42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 bars personal-capacity damages claims against bar grievance committee members for actions taken in their official duties because they have absolute immunity.

Parisi v. Mathias Heck, Jr. · filed 2016-11-16

The DBA Defendants’ actions at issue occurred while they performed their official duties, as members of the bar grievance committee. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that those individuals were entitled to absolute immunity in their personal capacity.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity from damages for a prosecutor’s conduct in a prosecutorial role, including initiating a prosecution, using false testimony at trial, and suppressing exculpatory evidence.

Smith v. Burge · filed 2016-11-28

On the other hand, because Defendant Daley was the Cook County State’s Attorney at the time of Plaintiffs prosecution, any decisions to initiate Plaintiffs prosecution or his other activities in his role as State’s Attorney fall under the protection of absolute immunity, including knowingly using false testimony at trial and suppressing exculpatory evidence.

A local liquor commissioner is not absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim based on a decision whether to renew a liquor license.

Brunson v. Murray · filed 2016-12-13

We must deny absolute immunity to local liquor commissioners in decisions to renew licenses.

Judges and prosecutors may be absolutely immune from damages claims under § 1983.

Madden v. Cleveland County · filed 2016-12-20

To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking damages, the prosecutor and the judge are both entitled to absolute immunity, see Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199‒200 (1985) (absolute immunity for judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430‒31 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors), and the state is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 631 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (State is not a “person” under § 1983).

Parole board officials have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 claims arising from decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole.

Serrano v. Prentice Hill · filed 2017-01-13

The district court properly dismissed Serrano’s claims against defendant Lam as barred by absolute quasi-judicial immunity because parole board officials are entitled to immunity for decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole.

Medical board officials have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims for actions taken in their quasi-judicial capacities.

Mir v. Deck · filed 2017-01-26

The district court properly dismissed Mir’s claims against defendants Chang, Esrailian, Levin, Low, Moran, and Schipske based on a 2010 California Medical Board decision because those defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for actions undertaken in their quasi-judicial capacities.

Witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on preparing or giving testimony in court.

Canen v. Chapman · filed 2017-01-27

Moreover, to the degree that this action is premised on the preparation or presentation of his trial testimony, absolute immunity protects him.

Section 1983 absolute prosecutorial immunity does not cover a prosecutor’s work as an investigator or witness.

Marten v. Swain · filed 2017-03-16

Upon review of the designated evidence in this case, the Court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Swain was acting outside the prosecu-torial role when he served as a witness and an investigator in the Martens’ criminal cases.

Officials who merely comply with valid court orders are immune from individual-capacity suits under § 1983.

Payne v. T.J. McDermott · filed 2017-03-20

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Payne’s claim against defendant McDermott in his individual capacity because McDermott is immune from suit, given that he did nothing but comply with valid court orders.

Section 1983 permits a malicious-prosecution claim based on an officer’s actions that initiate a prosecution independently of the officer’s grand-jury testimony, even though the testimony itself is absolutely immune.

King v. Harwood · filed 2017-03-27

And because King has alleged that Harwood set her prosecution in motion—and that Harwood both sought warrants despite the absence of probable cause and made knowing or reckless false statements implicating King in his investigative report—King may properly base her malicious-prosecution claim on those actions by Harwood without triggering the absolute immunity established by Rehberg.

Social workers are not absolutely immune from § 1983 claims alleging that they made false statements or fabricated evidence in child dependency proceedings.

Patterson v. Arizona Department of Economic · filed 2017-04-24

However, Patterson alleged that they made false statements and fabricated evidence in connection with the dependency proceeding that terminated Patterson’s custody over her daughter, and we have held that social workers are not immune from such claims.

Absolute judicial, petitioning, and witness immunity bar § 1983 claims even when the defendants allegedly acted intentionally or maliciously.

Pelino v. Hens-Greco · filed 2017-05-15

The doctrines of immunity that the District Court properly applied, however, provide for absolute immunity, not qualified immunity. ... Thus, they apply even though Pelino alleges that defendants acted intentionally and maliciously.

Prosecutors sued under Section 1983 lack absolute immunity for efforts to prevent testimony in a case outside their jurisdiction because those efforts are not part of their role as advocates.

Mikko v. City of Atlanta, Georgia · filed 2017-05-26

The prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions in this case because those actions were not taken in their role as advocates. The case in which Mikko planned to testify was not a case that these prosecutors were prosecuting or planning to prosecute, nor was it even located within their jurisdiction.

Social workers are not absolutely immune from § 1983 claims alleging that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false statements in a sworn dependency petition affidavit.

Olga C. v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2017-06-23

Absolute immunity will not bar a plausible § 1983 claim against Caudillo or Sandoval based on their alleged extrinsic fraud in the state dependency proceedings because social workers “are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury.” Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

An officer acting at a prosecutor’s direction to prepare evidence for trial is entitled to absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Cannon v. Polk County · filed 2017-06-28

When Taylor sent the bullets for CBLA analysis, however, he was working at the direction of the district attorney to help prepare for trial. He is therefore entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against agency officials are barred by absolute immunity when the officials’ challenged actions are prosecutorial or adjudicatory in nature and the proceedings have adequate procedural safeguards.

Bon-Ing Inc. v. Hodges · filed 2017-06-30

We agree with the district court’s careful analysis and conclude that the defendants’ challenged actions leading to the revocation of plaintiffs’ license were prosecutorial or adjudicatory in nature. ... Because the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against Himes and Hodges on the grounds of absolute immunity, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Section 1983 does not give an officer absolute immunity for false statements made in a warrant affidavit.

Miller v. Maddox · filed 2017-08-03

We conclude, therefore, that Maddox is not entitled to absolute immunity for the false statements he made in his warrant affidavit.

A probation officer who calculates time served for a sentencing court is absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim when that work is integral to the judicial process.

Carder v. Tinney · filed 2017-08-10

Because Tinney’s conduct was in furtherance of the sentencing judge’s ability to carry out judicial duties and his actions were integrally related to the judicial process, he was acting as an arm of the court. Gant, 944 F.Supp. at 733. He therefore is entitled to absolute immunity for his quasi-judicial functions.

Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for statements within their official duties, and witnesses have absolute immunity for their testimony.

Barksdale v. Joyce · filed 2017-08-31

The state judge and the prosecutors have absolute immunity from suit for acts, like those alleged here—statements during judicial proceedings—that fall within the scope of their official duties. ... Witnesses also enjoy absolute immunity for their testimony. The immunity thus shields the psychologists who testified in support of Barksdale’s commitment.

A government attorney representing a state defendant in a prisoner civil rights lawsuit may be absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim.

Harmon v. Rutledge · filed 2017-09-13

After careful de novo review, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal for failure to state claim reviewed de novo), we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Reynolds was entitled to absolute immunity in the circumstances presented here.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims arising from their imposition of parole conditions.

Mitchell v. Stone · filed 2017-10-26

Dismissal of Roderick’s claim for monetary damages was proper because defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the imposition of the challenged parole conditions.

A university chancellor acting in a quasi-judicial role has absolute immunity from an individual-capacity Section 1983 claim.

Board Of Trustees Of Purdue University, d/b/a Purdue University and Purdue Calumet Thomas Keon v. Eisenstein · filed 2017-10-30

Chancellor Keon was acting in a quasi-judicial role and is also entitled to absolute immunity.

Absolute immunity is grounds to dismiss a Section 1983 claim.

Fischer v. Hill · filed 2017-12-14

The district court properly dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) claims on the ground that the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from such claims, and properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law claims.

Section 1983 claims are barred when the defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of absolute immunity.

Kayiji v. Bowser · filed 2017-12-20

Appellant’s claims against appellee Miller are barred because they pertain to conduct within the scope of Miller’s absolute immunity.

Section 1983 claims against police board members are barred by absolute immunity for their actions in quasi-judicial disciplinary proceedings.

Foggey v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-02-05

As such, the Board members have carried their burden of showing that they are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions involved in the quasi-judicial proceedings, which culminated in Foggey’s termination.

A pretrial release officer who recommends an arrest warrant to a judge is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from a § 1983 claim for that act.

Patterson v. Van Arsdel · filed 2018-02-23

Given the similarities between Van Arsdel’s role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, we conclude that Van Arsdel’s action in submitting the bare unsigned warrant to Judge Tichenor should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation, as in Swift, or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge, as in Malley. Accordingly, Van Arsdel is not entitled to absolute immunity.

Grand-jury witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their testimony.

Allen v. Rucker · filed 2018-04-03

First, the Supreme Court in Rehberg v. Paulk , 566 U.S. 356, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) established that a grand-jury witness enjoys absolute immunity in § 1983 cases. ... Accordingly, Rucker's grand-jury testimony is beside the point because that testimony cannot be the basis for liability.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims arising from their imposition of parole conditions.

Turner v. Melody Smith · filed 2018-05-10

However, a parole officer’s quasi-judicial acts, including the establishment of a parole condition, are subject to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against prosecutors and judges are barred by absolute immunity when the alleged conduct falls within their prosecutorial or judicial duties.

Woodworth v. Hulshof · filed 2018-06-06

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment because absolute immunity bars Woodworth’s claims against both Hulshof and Judge Lewis.

Judges are immune from § 1983 damages claims for judicial acts unless they act in the clear absence of jurisdiction; clerks acting at a judge’s direction share that immunity.

Wright v. Miranda · filed 2018-07-10

Judge Miranda and the court clerks were protected by absolute immunity, and an amended complaint would remain subject to dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Wright’s claims and the denial of leave to amend.

Section 1983 claims challenging prosecutors’ and a police officer’s grand jury actions are barred by absolute immunity, including when the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief.

Dreyfuse v. Chiles · filed 2018-07-20

Additionally, if Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that Defendants’ grand jury actions were improper, such an attack, as explained by the Magistrate Judge, is precluded because all three Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity on that issue, and Plaintiff’s proposed amendments do not change the fact that absolute immunity bars his claims.

Grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from their grand jury testimony.

Calixte v. David · filed 2018-08-01

Accordingly, Officer David has absolute immunity against § 1983 claims arising from his grand jury testimony and his motion for judgment on the pleadings will, with respect to Count I, be allowed.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against officers based on their pretrial deposition or trial testimony because that testimony is absolutely immune.

Swanson v. Scott · filed 2018-08-10

The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 to give absolute immunity to functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Swanson's claim against them in Count V based on their pre-trial depositions and trial testimony.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity to JQC investigative and hearing panel members for their disciplinary functions and to Florida Bar officials acting as agents of the Florida Supreme Court in disciplinary proceedings.

Watson v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission · filed 2018-08-15

The district court did not err when it dismissed Watson’s claims against the JQC and Bar Officials because: (1) the members of the JQC investigative panel were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity based on the functions of their position; (2) the members of the JQC hearing panel were entitled to absolute ... judicial immunity based on the functions of their position; and (3) the Bar Officials were entitled to absolute immunity as agents of the Florida Supreme Court acting in disciplinary proceedings.

Section 1983 does not afford prosecutors absolute immunity for knowingly failing to preserve exculpatory evidence.

Munchinski v. Solomon · filed 2018-08-28

It follows that, consistent with Henderson, the knowing failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, much like the knowing destruction of exculpatory evidence, is not part of the prosecutorial function and therefore not entitled to absolute immunity.

Government attorneys acting as advocates in judicial proceedings may have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for that work.

Penate v. Kaczmarek · filed 2018-12-07

The conduct alleged here as a basis for subjecting Foster and Ravitz to liability under § 1983 was conduct necessarily undertaken in connection with a judicial proceeding and in furtherance of their role as advocates for the state.

State attorneys performing prosecutorial functions in civil proceedings have absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for conduct closely associated with the judicial process, including decisions about continuances and whether to seek a detainee’s release.

Ellison v. Ladner · filed 2019-04-04

“State attorneys and agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 concerning ... activities intimately associated with the judicial process.” ... So Ladner’s role in agreeing to, requesting, or acquiescing in those continuances involved an exercise of professional judgment associated with the judicial process. ... We also agree with the district court that any decision by Ladner not to seek Ellison’s release required an exercise of professional judgment.

A prosecutor seeking absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim must show that the challenged conduct was part of his role as an advocate for the state.

Ames v. Lindquist · filed 2019-05-03

“State prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 actions when performing functions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’ or, phrased differently, ‘when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.’” ... Lindquist has not yet met his burden as he has not explained his role, if any, in the state civil litigation. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of absolute immunity for the First Amendment retaliation claim and state law claims.

Prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from acts performed as advocates for the state.

Jackson v. Borough of Haines · filed 2019-05-24

We conclude that the prosecutors were acting in an advocacy role when they took the actions that gave rise to Jackson's claims. We therefore hold that they were entitled to assert the defense of absolute immunity against all of Jackson's claims, both state and federal, and that it was not error for the superior court to grant their motion to dismiss on such grounds.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity from a § 1983 claim does not cover a prosecutor's withholding of evidence in another person's case when that conduct lacks a functional tie to the prosecutor's own case.

Penate v. Kaczmarek · filed 2019-06-26

In short, Kaczmarek does not enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity from Penate's suit because of her role as Farak's prosecutor.

Officials performing adjudicative or prosecutorial functions in administrative proceedings have absolute immunity from damages claims under § 1983 when the proceedings provide adequate procedural safeguards.

Md. Bd. of Physicians v. Geier · filed 2019-06-26

All of the individual defendants who were sued under § 1983 have absolute immunity under federal law because they performed adjudicative or prosecutorial functions and the applicable provisions of State law afforded adequate procedural safeguards to restrain unconstitutional conduct by agency officials.

Section 1983 claims against witnesses, government attorneys, and judges may be barred by absolute immunity.

Vandermeulen v. Leclaire · filed 2019-07-19

The district court properly dismissed VanDerMeulen’s remaining claims against officers Walter and Tucker, as well as his claims against Brinker, Shupe, and Judges LeClaire, McMurdie, Swann, and Orozco, because these defendants are entitled to absolute immunity.

Agency attorneys performing prosecutorial functions are immune from damages suits under Section 1983.

Patrick Doheny, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 2019-07-23

Because the PennDOT attorneys were performing prosecutorial functions, they “are immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), and the claim against them lodged in Count IV was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 claims against licensing board officials are barred by absolute immunity when the challenged acts are quasi-prosecutorial functions in a disciplinary hearing process with adequate safeguards.

Mothe v. Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors · filed 2019-08-08

The Court finds the individual Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to all of the claims based on the factual allegations in the Complaint.

Government attorneys defending a municipality in a civil suit are absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim based on that defense.

Walker v. City of Rochester · filed 2019-08-14

Here, Attorney Davis’s and Attorney Brown’s only connection with Walker is the fact they defended the City and the County, respectively, in the civil action commenced by Walker in Monroe County Supreme Court. Accordingly, they are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983, see Barrett, 798 F.2d at 572, and must be dismissed as defendants on this basis.

A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim based on the witness’s testimony, even if the claim alleges a conspiracy to present false testimony.

Anderson v. City of Fulton, Kentucky · filed 2019-08-29

In conclusion, the Court finds that Bell has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on his grand jury testimony.

Absolute witness immunity in a Section 1983 action does not shield an officer from claims based on arrest and detention rather than testimony.

Boucher v. Tennessee · filed 2019-09-11

Plaintiff’s allegations are based on Defendant Malone’s arrest and detention of Plaintiff. (Id.) As a result, absolute witness immunity is inapplicable in this case.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer for testimony at a judicial proceeding, even if the testimony is alleged to be false.

Coakley v. Posey · filed 2019-09-13

The Court finds that the preliminary examination was a judicial proceeding at which Defendant Posey gave testimony, and that he is entitled to absolute immunity for that testimony.

State agency officials have absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for conduct akin to a prosecutor’s initiation of proceedings.

BUNTING v. NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER · filed 2019-09-20

Here, the Court agrees with Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim in Count III against individual officials Anderson and Lichtblau must be dismissed because these Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for the conduct alleged.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for an officer’s grand jury testimony because that testimony is protected by absolute immunity.

Gashi v. Scottsdale, City of · filed 2019-09-23

Regardless, this statement could not give rise to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... liability because an officer’s grand jury testimony is protected by absolute immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield prosecutors with absolute immunity for alleged conduct outside their prosecutorial functions when the complaint alone cannot establish what functions they performed.

Advantageous Community Services, LLC v. King · filed 2019-09-27

Because the AG Defendants bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to absolute immunity, and because delving into what each AG Defendant did in relation to the alleged fabrication of evidence and/or seizing funds outside of the judicial process would require consideration of evidence outside of the complaint, the AG Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity based on the complaint alone.

Section 1983 permits absolute immunity for municipal officials performing adjudicatory functions during impeachment proceedings, even when those proceedings are abandoned.

Abernathy v. White · filed 2019-09-30

However, Plaintiff cites no cases supporting her contention that this is a controlling distinction, and the Court does see how the fact that the impeachment proceedings were discontinued changes the nature of the proceedings in any material manner.

A township zoning hearing board is not entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

GRACE LAND II, LLC v. BRISTOL TOWNSHIP · filed 2019-09-30

A township and township zoning hearing board, however, are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against judges for judicial acts and court clerks for tasks integral to the judicial process are barred by absolute immunity.

Bennetti 85442 v. Gottfield · filed 2019-10-04

Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts except when they are taken “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” ... “[c]ourt clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” ... Because both Defendants are immune from liability for damages, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s requests for damages.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on medical board members for exercising summary suspension authority when that function is comparable to a judicial act.

Buckwalter v. Nevada Board of Medical Examiners · filed 2012-04-26

Accordingly, we hold that the Board Mem- bers are absolutely immune from liability for the exercise of that power.

Social workers may have absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims for quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial acts, but not for investigative or administrative acts.

Williams v. County Of Monterey · filed 2019-10-17

Unlike state statutory immunities, the absolute immunity based on a social worker’s quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial conduct extends to § 1983 suits. ... The Court nonetheless concludes that the absolute immunity does not provide a basis for dismissal because the complaint alleges facts suggesting that at least some of Moving Parties’ activities fall outside the scope of the immunity.

A probation officer has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for advocating probation revocation, including requesting a hearing.

Wilke v. Stublaski · filed 2019-10-21

In advocating for revocation, including requesting a hearing, Stublaksi’s acts were “intimately associated with the quasi-judicial phase of the criminal process,” and he is therefore absolutely immune from this suit for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a grand jury witness based on that witness’s testimony.

Willis v. Yancey · filed 2019-11-05

Defendant Rutherford, the homicide detective who testified before the grand jury, is absolutely immune to a § 1983 claim against him based on that testimony.

Section 1983 witness immunity does not automatically cover an officer’s false statements merely because they relate to later trial testimony.

Rucks v. City of New York · filed 2015-03-30

First, it is clear that absolute immunity for trial testimony does not extend to cover statements made at any time that have some connection to future trial testimony.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity bars Section 1983 suits arising from a prosecutor’s official duties.

Crampton v. Farris · filed 2019-11-26

In her second issue, Crampton argues that Farris’s absolute immunity does not apply to the allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts have held, however, that absolute prosecutorial immunity bars suits brought under section 1983.

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for presenting evidence to a grand jury as part of their prosecutorial duties.

Grady v. Gaddy · filed 2019-12-04

Plaintiff's allegations against prosecutors Reilly and Hoag all involve their presentation of evidence to the grand jury. Such actions “were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” and thus are entitled to absolute immunity protection.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their conduct in parole decisions and the exercise of their decision-making powers.

Martinez v. Abbott · filed 2019-12-05

“Parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for their conduct in parole decisions and in the exercise of their decision-making powers.” Littles v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995). This is precisely the conduct on which Martinez based his suit.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims against parole board officials for actions taken in their quasi-adjudicative roles.

Franza v. Stanford · filed 2019-12-11

In sum, because Defendants Stanford, Berliner, Davis, Drake, Demosthenes, and Coppola were parole board officials acting in their quasi-adjudicative roles, they are “entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages.”

Government attorneys are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of litigation.

Wister v. White · filed 2019-12-16

Moreover, Wister’s claims against the Alameda County Counsel, who represented the Alameda Tax Collector in the underlying state proceedings, are further barred by absolute immunity. Government attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 “[w]hether the government attorney is representing the plaintiff or the defendant, or is conducting a civil trial, criminal prosecution or an agency hearing.”

Parole officials performing judicial functions may invoke absolute immunity against a Section 1983 claim.

Franza v. Stanford · filed 2020-01-03

Plaintiff's argument is without merit. First, the Court carefully considered Plaintiff's contention that Defendants acted in a ministerial capacity and were therefore not protected by absolute immunity, and the Court rejected his argument for several reasons expressed in its Opinion and Order.

A grand jury witness has absolute immunity from § 1983 claims based on the witness’s testimony and preparatory discussions with prosecutors about that testimony.

Oates v. Chapman · filed 2020-01-14

Plaintiff’s claims based on these assertions against defendant Chapman are barred by absolute immunity, because they are “based on the witness’ testimony” to the grand jury, and upon “preliminary discussion in which the witness relates the substance of [her] intended testimony” to prosecutors.

Section 1983 does not give a prosecutor absolute immunity for investigative acts performed before charging a suspect.

Meade v. Smith · filed 2020-03-11

Although Smith’s ultimate decision to charge Meade with witness tampering falls squarely within the core functions of a prosecutor, his investigation prior to that point does not.

Parole officers have absolute immunity from § 1983 damages claims for conduct in parole decisions and the exercise of their decision-making powers.

Beard v. Jackson · filed 2020-03-13

Parole Officer Ray Rodriguez is protected from Plaintiff’s claims brought against him in his individual capacity for monetary damages by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for their conduct in parole decisions and in the exercise of their decision-making powers.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged deprivation and does not permit claims against defendants protected by absolute immunity.

Simonton v. Ryland-Tanner · filed 2020-03-25

Specifically, Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab recommends concluding that two defendants are protected by absolute immunity, and that Simonton has failed to allege any personal involvement on the part of the third defendant. ... After reviewing the record de novo, the Court finds no error in Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab’s recommendation that Simonton’s amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 damages claims against prosecutors are barred by absolute immunity when the challenged conduct is associated with the judicial phase of a criminal prosecution.

Geraci v. City of Austin · filed 2020-04-02

Plaintiff’s claims thus fall within the absolute immunity afforded to prosecutorial actions associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

Probation officers lack absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for supervising or arresting probationers because those duties are not adjudicatory.

MACK v. AVERTEST, LLC · filed 2020-04-28

These actions by Darrah would not provide her with absolute immunity, as these actions do not fall in line with an adjudicatory duty or involve Darrah acting as a quasi-judicial official.

Section 1983 claims against a social worker for alleged false statements or omissions in a court report are not categorically barred by absolute immunity.

Rivera-Martinez v. Kern County · filed 2020-05-04

Under Hardwick, at least some of the claims against Meek were not subject to absolute immunity.

An expert can be absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim based on a forensic report prepared after arrest and indictment to help prove the prosecution’s case.

Krause v. Yavapai, County of · filed 2020-05-15

In sum, the Court did not err in concluding that Defendant Peele is absolutely immune for the contents of his report, regardless of whether Peele testified at Plaintiff’s trial.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on officials for adjudicative decisions to revoke supervision or impose a sentence when those acts are protected by absolute immunity.

Griffin v. Bondar · filed 2020-06-30

These decisions to revoke, deny, and instate a sentence are “sufficiently adjudicative” in nature such that they are protected by prosecutorial immunity.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity can shield defendants from some claims brought under § 1983.

Wooten v. John Roach, Sr. · filed 2020-07-06

Despite the breadth of the allegations in this case and the various defenses asserted in response, the scope of issues we address in this appeal is relatively narrow: we consider only whether Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their alleged acts. We conclude that immunity shields some defendants, but not all.

Child welfare personnel and attorneys are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages claims based on preparing for or prosecuting state dependency proceedings.

REED v. HOULON · filed 2020-08-05

Moreover, even if Reed’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, each of the Defendants he names in this action are entitled to absolute immunity from any claims for damages under § 1983.

Officials are absolutely immune from Section 1983 claims for quasi-prosecutorial advocacy in a medical licensing proceeding.

Delashaw v. Roberts · filed 2020-08-07

Therefore, Dr. Roberts is absolutely immune from Dr. Delashaw’s Section 1983 claims because they are based on his actions to prepare for and present before the Disposition Panel and any subsequent advocacy before an MQAC panel for sanctions to issue against Dr. Delashaw.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity does not shield a prosecutor from a § 1983 claim based on sworn factual testimony given as a witness.

Sanders v. City of Pembroke · filed 2020-08-07

As such, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that Leamy is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for her testimony during the emergency guardianship proceeding. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this aspect of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is denied.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity from damages for child welfare workers and attorneys preparing and prosecuting state dependency proceedings.

HOWARD v. EINSTEIN HOSPITAL · filed 2020-08-10

Moreover, even if Howard’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, most of the Defendants she names in this action are entitled to absolute immunity from any claims for damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides absolute immunity to officials who execute facially valid court orders for conduct prescribed by those orders.

Wood v. Young · filed 2020-08-11

Appellees Kevin Young, Daniel Young, Mirra Merkel, and Jacob Taylor, all Snohomish County Corrections employees, “are charged with executing facially valid court orders,” and therefore “enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct prescribed by those orders.”

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a parole agent for a recommendation to revoke supervision and incarcerate a person when the agent is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Mays v. Johnson · filed 2020-08-20

In conducting the latter two tasks, Johnson was engaged in a quasi-judicial function for which she is protected by absolute immunity.

Officials sued under Section 1983 have absolute immunity for quasi-prosecutorial work preparing and presenting disciplinary charges before an impartial licensing panel.

Delashaw v. Roberts · filed 2020-08-21

Therefore, Dr. Roberts is absolutely immune from Dr. Delashaw’s Section 1983 claims because they are based on his actions to prepare for and present before the Disposition Panel and any subsequent advocacy before an MQAC panel for sanctions to issue against Dr. Delashaw.

State officials have absolute immunity from § 1983 claims for prosecutorial acts during administrative proceedings, but not for concealing evidence during an investigation to obtain false testimony.

Spec's Family Partners, Ltd. v. Executive Director · filed 2020-08-25

The district court correctly determined that Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from Spec’s’ § 1983 claims regarding administrative holds, protests of applications, and denials of renewals. It erred by concluding Defendants are absolutely immune from Spec’s’ § 1983 individual-capacity claim regarding the concealment of evidence.

Section 1983 claims against child welfare advocates are barred by absolute immunity for actions taken in preparing, initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings.

RAHMAN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-08-26

Because Defendant Udo-Inyang is entitled to absolute immunity, the Court need not address the merits of Plaintiff’s procedural due process allegations.

A government attorney is not absolutely immune from an entire Section 1983 claim merely because the challenged conduct occurred in her official role.

Meyer v. Sugahara · filed 2020-04-29

We accept Sugahara’s concession that the trial court’s limited judgment entirely dismissing the claim against her was in error, but we decline to resolve for the first time on appeal her new arguments that she is absolutely immune from some portions of the claims but not all.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by absolute immunity for a judge’s judicial acts and a prosecutor’s advocacy in criminal proceedings.

Thomas v. Kramer · filed 2020-09-25

For the foregoing reasons, Thomas’s § 1983 claims will be dismissed as against these two defendants, both of whom are entitled to absolute immunity for the actions Thomas challenges.

A probation officer has absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for statements made in response to a judge’s request for input at an in-chambers conference.

Baker v. Spinner · filed 2020-09-30

Responding to Judge Main’s request for input at the conference was more akin to performing a judicial duty, entitling Spinner to absolute immunity.

Section 1983 claims against judges and prosecutors may be barred by absolute immunity for acts within their judicial and prosecutorial roles.

Belcher v. Drakulich · filed 2020-11-05

Additionally, Defendants are absolutely immune in § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 does not give social workers absolute immunity for omissions outside their judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Melton v. Medeiros · filed 2020-11-10

Those undisputed facts make clear that neither Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity because neither was functioning in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity when they failed to make the disclosure.

Social workers are not absolutely immune from Section 1983 claims arising from their discretionary decisions about a child’s placement.

Walter v. County of San Diego · filed 2020-11-30

Because T.W.’s continued placement with Genevieve was the result of the social workers’ exercise of discretion, they are not entitled to absolute immunity.

Child welfare caseworkers have absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for statements made while prosecuting child custody proceedings.

LOWE v. LANCASTER COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 2020-12-08

Defendants are therefore absolutely immune for making any false statements or misrepresentations in either the petition or during the hearings.

Section 1983 damages claims against a prosecutor for presenting evidence at trial and a detective for trial testimony are barred by absolute immunity.

Terry Simonton, Jr. v. Ryland-Tanner · filed 2020-12-15

Here, taking the allegations in Simonton’s complaint as true, the District Court correctly held that Deputy District Attorney Ryland-Tanner and Detective Grumbine were shielded from suit by absolute prosecutorial immunity and witness immunity, respectively.

Section 1983 damages claims against parole board officials in their individual capacities are barred by absolute immunity for decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole.

Gay v. Shaffer · filed 2020-12-16

The district court properly dismissed Gay’s claims for damages against defendants in their individual capacities because defendants are entitled to absolute immunity. See Sellers v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that absolute immunity applies to parole board officials’ decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole).

Section 1983 claims against judges acting within their judicial capacity and jurisdiction, and prosecutors pursuing a criminal case, are barred by absolute immunity.

Walker v. Dueker · filed 2021-01-06

The two defendants named in this matter, Judge Dueker and prosecuting attorney Snyder, are protected by absolute immunity from plaintiff's § 1983 claims.

A psychiatrist who performs a court-ordered competency evaluation and report is absolutely immune from a Section 1983 damages claim for that work, even if the psychiatrist is not a court employee.

Allen v. Zhong · filed 2021-01-08

The Court DISMISSES this action on the ground that plaintiff Matthew Allen’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages against defendant Dr. Rocksheng Zhong is barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity.

Section 1983 provides a more plenary remedy for constitutional-rights deprivations by prison officials than traditional special common-law or statutory proceedings.

Tedder v. Fairman · filed 1981-03-06

The remedy under section 1983 above is more plenary than that existing under traditional special common law or statutory proceedings.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of a substantive right but does not itself create that right.

Humphreys v. Burke · filed 1980-12-03

The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but, instead, provides only a remedy for the deprivation of a substantive right contained in some other Act of Congress. ... The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, which assert a cause of action only under § 1983, thus cannot confer jurisdiction on this court under § 1343(4).

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for violations of federally protected rights but does not itself establish substantive rights.

Greenwood v. Ross · filed 1985-11-22

Section 1983 establishes no substantive rights but is merely the vehicle for seeking a federal remedy for violations of federally protected rights.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce federal rights established elsewhere; it does not itself establish substantive due process rights.

JL ex rel. Thompson v. New Mexico Department of Health · filed 2016-03-04

Second, Section 1983 does not itself establish substantive due process rights. Rather, the statute provides a vehicle for bringing a claim to redress a violation of a federal right that has been established elsewhere.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-train liability for a police chief only when an obvious risk of harm makes the failure to train deliberately indifferent.

Houck v. City of Prairie Village · filed 1996-09-27

A reasonable jury could not find on this record that the risk of harm to arrested persons with plaintiffs characteristics was so obvious to defendant Grover at the time that he was deliberately indifferent to that risk by failing to institute a training regimen which more specifically addressed the situation. Such a finding is required for liability under § 1983 for a failure to train in a case like this.

Section 1983 permits a failure-to-train claim against school officials when an obvious need to train teachers gives them implied notice that failing to train is likely to violate students' constitutional rights.

Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools · filed 1996-03-06

Although defendants did not have actual notice of a pattern of constitutional violations, the Court finds that defendants had "implied notice" that failure to train would likely result in the violation of constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional violation by the supervised person before a supervisory authority can be liable for inadequate training.

Sharon Temkin Bruce M. Temkin v. Frederick County Commissioners Glen Marion Selby, Jr. · filed 1991-09-12

A claim of inadequate training under section 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation on the part of the person being supervised.

Section 1983 permits failure-to-train liability against a sheriff's department only when the need for the training was plainly obvious to department decisionmakers.

Wright v. Sheppard · filed 1990-12-18

Next, Wright says that the Sheriff's Department violated Sec. 1983 by failing to train its officers as to private debt disputes. Before such liability arises, however, the need for such training must be plainly obvious to Department decisionmakers. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). As noted above, the district court found that the sheriff had no actual notice of unconstitutional practices by Livingston. Also the court found no evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse by Department personnel that would have put the sheriff on notice of the need for improved training or supervision. Wright failed to prove this theory of departmental liability.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for failure to train only when the training deficiency amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those affected.

Walker v. Norris · filed 1990-12-20

We agree with the district court that the omission of instruction with regard to the operation of unit doors and the use of mace did not render the training program "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of Fails and other inmates at the prison.

Section 1983 failure-to-train liability requires deliberate indifference to inmates’ rights; omitting instruction on unit doors and mace did not meet that standard.

Walker v. Norris · filed 1990-11-01

We agree with the district court that the omission of instruction with regard to the operation of unit doors and the use of mace did not render the training program “deliberately indifferent” to the rights of Fails and other inmates at the prison.

Section 1983 failure-to-train claims require deliberate indifference, rather than gross negligence.

Reed v. Hoy · filed 1989-12-15

We observe, however, that an intervening Supreme Court case has held that the mental state applicable to Section 1983 failure-to-train claims is deliberate indifference, not gross negligence. ... In any further proceedings, the district court should apply the City of Canton standard.

Section 1983 does not turn an officer's automobile negligence into a constitutional deprivation, and inadequate-training liability requires at least gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Martin v. Georgia Department of Public Safety · filed 1987-06-25

Officer D. E. Cochran under these facts is not liable under 42 USCA § 1983 for acting under color of state law to deprive plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... “[A]utomobile negligence actions [against a policeman acting in the line of duty] are grist for the state law mill. But they do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.” ... It is clear . . . that at least a showing of gross negligence will be necessary to establish liability for inadequate training.

Section 1983 requires more than mere negligence—at least gross negligence or deliberate indifference—for supervisory liability based on a failure to train or supervise, and an omission is actionable only when the official had an affirmative duty to act.

Smith v. Hill · filed 1981-03-23

It is sound policy to require a showing that a defendant’s conduct be reprehensible at least to the degree of gross negligence or deliberate indifference to fundamental rights before liability under section 1983 may attach. ... The court holds that the individual members of the Commission, and hence the County itself, were sufficiently removed from the conduct of Deputy Constable Hill that they cannot be liable under section 1983. ... Here, there was no such duty, and, hence, no possibility of liability.

Section 1983 allows a municipality to be liable for its own failure to hire, train, supervise, or discipline employees when, with notice of prior misconduct, that failure proximately causes a constitutional deprivation; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Herrera v. Valentine · filed 1981-07-13

It is clear that a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the acts of its employees. ... Her claim is that the City's failure to properly hire, train, retain, supervise, discipline and control Valentine and the other police officers directly caused her tortious injury. ... Under that theory, Yellow Bird was obligated to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the City breached a duty owed to her and that that breach proximately caused the deprivation of her constitutional rights. ... In order to prove her case, Yellow Bird had to establish that the City had notice of prior misbehavior and that its failure to act upon such knowledge caused her injury. ... "(W)here senior personnel have knowledge of a pattern of constitutionally offensive acts by their subordinates but fail to take remedial steps, the municipality may be held liable for a subsequent violation if the superior's inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or to tacit authorization of the offensive acts." ... If a municipality fails to train its police force, or if it does so in a grossly negligent manner so that it inevitably results in police misconduct, "the municipality exhibits a 'deliberate indifference' to the resulting violations of a citizen's constitutional rights." ... Moreover, a municipality's continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the type of informal policy or custom that is amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on police supervisors, and failure-to-train liability requires a causal connection or affirmative link through participation or acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation.

Linkogel v. Baker Protective Services, Inc. · filed 1981-10-27

Neither may they be held vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI) absent an “affirmative link” with the misconduct. ... While it is clear that such a cause of action does exist, there must be a sufficient “causal connection” or “affirmative link” present in order to hold the supervisor liable. ... This requirement is satisfied only by participating or acquiescing in the complained-of deprivation.

A county can face Section 1983 liability when it allegedly knew of a deputy’s violent history and negligently failed to supervise or train him.

Overbay v. Lilliman · filed 1983-10-03

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the plaintiff’s allegations of (1) knowledge of Deputy Lilliman’s past history of violence and (2) negligence in the supervising and training are sufficient to establish a cause of action against Lafayette County under Section 1983.

A Section 1983 supervisory-liability plaintiff must show a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm and corrective inaction amounting to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization; ordinarily, isolated incidents are insufficient.

Slakan v. T.C. Porter, M.M. Walters, Amos Reed, Ralph Edwards, Sam Garrison, and J.B. Barefoot, J.G. Watson, · filed 1984-06-05

The plaintiff, of course, assumes a heavy burden of proof in supervisory liability cases. He not only must demonstrate that the prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source, but he must show that the supervisor’s corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or “tacit authorization of the offensive [practices]”. ... Ordinarily, he cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, ... for a supervisor cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence within the area of his responsibilities.

A municipality's failure to supervise or train its police officers is actionable under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff shows the entity had notice of prior misbehavior, failed to act with deliberate indifference to further constitutional violations, and that this failure proximately caused the injury.

BAKER v. McCOY · filed 1984-07-24

In order to sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must show that the governmental body had notice of prior misbehavior, that it failed to act, with "deliberate indifference" to further constitutional violations, and that such failure to act proximately caused the injury.

Section 1983 municipal liability for inadequate training or supervision requires gross negligence or deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, and allegations of such a policy can survive dismissal.

Hardeman v. Clark · filed 1984-09-26

Only if the lack of proper training or supervision was so severe as to reach the level of “gross negligence” or “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiffs’ “constitutional rights” could liability attach. ... This deliberate indifference can give rise to liability, so it would be improper for the Court to dismiss the action as to the District of Columbia at this time.

A supervisor is liable under § 1983 for failure to supervise or train only if the supervisor at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the officers’ unconstitutional conduct.

Buckner v. State of Nev. · filed 1984-12-18

At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.

A municipal § 1983 failure-to-train claim must allege and prove a policy causing the constitutional deprivation and gross negligence or deliberate indifference in the training failure.

Scarpa v. Murphy · filed 1985-01-30

That means plaintiff must allege and prove a policy that deprived him of his constitutional rights and, in the case of an alleged policy failure to train, that that failure was grossly negligent or amounted to deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights.

Municipal liability under § 1983 for failure to train requires more than a general training deficiency; the plaintiff must establish a causal relationship between the failure to train and the officer’s misconduct.

Rymer v. Trooper H.A. Davis, City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky, and Ben Stillwell · filed 1985-02-11

It is not enough, however, that the plaintiff demonstrate a general failure to train. There must exist a causal relationship between the failure to train and the conduct of the police officer.

A municipality may face Section 1983 liability when its deliberate policy of leaving predictable medical emergencies to untrained officers causes a wrongful delay in necessary medical attention.

Davis v. Ramey · filed 1985-03-14

There was sufficient evidence based on the testimony of police chief Joyner and others to support a finding that the Roswell Police Department provided no training to its officers to handle predictable medical emergency situations but had a deliberate policy of “officer discretion” under such circumstances, resulting in this case in a wrongful delay of necessary medical attention in violation of 42 USC § 1983.

A municipal section 1983 claimant must produce facts showing the particular way the municipality adopted an unlawful policy or inadequately trained its officers.

Smith v. Yono · filed 1985-04-30

Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to provide the Court with facts in support of its § 1983 claim against the defendant municipalities. This factual showing should illustrate the particular manner in which the municipalities adopted impermissible policies or failed to properly train the officers.

A section 1983 failure-to-train claim against a police chief and municipality should not be resolved on summary judgment when genuine factual disputes remain about their liability for violating constitutional rights.

Voutour v. Harold Vitale, James T. Voutour v. Harold Vitale · filed 1985-05-09

Viewing the facts most favorably for plaintiff, we think a sufficient showing was made of genuine issues of material fact concerning whether or not the Chief and Town are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for having violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A municipality cannot be liable under section 1983 through respondeat superior or for negligent training based only on one isolated instance of wrongdoing.

Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers · filed 1985-05-10

Were this not so, the fact that there can be no liability under Sec. 1983 either under respondeat superior, Monell v. New York City. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), or for negligence in training, supervising or controlling subordinates, Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 152, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833, 103 S.Ct. 75, 74 L.Ed.2d 73 (1982), based simply on an isolated instance of wrongdoing would require dismissal of the action against the County and its Police Department.

An officer's isolated act is insufficient to establish municipal liability under section 1983 without a pattern or widespread practice supporting a failure-to-train claim.

Wells v. Bobby Glen Rushing and Town of Maben, Mississippi · filed 1985-05-20

Moreover, Rushing’s isolated act would be insufficient to subject the city to liability under the cases addressing the municipal duty to train. ... Rushing’s testimony could have added nothing to that of the other witnesses in establishing the pattern or widespread practice necessary to imposing liability on the town.

Allegations that a supervisory official's policymaking and training failures caused the constitutional deprivation are sufficient to withstand dismissal of a § 1983 claim.

Beynum v. Boteler · filed 1985-12-12

The law is clear that such allegations against a supervisory official in a section 1983 action are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 for failure to train when gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference causes a subordinate’s violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights.

Woodley v. Town of Nantucket · filed 1986-10-17

A supervisory official may be liable under Section 1983 for a failure to train properly employees working under his command. To be actionable, that failure must be the result of gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference and be causally linked to the subordinate’s violation of the plaintiff’s civil rights.

A city or county risks Section 1983 liability for deficient police training only when the failure is gross and is affirmatively linked to the particular constitutional violation.

Tompkins v. Frost · filed 1987-03-16

Although an action exists for inadequate police training, two of its elements are very severe. First, mere negligence in training is insufficient; the failure must be so gross in nature that future police misconduct is substantially certain to result. ... Second, even when gross negligence is demonstrated, a strong causal link must be established between the inadequacies in the training or supervision and the specific wrongdoing which injured the plaintiff.

Negligent hiring, training, or supervision does not state a Section 1983 claim; the deficiency must be severe enough to show gross negligence or deliberate indifference.

Kimpton v. School District of New Libsbon · filed 1987-03-19

A claim of negligence in hiring, training, and supervising employees does not state a cause of action under sec. 1983. ... For such a claim to be actionable under the federal act, the failure to supervise or the lack of training must be so severe that it shows "gross negligence” or "deliberate indifference.”

Mere negligence in training or supervision does not supply the municipal policy and causal force needed for Section 1983 liability.

Romero v. Otero · filed 1987-03-26

Especially as applied to supervisory personnel and municipalities where the alleged role in the constitutional deprivation is based on a failure to train and supervise, mere negligent conduct fails to supply the “moving force” behind the violation sufficient to “deprive” a citizen of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 supervisory liability requires a causal connection to the constitutional violation, and a failure to train or supervise must amount to gross negligence or conscious indifference rather than ordinary negligence.

Willbanks v. Smith County, Tex. · filed 1987-03-31

In order to be liable under § 1983, “[supervisory officials need not have participated personally in an act ..., but the plaintiff must show some causal connection between an act of the official and the alleged violation.” ... The causal connection may consist of a supervisor’s failure to train, but the supervisory failure must amount to more than mere negligence; a jury finding of gross negligence or conscious indifference is required.

Section 1983 permits no claim for failure to train or supervise a county officer when the officer committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department · filed 1990-06-19

When there is no underlying constitutional violation by a county officer, there cannot be an action for failing to train or supervise the officer.

Section 1983 requires sufficient evidence that a municipality’s failure to train or supervise amounts to a custom or policy of deliberate indifference before the municipality can be held liable.

Bell v. County of Washington County, Iowa · filed 1990-06-22

Although plaintiffs have evidence that eight other prisoners had previously attempted suicide in the Washington County Jail, they have failed to come forth with sufficient evidence to show that defendant County’s alleged failure to train and supervise constitutes a custom or policy of deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide in the Washington County Jail.

Section 1983 permits a claim against supervisory personnel for inadequate training only when the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the trained personnel encounter.

Heinlen v. Skelton · filed 1990-07-31

Inadequate training may form the basis for a claim against supervisory personnel "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [trained personnel] come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989) (defining scope of municipal liability under failure to train theory).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public agency for failure to train or supervise an officer absent evidence of similar harmful police misconduct or widespread serious incompetence or misbehavior.

Price v. LOUISIANA DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEV. · filed 1992-06-18

In the absence of evidence of a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by intentional or negligent police misconduct and/or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force, the MRBA cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the negligence or gross negligence of its subordinate officers for failing to train or properly supervise the particular officer(s) in question.

Section 1983 requires gross negligence amounting to conscious indifference and a pattern or practice of constitutional violations to hold a police agency independently liable for its officer’s conduct.

Price v. Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development · filed 1992-06-18

In order for the MRBA to be held liable independently from Poche’s liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the actions of the MRBA must be predicated upon “gross negligence” amounting to “conscious indifference” and there must be a pattern or practice of constitutional violations supporting the theory of gross negligence.

Section 1983 liability for failure to train correctional officers requires deliberate indifference to the need for training and a causal link between the training deficiency and the injury.

Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County · filed 1993-08-12

This undisputed testimony not only fails to reflect any wanton or callous disregard for the need to train correctional officers, it further shows that there is no causal link between Baptiste’s death and any alleged failure to train Fermino.

Section 1983 municipal and supervisory liability for failure to discipline requires evidence of a persistent or irresponsible practice, which isolated incidents do not establish.

Loggins v. Jeans · filed 1993-09-17

After analyzing Plaintiffs proffer for evidence of a failure to discipline, the Court must find that the one or two incidents for which such evidence exists, over the course of Seay’s four-year tenure as Sheriff of Cherokee County, do not come close to suggesting a persistent or irresponsible practice of failing to discipline officers who violate others’ rights. Plaintiff has offered evidence of nothing more than isolated incidents, many in the form of accusations only, and most without any mention of Defendants’ disciplinary responses.

Municipal liability under § 1983 for failure to train requires deliberate indifference to an obvious need for training; a lack of specialized training, recklessness, or gross negligence alone is insufficient.

Fittanto v. Children's Advocacy Center · filed 1993-09-24

Although plaintiffs have presented evidence that Village police are not specifically given training in the investigation of child sexual abuse, such a showing is not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment on their failure to train claim. The standard of deliberate indifference is not satisfied by a showing of recklessness or even gross negligence in failing to train the officers. ... Absent any evidence that the Village should have been on notice of the need for specialized training, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the need was so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in constitutional violation that the Village could be said to have been consciously indifferent. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the Village on plaintiffs’ failure to train claim.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failure to train or supervise requires the policy to actually cause the injury; failure to prevent a private driver's conduct does not satisfy that requirement.

Jones v. City Of Carlisle · filed 1993-10-13

While the City did nothing to prevent Byrd from driving, this inaction was not the "moving force" behind Mr. Jones' injuries. His injuries were directly caused by the epileptic seizure Byrd experienced while he was operating his vehicle. As a result, the Joneses' Sec. 1983 claim of failure to train or supervise was appropriately dismissed by the district court.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 for failure to train requires evidence of a policy or practice amounting to deliberate indifference; conclusory allegations based on a single incident of inadequate medical care do not suffice.

Lashley v. Pierce County · filed 1993-10-20

In rebuttal, Lashley submitted only his own conclusory statements that the inadequate treatment he allegedly received obviously resulted from inadequate training. Vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. ... Lashley thus failed to submit evidence at summary judgment showing a pattern or practice of failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of those incarcerated sufficient to impose municipal liability.

Under the Second Circuit supervisory-liability framework applied here, § 1983 personal involvement may include failure to remedy a known violation, maintaining an unconstitutional policy or custom, or grossly negligent supervision.

Johnson v. Meachum · filed 1993-12-15

Rather, the plaintiff must allege some direct personal responsibility or involvement. ... Second, a supervisory official, after learning of the violation, may have failed to remedy the wrong. Third, a supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue. Lastly, a supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. ... While the plaintiffs allegations with regard to Tilghman and Meachum may seem tenuous, it is at least remotely possible that the plaintiff can sustain, a viable claim of personal involvement based on one or more of these theories—with the exception, of course, of direct participation.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise when a policymaker’s deliberate indifference causes employees to violate constitutional rights.

Doolittle v. Ruffo · filed 1994-03-15

Having satisfied all three of these requirements, the court concludes that plaintiffs have come forward with sufficient evidence to, at the very least, create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the question of the County’s liability to plaintiffs based upon its failure to train and/or supervise the Sheriff and his supervisory officers with respect to the County’s Affirmative Action program.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a police chief liable under § 1983 for failure to train officers must prove deliberate indifference and, to overcome qualified immunity, show that the failure violated clearly established rights.

Fulwood v. Porter · filed 1994-03-28

Because appellees would have the burden at trial of proving deliberate indifference by Fulwood, they necessarily have the burden of proving that he violated clearly established rights by a failure to train rising to that exacting level.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for failure to train employees only when the failure results from the municipality’s deliberate indifference.

Seamons v. Snow · filed 1994-10-04

Although a municipal government may be held hable for failure to train its employees, such liability arises only where the failure to train results from the deliberate indifference of that municipal government.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to bring a failure-to-train or supervision claim when that failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of people the employees encounter.

Carpino v. Peter Demosthenes and James Sanders · filed 1994-10-13

A prisoner may maintain a Sec. 1983 action for violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process "where the failure to train [or supervise prison employees] amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] come into contact." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (municipal liability attaches only where a training program is inadequate due to policymakers deliberate indifference to the need for more or different training to prevent constitutional violations by employees).

Section 1983 allows a claim to proceed when a complaint alleges that county commissioners failed to train and supervise employees, thereby depriving the plaintiff of civil rights.

Felix v. Commissioners of Middlesex County · filed 1994-12-29

Felix also has alleged that the Commissioners failed to properly train and supervise their employees and that this deprived him of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. That is enough to state a claim under §1983.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for failure to train or supervise police officers without evidence of deliberate indifference in its training or supervision.

Anderson v. CITY OF GLENWOOD, GEORGIA · filed 1995-05-12

Because the undisputed evidence shows that the City was not deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police officers, the City’s motion for summary judgment on Anderson’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a policy or practice of failing to train or supervise employees, but one alleged failure to train or supervise is insufficient to infer such a policy or practice.

Barnett v. Dillon · filed 1995-06-22

Although plaintiffs allege multiple incidents of misconduct by Dillon, they allege only one incident of failure to train and supervise. That is, they only allege and set forth facts in opposition to this summary judgment motion related to one incident: the County’s failure to train and supervise Dillon. This is insufficient to raise an inference of a policy or practice of failure to train or supervise.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for failure to train or supervise only when deliberate indifference causes a constitutional deprivation.

Huong v. City of Port Arthur · filed 1997-02-24

Plaintiffs have not shown that the City was deliberately indifferent in adopting or failing to adopt any regulations related to the use of force by an officer or that any alleged failure to train or supervise amounted to deliberate indifference and caused the alleged constitutional deprivation of the right to be free from excessive force.

Municipal liability under § 1983 for inadequate training or supervision requires deliberate indifference and a causal link between that failure and the injury.

Morrissey v. City of New York · filed 1997-05-02

Plaintiff has failed to survive summary judgment on his claim of failure to train or supervise because (1) he has no evidence which demonstrates that the municipality exhibited a “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of plaintiff and others like him, and (2) there is no causal link between plaintiffs’ injury and any alleged deficiency in the municipality’s training or supervision program.

Section 1983 failure-to-train or supervise claims against a municipality or supervisor cannot withstand summary judgment on conclusory affidavits and pleadings.

Higgins v. City of Little Rock · filed 1998-03-26

Finally, the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper because Higgins's conclusory affidavits and pleadings were insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989) (municipal liability for failure to train or supervise); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996) (individual liability for supervisor's failure to train or supervise).

Section 1983 claims against a municipality or supervisor for failure to train or supervise cannot survive summary judgment on conclusory affidavits and pleadings alone.

Higgins v. City of Little Rock Louie Caudell, Chief of Police John Does · filed 1998-03-26

Finally, the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper because Higgins's conclusory affidavits and pleadings were insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (municipal liability for failure to train or supervise); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir.1996) (individual liability for supervisor's failure to train or supervise).