title VII plaintiff must satisfy a three-part burden-shifting test.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) holds employers liable for disparate treatment when a job action is motivated by a protected trait.

Pate v. Chilton County Board of Education · filed 2012-01-04(a)(1)

Title VII’s key nondiscrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), holds employers liable for disparate treatment. ... “A disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive’ for taking a job-related action.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Peters v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-04-16(a)(1)

Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA make it “unlawful for an employer” to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), or “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under both Title VII and the ADEA, “the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin [or] age. . .” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1196; Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the plaintiff cannot show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Knight v. Brown · filed 2012-06-22(a)

First, Knight failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because he could not show that a similarly situated non-African American sergeant was treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex based disparate treatment to identify similarly situated employees outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment with enough specificity to survive summary judgment.

Van Pelt v. Skolnik · filed 2012-09-21(a)(1)

While this definition is far too narrow, plaintiff has failed to identify anyone similarly situated even in a broader sense with enough specificity to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 disparate treatment claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Abdallah v. Napolitano · filed 2012-11-09(a)(1)

Claims under Title VII seeking redress for disparate treatment in employment are analyzed under the burden-shifting analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

A Title VII disparate treatment complaint need not plead every element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to survive dismissal.

Fields v. Department of Public Safety · filed 2012-11-27(a)(1)

Furthermore, it is not a pleading standard, but an “orderly way to evaluate the evidence ... as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.”

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to link the employer’s actions to a protected characteristic such as gender.

Hunter v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2012-11-29

Putting aside the question of whether these assertions are even supported by sufficient evidence, they are ultimately unavailing because none of them purport to link the District’s actions to Hunter’s gender. Because Hunter fails to meet his burden, the Court will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on an employee’s gender, race, or national origin.

Liang v. Café Spice SB, Inc. · filed 2012-11-29(a)

Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee based on her gender, race, or national origin.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim based on comparator evidence requires sufficiently similar employees outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment.

Telfair v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2013-03-28(a)

Accordingly, plaintiffs do not present sufficient comparator evidence to establish a prima facie case of racial or religious discrimination.

A racial disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee cannot show that white employees received more favorable treatment.

Davy v. Star Packaging Corporation · filed 2013-04-26(a)(1)

The district court did not err when it entered summary judgment against Davy’s complaint of racial discrimination under Title VII and section 1981. Davy failed to establish that Star treated white employees more favorably than him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from reducing an employee’s overtime hours or pay because of race or sex.

Robinson v. Goulet · filed 2013-05-17(a)(1)

The loss of overtime hours or pay on the basis of race or sex violates Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to identify a similarly situated employee outside her protected class who was treated more favorably.

Phillips v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army · filed 2013-05-23(a)

Phillips alleges that she suffered disparate treatment based on her race in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Because Phillips has not pointed us to a valid comparator, she has failed to establish a prima facie case.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must produce evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably to establish a prima facie case.

Oscar Moore, Sr. v. True Temper Sports, Inc · filed 2013-06-14(a)(1)

The plaintiffs failed to set out a prima facie case of discrimination because they failed to meet their burden of production with respect to showing that similarly situated non-black employees were treated more favorably than they were.

A race based disparate treatment claim relying on a comparison with another employee requires facts showing that their relevant employment circumstances were nearly identical.

Budik v. Howard University Hospital · filed 2013-09-30(a)(1)

But even if it is sufficient, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the action “gives rise to an inference of discrimination,” Royall, 548 F.3d at 144, because she has not pleaded facts that show that “all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were ‘nearly identical,’” Neuren, 43 F.3d at 1514, to those of her former Caucasian co-worker.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for an adverse employment action was pretextual.

Molina-Parrales v. Shared Hospital Services Corp. · filed 2014-01-17(a)

Plaintiff’s proof does not demonstrate SHS’s reasons for her termination to be pretextual. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs proof cannot support a judgment on her Title VII claims.

A plaintiff alleging sex-based disparate treatment must establish a prima facie case by showing protected-class membership, an adverse employment action, qualification, and that the position remained open or was filled by someone with similar qualifications.

Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morel Bauza Cartagena & Dapena LLC · filed 2014-02-07(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; (3) she was otherwise qualified; and (4) her position remained open or was filled by a person with qualifications similar to hers.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory motive for a disparate treatment claim.

Agoh v. Hyatt Corp. · filed 2014-01-13(a)(1)

The instant suit is one for disparate treatment, which requires proof of discriminatory motive.

A disparate treatment claim cannot proceed on a direct-evidence theory when the timely incidents do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination.

Pearson v. Reynolds School District 7 · filed 2014-02-24(a)(1)

The court disagrees with Pearson, and finds none of the incidents she alleges took place within the allowable time period constitutes “direct” evidence of disparate treatment, whatever may be said with respect to discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race or sex.

Bowen-Hooks v. City of New York · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to survive summary judgment when evidence that male employees were treated more favorably for similar conduct could support a finding of pretext.

Potter v. Synerlink Corporation · filed 2014-04-21(a)(1)

Evidence of Synerlink’s disparate treatment of Ms. Potter relative to the male TMs in responding to their expressed concerns about territory changes is sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

A discriminatory discharge claim fails at summary judgment when the employee cannot produce sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for termination was pretextual.

Finley v. Florida Parish Juvenile Detention Center · filed 2014-06-27(a)

Finley has failed to sufficiently rebut FPJDC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of FPJDC with respect to Finley’s Title VII and § 1981 disparate treatment claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof of discriminatory motive for a disparate treatment claim.

Jones v. FJC Security Services, Inc. · filed 2014-08-19(a)(1)

The instant suit is one for disparate treatment, which requires proof of discriminatory motive.

A discrimination plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case must raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Nguyen v. McHugh · filed 2014-08-22(a)

With respect to Plaintiffs Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims (First, Second, and Third Causes of Action), Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and while she is able to establish a prima facie case, of discrimination, she fails to raise a genuine material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for allegedly adverse actions were pre-textual.

A prima facie Title VII disparate treatment claim requires a qualified member of a protected class to show an adverse employment action under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Johnson v. Long Island University · filed 2014-09-30(a)(1)

To do so, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to [an] inference of discrimination.”

Under the indirect method of proving sex discrimination, a plaintiff must show satisfactory job performance and less favorable treatment than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Packer v. Trustees of Indiana University School of Medicine · filed 2014-12-22(a)(1)

With respect to the remaining factors, Dr. Packer has not established that she was performing her job satisfactorily or that she was treated less favorably than at least one similarly-situated male colleague.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts plausibly linking an adverse employment action to a protected trait; conclusory allegations of discrimination do not suffice.

Massaquoi v. District of Columbia Government · filed 2015-02-25(a)(1)

Here, the plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that he is entitled to an inference of discrimination based on disparate treatment.

To show disparate treatment under Section 2000e-2(a) through a comparator, an employee must identify a similarly situated employee whose misconduct was nearly identical.

Boyd v. Corrections Corp of Am · filed 2015-06-22(a)

This is a semantic distinction without a substantive difference: whether Boyd’s refusal is characterized by an outright refusal to disclose, or a refusal to disclose to the requesting superiors (Lucas and Walker), it remains an insubordinate act which differentiates her from her proffered comparators, and prevents her satisfaction of the fourth prong by a showing of disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show intentional discrimination.

Ray, III v. Ropes & Gray LLP · filed 2015-08-25(a)(1)

To successfully establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, Ray must show that he suffered intentional discrimination.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.

White v. Andy Frain Services, Inc. · filed 2015-11-03(a)(1)

White’s claims fail because no rational factfinder could conclude that Andy Frain discriminated against him because of his protected characteristics. ... Even assuming that adverse employment actions occurred, no rational factfinder could find that Andy Frain took those actions because of White’s protected characteristics.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race and national origin discrimination, but a disparate treatment claim based on comparator discipline requires evidence that the other employees were similarly situated.

Chen v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation · filed 2015-11-05(a)(1)

But since only Chen had primary responsibility for the tube system, his supervisors’ failure to discipline other technicians for tube-system outages does not amount to disparate treatment of similarly situated employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers adverse employment actions plausibly alleged to have occurred because of an employee’s sex.

Lorona v. Arizona Summit Law School, LLC · filed 2015-12-16(a)(1)

These allegations permit the reasonable inference that three of the Law School’s actions — denying her an opportunity for promotion, requiring her to work late, and terminating her — were “because of’ her sex.

A plaintiff pleading Title VII disparate treatment need not choose between a mixed-motive and pretext theory or establish a prima facie case before discovery.

Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp · filed 2016-01-11(m)

But, to be clear, at this stage Connelly is not obliged to choose whether she is proceeding under a mixed-motive or pretext theory, nor is she required to establish a prima facie case, much less to engage in the sort of burden-shifting rebuttal that McDonnell Douglas requires at a later stage in the proceedings.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of sex; men who were not shown to be employees cannot serve as comparators to show more favorable treatment.

Thompson v. Veterans Canteen Service · filed 2016-01-12(a)(1)

Assuming Plaintiff is trying to claim that she was treated differently from her purported male comparators, she has neither alleged nor established that either of the men involved was even a VCS employee. ... As a result, they cannot serve as comparators who were conceivably treated more favorably than Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(j) requires equal treatment of similarly situated employees, but does not create a right to preferential treatment.

Davis v. Crescent Electric Supply, Co. · filed 2016-08-05(j)

“Title VII requires employers to treat employees who are members of protected classes the same as other similarly situated employees, but it does not create substantive rights to preferential treatment.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires intentional discrimination for a disparate treatment claim; an unintended adverse effect from a neutral policy alone is insufficient.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe Management Solutions · filed 2016-09-15(a)(1)

We do not read the passage from Young in the inverse to stand for the proposition that an employer’s neutral policy can engender disparate treatment liability merely because it has an unintended adverse effect on members of a protected group.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment jury instruction to address whether sex bias motivated an employer to create a hiring test that caused the plaintiffs to be rejected.

Ernst v. City of Chicago · filed 2016-09-19(a)(1)

Here, the jury should have been instructed on the plain- tiffs’ burden of proving that Chicago was motivated by anti- female bias, when Chicago created the entrance exam that caused these plaintiffs not to be hired.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that an adverse employment action was based on race.

Cole v. Board of Trustees of Northern · filed 2016-09-27(a)(1)

Without direct or circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment based on race, no reasonable jury could find that Cole was demoted or disciplined because of his race.

Title VII disparate-treatment claims pursued on a pretext theory follow the McDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting framework.

LaRochelle v. Wilmac Corp. · filed 2016-09-27(a)

The plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

A Title VII disparate treatment complaint must plead enough facts to make every ultimate element plausible, though it need not present evidence establishing a prima facie case.

Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin · filed 2016-10-04(a)(1)

Although Chhim did not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, he had to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employer gives a legitimate reason for its decision and the plaintiff offers insufficient evidence of discriminatory pretext.

Varno v. Canfield · filed 2016-11-07

Upon review, we agree with the district court that the defendants sufficiently established a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Varno and that Varno failed to present sufficient evidence of discriminatory pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment complaint to plausibly allege that the employer intentionally discriminated against an individual because of race.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe Management Solutions · filed 2016-12-13(a)(1)

Given the EEOC’s disparate treatment claim, the proposed amended complaint had to contain sufficient factual allegations to set out a plausible claim that CMS intentionally discriminated against Ms. Jones, individually, because of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging racial disparate treatment to show that the employer took an adverse employment action because of the plaintiff’s race.

Pinder v. Employment Development Department · filed 2017-01-05(a)(1)

A plaintiff bringing a Title VII or FEHA racial discrimination action under a theory of disparate treatment must demonstrate at trial that his or her employer took one or more adverse employment actions against the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs race.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action and more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Gooden v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury · filed 2017-02-17(a)

In this case, the comments, decisions, and physical harassment alleged by Ms. Gooden are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because most do not amount to an adverse employment action. And, to the extent some of the alleged conduct does, Ms. Gooden still fails to establish a prima facie case ... because there is no evidence that a similarly situated individual outside her protected class was treated more favorably.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2 based on unequal discipline must allege that the other employee received no discipline or less discipline.

Wilson v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Svcs. · filed 2017-03-01

But Wilson’s disparate treatment claim suffers from a more serious defect: not alleging disparate treatment. Wilson’s claim of discipline “for something that a Caucasian female employee did not accomplish” does not allege that the Caucasian employee was not disciplined or received less discipline. Without an allegation of disparate treatment, this claim fails.

A plaintiff cannot establish pretext for discriminatory discharge through speculation about the employer's motive.

Ameti ex rel. United States v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. · filed 2018-02-06(a)(1)

A plaintiff may not establish pretext through mere speculation, and nothing suggests Mr. Ambrose decided to terminate his employment on the basis of his race, religion, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence must establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

Wilson v. City of Chesapeake · filed 2018-02-12(a)(1)

Because Wilson has no direct evidence of discrimination, he must rely on the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting framework to prove disparate treatment by indirect evidence. But his indirect evidence of discrimination is likewise insufficient.

A conclusory allegation of disparate treatment does not support an inference of race or sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Kelley v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech. · filed 2018-05-22(a)(1)

Kelley's conclusory allegation of disparate treatment is insufficient to permit an inference of discrimination.

A failure-to-hire disparate treatment claim requires evidence that the applicant was qualified for the position.

Tillery v. New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs. · filed 2018-06-25(a)(1)

Because she failed to show that she was qualified for the position, she failed to meet her initial burden under McDonnell Douglas.

When an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a promotion decision, a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present evidence that the reason was pretext for intentional discrimination.

Haughton v. Town of Cromwell · filed 2018-08-23(a)(1)

Assuming without deciding that Haughton met his prima facie burden, the Town met its burden in demonstrating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its assignment decision and Haughton failed to demonstrate that decision was merely pretext. Haughton failed to identify admissible evidence that would permit a jury to find that the Town acted with discriminatory intent when it chose to promote another officer instead of Haughton to Detective.

An employee cannot establish national origin discrimination through comparator evidence when a nondiscriminatory reason explains the employer’s different treatment.

Herrera v. United Airlines · filed 2018-10-22(a)(1)

However, because United’s differential treatment of Herrera can be explained by a nondiscriminatory motive—namely, United’s desire not to approve Herrera for the work release program—Herrera cannot establish pretext through disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate treatment complaint to allege more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee on facts material to the employer’s decision.

Freeman v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Chicago · filed 2018-11-29(a)(1)

It is thus key to the similarly-situated analysis whether the employees retained or hired in Freeman’s stead were likewise unable to drive. Freeman has not alleged as much, so he has failed to allege similarly- situated colleagues as required.

A discriminatory termination claim fails when the employer has a legitimate reason for firing the employee and the employee cannot show that reason was pretext for discrimination.

Arucan v. Cambridge E. Healthcare Center · filed 2019-02-12(a)(1)

Further, assuming Arucan has presented a prima facie case for employment discrimination, her claim fails because Cambridge Defendants terminated her for treating the wrong patient and she has failed to show that that reason is pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a disparate treatment claim to proceed when the alleged facts, taken as true, suggest intentional sex discrimination in discipline or compensation.

Poague v. Huntsville Wholesale Furniture · filed 2019-02-20(a)(1)

Ashley asserts that Plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims are due to be dismissed because they fail to provide sufficient facts to state a claim. Upon review, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts, if taken as true, that suggest intentional discrimination by Ashley in terms of discipline and the allocation of compensation.

A sex discrimination claim based on more favorable treatment of male coworkers fails without admissible evidence that the coworkers were similarly situated.

Brinig v. Illinois Central School Bus, LLC · filed 2019-02-27(a)(1)

Given the absence of any admissible comparator evidence, Brinig’s federal and state discrimination claims fail.

Unsupported assertions about an employer’s discriminatory motive do not create a triable race-discrimination claim.

Anderson v. Illinois Central Railroad Company · filed 2019-03-31(a)

Similarly, with respect to the second, third, and fourth bullet points, Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence supporting his conclusory and vague assertions.

A plaintiff can create a triable gender-discrimination claim when comparable misconduct draws harsher discipline and the employer’s explanation permits an inference of pretext.

Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys. · filed 2019-04-16(a)(1)

The explanations given for the difference in treatment suggest pretext, inasmuch as the explanations do not rationally explain the difference, and a jury could reasonably reject the stated reasons and find that the difference in treatment was instead motivated by gender discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must establish a prima facie case that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Richardson v. Day & Zimmerman Inc. · filed 2019-04-18(a)(1)

Under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green matrix, Richardson must make a prima facie case establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that similarly situated employees not in his protected class were treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim against an employer when the alleged facts plausibly link adverse treatment to race.

Evans v. Staples, Inc. · filed 2019-04-22(a)(1)

Taking these allegations as true, it is plausible that Plaintiff was treated differently, and ultimately fired, because of her race.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons for its actions were pretexts for discrimination.

Campbell v. Dep't of Human Servs. · filed 2019-04-23(a)(1)

The court considers each allegation in turn and concludes that Campbell may have established a prima facie case of disparate treatment with respect to being bypassed for the Temporary Assignment ("TA") position in July 2015 and being placed on Department Directed Leave ("DDL") in December 2015. However, because Campbell cannot prove pretext with respect to those two actions, his disparate treatment claim fails.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate treatment claim to proceed when the plaintiff plausibly alleges suspension or termination because of race, sex, or religion.

Jackson v. District Hospital Partner, L.P. · filed 2019-08-01(a)(1)

Considering that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to make out a Title VII disparate treatment claim based on race, sex, and religious discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and a retaliation claim.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a link between an adverse employment action and the plaintiff’s protected status.

Mason v. Worcester Regional Transit Authority (WRTA) · filed 2019-08-02(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a protected class, or that the adverse employment action by the Union could be linked to his protected status.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee alleging disparate discipline for a work-rule violation must show that employees outside her protected class were treated differently under nearly identical circumstances.

Mitchell v. The TJX Companies, Inc. · filed 2019-08-13(a)(1)

The Plaintiff offers no other evidence of disparate treatment and therefore fails to meet her burden, as she cannot show that African American employees were treated differently under circumstances nearly identical to hers. The Court need not continue the McDonnell Douglas analysis given that the Plaintiff fails to establish her prima facie case and summary judgment is proper as to the Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims.

A prima facie disparate treatment claim requires evidence of satisfactory job performance and different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Atchariyakornchai v. Frederick County Sanitation Authority · filed 2019-08-22(a)(1)

Although Plaintiff is a member of a protected class and alleges several adverse employment actions,8 he has not established that he satisfactorily performed his job or that FCSA treated him differently than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

A disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer acted with discriminatory intent; a difference in office assignments explained by nondiscriminatory reasons does not suffice.

Craig v. Duke · filed 2019-08-29(a)(1)

Tennessee DCS’s uncontested evidence precludes Craig’s disparate treatment claim because it establishes that the reason for the differential treatment was nondiscriminatory, i.e., differences in employment stature, not discriminatory intent or motive.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.

Murray v. The Dutchess County Department of Public Works · filed 2019-09-25(a)(1)

The prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, and not a pleading requirement; therefore, a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss his discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to present evidence supporting an inference that race, color, or national origin affected an adverse employment action.

KANNIKAL v. HOLDER · filed 2019-10-21(a)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case for his disparate treatment claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin; a discriminatory discharge claim fails without evidence that the employee met the employer’s legitimate expectations or that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

Onyemelukwe v. Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 2019-10-23(a)(1)

The Court finds Plaintiff fails to satisfy either the second or fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework and therefore fails to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude his race or national origin caused his discharge.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from treating an employee differently because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Butler v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc · filed 2019-11-14(a)(1)

To establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove that he was treated differently on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ... Accepting all of Mr. Butler’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, Mr. Butler has stated a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII and the WLAD.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory motive.

Boyce-Herbert v. New York Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2020-01-23(a)(1)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could infer that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive.

A plaintiff using a comparator to establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination must show that the comparator was similarly situated in all material respects.

Herron-Williams v. Alabama State University · filed 2020-02-07(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case and raise a presumption of discrimination, the preferentially treated individual from outside the plaintiff’s protected class (the “comparator”) must be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race discrimination in employment, but a disparate treatment claim fails at summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Mayes v. Ohashi · filed 2020-03-20(a)(1)

On this record, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Ace intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff. Mr. Mayes has presented no evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that race or sex motivated the challenged employment action for a disparate-treatment claim to survive summary judgment.

Watkins v. City Of Chicago · filed 2020-03-26(a)

Here, looking at all of the evidence as a whole, there is simply not enough factual support for a reasonable jury to infer that Higgins filed the CR against Watkins because of her race or sex.

A sex-discrimination disparate-treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference that the employer treated the plaintiff differently because of sex.

VERDU v. THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · filed 2020-03-30(a)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that tend to show that Plaintiff, based on his sex, was treated differently than any similarly situated female employee of the University.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-based disparate-treatment pay claim when an employee alleges that a white counterpart earned more for the same job.

Thompson v. Normandy Schools Collaborative · filed 2020-03-31(a)(1)

The Court finds Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits adverse employment actions taken because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Brackens v. Stericycle, Inc. · filed 2020-04-08(a)(1)

Because an adverse employment action is only unlawful under Title VII if it is taken because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, Brackens has failed to state a claim for discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment complaint to allege less favorable treatment because of a protected trait and a discriminatory motive.

Stiner v. Bank of America · filed 2020-04-23(a)(1)

As an initial matter, Title VII prohibits refusing to hire or discharging any individual on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... To state a claim of disparate treatment discrimination, a plaintiff must allege that an employer has treated her “less favorably than others because of a protected trait” and the defendant “had a discriminatory intent or motive for taking a job- related action.” Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). Here, again, Stiner alleges none of those things, including not alleging the bases for the disparate treatment or even the nature of the differing treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a religious disparate treatment claim to proceed when the pleaded facts support an inference of discrimination, even without details about similarly situated employees who received better treatment.

MILLER v. TITHONUS TYRONE, L.P. · filed 2020-04-29(a)(1)

Miller need not plead specifics of similarly situated individuals receiving favorable treatment so long as she has pleaded facts that are adequate to create an inference that the employment discrimination was based on unlawful criteria.

A disparate treatment plaintiff relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework must show satisfactory job performance and, when the employer offers a legitimate reason for its action, show that reason was pretextual.

Keimbaye v. Kaiser Permanente of Bellevue Medical Center · filed 2020-05-26(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish the job performance element of a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas or establish that Defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for accepting his resignation was pretextual.

A disparate treatment claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must plausibly allege an adverse employment action taken because of the plaintiff’s protected status.

Barthelemy v. CHS-SLE Land, L.L.C. · filed 2020-07-02(a)(1)

The Fifth Circuit has explained “there are two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her protected status.’”

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race and sex discrimination, and allegations of less favorable treatment than coworkers of another race and sex can support a potential claim at screening.

(PS) Garcia v. Procter and Gamble Company · filed 2020-07-06(a)

Plaintiff alleges that he was treated less favorably than Asian, female employees. He also claims that after he complained about being harassed by his lab supervisor, he was placed on leave and eventually terminated. Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to potentially state cognizable retaliation and race and sex-based discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers race discrimination claims based on assigning an employee more work than a similarly situated white coworker.

Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC · filed 2020-06-11(a)(1)

So Sanderson’s allegations that he was assigned more work than Ford—a white colleague with similar job responsibilities—are adequate to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2 requires a discrimination claimant to allege that an adverse employment action was connected to a protected trait such as race or sex.

(PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions · filed 2020-07-31(a)(1)

But the complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting that plaintiff’s race or gender influenced the decision to terminate his employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sexual orientation, and a disparate treatment claim must plausibly allege that sex motivated the discharge.

DeFrancesco v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2020-08-12(a)(1)

Therefore, to state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he was discharged (2) because of (3) his sex (which includes sexual orientation).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed when the alleged facts support an inference that an employer took an adverse employment action because of race.

LARA v. SAMUEL ADAMS PENNSYLVANIA BREWERY COMPANY, LLC · filed 2020-09-01(a)

The Court finds that Lara has pleaded sufficient facts to state claims of disparate treatment discrimination based on race in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff relying on a comparator to support a disparate treatment claim to plausibly allege that the comparator was similarly situated in all material respects.

Drehmer v. New York State, State University of New York, Corning Community College · filed 2020-10-22

Therefore, Drehmer has failed to plausibly allege that Allegretto was similarly situated, and the Court finds no merit in Drehmer’s disparate treatment claim.

A sex discrimination claim based on non-selection fails when the plaintiff makes no showing that the selected male candidate was similarly situated.

Bettice v. City of New Braunfels · filed 2020-11-17(a)(1)

This latter claim necessarily fails because Plaintiff has made no attempt to show that the selected male was similarly situated.

A Title VII employee relying on comparators must show they were similarly situated in all material respects, including the conduct for which they were disciplined.

Tamba v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 2020-11-20(a)(1)

First, Tamba has not established a prima facie case of discrimination because he cannot identify similarly situated ... comparators.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to show discriminatory intent, either through direct evidence or under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP · filed 2021-02-19(a)(1)

To establish disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s actions were motivated by a discriminatory intent, either through direct evidence of intent or by utilizing the three-part burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires an adverse employment action linked to protected status and, when the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason, evidence that would permit a jury to find that reason pretextual.

Husain v. Warren · filed 2021-02-19(a)

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claims fail because (1) many of the alleged wrongs that she invokes, even if true, would not rise to the level of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII; (2) in other respects, she fails to connect the alleged wrongs to any protected status, and not every workplace wrong is actionable under Title VII; and (3) she has failed to carry her burden of offering evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the non-discriminatory rationales that the agency proffered for taking specific, adverse employment actions were pretextual and that the real reason that the agency fired her was race-, sex-, national-origin-, or religion-based animus.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not support a disparate treatment claim when poor performance explains an employee’s reduced duties and termination and no evidence links those actions to protected traits.

Gravina v. Azar · filed 2021-03-12(a)

That said, significant evidence demonstrates that Harris reduced Gravina’s duties and ultimately terminated him because of his poor job performance. Furthermore, no evidence exists Harris took such measures on account of his race, national origin, sex, or sexual orientation.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment claim to allege different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Watkins v. Columbus City Schools · filed 2021-03-25(a)

Even interpreting this claim to be race based rather than national origin based, Watkins’ claim still fails to allege that he was treated differently from similarly situated members of an unprotected class.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim requires evidence that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of race or sex discrimination.

Pinkston-Shay v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2021-04-01(a)(1)

Pinkston-Shay has not met her burden to establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination under the McDonnell-Douglas framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits religious disparate treatment in employment; an employee must show that the employer’s stated reason for discipline was a pretext for discrimination.

GROFF v. DEJOY · filed 2021-04-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, Groff cannot prove that Defendant’s reasons for his discipline were a pretext for discrimination and his disparate treatment claim must fail.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim must plausibly allege satisfactory work performance.

Smith v. Lowes Companies, Inc · filed 2021-04-19(a)(1)

Because the Plaintiff has failed to make any factual allegations of satisfactory work performance, he has failed to state a plausible discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers allegations that an employer discharged and harassed an employee because of race as disparate treatment.

Thompson v. UOP LLC · filed 2021-04-28(a)(1)

“[T]he ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional discrimination’) provision” of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race,” among other things. ... Therefore, Defendant is not correct in arguing that Plaintiff is not entitled to the information being sought because has not alleged disparate treatment.

Different treatment of employees can support an inference of race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when their alleged misconduct is nearly identical.

Fields v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc · filed 2021-04-30(a)(1)

The court therefore concludes that the conduct at issue is not nearly identical and that Fields’s disparate treatment argument is insufficient to overcome summary judgment.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a race discrimination claim requires an adverse employment action and more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Johnson v. South Bend Community School Corporation · filed 2021-05-06(a)(1)

The problem with Johnson’s case lies in the fact that he was not subjected to an adverse action and he fails to point other non-white similarly situated employees who were treated better than him.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of discriminatory intent to sustain a disparate treatment claim based on religion or national origin.

Sahak v. New NGC Incorporated · filed 2021-05-07(a)(1)

As Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case through direct or circumstantial evidence or the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim fails when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and the employee cannot show they are pretextual.

Hollins v. Wilkie · filed 2021-05-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff is unable to show that any of Defendant’s offered reasons were pretextual, and therefore his discrimination claims fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate-treatment claim to allege different treatment based on a protected characteristic.

Herard v. UAB Hematology/Oncology · filed 2021-06-04(a)(1)

For factual allegations to support a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII, the facts must concern different treatment based on a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) and (m) require facts linking an adverse employment action to the employee’s sex to state a disparate treatment claim.

Potts-Lindroos v. United States Department of Interior · filed 2021-06-07(a), (m)

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the disparate treatment claim that is predicated on Ms. Potts Lindroos being assigned to a segregated route. Ms. Potts Lindroos has failed to adequately allege that the adverse employment action was taken because of her sex/gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

ACKIE v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS · filed 2021-06-10(a)

None of these instances rise to the level of an adverse employment action and, even if they did, they did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff to show an adverse employment action under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

CHAVARRIA v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS · filed 2021-06-10(a)

None of these instances rise to the level of an adverse employment action and, even if they did, they did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a disparate-treatment claim when the alleged facts plausibly link a protected trait to an adverse employment action.

Wolfe v. Columbia College · filed 2021-07-06(a)(1)

Accordingly, while Plaintiff’s race- and national origin-based disparate treatment claims may proceed, her sex-based disparate treatment claim is dismissed.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sex discrimination complaint to plausibly allege adverse treatment because of sex.

McIntosh v. Wormuth · filed 2021-08-02

More fundamentally, the facts before the Court do not make plausible that McIntosh suffered adverse treatment on account of her gender. On this element, the discrimination claim fails as a matter of law.

A disparate treatment claim requires proof that an employer took an adverse employment action because of the employee’s race or national origin.

Koosemans v. Siskiyou Joint Community College · filed 2021-08-23(a)(1)

A plaintiff bringing a Title VII or FEHA racial discrimination action under a theory of disparate treatment must demonstrate at trial that his or her employer took one or more adverse employment actions against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s national origin or race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a racial disparate-treatment claim when allegations plausibly support an inference that an employee was terminated for a discriminatory reason.

Okoroanyanwu v. MV Transportation, Inc. · filed 2021-08-27(a)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that the SAC has adequately pled a disparate treatment claim for racial discrimination based on Okoroanywanu’s termination.

A plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework for a discrimination claim must show that she met her employer’s legitimate expectations and that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received better treatment.

Zhan v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2021-09-13(a)(1)

Therefore, she has failed to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.

A sexual-orientation disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting a plausible inference of discrimination, such as favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class.

DeFrancesco v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 2021-09-14(a)(1)

Such flawed allegations fail to allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s termination was intentionally motivated by his sexual orientation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment claim fails, and his claim is dismissed.

A national origin disparate treatment claim requires evidence that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably.

Lopez v. Downtown Las Vegas Events Center · filed 2021-09-22(a)(1)

First, the Court must grant summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim, because she has not shown that any similarly situated employees were treated differently.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from firing an employee because of race or sex; a disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference of discrimination.

Watson v. City of Henderson · filed 2021-09-23(a)(1)

Because the complaint alleges Title VII and NRS § 610.330 claims against the City under only a disparate treatment theory of liability, those claims are dismissed.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to show disparate treatment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more favorably.

Willis v. Rock Hill Mechanical Corp. · filed 2021-09-30(a)(1)

But Willis has not identified ... a similarly-situated employee, who is not a member of a protected class, who was treated more favorably. As a result, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

A discrimination complaint plausibly alleges disparate treatment when a qualified employee suffers adverse action while a similarly situated employee outside his protected class receives more favorable treatment.

Angelucci v. Wolf · filed 2021-10-04(a)(1)

In sum, because Plaintiff’s SAC contains adequate factual matter to show that he was qualified for his position and a similarly situated individual outside his protected class was treated more favorably, and Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff has adequately pled the other elements of a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) can treat racially unequal employee housing as an adverse employment action when the housing is an employment benefit.

Adams v. Cameron · filed 2021-11-12(a)(1)

Where Adams’s allegations support an inference that Defendants provided employee housing as an employment benefit but provided housing with greater economic value to non-Black staff, these allegations sufficiently identify an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate treatment claim when less meaningful assignments support a plausible inference of discrimination based on race or sex.

Gordwin v. Amazon.com Incorporated · filed 2021-11-17(a)

In sum, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled plausible disparate treatment discrimination claims under § 1981 with respect to her rejection for the HR Manager position in May 2019 and under § 1981, Title VII, and the ACRA with respect to her being assigned less meaningful projects.

Section 2000e-2 bars employers from discriminating in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Parker v. Children's National Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2021-12-09(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer, inter alia, from discriminating against “any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Staggers v. Becerra · filed 2021-12-17(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits an employer, inter alia, from discriminating against “any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

A plaintiff relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework for a Title VII gender discrimination claim must show that similarly situated employees of another gender were treated more favorably.

Ross v. Chopra · filed 2021-12-30(a)(1)

Because Ms. Ross cannot satisfy the fourth element of a Title VII gender discrimination claim, Doctors’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Count VI of the second amended complaint.

A Title VII disparate-treatment claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

Perkins v. United States Department Of The Treasury · filed 2022-01-03(a)

It is clearly undisputed that (i) Plaintiff was not the only employee that did not receive the bonus, and (ii) another employee in both of Plaintiff’s protected classes did receive the bonus. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find an inference of racial discrimination due to Plaintiff not receiving the audit bonus.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from treating employees or applicants differently because of race, sex, religion, color, or national origin.

Paschall v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Division · filed 2022-01-11(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from treating an employee or applicant differently based on their race, sex, religion, color, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a discrimination claim to proceed when allegations of unequal discipline, denied promotions, and termination plausibly suggest bias based on sex or national origin.

SHARIFI v. AMERICAN RED CROSS · filed 2022-01-12(a)

Here, Plaintiff has pled that she was treated differently—unfairly disciplined and reprimanded, denied promotion opportunities, and ultimately terminated—than other employees of different ages, sex, and national origins. ... Plaintiff’s complaint, taken together with her EEOC charge of discrimination, is sufficient to entitle her to discovery on these claims. The ARC Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED as to Count Two with respect to ARC.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff relying on a comparator to show more favorable treatment under nearly identical circumstances.

Ned v. Lafayette General Health System Inc · filed 2022-01-21(a)(1)

Without this information, Ned cannot show that she was treated less favorably than LeBas under “nearly identical” circumstances.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting a reasonable inference that discrimination motivated the employer’s decision.

Jackson v. Saint Charles County, Missouri · filed 2022-01-25(a)(1)

Jackson’s allegations therefore fail to create a reasonable inference that a discriminatory motive was a determinative factor in the County’s decision to allow him to resign in lieu of facing termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; a disparate-treatment complaint must plausibly allege discrimination on one of those grounds.

Kinney v. McDonough · filed 2022-01-26(a)(1)

The “central inquiry” for a Title ... VII claim, Primm, 2017 WL 10646487, at *2, is whether an employer discriminated against an individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on account of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.

A sex discrimination claim based on disparate treatment requires plausible allegations that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received different treatment.

Baker v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2022-01-27(a)(1)

In this case, Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim against BPD fails because she has not adequately pled that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside of her protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on comparisons with other employees to show that those who received more favorable treatment were similarly situated in all material respects.

Stewart v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District · filed 2022-02-24(a)(1)

Stewart’s evidence is insufficient to show that SRP treated him “differently than a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class.” Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006). An individual seeking relief under Title VII must demonstrate that they are “similarly situated . . . in all material respects” to the employees that are receiving more favorable treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff without direct evidence to show an adverse employment action under circumstances supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Litten v. GM Components Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-03-09(a)(1)

A plaintiff claiming disparate treatment in the absence of direct evidence must produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) performed her job satisfactorily, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) suffered the adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging race-based disparate treatment in a failure-to-promote claim must make a prima facie showing that similarly situated applicants were treated more favorably because of race.

Cathey v. Sheriff Vic Regalado · filed 2022-03-11(a)(1)

Moreover, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that similarly situated White candidates were treated more favorably than plaintiff (i.e., examples of white applicants who had similar discrepancies in their background books that were nonetheless promoted to deputy).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment complaint to allege facts plausibly linking an adverse employment action to race or national origin.

McNair v. Wormuth · filed 2022-03-23(a)(1)

Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly showing that he suffered an adverse employment action based on race or national origin under Title VII.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must plead facts connecting an adverse employment action to the employee’s race.

Papa v. Capital One N A · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

Specifically, Papa has not articulated any facts that connect Clardy’s alleged preferential treatment with her adverse employment action.

A sex discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for an asserted adverse action.

Tavares v. ASARCO LLC · filed 2022-06-02(a)(1)

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination with respect to any alleged adverse employment action by Defendant. Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claim.

A race discrimination claimant can show pretext by identifying a similarly situated employee whose comparable misconduct did not result in termination.

Levier v. C B & I L L C · filed 2022-06-16(a)(1)

The Court finds that Mr. Wiltcher’s conduct is sufficiently similar to Mr. Levier’s conduct to establish pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits intentional discrimination in employment, and a disparate-treatment claim may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence.

Wilkinson v. Pinnacle Lodging, LLC · filed 2022-08-03(a)(1)

Under either the direct-evidence standard or the circumstantial-evidence standard, Wilkinson’s disparate-treatment discrimination claims fail.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a disparate treatment plaintiff to present evidence that a protected trait motivated the challenged employment action, even when using indirect proof.

Rodriguez v. Brown · filed 2022-08-18(a)(1)

In sum, then, Rodriguez is incorrect that she does not have to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Sheriff acted with a discriminatory intent or motive because of a protected trait like her race, sex, and/or national origin.

A disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an adverse employment action because of race or national origin.

Levy v. City of Sacramento · filed 2022-08-18(a)(1)

A plaintiff bringing a Title VII or FEHA racial discrimination action under a theory of disparate treatment must demonstrate at trial that his or her employer took one or more adverse employment actions against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s national origin or race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a job applicant alleging direct discrimination to plausibly connect a discriminatory remark to the decision not to hire him.

Willacy v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2022-08-26(a)(1)

Willacy has not alleged, and the Court cannot plausibly infer, that Velez’s statements, even if believed, bore directly on the decision not to hire him.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must offer evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action was a pretext for discrimination.

Jackson v. District Hospital Partner, L.P. · filed 2022-08-31(a)(1)

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute in this case and plaintiff has not come forward with evidence that defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged actions were pretextual, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim must plausibly allege that similarly situated employees were treated differently.

Tiger v. Powell · filed 2022-09-13(a)(1)

Because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that there were other similarly situated employees, let alone that those employees were treated differently, as discussed previously, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a Title VII claim.