42 U.S.C. § 12101

For an employment discrimination or retaliation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must file a timely administrative charge before filing suit.

Bach v. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Incorp · filed 2013-03-25

On the merits of the appeal, Ms. Bach first argues that Centocor retaliated against her under the ADA for having a disabled child. She argues that—despite not filing administrative charges and without specifying the nature of the retaliation, her claim can proceed because she need not succeed on an underlying discrimination claim to assert a retaliation claim. But whether her ADA claim is for discrimination or retaliation, Ms. Bach still needed to file a timely administrative charge before filing suit. See Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001); Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly this claim fails.

The ADA requires an employee to pursue an administrative charge and give the agency time to act before filing suit, so the agency has an opportunity to resolve the discrimination claim.

Brown v. Hayden · filed 2021-02-27

By failing to appeal EEO/DP’s determination that his December 2017 complaint was untimely, however, plaintiff deprived LOC of an opportunity to resolve his claims in the first instance, contrary to the principle underpinning the ADA’s exhaustion requirement. ... Whether cast as failure to appeal EEO/DP’s dismissal of his complaint or failure to timely file the December 2017 EEO/DP complaint in the first place, the fact remains that plaintiff did not, in EEO/DP’s view, timely file the complaint, did not appeal the determination that the complaint was untimely, and therefore did not give LOC the opportunity to resolve his claims before bringing the instant lawsuit. His argument that this complaint was properly exhausted is therefore unavailing.

The ADA requires a plaintiff bringing employment-discrimination claims to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing suit in federal court.

Salinas v. TKC Holdings, Inc. · filed 2021-04-26

He asserts these claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII) and under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA). Both of these statutes require a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding employment discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before filing a lawsuit in federal court. See Tyler v. Univ. of Arkansas Bd. of Trustees, 628 F.3d 980, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (Title VII) and Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet-Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911, 919 (8th Cir. 2018) (ADA). Salinas failed to raise these claims in his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As a result, I will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims for Salinas’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The ADA generally requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge within 300 days and obtaining a right-to-sue letter before bringing suit.

Schaneville v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 2021-11-01

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition precedent to bringing suit claiming a violation of the ADA. Terre v. Hopson, 708 F. App’x 221, 226 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000)). “[F]ailure to properly exhaust is an appropriate basis for dismissal of an ADA action.” Jones v. Nat. Essentials, Inc., 740 F. App’x 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). To properly exhaust administrative remedies under the ADA, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination and then obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Id. at 492–93 (citations omitted).

Section 12101(b) identifies the ADA’s purposes as eliminating disability discrimination and establishing clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards, which the court applied in rejecting workers’ compensation preemption of the plaintiff’s ADA claims.

Evans-Gray · filed 2026-04-17(b)

By passing the ADA, Congress sought: ... (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; ... (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; ... (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and ... (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). ... Instead, her claims are for the discrimination she experienced due to her disability (id.) and go to the heart of Congress’s purpose of passing the ADA. ... As a result, Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate and adverse employment claims are not preempted by TWCA.

Section 12101(b)(2) states that the ADA was enacted to provide clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Gastelum v. Nordstrom Incorporated · filed 2025-08-19(b)(2)

However, Congress enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). It was designed to protect disabled individuals from facing “subtle” discrimination, such as “difficult-to-navigate restrooms and hard-to-open doors.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). This kind of discrimination interferes with a disabled individual’s “full and equal enjoyment” of public accommodations. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). Like other civil rights causes of action, a private ADA plaintiff’s relief is limited to an injunction and an award for costs. Strojnik v. Driftwood Hosp. Mgmt. LLC, 2021 WL 50456, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 1642234 (9th Cir. 2022).

Section 12101(b)(3)'s purpose of ensuring a central federal enforcement role does not itself create a private ADA cause of action against the United States.

Snyder v. United States · filed 2023-08-04(b)(3)

While one of the stated purposes of the ADA is “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101, there is no precedent suggesting that a private cause of action exists under the ADA simply because this purpose was set forth in the statute.

(b)(2) states that the ADA is intended to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards to remedy disability discrimination in employment, public-entity services, and places of public accommodation.

Richardson v. Cardinal Ritter Institute Residential Services Corporation · filed 2023-02-21(b)(2)

The purpose of the ADA is to “provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” to remedy discrimination in employment (Title I), in the services of public entities (Title II), and in places of public accommodation (Title III).

Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA's purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Chalas v. Pork King Good · filed 2023-05-05(b)(1)

In fact, the ADA was meant to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).

Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA's purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities, supporting an interpretation that accommodates technological change.

Guerrero v. Ellusionist.com, Inc. · filed 2023-06-06(b)(1)

Congress’ intent in adopting the ADA was to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). It is evident that Congress intended to “integrate [the disabled] into the economic and social mainstream of American life,” and that Congress expected the statute to adapt as technology advanced.

The ADA generally requires departments of social services to reasonably accommodate parents with disabilities during CINA reunification efforts when parents disclose their disabilities and needed accommodations.

In re: Z.F. & B.F. · filed 2025-07-01

We hold that the Department is generally required under the ADA to make reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in rendering reunification efforts in CINA cases, as long as the parents make such disabilities, as well as the accommodations they require, known to the Department.

The ADA does not treat parental-rights termination proceedings as covered services, programs, or activities, but it requires the public agency to provide reasonable-accommodation services to a parent with a disability.

Adoption of Ulon. · filed 2024-01-02(a)(8)

However, "proceedings to terminate parental rights under G. L. c. 210, § 3, do not quality as 'services, programs, or activities' under the ADA, and thus, the ADA may not be raised as a defense to such proceedings" (citation omitted). Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 120 (2001). The ADA does require that the department provide appropriate services as reasonable accommodations for a parent's disability. See id. "What constitutes reasonable efforts . . . must be evaluated in the context of each individual case." Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. 212, 227 (2017).

The ADA applies to state-agency child-welfare services and requires reasonable reunification efforts to account for a parent's mental condition, although it cannot be used as a defense to termination proceedings.

In re Elijah C. · filed 2017-08-09

This court has nonetheless explained, consistent with the view of the vast majority of courts that have addressed the issue,16 that the ADA is not properly raised as a defense in a termination of parental rights or neglect proceeding because such an action is not a service, program, or activity of a state agency within the meaning of the ADA. ... This is not to say that the ADA plays no role in child welfare proceedings. To the contrary, as §§ 46a-71 (a) and 46a-77 (c) make eminently clear, ‘‘the department is required, pursuant to § 17a-112 (c) (1) [and the ADA], to take into consideration [a parent’s] mental condition when determining what ‘reasonable efforts’ to make at reunification.’’ In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 475, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

The ADA Amendments Act's stated purpose is to broaden ADA coverage, so temporary impairments are not categorically excluded from the definition of “disability.”

Moore v. Jackson County Board of Education · filed 2013-10-28

The court concludes, in light of the stated purpose of the ADAAA to broaden the coverage of the ADA (and, thus, the Rehabilitation Act), and especially the definition of the phrase “substantially limits,” and in consideration of the persuasive regulatory provisions interpreting the ADAAA, that Congress no longer intends for temporary impairments to be excluded from the definition of “disability.”

The ADA does not apply to a proceeding to terminate parental rights because such a proceeding is not a service, program, or activity within the statute.

S.G. v. Barbour County Department of Human Resources · filed 2013-11-01

Consistent with the majority of courts that have considered ADA challenges to termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, we hold that a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding is not a service, program, or activity within the meaning of the ADA and that, therefore, the ADA does not apply to such a proceeding.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not provide a defense to a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.

DCPP VS. F.B., D.M., S.M., AND D.B., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF D.L.B., JR., T.M.B., AND M.A.B. (FG-04-0126-18 · filed 2019-05-14

We also reject defendant's contention that the Division violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 to 12213, by failing to provide her with services that accommodated and were tailored to her disabilities. ... Moreover, it is well established that "the ADA does not provide a defense to a termination of parental rights proceeding" because to do so "would improperly elevate the rights of the parent above those of the child."

The ADA, as amended, uses relaxed standards intended to promote broad coverage of individuals with disabilities, and a disability-discrimination claim may proceed past dismissal when the complaint plausibly alleges the required elements.

Cortes-Luna v. Bristol Myers Squibb Manufacturing Company · filed 2020-04-27

As the First Circuit has held, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, (“the ADAAA”), “ushered in a brave new world for disability discrimination claims” whereby Congress expressly rejected the “strict standards imposed on the definition of disability by the Supreme Court and the EEOC” underscoring the intent to promote “broad coverage of individuals…, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms” of the ADAAA. Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation and quotations omitted). Under the more relaxed standards post-ADAAA, and taking all reasonable inferences in favor of Cortés, the Court rules that he has sufficiently alleged an ADA disability discrimination claim.

Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA provides a clear and comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, supporting broad construction of the statute.

Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg · filed 2013-11-07(b)(1)

The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Given this purpose, it is to be broadly construed.

Section 12101(b) states that the ADA aims to eliminate disability discrimination nationwide and should be construed broadly to advance that purpose.

Sumlin v. New York Beer Co., LLC · filed 2025-06-18(b)

The ADA’s purpose is to “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and “invoke the sweep of congressional authority” to address discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). As a remedial statute, the ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose.

The 2008 ADA Amendments Act applies prospectively and does not govern ADA claims that accrued before its January 1, 2009 effective date.

Rosario v. Western Regional Off Track Betting Corp. · filed 2014-05-14

Rosario also faults the district court for not applying the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). Like the district court, we find this argument unavailing. Rosario’s claims accrued in 2005 and 2006. The amendments became effective January 1, 2009, see Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 8, and, as this court has held, do not apply retroactively.

Title II of the ADA does not provide a vehicle for public-employment discrimination claims against an employer; such claims belong under Title I.

Bolds v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health · filed 2021-03-15

First, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Plaintiff’s Title II ADA claim is subject to dismissal. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted that Title II of the ADA does not apply in the employment context. ... Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge, applying the above binding precedent, correctly found that Plaintiff’s Title II ADA claim was barred because it was brought against his employer for his alleged wrongful termination. ... Therefore, as the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s above objection, it is overruled.

The ADA does not require courts to appoint counsel for a party in a civil trip-and-fall case.

D'Ambrosio v. Phoenix · filed 2015-05-05

D'Ambrosio appears to assert she was entitled to court-appointed counsel under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2015). That allegation is deficient, however, because the ADA does not require appointment of counsel in a civil trip-and-fall case.

The ADA does not mandate payment by the United States.

Morgan v. United States · filed 2017-06-30

In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction over Abi craims because they are not money-mandating.

The ADA is not a money-mandating source of law for purposes of this court's jurisdiction.

Driver v. United States · filed 2016-12-19

This court also lacks jurisdiction over any claims Mr. Driver may have under the ADA, because "the ADA is not a money-mandating source oflaw." Allen v. United States, 546 Fed. Appx. 949, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 805 (2009)).

The ADA does not provide a money-mandating basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims because ADA claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of district courts.

Dziekonski v. United States · filed 2015-05-08

For example, plaintiff’s reliance on the ADA is unavailing because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the “ADA is not a money-mandating” statute that would provide this court with jurisdiction. Pierce V. United States, 590 F. App’x 1000, 1002 (2015). This is because the statute confers exclusive jurisdiction over ADA claims on district courts.

The ADA is not a money-mandating source of law for Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction, and ADA claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal district courts.

Holland v. United States · filed 2020-08-07

Plaintiff further asserts that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., “should encourage” the return of his promotion. This court, however, lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s ADA claims. ... The ADA, however, is not a money-mandating law. ... Moreover, the United States District Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over ADA claims. ... Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s ADA claims.

The ADA Amendments Act applies to claims arising from incidents after January 1, 2009; it changed the interpretation of whether a person has a disability but did not change the legal requirements for reasonable accommodation.

Worthen v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2015-06-26

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.), applies to this appeal because the incidents in question occurred after the January 1, 2009 effective date of the ADAAA. Although the ADAAA changed the interpretation of the law concerning the existence of a disability, it did not affect the legal requirements as to reasonable accommodation.

Section 12101(a)(5), as applied here, requires public entities such as county human-services departments to make reasonable modifications to policies and services to accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities.

Peo in Interest of KE · filed 2025-12-24(a)(5)

The ADA mandates that public entities — such as a county department of human services — make reasonable modifications to existing policies and services to reasonably accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).

The ADA recognizes reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation but does not require an employer to create a new position.

Harvin v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. · filed 2019-04-16

The ADA provides that reassignment to a vacant position is a reasonable accommodation, but it does not require employers to create entirely new positions.

The ADA requires a qualified person with a disability to show denial of access to a program or activity because of the disability, and reasonable accommodation is part of access.

Wallace v. Baldwin · filed 2021-02-18

Second, Plaintiff argues that the transition plan violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794e. The analysis governing the ADA and the RA is the same, “except that the Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept for their prisons.” ... ADA and RA claims require that a claimant show (1) he is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the Department of Corrections denied him access to a program or activity because of his disability. ... Refusing to make reasonable accommodations is tantamount to denying access; although the RA does not expressly require accommodation, “the Supreme Court has located a duty to accommodate in the statute generally.”

The Americans with Disabilities Act's accommodation framework applies when a parent has a qualifying disability and seeks accommodation or services.

In re R.G. · filed 2021-06-09

The DHHR and the guardian finally contend that the circuit court erred by finding that the DHHR failed to make reasonable efforts to provide the father services under the ADA when there was no indication that he needed an accommodation; and any need for this accommodation could not be determined because the father refused to participate in the proceedings. 28 Again, we agree. There is no evidence that the father has a disability that would qualify for accommodations under the ADA. In addition, he made no request for accommodation or services and refused the services that were offered by the DHHR.

Title II does not require a public entity to provide a requested medical or dental treatment as a reasonable accommodation when the request is not aimed at avoiding disability-based exclusion from a service, program, or activity.

Whitall v. Munk · filed 2021-09-28

Moreover, the accommodation that plaintiff seeks – jaw surgery and an occlusal guard without dental cleaning – is not a reasonable accommodation to avoid exclusion from CDCR’s meals program and/or exercise and recreational activities based on plaintiff’s eating disorder disability, but rather a specific medical/dental treatment for the jaw pain causing plaintiff’s eating disorder disability that plaintiff’s dentists have rejected for legitimate medical reasons and which CDCR properly rejected as not a reasonable accommodation to avoid exclusion from the meals program and/or exercise and recreational activities.

The ADA requires a failure-to-accommodate plaintiff to allege a disability, employer notice, ability to perform essential job functions with accommodation, and refusal to accommodate.

Dolac v. County of Erie · filed 2021-11-12

To establish a prima facie claim for failure to reasonably accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.”

The ADA does not require a court to restore a mortgage foreclosure action to settlement negotiations absent sufficient proof of disability, notice, a requested or denied reasonable accommodation, or failure of negotiations because of the disability.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Seepersaud · filed 2022-07-06

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the ADA did not obligate the Supreme Court to return the action to the mortgage foreclosure settlement conference part. ... Even assuming that the alleged disability was generally known, there was no allegation by the defendant, let alone proof, that the defendant requested, or was denied, reasonable accommodations during the prior settlement negotiations ( see generally Matter of Solomon v Fishman , 162 AD3d 1052, 1053; Kadanoff v Kadanoff , 46 AD3d at 627), or that prior negotiations had failed "by reason of [his] disability" ( Sikorsky v City of Newburgh , 188 AD3d at 1115 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The ADA requires courts, as public entities, to provide disabled litigants a reasonable accommodation to participate in proceedings, but not necessarily the accommodation requested.

F. S. v. J. S. · filed 2024-02-20

Accordingly, once a court identifies a litigant as having a disability, it should act to provide some reasonable accommodation to allow the litigant to participate in the court proceedings. A court has considerable discretion, however, in choosing the type of accommodation to offer. ... A party is not entitled to the precise accommodation that he or she requests but only a reasonable accommodation.

The ADA’s reasonable-accommodation issues are not properly litigated in a petition for conditional release.

People v. Ingram · filed 2024-09-12

Whatever we think of these arguments in the abstract, we agree with the trial court’s comment that a petition for conditional release is not the proper forum to litigate reasonable accommodation issues. When ruling on such a petition, the only question for the court to decide is whether the petitioner met his or her burden of proving he or she is not likely to reoffend if conditionally released. (See § 6608, subd. (g); People v. Rasmuson, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1505-1506.) Whether reasonable accommodations are required in order to make treatment or conditional release more accessible to someone with an intellectual disability or whether someone’s disability can be better accommodated somewhere other than DSH are simply not part of that equation.

The ADA requires reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities to provide meaningful access to reunification and family-preservation services.

In re M.F.-1 and D.F. · filed 2024-09-24

We find that the record supports the circuit court’s finding that the petitioner’s mental illness was reasonably accommodated in accordance with the ADA. Specifically, the service provider implemented modifications to the parenting class and increased attempts and methods of contacting the petitioner. The DHS aided the petitioner in obtaining medication and housing. The petitioner was also given direct access to the foster mother for ease in communication with or regarding the children. ... Furthermore, not once during the pendency of the proceedings did the petitioner indicate that she needed additional accommodations or request accommodations that were denied by the DHS. Therefore, we find no error.

The ADA does not apply to federal courts.

CHITESTER · filed 2026-02-26

But despite Debtor’s reliance on the ADA, it does not apply to the Federal Courts.

The ADA does not apply to federal courts.

Pavageau v. Delta Airlines Inflight Services · filed 2025-09-10

The Court’s prior order explained to Ms. Pavageau that the ADA does not apply to the federal courts.

The ADA's standards apply to federal employers through the Rehabilitation Act.

QUARRICK v. BRENNAN · filed 2019-10-29

The Rehabilitation Act makes the standards articulated by the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., specifically applicable to federal employers.

The ADA does not authorize claims against the federal government under Titles I–III.

Bean v. Vilsack · filed 2017-09-11

The ADA is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in several areas of life including, employment, state and local government services, public accommodations, and telecommunications. See generally 42 U.S.C. ch. 126. However, the ADA does not cover the federal government in any of these areas. The “employer” under Title I of the ADA “does not include [] the United States,” thus barring claims by federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B). ... Thus, the federal government and its agencies are not covered. A claim for relief under Title III of the ADA is also not viable as it prohibits discrimination by “public accommodations,” but only applies to enumerated types of private entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181–82. Thus, to the extent that Mr. Bean is attempting to bring suit under the ADA, his claim must fail because the federal government is not amenable to suit under that statute.

The ADA does not apply to federal employees; disability-employment claims by federal employees are governed by the Rehabilitation Act.

Scull v. Wolf · filed 2020-12-16

Although Plaintiff asserts Claims II, III, and V under the ADA, these claims are brought against the TSA and premised on her employment as a federal TSA employee and “the Rehabilitation Act, rather than the ADA, applies to federal employees.” Mattson v. Napolitano, No. 09-cv-02024-PAB-BNB, 2010 WL 11553697, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2010) (internal citation omitted). See also Hernandez v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 19-cv-04002-HLT, 2020 WL 2766213, at *4 n.6 (D. Kan. May 28, 2020) (“Although Plaintiff purports to bring his claim for disability discrimination under the [ADA], this claim is properly brought under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act because Plaintiff is a federal employee and alleges this claim against a federal agency.”). Thus, this court construes Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint liberally to find that Claims II, III, and V are asserted under the Rehabilitation Act.

The ADA does not apply to federal-government employment; disability-discrimination claims by federal employees are instead governed by the Rehabilitation Act.

Harris v. Department of the Interior · filed 2021-10-25

As Defendant observes, the ADA does not apply to the federal government; however the Rehabilitation Act does. ... Therefore, like Defendant, I construe Plaintiff’s ADA allegations as a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

Title II of the ADA does not apply to federal courts because they are not public entities subject to its public-services provisions.

Webb v. Streeter · filed 2022-06-29

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel as an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act based on a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder, but federal courts are not “public entities” subject to the public services provisions of Title II of the ADA. See Clay v. Wall, No. CV 17-506WES, 2019 WL 113718, at *3 (D.R.I. Jan. 4, 2019) (citing cases); 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

The ADA does not apply to federal employers.

Freeman v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation · filed 2023-02-10

Plaintiff again argues that he meant to bring these claims under the ADA and GINA. This is unavailing, not only because the ADA does not apply to federal employers, see Brown v. Austin, 13 F.4th 1079, 1084 n.3 (10th Cir. 2021),7 but also because Claims One and Two are based on employment discrimination, and Plaintiff was not employed by the federal government.

The ADA's public-entity provisions cover state and local governments, not the federal government, its agencies, or its employees.

Ortiz v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-05-11(1)

However, while the ADA applies to state and local entities, it does not apply to the federal government, its agencies, or its employees.

The ADA does not apply to federal workers.

Gamberdella v. Brennan · filed 2024-03-29

The Court construes Gamberdella’s claim as one under the Rehabilitation Act as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq, does not apply to federal workers. Vargas v. Dejoy, 980 F.3d 1184, 1190, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2020).

The ADA does not apply directly to the federal government or its agencies.

Kramer v. Bessent · filed 2025-09-04

The ADA does not apply to the federal government or its agencies.

The ADA's plain language excludes the entire federal government from its coverage.

Billups · filed 2025-12-18

The plain language of the ADA clearly excludes “the entire federal government” from its coverage.

The ADA does not provide a money-mandating source of law for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Guloy v. United States · filed 2025-10-27

However, the ADA is not a money-mandating source of law, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims.

The ADA is not a money-mandating source of law that gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over damages claims.

Straw v. United States · filed 2017-12-06

The ADA, however, is not a money-mandating law. See Dziekonski v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 806, 809-1 O (2015) (noting that the ADA is not a money-mandating provision that would provide the COFC with jurisdiction) (citation omitted); Shipman v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 701, 707 (2014) ("[T]he court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., because the ADA is not a money-mandating source of law.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Failure to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act does not provide a defense to a guardianship action.

DCPP VS. L.M.A. AND A.C. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.C. AND S.M.C. (FG-07-0157-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWI · filed 2018-06-11

We decline to address Lisa's arguments directed to the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, because they were not presented to the trial court. See Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). However, even if we consider the arguments they are without merit, because the Division's failure to comply with the ADA is not a defense to a guardianship action.

The ADA does not preclude § 1983 claims for disability discrimination based on constitutional violations.

Bullington v. Bedford Cty., Tenn. · filed 2018-09-25(b)

In sum, we find no clear inference from either the text of the statute, its legislative history, or its context that Congress intended for the ADA’s remedial scheme to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights.

The ADA does not preclude a § 1983 claim alleging a constitutional violation based on disability discrimination, even when the same facts could support an ADA claim.

Grillo v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago · filed 2019-04-16

So, Grillo can bring a § 1983 claim for a violation of his constitutional rights, but not his statutory rights. For example, his allegations regarding retaliation for asserting his rights under the ADA do not state a constitutional claim. But the complaint also alleges that defendants violated Grillo’s constitutional rights by discriminating against him based on his disabilities, and those allegations state an independent constitutional claim that the ADA does not preclude.

Title II of the ADA permits a school district to be liable under a deliberate-indifference theory only when it had knowledge of the alleged disability discrimination and its response caused the student to suffer additional discrimination.

K.C. v. Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. · filed 2019-01-29

It is undisputed that the Board had no notice of any alleged abuse of K.C. by Teckenbrock prior to May 1, 2016, when plaintiff’s parents reported the alleged abuse to the Marshall County Sheriff’s Office. Under the above authorities, the Board cannot be liable for deliberate indifference for acts about which it had no knowledge. ... It is further undisputed that K.C.’s last day of school at Marshall Elementary was April 29, 2016. Thus, the post-complaint faults that plaintiff alleges in the Board’s handling of his complaint—shoddy interviews, lack of communication, etc.—cannot constitute deliberate indifference because, even assuming those actions were deficient, they did not cause K.C. to suffer any further abuse.

The ADA does not provide the relief sought by this plaintiff and requires an action against a proper party.

Oden v. Munneke · filed 2019-11-26

Specifically, while there might conceivably be a claim related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., Plaintiff requests relief that is not available under the ADA and has not named a proper party under the ADA.

The ADA protects qualified individuals with disabilities from being denied access to services, programs, or activities of a public entity, but it does not permit claims against individual employees, and it does not cover improper treatment of a medical condition.

Golden v. Jefferys · filed 2022-06-28

Individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or RA; the proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 670 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012). The ADA confers rights on “qualified individual[s] with a disability” who are denied access to “services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. While some courts have recognized access to showers as an activity under the ADA/RA, Plaintiff does not complain that he did not have access to showers. And he cannot state a claim related to improper treatment of his medical condition under the ADA/RA. Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Count 2 will be dismissed.

Title II of the ADA bars a public entity from excluding a qualified individual with a disability or discriminating against that person because of the disability, and an arrest-related claim requires disability, a covered entity, and disability-based denial or discrimination.

Scott v. Lazure · filed 2020-05-22

Mr. Scott contends that Sergeant Lazure violated his rights under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., by failing to refrain from using force when he stated that voices told him to hurt Sergeant Lazure. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 121342. There is no individual liability, however, under the ADA. See, e.g., Fox v. State Univ. of New York, 497 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Thus, any ADA claim would be cognizable only against the Town of West Hartford, and not Sergeant Lazure individually. To state a cognizable ADA claim, Mr. Scott must establish three factors: (1) he is a qualified person with a disability, (2) the defendants in their individual or official capacities are considered an entity subject to the ADA, and (3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from an institutional program, service, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against because of his disability. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003). ... Mr. Scott was arrested because he, and the car he was in, fit Dispatch’s description from the robbery. Incident Report at 1. Thus, his claim would be of the second type described above, involving a proper arrest, but where officers allegedly failed to accommodate his disability. Mr. Scott allegedly suffers from a schizoaffective disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, Ex. B: Interdisciplinary Treatment Plan Review, ECF No. 1-2 (Apr. 11, 2018), but does not allege facts showing that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Even if Mr. Scott was disabled under the ADA, he does not allege any discriminatory treatment after his arrest was accomplished and identifies no injury or indignity he suffered that would not have been suffered by any arrestee who was actively resisting arrest and attempting to flee. Thus, Mr. Scott fails to allege facts to support a plausible ADA claim.

The ADA permits a failure-to-accommodate claim for mobility restrictions to proceed against the responsible state agency, but not against individual employees in their individual capacities.

Cortez v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2021-01-27

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed on an ADA and/or RA claim for failure to accommodate his mobility restrictions and related pain. However, this claim cannot proceed against individual defendants; individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). Plaintiff has included the IDOC as a Defendant and Count 6 may properly proceed against this state agency.

The ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities, and a claimant must plausibly allege disability-based denial or discrimination rather than merely inadequate medical treatment.

East v. Nez Perce County Sheriff's Department · filed 2021-03-08

Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The ADA generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s disability. In order to proceed with an ADA claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). ... Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim under the ADA. Plaintiffs states that he is a qualified individual with a disability, but he points to no action on the part of any Defendant that constitutes discrimination on account of that disability. The ADA is not a remedy for inadequate medical treatment. See Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”)). As a result, Plaintiff’s ADA claims are implausible.

The Americans with Disabilities Act is not a money-mandating source of law, and claims under it fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal district courts rather than the Court of Federal Claims.

Wilcock v. United States · filed 2021-04-30

To the extend that plaintiff is alleging a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the statute is not a money-mandating law. ... Moreover, the United States District Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over ADA claims. ... Thus, this court is not the proper forum to seek judicial relief under the ADA. ... Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s ADA claims.

To establish an intellectual-disability claim under the ADA, a plaintiff need not prove intellectual disability under Atkins, and testing for adaptive deficits is not required when the ADA claim does not put that issue at stake.

Saunders v. Hamm (DEATH PENALTY) · filed 2022-12-05

That said, it is well understood that to establish an intellectual disability claim under the ADA, Saunders is not required to prove that he is intellectually disabled under Atkins. ... Defendants have stated no reason to test Saunders for adaptive deficits for his ADA claim and the Court finds none.

The ADA requires public entities to make reasonable modifications necessary to avoid disability discrimination unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, and Arizona's reasonable-efforts reunification requirement satisfies that reasonable-accommodation obligation.

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.C. and N.N. · filed 2023-10-05

Under the ADA and its implementing regulations, public entities have an affirmative duty to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless . . . the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service” provided. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The obligations imposed by Arizona statute and the ADA are coextensive; as this court has held, “Arizona’s statutory requirement that DCS make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services satisfies the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement.”

An ADA disability-discrimination claim may proceed against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, but not against individual officials in their individual capacities or for damages against the state entity.

Carroll · filed 2026-04-02

Defendants University of Kentucky, Brian Nichols, Daniel O’Brien, Hector Rios-Patjane, and Regina Lysell’s motion for partial dismissal [Record No. 12] is GRANTED with respect to Count I (Kentucky Whistleblower Act against O’Brien, Rios-Patjane, and Lysell in their individual capacity); Count II (ADA against the University and O’Brien, Rios-Patjane, and Lysell in their individual capacity); ... The defendants’ motion is further GRANTED for the following claims against all individual defendants in their official capacity to the extent those claims seek damages: Count II (ADA), Count III (First Amendment), Count IV (Fourteenth Amendment), and Count V (unspecified civil rights). ... The defendants’ motion is likewise DENIED for the following claims against all individual defendants in their official capacity to the extent those claims seek injunctive relief: Count IT (ADA), Count II (First Amendment), Count IV (Fourteenth Amendment), and Count V (unspecified civil rights).

Section 12101 states that the ADA is intended to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities.

Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 1997-06-02

The Americans with Disabilities Act was cast in terms not of subsidizing an interest group but of eliminating a form of discrimination that Congress considered unfair and even odious.

The ADA does not itself create an independent right to handicap-accessible prison facilities or call boxes; it addresses disability-based discrimination rather than lack of access or safety aids as such.

Romero v. Idaho State Correctional Institution · filed 2023-12-21

The Court finds the reasoning of these courts persuasive and concludes that the ADA does not itself provide an independent right to handicap-accessible prison facilities or call boxes. The lack of these items or facilities is, at its core, a conditions-of-confinement claim. Such a claim fits much more closely within an Eighth Amendment framework than within an ADA framework. Indeed, the ADA is focused on disability-based discrimination—not on lack of access or necessary aides with which to ensure a disabled inmate’s health and safety.

Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in public-entity programs, services, or activities and applies to inmates in state prisons.

Kenneth W. Mills v. State of California · filed 2020-05-14

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended and codified in 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs, services or activities of a public entity. Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act apply to inmates within state prisons.

Title II of the ADA applies to prison inmates denied participation in prison programs or services because of disability and requires a plausible showing of disability, qualification, denial or discrimination, and causation by disability.

Black v. State of Idaho · filed 2020-01-24

Title II extends to prison inmates who are deprived of the benefits of participation in prison programs, services, or activities because of a disability. ... In order to proceed with an ADA claim, Plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. ... A public entity is required to “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” ... By statutory definition, a Title II ADA claim must be brought against a state or state entity. ... Claims against individuals asserted under the ADA are treated as official capacity claims because no individual capacity claims exist under the statute. ... Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim under the ADA. ... However, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he was denied such services or treatment on account of Plaintiff’s disability. Therefore, the Complaint fails to allege that a state official acted with a discriminatory motive in denying Plaintiff the services or treatment that he desires.

Title II of the ADA bars public entities from denying qualified individuals with disabilities the benefits of services, programs, or activities because of disability and applies to state prisons.

White 228524 v. Corizon Inc. · filed 2020-02-19

Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that disability, “be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” ... In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiff’s disability. ... The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and inmates. ... Upon initial review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Corizon, Coleman, Sices, Coe Hill, and Stillman are sufficient to state both an Eighth Amendment claim and a claim under the ADA.

The Americans with Disabilities Act applies to prisoners and protects disabled inmates in prison-related programs and services.

Lowry v. Reginald · filed 2020-02-19

The Americans with Disabilities Act applies in prisons, Penn. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998), and it provides protections for disabled inmates seeking relief from, for example, a state parole board, Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curium).

Title II claims accrue anew each day a public entity fails to correct a noncompliant service, program, or activity, so a continuing denial of accessible services remains timely when suit is filed within the applicable limitations period.

Bailey v. Board of Commissioners of the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District · filed 2020-02-21

Title II mandates that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Congress’s use of the present tense suggests that a new claim accrued on each day the defendants failed to correct a non-compliant service, program, or activity.

A Title II ADA claim requires proof that the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability, was denied a public entity’s benefits or otherwise discriminated against, and suffered that denial or discrimination because of the disability; failure to make reasonable modifications can establish discrimination.

Bradley v. Lashbrook · filed 2020-06-25

To prevail on a Title II ADA claim, the plaintiff must establish (1) “he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’”; (2) “he was denied ‘the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity’ or otherwise subject to a discrimination by such an entity”; and 3) “the denial or discrimination was ‘by reason of his disability.’” Lacy v. Cook Cty., 897 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2018). Discrimination can be established by showing the defendant failed to make reasonable modifications for the plaintiff’s disability. Id.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not make employment-discrimination claims non-arbitrable; such claims may be subject to mandatory arbitration.

Wilmore v. Charter Communications · filed 2023-03-14

Further, there is no indication that Congress intended Wilmore’s Title VII or ADA claims to be non-arbitrable. Indeed, the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have repeatedly held that claims arising under employment discrimination statutes, including Title VII and the ADA, may be subject to mandatory arbitration, and have rejected the suggestion that Congress intended for these claims to be non-arbitrable.

The ADA requires a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence of intentional discrimination to establish disability, qualification with or without reasonable accommodation, and causation, after which the burdens shift to the employer and back to the plaintiff to show pretext.

Lammers v. Ag Valley Cooperative Non-Stock · filed 2023-09-27

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating (1) that the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) a causal connection between an adverse employment action and the disability. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.

The ADA does not bar arbitration of disability-discrimination claims, and a collective bargaining agreement waives access to court only if it clearly and unmistakably waives statutory anti-discrimination rights; such claims are not subject to exhaustion of the agreement's grievance procedure.

Canaii, Jr. v. Government of the Virgin Islands , Albert Bryan · filed 2024-10-04

Neither the ADA nor Title VII exclude arbitration as an appropriate forum. ... The VIFS CBA does not clearly and unmistakably waive Plaintiff’s right to seek redress under federal anti-discrimination statutes in a judicial forum. Thus, the grievance procedure under the VIFS CBA does not provide the exclusive remedy for resolving Plaintiff’s federal statutory anti-discrimination claims. ... Here, Plaintiff is pursuing claims pursuant to federal anti-discrimination statutes, rather than rights created by the VIFS CBA. Accordingly, no exhaustion requirement applies.

The ADA requires a discrimination plaintiff to show disability, qualification to perform the job's essential functions, and an adverse employment decision resulting from discrimination.

ROBERTSON · filed 2025-10-31

To make out a discrimination claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must show (1) he is disabled, (2) qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, and (3) experienced an “adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”

A plaintiff alleging ADA discrimination must show a disability, qualification to participate in the relevant program, and exclusion from or denial of the program's benefits because of the disability.

Arna · filed 2026-04-17

Arna also alleges that staff at Menard violated the ADA. In order to state a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffers from a disability as defined in the statute, (2) that he is qualified to participate in the program in question, and (3) that he was either excluded from participating in or denied the benefit of that program based on his disability. Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2018). Arna fails to allege the disability that he suffers from or the program that he was excluded from participating in because of his disability. He fails to allege how the delays in his pain medication or the placement in segregation violated the ADA. His conclusory statements that Defendants’ actions violated the ADA are not enough to state a claim.

Section 12101(b) states that the ADA’s purpose is to address and eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Fitzpatrick v. Richard Goettle, Inc. · filed 2020-03-02(b)

The purpose of the ADA is to address and eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Plaintiff’s actions, which do not pertain to disability discrimination, are not protected activity for the purpose of an ADA retaliation claim.

The ADA’s retaliation provision uses the Title VII pleading standard, and a plaintiff must plausibly allege an adverse action caused by protected activity.

Xanthakos v. City University of New York · filed 2020-08-24

Retaliation claims brought under the ADA and the RA are analyzed under the same pleading standard used for retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title VII, Section 1983, EPA, and NYSHRL. See Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2002); supra Section II. ... Even assuming Plaintiff’s complaints constituted protected activity, however, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that she experienced any adverse action as a result of engaging in such activity.14 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims under the ADA and the RA are dismissed.

Section 12101(b) states that the ADA’s overarching purpose is to use Congress’s authority to address major areas of discrimination faced by people with disabilities.

O'HANLON v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. · filed 2021-06-14(b)

The Court must also emphasize , in response to Uber’s briefing, that Defendants’ selective cherry-picking and mistaken extrapolations from the legislative history notwithstanding, the overarching purpose of the ADA is to “invoke the sweep of Congressional authority . . . in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).

Section 12101(b) states that the ADA’s purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

TB v. Northwest Independent School District · filed 2022-01-25(b)

The ADA exists to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).

The ADA requires a retaliation claimant to allege protected activity, a subsequent adverse employment action, and a causal connection; disability alone is not protected activity.

Lister v. Wichita, City of · filed 2022-08-03

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, plaintiff must allege: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. ... Being disabled does not constitute protected activity under the ADA. ... Because plaintiff has failed to allege that he engaged in protected activity under the ADA, the Court sustains defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim.

Section 12101 identifies the ADA’s purpose as eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities, including improving accessibility, rather than establishing general safety measures.

Freshley v. Yale Realty Services Corp. · filed 2023-10-11

Even assuming that Freshley is disabled,3 the ADA’s stated purpose is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, including making premises more accessible. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; ... Freshley has not shown that the ADA or ADAAG were created to establish general safety measures. Neither is there support that Freshley’s injuries are of the type the ADA or ADAAG were designed to prevent. ... Because the ADA and ADAAG were not designed to prevent Freshley’s alleged injury, they cannot serve as bases for negligence per se under Tennessee law.

The ADA protects an employee who reasonably and in good faith believes that the employer violated the Act, even if the employee cannot ultimately establish an actual disability, when the employee engages in protected activity.

Suarez v. New York County District Attorney's Office · filed 2025-03-24

While, as noted above, Suarez has not adequately pled a disability under the ADA, this Court concludes that Suarez has plausibly alleged that she had a reasonable, good faith belief that she was engaging in protected activity under the ADA when she made the September 10, 2021 submission alleging disability discrimination. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Suarez’s ADA retaliation claim will be denied.

Section 12101 states that the ADA's purpose is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities and provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing such discrimination.

Rodriguez v. Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association Inc. · filed 2025-03-25

A plain reading of these provisions shows that they are intended to benefit or protect individuals with disabilities; that is, such provisions are intended to “remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals . . . and to integrate them into the economic and social mainstream of American life.” PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674-75 (2001) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and] . . . to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against [such] individuals.”).

Section 12101(b) states that the ADA’s purpose is eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities, rather than promoting safety or eliminating hazards.

Soares v. City of San Diego · filed 2025-03-28(b)

Plaintiff must demonstrate this causal link between his complaints about the alterations to Voltaire Street and his disability because generalized complaints about his safety are insufficient to establish a violation of the ADA. “The ADA is not a public-safety statute.” Armbrester v. Alameda County, No. 17-cv-05231-LB, 2018 WL 5780044, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2018). “Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) expressly states that the purpose of the ADA is ‘the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’ … There was no mention of promoting safety or eliminating hazards in the Act[.]” Id. (quoting Levin v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 06-00605, 2006 WL 3538964, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2006)).

Section 12101(b) establishes that the ADA is intended to prohibit disability discrimination, not to protect people with disabilities from injury.

Allen v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2025-05-12(b)

In other words, Title III was enacted to prohibit discrimination; it was not enacted to protect people with disabilities from injury. See 42 U.S.C. §12101(b).

Section 12101(a)(5) reflects the ADA’s purpose to address intentional exclusion and require reasonable modifications to existing practices.

in Interest of S.K · filed 2019-03-07(a)(5)

The ADA was enacted not only to remedy discrimination in the form of intentional exclusion, but also to mandate reasonable modifications to existing policies and to otherwise reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities.

Section 12101(b) identifies eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities as a purpose of the ADA; an injury that causes a disability is outside that purpose.

Miller v. University of Maryland Baltimore County · filed 2019-12-10(b)

Instead, he alleges that defendant caused his disability, which is not an injury that the ADA was conceived to redress. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (noting that the purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination" against those individuals, and to ensure that the Federal Government is involved in enforcing those standards through the "sweep of congressional authority" including the Fourteenth Amendment).

The ADA prohibits retaliation against a person for engaging in protected conduct, and a retaliation claim requires a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.

Mahone · filed 2025-12-09

“The analysis of a retaliation claim under the ADA is the same as Title VII. ... That is, his ADA retaliation claim is premised on an event (failure to rehire) that is far too removed from the allegedly protected conduct to be actionable.”

The ADA protects employees from retaliation for opposing disability discrimination when the opposition is based on a good-faith, reasonable belief that the challenged employment practice is unlawful.

Mitchell, Jr. v. Planned Parenthood of Greater New York, Inc. · filed 2025-06-30

The antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADA are “substantially similar,” ... To plead a retaliation claim under either statute, the plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” ... Title VII and the ADA prohibit employers from “retaliat[ing] on account of an employee’s having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination.” ... “A plaintiff seeking to demonstrate that he engaged in protected activity need not show that the behavior he opposed in fact violated Title VII or the ADA, but rather that his protected activity was motivated by a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was unlawful.”

The ADA’s retaliation provision requires protected activity, employer knowledge, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection; blacklisting a former employee can constitute an adverse employment action.

Calise v. Casa Redimix Concrete Corporation · filed 2022-02-04

To allege a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.” ... The AC also pleads the latter two elements of an ADA and NYSHRL retaliation claim— an adverse employment action and a basis to infer a causal connection between that action and the plaintiff’s protected activity. ... As courts in this Circuit have recognized, blacklisting, or interfering with future employment opportunities, can constitute an adverse employment action.

The ADA prohibits retaliation for exercising rights protected by the statute and requires a retaliation claim to allege protected activity, an adverse action, and a causal connection.

Hamilton v. Oswego Community Unit School District 308 · filed 2021-02-26

To state a retaliation claim, each plaintiff must show “(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection between the two.”

The ADA's retaliation provision requires an employee to show protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection, with but-for causation required.

Ernest v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP · filed 2020-03-16

Similarly, establishing a prima facie case of ADA retaliation requires an employee to show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2016). A retaliation claim “requires a but-for causal connection between the employee's assertion of her ADA rights and an adverse action by the employer.” Id. (citation omitted).

The ADA prohibits disability discrimination and retaliation in employment, including hiring; under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employer may prevail by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that the plaintiff cannot show are pretextual.

YINGST v. COATESVILLE HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC · filed 2020-09-18

To prove retaliation under the ADA and PHRA, “an employee must show 1) she engaged in a protected activity; 2) the employer took adverse action; and 3) a causal connection.” ... Even assuming, arguendo, that this scant evidence of Murphy’s awareness is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation here, it does not change the fact that Defendant has presented credible nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring choices. ... her retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.

The ADA's discrimination claim is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and a plaintiff who cannot show that the employer's stated reason was pretextual cannot prevail.

Parker v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2025-04-04

Parker’s ADA claim for discrimination is subject to the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... Assuming, without deciding, that Parker’s injury satisfies the prima facie requirement for her ADA discrimination claim, we conclude that she fails to carry her burden at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires her to demonstrate that IDB’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. ... Because Parker has not met her burden of showing that IDB’s reasons for her termination were pretextual, the district court’s dismissal of her ADA discrimination claim was proper.

The ADA's employment-discrimination protections generally protect employees rather than independent contractors, and a plaintiff must allege specific unlawful employment practices to state a plausible claim.

Ekeh v. Penske Truck Leasing Cooperation L.P. · filed 2025-07-07

To the extent plaintiff alleges defendants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the complaint fails to allege facts showing plaintiff was an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, of any of the defendants. See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, the federal employment discrimination statutes protect employees, but not independent contractors.”) (citing Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 567-69 (6th Cir.1998) (ADA)). More importantly, the Court is unable to discern what actions, if any, the specific defendants took to violate plaintiff’s rights under the ADA and where the allegedly unlawful employment practices occurred. The Court is unable to conclude that plaintiff states a plausible claim under the ADA.

The ADA's employment-discrimination protections generally cover employees rather than independent contractors, and a complaint must plausibly allege the defendants' unlawful actions and where those practices occurred.

Ekeh v. Clark County Municpal Court · filed 2025-07-07

To the extent plaintiff alleges defendants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the complaint fails to allege facts showing plaintiff was an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, of any of the defendants. See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004) (“As a general rule, the federal employment discrimination statutes protect employees, but not independent contractors.”) (citing Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 567-69 (6th Cir.1998) (ADA)). More importantly, the Court is unable to discern what actions, if any, the specific defendants took to violate plaintiff’s rights under the ADA and where the allegedly unlawful employment practices occurred. The Court is unable to conclude that plaintiff states a plausible claim under the ADA.

The ADA requires disability-discrimination plaintiffs to plead facts supporting that they have a qualifying disability, and it does not impose individual liability on supervisors.

Collins v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2020-09-30

To clarify, medical diagnoses, alone, are insufficient to qualify a person as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. ... The Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Collins’ ADA claims, but also grants Collins leave to file an amended complaint to give more factual details supporting her disability claims. ... Last, the Court dismisses defendant Georgette Hampton from this lawsuit with prejudice because there is no individual liability under the ADA or ADEA.

Under the ADA, a disability-discrimination plaintiff must plead disability, qualification to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment action because of the disability.

Williams v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2024-07-18

To successfully plead disability discrimination, Williams must allege that “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) she suffered from an adverse employment action because of her disability.” ... To successfully plead a claim for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must allege “(1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” ... To state a retaliation claim under the ADA, Williams must allege that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.

The ADA permits a plaintiff to pursue an accommodation claim against the proper state agency or an official in an official capacity, but not against individual state employees.

Richmond v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-10-22

Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed on an ADA and/or RA claim. However, this claim cannot proceed against individual defendants because individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. ... Therefore, the proper defendant is Rob Jeffreys, in his official capacity as the IDOC Director.

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege disability-based exclusion from a public entity’s services and permits claims against public entities, not individuals in their personal capacities.

Asbell v. West · filed 2022-06-23

In order to proceed with an ADA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. ... By statutory definition, a Title II ADA claim must be brought against the state or state entity. ... Claims against individuals asserted under the ADA are treated as official-capacity claims because no individual capacity claims exist under the statute. ... The ADA is not a remedy for inadequate medical treatment.

The ADA requires a plaintiff to allege that they have a disability, were denied public-entity services or subjected to discrimination, and suffered that denial or discrimination because of the disability.

Rodriguez v. Monti · filed 2025-01-09

To state a colorable claim under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., or Rehab Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794–94e, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a qualified person with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination by the entity; and (3) the denial or discrimination was because of his disability. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, Plaintiff alleges that his stroke-related mobility issues qualified him as a person with a disability and necessitated housing that allowed him access to the HCU, physical therapy, pill line, and insulin line. Without these accommodations, Plaintiff claims he was unable to access necessary medical care, medication, and physical therapy at the prison. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the ADA and/or Rehab Act that is appropriately brought against the state agency (i.e., Illinois Department of Corrections) or a state official acting in his or her official capacity (i.e., Warden Daniel Monti, in an official capacity).

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to show qualified disability status, exclusion from or denial of a public entity’s services or discrimination by that entity because of the disability; compensatory damages additionally require intentional discrimination under a deliberate-indifference standard.

Mazzeo · filed 2026-03-31

To state a claim under both statutes, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that: 1) X.B. was a qualified individual: 2) with a disability; and 3) he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; 4) by reason of his disability. ... In a case such as this, “[w]here compensatory damages are sought, a plaintiff must also show intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard.” ... The complaint does not allege that any district official with authority to address disability discrimination was aware of and was deliberately indifferent to a pattern of such conduct for substantially the same reasons discussed above in Section 1. The district's liability turns on deliberate indifference, and deliberate indifference requires knowledge. That knowledge has not been pled in a manner setting forth plausible Section 504 and ADA claims. Defendants’ motion to dismiss will thus be granted.

Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in a public entity’s programs, services, or activities and requires a plaintiff to show qualified disability, qualification for the public service, exclusion or discrimination, and sole causation by disability.

Raiser v. City of Murrieta · filed 2020-11-02

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs, services or activities of a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794. ... To state a claim for violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs or activities; (3) he was excluded or otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) the exclusion or discrimination occurred solely by reason of his disability. ... Raiser, however, alleges defendant Jacob’s conduct “was driven by [Raiser] being homeless”, rather than Raiser’s disability. Id. at 10. Hence, Raiser’s ADA claim is subject to dismissal.

Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities and applies to law-enforcement investigations and arrests.

Hyer v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2021-05-27

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) prohibits a public entity from discriminating against any “qualified individual with a disability.” ... To state a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to the public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and, (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of his disability. ... The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that Title II of the ADA applies to law enforcement investigations and arrests. ... Factual issues raised by Plaintiffs’ claims include whether Hyer was a qualified individual pursuant to the ADA and whether he posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others. ... These questions are questions of fact for trial and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to show that the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability, was excluded from a public entity’s service, program, or activity, and was excluded because of the disability.

STRUNK v. HILLSBOROUGH TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-03-17

To state a claim of violation Title II of the ADA or § 504, “a plaintiff must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability; that he was excluded from a service, program, or activity of a public entity; and that he was excluded because of his disability.” ... This, with the rest of the allegations in the complaint, is enough to satisfy the Court that Plaintiffs are entitled to proceed with their ADA and § 504 claims.

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to show qualification, exclusion from a public-entity service, program, or activity, and exclusion because of disability.

J.A. v. MONROE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION · filed 2022-03-31

To state a claim of violation Title II of the ADA or § 504, “a plaintiff must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability; that he was excluded from a service, program, or activity of a public entity; and that he was excluded because of his disability.”

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to show a disability, denial or exclusion from a public entity’s services, programs, or activities despite being qualified, and that the denial or discrimination was because of the disability.

Murdock v. Gamewell · filed 2024-08-06

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sought to state a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., by his single allegation that an unidentified individual or individuals “[r]efused ADA accommodations in the cells,” he has failed. Other than his allegation of having a traumatic brain injury, which may be a disability, Plaintiff has failed to alleged facts supporting the elements of such an ADA claim. See Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.) (citations omitted).

Under Title II of the ADA, awareness of a person's disability alone is insufficient to state a claim; the plaintiff must allege that the disability motivated the defendant's action.

Roquemore v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2025-04-23

Awareness of a disability without more is insufficient to state a claim under Title II of the ADA.

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to show a disability, exclusion from or denial of a qualified public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and discrimination by reason of the disability.

Womble · filed 2026-03-18

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sought to state a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., based on the failure to timely replace his hearing aid battery, he has failed. Other than his allegation of being unable to hear in his right ear, Plaintiff has failed to alleged facts supporting the elements of such an ADA claim. See Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.) (citations omitted).

Title II of the ADA requires proof of a disability, exclusion from or denial of a qualified public-entity service, program, or activity, and discrimination because of the disability, and it does not provide a claim for inadequate medical care.

Womble · filed 2026-04-09

To the extent Plaintiff sought to state a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., based on the failure to timely replace his hearing aid batter, he has again failed. Other than his allegation of being unable to hear in his right ear, Plaintiff has failed to alleged facts supporting the elements of such an ADA claim. See Miller v. Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.) (citations omitted). Moreover, “‘the ADA cannot be used to assert a claim of inadequate medical care.’” Davis v. Keller, No. 7:23-cv-00593, 2024 WL 4326544, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 27, 2024) (quoting Baxley v. Jividen, 508 F.Supp.3d 28, 62 (S.D.W. Va. 2020)) (collecting cases). The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.

Title II of the ADA permits a plaintiff to proceed against a public entity or an official acting in an official capacity, but not against the official individually.

Perez · filed 2026-05-08

The Court has reviewed Counts I and II and concludes that, as they are pled in the amended complaint and attachments thereto, they are sufficient to survive the statutorily required screening. The Court notes, however, that with respect to the ADA claims in Counts I and II, Plaintiff may sue Defendant only in his official capacity.

Title II prohibits disability discrimination in a public entity’s programs, services, or activities, requires deliberate indifference for a violation, and does not allow suits against individuals in their individual capacities.

Borenstein v. The Animal Foundation · filed 2024-05-23

Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability in the programs, services or activities of a public entity. The ADA broadly “defines ‘public entity’ as ‘any State or local government [and] any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.’” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)). Thus, to prove a violation of Title II of the ADA “[a] plaintiff must prove that the defendant public entity acted with ‘deliberate indifference.’” Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 n.6 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). As relevant here, this means that the public entity had knowledge that a violation of Borenstein’s rights under the ADA was substantially likely to occur and that the public entity failed to act on that knowledge. Because these claims must be brought against a public entity, Title II does not allow for individual capacities suits.

Title II of the ADA permits a claim against the responsible state department or agency, but not against state employees in their individual capacities.

Gabriel v. Myers · filed 2021-05-07

Gabriel’s allegations are also sufficient to articulate a colorable ADA claim in Count 2. His claim, however, cannot proceed against the individual defendants as individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs, 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). As such, Rob Jeffreys, the IDOC Director, will be added to the case, in his official capacity only, for purposes of Gabriel’s ADA claim.

Title II of the ADA permits claims against a public entity or an official in an official capacity, but not against public employees in their individual capacities.

Rice v. Jones · filed 2023-03-13

“The proper defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity or an official acting in his official capacity.” ... “Neither Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide a private right of action against a public employee acting in his or her individual capacity.” ... “Any individual capacity claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should therefore be dismissed.”

The ADA permits claims against employers, but not individual coworkers or supervisors.

Tatum v. North American Central School Bus LLC · filed 2023-12-18

Similarly, there is no individual liability for co-workers or supervisors under the ADA, only employers.

The ADA claim may proceed against the relevant state department or agency, but individual IDOC employees cannot be sued under the ADA.

Coleman v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2025-04-01

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed on an ADA and/or RA claim. However, this claim cannot proceed against individual defendants because individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, the proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). Plaintiff has correctly named the IDOC as a defendant and Count 4 will proceed only against the agency. The remaining defendants will be dismissed from this claim.

The ADA does not permit suits against individual state employees in their individual capacities; the proper defendant for a Title II claim is the relevant state department or agency.

Gutierrez v. Ski · filed 2025-07-31

Gutierrez also states a claim in Count 2 for violations of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The claim cannot proceed against the individual defendants, however, because individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his/her official capacity)).

The ADA allows disability-accommodation claims against the responsible state agency, but not against individual state employees.

Griffin · filed 2026-03-30

Plaintiff's allegations state a cognizable ADA and/or RA claim. However, the individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, the proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director in his/her official capacity).

The ADA does not impose liability on employees in their individual capacities.

Ibarra-Berrios v. ACI-HERZOG, Joint Venture · filed 2020-12-08

It is well-settled that the ADA does not apply to employees in their individual capacity. Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011); Torres v. Junto de Gobierno de Servicio de Emergencia, 91 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250 (D.P.R. 2015). Thus, Plaintiffs’ ADA claims against the two ACI-HERZOG employees, Ivelisse Hernández-González and Ilia I. Iglesias-Torres, in their individual capacity fail as a matter of law.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not impose liability on individual defendants.

WRIGHT v. IMPACT SITE WORKS, L.L.C. · filed 2021-01-25

The ADA does not provide for individual liability.

The ADA does not provide a cause of action against defendants in their individual capacities.

Brown v. Burns · filed 2021-12-07

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Burns must be dismissed because there 1s no individual liability under the ADA.!

The ADA does not impose liability on individual defendants.

Ingram v. Banks · filed 2022-07-12

But, as the defendants note, it is well settled that the ADA does not provide for individual liability.

The ADA's employment-discrimination provisions do not authorize suit against an individual employee in the employee's personal capacity when the individual is not an employer.

Cordell v. West · filed 2023-08-24

The Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and ACRA claims against Sheriff West are dismissed with prejudice because Sheriff West is not an “employer” capable of being sued in his individual capacity.

Title II of the ADA does not impose liability on individuals sued in their individual capacities.

Williams v. Miller · filed 2026-01-27

Title II of the ADA does not provide for individual liability.

The ADA identifies segregation and institutionalization as discrimination, so its protections do not prohibit transfer to an appropriate, more integrated setting.

Roll v. Howard · filed 2020-12-11(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5)

The ADA defines discrimination as, among other things, unjustified segregation (including institutionalization) of disabled persons from the greater community. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5). Had the Department insisted that Roll remain at Parsons, as the Georgia hospital did in Olmstead, such a directive would be prima facie evidence of discrimination under the ADA because it would have excluded her from participating in a more integrated program for which she was qualified. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. Here, however, we are presented with the factual inverse of Olmstead; it is the Department that seeks to transfer Roll to an appropriate and more integrated—that is, less discriminatory—environment while Roll (and her guardians) oppose the transfer. The Department has not proposed a discriminatory act that triggers the ADA's protections.

Section 12101(5) recognizes segregation as a form of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

J.G. v. Los Angeles Unified School District · filed 2023-02-21(5)

The ADA preamble expressly defines unjustified segregation as a form of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . segregation.”); see Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 599–600.

Section 12101 recognizes institutionalization and segregation as forms of discrimination against people with disabilities.

Martin v. Taft · filed 2002-09-19(a)(2), (3), and (5)

The ADA differs from the RA and other earlier acts in that it explicitly recognizes “institutionalization” and “segregation” as forms of discrimination against disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), and (5).

The ADA covers correctional-facility services, and a denial-of-treatment claim requires exclusion from services because of disability, not merely inadequate care.

Estate of Haile Neil v. County of Colusa · filed 2022-09-16

“Both the ADA and the RA apply in the context of correctional facilities, and prohibit disabled inmates from being excluded from participation in inmate services, programs, or activities, including medical programs.” ... “The elements Plaintiffs must allege to state a claim under the ADA or RA for denial of treatment are: (1) plaintiff was an individual with a disability; (2) she was otherwise qualified to receive the benefit of a public entity’s services; (3) she was denied the benefits of the public entity’s services; and (4) such exclusion was because of her disability.” ... “Notably, “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”” ... “In the instant case, the Court finds Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a distinct and complete denial of care.” ... “Rather, the facts of this case as pleaded represent an unfortunate deficiency in care during a critical period.” ... “Finally, Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy the fourth element of an ADA claim for denial of services, as the FAC does not allege Neil was denied care because of her disability.” ... “Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims Four and Five with leave to amend.”

Title II bars a public entity from denying a qualified person with a disability the benefits of its services because of disability, and a reasonable-accommodation claim requires notice of both the disability and the need for accommodation.

Cruz v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo · filed 2022-09-29

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” ... To have a viable claim [under Title II of the ADA], a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he or she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. ... As to the reasonable accommodation factor, a plaintiff must show that “[a] public entity … [knew] that the individual [was] [1] disabled and [2] require[d] an accommodation of some kind to participate in or receive the benefits of its services.” ... After thoroughly reviewing the evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a causal link between her disability and the expiration of her voucher. ... Consequently, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her ADA claim.

The ADA requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted because of the plaintiff’s disability or that the disability made access to benefits difficult and required a reasonable accommodation.

Marquez v. Prieston · filed 2022-12-06

Given the Court’s obligation to construe Plaintiff’s submissions “liberally, . . . reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,” Nunez, 836 F. App’x at 72 (citation omitted), the Court construes this as a claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. However, his ADA claim fails because he “does not allege that Defendant[ ] acted ‘due to [his] disability,’” Speer v. Norwich Pub. Utilities, 2022 WL 852968, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Hamilton v. Westchester Cty., 3 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2021)), or that his “disability made it difficult in any way for [him] to access benefits” and required a reasonable accommodation. Id. (quoting Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2021)).

Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities, but an intentional-discrimination claim requires facts showing adverse action because of the plaintiff’s disability; a conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Alejandro v. Quiros · filed 2023-04-18

Marrero-Alejandro alleges that the DOC violated Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., which prohibits disability discrimination by public entities, by intentionally discriminating against him and denying him special accommodations. ... In the first initial review order, I explained that Marrero-Alejandro’s intentional discrimination claim failed because he had not alleged facts showing that he suffered adverse action because of his mental illness. ... Accordingly, I will dismiss the ADA claims.

Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a qualified person with a disability from its services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminating against that person because of the disability.

Herships v. State of California Superior Court · filed 2024-09-13

The Title II claim, brought under the ADA, may proceed against the Superior Court and the County. ... The 4AC alleges that Herships, because of his hearing disability and the courtroom’s nonfunctioning sound system, was unable to communicate with court-appointed legal counsel. ... This is enough to go forward.

Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities in their services, programs, and activities, requiring proof that the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability, was denied a public benefit or otherwise discriminated against, and suffered that denial or discrimination because of the disability.

Hollis v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2024-12-30

The ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination in the provision of public services, programs, and activities. Moore v. W. Illinois Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 594 (7th Cir. 2023). To succeed on a claim for discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or otherwise subjected to discrimination by such an entity; and (3) the denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Id.

Title II of the ADA requires a plaintiff to plead that he is a qualified individual with a disability, the defendant is a public entity, and he was denied or discriminated against in accessing the entity’s services, programs, or activities because of his disability.

Chambers v. State of Connecticut · filed 2025-05-07

The ADA protects against discrimination based upon disability with respect to, among other things, employment, public entities, public accommodations, and telecommunications. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; ... To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must plead facts that, if proven, would show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is a public entity subject to the acts; and (3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendant’s services, programs, or activities or the defendant otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability. ... Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim under Title II of the ADA.

The ADA requires a plaintiff seeking accommodation to show a disability, employer notice, ability to perform the essential job functions with reasonable accommodation, and the employer’s refusal to accommodate, along with facts supporting discriminatory intent.

Verne v. New York City Department Of Education · filed 2022-09-30

The prima facie case for a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that: “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)). Further, “[p]laintiff must plead sufficient facts to raise the inference ‘that the failure [to accommodate] was motivated by discriminatory intent.’” Novick v. Vill. of Wappingers Falls, 376 F. Supp. 3d 318, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Lyman v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 3789 (RWS), 2003 WL 22171518, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2003)).

A failure-to-accommodate claim requires proof of an ADA disability, employer notice, ability to perform the essential functions with reasonable accommodation, and failure to provide an accommodation.

PELPHREY-WEIGAND · filed 2026-02-02

To state a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she had a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) RHD had notice of this disability; (3) she can perform the essential functions of her position with reasonable accommodation; and (4) RHD failed to provide an accommodation.

Title III of the ADA requires a plaintiff to establish a qualifying disability, that the defendant operates a place of public accommodation, and discrimination within the ADA's meaning.

Martinez v. Lea County · filed 2022-12-12

To state a claim for violation of Title III, “which authorizes private actions only for injunctive relief, not monetary damages,” a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that the defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA.”

The ADA covers self-service items, and temporary or movable barriers are not categorically exempt; whether an alleged barrier violates the statute depends on the facts.

Hernandez v. Syncrasy · filed 2023-03-22

These cases do not indicate that self-service items, specifically the items mentioned in opposition, are outside the scope of the ADA as a matter of law. ... However, temporary or movable objects are not, as a matter of law, exempted from the ADA.

The ADA applies to stadium accessibility, and comparable wheelchair sightlines satisfy its accessibility requirements when they meet the DOJ’s two-part standard.

Landis v. Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District · filed 2023-06-05

Having carefully reviewed the evidence produced during the bench trial, the parties’ opening and responsive briefs on remand, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court finds that T-Mobile Park meets the Accessible Stadiums comparable-sightline standard, and thus, its sightlines for spectators using wheelchairs are sufficient to satisfy the ADA.

The ADA allows disability-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims to proceed at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges enough facts to make them facially plausible.

Brister v. Employment Opportunity & Training Center of Northeastern Pennsylvania Incorporated · filed 2023-07-10

On review of Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff has more than adequately pleaded her claims under the ADA and PHRA, including unlawful discrimination and failure to accommodate. All that is required is that Plaintiff allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. ... Plaintiff has adequately pleaded Counts | and Il, for discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA and the PHRA. Defendant’s Motion will be denied with respect to these counts.

The ADA is a broad remedial statute addressing, in part, employment discrimination based on disability; its remedies run to the affected individual and are intended to make victims whole.

JACKSON v. SUMTER COUNTY GEORGIA · filed 2025-03-17

Likewise, considering the NEC Corp. factors, the ADA and Section 1981 are remedial statutes and these claims also survive Jackson’s death. ... With regard to this first factor, as courts in this district have noted, “the ADA [is a] broad remedial statute[] adopted by Congress to address, in part discrimination in employment on the basis of . . . disability.” Roman v. Concharty Council of Girl Scouts, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1380 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 2002). ... As to the second factor, the remedies for both § 1981 and the ADA run to the wronged individual rather than the public—individuals file lawsuits to recover damages for the discrimination they personally have experienced. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (“An individual who establishes a cause of action under [§] 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory . . . damages”); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). ... Finally, as to the third factor, “the authorized recovery under the [ADA and § 1981 are] not disproportionate to the harm suffered since . . . [the ADA and § 1981] are intended to make whole the victims of discrimination.” Kilgo, 789 F.2d at 876. Therefore, as the ADA and § 1981, like the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII, are remedial statutes rather than penal ones, all of Plaintiff’s claims survive her death; and, pursuant to Rule 25, William Jackson may pursue the claims as the representative of her estate.

Section 12101(a)(5)'s findings show Congress intended the ADA to address the discriminatory effects of architectural barriers and disparate impact discrimination.

Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky · filed 2001-12-26(a)(5)

This language demonstrates that part of Congress’s intent was to eliminate discriminatory effects of architectural barriers. Because disparate impact discrimination specifically deals with discriminatory effects, Congress’s findings establish an intent to address disparate impact discrimination.

Section 12101 states the ADA’s purpose of preventing disability discrimination; it does not establish a standard of care for preventing physical injury.

Carey-Thomann v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks and Board of Regents · filed 2026-05-01(b)(2)

We conclude that neither the ADA nor the AHRA imposes an applicable standard of care in this context.

Section 12101 states the ADA’s findings and purpose but does not itself create a private right of action.

Lightfeather v. PornHub.com · filed 2021-08-26

The statement of purpose, in and of itself, does not give rise to a private right of action.

Section 12101(b)’s stated federal purposes support ADA remedies despite a state workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provision.

Wood v. County of Alameda · filed 1995-01-30(b)

In light of the broad remedial purpose expressed by Congress and the fact that defendant’s urged construction would significantly limit the scope of relief available to plaintiffs under the ADA, the Court finds that giving effect to the exclusive remedy provision in the state statute in a manner which limits the availability of federal remedies would clearly stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ stated purpose in enacting the ADA.

Section 12101(b)(4) states Congress’s purpose to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in applying the ADA to states.

Williams v. Ohio Department of Mental Health · filed 1997-04-22(b)(4)

Further, Congress has expressly stated that the ADA is enacted pursuant to its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to its applicability to the states.

Section 12101(b)(4) states that Congress invoked both its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and its commerce power to address disability discrimination.

United States v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety · filed 2003-02-05(b)(4)

Thus, Congress’ intent in enacting the ADA was to use both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause to remedy discrimination.

Section 12101(b)(4) states Congress’s purpose to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and commerce power in enacting the ADA.

Mayer v. University of Minnesota · filed 1996-10-15(b)(4)

In enacting the ADA, Congress specifically stated that it was Congress’ purpose “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce----” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).