42 U.S.C. § 1983

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim when their conduct did not violate that amendment.

K.G. ex rel. Gosch v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District · filed 2017-03-23

The same is true, here: Because I have found no Fourteenth Amendment violation, the defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim for an investigative detention if a reasonable officer could have believed that reasonable suspicion existed.

De La Rosa v. White · filed 2017-03-27

Thus, Trooper White is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that he had a reasonable suspicion; in other words, if he had arguable reasonable suspicion.

Qualified immunity bars damages claims under § 1983 against officials in their individual capacities when the plaintiff fails to state a constitutional violation.

Doe v. Miami University · filed 2017-03-28

As such, the Court concludes that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities for civil damages.

Officers sued for damages under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when existing precedent did not clearly establish that their particular conduct was unlawful.

Middaugh v. City of Three Rivers · filed 2017-03-29

In light of the analysis in Mullenix, we find it not beyond debate that reasonable officers in their position could have believed their conduct was lawful under then-existing precedent. ... Therefore, Officers Piper and Gipson are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when existing law gave no fair notice that the challenged conduct violated a constitutional right.

Donovan v. Phillips · filed 2017-03-29

Without such fair notice, we hold that Officer Phillips is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield officers with qualified immunity for an investigatory stop when clearly established law gave them fair warning that the stop was unlawful.

Campbell v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-03-29

Accordingly, under clearly established precedent, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because, on the undisputed facts, the officers would have had “fair warning” that they were acting contrary to the law when they conducted the investigatory stop.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials are limited by qualified immunity and require a causal connection for supervisory liability.

Jackson v. Glynn County Georgia · filed 2017-03-31

The district court correctly entered summary judgment against Jackson’s complaint against Bennett in his individual capacity. Bennett was entitled to qualified immunity unless Jackson proved that Bennett’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. ... Jackson also alleged that Bennett was responsible for the allegedly unlawful force used by and punishment inflicted by his officers, but Jackson failed to identify any evidence that would establish the causal connection required to impose supervisory liability on Bennett. ... Bennett’s conduct “was not constitutionally inadequate for purposes of qualified immunity.” Id.

An individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Harmon v. Dallas County · filed 2017-03-31

For the reasons stated, the court concludes that Evans is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs claim against him in his individual capacity for retaliation in violation of Plaintiffs First Amendment right to free speech brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismisses with prejudice this claim.

Section 1983 claims against individual officers are subject to qualified immunity.

Rogers v. Lee County, Mississippi · filed 2017-04-03

Because we cannot find, on summary judgment, that the officers acted objectively reasonably in conducting the warrantless search of the red truck, we reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity in favor of Warren and Howell relating to the warrantless search of the 320A property, including the red truck.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonably competent officer could conclude that probable cause existed.

Sanseviro v. State of New York · filed 2017-04-04

Since an officer of reasonable competence could have concluded that Sanseviro violated the law, those involved in his arrest and prosecution are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer who shoots a fleeing suspect when a reasonable officer would know the suspect poses no imminent threat.

Littlejohn v. Myers · filed 2017-04-04

The aforementioned case clearly establishes a constitutional violation when an officer shoots a fleeing suspect in the back without a basis for believing that the suspect poses an imminent threat, regardless of the previous felony the suspect committed. See Washington, 977 F.2d at 994–95. As we have previously explained, Littlejohn did not pose a threat to the officer or to any innocent bystanders. Accordingly, a reasonable officer in Myers’ position would know that the use of deadly force was not authorized.

Section 1983 permits excessive force claims against officers, subject to qualified immunity.

Estate of Hill ex rel. Hill v. Miracle · filed 2017-04-04

Miracle is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Hill’s § 1983 claim of excessive force.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when an officer's objectively reasonable conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Boyd v. City of New York · filed 2017-04-05

Further, the appellants established that Gomez’s actions were privileged under the doctrine of qualified immunity, as they were objectively reasonable (see Davila v City of New York, 139 AD3d at 893; Williams v City of New York, 129 AD3d at 1067), and his conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known (see Davila v City of New York, 139 AD3d at 893; Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v Town of Cortlandt, 79 AD3d 700, 704 [2010]). It was objectively reasonable for Gomez to believe that his actions in supervising the team executing the valid search warrant, including the decision to handcuff the plaintiff, did not violate the plaintiff’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Section 1983 claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Hanks v. Rogers · filed 2017-04-05

We therefore hold that Hanks has met his burden of rebutting Officer Rogers’s qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 failure-to-intervene claim when existing law did not put a reasonable officer on notice that intervention was required under the circumstances.

Militello v. Sheriff of the Broward Sheriff's Office · filed 2017-04-05

Because all of these factors distinguish this case from those where officers have been found liable for failing to intervene when excessive force was used, we hold that Deputies Morel' and Polk did not violate clearly established law. Therefore, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Spears v. City of Tucson · filed 2017-04-11

The district court appropriately held that Officer Burnett is entitled to qualified immunity. When the Tuscon Medical Center security requested that Spears and the other protestors be removed, it was reasonable for Burnett to rely on land records and confirmation from the City that North Wyatt and East Farness Drives were privately owned. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity where his actions did not “violate a clearly established constitutional right, where ‘clearly established’ means that ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law.

Hudson v. Knapp · filed 2017-04-13

In order to be entitled to qualified immunity on a false arrest claim, Knapp must have had “arguable probable cause” to arrest Hudson. ... Based on Hudson’s version of events, we conclude his constitutional rights were violated. ... Thus, we proceed to whether the constitutional violation was clearly established.

A public official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Godboldo v. County of Wayne · filed 2017-04-14

Public officials who violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Plaintiffs have not established that their constitutional rights were violated, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment claim asserted against Wenk.

For § 1983 qualified immunity, the law was clearly established by January 2014 that an officer could not use deadly force without warning against a person who was not committing a crime, resisting arrest, holding a weapon, or making threatening moves.

Turk v. Bergman · filed 2017-04-14

Furthermore, as of January 9, 2014, the law was clearly established that a police officer may not use deadly force without warning against a person who was not committing a crime, resisting arrest, holding a weapon, or making any threatening moves.

In a Section 1983 suit, a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing individual liability to overcome qualified immunity.

Hall v. Texas Commission on Law Enforcement · filed 2017-04-17

Both his original and amended complaints contain only vague allegations about individual culpability. Hall thus failed to overcome the qualified-immunity defense.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Hamilton v. Singleton · filed 2017-04-18

With regard to the refusal-to-pay claim, we conclude that Sheriff Singleton was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, because the claim was not based upon a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

A parole officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Cody Marble v. Smith · filed 2017-04-18

Here, even if there were a violation of Marble’s due process rights, Smith is entitled to qualified immunity because those rights were not clearly established.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a false arrest claim at the motion to dismiss stage when no objectively reasonable officer could find probable cause on the alleged facts.

Alexander v. City of Round Rock · filed 2017-04-18

Because, on the facts alleged, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Alexander for resisting a search under Texas law, and because no objectively reasonable officer would conclude that such probable cause did exist, we hold that: (1) Alexander has stated a Fourth Amendment claim; and (2) the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from that claim at the motion to dismiss stage.

Qualified immunity shields an official from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Tschida v. Motl · filed 2017-04-18

Tschida lacked a clearly established constitutional right to speak about the existence of his ethics complaint. The statute calls for confidentiality. The confidentiality provision has never been challenged or ruled unconstitutional. The cloak of qualified immunity attached to Motl in this case.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff’s account shows excessive force against a person who was not resisting arrest for a minor offense.

Scott v. Palmer · filed 2017-04-19

The district court did not err by denying Palmer qualified immunity. ... Assuming, as we must, that James was not resisting arrest for a minor offense, the acts of shoving him to the ground, kneeling on his back, pressing his face into the ground, and ignoring his assertions that he could not produce his arm for handcuffing and could not breathe were excessive.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim if the plaintiff cannot show both a violation of a federally protected right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Evans v. Plummer · filed 2017-04-19

Courts ask two questions: (1) whether the plaintiff’s federally-protected rights were violated, and (2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time.

Defendants seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim must address that claim to obtain summary judgment on immunity grounds.

Holmes v. City of Wilmington · filed 2017-04-19

Defendants’ brief did not squarely address whether Pfaff and Nowell are subject to qualified immunity against the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, having focused instead exclusively on the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, defendants motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim is denied.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the challenged conduct would not have been clearly unconstitutional to every reasonable official.

Corona v. Knowles · filed 2017-04-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Santana’s Eighth Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to every reasonable official that depriving Santana of outdoor exercise for approximately five months in response to a violent attack on prison officials was unconstitutional.

A plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity on a Section 1983 claim by showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and objectively unreasonable conduct.

Foster v. Woods · filed 2017-04-20

A plaintiff overcomes the immunity if he can show: “(1) that he has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and (2) that the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident.”

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity on claims for which the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Antoine Miles v. Guice · filed 2017-04-21

Because the officials did not violate Miles’ Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, we conclude that they are entitled to qualified immunity on those claims.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when disputed facts about the officials’ conduct bear on whether they violated a clearly established right.

McNamara v. City of Long Beach · filed 2017-04-21

These facts inform whether defendants violated a clearly established right of the plaintiffs. As a result, the Court cannot dismiss plaintiffs claims at this stage based on qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Rodarte v. Alameda County · filed 2017-04-24

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on the Deputy Sheriffs’ qualified immunity defense because their conduct did not violate Rodarte’s clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force during an arrest.

Individual-capacity claims under § 1983 are subject to qualified immunity unless the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right.

McCarty v. Roos · filed 2017-04-24

The district court properly dismissed McCarty’s individual capacity claims against the federal and state defendants because McCarty failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct violated a clearly established right.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights.

Guy v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2017-04-25

Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their actions violate clearly established rights.

A § 1983 complaint may be dismissed when the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Anderson v. Patterson · filed 2017-04-27

Rufus Julius Cornelius Anderson appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Anderson’s motion for an order of protection or restraining order, grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to prison officials who had fair warning that retaliating against an inmate for filing a grievance violated the First Amendment.

Booker v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2017-04-28

In sum, given the authority discussed above, we conclude that a reasonable prison official had fair warning that retaliating against an inmate who filed a prison grievance was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim against an officer who allegedly violated a clearly established right to conduct door-to-door outreach.

Rivero v. Montgomery County · filed 2017-05-03

Accordingly, qualified immunity does not bar the Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Officer Kettering.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when their use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Abbey v. City of Reno · filed 2017-05-04

The district court properly concluded that the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer’s qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim depends on facts known to that officer; another officer’s knowledge does not establish it.

Johnson v. Burns · filed 2017-05-04

That the jury found facts as to Burns’s knowledge — that Burns had observed heroin drop from Johnson— does not avail Wright. It would have supported a claim of qualified immunity as to Bums. But because it does not bear on Wright’s knowledge, it has no bearing on Wright’s qualified immunity claim.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the force was objectively reasonable and violated no constitutional right.

Boude v. Heady · filed 2017-05-05

Heady is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on the excessive-use-of-force claim.

A § 1983 claim cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds unless the defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.

Janowski v. City of North Wildwood · filed 2017-05-05

Without further factual development, the Court cannot evaluate the full set of circumstances with which Sergeant McGee was confronted at the time he arrested Plaintiff. This information is critical to this Court’s determination of whether Sergeant McGee is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, as the Court does not find that qualified immunity is apparent on the face of the Complaint, Sergeant McGee’s motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice.

Factual disputes about whether prison officials gave meaningful segregation reviews can preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit.

Isby v. Brown · filed 2017-05-10

... in the case at hand, the various factual disputes discussed above preclude summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects parole officers from an unreasonable-search claim when they reasonably believe the searched home is a parolee’s residence.

Frego v. Parole Officer F. Kelsick · filed 2017-05-11

The district court properly concluded that Defendants here are entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed that Frego’s home was the residence of her estranged husband, Troy Clayton Wallace (“Wallace”), an absconded parolee who had been missing for over a week.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law warned that slamming a secured, handcuffed arrestee who posed no danger or flight risk was unconstitutional.

Scott v. Ossie Battle · filed 2017-05-11

In light of these cases, no objectively reasonable officer in Battle’s position could have thought that slamming a physically outmatched, handcuffed, secured suspect— who was surrounded by multiple officers, not resisting arrest, and making no attempt to flee—was a constitutionally permissible use of force.

An officer is immune from a Section 1983 excessive force claim unless the unlawfulness of the force was clearly established in the specific circumstances at the time.

S. B. v. County of San Diego · filed 2017-05-12

Moses is therefore immune from liability under section 1983 for his ... use of deadly force, so we reverse the denial of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Officials who were not final decision-makers received qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim because their personal liability was not clearly established.

Pennypacker v. City of Pearl, Mississ · filed 2017-05-12

Plaintiffs concede that Mayor Rogers and Myers were not the final decision-makers responsible for their terminations. It is not clearly established in this circuit whether these individual defendants may be held personally liable for First Amendment retaliation under § 1983. ... Accordingly, we GRANT summary judgment based on qualified immunity in favor of Mayor Rogers and Myers.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 liability when the officer reasonably perceives a threat of serious physical harm from an apparent firearm.

Dooley v. Tharp · filed 2017-05-15

Qualified immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless the officer’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... We thus conclude that, however tragic the circumstances of Dooley’s death, Tharp was correctly granted qualified immunity in the constitutionally based action.

Qualified immunity does not require dismissal of a § 1983 political retaliation claim when the complaint plausibly alleges that every reasonable official would have known the dismissal was unlawful; the defense may be raised again after factual development.

Maldonado v. Rodriguez · filed 2017-05-15

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have at least stated a plausible claim that every reasonable DA in Rodriguez's position would have known that the Pickering - Connick factors balanced in each Plaintiff's favor, and will deny Defendants' Motion without prejudice to their ability to re-urge the defense of qualified immunity upon further development of the factual record.

An officer performing discretionary duties is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established right.

Santana v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2017-05-17

We agree with the district court that Officer Alech is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and that there is no basis for Plaintiff to recover against the County on his negligence or wrongful death claims.

Officers sued under Section 1983 in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the specific circumstances they faced.

Jones v. Officer S. Fransen · filed 2017-05-19

For these reasons, we must conclude that Jones’s constitutional right was not clearly established when Defendant Officers engaged in the challenged behavior. As a result, Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s ruling to the contrary must be reversed.

A state official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity if the evidence permits a finding that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Jenkins v. Tucker · filed 2017-05-23

A state official is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity unless (1) the "facts taken in the light favoring the nonmoving party show that the official's action violated a constitutional right" and (2) that right "was clearly established" at the time of the violation. ... For these reasons we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Tucker summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

A police officer may be protected by qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Harrison v. Curt Vanderkooi · filed 2017-05-23

With respect to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arising from the P&P procedure, and for the reasons set forth in Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___, we hold that VanderKooi was protected by qualified immunity.

Government officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Payne v. Hopkins · filed 2017-05-23

Payne has not established that it would be clear to reasonable prison officials in the positions of the DCS officials in this case that their conduct was unlawful. The district court did not err in finding the officials entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Payne’s First Amendment claims.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from liability under Section 1983 for a warrantless entry presenting a close constitutional question, but does not protect an arrest that violates clearly established rights.

Gibson v. O'Donnell · filed 2017-05-23

O’Donnell’s entry into the plaintiffs’ apartment without a warrant presents a close question under clearly established Fourth Amendment law, even in light of the plaintiffs’ version of the facts. But the doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials against liability in close cases. However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, O’Donnell’s arrest of Gibson without probable cause violated Gibson’s clearly established constitutional rights, which a reasonably competent police officer should have known at the time.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Baptiste v. Foster, NHAG, et al. · filed 2017-05-25

Because there is no case before December of 2014 holding that searches conducted in the manner used by the defendants to search Baptiste violated an inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity for a search when no clearly established law put them on notice that it violated the Fourth Amendment.

Doe v. Goodman · filed 2017-05-25

We conclude, however, that there was no clearly established law putting defendants on notice that a search of Doe’s rented room would violate the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the facts known to the officer could lead a reasonable officer to believe there was probable cause to arrest.

Foster v. County of Spokane · filed 2017-05-26

Accordingly, Defendant Skogen was entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim.

Qualified immunity can defeat a Section 1983 excessive force claim against police officers sued in their individual capacities.

Moody v. Hollandsworth · filed 2017-05-30

Corey Moody appeals from the district court’s awards of summary judgment to police officers Danielle Hollandsworth and Randy Gibson, in their individual capacities, in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action. ... The district court rejected Moody’s excessive force claims against Hollandsworth and Gibson, and ruled that both officers are entitled to qualified immunity. ... Having done so, we are satisfied to adopt the reasoning and analysis of the district court and to affirm on the basis of the court’s comprehensive and well-crafted Opinion.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the law did not clearly establish that their use of force was unconstitutional at the time.

Emmett v. City of Tacoma · filed 2017-05-30

At the time Emmett was arrested, however, our law relating to the use of tasers was not “clearly established.”

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could believe deadly force was necessary to prevent an armed suspect from escaping and harming others.

Sharese M. Wells v. Talton · filed 2017-05-30

A reasonable officer in Deputy Glidden’s position could have believed that deadly force was necessary to prevent the decedent’s escape and avert a threat of harm to others. Deputy Glidden resorted to deadly force after his verbal commands and ... physical altercation did not subdue the decedent. Under the evidence in the record at the time of summary judgment, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the district court properly determined that the use of deadly force did not violate Chambers’ Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, we hold the district court properly granted qualified immunity to Deputy Glidden.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer could reasonably believe the conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Stevenson v. Jones · filed 2017-05-30

Given these circumstances, Deputy Jones could have believed reasonably, but mistakenly, that the force he used did not amount to constitutionally-prohibited excessive force. He therefore is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in his favor on the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a factual dispute remains over whether officers struck a handcuffed, submissive arrestee.

Wood v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2017-05-31

Summary judgment here would be premature because there exists a genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether any of the five officers involved in the stop, arrest, and ensuing melee punched, kicked, or stepped on Mr. Wood after he had been completely handcuffed and had fully submitted to their authority by ceasing his own “hitting.”

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the plaintiff fails to show that they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills · filed 2017-06-01

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Marshall’s § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims.

Qualified immunity does not bar a Section 1983 retaliation claim against a prison official when the inmate’s right to file a grievance was clearly established.

Martin v. Duffy · filed 2017-06-01

And we further conclude that Duffy is not entitled to qualified immunity from Martin’s retaliation claim because, under this Court’s precedent, it was clearly established at the time Duffy placed Martin in segregation that retaliating against an inmate for filing a grievance violates the inmate’s rights under the First Amendment.

Officials sued under Section 1983 retain qualified immunity when an adequate lawful motive supported their conduct, even if they also had a retaliatory motive.

Wall-DeSousa v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles · filed 2017-06-02

When an adequate lawful motive is present, even an assumed fact that an unlawful, retaliatory motive also exists does not preclude qualified immunity.

An officer loses qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer’s conduct violates a right that was clearly established at the time.

Perry v. Woodruff County Sheriff Department ex rel. Barker · filed 2017-06-05

An officer loses the shield of qualified immunity if (1) the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the purported misconduct.

Qualified immunity does not entitle an officer to summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the evidence could show that the officer allowed a dog to continue biting after the plaintiff surrendered.

Chatman v. Deputy Wengert · filed 2017-06-06

Instead, all of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Chatman creates a factual issue as to how long the dog bite continued and how long Deputy Wengert allowed canine Diesel to continue biting or holding Chatman’s upper leg after Chatman surrendered. ... Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s order denying Deputy Wengert’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established.

Leek v. Miller · filed 2017-06-07

“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action, providing immunity from suit from the outset.” Washington, 847 F.3d at 1197 (internal quotation marks omitted). ... As these cases demonstrate, the law in this circuit is not clearly established whether a prisoner has a protected property interest in his prison accounts. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff does not show that the officer violated a constitutional right.

Roupe v. Strickland · filed 2017-06-08

Officer Veach was also entitled to qualified immunity because Roupe did not allege or show facts that Officer Veach violated Roupe’s constitutional rights by not reporting the tasing.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer violates a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Perry v. Wolfe · filed 2017-06-05

Accordingly, Pennycook does not control this case, and we conclude that Perry’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force was clearly established in August 2009 such that Wolfe was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 claim against a governor.

Jackson v. Lawrence Hogan, Jr. · filed 2017-06-05

We therefore conclude that Governor Hogan is entitled to qualified immunity, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity must show a rights violation and a clearly established right.

Nauman v. Utah Highway Patrol · filed 2017-06-07

Where, as here, a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “that on the facts alleged the defendant violated his or her constitutional or statutory rights” and (2) “that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful activity.” ... Because he has failed to advance legal arguments on qualified immunity, the district court correctly granted summary judgment against him.

An arresting officer is immune from damages under § 1983 when it was objectively reasonable to believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Morris v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-09

We conclude that Lorenzo’s testimony establishes, as a matter of law, that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for a violation of section 1814 (b) (see People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]; Fitzpatrick v Rosenthal, 29 AD3d 24, 28 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 715 [2006]).

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the complaint plausibly alleges continued force against a subdued, unthreatening person in violation of clearly established law.

Anthony v. Seltzer · filed 2017-06-14

In a sentence, it could not be questioned in November of 2013 that the continued application of force to an unthreatening and subdued individual suffering a seizure constituted an unreasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant at the pleading stage from a retaliation claim based on alleged threats to fire or kill an employee for protected union activity.

Schleig v. Borough of Nazareth · filed 2017-06-15

Such direct threats of adverse action are squarely prohibited by Supreme Court precedent and the precedent of this Court. Therefore, Troxell is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when no reasonable officer could find arguable probable cause for the arrest.

WBY, Inc. v. Rutland · filed 2017-06-16

In sum, because Schindler’s conduct amounted to no more than a failure to respond immediately to Rutland’s orders while informing the officer of his status as a valet and questioning what the officers were doing at Follies, it cannot reasonably be construed as obstructing or resisting the exercise of a lawful duty. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Rutland on Schindler’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless their acts violate clearly established law.

Karow v. Fuchs · filed 2017-06-16

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless their acts violate clearly established law. ... The district court was right to conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages.

In a Section 1983 excessive force claim, qualified immunity protects an officer who reasonably believes the suspect poses a threat of serious harm.

Guerra v. Bellino · filed 2017-06-19

Qualified immunity requires that Bellino reasonably believed Guerra posed a threat of serious harm. See Flores, 381 F.3d at 395, 402.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 damages claims when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Sause v. Bauer · filed 2017-06-20

Because Sause fails to demonstrate that the contours of the right at issue are clearly established, we agree with the district court that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show they violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Reid v. Streit · filed 2017-06-21

Based on the facts as we must take them at this summary judgment stage of the proceedings, Streit and Webber are not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court properly denied them summary judgment on Reid’s claims against them in their individual capacities.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant infringed a constitutional right.

Wanzer v. Gloor · filed 2017-06-22

Because Wanzer has not shown that the defendants infringed his constitutional rights, he concomitantly has not shown that the district court erred by concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive force suit, an officer’s claim of qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor do not support the officer’s perception of an immediate threat.

Hughes v. Kisela · filed 2017-06-27

Ms. Hughes brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming excessive force in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Corporal Kisela, concluding that his actions were reasonable and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The facts when viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hughes do not support the district court’s decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. ... In this case, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Hughes, the record does not support Corporal Kisela’s perception of an immediate threat.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the force used violates a clearly established right and falls outside the margin of error allowed to a reasonable officer.

Ciolino v. Gikas · filed 2017-06-28

We conclude, as did the district court, that Gikas's actions not only violated Ciolino's Fourth Amendment right but also fell outside the "margin of error," Morelli, 552 F.3d at 24, that qualified immunity provides.

Section 1983 claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the official violated no constitutional right or the right was not clearly established.

De Ritis v. McGarrigle · filed 2017-06-29

As we conclude that there was no constitutional right violated by Roger under then-existing case law, a fortiori, such right was not “‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct,” Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381, and thus Roger was entitled to qualified immunity on that independent ground.

Section 1983 allows private security employees acting at a supervising government official’s direct instruction to claim qualified immunity.

Meadows v. Rockford Housing Authority · filed 2017-06-30

The cir- cumstances presented here, however, establish that the de- fendants were operating at the direct instruction of a super- vising government official. Under these circumstances, quali- fied immunity is available to the defendants.

Qualified immunity did not support summary judgment on this § 1983 excessive force claim because the plaintiff’s evidence raised a triable dispute about the officer’s use of force.

Heggem v. Snohomish County Corrections · filed 2017-07-03

The district court granted summary judgment on Heggem’s excessive force claim against defendant Eichelberger on the basis of qualified immunity, ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Heggem, and under any potentially applicable standard, Heggem raised a triable dispute as to whether Eichelberger’s use of force was excessive. ... We reverse summary judgment for Eichelberger, and remand for further proceedings as to Heggem’s excessive force claim against defendants Eichelberger, Nicholas and Miller.

Section 1983 does not allow a governmental entity to claim qualified immunity from damages liability.

Soto v. Gaudett · filed 2017-07-05

The defense of qualified immunity protects a government official, sued for actions he took under color of state law, from claims for damages against him in his individual capacity. That defense does not belong to the governmental entity; the entity itself is not allowed to assert that defense.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim requires an individual assessment of each officer’s conduct.

Tabatha Manning v. Vaughn Cotton · filed 2017-07-05

The doctrine of qualified immunity requires an individualized analysis as to each officer, Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2013), because a person "may be held personally liable for a constitutional violation only if his own conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right," Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 482 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

Officers sued under § 1983 for excessive force are entitled to qualified immunity when no controlling precedent clearly establishes that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment in the circumstances presented.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 2017-07-05

No precedential decision of the Supreme Court or this Court “clearly establishes” that the actions of Naimoli or Plevritis, viewed in the circumstances in which they were taken, were in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The excessive force cases on which Brown relies do not suffice for this purpose.

In a § 1983 suit, the court must decide an asserted immunity defense before requiring defendants to confer about settlement or prepare a discovery plan.

Howe v. City of Enterprise · filed 2017-07-06

If they do so, the district court should decide those immunity issues before requiring that the parties litigate Howe’s claims any further.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when reasonable officers could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest.

Avery v. Davis · filed 2017-07-06

In light of those facts, reasonable officers in Davis’ position could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Avery for an affray. See Brown, 608 F.3d at 734-75. As a result, Davis is entitled to qualified immunity as to Avery’s § 1983 false arrest claim.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim alleging that an officer shot an unarmed, injured person lying motionless on the ground.

Holloway v. Bartman Horn · filed 2017-07-07

Shooting an unarmed, injured person who is unmoving and bleeding profusely while lying on the ground would in itself be sufficient to defeat qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the law did not give fair warning that the conduct was unlawful.

Harvey O.J. Simpson, Sr. v. Coffee County School District · filed 2017-07-10

Vickers is entitled to qualified immunity on Mrs. Simpson’s excessive-force claim. ... No reasonable jury could find that Vickers had fair warning that his conduct towards Mrs. Simpson constituted excessive force.

In a § 1983 damages claim, qualified immunity requires consideration of whether the asserted right was clearly established; students’ rights to freedom of expression and speech were clearly established.

Abbott v. Pastides · filed 2017-07-11

Government officials are protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Here, Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of expression and speech are clearly established.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for shooting a fleeing suspect who posed no threat of serious physical harm when the prohibition was clearly established.

Carden v. City of Knoxville, Tenn. · filed 2017-07-12

The next of kin of the decedent Ronald Carden filed this § 1983 action alleging that Gerlach had used excessive force when he shot and killed Carden after a scuffle alongside the interstate. Because it was clearly established at the time of the shooting that the police may not fire on a fleeing suspect who does not pose a threat of serious physical harm, the denial of qualified immunity was proper.

Section 1983 claims against officers are barred by qualified immunity when the plaintiffs fail to show that the asserted right was clearly established under the specific facts.

Bailey v. City of San Antonio, Tex · filed 2017-07-13

But the appellants have made no showing that, under these facts, Abernathy’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly established and thus have not satisfied their burden.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer did not violate clearly established law.

Clark v. McGuire · filed 2017-07-13

Because McGuire did not violate clearly established law, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment to McGuire.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the officers’ use of force violated clearly established law under the specific facts.

Bailey ex rel. K.A. v. Preston · filed 2017-07-13

But the appellants have made no showing that, under these facts, Abernathy’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly established and thus have not satisfied their burden.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Bounds v. Parsons · filed 2017-07-14

“A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” ... The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims may proceed against individual defendants when their qualified immunity defense has been rejected.

Matter of Haberman v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City of Long Beach · filed 2017-07-14

In short, our reversal of the September 2010 order insofar as appealed from, and our denial of that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the sixth cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendants, necessarily rejected the individual defendants’ claims of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects forensic medical professionals from § 1983 liability for honest opinions based on accurate, unaltered medical records, even if the opinions are mistaken.

Ferris v. City of Cadillac · filed 2017-07-14

Defendants de Jong, Castellani, and Schmidt are entitled to qualified’immunity because the record does not support that they did anything beyond honestly form and express their opinion's — opinions they continue to hold — that Kalla’s death was a homicide based on an accurate and unaltered medical record, and on their experiences in similar situations.

Corrections officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless they violated an inmate’s clearly established constitutional right.

Baptiste v. MacDonald, et al. · filed 2017-07-17

More importantly, in the context of qualified immunity from liability for an alleged constitutional violation, corrections officers are protected unless they violated an inmate’s clearly established ... constitutional right.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific context of their conduct.

Crosby v. University of Kentucky · filed 2017-07-17

The defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Crosby’s claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest without due process of law.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Segaline v. State Of Wa, Dept. Of L & I · filed 2017-07-17

Because Segaline did not meet his burden to show a clearly established right when Croft issued the Trespass Notice in 2003, as a matter of law Croft was entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity requires dismissal of a § 1983 claim against a government official when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated a clearly established right.

Segaline v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2017-07-17

Because Segaline did not meet his burden to show a clearly established right when Croft issued the Trespass Notice in 2003, as a matter of law Croft was entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff establishes a constitutional violation and shows that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.

Vreeland v. Wren · filed 2017-07-18

When a public official invokes qualified immunity, a court must grant immunity if the plaintiff fails to establish the violation of a constitutional right and show this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. ... As discussed above, there was no constitutional violation here.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Thomas v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-07-19

Nor did the district court err by granting qualified immunity to Sherriff Baca. It was not “clearly established” between December 2002 and May 2005 that forcing inmates to sleep on the floor with mattresses violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the officer lacked arguable probable cause.

Perkins v. Thrasher · filed 2017-07-19

Thrasher is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity as it relates to Perkins’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Section 1983 claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when an officer reasonably believes a suspect poses a threat of serious harm.

Francis v. Harris County Sheriff's Dept, e · filed 2017-07-20

Qualified immunity applies here also. ... Without the benefit of overhead light, then, it would be reasonable for GBunblee to assume that Perkins posed a threat.

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions when their actions could reasonably have appeared consistent with established rights.

Carter v. Hamaoui · filed 2017-07-20

Qualified immunity is immunity from suit provided to government officials performing discretionary functions where “their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Thus, we look to preexisting law and whether any unlawfulness of the actions in question was apparent.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when their alleged conduct, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Lewis v. McLean · filed 2017-07-21

It has long been clear that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. As for whether Cichanowicz and McLean’s delay in assisting Lewis ran afoul of that clearly established right, as the discussion above makes clear, when viewed in the light most favorable to Lewis, his factual allegations could demonstrate a constitutional violation. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to immunity from suit.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim bears the burden of overcoming an officer’s qualified immunity defense.

Escarcega v. City of Lubbock Police Dept, et · filed 2017-07-21

Escarcega bore the burden of negating the qualified immunity defense.

An officer whose actions are authorized by a duly enacted statute or ordinance is generally entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim.

Wickersham v. State of Washington · filed 2017-07-24

In general, an officer whose actions are authorized by a duly enacted statute or ordinance is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Kass v. City of New York · filed 2017-07-24

We hold that, because the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Kass for obstructing governmental administration, N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05, and refusing to comply with a lawful order to disperse, N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(6), they áre entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances the officer faced.

Vester v. Hallock · filed 2017-07-25

However, even assuming that Hallock’s use of the arm-bar technique rose to the level of a constitutional violation, we reject Vester’s claim that his right to be free from such force in this factual context was clearly established at the time of his arrest.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on prison officials for denying outdoor exercise when precedent did not clearly establish that the denial was unconstitutional.

Apodaca v. Raemisch · filed 2017-07-25

Perkins’s ambiguity means that our circuit has not clearly established a right to outdoor exercise over an eleven-month period. As a result, the warden and director are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer with arguable probable cause to arrest is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Bennett v. Vidal · filed 2017-07-25

In sum, Officer Vidal had arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs false arrest claim.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Lowe v. Raemisch · filed 2017-07-25

Thus, the underlying right was not clearly established and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 over inaccurate testimony supporting an arrest warrant has qualified immunity if accurate testimony would still establish probable cause.

Odom v. Kaizer · filed 2017-07-26

However, Kaizer is entitled to qualified immunity because probable cause for the arrest warrant for Odom on the charges of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia would have been present even if Kaizer’s testimony had been completely accurate at the time.

Officials facing a Section 1983 claim cannot obtain qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence could show that they disregarded a prisoner’s serious medical needs and the right was clearly established.

Darrah v. Krisher · filed 2017-07-26

Thus, it was “clearly established” in 2011, at the time of Darrah’s transfer to MCI, that neglecting to provide a prisoner with needed medication, choosing to prescribe an arguably less efficacious treatment method, and continuing on a treatment path that was clearly ineffective could constitute a constitutional violation.

Government officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Morales v. City of North Las Vegas · filed 2017-07-26

Accordingly, the doctrine of qualified immunity applies, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Privately employed medical personnel working in prisons or jails cannot invoke qualified immunity against Section 1983 claims.

Estate of Clark v. Walker · filed 2017-07-26

Because Kuehn was a privately employed nurse working at the Green Lake County Jail, she is ineligible for qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity on a use of force claim when the law was not clearly established.

Carter v. S. Khan · filed 2017-07-27

We affirm the decision of the district court for the reasons stated with respect to the existence of probable cause to arrest Carter for the equipment violation and with respect to its holding that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on Carter’s use of force claim due to the absence of clearly established law.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 claims when their use of force violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Division of Employment Security v. Board of Police Commissioners · filed 2017-07-28

Giving proper deference to the factual allegations made by Lancaster and supported by deposition testimony, we hold that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims or official immunity on the state law claims.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff establishes a violation of a right that was clearly established at the time.

Easley v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2017-07-28

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for monetary damages unless the plaintiff establishes that (1) the conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was “clearly established” when the misconduct occurred.

Officers sued under § 1983 for unlawful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Starrett v. City of Lander · filed 2017-08-01

We conclude that, given the “unique set of facts and circumstances” this case presents, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), Sergeant Romero and Officer Ramsey had arguable probable cause to arrest Mrs. Starrett for interference under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a). The district court therefore properly determined that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Johnson v. Peay · filed 2017-08-01

Johnson cannot demonstrate a clearly established constitutional right to be free from the use of deadly force after leading law enforcement on a lengthy, high-speed chase and using her truck as a weapon in close proximity to police officers. We therefore agree with the district court that Sergeant Peay is entitled to qualified immunity and AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established under the circumstances.

Mitchell v. Schlabach · filed 2017-08-03

Since Schlabach did not violate any of Mitchell’s “clearly established” rights, the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis also supports our decision to affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff fails to identify clearly established law that would have put the officer on notice that the conduct was unlawful.

Petersen Ex Rel. L.P. v. Lewis County · filed 2017-08-03

However, even if McKnight’s actions were unreasonable, Petersen has failed to identify any clearly established law putting McKnight on notice that, under these facts, his conduct was unlawful. ... The district court therefore correctly granted qualified immunity to McKnight on the excessive force claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established.

Diaz v. Bullock · filed 2017-08-03

For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified, immunity. ... The basis for the Court’s finding as' to qualified immunity is that to the extent there is a constitutional right at issue, it is not clearly established.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when genuine disputes of material fact bear on that defense.

Wealot v. Brooks · filed 2017-08-04

Under either prong of the inquiry, the district court “may not resolve genuine disputes of fact” relevant to the issue of qualified immunity. ... We reverse the dismissal of Wealot’s excessive force claims against Officers Gates and Colhour and remand for further consideration.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim for retaliation over prison grievances on the ground that the right was not clearly established in 2015.

Rucker v. Harrison · filed 2017-08-07

In light of Booker, we vacate the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Harrison in his individual capacity on the First Amendment retaliation claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 claims against officials are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

McLin v. Ard · filed 2017-08-08

We therefore hold that McLin fails to plead a violation of a “clearly established” constitutional right, and we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the Defendants and dismissal of McLin’s Fourth Amendment claim on that basis.

A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim against an officer bears the burden of showing a violation of clearly established law to overcome qualified immunity.

Guerra v. Bellino · filed 2017-08-08

Even had a constitutional violation occurred, the plaintiffs carry the burden of demonstrating Bellino violated clearly established law.

In a Section 1983 action, qualified immunity is an objective defense; the official’s subjective intent does not determine whether the defense applies.

Jackson v. Gutzmer · filed 2017-08-10

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense governed by an objective standard in which “the defendant’s subjective intent is simply irrelevant.” Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588.

Qualified immunity does not defeat a Section 1983 false arrest claim at the pleadings stage when the complaint alleges conduct no reasonable officer would have taken.

Hall v. District of Columbia · filed 2017-08-11

A Rule 12(c) motion considers the defendants’ answers together with the complaint, so we take into account Officer Lee’s Answer asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in response to the section 1983 claims. ... We hold that the complaint alleges action by Officer Lee that no reasonable officer would have taken, and thus was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the common law.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 special-relationship claim against state officials when existing law did not clearly establish a custodial relationship between those officials and the plaintiff.

Dahn v. Amedei · filed 2017-08-14

Thus, even accepting all of Dahn’s factual allegations as true, Dahn presents no clearly established law creating a special, custodial relationship between ... him and Colorado or its employees, and therefore the district court should have awarded Amedei and Cramer qualified immunity on Dahn’s special-relationship claims against them.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim requires considering whether an officer violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Nichols v. MacIas · filed 2017-08-15

The district court premised its finding of qualified immunity on its conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Raymond and Daniel, and did not consider the second prong of the required analysis. We therefore vacate the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and remand for further proceedings on whether, under the facts of this case, the officers reasonably believed there was probable cause for the arrests.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when it would not have been clear to every reasonable official that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Hazelquist v. Stephan · filed 2017-08-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for defendant Hull on Hazelquist’s § 1983 claim for involuntary commitment because it would not have been clear to every reasonable government official that Hull’s decision to temporarily commit Hazelquist violated her clearly established right to due process.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Cobarobio v. Midland County Texas · filed 2017-08-15

Because Cobarobio’s arrest occurred in 2012, he cannot satisfy his burden of establishing that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Greene v. Feaster · filed 2017-08-16

For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Greene fails to demonstrate that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Scott v. Tempelmeyer · filed 2017-08-16

We conclude that the First Amendment right asserted by Scott—a right to be free from retaliatory regulatory enforcement that is otherwise supported by probable cause—was not clearly established. We therefore reverse the district court’s order denying in part Tempelmeyer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable jury could find that they violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Acoff v. Gorby · filed 2017-08-17

This Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants violated Acoff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Thus, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment.

Section 1983 protects an officer through qualified immunity when no clearly established law would have alerted a reasonable officer that her conduct was unconstitutional.

Sumpter v. Wayne Cty. · filed 2017-08-18

For these reasons, we need not conduct the Fourth Amendment analysis to its completion in order to conclude that Graham is entitled to qualified immunity. Neither Stoudemire, nor Williams, nor any other case, would have put Graham on notice that conducting group strip searches when the volume of inmates made individual searches imprudent was unreasonable. Thus, regardless of whether Graham, in fact, violated the Fourth Amendment, no reasonable officer would have known that at the time. We therefore hold, as the district court did, that defendant Graham is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Smith v. Nick Roundtree · filed 2017-08-21

The district court also did not err in determining that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their individual capacities from liability against a plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 if the officials’ conduct did not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the official violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Matt Moonin v. Tice · filed 2017-08-22

We hold that the sweeping policy imposed by Tice’s email violated the troopers’ clearly established First Amendment rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the challenged conduct violated clearly established law.

Green v. Newport · filed 2017-08-22

Green has failed to meet the burden of establishing that the frisk violated clearly established law, and we find that Officer Newport is entitled to qualified immunity regarding the frisk.

An off-duty police officer who acts under color of state law while providing private security cannot claim qualified immunity when he is not serving a public, governmental function.

Dillon Bracken v. Chung · filed 2017-08-23

We hold, first, that Chung may not assert qualified immunity, because he was not serving a public, governmental function while being paid by the hotel to provide private security.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity from false arrest and false imprisonment claims when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Basinski v. City of New York · filed 2017-08-24

Therefore, the Defendants-Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity on Basinski’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when their belief that they had probable cause was objectively unreasonable.

Hoyland v. McMenomy · filed 2017-08-28

We hold that, under Minnesota law, it was not objectively reasonable for these officers to believe they had probable cause to arrest Hoyland for obstruction. ... The officers are therefore denied qualified immunity for Hoyland’s Fourth Amendment claim.