42 U.S.C. § 1983

A sheriff or undersheriff has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false imprisonment claim because no clearly established law requires investigating every lead alleging wrongful detention.

Hendricks v. Sheriff, Collier County, Florida · filed 2012-10-15

Assuming arguendo that Appellants’ detention constituted false imprisonment under § 1983, there was and is no clearly established law requiring a sheriff or undersheriff to investigate every lead alleging wrongful detention.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officials in the defendants’ position would not have understood that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Darnell Dukes v. v. Lizaola · filed 2012-10-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on Dukes’s pepper spray decontamination claim because it would not have been clear to reasonable prison officials in defendants’ position that the decontamination would amount to deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on relevant statutes, regulations, and case law and do not violate a clearly established right.

Adamo v. Dillon · filed 2012-10-16

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to their decision to eject Adamo and the failure to hold a pre- or post-deprivation hearing, because Defendants were reasonably reliant upon relevant statutes, regulations, and case law.

Qualified immunity shields a caseworker from § 1983 damages when a reasonable caseworker could believe the child’s removal was lawful.

Xiong v. Wagner · filed 2012-10-19

Thus, because defendants could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed sufficient to justify Thor’s seizure—and accordingly would not have understood their actions to violate clearly established law—qualified immunity shields them from any alleged liability stemming from Thor’s initial removal.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established, even if their conduct may have violated the Constitution.

Miller v. Harbaug · filed 2012-10-19

Even if IYC St. Charles’s decision to use the metal bunk beds in rooms occupied by mentally disturbed, but not imminently suicidal, residents amounted to deliberate indifference, and thus amounted to a viola- tion of Jamal’s constitutional rights, the law in this area was not clearly established enough to defeat the super- visory defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be resolved on summary judgment when a factual dispute must be decided to determine whether an officer’s arrest was objectively reasonable.

Adams v. May · filed 2012-10-19

Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate because qualified immunity can only be determined after the factual dispute has been resolved by a fact-finder.

Qualified immunity protects these individual defendants from the § 1983 claims against them.

McCormick v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-10-22

Counts II and IV also charge constitutional violations against defendants Patten and Brown pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the Court finds that qualified immunity protects these defendants, and so does not discuss these counts here.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when they have not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Titus v. Horrell · filed 2012-10-22

Because Titus had no protected property interest in his continued employment, he suffered no due process violation, and appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 false arrest claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Kaufman v. Higgs · filed 2012-10-23

As a practical matter, we implement this standard by asking whether there was “arguable probable cause” for an arrest – if there was, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when arguable probable cause supports the arrest.

Zann v. Whidby · filed 2012-10-24

Under the facts presented here, in the light most favorable to Zann, Deputy Whidby had at least arguable probable cause to arrest him. As such, there was no constitutional violation and Deputy Whidby is entitled to qualified immunity on Zann’s claim of false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Zeitchick v. Lucey · filed 2012-10-26

An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless: 1) the plaintiff shows that the government official violated a constitutional right; and 2) that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. ... We hold that there is no clearly established First Amendment right against the retaliatory cessation of negotiations.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of constitutional or statutory rights.

Williams v. Zurz · filed 2012-10-30

Because Williams has not demonstrated that a violation of her constitutional or statutory rights occurred, we agree with the district court that Zurz is entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant does not waive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by failing to seek or secure dismissal before trial.

Strange v. Spokane County · filed 2012-10-30

The cited decisions do not hold that a defendant who fails to seek or secure dismissal of a § 1983 claim before trial waives immunity. It is not waived.

Section 1983 damages claims against state officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials reasonably believed their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services · filed 2012-11-02

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds for alleged unconstitutional conduct in connection with his arrest and incarceration for a PRS violation on April 2, 2008 and his continued incarceration until September 2008.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials are barred by qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Mpoy v. Fenty · filed 2012-11-05

Even if this Court were to find Plaintiff’s speech to be protected, his § 1983 claim against Presswood and Rhee – the District having been dismissed earlier – would nonetheless be barred by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows a person to seek money damages from government officials for violating constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Titlow v. Corrections Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-07

Plaintiffs may seek money damages from government officials who have violated their constitutional rights. But the officials may claim qualified immunity “so long as they have not violated a clearly established right.” ... To defeat qualified immunity, Titlow must satisfy a two-step inquiry: First, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Titlow, has she shown that a constitutional violation occurred? Second, was the right clearly established at the time of the violation?

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Akrawi v. Remillet · filed 2012-11-08

A defendant who violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right is entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not clearly established such that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by state officials, subject to qualified immunity.

B.K. v. NH Dept. HHS · filed 2012-11-14

So , whether or not the ... defendants’ complained-of actions here amounted to reasonable efforts at such an accommodation, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from BK’s claims against them for money damages under § 1983 (which, as already discussed, are the only claims remaining in the case).

Section 1983 provides a civil action against state officials for constitutional violations, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Elwell v. Byers · filed 2012-11-14

Because the Elwells’ constitutional rights were violated, we must consider whether those rights were clearly established. ... But given the state of the case law, we must reverse the district court’s qualified immunity determination.

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against state officers, subject to qualified immunity.

Estate of Kelly A. Allen v. City of West Memphis · filed 2012-11-14

After this review if we reach the same conclusion as did the district judge, as we do here, it would seem that what we are doing is affirming that judgment. Whether we call it a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or an affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity, the result is the same.

Section 1983 allows damages claims against state officials who violate constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

BK v. Toumpas · filed 2012-11-14

For the reasons just discussed, Wilder and its progeny hardly establish beyond debate that the Free Exercise clause bestows on parents the right to reasonable efforts towards accommodating their religious preferences when the state places their children in foster care. ... So, whether or not the defendants’ complained-of actions here amounted to reasonable efforts at such an accommodation, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from BK’s claims against them for money damages under' § 1983 (which, as already discussed, are the only claims remaining in the case).

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Wood v. Farmington City · filed 2012-11-16

Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Deputy Boucher to believe that Mr. Wood posed a serious-threat of physical harm. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis because they have failed to demonstrate that Deputy Boucher’s use of lethal force was objectively unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Government officials performing discretionary duties are immune from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Suetta Smith v. County of Lenawee · filed 2012-11-20

Government officials are immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing discretionary duties, provided “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Even if we view the facts, as we must, in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Sergeant Dye is entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can justify staying discovery in a Section 1983 action while a defendant’s summary judgment motion is pending.

Will Palmer v. Salazar · filed 2012-11-20

The district court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending a ruling on defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Qualified immunity confers upon officials a right, not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 5 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review).

In a § 1983 suit, an officer acting within the scope of discretionary authority may invoke qualified immunity.

Collins v. Ensley · filed 2012-11-21

Thus, for the purposes of qualified immunity, we conclude that Whittenbarger was “acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1254 n.19 (quotations omitted).

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim challenging SWAT team deployment when no clearly established right prohibits that deployment.

Fortunati v. State of Vermont · filed 2012-11-26

We conclude that the district court was correct; there was no “clearly established” right in this Circuit to be free from the deployment of a police SWAT team.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2012-11-27

Because we announce today for the first time that segregated confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing, we conclude that it would not have been clear to reasonable officers in 2006 that their behavior violated LaChance’s right to due process. We therefore remand the case for entry of summary judgment for the defendants with respect to those claims that allege constitutional violations in the defendants’ individual capacities.

Section 1983 permits a false arrest claim against officers who lacked probable cause and were not entitled to qualified immunity because they also lacked arguable probable cause.

Ackerson v. City of White Plains · filed 2012-11-29

Having decided that neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause existed for the arrest as a matter of law, we also conclude that the district court erred in denying Ackerson’s motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his false arrest claims against Fisher and Fottrell.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

James v. Wilkes Barre City · filed 2012-11-29

Having found no constitutional violation, we hold that Officer Marshall is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable official in the same circumstances would know the conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Andrews v. Hickman County, Tennessee · filed 2012-12-03

The State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable DCS employee faced with the same circumstances would know that her conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity damages claims under § 1983 when reasonable officials would not have known their conduct violated clearly established rights.

Sutton v. Bailey · filed 2012-12-03

For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that Patricia Bailey and Kellie Thomas are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity from all § 1983 individual-capacity damage claims asserted in Toby Sutton’s Complaint.

In a § 1983 damages claim, a plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time to overcome qualified immunity.

Drendolyn Sims v. Stanton · filed 2012-12-03

In a claim for civil damages under § 1983, to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the occurrence.

Qualified immunity did not warrant dismissing a pleaded § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against the officer.

Mitchell v. Township of Willingboro Municipality Government · filed 2012-11-28

However, Defendant Perez argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. This argument is unpersuasive.

Government officials are protected from damages under § 1983 when their actions do not violate clearly established rights.

Kramer v. Pollard · filed 2012-12-05

Kramer’s group-worship claims under § 1983 cannot succeed if the defendants, who are government officials, are protected by qualified immunity. ... Having concluded that qualified immunity bars Kramer from recovering damages on his group-worship claims, we need not separately evaluate his claims regarding Green Bay’s denial of Odinist group-practice items.

An officer facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs cannot show that his conduct violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

Harney v. City of Chicago · filed 2012-12-10

Even if the court were to find consent lacking, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate—and cannot demonstrate in light of this court’s holding in Gerald M.—that Officer Midona’s following of his prisoner Harney into his apartment was unreasonable, much less a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. ... As such, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Midona would still be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Lawson v. City of Miami Beach · filed 2012-12-11

Since the officers therefore had arguable probable cause to arrest Lawson for trespassing, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court accordingly dismisses Count I.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Woodard v. Shanley · filed 2012-12-12

Even assuming arguendo that the "some evidence" standard is not satisfied in this case, defendants nevertheless have qualified immunity from liability because they did not violate clearly established law.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest damages claim when a reasonable officer would have known the arrest lacked probable cause.

Rogers v. Cofield · filed 2012-12-12

Accordingly, as determined in the Memorandum and Order and consistent-with the aforementioned discernable facts found by the jury, including the absence of a harmful or offensive contact, and the jury’s affirmative answer to the immunity question (Docket Entry # 52, No. 11), Officer Cofield is not entitled to qualified immunity from damages -on-the section 1983 false arrest claim.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Anderson v. City of Naples · filed 2012-12-17

Because there was arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson, Officer Anthony is entitled to qualified immunity from Anderson’s First and Fourth Amendment false arrest claims.

An officer who fails to intervene in another officer’s excessive force may be personally liable under § 1983 and cannot claim qualified immunity when the duty to intervene was clearly established.

Taylor v. Hale · filed 2012-12-17

Second, the duty of an officer to protect inmates in their care from assault by fellow officers had been clearly established for years prior to these defendants’ alleged failure to intervene or protect Plaintiff on this occasion. ... As such, Defendant Mead’s and Defendants Burks and Weiss’s motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are also due to be DENIED.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows they violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Ada Electric Cars, LLC v. Kemp · filed 2012-12-18

Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing: 1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and 2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct.... As a matter of law, Appellees are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit receives qualified immunity when no clearly applicable law gave fair warning that the conduct was unconstitutional.

Phaneuf v. Collins · filed 2012-12-19

Thus, in the absence of any clearly applicable law giving him “fair warning” that his actions were unconstitutional, Collins must receive qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Freeman v. Carroll · filed 2012-12-19

In the absence of clearly established authority that Mr. Freeman was entitled to notice of potential sanctions, the board defendants are protected by qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits a claim against officials overseeing a foster child’s case when the alleged failure to investigate violates the child’s clearly established right to reasonable safety; qualified immunity does not bar such a claim at the pleading stage.

Schwartz v. Booker · filed 2012-12-19

Consequently, it was apparent, in light of pre-existing law, to a reasonable official in Booker’s and Peagler’s positions that failing to investigate the child abuse referrals and dismissing Chandler’s case without investigation was an abdication of duty that would violate Chandler’s substantive due process right to be reasonably safe from harm as a foster child. See Moore, 438 F.3d at 1042-43. Therefore, on the record presently presented, Booker and Peagler are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Novick v. Staggers · filed 2012-12-20

Although the Court reexamines portions of its earlier ruling, and reaches a different conclusion in regards to whether a prima facie case was established, it ultimately denies the Motion for Reconsideration because qualified immunity still dictates that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants.

In a § 1983 excessive-force claim, officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law, taking the plaintiff’s supported account as true at summary judgment.

Newman v. Guedry · filed 2012-12-21

Therefore, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Newman at the summary-judgment stage, the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a protected property interest or speech made as a private citizen.

Looney v. Black · filed 2012-12-21

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District Court erred in determining that Defendant-Appellant Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to Looney’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as Looney has not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. We hold also that the District Court erred in determining that Defendants-Appellants Black, Clark, and LaBella were not entitled to qualified immunity as to Looney’s First Amendment claim, as Looney does not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 false arrest claim when disputed facts bear on whether the officers reasonably believed they had probable cause.

Barksdale v. Colavita · filed 2012-12-26

Thus, the facts in dispute are “material to a determination of reasonableness,” and we vacate the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Barksdale’s claim for false arrest against Officers Colavita and Quatrone.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against officials when prior law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Humphries v. Coun · filed 2012-12-26

Although Humphries maintains that the denial of her application violated her right to due process, we agree with Muniz and his supervisor that qualified immunity protects them from any liability for this decision.

An official acting within discretionary authority is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established law.

Wordley v. San Miguel · filed 2013-01-03

In this matter, given that Defendant was arresting Plaintiff at the time in question, Defendant was acting within his discretionary authority. Thus, Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that Defendant violated clearly established law. Plaintiff has not met this burden.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a supervisor when the alleged sexual assault could violate clearly established law.

Fields v. Atlanta Independent School System · filed 2013-01-04

Accordingly, qualified immunity does not bar Fields’ § 1983 claim against Lovelace, and genuine questions of fact exist as to whether there is a basis to hold Lovelace liable for the harassment, and it is therefore RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be DENIED with respect to Fields’ § 1983 hostile work environment sexual harassment claim against Lovelace.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from damages in a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Gallegos v. Freeman · filed 2013-01-07

Accordingly, because the particularized right at issue was not “clearly established,” the trial court correctly ruled that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity against this claim.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the official did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Raeford v. Williams · filed 2013-01-09

Because Bozinovski did not violate Raeford’s constitutional rights, she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an official from liability under Section 1983 when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Rick Thaler · filed 2013-01-10

In the absence of a constitutional violation, qualified immunity protects Adams from liability.

Qualified immunity is unavailable to government entities and officials sued in their official capacities under § 1983.

Campbell v. Iowa, Third Judicial District Department of Correctional Services · filed 2013-01-11

If the Judicial District and Scholl asserted qualified immunity, it would not be available.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Stickley v. Byrd · filed 2013-01-14

We hold only that, in the circumstances presented in this case, the Defendants’ refusal to grant Stickley’s request for additional toilet paper did not violate any clearly established right. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 must show that an officer violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time to overcome qualified immunity.

Drendolyn Sims v. Stanton · filed 2013-01-16

In a claim for civil damages under § 1983, to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the occurrence.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, officers cannot obtain qualified immunity on summary judgment when disputed facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show significant force without significant provocation or warning.

Furnace v. Sullivan · filed 2013-01-17

Applying the Hudson factors to the facts as Furnace alleges them, we find that a significant amount of force was employed without significant provocation from Furnace or warning from the officers. We therefore conclude that qualified immunity was inappropriately granted at the summary judgment phase of this litigation.

Prison officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from a First Amendment religious diet claim when a reasonable officer could have believed that requiring verification of religious belief was constitutional.

Grimes v. Tilton · filed 2013-01-17

The district court erred in denying defendants qualified immunity on Grimes’ First Amendment claim because a reasonable officer in defendants’ position could have concluded, pursuant to California regulations in force at the time, that requiring verification of Grimes’ religious belief before providing a vegetarian diet was constitutional.

Section 1983 officers who rely on a prosecutor’s legal advice in securing an arrest warrant are presumptively entitled to qualified immunity.

Fiore v. City of Bethlehem · filed 2013-01-18

Because the officers relied on ADA Taschner‘s legal advice in securing the arrest warrant, we must presume that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence supports a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Rutherford v. McKissack · filed 2013-01-22

Officer Chin was not entitled to qualified immunity because the trial testimony viewed in the light most favorable to Rutherford supported a conclusion that Officer Chin violated Rutherford’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

An officer facing a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when factual disputes remain over whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Phat's Bar & Grill v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2013-01-22

To determine whether Officer Smith violated Williams, Jr.’s constitutional rights, the Court will analyze the malicious prosecution claim as a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Because Officer Smith fails to show that a constitutional violation did not occur, he is not entitled to federal qualified immunity at this time.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 false-arrest claim when an officer acts within his discretionary authority and no binding law clearly establishes that his conduct is unconstitutional.

Amber C. Maughon v. City of Covington · filed 2013-01-28

Moreover, Maughon has failed to cite any binding authority clearly establishing, for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis, that an extra-jurisdictional arrest supported by arguable probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, Fuller is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim.

When an officer asserts qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Smith v. McCord · filed 2013-01-29

But once an officer asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the “heavy two-part burden” of showing both that (1) “the defendant violated . . . [a] constitutional . . . right[],” and (2) the “infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his or her challenged conduct was illegal.” Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007).

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had actual or arguable probable cause for the arrest.

Depalis-Lachaud v. Noel · filed 2013-01-30

In false-arrest cases like this one, the qualified immunity standard requires the plaintiff to show that the officer lacked both actual probable cause and arguable probable cause for the arrest; thus, if an officer shows that he had either type of probable cause, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct violated clearly established law.

Spiker v. Allegheny County Board of Probation & Parole · filed 2013-01-30

Kelly is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Spiker’s § 1983 claims in counts I, II, and III of the second amended complaint for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer in their circumstances would not have understood that their care of a person in protective custody violated his constitutional rights.

Lucia v. City of Peabody · filed 2013-01-30

In short, a reasonable police officer under the circumstances presented here would not have understood that his conduct violated Lucia’s constitutional right to proper monitoring and care while incarcerated. Accordingly, the Court finds that Officer Pickering, Officer Kenney, Lieutenant Wlasuk, and Sergeant Yeo are entitled to qualified immunity and will grant them summary judgment on the plaintiffs § 1983 claims on that basis.

Qualified immunity shields officers from damages under § 1983 when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Benn v. Kissane · filed 2013-01-31

We need not reach the issue of whether probable cause actually existed, however, because the information known to the officers at the relevant times plainly gave rise to an “arguable” case that the probable cause standard was satisfied in these circumstances.

Section 1983 officers may receive qualified immunity on an excessive force claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Abston Ex Rel. Estate of Abston v. City of Merced · filed 2013-01-31

Because plaintiffs’ body compression claim survives Saucier’s qualified immunity test, the district court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to that claim. The district court erred, however, in denying partial summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ Taser claims on the ground of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense.

Sylvester Martin v. Seal · filed 2013-01-31

Martin, not Appellants, had the burden to plead facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference and overcome a qualified immunity defense.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known that a strip search was unreasonable and lacked a legitimate penological justification.

Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep't of Corrections · filed 2013-01-31

Thus, the district court did not err in holding that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stoudemire, a reasonable officer would have been on notice that the search was unreasonable under the circumstances and devoid of any legitimate penological justification related to security and order.

Section 1983 officials are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not clearly establish that their conduct was unconstitutional.

Chappell v. Mandeville · filed 2013-01-31

We hold that both Mandeville and Rosario are entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time Chappell was on contraband watch did not clearly establish that their actions were unconstitutional.

Individual officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Kaibel v. Municipal Building Commission · filed 2013-01-31

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ termination and that individual Defendants Rybak, Goodman, Opat and Stenglein are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from Section 1983 claims for an arrest without arguable probable cause that violates clearly established First and Fourth Amendment rights.

Merenda v. Tabor · filed 2013-02-01

Therefore, the district court’s finding that Tabor is not entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment claims is due to be affirmed.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for using unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force against an unarmed, secured person.

William Meyers, Sr. v. Baltimore County, Maryland · filed 2013-02-01

The use of any “unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force,” whether arising from a gun, a ... baton, a taser, or other weapon, precludes an officer from receiving qualified immunity if the subject is unarmed and secured.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established and a reasonable officer would not have known the conduct was unlawful.

Boggs v. Hoover · filed 2013-02-04

Qualified immunity was thus properly granted because Boggs’s right to procedural safeguards was not “clearly established” and it would not have been “clear to a reasonable officer” that failure to provide Boggs with notice and a name-clearing hearing was “unlawful in the situation . . . confronted.”

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for an officer when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Watson v. City of Leland · filed 2013-02-04

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for entry of partial summary judgment in Bryant’s favor on his qualified-immunity defense to Ms. Watson’s Fourth Amendment claim.

In a § 1983 false arrest suit, qualified immunity shields an officer when omitted facts in an arrest warrant affidavit were not clearly material to probable cause.

Kirhy Smith v. Sheriff, Clay County, Florida · filed 2013-02-05

Detective Matos’s conduct was neither plainly incompetent nor a knowing violation of the law, and he is therefore shielded by the aegis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 gives a public employee qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black · filed 2013-02-07

We agree with Black that the validity of such a discrimination claim was not clearly established at the time of Black’s actions. ... Black was therefore entitled to summary judgment on Allstate’s hostile-work-environment claim.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim depends on whether the specific right asserted was clearly established when the officials acted.

Occupy Columbia v. Haley · filed 2013-02-07

The court agrees with Defendants that it was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests that there was a constitutional right to camp, sleep, or live continuously on the State House grounds.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law gave fair warning that the alleged use of deadly force was unlawful.

Morton v. Kirkwood · filed 2013-02-08

“[I]n the light of pre-existing law,” here Garner and Vaughan, “the unlawfulness” of Kirkwood’s alleged actions was “apparent,” and so qualified immunity does not apply.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could show that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Milfort v. Prevete · filed 2013-02-13

Given the factual dispute as to the type and degree of force Defendants employed against Plaintiff, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for Defendants to believe they were not violating Plaintiffs rights. ... Therefore, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is denied as to the excessive force claims against Defendants.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official would have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional requirements.

Bailey v. Pataki · filed 2013-02-14

We also agree with the district court that a reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known that the process by which the plaintiffs were committed did not satisfy basic constitutional requirements and that the defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against officials when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Dorsey v. Hogan · filed 2013-02-14

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated when the State required him, an individual detained under the Act after a probable cause hearing, to participate in a sex offender treatment program.

An official sued for damages under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Marsilio v. Vigluicci · filed 2013-02-14

The Court accepts the conclusion of the magistrate judge that even if plaintiff could demonstrate a violation of her First Amendment rights, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim in his individual capacity.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff facing an officer’s qualified-immunity defense must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Smith v. McCord · filed 2013-02-15

But once an officer asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the “heavy two-part burden” of showing both that (1) “the defendant violated . . . [a] constitutional . . . right[],” and (2) the “infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly unlawful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known that his or her challenged conduct was illegal.” Martinez v. Carr, 479 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007).

Qualified immunity shields an officer from personal liability under Section 1983 when the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Brown v. Wilhelm · filed 2013-02-15

The Court therefore will not address Wilhelm’s equally plausible argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity, Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 10-12, except to conclude that he is correct. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (“Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.”) (citation, internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive force claim when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that the officer used unreasonable force.

Rivera v. Bell · filed 2013-02-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rivera’s excessive force claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity because Rivera failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant used unreasonable force in trying to gain control over, search, and arrest Rivera after Rivera refused to obey instructions, behaved erratically, and tried to resist the officer.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim if not every reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have known the conduct violated the Constitution.

Will Aguilar v. Williamson County, Texas · filed 2013-02-19

We conclude that not every reasonable official in Robertson’s circumstances would have known this conduct violated the Constitution. We reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to Robertson and remand to the district court for entry of judgment dismissing him from the suit.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful and the right was clearly established.

James v. City of Birmingham · filed 2013-02-19

No reasonable officer would think that drinking or holding a beer in a private residence constitutes drinking in public. Accordingly, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that drinking in a private residence does not provide probable cause for drinking in public. Thus, defendant Looney is not entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims.

In a Section 1983 suit, a court may defer deciding qualified immunity when the pleadings lack facts needed to resolve the defense.

Fox v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-20

But at this stage, the Court will deny their motions for judgment on Counts 2 and 3 because it does not have sufficient facts to determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the alleged facts could show force against a person who posed little or no threat and the right was clearly established.

McCaig v. Bangor City Police Officer, Kevin Raber · filed 2013-02-21

Because it was clearly established that the use of force on a non-resistant or passively-resistant individual may constitute excessive force, and because a reasonable jury could find that McCaig posed little or no threat based on the facts alleged, the district court did not err in denying Officer Raber’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence permits a finding that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Quigley v. Thai · filed 2013-02-21

The estate has established that Thai violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. Thai is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if they reasonably could have believed probable cause existed, even if it did not.

Reiver v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-02-22

Thus, even if there was not sufficient probable cause, defendants will still be immune from suit if reasonable officers in their positions “could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [plaintiff].” Hunter v Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1991).

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when genuine disputes remain over facts material to that defense.

Jiggets v. Long · filed 2013-02-22

We hold that, in light of the spartan record before us, the disputes concern facts material to Jiggetts’ § 1983 claims of false arrest and excessive use of force. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s holding that, at this stage of litigation, genuine disputes of material fact exist sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in favor of Long.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law at the time did not give them fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Jackson v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation · filed 2013-02-26

Thus, because the state of the law in 2007 did not give the defendants fair warning of the potential unlawfulness of their conduct, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to a correctional officer when the evidence permits a finding that he retaliated against an inmate for using the prison grievance process.

Santiago v. Blair · filed 2013-02-27

Taken in the light most favorable to Santiago, a reasonable jury could conclude that these facts demonstrate that Blair took the above-described adverse actions because of Santiago’s continued use of the prison grievance procedure. Thus, Blair is not entitled to qualified immunity on Santiago’s retaliation claim.

A municipality cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Becker v. Bateman · filed 2013-02-27

While Officer Bateman is entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense, the City is not.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the governing law was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Jackson v. Lombardi · filed 2013-03-01

The district court did not err when it granted in part the officers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that all three tasing officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Jackson’s Fourth Amendment claims. At the time Jackson was tased, the law regarding excessive-force claims involving the use of tasers was not clearly established in this circuit.

Individual defendants sued under Section 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Nichols v. Brown · filed 2013-03-03

Claim Two of the First Amended Complaint, challenging the application of City of Redondo Beach Municipal Code sections 4-85.01 and 4-35.20, is DISMISSED without leave to amend and with prejudice as to the claims against the individual Redondo Beach Defendants Chief Leonardi, Officer Heywood, and Does 1-10, as they are entitled to qualified immunity, and with leave to amend as to the Monell claims against the City of Redondo Beach.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment when the record, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, supports a violation of clearly established law.

Mazzeo v. Gibbons · filed 2013-03-05

Thus, because the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mazzeo, “support[s] a claim of violation of clearly established law,” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528 n.9, the district court did not err in denying Young’s motion for summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 shields an officer from damages through qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Winfield v. Trottier · filed 2013-03-06

Accordingly, Trottier’s actions were “‘objectively legally reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken,’” X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations omitted) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639), and he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity, and claims against municipalities require a basis for municipal liability.

Curtis v. Anthony · filed 2013-03-06

Here, for the same reasons provided in Winfrey, we affirm summary judgment as to Wright, Fort Bend County, the City of Houston, and the unknown HPD and Fort Bend County employees, on qualified immunity grounds and for failure to establish municipal liability.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could allow a jury to find that officers lacked even arguable probable cause.

Graham v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-06

A reasonable jury could believe Plaintiffs assertion that he provided his registration to Defendant Glenn, and, therefore, not even arguable probable cause existed and there was no basis for Officer Defendants to arrest Plaintiff or use any force against him. Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment on the theory that the Officer Defendants are immune.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts could allow a jury to find that the officer used excessive force.

Simonelli v. Mt. Snow Ltd. · filed 2013-03-07

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot grant the motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. ... The Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in regard to the claim for assault and battery (Count I), excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III).

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest claim when the complaint alleges an arrest without arguable probable cause in violation of a clearly established right.

Petithomme v. Counmty of Miami-Dade · filed 2013-03-08

Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a violation of the clearly established constitutional right to not be arrested absent probable cause, and the district court properly denied the Officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity as to the seizure.

Qualified immunity shields an official from a Section 1983 due process claim when no reasonable official would believe that following the statutory procedures violates federal due process rights.

Hill v. Giani · filed 2013-03-08

Thus, Collier is immune from suit for all of the procedures she followed during the investigation that were required by statute, because no reasonable official would have reason to believe that conduct required or permitted by statute would violate a licensee's federal due process rights.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when plaintiffs lack sufficient facts to support an alleged constitutional violation.

Hootstein v. Collins · filed 2013-03-08

In this case, Plaintiff Grandparents fail to clear the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis because they have not set forth sufficient facts in support of any count in their complaint that are sufficient to maintain their claims that Defendants violated their constitutional rights. Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A finding of bad faith in an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim does not automatically bar a defendant from asserting qualified immunity under Section 1983.

Henry v. Dinelle · filed 2013-03-08

While such a per-se ban on the qualified-immunity defense may be the rule under New York State law, it is not the rule under federal law.

A court must consider a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 claim at the motion to dismiss stage, before allowing discovery.

Cobb v. City of Harahan, Louisiana · filed 2013-03-12

We first note that the district erred in refusing to consider the merits of Mosca’s qualified immunity defense. ... If Cobb’s allegations, accepted as true, do not defeat Mosca’s qualified immunity defense, Mosca should not be subjected to the burdens of further litigation, including discovery.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when genuine factual disputes remain over the alleged constitutional violation.

Spence v. Nelson · filed 2013-03-14

Because we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the issues discussed above, we also find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for seeking an arrest warrant if a reasonable officer could have believed the warrant should issue.

Garcia v. Thorne · filed 2013-03-19

Even if this Court were to find that Thorne lacked probable cause in seeking Garcia’s arrest, Thorne is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may prevail on a qualified immunity defense to a § 1983 medical care claim when the plaintiff cannot establish that the officer knew of a serious risk of harm or intended to cause it.

Stevenson v. Canton Police Department · filed 2013-03-19

Stevenson’s inability to establish that Officer Young had either an objective or subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm or that he intended to cause such harm renders his summary judgment motion meritless whether its denial was based on § 1983 liability or a qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity shields officers from a § 1983 unlawful entry claim when they reasonably believe they have consent to enter, even if that belief is mistaken.

Seifert v. Rivera · filed 2013-03-19

For the reasons already discussed, it was objectively reasonable for the Defendants to believe they have been given consent to enter and therefore an objectively reasonable officer would believe his actions in entering a premise with consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even if the Defendants made a mistake of fact as to whether consent had been given, qualified immunity would still shield them for making such a reasonable mistake of fact.

When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment in a § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must show a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Moriarty v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2013-03-20

But when, as here, “a defendant asserts qualified immunity at ... summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.”

A defendant facing Section 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims is entitled to qualified immunity when arguable probable cause supported the arrest.

Sharnick v. D'Archangelo · filed 2013-03-22

Since arguable probable cause existed for Sharnick’s arrest, Podpolucha is entitled to qualified immunity from the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 seizure claim when clearly established law warned that unreasonable handcuffing could turn an investigative stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.

Plascencia v. Taylor · filed 2013-03-26

The district court did not adopt a per se rule that the use of handcuffs constitutes an arrest. It instructed the jury that if Taylor used handcuffs “because he reasonably believed that such measures were necessary to protect his own safety, then the use of such measures does not necessarily mean that Mr. Plascencia was arrested.” This statement is consistent with clearly established Tenth Circuit law at the time of the arrest. ... Accordingly, we reject Taylor’s qualified immunity argument.

Qualified immunity does not defeat a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the evidence supports a violation under either potentially applicable constitutional standard.

Davis v. Pickell · filed 2013-03-26

The Court need not decide at this stage whether the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment governs the plaintiffs claims, because on the record as it stands, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat the defendants’ asserted qualified immunity defense under either standard.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim unless the plaintiff shows a constitutional violation that was clearly established at the time.

Daker v. Steube · filed 2013-03-27

To do so, the plaintiff must show that the official committed a constitutional violation in a way that was clearly established at the time. Id. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting Riley qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Hearring v. Sliwowski · filed 2013-03-27

Sliwowski is thus entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether her conduct amounted to a violation of B.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights, and we express no opinion as to whether there was a constitutional violation in this case.

In a Section 1983 false-arrest claim, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if probable cause was at least arguable.

Moses v. Mele · filed 2013-03-27

The case at hand exemplifies this point; where, as here, a section 1983 action rests on a claim of false arrest, the qualified immunity standard is satisfied "so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable."

Section 1983 shields officers from false arrest and malicious prosecution liability through qualified immunity when they reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Levy v. City of New York · filed 2013-03-29

The Court finds that Defendants had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and thus are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs false' arrest and malicious prosecution claims.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s version of the facts shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Adams v. Stokes · filed 2013-04-01

Thus, at this stage in the proceedings, where we must ... accept Adams’s version of events as true, Stokes is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability for objectively reasonable mistakes.

Lord v. Hall · filed 2013-04-02

We do note that perhaps the officers could have behaved differently to avoid injuring an innocent man, but qualified immunity allows for all but unreasonable mistakes.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Collvins v. Hackford · filed 2013-04-03

Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit has any precedent that would have put Defendants on notice that their actions may have been unconstitutional, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits an excessive-force claim against officers whose conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right; qualified immunity does not shield those officers from damages.

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights · filed 2013-04-09

A reasonable officer should have known that subduing an unarmed, minimally dangerous, and mentally unstable individual with compressive body weight, head and body strikes, neck or chin restraints, and torso locks would violate that person’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force. The Constitution does not countenance this level of force. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officers when no reasonable officer could believe their stop and arrest were lawful.

Jackson v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-16

No reasonable officer would have believed he was justified in stopping — not to mention arresting — Plaintiff, absent any unlawful behavior. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiffs surviving causes of action.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Belizaire v. City of Miami · filed 2013-04-16

Because Ms. Belizaire has failed to satisfy her burden of alleging the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the Court finds that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities have qualified immunity when the facts do not establish a constitutional-right violation.

Rizzo v. Connell · filed 2013-04-17

Qualified immunity applies if (1) the facts do not establish the violation of a constitutional right, or (2) the right at issue is not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. ... The District Court carefully and thoroughly explained its basis for concluding that Rizzo could not establish that his constitutional rights were violated by any actions of the defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Rizzo, 2012 WL 32206, at *3-11. We will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court.

State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez · filed 2013-04-18

Rocket Learning challenges only the district court's dismissal of the three constitutional claims for money damages alleged as the basis for its § 1983 action against the Secretary in his personal capacity. ... We affirm on the ground that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a Section 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show they had no reasonable cause to believe a child faced imminent serious bodily injury requiring warrantless removal.

Kemper v. County of San Diego CA4/1 · filed 2013-04-22

Kemper's complaint alleges that the police officer defendants had no reasonable cause to believe Kemper's child was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and a delay to obtain a warrant would not have placed the child in any danger. Assuming these facts to be true, defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims cannot proceed against a defendant entitled to qualified immunity.

Lyon v. Thacker · filed 2013-04-23

Dismissal of Lyon’s claims for damages was proper because defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute over whether the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Tolan v. Cotton · filed 2013-04-26

Accordingly, and because Robbie Tolan has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact for whether Sergeant Cotton’s shooting him was objectively unreasonable under clearly-established law, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was proper.

A defendant preserves qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim when its pleading gives the plaintiff notice of the defense and causes no prejudice.

Soto v. Ortiz · filed 2013-04-26

Defendants’ answer provided notice to Soto that Defendants were seeking immunity in defending against Soto’s claims, and Soto has not asserted he was prejudiced in any way. We therefore conclude that Soto’s waiver argument fails.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be granted when disputed material facts prevent the court from determining whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Lyttle v. Redford Police Officer Riley · filed 2013-04-29

We cannot grant qualified immunity to Riley because disputed issues of material fact preclude a determination of whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Apothecary Development Corp. v. City of Marco Island · filed 2013-04-29

We agree with the district court that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint based on qualified immunity grounds at the motion-to-dismiss stage is not appropriate in this case.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when clearly established law gave fair notice that the force was unlawful.

Aranda v. City of McMinnville · filed 2013-04-29

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aranda, Broyles is not entitled to qualified immunity for his use of force.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for warrantless home arrests without exigent circumstances when the right was clearly established.

Garay v. Liriano · filed 2013-05-03

Because the Court has already determined as a matter of law that no exigent circumstances were present here, see Section III.A.1.a.i, supra, the warrantless arrests of Garay and Jennifer in their apartment were unlawful. Additionally, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity here as this right has been clearly established.

A defendant facing a § 1983 false arrest claim is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings unless the complaint establishes actual or arguable probable cause.

Barnett v. Mount Vernon Police Department · filed 2013-05-03

We agree with the district court that the defendants have failed to show “on the face of the complaint” that probable cause or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Barnett.

An officer sued under § 1983 may be denied qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from arrest without probable cause.

Pleasants v. Town of Louisa · filed 2013-05-07

On these pleadings, Pleasants has stated a claim for false arrest, and on the limited record before us, Officer Rigsby is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability under § 1983 unless the official violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

LaCross v. City of Duluth · filed 2013-05-08

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation in a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, Mark is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate LaCross’s then clearly established constitutional rights.

An official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Norton v. Stille · filed 2013-05-13

Because Stille’s actions, based on the facts as alleged by Norton and assumed by the district court for summary judgment purposes, were a violation of Norton’s Fourth Amendment rights and those rights were clearly established at the time of the incident, Stille is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows government officials to assert qualified immunity, but officers alleged to have removed a child without reasonable cause cannot establish that defense at the pleading stage.

Kemper v. County of San Diego CA4/1 · filed 2013-05-13

Under section 1983, government officials are generally entitled to "qualified immunity," which "shields [them] from liability for civil damages if (1) the law governing the official's conduct was clearly established; and (2) under that law, the official objectively could have believed that her conduct was lawful." (Mabe, supra, 237 F.3d at p. 1106.) ... Assuming these facts to be true, defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer facing a § 1983 false arrest claim may receive qualified immunity if a corrected warrant affidavit would have supported arguable probable cause.

Norwood v. Mason · filed 2013-05-14

In reviewing false arrest claims on qualified immunity motions, “a court should put aside allegedly false material [in the warrant affidavit], supply any omitted information, and then determine whether the contents of the ‘corrected affidavit’ would have supported a finding” of arguable probable cause. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate where “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], discloses no genuine dispute that a magistrate would have issued the warrant on the basis of the corrected affidavits.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In a Section 1983 false arrest or imprisonment claim, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity upon showing arguable probable cause.

Caraballo v. City of New York · filed 2013-05-14

In the context of a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, moreover, “the defending officer need only show ‘arguable’ probable cause” to be entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Beasley v. City of Keizer · filed 2013-05-14

Because existing precedent hardly “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083, Beasley cannot demonstrate the violation of a clearly established right. Thus, both the District Attorneys and the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

School officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Yoder v. University of Louisville · filed 2013-05-15

Because we conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the SON’s policies are neither overbroad nor vague, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer would believe probable cause existed, but not from an excessive force claim when the alleged force violated clearly established law.

Ramirez v. Jim Wells County, Texas · filed 2013-05-15

In summary, we hold Deputy Martinez is entitled to qualified immunity on Ramirez’s false arrest claim but not on Ramirez’s excessive force claim.

Qualified immunity shields prison officials from Section 1983 damages claims when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Williams v. Ozmint · filed 2013-05-15

We conclude that the prison warden who imposed the challenged actions is shielded by qualified immunity from the inmate’s claim for monetary damages because, under the facts presented here, the inmate did not have a clearly established constitutional right to visitation.