42 U.S.C. § 12101

To state an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability, be excluded from or denied equal access to a public entity's services, programs, or activities (or otherwise discriminated against), and suffer that exclusion or discrimination because of the disability.

Hernandez · filed 2026-02-05

To state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) that [s]he is a ‘qualified individual’ with a disability; (2) that [s]he was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to [her] disability.”

The ADA protects individuals with disabilities from discrimination, provides access to reasonable accommodations, and treats requesting an accommodation as statutorily protected activity for retaliation purposes.

Alexander · filed 2026-03-23

Instead, the ADA protects individuals with disabilities from discrimination and provides access to reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Tarpley, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 913; Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiffs assert rights under the ADA by raising a claim of discrimination or seeking an accommodation). Additionally, seeking an accommodation qualifies as an activity statutorily protected under the ADA. ... Thus, a retaliation claim for ADA-protected activity must proceed under an ADA retaliation claim, not Title VII.

The ADA does not apply retroactively to discriminatory acts occurring before its effective date absent a specific post-effective-date violation.

Daniels v. Allied Electrical Contractors Inc. · filed 1994-03-11

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not re-take the examination at issue after he faded it for a second time on July 17, 1992, and that the ADA did not become effective until July 26, 1992. ... Both the “continuing violation” argument and the alternate contention that the ADA should be applied retroactively have been widely rejected. ... As Plaintiff does not allege any specific post-July 26, 1992 acts in violation of the ADA, summary judgment is granted in all Defendants’ favor as regards this claim.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities, but it does not cover discriminatory actions occurring before its effective date.

Julian v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1994-05-06

Effective July 26, 1992, The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. [“ADA”], prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. However, the discriminatory actions alleged by plaintiff occurred prior to the effective date and are therefore not covered by ADA.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply retroactively to conduct occurring before its effective date.

Pernikoff v. Eleanor Davidson Yetta Pernikoff, State of Michigan Phyllis McMillen · filed 1995-05-03

Pernikoff's claim is meritless because the Americans with Disabilities Act did not become effective until July 26, 1990, and is not retroactive.

The ADA is substantive legislation and is not applied retroactively.

Zeno v. HWT PROPERTIES · filed 1995-06-23

The ADA, which is substantive in nature, is not to be given retroactive effect.

The ADA does not apply to an employment-discrimination claim based on an application rejected before the Act's effective date.

Kemer v. Roger Johnson, Administrator, General Services Administration · filed 1996-04-30

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., is inapplicable to Kemer's claim because his application for employment with the defendant General Services Administration ("GSA") was rejected in December 1990, prior to the July 26, 1992, effective date of the ADA, see Pub.L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990).

The ADA does not apply retroactively to conduct completed before its effective date, and a later denial of readmission does not create a new ADA violation when it is merely the inevitable consequence of the earlier termination.

Kasemeier v. Indiana University · filed 1996-10-16

The ADA was not yet effective in December 1991, when the university expelled Kasemeier (the other federal statutes under which Kasemeier brings his claims were, but that does not matter with respect to Kasemeier's ADA claims), so the university could not have violated the ADA (which is not retroactive) in making that decision. As such, its denial of his application for readmission did not violate the ADA because the decision on that application was effectively made when Kasemeier was expelled.

The ADA applies prospectively from July 26, 1992, and does not cover employment events occurring before that effective date.

Jarrett v. Sprint/United Management Co. · filed 1999-01-15

The ADA became effective on July 26, 1992, and does not operate retroactively. ... Therefore, in order for Jarrett to pursue a claim under the ADA, she must have been employed by Sprint on or after July 26, 1992.

Section 12101(a)(1)'s finding about the number of Americans with disabilities supports limiting ADA coverage to people whose learning disability places them significantly below average, rather than everyone with average or slightly below-average reading or writing ability.

Gonzalez v. National Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1999-08-10(a)(1)

Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). This finding, enacted as part of the ADA, requires the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring under the statute’s protection all those persons whose level of reading or writing falls within the average or slightly below average range. To interpret the ADA’s reach as broadly as plaintiff requests would be inconsistent with congressional findings and the purpose of the statute. Had the' purpose been to include all individuals who are unable perform at an above-average level in writing or reading tests, Congress undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons. That it did not is evidence that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those whose learning disability places them significantly below average.

The ADA targets discrimination against physically disabled persons themselves and does not extend the asserted protection to people merely associated with persons with disabilities.

Morgan v. City Of Albuquerque · filed 1994-05-25

Plaintiff next contends that the use of peremptory challenges to strike veniremen who have an association with persons with physical disabilities violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq. Nothing in the ADA supports this contention. Even assuming that the ADA did bar use of peremptory challenges to remove physically disabled veniremen, there would be no grounds for an extension of such protection to persons who have some association with persons with disabilities--the ADA is intended only to remove discrimination against physically disabled persons themselves.

Section 12101's purpose and findings support applying the ADA to discriminatory effects of benign actions or inaction, not only intentional discrimination.

Mayberry v. Von Valtier · filed 1994-02-08(b)(1), (a)(5)

One of the stated purposes of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress specifically found that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion [and] the discriminatory effects of ... communication barriers____” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Given that statement, Congress appears to have intended the ADA to address the discriminatory effects of benign actions or inaction, as well as intentional discrimination.

The ADA's federal parking-space requirements do not apply to parking spaces or access areas that are neither newly constructed nor relocated.

City of Wichita v. Basgall · filed 1995-04-28

The parking spaces or access areas herein were not new parking spaces or relocated parking spaces and hence were not subject to the statute.

The ADA applies to state bar admissions, and disability-related bar-application questions violate it absent a showing that admitting the applicants would pose a direct threat to public safety.

In Re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the Rhode Island Bar · filed 1996-10-09

We are persuaded that the procedures required for admittance to the bar are the functional equivalent of a hiring process and that the committee operates as the equivalent of an employer when it screens applicants. Thus, we concur with the master’s conclusion that the ADA applies to State Bar admissions. Because question Nos. 26, 29(a), and 29(b) ask about the existence of a disability or treatment, these questions may be deemed to violate the ADA, absent a showing of a direct threat to public safety if persons with a mental or an emotional disability or history of substance-abuse treatment are admitted to the bar.

Title II of the ADA applies to state corrections institutions and prisoners are not excluded; § 12101(b)(4) confirms that Congress intended to alter the federal-state balance when enacting the ADA.

Kaufman v. Carter · filed 1996-12-09(b)(1) (b)(4)

The ADA was enacted in order to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). By its terms, Title II of the ADA applies to state corrections institutions. The Act’s language is broad and contains no specific exception for prisoners. ... This rationale is also unfounded. There is no room for doubt that Congress specifically intended to alter the federal-state balance in enacting the ADA. Section 12101(b)(4) of the ADA specifically invokes the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the legislation. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).

Section 12101(b)(4) states that a purpose of the ADA is to invoke Congress’s authority, including its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, to address major areas of disability discrimination.

Nihiser v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency · filed 1997-08-06(b)(4)

In 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4), Congress stated that one purpose of the ADA was “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” This language indicates that in enacting the ADA, Congress intended to utilize its enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The ADA requires a plaintiff asserting an ADA claim to allege that he is a person with a disability.

Hackett v. Guam Agency in Video 3 · filed 2023-04-13

Second, the Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff is a person with a disability. ... A complaint must state the elements of the claim, and here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state an important element of his ADA—that he is a person with disability.

The Americans with Disabilities Act protects employees but does not cover independent contractors.

Aberman v. J. Abouchar & Sons, Incorporated · filed 1998-11-18

“[T]he ADA protects ‘employees’ but not independent contractors.”

The ADA's employment protections cover qualified individuals with disabilities, including job applicants and existing employees.

Kresmery v. Service America Corp. · filed 1998-09-30

As reflected in the ADA legislative history, the law applies to “qualified individuals with disabilities,” a term that refers to job applicants and existing employees.

The ADA permits an employer to discharge an employee for misconduct even when the misconduct is related to the employee's disability.

Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation · filed 1998-06-19

An employer is free to discharge a disabled person for misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to his disability.

Title I of the ADA requires that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to receive the same benefits as nondisabled officers who have given an equivalent amount of service.

Castellano v. City of New York · filed 1998-02-24

The ADA requires only that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to receive the same benefits as non-disabled officers who have given an equivalent amount of service.

The ADA places the ultimate burden of persuasion on the claimant to show that he suffered unlawful discrimination, even when the employer may bear a burden of producing evidence concerning reasonable accommodation.

Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Companies, Inc. · filed 1998-02-25

Even though the panel did not discuss whether Piper Jaffray had met its burden of producing evidence that Kiernan could not perform the essential functions of an investment executive even with reasonable accommodation, it correctly placed the ultimate burden of persuasion on Kiernan to show that he suffered unlawful discrimination.

For ADA employment-discrimination claims, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case; the burden then shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual.

Vargas v. Gromko · filed 1997-09-05

Claims of employment discrimination under FEHA and the federal anti-discrimination statutes (here, Title VII, the ADA and § 1981) are subject to a shifting burden analysis. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie ease of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for the action of which the plaintiff complains. If the defendant carries this burden of production, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are not the true reasons, but a pretext for discrimination.

The ADA requires a plaintiff to show that he can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, to establish an ADA employment claim.

Kalafatich v. Cardinal Healthcare Inc. · filed 1997-11-21

Because Kalafatich failed to provide any evidence that he could perform the essential functions of a warehouseman's job, we conclude that the district court's grant of Cardinal's summary judgment motion dismissing the ADA claim was proper.

The ADA requires a claimant to show that they are a qualified person with a disability, meaning they can perform the job's essential functions with reasonable accommodation; failure to rebut the employer's inability to accommodate defeats that showing.

Lawrence v. IBP, Inc. · filed 1996-09-09

Determining whether a person is a qualified person with a disability for purposes of the ADA requires a two-step analysis. ... Plaintiff admits that she could not perform the essential functions of her job without accommodation. ... We conclude, instead, that IBP has met its burden of production and has presented evidence of its inability to accommodate. Because plaintiff has not rebutted IBP’s evidence, see id. at 361, she has failed to establish that she is a “qualified person” for ADA purposes.

Section 12101(b)(1) states that a purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Torcasio v. Murray · filed 1994-09-14(b)(1)

One of the stated purposes of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).

The ADA requires an employer to have notice of an employee's disability before the employer can be liable for disability discrimination or be subject to the Act's related obligations.

George H. Thomas, Jr. v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1996-10-08

Without notice of a disability, an employer cannot be liable for discrimination against an employee on the basis of his disability. ... The events relied upon by Mr. Thomas, such as frequent absence, disrespect to a supervisor, failure to return to work after a suspension and requesting an application for sick leave without mention of a disabling illness, do not constitute, as presented here, notice of the presence of a disability and therefore do not trigger GM's obligations under the Act.

The ADA requires a plaintiff alleging failure to accommodate to show that he was otherwise qualified for the position, even with a reasonable accommodation.

Nugent v. The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company · filed 1997-02-12

Nugent is not entitled to relief on his first claim because he did not meet his burden of showing that he was otherwise qualified for his position, even with a reasonable accommodation.

An ADA reasonable-accommodation claim may proceed past the pleadings when whether the condition substantially limits a major life activity and whether accommodations were reasonable remain disputed.

Yaba v. Roosevelt · filed 1997-04-16

Whether Yaba has suffered a disability that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities, and whether Cadwalader failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability, cannot be decided on the pleadings alone.

The ADA does not require an employer to eliminate or reallocate a job's essential functions as a reasonable accommodation.

Rios v. Indiana Bayer Corp. · filed 1997-06-03

The ADA does not require the elimination or reallocation of essential functions and neither will this Court.

The ADA requires an employment-discrimination plaintiff to allege employment, disability, satisfactory performance, discharge or demotion, and more favorable treatment of persons outside the protected class.

Wolf v. Fliss · filed 1997-01-09

A prima facie case of an ADA violation must include the following allegations: that the plaintiff was employed by the defendants; that the plaintiff meets the definition of disabled under the ADA; that the plaintiff was meeting the employer's legitimate expectations; that the plaintiff was discharged or demoted; and that persons not within the protected class were treated more favorably.

The ADA does not shield a disabled employee from discipline or discharge for workplace misconduct, including misconduct related to the disability, unless the stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Bourara v. The New York Hotel Trades Council and Hotel Association of New York City, Inc., Employee Benefit Funds · filed 2020-09-01

The ADA, however, “does not immunize disabled employees from discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace,” Krasner v. City of N.Y., No. 11cv2048 (PGG), 2013 WL 5338558 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (collecting cases), and even if an incident of misconduct is connected to an alleged disability, an employer is entitled to discipline an employee for that incident, so long as it is not pretext for discrimination, see McElwee v. Cty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012) (“under the ADA, workplace misconduct is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment, even when such misconduct is related to a disability”); Pearson v. Unification Theological Seminary, 785 F. Supp. 2d 141, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting “plaintiff’s argument that since her disability caused her conduct, she was in essence fired because of her disability”); Szuszkiewicz v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 257 F. Supp. 3d 319, 327-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“that a disabled plaintiff’s ‘misconduct was a manifestation of his disability is immaterial because the ADA does not immunize [him] from discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace.’” (citation omitted)).

The ADA’s anti-discrimination rights arise independently of a collective bargaining agreement, so an ADA claim is not a minor dispute subject to Railway Labor Act preclusion.

Saridakis v. United Airlines · filed 1999-02-03(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4)

We hold that Saridakis’s ADA claim is not a minor dispute precluded by the Railway Labor Act because this federal right exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement between United and the union.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not impose individual liability on a coworker or other individual defendant.

Thibodeau v. Blake's Restaurant · filed 1998-04-23

In addition, the court can find no grounds to distinguish the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA), from Title VII on the issue of individual liability. Thus the court holds that the ADA does not impose individual liability either, and defendant England is entitled to judgment on plaintiff’s ADA claim.

The ADA permits an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement to pursue disability-discrimination claims in federal court without first exhausting the agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedures.

Coleman v. Houston Lighting and Power Co. · filed 1997-11-06

The statutory amendments, while encouraging arbitration “where appropriate,” do not preclude an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement from availing himself of a judicial forum for resolving employment discrimination claims brought under the ADA or Title VII.

The ADA does not provide for liability against individual employees for discrimination violations.

Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft · filed 1996-07-19

To the extent her sixth claim for relief seeks to allege violations of the ADA by the Management Committee and other Cadwalader employees, the claims would be futile because the ADA, like Title VII, does not provide for liability by individual employees.

The ADA permits employment-discrimination claims to be resolved through arbitration when the parties have agreed to arbitrate.

Topf v. Warnaco, Inc. · filed 1996-08-22

Plaintiffs statutory claims under the ADEA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act are arbitrable. ... Given the federal policy favoring arbitration, and the text of the statute a clear expression of congressional intent, plaintiffs ADA claim is arbitrable.

The ADA does not allow a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement to prevent an employee from pursuing an ADA claim in federal court.

Block v. Art Iron, Inc. · filed 1994-10-19

In light of the foregoing, this court finds that Block’s ADA claim is not governed by the arbitration clause of the CBA and Block is not precluded from pursuing his claim in federal court.

The ADA does not give an employee's spouse a cause of action for loss of consortium based on the employee's employment-discrimination claim.

Franz v. Kernan · filed 1996-10-21

Based on Schulte and authority from other districts, the Court finds that plaintiff Sherry Franz does not have a cause of action for loss of consortium based on the employment discrimination claims asserted by her husband. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the loss of consortium claim under the ADEA, Title VII, the ADA, and the MHRA.

Section 12101 et seq. requires an employee bringing an ADA claim to exhaust available administrative remedies before proceeding in court.

Morales v. International Textile Products · filed 1996-10-29

En el caso que nos ocupa no hay prueba de que se hayan agotado los remedios administrativos para una reclamación bajo la A.D.A., por lo que procede desestimar esta causa de acción.

The statute does not support a claim absent an allegation of disability discrimination.

Curran v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals of the Massachusetts Department of Education · filed 1994-10-24

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs’ complaint is completely devoid of any allegation that the Landmark School discriminated against Brett. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101, is dismissed.

Rights under the ADA may be knowingly waived by a voluntary and fully informed superseding agreement.

Thompson v. Plante & Moran · filed 1995-08-21

Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiffs voluntary and fully informed entry into the DRA constituted a knowing waiver of any allegedly implicated statutory rights under the ADA or MHCRA. Accordingly, defendants will be granted summary judgment as to these two claims.

The ADA permits compatible state-law disability remedies to be pursued alongside federal ADA remedies and does not preempt them.

Mangin v. Westco Security Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-02-02

The ADA statute and legislative history establish Congress’ intent to allow “simultaneous recovery” under compatible state and federal statutes. Plaintiffs remedies under the state discrimination law are not preempted by the ADA.

The ADA governs prosecution of ADA claims even when the conduct is arguably covered by the NLRA.

Smith v. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. · filed 1997-09-09

We therefore hold that to the extent that Plaintiffs’ ADA claims encompass conduct that is arguably covered by the NLRA, the ADA governs the . prosecution of these claims and not the NLRA.

Section 12101(2)(A) treats activities such as walking, standing, lifting, bending, and working as major life activities, and restrictions on running, squatting, or kneeling may qualify as limitations on a major life activity.

Nazario · filed 2026-03-11(2)(A)

“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A). ... We find it reasonable to conclude that restrictions on running, squatting, or kneeling amount to limitations on a major life activity.

The statute treats walking, standing, concentrating, and thinking as major life activities relevant to whether an impairment qualifies as a disability.

Epley v. Lopez · filed 2025-04-21(2)(A)

Under the ADA, “major life activities” include walking, standing, concentrating, and thinking. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A). ... Epley’s physical injuries may have been temporary, but he alleges that they inhibited his mobility and prevented him from accessing the food and medication trays in his cell and using the toilet. Contrary to the district court’s finding, he has plausibly alleged that his injuries substantially limited his ability to engage in major life activities and constituted a qualifying disability under the ADA.

The ADA's disability definitions parallel those in the Rehabilitation Act, so courts may use them interchangeably when assessing disability.

JOHNSON v. CLARK · filed 2024-05-22

Due to the “parallel definitions of disability” between the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, Courts use them interchangeably.

Subsection (2)(A) identifies major life activities, including performing manual tasks and lifting, that may be impaired for purposes of an ADA disability.

Scheurer-Henry v. Envoy of Richmond, LLC · filed 2021-12-03(2)(A)

Accordingly, the Court can infer that, at minimum, her rheumatoid arthritis and Ehlers-Danlos syndrome impair her ability to complete the major life activities of “performing manual tasks” and “lifting.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A)).

The statute defines disability through a physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities and requires that limitation be assessed without considering mitigating measures.

Schorsch v. Miller · filed 2021-09-10(2), (4)(E)(i)

The ADA, as recognized in the M&R, defines disability as a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, and working. ... The ADAAA explicitly states that the “substantially limits” inquiry should be made “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” such as “learned behavioral . . . modifications.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(E)(i). Instead, courts should consider impairments in their “unmitigated state.” ... Schorsch thus adequately pleads how his physical impairment substantially limits a major life activity as required by Rule 12(b)(6).

When determining whether nearsightedness substantially limits a major life activity, the ADA requires courts to consider whether the person can correct the condition with eyeglasses or contact lenses.

Greene, Jeremy v. Carr, Kevin · filed 2021-06-28(4)(E)(ii)

Notably, with respect to nearsightedness, a court must consider whether a plaintiff is able to correct his vision with eyeglasses or contact lenses in determining disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(E)(ii), which appears to be the case.

The ADA can treat pregnancy-related complications or impairments as a disability, and a claimant may exhaust an ADA claim through an EEOC charge whose factual allegations put the agency on notice even if the disability box is unchecked.

SEIPLE v. TWO FARMS, LLC · filed 2021-02-16

Although pregnancy by itself does not constitute a disability under the ADA, certain complications and impairments that occur as a result of pregnancy may constitute a disability under the ADA. ... Seiple’s EEOC Charge and Declaration, however, provided enough information to put that EEOC on notice that Seiple did not have a routine pregnancy and that she may have been discriminated against as a result of a pregnancy-related impairment. ... Despite Seiple’s failure to check the box marked disability on the EEOC Charge, Seiple’s allegations were sufficient to place her disability claim within the scope of the EEOC investigation that was reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Because Seiple exhausted administrative remedies for her ADA claim, I will deny Royal Farms’ motion to dismiss her ADA claim.

Section 12101 does not define “mental impairment”; the court therefore relies on ADA regulations to recognize mental impairments within the term “disability.”

Josephs v. Pacific Bell · filed 2005-12-27

[10] The term “mental impairment” is not defined in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. ADA regulations however, recognize that “mental impairments” are included within the term “disability,” and indirectly define this phrase to include “[a]ny mental or physiological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illnesses.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2) & (h)(2) (2005).

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not qualify the state-law definitions of blindness and deafness used for board membership.

Opinion No. · filed 2001-03-23

I am unaware of anything in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., that would in any way qualify these definitions.

The ADA protects a qualified individual with a disability, and whether a claimant has a disability and is qualified for the position may present factual questions.

Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc. · filed 1998-03-26

Contrary to what the district court held, we think that the evidence (if believed) could have shown that Jasmantas was a “qualified individual with a disability.” ... Viewing this in the light most favorable to Jasmantas, there is an issue of fact on the question of her disability. There is similarly a question of fact as to whether Jas-mantas was qualified for her former position.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not support a discrimination claim by a person who was totally disabled and therefore was not a qualified individual with a disability.

Kalanquin v. Comm'n on Human Rights Opp., No. Cv97 0567909 (Feb. 3, 1998) · filed 1998-02-03

As to the former claim, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that the plaintiff's disability as of December 14, 1995 was total. Accordingly, she would not be a "qualified individual with a disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act to support a discrimination claim subsequent to December 14, 1995.

Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA is intended as a comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Howard v. Department of Social Welfare · filed 1994-12-30(b)(1)

We disagree because we do not believe that Congress intended public entities acting under the authority of federal legislation to be exempt from the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. The ADA was intended to provide comprehensive legislation to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The rationale of DSW suggests that Congress must include a nondiscrimination clause at the end of every statute it enacts in order to provide the protection of the ADA. We also reject the notion that applying the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to the ANFC program means that the disability laws supersede the AFDC statute; rather, they merely require flexibility in administering the AFDC program to ensure that disabled individuals are not excluded from participation on the basis of disability.

Section 12101 identifies segregation as a serious and pervasive form of disability discrimination and states that integration and independent living are national goals.

Helen L. v. DiDario · filed 1995-02-24(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8)

Congress also concluded that "[i]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... segregation....", 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101(a)(5) (emphasis added). ... In furtherance of the objective of eliminating discrimination against the disabled, Congress stated that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals[.]" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101(a)(8) (emphasis added). ... Thus, the ADA and its attendant regulations clearly define unnecessary segregation as a form of illegal discrimination against the disabled.

The ADA requires an employee who declines an offered accommodation to request an alternative accommodation she believes would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job; she cannot base an ADA claim on the employer's failure to infer that undisclosed accommodation.

Ferry v. Roosevelt Bank · filed 1995-04-17(b)(5)(A)

The Court concludes that after defendant offered Ferry a period of unpaid medical leave to resolve her problems, it was incumbent upon Ferry to request an alternative accommodation if she believed that such an accommodation would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job. Having failed to do so when given the opportunity, Ferry may not now premise her ADA claim on defendant's failure to ascertain the precise accommodation she secretly desired.

The subsection requires a physical impairment to substantially limit one or more major life activities for the person to qualify as disabled.

Brasfield v. Gilmore Memorial · filed 1996-04-23(2)(A)

To establish disability under § 12101(2)(A), Brasfield must prove that her physical impairment substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. ... Accordingly, Brasfield fails to qualify as disabled under § 12101(2)(A).

The ADA’s disability definition does not treat ordinary pregnancy, without unusual circumstances, as a physical impairment constituting a disability.

Jessie v. Carter Health Care Center, Inc. · filed 1996-05-24

No unusual circumstances exist with respect to Jessie’s pregnancy and thus such condition is not a “physical impairment” under the ADA. This claim therefore must be dismissed.

The ADA's definition of disability does not encompass temporary medical conditions that do not substantially limit a major life activity.

DeJoy v. Comcast Cable Communications Inc. · filed 1997-03-21(2)

Temporary medical conditions do not constitute disabilities under the ADA.

Under the ADA, statements made in disability-benefit applications do not automatically bar a claimant from qualifying as an individual with a disability; whether they preclude an ADA claim depends on the circumstances.

Easterly v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. · filed 1997-08-13

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds, in the unique circumstances of this case, that Plaintiff is not estopped from asserting her ADA claims by her statements on either the Social Security forms or on the long-term disability benefits claim form.

Section 12101’s protections do not extend to a claimant who fails to establish that he was a disabled person when the challenged action occurred.

Hosking v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Employees' Retirement Board · filed 1998-06-29

Hosking contends that CRAB’s decision violates the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101, because the decision unlawfully discriminates against individuals who sustained work-related injuries. Hosking has failed to provide any evidence, let alone sufficient evidence to overturn CRAB’s decision, that he qualified as a “disabled person” at the time of MTAERB’s action so as to be afforded protection under the Act.

The ADA defines disability to include an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Zamora-Quezada v. HealthTexas Medical Group · filed 1998-11-30(2)(A)-(C)

The ADA contains three definitions of disability: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of major life activities; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A), (B), (C). Breast cancer is an “impairment” under the statute.

Section 12101(2) defines disability to include an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment; difficulty with one specific job is insufficient.

Duncan v. State of Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services · filed 1999-02-03(2)

Under the ADA, a plaintiff may prove disability by showing one of three things: (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” of the individual, (2) “a record of such impairment,” or (3) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2). ... As we have often had occasion to remark, not every disability — actual or perceived — triggers statutory protection. Instead, as the law specifies, the disability must be one that substantially limits” a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); ... But even if the Ethan Allen officials thought that Duncan was ill-suited to the job of youth counselor because he had a personality disorder, that would demonstrate only that he had trouble at one specific job — a showing of disability that we have specifically found to be inadequate under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.

Section 12101(2) treats a person as having an ADA disability when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, there is a record of such an impairment, or the person is regarded as having such an impairment.

Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 1999-05-13(2)

Under the ADA, an individual is considered to have a disability if she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2). To constitute a disability under the ADA, the impairment, whether mental or physical, must substantially limit a major life activity.

Section 12101(2) treats a person as having a disability only when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity; merely having an impairment is insufficient.

Kohn v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1999-06-21(2)(A)

Whether ADD constitutes a mental impairment within the meaning of the statute is not dispositive of whether ADD is a disability under the ADA, however. “The ADA does not consider every impaired person to be disabled as defined under the statute.” ... As stated, the ADD must also “substantially limit” a major life activity. ... 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A).

Section 12101(2)(A) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; inability to work under one particular supervisor is too narrow to substantially limit the major life activity of working.

Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, Kansas Water Department · filed 1999-11-30(2)(A)

A disability means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A); see also K.S.A. 44-1002(j)(1). ... In order to demonstrate that an impairment “substantially limits” the major life activity of working, plaintiff must show a “significant restriction in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” ... The inability to work under a certain supervisor because of the stress and anxiety it causes does not constitute a disability under the ADA. ... A psychiatric impairment qualifies as a disability under the ADA only if the impairment substantially limits the plaintiffs major life activities or is regarded by the employer as doing so. ... Plaintiff has demonstrated only that she could not perform under the supervision of Masters. The inability to perform only these jobs is too narrow to constitute a “class of jobs.” Accordingly, we find that the City is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

The ADA's definition of disability does not encompass an impairment that prevents working only under a particular supervisor; it must substantially limit a major life activity.

Potter v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2000-03-31(2)(A)

Section 12101(2)(A) of Title 42 defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.... ” Here, the record indicates that plaintiffs impairment is his inability to work under the supervision of Danylyshyn. That does not rise to the level of a disability under the statutory definition.

Section 12101(2)(A) defines disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and subsection (2)(C) covers being regarded as having such an impairment.

Jones v. Ravens, Inc. · filed 2000-08-07(2)(A), (C)

The ADA defines disability as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [an individual’s] major life activities,” or being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A), (C).

The ADA covers a person whose physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Sapp v. MHI Partnership, Ltd. · filed 2002-04-15(2)(A)

To be disabled under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he or she suffers from “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A). ... Thus, the Court determines that Ms. Sapp is a disabled individual under § 12101(2)(A).

The ADA defines disability to include an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Gottesman v. J.H. Batten, Inc. · filed 2003-09-26(2)

. In the context of the ADA, "disability” means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of a [qualified individual]; [ ] a record of such impairment; or [] being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2).

Section 12101(2) also covers a person with a record of an impairment or who is regarded as having such an impairment.

Galvan v. City of Bryan, Tex. · filed 2004-07-15(2)

A disability is also defined as a "record of such an impairment” or even being "regarded as having such an impairment.”

Section 12101(2)(A) defines a disability as a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Steinke v. Septa · filed 2003-12-10(2)(A)

Pursuant to the ADA, “a physical impairment that ‘substantially limits one or more ... major life activities’ is a ‘disability’.”

The provision treats a person as disabled if an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the person has a record of such an impairment, or the person is regarded as having one.

Whitlow v. VISITING NURSE ASS'N OF WESTERN NY · filed 2005-09-01(2)

The ADA defines “disability” as (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Section 12101(2) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable Inc. · filed 2008-10-24(2)

The ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2).

Section 12101(1) defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Bachman v. Donahoe · filed 2012-02-10(1)

The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). Prior workman’s compensation claims do not fit this statutory definition; therefore, Bachman’s ADA claim fails.

The ADA's disability definition is construed broadly, and a temporary impairment can substantially limit major life activities.

Hodges v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-08-12

Because the conduct alleged in Hodges’s complaint occurred in 2010, the ADAAA and the new regulations apply. See ADAAA § 8. Hence, the fact that Hodges’s impairment was expected to be temporary is not a bar to his ADA or DCHRA claims. ... Taking Hodges’s allegations as true, and giving the term “substantially limits” a broad construction, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), the Court concludes that Hodges has pled factual matter sufficient to show that he had a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 12101(4)(A) requires the ADA’s definition of disability to be construed broadly in favor of coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the statute.

Walters v. Mayo Clinic Health System-Eau Claire Hospital, Inc. · filed 2014-02-11(4)(A)

Moreover, the ADA expressly provides that “the definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(A). In light of this broad definition, the court has little trouble finding that plaintiff has put forth more than sufficient evidence to demonstrate that her mental health issues substantially limits one or more major life activities, at least during the period of time or times she experienced heightened anxiety or increased depression due to a reoccurrence of PTSD.

The ADA covers an individual whose impairment substantially limits a major life activity, leaves a record of such impairment, or is regarded as such; a finite, non-permanent injury does not qualify.

Sampson v. Methacton School District · filed 2015-02-12

A “disability” is defined as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” ... An injury like Plaintiffs, involving several months of limitation without long-term or permanent effect, is not a disability under the ADA. ... Plaintiff has failed to establish a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden to establish that she was disabled under the ADA.

Section 12101(1) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Lloyd v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-31(1)

Under the ADA, the term “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; a record' of such an impairment; or being- regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1).

The ADA Amendments Act treats episodic impairments as disabilities and does not count mitigating measures such as medication when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Latson v. Clarke · filed 2017-04-20(4)(D)

The amendments to the ADA expressly included episodic impairments in the definition of disability and provided that mitigating measures such as medication should not be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and thus qualifies as a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(D), (E).

Section 12101(4)(E)(i) requires disability to be assessed without considering the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, including learned behavioral modifications such as a strict diet.

J.D. by Doherty v. Colonial Williamsburg Found. · filed 2019-05-31(4)(E)(i)

Furthermore, the ADAAA makes explicit that the “substantially limits” inquiry is to be made “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” such as “learned behavioral . . . modifications.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(E)(i). Instead, we are to consider impairments in their “unmitigated state.”

Section 12101(4)(E)(i) requires disability determinations to disregard the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.

Woods v. Mann+Hummel Filtration Technology US LLC · filed 2019-08-07(4)(E)(i)

Furthermore, the ADAAA makes explicit that the ‘substantially limits’ inquiry is to be made ‘without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,’ such as ‘learned behavioral ... modifications.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(E)(i). Instead, we are to consider impairments in their ‘unmitigated state.’ Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir. 2009).” ... “In this case, there is at least a genuine issue for trial that Woods is disabled under these principles. Beyond the cancer diagnosis itself, not being able to control one’s urinary habits and incontinence substantially impairs one’s ability to ‘car[e] for oneself.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). And, mitigating measures, such as going to the bathroom frequently or wearing protective clothing (which would be behavioral modifications) cannot be considered in evaluating the disability.

The ADA does not categorically exclude ADHD from the definition of disability; whether ADHD qualifies depends on an individualized inquiry.

Lewis v. DBI Services · filed 2019-08-12

Although the Fifth Circuit has not definitively held that ADHD constitutes a disability under the ADA, neither has it held that it does not. Rather, even before the 2008 ADAAA amendments, which broadened the ADA definition of “disabled,” courts addressing ADHD and the ADA declined to hold that ADHD should categorically be rejected as a qualifying disability and emphasized that whether an individual has a disability under the ADA is “an individualized inquiry.” ... Accordingly, because Plaintiff could possibly assert a viable claim for retaliation under the ADA based on his ADHD diagnosis and mental-health history, Plaintiff has stated at least one non-frivolous claim in this case.

When determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the ADA disregards the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, including learned behavioral modifications.

DORIEN GREYSON ROSE v. BAPTIST CHILDREN'S HOMES OF NORTH CAROLINA · filed 2019-10-29(4)(E)(i)

But his allegations also allow the inference that this was largely because his wife had learned how to manage her hearing loss, and courts evaluate whether a person has a disability as defined by the Act without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as learned behavioral modifications. J.D. v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 670–71 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(E)(i) and noting the “clear mandate of the ADAAA”).

The ADA’s disability-protection framework covers an individual with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Ruiz v. Woodward, Inc. · filed 2019-12-18(1)

The ADA’s protections extend to individuals who have a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To have a “disability,” and individual must have either (i) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) a record of such an impairment, or (iii) been regarded by others as having had such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). ... The Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of fact requiring trial as to whether Mr. Ruiz is “substantially limited” in the major life activity of sleeping, as well as whether his excretory system is substantially limited by his impairment. ... Accordingly, Woodward’s motion seeking summary judgment on Mr. Ruiz’s ADA claims on the grounds that Mr. Ruiz is not “substantially limited” in one or more major life activities is denied.

Section 12101(1) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Clancy v. Esper · filed 2020-02-10(1)

The Rehabilitation Act also incorporates the definition of “disability” under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1): “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and an abnormal pregnancy with sufficiently severe complications may satisfy that definition.

Stanford v. Fox College · filed 2020-02-19(1)(A)

The ADA defines “disability” to mean “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A); ... The court will assume that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s pregnancy complications were “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... but Plaintiff has produced enough evidence to leave this to the trier of fact.

The ADA does not treat intermittent, episodic impairments such as broken limbs as disabilities.

VELEZ v. BROWN · filed 2020-04-09

Though Mr. Velez refers to his fractured foot as a disability, his condition does not meet this essential element to bring an ADA or RA claim because “intermittent, episodic impairments such as broken limbs . . . are not disabilities” under the ADA.

Section 12101(4)(A) requires the definition of “disability” to be construed in favor of broad coverage.

Scaperotta v. Wagatsuma · filed 2021-03-25(4)(A)

The term “disability” means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” “a record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “Major life activities” include walking, standing, and major bodily functions such as bowel and bladder functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The definition of “disability” is “construed in favor of broad coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4)(A).

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Byrd v. Outokumpu Stainless, USA, LLC · filed 2022-06-14(1)(A)

The term “disability” can mean any of three things. First, it can mean “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of” the plaintiff, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A), which is referred to as an “actual disability.”

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Watson v. EQH Service Company, LLC · filed 2022-06-22(1)(A)

The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A). ... At this early stage of litigation, where the Court has limited information regarding Plaintiff's medical condition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that her asthma amounts to a disability under the ADA.

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical · filed 2022-08-12(1)(A)

The ADA defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A). ... While he now also alleges an unspecified “heart disease” and problems with his vision, he does not allege facts suggesting that either of these conditions limit major life activities.

Section 12101(1) is treated as defining disability to include an impairment that substantially limits major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment; the regarded-as prong applies when an employment action is taken because of an actual or perceived impairment, whether or not it limits a major life activity.

Allen v. Macoupin County Public Health Department · filed 2022-09-22(1)

To prove a disability under the ADA, a plaintiff must show “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities . . . (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1). Plaintiff here relies on the “regarded as” prong. An individual meets the definition of having a disability under that prong “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action . . . because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Id. at § 12102(3)(A). ... Plaintiff has presented evidence to support her claim that she was “regarded as” having an impairment. ... Blank’s descriptions of Plaintiff also raise a question as to whether the Department regarded Plaintiff as having a mental impairment. However, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to each party as they must be on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court determines that the issue of whether Plaintiff was “subjected to an action,” in this case, placing Plaintiff on FMLA leave, “because of” the perceived impairment is a question of fact for a jury to decide.

The ADA covers a person substantially limited in the ability to walk as an individual with a disability.

Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2023-10-02

Because Gilbert is substantially limited in his ability to walk, Gilbert is disabled as that term is defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability to include a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

Clark v. Housing Connect · filed 2023-11-29(1)(A)

The ADA defines a “disability” as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

The ADA does not recognize vaccination status or being regarded as having COVID-19 as a cognizable disability.

Vasquez v. City of New York · filed 2024-03-30

Even if such claim had been properly brought before the NYSDHR, exhausted, and then brought before this Court, it would have failed because vaccination status (or, for that matter, being regarded as having COVID-19), is not cognizable under the ADA.

The ADA requires a plaintiff claiming disability discrimination to plausibly allege an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; dyslexia alone is insufficient to establish a disability.

Davis v. Chenega Corporation · filed 2024-12-13

First, all Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA necessarily fail because the Amended Complaint fails to make plausible allegations that she has a disability as defined by the ADA. Plaintiff alleges that she has dyslexia,2 but this impairment, on its own, does not establish Plaintiff has a disability under the ADA. ... Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that her condition has a substantial limitation on a major life activity.

Section 12101(1)(A) covers an individual with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; evidence that ADHD substantially limited concentrating and working was sufficient to create a fact issue.

Jones v. Flagstaff Unified School District · filed 2025-03-31(1)(A)

As previously noted, an individual is actually disabled within the meaning of the law if she has a “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A). ... The Court finds that Ms. Jones has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her ADHD substantially limits her ability to concentrate and work.

Section 12101(1)(A) covers an individual whose physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities, including concentrating and working.

Jones v. Flagstaff Unified School District · filed 2025-04-01(1)(A)

As previously noted, an individual is actually disabled within the meaning of the law if she has a “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A). ... The Court finds that Ms. Jones has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her ADHD substantially limits her ability to concentrate and work.

Section 12101(1) defines an ADA disability as a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.

PARRISH v. MILLER · filed 2025-06-04(1)

A "disability" under the ADA means "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual," a "record of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1).

Section 12101(1)(A) defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Brooks · filed 2026-03-18(1)(A)

A “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)(A).

A temporary injury may qualify as a disability under the ADA, so an ADA claim cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage solely because the injury was temporary.

Boggs · filed 2026-04-28

There is a “possibility that a temporary injury can constitute a qualifying disability” and thus, claims brought under the ADA cannot be dismissed at the pleadings stage “simply because the injury causing these limitations was temporary.”

The ADA requires a failure-to-accommodate claimant to show a disability, qualification for the job with or without accommodation, employer knowledge, a requested accommodation, and the employer's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; an untimely claim is barred.

Toland v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs. · filed 2020-06-17

To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate an employee must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is otherwise qualified for the position, such that she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation; (3) the employer knew or had reason to know of her disability; (4) the employee requested an accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation thereafter. ... However, such a claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

The ADA requires an employer to offer a reasonable accommodation to an employee's disability.

Etim U. AKA v. Washington Hospital Center · filed 1997-06-20

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Washington Hospital with regard to one of the challenged hiring decisions, and with regard to Aka's claim that Washington Hospital has failed to satisfy its obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("the ADA") to offer Aka a "reasonable accommodation" to his disability, and we remand the case for trial of these claims; we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington Hospital with regard to Aka's remaining claims.

The ADA requires consideration of whether a person can perform the essential functions of a job with reasonable accommodation, but does not require an employer to eliminate an essential function and create a new job.

Ingerson v. Healthsouth Corporation · filed 1998-02-26

Under the ADA, once it is determined a person cannot perform an essential function of the job without accommodation, the court must consider whether a plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of fact regarding his or her ability to perform the essential functions with reasonable accommodations. ... Although job restructuring is a possible accommodation under the ADA, it is limited to reallocating only the marginal functions of a job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). We have consistently held that it is not a reasonable accommodation to require the employer to eliminate an essential function of the job, in effect creating a new job for a plaintiff.

Under the ADA, an employee who cannot perform the former job may still qualify for reasonable accommodation by reassignment to a vacant position, subject to qualification, availability, and undue-hardship limits.

Aka, Etim U. v. Ctr · filed 1998-10-09

As to Aka's reasonable accommodation claim, we reject WHC's claim that Aka's inability to perform his orderly job even with a reasonable accommodation rendered him inelig-ible for the reasonable accommodation of reassignment. We also find that the district court was incorrect in perceiving a conflict under all circumstances between the terms of the CBA and the ADA, and so need not have reached the issue of what would occur in the event of such a conflict. We thus reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to WHC on this issue. On remand, the district court should determine, through summary judgment or trial, whether on the facts of this case WHC had an obligation under the ADA to reassign Aka to a vacant position. This entails deciding, among other questions, whether a vacant position for which Aka was qualified was available, and whether reassigning Aka would have been an undue hardship.

Section 12101, as applied through the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation requirements, requires an employee to provide medical information necessary for the interactive process; withholding that information can bar a claim that the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation.

Templeton v. Neodata Services, Inc. · filed 1998-12-10

Here, as in Beck, the employee’s failure to provide medical information necessary to the interactive process precludes her from claiming that the employer violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accomodation.

Section 12101(29)(5) describes the ADA as addressing intentional exclusion and requiring reasonable modifications or accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Ogin · filed 2002-09-12(29)(5)

The ADA was enacted not only to remedy discrimination in the form of intentional exclusion, but also to mandate reasonable modifications to existing policies or otherwise to reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities.

Section 12101(b)(4) states that the ADA invokes Congress's Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause powers to address discrimination against people with disabilities.

United States v. MS Dept Pub Safety · filed 2003-03-05(b)(4)

This argument is flatly contradicted by the statutory language of the ADA. One of the express purposes of the ADA is “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress’ intent in enacting the ADA was to use both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause to remedy discrimination.

The ADA does not require an employer to create a new light-duty position as a reasonable accommodation.

Hudson v. Western New York Bics Division · filed 2003-09-09

Further, contrary to plaintifPs suggestion, there is no requirement under the ADA that defendants create a new light duty position for him, and plaintiff has not offered any evidence that there was light duty work available in 1999, even assuming that he did seek light duty work as a reasonable accommodation.

The ADA does not require an employer to excuse past workplace misconduct as a retroactive accommodation for an employee's disability.

Davila v. Qwest Corporation · filed 2004-09-09

But, as many cases have recognized in various contexts, excusing workplace misconduct to provide a fresh start/second chance to an employee whose disability could be offered as an after-the-fact excuse is not a required accommodation under the ADA.

The ADA does not impose liability on employers solely for refusing to engage in the interactive process.

Wysinger v. Automobile Club · filed 2007-11-29

No provision in the ADA imposes liability on employers who refuse to engage in the interactive process.

The ADA does not require an employer to reassign an employee who will lose the current position because of disability to a vacant position for which the employee is qualified.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2012-03-07

As Humiston-Keeling is still good law and directly on point, the district court rightly concluded that the ADA does not require employers to reassign employees, who will lose their current positions due to disability, to a vacant position for which they are qualified.

The ADA requires reasonable accommodations for qualified employees with disabilities, but does not require an employer to alter work hours solely to make an employee’s commute more convenient.

Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc. · filed 2012-05-10

We find, similarly, that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate Regan’s request for a commute during more convenient hours. Under the facts present here, her proposal of a modified work schedule for purposes of commuting during hours with allegedly lighter traffic is not a reasonable accommodation.

The ADA does not require an employer to eliminate an essential job function as a reasonable accommodation.

Davis v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2013-01-25

The law, however, does not afford a disabled individual the right to redefine, much less eliminate, the functions of a job deemed essential by an employer. It affords a right to such reasonable accommodations as will allow the disabled individual to perform those functions.

The ADA's reasonable-accommodation protection does not require magic words, but the claimant must request an accommodation and make the connection between the request and the disability known, or the nexus must be obvious.

Ely v. Mobile Housing Board · filed 2014-04-07

Now, the Court is well aware that a plaintiff need not use talismanic language to invoke the reasonable accommodation provisions of the FHAA or the ADA. However, she must do something to make the defendant aware of a connection between her request and the underlying disability (or the nexus must be obvious). ... Accordingly, the Board is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims of disability discrimination/failure to accommodate, whether postured under the FHAA, the ADA, or any other statutory or regulatory scheme.

The Americans with Disabilities Act does not require an employer to create a permanent light-duty position as a reasonable accommodation for an employee with a permanent disability.

COLES, GERALDINE v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN, RIGHTS · filed 2014-11-14

Consequently, and contrary to petitioner’s contention, ECSO was not required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC § 12101 et seq.) or the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296) to accommodate petitioner by creating such a position for her (see King v Town of Wallkill, 302 F Supp 2d 279, 292).

The ADA requires reasonable accommodations for a qualified employee's known disability, but does not require an employer to excuse past misconduct or overlook a workplace-rule violation caused by the disability.

Dewitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 2017-01-18(b)(5)(A)

The ADAAA does not require employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s disability by overlooking past misconduct—irrespective of whether the misconduct resulted from the employee’s disability. ... Bolstered by the plain language of the EEOC guidance and the persuasive conclusions reached by our panel in Davila and in our sister circuits, we are confident that the ADAAA does not require employers to accommodate disabled employees by overlooking a past violation of a workplace rule, regardless of whether that violation was caused by the employee’s disability. Accordingly, SWBTC was not required to accommodate Ms. DeWitt by overlooking her March 2010 dropped calls while she was on a Last Chance Agreement, and Ms. DeWitt’s ADAAA accommodation claim must fail.

The ADA may treat a request for FMLA leave as a request for a reasonable accommodation in certain circumstances.

Capps v. Mondelez Global LLC · filed 2017-01-30

We recognize that a request for FMLA leave may qualify, under certain circumstances, as a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(c)(2), and to the extent that the District Court held otherwise, that was error. However, in this case, even assuming that Capps had a disability as defined by the ADA, that Capps was a qualified individual under the ADA, and that Capps’ request for intermittent FMLA leave also constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the record does not support a view that Mondelez discriminated against Capps under the ADA or refused to accommodate any such request.

Under the ADA, evidence that an employer knew of disability-related limitations, caused a breakdown in the interactive process, and failed to provide a reasonable accommodation can create a jury issue.

Santhuff v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2019-09-19

Plaintiff only opposes the dismissal of three: UPS’s alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301 et seq. (“LEDL”), and UPS’s alleged failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). ... Having carefully considered the arguments, law, and evidence, the Court will deny the motion as to the ADA and LEDL claims. Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor, a reasonable jury could conclude that UPS knew of the limitations Plaintiff had with riding a car five days a week (as it related to his eye), was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process, and failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. In short, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

Section 12101 et seq. requires a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination based on denial of a reasonable accommodation to show a disability, employer notice, ability to perform the job's essential functions with an accommodation, and the employer's refusal of that accommodation.

Nordenstam v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. of Envtl. Science & Forestry · filed 2020-06-12

Contrary to plaintiff's contention, Supreme Court properly granted the motion with respect to the seventh through ninth causes of action, alleging disparate treatment and disability discrimination that was based on defendant's purported refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ([ADA] 42 USC § 12101 et seq. ), Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 701 et seq. ), and Human Rights Law ([NYSHRL] Executive Law § 290 et seq. ), respectively. Those statutes provide that, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon the denial of a reasonable accommodation, plaintiff "must prove that he or she is a person with a disability, that the employer had notice of the disability, that he or she could perform the essential functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation and that the employer refused that reasonable accommodation" ( Graham v New York State Off. of Mental Health , 154 AD3d 1214, 1217-1218 [3d Dept 2017]; see Matter of Abram v New York State Div. of Human Rights , 71 AD3d 1471, 1473 [4th Dept 2010]; Stone v City of Mount Vernon , 118 F3d 92, 96-97 [2d Cir 1997], cert denied 522 US 1112 [1998]).

Title II of the ADA bars public entities from excluding qualified individuals because of disability and requires reasonable accommodations when the entity knows an accommodation is necessary.

Taylor v. County · filed 2020-09-22

Title II of the ADA provides, “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” ... To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: ... o First, “he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA”; ... o Second, “he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity”; ... o Third, “such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.” ... In addition to prohibiting discrimination, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act “impose upon public entities an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals.” ... To establish a prima facie case on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show that: ... o First, “he is a qualified individual with a disability”; ... o Second, “the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity”; ... o Third, “the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” ... The Fifth Circuit quite clearly holds, “In the context of a failure-to-accommodate claim, intentional discrimination requires at least actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” ... The claim based on a failure-to-accommodate theory must be dismissed.

The ADA does not require a formal accommodation request; an employee need only provide enough information for the employer to know of the disability and desire for accommodation.

Dipinto v. Westchester County · filed 2020-10-19

Under the ADA, determining whether a plaintiff sought a reasonable accommodation is not concerned about “formalisms about the manner of the request, but whether the employee . . . provides the employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.”

The ADA protects only a qualified individual who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; a multimonth leave that merely excuses inability to work is not a reasonable accommodation.

McAllister v. Innovation Ventures, LLC · filed 2020-12-30

“The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for a qualified individual with a disability.” ... McAllister “bears the burden of proving that she is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’—that is, a person ‘who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions’ of her job.” ... “Inability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA.” ... In Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., we expanded on Byrne, holding that a “multimonth leave of absence is beyond the scope of a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”

The ADA places the initial burden on a plaintiff seeking a reasonable accommodation to produce evidence that a reasonable accommodation exists.

O'Doan v. Sanford · filed 2021-03-19

O’Doan also argues that the City violated the ADA because officers failed to make a reasonable accommodation when detaining him, i.e., that they should have done so in a less forceful manner that was more appreciative of O’Doan’s epilepsy. See Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015). The district court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim. Under the ADA, “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of producing evidence of the existence of a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1233. O’Doan has not shown that a lesser amount of force would have been reasonable under the circumstances. For the same reasons, O’Doan’s ADA failure to train claim likewise fails. O’Doan has not shown how personnel with different training would have acted differently given the exigencies of the situation.

The ADA does not require an employer to reassign a disabled employee's essential job functions to existing or new employees when the employee cannot perform them because of disability.

Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. · filed 2021-05-28

However, the ADA does not require employers “to assign existing employees or hire new employees to perform certain functions or duties of a disabled employee’s job which the employee cannot perform by virtue of [her] disability.” ... In short, because Nissan has shown that it is essential that project managers be available to work more than forty hours a week, Wyatt’s failure-to-accommodate claim must fail. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Nissan on Wyatt’s failure-to-accommodate ADA claim.

For ADA claims arising from arrests, exigent circumstances inform whether reasonable accommodations are required.

Estate of Gabriel Strickland v. Nevada County · filed 2021-09-28

“Plaintiffs and Defendants concur that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. provide identical remedies, procedures, and rights, and are analyzed under the same legal framework. ... “Title VII of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against any qualified individual with a disability. Title VII applies to arrests.” ... These pressing facts must weigh into the reasonableness determination of Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. ... As indicated above, given the allegations of the Complaint as it currently stands, the Court finds that officers acted reasonably in employing deadly force. Accordingly, Claims Seventeen and Eighteen as against Defendants Grass Valley and Nevada County13 are DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Title II of the ADA treats in-home care promised under a disabled person's independent support plan as a reasonable accommodation, and no additional accommodation request need be pleaded.

M.A.C. v. Smith · filed 2021-12-20

The state has agreed to provide Plaintiffs with in-home care in accordance with each Plaintiffs’ ISP and has not done so. That is the reasonable accommodation to which Plaintiffs are entitled. Nothing more need be pled.

Title II of the ADA applies to arrests, and the reasonableness of disability accommodations is assessed in light of Fourth Amendment considerations and exigent circumstances.

Jackson v. City of Modesto · filed 2022-08-03

The ADA and RA apply to arrests. ... Generally, the same considerations that govern a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim will also govern the reasonableness of an ADA/RA accommodation analysis. ... Further, exigent circumstances will inform the reasonableness of any accommodation requested or identified. ... As the Court reads the FAC and Plaintiffs’ opposition, Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims essentially mirror the Fourth Amendment claim. So reading the ADA and RA claims, the Court does not find that dismissal is appropriate. The FAC’s allegations do not indicate that exigent circumstances existed with respect to Bettis’s use of the shotgun and Lamantia’s second pistol shot. Rather, the FAC alleges that Jackson had dropped the knives and was staggering away from the officers when these force mediums were used. Further, as with the Fourth Amendment, the events leading up Lamantia’s second pistol shot and Bettis’s shotgun shots (including Callahan’s use of the taser, Lamantia’s first pistol shot, Jackson’s conduct, and the officer’s tactics) may be considered under the totality of the circumstances leading to the second pistol shot and use of the shotgun. ... Therefore, dismissal is inappropriate.

The ADA does not limit the accommodations an employer must consider, or the subject of the interactive process, to the specific accommodation initially requested by an employee.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Western Distributing Company · filed 2022-11-22

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant cannot merely reject its employees’ specific requests and avoid liability under the ADA. Defendant cites Tenth Circuit law holding that an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation or participate in the interactive process is not triggered until the employee informs it of the accommodation he or she wishes to receive. ... What these cases do not hold is that accommodations potentially available to an employee are limited to the specific accommodations requested, nor do they hold that the subject matter of the ensuing interactive process is limited to those specific accommodation requests. ... Endorsing the limitation that Defendant argues is the law would neuter the “interactive” aspect of the process mandated by the ADA.

Title II of the ADA applies to arrests, and whether an accommodation is reasonable is ordinarily a question of fact.

Hyer v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 2024-09-23

As we have previously concluded, “Title II [of the ADA] applies to arrests.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232. ... “To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff generally must show: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of a public entity’s services, programs or activities; (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and ... (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of her disability.” Id. ... Thus, “[f]or the reasons stated here, and because the reasonableness of an accommodation is ordinarily a question of fact,” id., summary judgment was not appropriate on Plaintiffs’ ADA claims, and the exclusion of the expert reports was prejudicial.

The ADA requires an employer to provide a qualified individual with a disability a reasonable accommodation, but it does not require the employer to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation or create a permanent light-duty position.

McCarty v. Village of Lakemoor · filed 2024-09-23

To survive summary judgment on a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, McCarty must show that (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) her employer was aware of this disability; and (3) her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. ... McCarty is not a qualified individual under the ADA because her own treating physician testified in 2023 and reaffirmed in 2024 that McCarty cannot perform the duties of a police officer even with a reasonable accommodation. ... To the extent McCarty suggests that permanent light duty is a reasonable accommodation, the Court disagrees. ... Moreover, here McCarty’s physician requested a ride along, and the Village granted that accommodation in the form of a field training officer (FTO) riding along with her. ... an employer is required to provide a reasonable accommodation, not the specific accommodation requested. ... In sum, McCarty and her treating physician made clear that she is unable to resume the responsibilities of a patrol police officer for which she was hired. Her ADA claim is therefore without merit and summary judgment is granted as to Count I.

The ADA requires a qualified employee with a known disability to receive a reasonable accommodation, and an employer may satisfy that duty by allowing work from home when that arrangement is reasonable and does not impose undue hardship.

Russell v. T-Mobile USA Inc · filed 2025-06-02

To make a prima facie case of failure to accommodate under either the WLAD or the ADA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is qualified for the job in question and capable of performing it with reasonable accommodation; (3) the employer had notice of her disability; and (4) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. ... If an employee identifies a disability that may require accommodation, the employer has a mandatory duty under the ADA to engage in a good faith interactive process of identifying essential and nonessential job tasks and possible accommodations, assessing the reasonableness and effectiveness of the accommodations, and implementing the accommodation most appropriate for the employee and employer that does not impose an undue hardship on the employer. ... It is undisputed that allowing Plaintiff to work from home was a reasonable accommodation for her disability.

Under the ADA, an employer is not liable for failure to reasonably accommodate when it engages in a good-faith interactive process but the employee does not cooperate.

LaBrie v. Town of Coventry · filed 2025-08-25

“If an employer engages in an interactive process with the employee, in good faith, for the purpose of discussing alternative reasonable accommodations, but the employee fails to cooperate in the process, then the employer cannot be held liable under the ADA for a failure to provide reasonable accommodations.”

Section 12101(a)(5) identifies failures to modify existing facilities and practices as a form of disability discrimination, supporting the ADA’s reasonable modifications regulation.

S.R. v. Pa. Dep't of Human Servs. · filed 2018-03-23(a)(5)

Further, Congress included in its statement of findings applicable to the ADA as a whole that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). ... Again we see that the statutory text itself incorporates the right upon which the reasonable modifications regulation is founded.

Section 12101(a)(7)'s findings support at least intermediate scrutiny of disability-based classifications affecting access to existing state community residential programs.

Martin v. Voinovich · filed 1993-12-14(a)(7)

Nevertheless, classifications for purposes of providing community residential services through existing state programs do not appear to this Court to involve such state interests, and are therefore subject at least to intermediate heightened scrutiny based on Congress’ findings in § 12101.

The ADA does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to permit these claims against state defendants.

Brian A. Ex Rel. Brooks v. Sundquist · filed 2000-10-26

Since the filing of this action and the pending Motion to Dismiss, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Congress exceeded its authority when it abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by applying the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to the States. ... In light of this holding by the Sixth Circuit, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADA claims against these State Defendants should be granted, and those claims are DISMISSED.

The ADA does not validly abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress lacked a valid constitutional grant of power to do so.

Garrett v. University of AL · filed 1999-10-26

Therefore, we grant the Petition for Rehearing filed by the plaintiffs, vacate our prior opinion reported at Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 261 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2001) except to the extent that it affirms the district court decision that Congress had not acted pursuant to a valid grant of power when it attempted to abrogate the state’s immunity under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and remand the case to the district court to consider the argument that defendants have voluntarily waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by their receipt of federal financial assistance conditioned upon such a waiver, and to conduct such further proceedings as may be consistent with this decision.

Section 12101(b)(4) states that the ADA invokes Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce to address discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Nelson v. Miller · filed 1999-03-25(b)(4)

It is clear from the language of the ADA that Congress passed the ADA pursuant to both its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and its power to regulate commerce. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).

Section 12101(b)(4) identifies the ADA as an exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the spending power.

Lewis "Toby" Tyler v. City of Manhattan, United States of America, Amicus Curiae · filed 1997-07-08(b)(4)

In any event, the ADA is an exercise of Congress’s broad powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, not of the spending power. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).