Statute Annotations › Federal › 42 U.S.C. § 12101

42 U.S.C. § 12101

Findings and purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
602
Cited in passing
12,594
Citing cases indexed
14,304
Case dates
1993–2026
Screened through
2026-06-30
Checked for later law changes
2026-09-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

13,196 citing cases reviewed of 14,304 in the citation index: 602 interpreted the section (annotated below), 12,594 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-30 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 42 U.S.C. § 12101?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1998-06-15 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey held that Title II applies to state prisons and inmates. Source
  • 2001-02-21 Board of Trustees v. Garrett held that Title I does not validly abrogate state immunity from private money-damages suits. Source
  • 2004-05-17 Tennessee v. Lane held that Title II validly abrogates state immunity as applied to access to courts. Source
  • 2006-01-10 United States v. Georgia held that Title II validly abrogates state immunity for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Source
  • 2009-01-01 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 replaced § 12101(a)(1)’s 43-million finding, struck the former discrete-and-insular-minority finding, and renumbered the remaining findings. Source
  • 2009-01-01 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 broadened § 12102 disability coverage, including temporary substantially limiting impairments, regarded-as claims without a perceived substantial limit, and assessment without most mitigating measures. Source
  • 2009-01-01 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 added § 12201(h), excluding accommodation duties for people covered solely by the regarded-as prong. Source
  • 2019-08-20 Murray v. Mayo Clinic displaced Head’s motivating-factor test for Title I disability discrimination with but-for causation. Source
  • 2023-03-21 Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools held that IDEA exhaustion does not bar an ADA suit seeking relief unavailable under the IDEA, such as compensatory damages. Source
  • 2025-06-12 A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools rejected a heightened bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment standard for educational-services ADA claims. Source

Purpose and findings

Section 12101(a)(7) identifies equality of opportunity and full participation as goals of disability discrimination law, but those goals do not require educational institutions to lower or substantially modify academic standards.

Sallaj · filed 2026-02-27(a)(7)

Though discrimination statutes guarantee disabled students “equality of opportunity” and “full participation” in society, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), they do not require an educational institution to lower or substantially modify its standards to do so, Southeastern Community Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979).
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Section 12101(a)(7) supports the ADA’s purpose of promoting independent living, so an accommodation that makes people with disabilities reliant on others is not equivalent access.

Craig · filed 2025-12-19(a)(7)

The court went on to hold that even if providing nursing services could be considered a design or technology, requiring the plaintiff “to rely on nursing assistance[] rather than providing the means for [plaintiff] to address his own basic needs” could not be considered providing equivalent access since “the purpose of the ADA, even in the jail context, is to promote the ability of individuals with disabilities to engage in ‘independent living.’” Id. at 1069 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)). The Court finds this case persuasive. Defendant’s disputed practice renders inmates reliant on staff to access the showers, regardless of whether a safe or appropriate chair is provided.
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA was enacted to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. · filed 2024-12-13(b)(1)

However, Congress enacted the ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). As the Supreme Court has recognized, discrimination against disabled persons includes not just “intentional discrimination” or “affirmative animus” but also “thoughtlessness and indifference.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). Since courts must “construe the language of the ADA broadly to advance its remedial purpose,” the Court cannot say here that Plaintiffs’ emergency evacuation claims fail as a matter of law. Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014); see Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945.
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Section 12101(b)(1) states a broad anti-discrimination purpose, but it does not instruct courts to broadly construe the ADA or override Title III's specific statutory text.

Sookul v. Fresh Clean Threads, Inc. · filed 2024-10-16(b)(1)

The Court observes that, while Section 12101(b)(1) may state a broad purpose, it does not actually instruct courts to broadly construe any provisions in the ADA—including Title III’s definition of “public accommodation.”
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Section 12101(a)(7) identifies assuring equality of opportunity for individuals with disabilities or perceived disabilities as a goal of the ADA; the opinion uses that purpose to explain that uniformly applied workplace policies do not, by themselves, implicate the ADA’s disability protections.

Bereznak v. Arrow Electronics, Inc. · filed 2024-08-12(a)(7)

Indeed, Plaintiff’s position on this matter is contrary to the spirit animating the ADA. The ADA seeks to “assure equality of opportunity” for individuals with disabilities or perceived to have disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Importantly, “to be perceived as having a disability, one must be perceived as different from most people in the general population.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2024). Thus, the ADA’s concerns are not implicated where, as here, an employer views and treats all employees the same, such as through adopting company-wide policies applicable to every employee.
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Section 12101(b)'s statement of the ADA's purpose, standing alone, does not create a private right of action.

Lightfeather v. Green · filed 2021-09-02(b)

Plaintiff designates his Complaint as presenting a “disability rights claim” under 42 U.S.C. § 12101. (Filing 1, p. 4.) This statute contains Congressional findings and a statement of purpose for enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). The statement of purpose, in and of itself, does not give rise to a private right of action.
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Section 12101(b)(3)'s statement of congressional purposes does not indicate that courts must alter generally applicable procedural rules to accommodate a litigant with a disability.

Ombe v. Cook · filed 2021-06-24(b)(3)

In connection with his argument that the district court did not sufficiently accommodate his autism, Mr. Ombe references a portion of the ADA that sets forth the Congressional purposes in enacting it. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3). But this provision in no way indicates the district court ought to have altered or deviated from the rules applicable to everyone for the benefit of Mr. Ombe, or that it erred in concluding his claims were time-barred.
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Section 12101(b)(1) identifies eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities as one purpose of the ADA.

Awodiya v. Ross University School of Medicine · filed 2021-05-24(b)(1)

Similarly, the ADA explicitly provides that one of its purposes is to eliminate discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (stating that one purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”). ... From those provisions, it is clear to us that the focus of both Acts is the elimination of discrimination.
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Section 12101(b)(1) identifies eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities as the ADA’s purpose, supporting individualized assessment in Title II accommodation requests.

Marble v. Tenn. · filed 2019-03-29(b)(1)

Although PGA Tour is a Title III case, the Supreme Court’s reasoning makes clear that the individualized inquiry requirement also applies to requests for accommodation under Title II. ... Those three reasons also obtain for Title II: (1) the ADA protects “individuals,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); ... Therefore, when a disabled individual requests accommodation under Title II, the covered entity must give “individualized attention” to that request.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA's purpose is eliminating disability discrimination, not creating or promoting safety measures.

Samuels v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 2019-06-05(b)

Nowhere does the ADA mention the creation or promotion of safety measures. Instead, as § 12101(b) makes clear, the ADA’s relentless focus is on the elimination of discrimination.
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Section 12101(b)(1) declares a clear and comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Montgomery v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-08-05(b)(1)

This Court agrees. Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehens ive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). To that end, the ADA “must be interpreted broadly to include the ordinary operations of a public entity in order to carry out the purpose of prohibiting discriminatio n. ” Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1998). Hence, reading the “‘subjected to discrimination’ phrase in Title II” as “a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity,” Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180, including in the arrest and interrogation contexts, comports both with the text and purpose of the ADA.
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The ADA Amendments Act broadened the interpretation of disability and instructed courts not to demand extensive analysis to determine whether an impairment is covered.

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2017-12-15

Congress amended the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the “ADAAA”) with the goal of broadening the interpretation of a disability under the ADA. It sought to “convey that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1268 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101, Note)..
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA's purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

City of Los Angeles v. AECOM Services, Inc. · filed 2017-04-24(b)(1)

Congress expressly set forth the purpose of Title II as “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” through “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2).
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Section 12101 states congressional findings and does not itself grant federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Fermin v. United States · filed 2017-08-04

Sixth, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 likewise does not grant subject matter jurisdiction because it is simply a statement of Congressional findings.
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Section 12101(b) states the ADA's purpose of eliminating disability discrimination and creating causes of action for qualified people, without changing obligations imposed by unrelated statutes.

In the Interest of: J.J.L., a Minor · filed 2016-11-15(b)

Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination and to create causes of action for qualified people who have faced discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). We do not believe Congress intended to change the obligations imposed by unrelated statutes. ... Similarly, in the instant matter, the ADA is not applicable to a proceeding regarding the termination of parental rights under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA's purpose is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, rather than racial discrimination.

Taos County Magistrate Court v. Currier · filed 2015-08-31(b)

Because the ADA protects against discrimination due to disability, and not due to race, a denial of ADA rights does not support § 1443(1) removal. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (purpose of the ADA is “elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”); §12101(a)(4) (distinguishing disability discrimination from racial discrimination).
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Section 12101(b) identifies the ADA’s purpose as eliminating disability discrimination through enforceable standards, which the court held does not include a remedy for physical injuries.

Aponik v. Verizon Pennsylvania Inc. · filed 2015-05-21(b)(1) and (2)

The ADA provides individuals with disabilities “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination” against them through “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing [that] discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) and (2). ... As the ADA lists specific remedies and physical injury is not among them, and we will not read into the ADA a remedy that Congress was at pains not to mention. ... We hold that the ADA does not- permit recovery for physical injuries and will accordingly grant Verizon’s motion for partial summary judgment as to this claim.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA seeks both to remedy and prevent discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark · filed 2012-08-09(b)

Thus, the goal of the ADA is twofold. It is intended not only to remedy discrimination against disabled individuals but to prevent it.
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Section 12101(b)(1) establishes a national mandate to eliminate disability discrimination, so a Title III plaintiff need not prove that discrimination was intentional.

Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc. · filed 2012-07-24(b)(1)

The Act, which is designed "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), noted, among Congress's findings, that individuals with disabilities had "continually encounter[ed] various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion . . . and . . . failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices" id. § 12101(a)(5) (emphases added). This language itself is antithetical to any suggestion that the ADA was intended to allow recovery only for intentional discrimination.
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Section 12101(b)(1) declares a national mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Sak v. City of Aurelia · filed 2011-12-28(b)(1)

The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Included within this mandate was Congress’s intention to ensure that disabled individuals, like Sak, are not separated from their service animals. Thus, I find that, whatever the legal bark of the City’s Ordinance prohibiting pit bull dogs as a general matter of public health and safety, it is sufficiently likely that enforcement of that Ordinance against Snickers would take such an impermissible bite out of Title II of the ADA and the regulations and guidance promulgated to implement it that a preliminary injunction is warranted.
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA is intended to eliminate discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.

Grosso v. UPMC · filed 2012-03-09(b)(1)

The purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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Section 12101(b) and (b)(1) state that the ADA invokes broad congressional authority to address major areas of disability discrimination and establishes a clear, comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination.

Pearson v. CHUGACH GOVERNMENT SERVICES INC. · filed 2009-11-06(b), (b)(1)

The purpose of the ADA is to “invoke the sweep of Congressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b), and “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (emphasis added). ... Turning to the ADA, its broad language and legislative history emphasize its sweeping authority and national scope. Title I of the ADA lacks an ANC exemption; moreover, case law circumscribes its tribal exemption to tribal organizations functioning in a governmental role. ... In sum, the statutory language, legislative history, analogous case law, and federal policy all support one conclusion; under these facts, Aaskan Native Corporations retain employer liability under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act.
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Section 12101(b) states the ADA’s purposes and shows Congress intended equal treatment of people with disabilities, even when that conflicts with the interests of state or local governments.

Bacon v. City of Richmond · filed 2006-02-28(b)

The plain language of § 12101(b), therefore, evinces clear Congressional intent to ensure equal treatment of disabled individuals, including, in appropriate cases, when these rights conflict with the interests of states, local governments, or their various subdivisions.
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Section 12101(a)(7) identifies preventing disability discrimination based on uncontrollable characteristics and stereotypic assumptions as a purpose of the ADA.

Smith v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service · filed 2004-07-15(a)(7)

The purpose of statutes like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA is to prevent employers from discriminating “based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.”
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA's purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Hason v. Medical Board of California · filed 2002-02-12(b)(1)

Courts must construe the language of the ADA broadly in order to effectively implement the ADA's fundamental purpose of "provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Arnold, 136 F.3d at 861 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).
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Section 12101(b) identifies the ADA's purposes as eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities through clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards.

Association for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 2002-02-19(b)(1), (b)(2)

The primary purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2001). The Consent Decree fulfills that purpose by creating a clear and comprehensive program guaranteeing that Defendant’s gasoline stations and convenience stores throughout the nation will be accessible to the disabled, as determined by application of clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards.
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Sections 12101(b)(1) and (a)(2) describe the ADA as a comprehensive mandate to eliminate disability discrimination and identify isolation and segregation as serious, pervasive discrimination.

Pathways Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown · filed 2001-03-29(b)(1), (a)(2)

The purpose of the ADA was to establish “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). ... The ADA was enacted in part because Congress found that the isolation and segregation of individuals with disabilities is a serious and pervasive form of discrimination in society.
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Section 12101(b)(2) reflects the ADA's purpose of providing clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable standards to eliminate disability discrimination, rather than imposing a McDonnell Douglas pretext framework absent an allegation of disparate treatment.

Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company, a Delaware Corporation James McIntosh · filed 2001-01-23(b)(2)

In contrast, the ADA was designed "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). As such, unless disparate treatment with others similarly situated is alleged, there is no statutory avenue under the ADA for an employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions or for an employee to show that the employer’s reason was pretextual.
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The statute’s findings that disability discrimination is a serious and pervasive problem affecting access to public services were generalized and unsupported and did not establish the evidentiary basis needed for Title II’s application to the States.

Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division · filed 2000-09-18(a)(2)-(3)

Congress did include some specific findings in the ADA itself identifying discrimination against the disabled as a “serious and pervasive social problem” and stating that discrimination against the disabled affects “access to public services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3). In our view, these generalized and unsupported “findings” do not cure the dearth of evidence in the legislative history.
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Section 12101(a)(7)'s finding that people with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority does not justify applying heightened constitutional scrutiny.

Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections · filed 2000-08-08(a)(7)

In light of Cleburne, we give little weight to Congress' finding in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) that the disabled are a "discrete and insular minority”' — a finding that might lead some to infer erroneously that a heightened standard of scrutiny may be appropriate.
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Law changed since Tennessee v. Lane (May 17, 2004) upheld Title II’s abrogation as applied to access to courts; United States v. Georgia (Jan. 10, 2006) upheld it for conduct that also violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 12101 identifies discrimination against people with disabilities as the ADA’s target and invokes Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, but the court held that Title II exceeded that power because the ADA created substantive rights beyond the Equal Protection Clause.

Bane v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-14(b)(4), (a)(7)

Congress explicitly relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (stating that “it is the purpose of this chapter ... to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peoples with disabilities.”). ... Thus, this Court concludes, because the ADA creates new substantive rights and affords greater protections to disabled persons than those available under the Equal Protection Clause, it cannot be said that the ADA “enforces” the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Section 12101(b) identifies the ADA's purpose as eliminating disability discrimination and providing causes of action for qualified people, and the court understood it not to alter obligations imposed by unrelated statutes.

In Re AP · filed 1999-04-09(b)

Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination and to create causes of action for qualified people who have faced discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). We do not believe Congress intended to change the obligations imposed by unrelated statutes. Mother may have a separate cause of action against CYS pursuant to the ADA; however, such claim does not form a basis upon which to attack an order entered under § 6351(g) of the Juvenile Act. The complex issues associated with a claim of discrimination under the ADA are best resolved by resort to a separate suit in another forum.
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Law changed since The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (effective Jan. 1, 2009) replaced the 43-million finding in § 12101(a)(1) and directed courts in § 12102(4)(E) to disregard most mitigating measures.

Section 12101(a)(1)'s finding that about 43 million Americans have disabilities supports limiting ADA coverage to impairments that remain substantially limiting despite corrective measures.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1999-06-22(a)(1)

Finally, and critically, findings enacted as part of the ADA require the conclusion that Congress did not intend to bring under the statute’s protection all those whose uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities. Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.” § 12101(a)(1). This figure is inconsistent with the definition of disability pressed by petitioners.
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Section 12101(a)(2) identifies the isolation and segregation of individuals with disabilities as discrimination the ADA was enacted to prevent.

Waggoner v. Olin Corporation · filed 1999-02-26(a)(2)

The purpose of the ADA is, of course, to prevent discrimination against persons with disabilities. Congress saw discrimination against disabled persons in society’s tendency “to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
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Section 12101(a)(8)'s equality-of-opportunity goal does not require an employer to terminate a nondisabled employee to accommodate a disabled employee.

Quick v. Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, P.A. · filed 1999-03-16(a)(8)

Quick’s request that a non-disabled employee be terminated in order to retain her as an accommodation is not reasonable in light of the ADA’s goals: “to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8). Complying with such an accommodation could subject employers to claims of reverse discrimination.
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Section 12101 identifies disability discrimination, including segregation and institutionalization, as a pervasive problem and states a national mandate to eliminate it.

Cramer v. Chiles · filed 1999-01-08(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5), (a)(7), (b)(1)

A major purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to provide clear, strong, consistent and enforceable standards addressing discrimination against these persons. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2). Discrimination under the ADA includes segregation. ... Segregation is a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA; as a matter of law integration is affirmatively required. Federal regulations adopted to implement the ADA statute provide that “[a] public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). Institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities, against their will, where less confining programs will satisfy their needs, violates the Americans with Disabilities Act’s integration requirements.
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Section 12101(a)(3) records Congress's finding that people with disabilities have faced persistent discrimination in critical areas including employment and access to public services.

Alsbrook v. AR Commission on Law · filed 1998-09-11(a)(3)

By contrast, Congress incorporated into the ADA detailed and specific findings regarding the nature and extent of persistent discrimination suffered by individuals with disabilities “in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
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Section 12101(a)(2) and (a)(3) identify the ADA's purpose as eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities, rather than subsidizing them.

Johnson v. State Technology Center at Memphis · filed 1998-10-06(a)(2) and (a)(3)

The purpose of enacting the ADA was not to subsidize the disabled but to eliminate a detestable form of discrimination.
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Section 12101(b) declares that the ADA's purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Gorman v. Bartch · filed 1998-08-20(b)

The stated purpose of the ADA also demonstrates its applicability to transportation of arrestees. In the statement of findings and purpose at the beginning of the statute, Congress noted that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as...transportation...institutionalization...and access to public services” and that disabled individuals face the discriminatory effects of “failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a). Congress enacted the ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
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Law changed since The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (effective Jan. 1, 2009) struck former § 12101(a)(7)’s finding about a discrete minority subjected to purposeful unequal treatment.

Section 12101 states Congress's intent to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority and finds that people with disabilities have suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment.

Thrope v. State of Ohio · filed 1998-08-28(b)(4), (a)(7)

In enacting the ADA, Congress specifically stated that is was Congress’ purpose “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). ... Furthermore, Congress made specific findings in the ADA that disabled persons are a discrete and insular minority who have faced restrictions and limitations and been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). The ADA thus clearly invokes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... which limits states’ ability to discriminate on the basis of classifications.
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Subsection (a) records Congress’s findings that discrimination against people with disabilities is serious, widespread, and pervasive, supporting the ADA’s remedial scheme.

Coolbaugh v. La State · filed 1998-03-25(a)

In making our proportionality review, as Flores directs, we must consider the ADA’s scope in light of the evil it addresses. We first turn to findings in the ADA where Congress detailed its understanding of the extent of the evil it was addressing--discrimination against the disabled. ... 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1995). We must give these congressional findings substantial deference. ... We are satisfied that the extensive record compiled in the legislative history fully supports Congress’ detailed findings of a serious and pervasive problem of discrimination against the disabled. ... We are persuaded that Congress’ scheme in the ADA to provide a remedy to the disabled who suffer discrimination and to prevent such discrimination is not so draconian or overly sweeping to be considered disproportionate to the serious threat of discrimination Congress perceived.
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Section 12101(a)’s congressional findings about disability discrimination are entitled to substantial judicial deference in reviewing the ADA’s constitutionality.

Coolbaugh v. State of Louisiana, on Behalf of la.dept. Of Public Safety & Corr., on Behalf of La. Dept. Of M · filed 1998-02-27(a)

We must give these congressional findings substantial deference.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA’s purpose is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Doe v. Stincer · filed 1997-12-02(b)

The ADA is intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
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Section 12101(a)(8) identifies equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency as the Nation’s proper goals for individuals with disabilities, and does not require preferential treatment.

Terrell v. USAIR · filed 1998-01-06(a)(8)

We cannot accept that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for disabled workers. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; . . .”).
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA has a broad, remedial purpose of eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities.

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix · filed 1996-07-17(b)

Thus, the purpose of the ADA is clearly both broad and remedial; to ensure “the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
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Section 12101 states that the ADA’s purpose is to eliminate disability discrimination and that discrimination includes disparate effects from neutral barriers and failures to modify facilities and practices.

Vernon Crowder Stephanie Good v. Yukio Kitagawa, Chairman, Board of Agriculture, State of Hawaii Calvin Lum · filed 1996-04-30(b)(1), (a)(5)

The ADA was enacted by Congress in 1990 “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress found that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices_” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). ... In section 12101(a)(5), Congress declared its intent to address “outright intentional exclusion” as well as “the discriminatory effects of architectural,, transportation and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices.” It is thus clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover at least , some so-called disparate impact cases of discrimination, for the barriers to full participation listed above are almost all facially neutral but may work to effectuate discrimination against disabled persons.
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Section 12101 identifies eliminating discrimination against people with physical or mental disabilities as the ADA's purpose and treats them as intended beneficiaries.

Noland v. Wheatley · filed 1993-10-22(a), (b)(1)

First, the ADA was intended to benefit individuals with physical or mental disabilities by eliminating discrimination against them because of their disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) and (b). Mr. Noland is an individual with a disability; thus, the ADA was intended to benefit him.
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Section 12101 states that the ADA is intended to use broad congressional authority to address major areas of disability discrimination and provide a clear, comprehensive national mandate against such discrimination.

Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England, Inc. · filed 1994-10-12(b), (b)(1)

Our interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history of the ADA. The purpose of the ADA is to “invoke the sweep of Congressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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Section 12101 expresses the ADA’s intent to end the isolation and segregation of individuals with disabilities but does not itself provide a cause of action.

Hodges v. Smith · filed 1995-05-16

Plaintiffs also maintain that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, proscribe Defendant’s refusal to pay for Osmolite. As to the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiffs’ argument is that the age discriminatory feature in Georgia’s Medicaid plan violates the Act. However, the statute cited by Plaintiff has nothing to do with age discrimination. Plaintiffs’ argument under the Americans With Disabilities Act is that the provision of enteral products to those in nursing homes but not to those receiving home health services has a tendency to “isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” in contravention of § 12101’s intent to end such segregation in American society. Hodges argues that he will be forced to live in a nursing home (a more segregated facility) in order to continue to receive Osmolite. However, the section cited by Hodges does not itself provide a cause of action to him; moreover, the record fails to convince the court that he would necessarily have to enter a nursing home if Osmolite is not reimbursable as part of home health services.
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Section 12101(a) records Congress’s findings that people with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority subjected to purposeful unequal treatment based on disability-related stereotypes, supporting broad construction of the ADA as a remedial statute.

Civic Ass'n of the Deaf of New York City, Inc. v. Giuliani · filed 1996-02-09(a)

In passing the ADA in 1990, Congress found that forty-three million Americans have one or more physical or mental disability; that they are a discrete and insular minority; and that they have been subjected to purposeful unequal treatment and relegated to a status of political powerlessness “based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). As a remedial statute, the ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose.
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Section 12101(a)(4) finds that people who experienced disability discrimination often lacked legal recourse, unlike victims of several other forms of discrimination.

Bartush v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1996-03-14(a)(4)

Clearly the rights granted under the ADA are independent of the employment rights granted under the CBA. The plain language of the ADA states that the rights protected by it are rights that have heretofore not been protected. “[U]nlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
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Section 12101 states that the ADA should use the full scope of congressional authority to address major areas of disability discrimination and establish a clear, comprehensive national mandate to eliminate that discrimination.

Kotev v. First Colony Life Insurance · filed 1996-05-30(b)(4) (b)(1)

First Colony’s narrow construction of Title III runs counter to the broadly stated purpose of the ADA: to “invoke the sweep of Congressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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The ADA's national mandate eliminates disability discrimination by placing people with disabilities on an equal footing, not by giving them advantages unavailable to others.

Kornblau v. Dade County · filed 1996-06-20(b)(1)

The ADA was enacted to provide a national mandate "for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). ... nothing in the Act, its purpose, or the regulations can reasonably be read to give disabled parkers access to areas that would not be available to them if they were not disabled. The purpose of the Act is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing, not to give them an unfair advantage.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA's central purpose is eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Hensley v. Gorda · filed 1997-01-06(b)

The ADA is intended first and foremost "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C., § 12101(b).
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Section 12101(b)(4) states that Congress intended to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause authority, and the ADA was legitimately enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Armstrong v. Wilson · filed 1996-09-20(b)(4)

The ADA specifically states that its purpose is “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day to day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). ... The Court holds that the ADA was legitimately enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Section 12101 identifies institutionalization as a critical area in which disability discrimination persists and states that Congress invokes its constitutional and commerce powers to address disability discrimination.

Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 1997-07-10(b)(4)

In sum, in enacting the ADA, Congress "invoke[d] the sweep of [its] authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). The "critical areas" in which "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists" were set forth in the statute, and include "institutionalization." Id. § 12101(a)(3). Thus, if the plain words of a statute are to guide the courts in interpreting it, then both statutes must be held to apply to state and local correctional facilities.
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Section 12101(a)(3)'s mention of voting in the ADA's findings and purpose does not make the ADA an election law.

Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Tex. · filed 1997-08-01(a)(3)

This analysis suggests that the ADA is not an election law. First, the ADA does not include even a single provision specifically governing elections. On the contrary, the statute never refers to elections. Indeed, the statute only mentions voting once, and that is in the "findings and purpose" section. This section, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), notes that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services...." The mere mention of the word "voting" here does not transform the ADA into an "election law." Such a tangential allusion is insufficient to impose on the Secretary the rather extraordinary duty of ensuring that local election officials interpret and apply the ADA uniformly.
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Section 12101(a)(3)'s reference to voting in the ADA's findings and purpose does not make the ADA an election law.

Lightbourn v. County of El Paso · filed 1997-08-11(a)(3)

This analysis suggests that the ADA is not an election law. First, the ADA does not include even a single provision specifically governing elections. On the contrary, the statute never refers to elections. Indeed, the statute only mentions voting once, and that is in the "findings and purpose" section. This section, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), notes that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services...." The mere mention of the word "voting" here does not transform the ADA into an "election law." Such a tangential allusion is insufficient to impose on the Secretary the rather extraordinary duty of ensuring that local election officials interpret and apply the ADA uniformly.
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Law changed since Board of Trustees v. Garrett (Feb. 21, 2001) held that Title I does not validly abrogate state immunity from private money-damages suits; the ADA’s validity against States is not categorical.

Section 12101’s congressional findings and stated purpose support the ADA’s proportionality and its validity as an exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.

Lamb v. John Umstead Hospital · filed 1998-09-01(a), (b)

Congress’s finding of a significant likelihood of unconstitutional action with respect to the disabled, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) and accompanying, substantial legislative history, is entitled to judicial deference.
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Law changed since The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (effective Jan. 1, 2009) struck former § 12101(a)(7)’s discrete-and-insular-minority finding, so that finding no longer supports the asserted inference about Congress’s constitutional intent.

Section 12101(a)(7)'s designation of people with disabilities as a discrete and insular minority shows an intent to alter the constitutional standard for disability classifications, rather than merely remedy violations under the existing standard.

Brown v. North Carolina Division Of Motor Vehicles · filed 1999-02-12(a)(7)

The ADA, by contrast, specifically takes issue with the Court's definitional choice and declares that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). This declaration evinces an intent not to remedy violations of the standard of Cleburne, but rather to effect a "substantive alteration of its holding." Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2171.
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Section 12101(a)(2) records Congress's finding that discrimination against people with disabilities was pervasive and supports treating the ADA's application to state prisons as remedial legislation.

Amos v. Md. Dept of Public Safety · filed 1999-12-29(a)(2)

When enacting the ADA, Congress made several findings of both past and present discrimination against the disabled in the country's general population that it determined violated the Equal Protection Clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(a)(3), (a)(5)-(a)(6); H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 22, 30, 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 303, 311-12, 324. Congress determined that "the exclusion of persons with disabilities from government facilities, programs, and benefits was a result of past and on-going discrimination." (Intervenor S. Br. at 18). ... In light of the legislative history and the stated purpose of the ADA, we must conclude that the ADA, even with respect to state prison inmates, is indeed adequately justified as remedial legislation and therefore fully within the scope of Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Law changed since The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (effective Jan. 1, 2009) replaced § 12101(a)(1)’s 43-million finding and broadened § 12102; temporary impairments are not categorically excluded if substantially limiting.

Section 12101(a)(1) records Congress’s finding that about 43 million Americans have physical or mental disabilities, which the court used to conclude that the ADA’s protections were not intended to extend to temporary impairments.

Pollard v. High's of Baltimore, Incorporated · filed 2002-02-25(a)(1)

Congressional findings, enacted as part of the ADA, require the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Act’s protections to extend to individuals with temporary impairments. Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). If Congress had intended temporary disabilities to be covered by the Act, this number undoubtedly would have been much higher. ... Federal courts are simply not in the position to extend the ADA without a directive from Congress, and we decline to do so in this case.
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA's purpose is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, not to remedy sexual-orientation discrimination unrelated to disability.

Vandeveer v. Fort James Corp. · filed 2003-03-12(b)(1)

It goes without saying, though, that the ADA was not designed to remedy discrimination based on sexual orientation, but to “eliminat[e] discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). ... To accept Vandeveer’s reasoning would be to treat the ADA as a “back door” through which the disabled (and no one else) would be able to challenge any form of discrimination - or any kind of unpleasant circumstances - whatsoever. We decline to do so.
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Section 12101(b)(1) identifies the ADA's purpose as providing a clear and comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

Westchester Disabled on the Move, Inc. v. County of Westchester · filed 2004-10-22(b)(1)

The ADA sets forth the standards of accessibility that must be met by various public entities and, as such, establishes the level of accessibility that disabled individuals can properly expect. Whether its requirements are met, therefore, provides an appropriate framework for determining whether, in a given case, disabled individuals seeking injunctive relief are at risk of suffering a harm that the law recognizes. The ADA was enacted to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000). In particular, it requires that otherwise qualified handicapped individuals be provided with “meaningful access” to the program or services sought.
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Section 12101(a)(5) recognizes that discrimination includes the effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers and failures to modify existing facilities.

Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky · filed 2004-10-01(a)(5)

Most importantly, our conclusion is supported by the text of Title II. Title II and the ADA more broadly were motived in part by Congress’s finding that, in addition to “outright intentional exclusion,” individuals with disabilities also suffer from indirect forms of discrimination, such as “the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, . . . [and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (emphasis added). Congress stated that the purpose of the ADA was to eliminate such discrimination, in part by using its power “to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce [] in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(1) & (4). Such language shows that Congress, aside from merely hoping to curtail intentional discrimination against the disabled, aimed to improve the quality of the lives of the disabled by requiring that public entities – as well as other entities subject to the Act’s requirements – eliminate barriers to physical access, including barriers inherent in existing facilities.
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Section 12101(a)(5) identifies failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices as a form of discrimination targeted by the ADA.

AP Ex Rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Independent School District No. 11 · filed 2008-03-17(a)(5)

Several aspects of the ADA and its implementing regulations make it clear that covered entities have a duty to grant reasonable accommodations to disabled persons. As noted above, the “Findings” section of the ADA explicitly identifies the “failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices” as one of the “various forms of discrimination” at which the law is directed. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
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Section 12101(a)(9) identifies Congress's finding that disability discrimination denies people with disabilities equal opportunities and reflects an ADA purpose broader than protecting only those with the most obvious impairments.

Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals Lp · filed 2005-03-11(a)(9)

The statute was passed because Congress found “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9), not in order to provide piecemeal protection to only those with the most tragic or obvious impairments.
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Section 12101(a)(9) identifies assuring equality of opportunity and full participation for people with disabilities as a purpose of the ADA.

Moss v. Shelby County · filed 2005-11-29(a)(9)

Congress enacted the ADA with the intention of incorporating disabled individuals into society and the workforce. One of the ADA’s purposes, specified in 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9), is to “assure equality of opportunity [and] full participation” of disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9). In order to achieve this goal, in certain situations, it is necessary to modify standard procedures to ensure that disabled individuals are receiving the same benefits and opportunities as non-disabled individuals.
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Section 12101(a)(7) recognizes that people with disabilities have faced unequal treatment based on stereotypic assumptions not indicative of their ability to participate in and contribute to society.

Bolmer v. Oliveira · filed 2008-08-05(a)(7)

While DMHAS is literally correct that stereotyping in not recited in the Title II regulations, the ADA itself memorializes Congress’s intent to combat stereotyping of handicapped individuals: ... individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals ... and resulting from stereotypic assumptions ... not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.
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Section 12101(b)(2)'s purpose of strong, consistent, and enforceable anti-discrimination standards supports requiring public entities to act affirmatively to ensure meaningful access for people with disabilities.

Pierce v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-09-11(b)(2)

Given Congress’s unmistakable intent to create “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities” in various aspects of life, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2), and also its recognition that “benign neglect” is a particularly pernicious form of disability discrimination, Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295, the District’s insistence here that prison officials have no legal obligation to provide accommodations for disabled inmates unless the inmate specifically requests such aid—and even then, only if it actually turns out that the inmate really needs the requested accommodation—is untenable and cannot be countenanced.
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Section 12101(b)(1) establishes a broad mandate to eliminate disability discrimination, including intentional exclusion and failures to modify existing facilities and practices.

Bassilios v. City of Torrance · filed 2015-12-04(b)(1)

The statute provides a “comprehensive” and “broad mandate” to eliminate discrimination against disabled persons, addressing both “outright intentional exclusion” as well as the “failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices.” PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir.2014); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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Section 12101(b) identifies the ADA’s principal purposes as eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities and establishing clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing that discrimination.

Chicago Housing Authority v. DeStefano & Partners, Ltd. · filed 2015-12-11(b)

The principle purpose of the ADA is "(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006). Congress, therefore, intended to remedy discrimination against disabled individuals, as well as to prevent discrimination against the same group.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA's purposes are eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities and providing clear, strong, consistent, enforceable antidiscrimination standards.

Chicago Housing Authority v. DeStefano & Partners, Ltd. · filed 2016-02-19(b)

The principle purpose of the ADA is “(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006).
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Section 12101(a)(7) identifies independent living as an ADA purpose, supporting the requirement that accommodations enable people with disabilities to address basic needs independently rather than merely rely on staff assistance.

Clemons v. Dart · filed 2016-03-09(a)(7)

And by requiring Clemons to rely on nursing assistance, rather than providing the means for Clemons to address his own basic -needs, the defendants are not providing “equivalent access,” as the purpose of the ADA, even in the jail context, is to promote the ability of individuals with disabilities to engage in “independent living.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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Section 12101(a)(2)'s finding that society has isolated and segregated people with disabilities supports an expansive reading of the ADA's integration mandate, extending beyond institutionalization.

Guggenberger ex rel. Guggenberger v. State · filed 2016-07-28(a)(2)

These findings suggest that the ADA and the integration mandate have an expansive reach, touching upon all aspects of an individual’s life in which “isolation] and segregation]” may be experienced.
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Section 12101(b) reflects the ADA’s purpose of eliminating discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities and creating causes of action for those who face it, without changing obligations imposed by unrelated statutes.

In the Interest of: J.J.L., a Minor · filed 2016-10-06(b)

Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination and to create causes of action for qualified people who have faced discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). ... We do not believe Congress intended to change the obligations imposed by unrelated statutes. ... Mother may have a separate cause of action against CYS pursuant to the ADA; however, such claim does not form a basis upon which to attack an order entered under § 6351(g) of the Juvenile Act. ... Similarly, in the instant matter, the ADA is not applicable to a proceeding regarding the termination of parental rights under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. ... Mother’s claims related to any alleged discrimination are more appropriately handled in a suit separate from the termination of her parental rights, and not as a basis to attack the determination regarding termination of parental rights. Hence, this claim is without merit.
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Section 12101 declares the ADA a national mandate requiring clear, consistent, and enforceable standards to combat disability discrimination.

Guenther v. Griffin Construction Company · filed 2017-01-19(a)(2), (b)(1)

So what did Congress say? Congress declared its interest in passing the ADA was to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate” with “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards” to address the “serious and pervasive social problem” of disability-based discrimination on a case-by-case basis. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added); see Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 446 & n.6 (considering broad application of the ADA’s protections “consistent with the statutory purpose of ridding the Nation of discrimination”). ... A state law allowing claims to abate when the aggrieved party dies impedes this broad remedial purpose. ... For all of these reasons, we hold federal common law does not incorporate state law to determine whether an ADA claim for compensatory damages survives or abates upon the death of the aggrieved party.
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Section 12101's ADA Amendments Act findings direct that disability under the ADA be interpreted broadly without demanding extensive analysis.

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2019-08-15

Congress amended the ADA by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (the "ADAAA") with the goal of broadening the interpretation of a disability under the ADA. It sought to "convey that the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis."
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Section 12101(b)(1) states that the ADA was enacted to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and the court used that purpose to construe the Act broadly when evaluating a Title II failure-to-accommodate claim.

Smith v. Dunn (DEATH PENALTY) · filed 2021-02-08(b)(1)

The ADA was enacted “for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The Act responds to an extensive history of discrimination in public services against individuals with disabilities. Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf v. Florida, 980 F.3d 763, 773 (11th Cir. 2020). Its provisions are to be construed broadly to protect those interests. Kornblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Section 12101's congressional findings do not identify a history of unconstitutional disability discrimination in professional licensing or retaliation against employees opposing unlawful disability discrimination.

Renner v. Supreme Court of Florida · filed 2022-05-25

In the findings and purpose clause of the ADA, Congress did not find a history of unconstitutional discrimination of disabled people with regard to professional licensing or a history of retaliation against employees who opposed unlawful employment discrimination against the disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
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Section 12101(a)'s finding that disability should not diminish full participation in society is a policy mandate and, standing alone, does not create a cause of action.

Mercer v. Amalgamated Transit Union Division 689 · filed 2023-02-24(a)

In response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff points to the Findings and Purpose section of the ADA, which includes the finding that a mental or physical disability should not “diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). The Court concurs with this sentiment; however, it agrees with Defendants this mandate alone does not provide a cause of action in this matter.
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42 U.S.C. § 12101 contains the ADA’s findings and purpose provisions and does not itself provide a cause of action.

King v. Lazer Spot Inc. · filed 2024-07-24

The federal statute is the ADA’s “Findings and purpose” provision, which does not provide a cause of action.
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Section 12101 states the ADA's findings and purposes but does not itself provide a substantive cause of action.

Gunn v. Stearns · filed 2025-08-21

“Section 12101 is simply a statement of the ‘[f]indings and purpose’ behind the ADA; it provides no substantive causes of action.”
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Section 12101 identifies voting as an area where discrimination against people with disabilities persists, but does not require states to provide blind voters voting privacy free from third-party assistance.

Nelson v. Miller · filed 1996-12-20

This Court does not find anything in the ADA to indicate that Congress believed that the Voting Rights Acts were insufficient. Nothing in Ligktbourn or in anything submitted by the Plaintiffs demonstrate that Congress intended that the ADA or RA should be read so broadly as to require states with statutory provisions regarding a secret ballot to provide blind voters with voting privacy free from third party assistance.
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Section 12101(a)(7)'s finding that people with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority does not justify heightened constitutional scrutiny.

Lavia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Greene · filed 2000-08-08(a)(7)

In light of Cleburne, we give little weight to Congress' finding in 42 U.S.C. S 12101(a)(7) that the disabled are a "discrete and insular minority" -- a finding that might lead some to infer erroneously that a heightened standard of scrutiny may be appropriate.
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Section 12101(b) states that the ADA aims to eliminate disability discrimination and create causes of action without changing obligations imposed by unrelated statutes.

In Re CMS · filed 2007-07-03(b)

Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against people with disabilities and to create causes of action for qualified people who have faced discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). Congress did not intend to change the obligations imposed by unrelated statutes.
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Section 12101(a)(8) identifies equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency as national goals for individuals with disabilities.

Hartsfield v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2000-04-18(a)(8)

We cannot accept that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to grant preferential treatment for disabled workers. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; ...”).
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Section 12101(b)(4) expressly invokes Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power as a basis for the ADA.

Martin v. State of Kan. · filed 1997-09-30(b)(4)

Congress clearly and explicitly invoked its “power to enforce the fourteenth amendment” in enacting the ADA, however. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4).
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Section 12101(b)(4) states that the ADA invokes Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.

Kimel v. State of FL Bd. of Regents · filed 1998-04-30(b)(4)

Unlike the ADEA, it is plain that Congress was invoking its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers when it enacted the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (“It is the purpose of this chapter ... (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment-”).
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Section 12101(b)'s statement of purpose supports the conclusion that the ADA preempts conflicting state law.

Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Greenfield · filed 1998-09-30(b)

Given these explicit exceptions to preemption and the statement of Congressional purpose, the court concludes that Congress intended that the ADA preempt state law with which it conflicts.
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Law changed since The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, effective January 1, 2009, directed broad disability coverage and rejected narrow coverage tests; the earlier exclusion based on a severely disadvantaged group does not govern later claims.

Section 12101(a)’s findings describe the population Congress sought to protect as isolated, segregated, and severely disadvantaged.

Gonzales v. National Board of Medical Examiners · filed 2000-08-22(a)

In the introductory section to the ADA, “Findings and Purpose,” Congress describes the disabled population it seeks to protect. It presents the disabled as isolated and segregated individuals; as individuals who often have “no legal recourse to redress ... discrimination”; and as those who “as a group occupy an inferior status in our society and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a). ... In short, Gonzales is not a member of the severely disadvantaged group Congress envisioned when it enacted the ADA.
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Section 12101(a)(3)’s findings of disability discrimination in areas including education and voting encompass discrimination by states.

Cisneros v. Wilson · filed 2000-09-11(a)(3)

We conclude that contrary to Lavia’s holding that the statute lacks a legislative history or congressional findings of discrimination against the disabled by the states, Congress did in fact make findings of state discrimination.
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Section 12101 describes the ADA’s purpose as eliminating discrimination and ensuring equal opportunity for people with disabilities, rather than giving them a competitive advantage.

United States v. Woody · filed 2016-11-22

Notwithstanding this lack of clear direction, the “findings and purpose” section of the ADA persuade the Court that Congress did not intend the ADA to operate as an affirmative action statute.
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Section 12101(b)(3) and (4) state the ADA’s purpose to use federal authority and enforcement to address discrimination against people with disabilities.

Independent Living Center v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2013-09-19(b)(3)–(4)

Congress made explicit its purpose in creating a national remedial scheme in which the “Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the [protections] on behalf of individuals with disabilities” and “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) & (4).
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Section 12101’s findings and purpose support applying the ADA to discrimination against people with HIV or AIDS even when the discrimination stems from ignorance.

United States v. Morvant · filed 1995-03-23

One of the stated purposes of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). ... Given that statement, Congress appears to have intended the ADA to address the discriminatory effect of benign actions or inaction as well as intentional discrimination. ... While these statements were made in the context of the hearing impaired and with regard to the burden of proof to be applied in an ADA case, there is no reason for their not being equally applicable to an AIDS or HIV-positive individual where such blatant discrimination as demonstrated by Morvant is presented.
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Disability discrimination

Section 12101 recognizes disability discrimination and reflects Congress's purpose of reducing it, but it does not change the rational-basis standard for constitutional equal-protection review of disability classifications.

Contractors Association Of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City Of Philadelphia · filed 1993-10-07(a)(5)

We disagree. The Contractors offer no evidence that the ADA overruled Cleburne, and the limited case law is to the contrary. More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 n. 4 (8th Cir.1993) (ADA does not "alter the standard for constitutional equal protection claims"). Moreover, we believe application of heightened scrutiny to the preference for handicapped business owners would run counter to the ADA, which Congress enacted to reduce discrimination against handicapped persons. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101(a)(5)-(9) (Supp.1990). Therefore, we hold the district court properly chose the rational basis standard in reviewing the Ordinance's preference for handicapped persons.
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Section 12101(a)(5) recognizes that ADA discrimination includes failure to modify existing facilities and practices and relegation to lesser services, not merely outright intentional exclusion.

Ball v. AMC Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2003-02-24(a)(5)

However, it is clear that Congress intended the ADA to require more than the general availability of services. Congress expressly stated that the Act addressed the various forms of discrimination encountered by disabled individuals, which included not only “outright intentional exclusion” but also “failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices” and “relegation to lesser services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
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The ADA prohibits employment discrimination based on disability and supports claims for failure to accommodate, failure to engage in an interactive process, hostile work environment, and termination because of disability.

Eaton v. Town of Townsend · filed 2019-03-06

Count III asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ... The Court concludes that the amended complaint plausibly states a claim on each of the four theories.
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The ADA does not provide a remedy for inadequate medical treatment absent discrimination based on disability.

Brown v. Rose · filed 2019-03-12

The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to state an ADA claim because he did not allege discrimination based on his disability, but instead a claim for incompetent treatment. Id. at 249. ... Further, the Seventh Circuit held that the ADA is not a remedy for medical malpractice. Id. ... He is alleging incompetent treatment for his injuries, not incompetent treatment for a disability. Further, it is not apparent that Brown even alleges a purported disability with specificity. The ADA does not apply to Brown’s allegations.
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to show that she is disabled, qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and suffered adverse employment action because of her disability.

Bethea v. JP Morgan Chase & Co · filed 2019-09-30

The elements of an ADA discrimination claim vary slightly: “To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must show that ‘[(1)] [her] employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [s]he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) [s]he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) [s]he suffered adverse employment action because of [her] disability.’” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was qualified for her position, with or without accommodation, at the time of her termination and that Plaintiff therefore cannot establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, Title VII, or the ADEA.
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to show a disability, the ability to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and adverse employment action because of the disability.

MURRAY v. WAL-MART STORES INC · filed 2019-12-06

To carry his initial burden at step one of the ADA burden-shifting, Murray must establish “that (1) he suffers from a disability or handicap, as defined by the ADA . . ., that (2) he was nevertheless able to perform the essential functions of his job, either with or without reasonable accommodation, and that (3) [the defendant] took an adverse employment action against him because of, in whole or in part, his protected disability.”
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The ADA does not provide a separate basis for relief on these facts when the school’s educational program satisfies IDEA/FAPE requirements and does not deny meaningful participation.

C.K. v. Mercer Island School District · filed 2020-03-17

The Court’s ruling in support of the ALJ’s findings and conclusions – affirming that Parents were not denied meaningful participation in the IEP process and Student was not denied a FAPE by the District’s actions and recommendations – basically resolves any question of whether Defendant’s actions violated the ADA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
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The ADA protects qualified individuals with disabilities from intentional employment discrimination; a plaintiff must plausibly allege a disability, qualification to perform the job's essential functions, and an adverse employment action because of the disability.

Haymon v. Metra · filed 2020-03-31

To state a claim for intentional disability discrimination, a plaintiff must adequately allege that she was (1) disabled within the meaning of the ADA (or the Rehabilitation Act); (2) qualified to perform the essential functions of her job; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See Bunn v. Khoury Enter., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that, generally, the standards applicable to the ADA are also applicable to the Rehabilitation Act).
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The ADA prohibits disability discrimination and requires a disabled employee seeking accommodation to show that she can perform the essential job functions with or without a reasonable accommodation and that the employer failed to provide one.

Oquendo v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2020-04-07

To survive summary judgment on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must point to sufficient evidence showing that: (1) she is disabled within the ADA’s definition; (2) she could perform the job’s essential functions either with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer knew of her disability yet failed to reasonably accommodate it. ... To prove “reasonable accommodation,” a plaintiff needs to show not only that the proposed accommodation would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job, but also that, at least on the face of things, it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances.
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The ADA prohibits private employers from discriminating against qualified individuals because of disability and requires a disability-discrimination claimant to show disability, qualification, and an adverse action because of disability.

Wilmes v. Packsize, LLC · filed 2020-04-21

The ADA “bars private employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” ... In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, “an employee must show that she (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is a qualified individual under the ADA, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” ... Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the first two elements of a prima facie case under the ADA, her claim founders on the third. ... Therefore, she fails to state a claim under the ADA.
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Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities, but it does not treat inadequate medical treatment as discrimination in a public service, program, or activity.

Morris v. State of California · filed 2020-04-30

However, the Court agrees that the complaint does not state an ADA claim. Plaintiff’s requests – a wheelchair, housing in a facility with a wheelchair ramp, and housing in a prison with an on-site podiatrist and orthopedist – are requests for medical treatment, not requests for the prison’s services, programs or activities, as understood by the ADA. The defendants’ failure to provide the requested medical treatment does not state a cognizable ADA claim. The “ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”
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Under the ADA, a prima facie disability-discrimination claim requires proof that the employer is covered, the plaintiff is disabled, qualified with or without reasonable accommodation, subjected to an adverse employment action, and acted against because of the disability.

Lavorgna v. Hamden Shoreline Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, P.C. · filed 2020-07-29

To state a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA and the CFEPA, Plaintiff must show: “(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by her employer; (3) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; (4) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse action was imposed because of her disability.”
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The ADA broadly covers individuals with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, but the claimant must provide enough evidence to show that substantial limitation.

Garren v. CVS Health Corporation · filed 2020-08-28

For the ADA to apply, a person must have a “disability” as defined in the Act, meaning he or she either (1) has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” (2) has “a record of such an impairment,” or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” ... Courts are to apply a broad construction in favor of expansive coverage in determining whether a person is disabled and whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity. ... “Standing” and “working” both qualify as major life activities. ... “To determine whether a disability substantially limits major life activities, the regulations direct courts to compare the person claiming a disability to ‘most people in the general population.’” ... This is not a demanding standard, and it generally does not require a plaintiff to submit scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. ... The Court therefore lacks evidence from which it could find Plaintiff is substantially limited in standing or working. Without such evidence, the Court cannot determine that Plaintiff qualifies as a person with a disability under the ADA. ... The Court will therefore GRANT CVS’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA.
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The ADA requires a discrimination plaintiff to show that she is qualified to perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and it does not require employers to tolerate chronic absenteeism caused by a disability.

Sanchez v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2020-09-28

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) [her] employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [she] was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) [she] was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) [she] suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” ... “An employee cannot be considered otherwise qualified when she is unable to report to work at the time required, because she is not able to perform the essential functions of her job.” ... “[t]he ADA does not require employers to tolerate chronic absenteeism even when attendance problems are caused by an employee’s disability.”
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination claimant to allege that she is disabled, qualified to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.

Griffin v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-10-27

Finally, to allege discrimination based on disability, Griffin must allege “facts showing that (1) [s]he is disabled; (2) [s]he is qualified to perform the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” ... These allegations plausibly state claims for relief based upon the City’s June 2019 denial of Griffin’s application.
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The ADA requires a plaintiff alleging discrimination to allege that the discrimination was based on a disability.

Donald v. Jackson · filed 2020-10-27

Donald also does not allege he was discriminated against on the basis of a disability, which is required for a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. or the Tennessee Disabilities Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 et seq.
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The ADA requires a claimant to show a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; stress and anxiety tied only to a particular job do not establish a disability.

O'Malley v. Trader Joe's East, Inc. · filed 2020-12-17

A “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). ... Therefore, the fact that the Plaintiff suffered stress and anxiety as a result of the particular circumstances related to her employment at Trader Joe’s does not mean that the Plaintiff was disabled.
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The ADA bars an employer from discriminating against a qualified employee because of the employee’s known association with a person with a disability.

Sterling v. Board of Trustees of University of Arkansas · filed 2020-10-23

Under the ADA, Ms. Sterling can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was qualified for the position, that she was subject to an adverse employment action, that she had a known association with a person with a disability, and that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that her association with a person with a disability was a determining factor in the adverse employment action.
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The ADA covers employers and protects qualified individuals with actual or perceived disabilities from adverse employment actions and denial of reasonable accommodation.

Vincent v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2021-03-30

To state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (a) her employer is subject to the ADA; (b) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by her employer; (c) she was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (d) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. ... A plaintiff states a prima facie failure to accommodate claim by demonstrating that (1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.
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The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of disability, and a plaintiff must allege a disability, qualification for the job, and an adverse employment action because of the disability.

Williams v. Genesis Energy, LLC · filed 2021-03-31

“ ‘The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability,” by, among other things, terminating an individual's employment.’ ” ... “ ‘To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.’ ” ... Here, Oris failed to state a claim under the ADA because he did not allege that he has a disability. The ADA defines “disability” as: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Notably, the Complaint fails to specify whether Oris had a physical or a mental disability, what the disability was, or how it impaired a major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). It follows that Oris has also failed to allege that he suffered an adverse employment decision on account of his disability, since he fails to identify any such disability. Consequently, the Court finds that Oris’ failure to identify any alleged disability is fatal to his ability to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Oris’ claims for disability discrimination under the ADA and the LEDL are dismissed.
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The ADA does not prohibit punishing a person for misconduct arising from a disability when the punishment is for the misconduct rather than the disability.

Syed v. Northwestern University · filed 2021-05-06

Alternatively, Syed seems to suggest that he cannot be held accountable for acts that were caused by his disability. Federal law, however, does not prohibit individuals from being punished for misconduct arising from their disability, so long as the individual is not being punished for the disability itself. See Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2013). Northwestern expelling Syed because it believes he assaulted and harassed other students, does not violate the ADA or Section 504. Syed has failed to establish a likelihood of success for his discrimination claims.
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The ADA requires an adverse action because of disability for intentional discrimination, and a prisoner seeking an accommodation must show that it is necessary for equal access to mental-health treatment or other services and benefits.

Robinson v. Butrisk · filed 2021-05-17

But to the extent that he claims intentional disability discrimination claim on the basis of what he believes to be inadequate mental health treatment and deprivation of single-cell status, this intentional disability claim fails because he has not alleged facts to show that any adverse action was taken by prison officials because of his mental disability. ... Nor does Robinson allege any plausible failure-to-accommodate claim, because he does not allege facts to show that single-cell status is necessary in order for Robinson to have an equal opportunity to receive mental health treatment or other prisoner services and benefits. ... Accordingly, Robinson has not alleged plausible grounds for relief under the ADA.
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The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, including failure to accommodate, and a prima facie claim requires disability, qualification, and exclusion or denial of a program benefit because of the disability.

Munz v. David · filed 2021-05-27

Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794e. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals because of their physical or mental disability, including a failure to accommodate a disability. Jaros v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he suffers from a disability as defined in the statutes, (2) that he is qualified to participate in the program in question, and (3) that he was either excluded from participating in or denied the benefit of that program based on his disability. Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the denial of a low bunk permit to accommodate his neurological issues are sufficient to state a prima facie case under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
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The ADA does not require a prison to provide an accommodation that is not necessary for an equal opportunity to receive treatment, services, or benefits; a requested accommodation sought as an end in itself is insufficient.

Alejandro v. Quiros · filed 2021-11-16

Alejandro alleges that the DOC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., by discriminating against him because of his mental health issues and by denying him special accommodations. ... this intentional discrimination claim fails because he has not alleged facts to show that any adverse action was taken by the defendants because of his mental health illness. ... Nor does Alejandro allege any plausible failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, because he does not allege facts to show that single-cell status is necessary in order for him to have an equal opportunity to receive mental health treatment or other prisoner services and benefits. ... To the contrary, he seeks single-cell status as an end in itself. ... Accordingly, I will dismiss Alejandro’s ADA claim.
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The ADA prohibits an employer from failing to make reasonable accommodations for a qualified individual’s known disability unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship, and it contemplates an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation.

Solomon v. County of Nassau · filed 2021-12-01

Discrimination under the ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). ... Once that request is provided, the ADA contemplates that “employers will engage in an interactive process with their employees and in that way work together to assess whether an employee's disability can be reasonably accommodated.” ... After reviewing the allegations concerning the willingness of Defendant to address Plaintiff's complaints and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA.
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The ADA requires a plausible showing that an employer took adverse employment action because of the employee’s disability.

Hayes v. Mellon · filed 2022-08-09

To succeed on a claim of disability discrimination under both the ADA and G.L. 151B, a plaintiff must make a plausible claim that his employer took adverse employment action against him because of his disability or handicap. ... In light of the pre-existing plan to outsource Plaintiff’s entire division, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim that he was terminated as a result of his disability.
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The ADA protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination in job applications, hiring, discharge, and other terms and conditions of employment.

Chandler v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation · filed 2022-10-27

The ADA thus protects a qualified individual from discrimination on the basis of disability in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, and prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of the individual's disability.
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A plaintiff must allege that she has a disability to plausibly state a discrimination claim under § 12101.

Murray v. Pyle · filed 2022-11-16

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 because she fails to allege that she has a disability.
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The ADA requires a plaintiff seeking to challenge denial of benefits to allege that the defendant acted because of the disability or that the disability made access difficult and required a reasonable accommodation.

Marquez v. Office of Social Security · filed 2022-12-06

Given the Court’s obligation to construe Plaintiff’s submissions “liberally, . . . reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest,” Nunez, 836 F. App’x at 72 (citation omitted), the Court construes this as a claim asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. However, his ADA claim fails because he “does not allege that Defendant[ ] acted ‘due to [his] disability,’” Speer v. Norwich Pub. Utilities, 2022 WL 852968, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Hamilton v. Westchester Cty., 3 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2021)), or that his “disability made it difficult in any way for [him] to access benefits” and required a reasonable accommodation. Id. (quoting Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2021)). As this claim is premised on an “indisputably meritless legal theor[y],” it must be dismissed.
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The ADA requires a disability-employment-discrimination plaintiff to show disability, qualification to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment decision caused by discrimination; a failure-to-accommodate claim requires additional proof of notice, a request, lack of good-faith assistance, and reasonable accommodability.

HALL v. SEPTA · filed 2022-12-15

To state a claim of disability employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” ... To support a claim for a failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) he was disabled and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably accommodated.”
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination claim to plausibly allege a disability, exclusion from or denial of a qualified person's access to a public entity's services, programs, or activities, and discrimination because of the disability; inadequate medical care alone is insufficient.

Jenkins v. Getachew · filed 2023-03-22

The Complaint separately refers to violations of the ADA but avers no facts to make the claim plausible. ... A disability discrimination claim must plausibly aver that (1) the plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2) he was excluded from or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and (3) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was because of his disability. ... Although the Complaint broadly alleges that Jenkins is “disabled,” no other facts explain the nature or extent of his disability. ... And even if his ankle injury renders him physically disabled, the Complaint focuses solely on Defendants’ denial of adequate medical care. This alone is insufficient to establish a violation of the ADA. ... Because the ADA claim fails as a matter of law, it must be dismissed.
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The ADA prohibits discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual because of disability and requires an ADA plaintiff to show disability, qualification, exclusion from services because of disability, and a public entity.

Washington v. Serrato · filed 2023-03-28

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., prohibit discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual based on his or her disability. ... In order to obtain relief under either the ADA or RA, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is disabled within the meaning of the act, (2) that he is “otherwise qualified” for the services sought, (3) that he was excluded from the services sought solely by reason of his disability, and (4) that the program in question receives federal financial assistance (for an RA claim), or is a public entity (for an ADA claim).
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The ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities, including disparate treatment and failures to make reasonable accommodations; damages require an intentional violation.

Piotrowski v. the Rocky Point Union Free School District · filed 2023-03-30

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) plaintiff was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was due to plaintiff’s disability.” ... In sum, the School District, Board, and County are entitled to summary judgment on Piotrowski’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act damages claims based on a one-day in-school suspension, both because Piotrowski has not put forward facts suggesting he “as a practical matter was denied meaningful access” to school services as a result of the suspension, Hamilton, 3 F.4th at 91, and because he has not put forward facts suggesting that his suspension for insubordination reflected a deliberately indifferent or otherwise purposeful failure to accommodate his diabetes.
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The ADA permits an employee to proceed with an employment-discrimination claim when the complaint plausibly alleges that the employer regarded her as having a mental or behavioral health impairment.

Fedder v. Ohio Medical Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-05-12

Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently pleads a “regarded-as” disability discrimination claim under the ADA, and Plaintiff may therefore proceed on that claim.
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Title II of the ADA bars public entities from denying qualified individuals with disabilities the benefits of services, programs, or activities, or discriminating against them because of disability.

Adamczyk v. IDOC · filed 2023-08-16

In Count 6, Plaintiff articulates a viable claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act). The ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that disability . . . be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehab Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e, prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals based on a physical or mental disability. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-94e. Discrimination under both statutes includes the failure to accommodate a disability. The analysis is the same under both statutes, except that the Rehab Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept for their prisons. Jaros v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The ADA prohibits disability discrimination in employment, public-entity programs and services, public accommodations, and telecommunications, but a plaintiff must allege a disability and discrimination or denial of access covered by one of those titles.

Swinton v. Department of Justice · filed 2023-09-28

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability in the employment context. Title II of the ADA requires public entities to make their programs and services equally accessible to individuals with disabilities. Title III of the ADA prohibits owners, operators, and lessees of places of public accommodations from prohibiting against individuals on the basis of disability with regards to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, or accommodations of the place of public accommodation. Title IV requires that all telecommunications companies in the U.S. take steps to ensure functionally equivalent services for consumers with disabilities, notably those who are deaf or hard of hearing and those with speech impairments. Plaintiff has not identified his disability, and the complaint does not allege discrimination in the employment context, or that a public entity denied him services based on a disability, or that he was denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation, or that he was unable to use a telecommunications service due to his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the ADA. Because it is unclear if Plaintiff could state a claim under the ADA, his ADA claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
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The ADA requires a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination to show disability or regarded-as disability, qualification for the job, and an adverse employment action because of the actual or perceived impairment.

Fedder v. Ohio Medical Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-12-28

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was, or was regarded as, disabled, (2) she was qualified to perform the job’s requirements, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability or perceived impairment. ... In light of these allegations, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that she was terminated because of her perceived impairment as opposed to her poor performance or some other reason.
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The ADA's disability-discrimination claim requires a causal connection between the challenged conduct and the plaintiff's disability.

Hoid v. Boulder County Sheriff's Office · filed 2024-02-06

Furthermore, neither Mr. Hoid’s complaint nor his objection presents support for the contention that Mr. Hoid’s alleged mistreatment, while detained, was due to him having type 1 diabetes.
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Title II of the ADA covers state prisons, but it does not guarantee a particular level of medical care absent discrimination because of a disability.

Jordan v. Correction · filed 2024-02-06

Granted, as to factor (2), the ADA applies to state prisons, rendering a prison "an entity subject to" that statute. See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S 206, 209 (1998) (holding that the ADA "unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage"). However, the issue remains as to the third factor—whether Plaintiff has been discriminated against because of a disability. ... The ADA "do[es] not guarantee any particular level of medical care for disabled persons, nor assure maintenance of services previously provided." ... "Courts routinely dismiss ADA suits by disabled inmates that allege inadequate medical treatment, but do not allege that the inmate was treated differently because of his or her disability." ... Plaintiff fails to identify any activity or program he was unable to participate in because of his disability. He alleges that he did not receive timely dental care but attributes the lack of care to lawsuits and grievances he filed, not to any disability. Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to establish the third element of an ADA claim. Any ADA claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
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An ADA discrimination claim requires treatment because of the plaintiff's impairment; a bare denial of disability-plan benefits, without disability-based discrimination, does not state such a claim.

McGrath v. Fire Department of the City of New York · filed 2024-02-09

This court also dismissed Plaintiffs disability discrimination claim because Plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting “even a minimal inference of discrimination motivated by Plaintiffs disa- bility.” ... “[T]he sine qua non of an ADA claim is that the plaintiff was treated dif- ferently ‘because of his impairment.” ... These assertions are more properly suited for his operative retaliation claim; they cannot, however, sustain a claim under the ADA. See Dedyo, 1998 WL 9376, at *12 (“[A] simple denial of entitlement under a dis- ability plan does not state a claim under the ADA. Congress did not intend to federalize all claims of improper withholding of dis- ability benefits, and we decline to adopt a rule that would compel that result.”).
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The ADA requires a plaintiff to show a disability, qualification for the public service or program with or without reasonable modifications, and exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination because of the disability; a plaintiff who refuses a reasonable accommodation cannot prevail on that discrimination claim.

Cartagena v. Lovell · filed 2024-05-24

To seek recovery for violation of either the ADA or the RA, a plaintiff “must allege that (1) she has a disability, (2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity, and (3) she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of such service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis of her disability.” ... In short, Cartagena’s complaint demonstrates that he was not “qualified” to remain in the general prison population. ... For this reason alone, Cartagena failed plausibly to allege that he was “otherwise qualified” for the benefits that he seeks and therefore to state a claim for discrimination. ... Quite apart from these shortfalls in Cartagena’s complaint, it must also be noted that Cartagena refused the reasonable accommodation — treatment of his mental illness — that would have expedited his return to the general prison population. This also undoubtedly precludes his present claims. Neither the ADA nor the RA supports a claim for discrimination when the plaintiff rebukes the very accommodations tailored to move him out of the restrictive housing of which he complains.
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The ADA's employment-discrimination framework requires a plaintiff to show that she is disabled, qualified to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and terminated because of her disability.

Buhagiar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2024-06-11

Next, we turn to the ADA discrimination claim. “To set forth a prima facie disability discrimination claim [under the ADA], a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified (i.e., able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation); and (3) the employer terminated him because of his disability.” ... “Under the ADA an employee is considered disabled if he is regarded by his employer as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” ... Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Buhagiar, we conclude that the record does not support an inference that Wells Fargo perceived Buhagiar as disabled under the ADA. ... Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Wells Fargo on Buhagiar’s ADA discrimination claim.
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Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from excluding a qualified individual with a disability from its services, programs, or activities because of that disability, and a plaintiff must plead the elements of a prima facie case.

Wells v. East Baton Rouge School System · filed 2024-08-08

Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” ... To make out a prima facie case under Title II, a plaintiff must show (1) that she is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of her disability.
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to show a disability, qualification for the position, and an adverse employment action because of the disability; a failure-to-accommodate claim requires employer knowledge, a request for accommodation, no good-faith effort to accommodate, and a possible accommodation.

AYALA, SR. v. LOCAL 6 BAKERY CONFECTIONERY AND TOBACCO WORKERS INTERNATIONAL · filed 2024-08-21

To establish a prima facie case, an ADA discrimination plaintiff must show that he: (1) has a disability; (2) is a qualified individual; and, (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of that disability. ... Establishing a prima facie case of failure-to-accommodate discrimination requires showing that: (1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; (2) the employee asked for an accommodation or assistance; (3) the employer did not make a good-faith effort to accommodate the employee; and, (4) the employee could have been accommodated.
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The ADAAA requires a retaliation plaintiff to show protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal relationship between them.

EASTERLING v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE · filed 2024-12-03

To establish a claim of retaliation under the ADAAA and under the PHRA on the basis of a disability, plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of retaliation. He may do so by showing that he engaged in protected conduct, that the employer took an adverse action either after or at the same time as the employee’s protected activity, and that the protected conduct and the adverse action were causally related.
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The ADA does not require a particular level of medical care or provide a remedy for inadequate treatment unless the plaintiff alleges disability-based unequal access to services.

Jordan v. Quiros · filed 2024-12-13

The ADA “do[es] not guarantee any particular level of medical care for disabled persons, not assure maintenance of services previously provided.” ... Indeed, “courts routinely dismiss ADA suits by disabled inmates that allege inadequate medical treatment, but do not allege that the inmate was treated differently because of his or her disability.” ... Accordingly, because Mr. Jordan alleges that he cannot speak to mental health staff whenever he wishes, but does not allege that able-bodied inmates are afforded any different access, his ADA/RA will be dismissed.
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The ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in covered areas of public life and requires allegations tying the challenged conduct to a provision of the Act.

McCloskey v. Humboldt County Sheriff's Department · filed 2023-11-14

What is not clear, of course, if how Deputy Hearn’s admonition to Plaintiff violated any section of either the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq.) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities in various areas of public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and private places that are open to the general public – ensuring that people with disabilities have the same rights and opportunities as everyone else) or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701, et. seq.) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability in programs conducted and funded by the federal government). Nothing in the FAC even approaches stating a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, nor does it appear that this defect can be remedied by amendment; accordingly, Claim-6 is DISMISSED with prejudice.
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination claim to allege a disability, qualification for the position, and an adverse employment action because of the disability; an ADA retaliation claim requires protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection.

Pena v. Atascosa County · filed 2025-01-27

Both Pena’s disability discrimination and retaliation causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), require him to demonstrate a causal connection between the discrimination or retaliation he experienced and his alleged disability. A discrimination cause of action brought under the ADA requires a plaintiff to allege he has a disability, that he was qualified for his position, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. ... To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must show he participated in an activity protected under the statute, his employer took an adverse employment action against him, and a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.
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The ADA prohibits covered entities from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires reasonable accommodations for known physical or mental limitations.

Way v. City of Missouri City · filed 2025-04-09

The ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., “is a federal antidiscrimination statute designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996). The ADA thus makes it unlawful for covered entities to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability[.]” § 12112(a). 5 “Discrimination” under the ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee.” § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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The ADA prohibits disability discrimination and requires covered employers to provide reasonable accommodations when a qualified employee can perform the essential functions of the job with accommodation.

Brikman v. Westchester Medical Center Advanced Physician Services, P.C. · filed 2025-08-13

The elements of a [discrimination] claim under the ADA are: “(1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by his employer; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation; (4) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse employment action was imposed because of his disability.” ... To sufficiently plead a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.”
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Section 12101's ADA covers disability discrimination based on pregnancy-related complications, but pregnancy alone is not a disability; a claimant must show disability, qualification with or without reasonable accommodation, and discharge solely because of the disability.

Bunnell v. Wm. Beaumont Hosp. · filed 2025-09-04

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under either statute, Bunnell must show that she is an individual with a disability, that she is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation, and that Beaumont discharged her solely because of the disability. ... Although pregnancy, by itself, is not a “disability” under the ADA, some pregnancy complications can predicate a claim of disability discrimination. ... Bunnell has not shown a dispute of material fact as to disability discrimination under the ADA and PWDCRA. ... But there is no evidence that Zeiter or any other Beaumont employees knew about her severe morning sickness, which was not mentioned in her doctor’s note. For these reasons, the district court properly dismissed Bunnell’s disability-discrimination claims.
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The ADA requires a disability-discrimination plaintiff to allege a disability, qualification to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment decision because of discrimination; accommodation allegations must connect the requested accommodation to the disability and ability to work.

IN RE: NIA STALLWORTH · filed 2025-09-12

To state a claim under the ADA, the Complaint must allege that the plaintiff (1) “is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA,” (2) “is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations,” (3) and has experienced an “adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” ... Without any allegations at all connecting Plaintiff’s doctor’s appointments to her disabilities or connecting her disabilities to her ability to work, the Complaint does not state a claim for disability discrimination or a failure to accommodate.
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The ADA prohibits disability discrimination by public entities and requires a plaintiff to plead qualification, denial or discrimination in a public service, and causation by disability.

VanderWeken v. Davis · filed 2025-10-06

The ADA generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s disability. In order to proceed with an ADA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was denied the benefits of those services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.
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To state an ADA claim under Title II or III, a plaintiff must plead facts supporting disability discrimination and identifying the defendant's status as a public or private entity or place of public accommodation.

Flenaugh · filed 2025-12-23

In any case, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under Titles II or III of the ADA. Plaintiff states her belief that Defendant discriminated against her because of her alleged disability but does not plead any facts to support this assertion, nor any that support an inference that any of the alleged actions taken by Defendant were motivated by a discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Neither does Plaintiff allege whether Defendant is a “private entity” or “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of the ADA.
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The ADA requires a plaintiff to show that she is a qualified individual with a disability, was excluded from or denied access to a public entity’s services or was otherwise discriminated against, and suffered that exclusion or discrimination because of her disability.

Hernandez · filed 2026-01-13

To state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) that [s]he is a ‘qualified individual’ with a disability; (2) that [s]he was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to [her] disability.”
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Notes 1–150 of 602, oldest cases first.

12,594 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Britt v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., the opinion construes §§ 12143 and 12201, not § 12101’s findings-and-purpose provision. opinion →
The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach CA2/8, the opinion applies the ADA’s illegal-drug-use rule, not the findings-and-purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach, the opinion applies the ADA’s illegal-drug-use rule, not § 12101. opinion →
Walter Irving Banks v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 99, the opinion addresses ADA discrimination elements and the duty of fair representation, not § 12101. opinion →
Brosius v. Department of Labor, the opinion addresses the ADA Amendments Act’s effective date and disability/accommodation standards, not § 12101’s findings and purpose. opinion →
Durick v. New York City Department of Education, the opinion applies ADA reasonable-accommodation standards, not § 12101. opinion →
Dunn v. Dunn, the opinion applies the ADA’s integration mandate but does not construe § 12101(a)(2). opinion →
Maddox v. State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance, the court applies ADA discrimination standards under other provisions and does not construe the findings-and-purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Angeles v. Coast Engineering Contractors CA4/3, the opinion construes the public-accommodation provisions in §§ 12182(a) and 12183(a)(1), not § 12101. opinion →
Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the opinion construes ADA enforcement and exhaustion requirements under §§ 12112 and 12117, not the findings-and-purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Richardson v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the opinion applies the federal-government exclusion in § 12111(5)(B), not § 12101’s findings and purpose. opinion →
Jarrell v. Hospital for Special Care, the opinion applies ADA reasonable-accommodation standards to an indefinite-leave request, but does not construe the findings-and-purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Cavaliere v. Advertising Specialty Institute Inc., the opinion states the ADA's prima facie employment-discrimination elements, not § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Anderson v. Colorado, Department of Corrections, the opinion states Title II claim elements, not what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Tani v. FPL/Next Era Energy, the opinion addresses ADA coverage of independent contractors under other provisions, not § 12101. opinion →
Fogle v. Monroe County, the opinion applies an ADA administrative-preclusion rule, not § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Blanco v. Bath Iron Works Corp., the opinion construes the confidentiality requirement in § 12112(d)(3)(B), not § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Dooley v. Parks & Recreation for the Parish, the opinion states general ADA prima facie elements without construing § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Baldessarre v. Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, the opinion applies the IDEA's exhaustion requirement to an education-related ADA claim, not § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Lyles v. District of Columbia Government, the opinion applies an ADA exhaustion standard but does not construe § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Soto-Fonalledas v. Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel Spa & Casino, the opinion decides the arbitrability of ADA claims, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the opinion decides individual liability under Title I, not the findings and purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Carson v. Sim, the opinion applies ADA administrative-exhaustion requirements but does not construe § 12101's findings or purposes. opinion →
Venter v. Potter, the opinion addresses the ADA's federal-employee exclusion under other provisions, not § 12101. opinion →
Firstenberg v. CITY OF SANTA FE, NM, the opinion addresses conflict between the ADA and the Telecommunications Act, not what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Burgos v. Chertoff Ex Rel. United States Department of Homeland Security, the opinion’s definition of disability is actually codified at § 12102(2), despite its apparent citation to § 12101(2); it does not construe the findings and purpose provision at issue here. opinion →
Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the quoted Title II state-immunity provision is codified at § 12202, despite the opinion’s citation to § 12101(b)(4); the court’s ruling concerns Title II sovereign immunity, not § 12101. opinion →
Ramirez v. New York City Board of Education, the opinion’s definition of disability is actually codified at § 12102(2), despite its apparent citation to § 12101(2); it does not construe the findings and purpose provision at issue here. opinion →
Velazquez v. De Autobuses, the court applies exhaustion rules incorporated through § 12117(a) and Title VII; it does not construe the findings and purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Atamian v. Burns, the court merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the ADA citation; its ruling concerns failure to allege disability and does not construe the findings and purpose provision. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mother's Work Inc., the court applies the ADA’s disability standard, which concerns § 12102 and related provisions, not the findings and purpose provision in § 12101. opinion →
Torres-Negron v. Merck & Company, the court applies ADA employment-liability principles and a single-employer doctrine drawn from other provisions and precedent; it does not construe § 12101. opinion →
Leonel v. American Airlines, the citation to § 12101 identifies the ADA, but the court’s holding concerns the medical-examination rule in § 12112(d)(3), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Flores v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., the court cited § 12101 and § 12101(b) only by analogy while deciding the remedies available under Rehabilitation Act § 504. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the ADA. opinion →
Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, section 12101 appears only in a footnote listing statutes amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The court decided retroactivity and jury-trial issues under Title VII and the ADEA, and did not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., the opinion mentions § 12101 only in a parenthetical citation identifying the Americans with Disabilities Act as one statute covered by the 1991 Act's damages provisions. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Kent v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Elem. & SEC. Educ., the citation to § 12101 et seq. identifies the Americans with Disabilities Act generally. The court's operative analysis and dismissal rested on § 12117(a) and the Title VII right-to-sue procedures, not on the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
James v. American International Recovery, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only in a list of statutes covered by § 102(a) and (b) of the 1991 Act, as background to deciding retroactivity; it does not interpret or apply the ADA. opinion →
Opinion No., section 12101 et seq. is cited only in the introductory identification of the ADA. The opinion's analysis and conclusions address other provisions, principally §§ 12111, 12112, and 12132, rather than construing § 12101. opinion →
Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., the court cites § 12101(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(5) only to recount Congress's general findings in the ADA's background. It does not interpret or apply those provisions; the operative analysis concerns the public-accommodation and direct-threat provisions in §§ 12181 and 12182. opinion →
New York Infirmary — Beekman Downtown Hospital v. Sarris, the court merely conditionally cites the ADA as a potentially applicable anti-discrimination law and does not construe § 12101, determine its requirements or coverage, or decide that it applies to the parties. The petitions were dismissed on other grounds. opinion →
Smith v. State Ex Rel. Board of Regents of Oklahoma State University, the dissent merely recounts Smith’s mootness argument that the ADA afforded similar protection and cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. in footnote 5; it does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
More v. Farrier, the statute appears only in a footnote recounting and rejecting appellees’ argument about the constitutional equal-protection standard. The court does not interpret § 12101, determine what it requires, or apply it to the claims. opinion →
Kinney v. Yerusalim, the court cites § 12101 only to describe the ADA’s general legislative purpose. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 12101 requires; the ruling concerns Title II regulations governing alterations and curb ramps. opinion →
Lebron v. National RR Passenger Corp.(Amtrak), the court cites § 12101 only in passing as part of describing Amtrak's governmental character while deciding a First Amendment governmental-action issue; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
More v. Farrier, section 12101 appears only in a footnote reporting the appellees’ argument that disability statutes warranted heightened scrutiny; the court decided the Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection issue under rational-basis review and did not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Williams v. SECR. OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HUMAN SERV., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court's analysis construes other ADA provisions, including §§ 12131, 12132, and 12182, and does not interpret § 12101 itself. opinion →
Williams v. Secretary of Executive Office of Human Services, the opinion adjudicates claims under Title II's operative provisions, especially §§ 12131, 12132, and 12182, and related regulations. Section 12101 is cited only generically as part of the ADA's et seq. range and is not construed or applied as a separate provision. opinion →
Breece v. Alliance Tractor-Trailer Training II, Inc., the court cites § 12101 only as the general statutory basis for jurisdiction. Its substantive analysis applies §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 12182(b)(3), not § 12101. opinion →
Galloway v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the opinion merely recites the findings in § 12101(a)(7) in its introduction. It decides the dispute under the Rehabilitation Act, Title II provisions including § 12132, and § 1983, without construing or applying § 12101(a)(7). opinion →
Trautz v. Weisman, the court cited § 12101’s congressional findings and purposes only as background informing its separate holding that individuals with disabilities may constitute a protected class under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). It did not construe, apply, or decide the meaning or coverage of § 12101. opinion →
Cohen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the opinion decides a retroactivity issue under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and mentions § 12101 only in a footnote identifying the ADA as one of the statutes amended by § 109. It does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
James v. Texas Department of Human Services, the court merely identifies the ADA as the basis of Plaintiff’s final claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Baby Neal v. Casey, the opinion cites 42 U.S.C. § 12101 only as part of an et-seq. citation while addressing claims under § 12132; it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion only flags that the Americans with Disabilities Act might apply to Arkansas's exclusion of insulin-dependent diabetic school-bus drivers; it does not construe § 12101 or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Bombrys v. City of Toledo, the opinion cites § 12101 only as the beginning section of the ADA's codification and does not construe or apply that section. Its ADA analysis instead addresses §§ 12112(a) and 12182(b)(3), along with related regulations. opinion →
Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, the court merely describes the ADA claim and declines to resolve it, finding that neither side established entitlement to summary judgment and that the issue was essentially moot; it does not interpret or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
O'Neal Ex Rel. Boyd v. Alabama Department of Public Health, the court merely recites the ADA’s general purpose in describing the parties’ claims; it does not interpret, define, or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101 in deciding the motion. opinion →
Matter of Baby K, section 12101 appears only in the introductory list of statutes supporting federal-question jurisdiction. The court's substantive ADA analysis addresses §§ 12102, 12181, and 12182, not § 12101. opinion →
Westhoven v. Lincoln Foodservice Products, Inc., section 12101 appears only as a general “42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.” citation identifying the ADA and its effective date. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; it discusses other ADA provisions while deciding ERISA preemption and the ADA's nonretroactivity. opinion →
Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only while quoting legislative-history commentary comparing a Title VII amendment to the ADA; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Sales v. Republic of Uganda, the opinion merely mentions the recently enacted ADA as a general reason to doubt an expert’s prediction about the plaintiff’s future employability; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Ago, the opinion mentions the Americans with Disabilities Act and cites 42 U.S.C. § 12101 in a footnote only as background to a Florida statute; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Untitled California Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 12101 only as the beginning of the ADA's statutory range when identifying the ADA. Its analysis and conclusions concern Title III and other provisions, cited as §§ 303, 306, and 308, rather than § 12101 itself. opinion →
Finley v. Giacobbe, the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the statute underlying plaintiff’s claim. Although the court holds that New York notice-of-claim provisions do not apply to ADA claims, it does not construe § 12101 or decide what that section means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, the citation to § 12101 appears only in plaintiffs' preemption argument identifying the ADA generally; the court did not interpret or apply § 12101, and dismissed the claim based on the defendants' lack of coverage under the ADA and ERISA preemption. opinion →
Minter v. Ford Motor Co., section 12101 is mentioned only in a footnote reporting plaintiff’s denied motion to amend the complaint to add an ADA claim. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Wright v. Alexandria Division of Social Services, the court did not construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101; it merely noted that the ADA claim had not been raised below and was procedurally barred from appellate review. opinion →
Verdon v. Consolidated Rail Corp., section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA in plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. The court’s ADA ruling concerns nonretroactivity and cites § 12111(5)(A) and the statute’s effective-date provision, not § 12101. opinion →
Misek-Falkoff v. International Business MacHines Corp., the court mentions § 12101 only in describing that the suit may be subject to the ADA; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as a source and model for California’s FEHA definition; the court’s holding concerns the FEHA and does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
TEP, AND KJC v. Leavitt, the court held that the Utah statute violated the ADA, but cited § 12101 only as the ADA's general statutory reference; the operative provision it discussed was § 12132, along with an implementing regulation defining disability. opinion →
Harmer v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., the citation to § 12101 appears only in the factual description identifying the ADA underlying the suit. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101; its merits discussion addressed other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, 12112, 12117, and 12203. opinion →
Mason Ex Rel. Mason v. Schenectady City School District, the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only in reciting the plaintiff’s asserted claims and procedural history. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what the ADA or § 12101 requires. opinion →
Northen v. City of Chicago, the court merely cited § 12101 as the general statutory citation for the ADA in describing the plaintiffs’ claim. Its ruling addressed whether retirees could be covered under the ADA’s employment provisions, relying on Title VII and referring in a footnote to §§ 12111-12, not interpreting or applying § 12101. opinion →
People v. Caldwell, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA. The court’s substantive analysis and application concern ADA §§ 201 and 202, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 and 12132, rather than § 12101. opinion →
Nelson v. United Artist Theater Circuit, Inc., the ADA is discussed only as an alleged basis for federal-question removal; the court remanded because the state-law claims did not depend on resolving either federal statute and did not construe § 12101 or decide its substantive meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Kansas Hospital Ass'n v. Whiteman, the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only as the source of the ADA while addressing a claim under the implementing notice regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a). The court did not interpret or decide what § 12101 requires or whom it covers; it merely found no likely entitlement to injunctive relief on the regulation-based claim. opinion →
Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., the statute is mentioned in the complaint’s description and in a footnote reporting the plaintiff’s assertion that he pleaded an ADA claim; the court instead found that the complaint did not state such a claim and did not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 only as the general citation to the ADA when describing Bolton’s allegation; it does not interpret or apply § 12101’s findings or purposes. opinion →
Eisfelder v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA counts in the complaint. It does not construe § 12101 or decide what that section means or requires; its ADA analysis concerns effective dates, Title I and Title II, and § 12112(b)(2). opinion →
Matter of Marriage of Olson, the court merely concluded, without analyzing § 12101 or identifying any ADA requirement, that the hearing impairment had been accommodated; its actual reasoning relied on Washington interpreter law and trial-court discretion. opinion →
Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, the court cited § 12101(b)(1) to identify the ADA's objectives while rejecting a Fifth Amendment takings challenge; it did not construe or apply this subsection. opinion →
Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools, section 12101 is cited only in the complaint's list of claims. The court's ADA discussion quotes and applies § 12132, then dismisses Count IV as redundant of the IDEA claim; it does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Kinney v. Yerusalim, section 12101 is cited only for general legislative findings about disability discrimination and architectural barriers. The court does not interpret or apply that statute; its holding concerns the ADA implementing regulations, particularly 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b) and (e), and resurfacing-related curb ramps. opinion →
Kinney v. Yerusalim, the court cited § 12101 only for the ADA’s general findings about isolation, discrimination, and architectural barriers; it construed the implementing regulations, especially 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150 and 35.151, rather than deciding what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Spranger v. Anthony A. Frank, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, the court decided a handicap-discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act and referred to the ADA and its regulations only as an analogue for interpreting "substantially limits." It did not decide an ADA claim or construe what 42 U.S.C. § 12101 requires; the § 12101 citation is incidental. opinion →
Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., the court mentions the ADA only in a footnote stating that the parties did not brief or argue its applicability and that no issue concerning it was before the court; the opinion does not construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Shepherd v. Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs Disabled American Veterans, the court merely reported the plaintiff's newly raised ADA jurisdiction argument and expressly declined to consider it because it was not raised below; it made no ruling about what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Molski v. Gleich, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA in describing the facilities; it does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. The decision instead concerns class certification, consent-decree interpretation, and damages under California disability law. opinion →
Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., section 12101 et seq. is cited only as the general citation identifying the ADA claim. The court granted summary judgment based on the complaint and affidavits, finding no allegation that the denial of services was based on disability; it did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Felde v. City of San Jose, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA in the plaintiff’s background allegation. The court’s ruling concerns the ADA’s discrimination provisions in § 12112, not § 12101’s findings or purpose. opinion →
United States v. Morvant, the court merely recites the ADA's statutory purpose in discussing claims arising under Title III; it does not construe or apply § 12101. The operative rulings concern other provisions, including §§ 12182 and 12188. opinion →
Klein v. Boeing Co., the court did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. It merely noted that an unpleaded, hypothetical ADA claim would fail under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d), so the citation is incidental. opinion →
Crowder v. Kitagawa, the opinion quotes § 12101(a)(7) only as plaintiffs’ support for treating visually impaired persons as a suspect class, then expressly declines to decide that issue and resolves the constitutional claims on assumed strict scrutiny grounds. It does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital, the court cited § 12101(b)(1) only to identify the ADA’s general purpose while deciding, under § 12182(a), that an independent contractor lacking control over hospital policy was not a proper defendant. It did not construe or apply § 12101(b)(1) itself. opinion →
Thomas by and Through Thomas v. Davidson Academy, the court cited § 12101(b)(1) and (2) only to describe the ADA's purpose in addressing the public-interest factor for a preliminary injunction; it did not construe or apply those provisions as the basis of its ruling. opinion →
Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corp. v. Trust Insurance Plan, section 12101 is cited only in a parenthetical summarizing another court’s ADA retroactivity analysis. This court’s retroactivity ruling concerns amendments to the Indian Health Care Improvement Act and does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc., the court merely cites § 12101 et seq. to identify the ADA; its ruling concerns pleading and affirmative defenses, including a reference to § 12113, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Way v. Fred Meyer, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general starting citation for the ADA, and the court's decision concerns the ADA's temporal applicability to a pre-effective-date claim, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Crowder v. True, the court merely identifies § 12101 as one of the statutes invoked in Count II and reports that the ADA claim was dismissed with prejudice. It does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., section 12101 is cited only in the background to identify the ADA claims. The court's analysis concerns the ADA's covered-entity and employer provisions in §§ 12112(a) and 12111(5)(A), and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, the court quoted § 12101(a)(7) as a congressional finding in a footnote supporting its discussion of reasonable modifications and rejecting stereotypical assumptions. It did not construe or apply § 12101(a)(7); the preliminary-injunction ruling was based on Title II and its implementing regulations. opinion →
Staron v. McDonald's Corp., the court cites § 12101(a) and (b) only to recount the ADA's congressional purpose and findings. It does not construe or apply those provisions; the dismissal rests on § 12201(b) and the reasonable-modification requirement in § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). opinion →
Blanton v. Winston Printing Co., section 12101 is cited only as the general citation for the ADA in the description of Plaintiff's claim. The court's analysis and ruling concern the definitions of disability and qualified individual and the ADA's discrimination rule, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Copanas v. Loehr, the court only reported the appellant’s argument that the ADA, including § 12101, justified appointing an interpreter, then expressly declined to decide the argument’s merit and resolved the issue on the record’s failure to show a refusal. opinion →
Eric L. by and Through Schierberl v. Bird, section 12101 et seq. appears only as a citation identifying the ADA. The court discusses and applies Title II's operative provision, § 12132, and denies dismissal of the ADA claims; it does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Carrozza v. Howard County, Md., the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only in the introductory description of the ADA claim and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Matter of MR, the court cites § 12101 only as background evidence of increasing concern for the rights of people with disabilities. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Tyler v. City of Manhattan, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court's substantive analysis concerns Title II and its implementing regulations, particularly §§ 12132 and 12134, not § 12101's findings or purpose. opinion →
Tyler v. City of Manhattan, the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the source of the plaintiff's claims. The court's actual analysis concerns Title II's remedial provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12133, and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Simpson v. Ernst & Young, the court merely cites the ADA and § 12101 in a general comparison of employment-discrimination statutes; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about this statute. opinion →
Pazer v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, the court recites § 12101's general purpose while laying out the ADA's statutory framework, but it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 12101 itself. The ruling concerns the requested examination accommodations and the plaintiff's failure to establish a learning disability and irreparable injury. opinion →
Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., the court identified the ADA as one of the causes of action and described the plaintiffs’ allegations, but decided only Rule 23(b)(2) class certification and trial bifurcation; it did not construe or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the source of EEOC regulatory comments used by analogy in interpreting the PHRA. Its actual holding is that pregnancy is not a disability under the PHRA, not what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Conlin v. Mission Foods Corp., the court mentions § 12101 only when describing Conlin's pleaded ADA cause of action. Its actual ruling concerns the retroactive application of Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and Title V, 42 U.S.C. § 12203, not § 12101. opinion →
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., the statute is mentioned only to identify the statutory basis of plaintiff's employment-discrimination action. The court decides discovery motions concerning a journalist's privilege and does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Curry v. Randall, the ADA citation appears only in the procedural history to identify the statute invoked in Curry's complaint. The court resolved the appeals on exhaustion of state remedies and related procedural grounds and did not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of § 12101. opinion →
Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., the court merely identifies the statutory basis of plaintiff's lawsuit in the introductory facts; the ruling concerns discovery of videotaped interviews and the journalist's privilege, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., the court cites § 12101 only to identify the ADA involved in the separately reported Bolton case. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; its own ADA analysis concerns §§ 12102 and 12111. opinion →
Maddox v. University of Tennessee, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court's substantive ADA discussion concerns §§ 12112(a), 12114(e)(4), 12117(b), and 12201(a), so the opinion does not decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Langridge v. Oakland Unified School Dist., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA while the court addresses a supremacy-clause argument and relies on the ADA's employment-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Langridge v. Oakland Unified School District, the court mentions § 12101 et seq. in describing Langridge’s supremacy-clause argument, but its decision concerns whether FEHA preemption conflicts with the ADA and whether the supremacy clause is implicated. It does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA in the introductory description of the lawsuit. Its substantive rulings construe other ADA provisions, not § 12101. opinion →
Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., the court cited § 12101(a)(9) only to reference the ADA’s general purpose while rejecting a judicial-estoppel argument. It did not interpret, define, or decide what the subsection requires or how it applies. opinion →
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Jaffe New York Decorating, the court cited § 12101 in a footnote to disclaim any implication about disabled Americans' employment prospects and to provide background on congressional policy; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Jaffe New York Decorating, the statute is mentioned in a footnote as contextual background about later national policy; the court does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Candelaria v. Coughlin, the court only noted that a possible ADA claim existed and expressly declined to assess it because the issue was beyond its jurisdiction; it did not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Livingston v. Guice, the opinion merely recites the statute's congressional findings as background. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; the dismissal rests on judicial immunity and failure to state a claim. opinion →
Gordon County Farm v. Maloney, the statute is mentioned only in a dissent's observation that requiring testimony from rejected employers could expose an employer to sanctions under the ADA; the opinion does not decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Coleman v. Zatechka, the opinion mentions §§ 12101(a) and 12101(b)(1) only to invoke the ADA’s broad anti-stereotyping purpose as supporting context; its operative analysis and holding concern §§ 12131(2) and 12132, so it does not construe or apply § 12101 as a substantive provision. opinion →
Malek v. Martin Marietta Corp., the opinion mentions 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. only to identify the plaintiff's ADA claim; it does not interpret or apply the statute, and grants summary judgment because the plaintiff lacked evidence of discriminatory discharge or an available position for recall. opinion →
Osborn v. E.J. Brach, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA in describing defendants’ argument. The court’s actual ADA ruling concerns the filing prerequisites incorporated through § 12117(a), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of North Carolina, section 12101 is cited only as the introductory citation for the ADA; the court’s legal analysis and ruling concern other provisions, chiefly §§ 12111 and 12112, rather than construing § 12101. opinion →
Tugg v. Towey, section 12101 appears only in the background as part of the plaintiffs’ description of their ADA claim. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis concerned Title II provisions, including §§ 12131 and 12132, and related regulations. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Lambert v. West Virginia State Board of Education, the court cites the ADA only generally, in a string of federal disability authorities; its actual discussion and ruling rely on the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act regulations, not on the meaning or application of 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA; its analysis and ruling concern other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, 12112, and 12117, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Otis v. Canadian Valley-Reeves Meat Co., section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act in describing the defendant's motion. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis instead discusses §§ 12102(2)(A) and 12111(8). opinion →
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA in describing the plaintiff’s claim. The court analyzes the ADA’s disability definition under § 12102(2)(A), the remedial incorporation provision in § 12117(a), and supervisor liability; it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Massey v. Scrivner, Inc., the court cites § 12101 only as the general statutory citation for the ADA in describing plaintiff’s claim. Its substantive analysis applies other provisions, specifically § 12102(2)(A) and § 12111(8), and does not construe or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Nelson v. Ryan, the court mentioned 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. only for legislative-history guidance in deciding a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; it did not construe, apply, or decide the meaning or requirements of § 12101. opinion →
Harrelson v. Elmore County, Ala., section 12101 is cited only in the introductory description of the plaintiff's allegations. The court's ADA discussion addresses Title II and the remedies incorporated through § 12133, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Incorporated of California, T/a Kee Business College Campus National Educ, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA. The court's actual analysis and holding concern the definition of a qualified individual and discrimination provisions in §§ 12111(8) and 12112, not § 12101 itself. opinion →
Smith v. Upson County, Ga., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis for the ADA claim, but it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. The court instead applies the ADA's discrimination standard and resolves the claim for lack of evidence of causation. opinion →
State v. Raymond C., the court used § 12101(b) only to state the ADA's general purpose while resolving whether an alleged ADA violation could affect a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding under Wisconsin's separate diligent-effort statute. It did not construe or apply § 12101(b). opinion →
Argen v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only in describing the statutory basis of the plaintiff's lawsuit. The court's analysis concerns other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12112, 12131, 12132, and 12189, and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Sarsycki v. United Parcel Service, section 12101 is cited only in the opening description of the ADA claim. The court's actual ADA analysis and judgment rely on other provisions, not on the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, the citation identifies the ADA as the basis of Clark’s allegations and is not a construction of § 12101. The court’s discussion of disability relied on 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, and its contrary standing ruling was later vacated on reconsideration. opinion →
Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., the court actually construed and applied the ADA's disability definition in § 12102(2). Section 12101 appears in the complaint's general citation to Title I, and the later § 12101(2) citation is an apparent miscitation of § 12102(2), so the opinion does not hold anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Abbasi v. Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., the court mentions § 12101 only as part of identifying the ADA statute underlying the plaintiff’s claim. Its actual ADA analysis addresses §§ 12102, 12111(8), and 12112, not § 12101’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Matter of Detention of Js, the court merely reports an amicus argument invoking the ADA and expressly declines to analyze the case under the ADA because the issue was not raised below or in the parties’ briefs. It therefore makes no holding about 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA. The court’s actual coverage ruling construes §§ 12114 and 12210, not § 12101. opinion →
Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general citation for the ADA in the statement of the claim. The court's analysis concerns the ADA's substantive provisions in §§ 12102 and 12112, not § 12101 itself. opinion →
Bishop v. Okidata, Inc., the court cited § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA claim. Its actual rulings concerned the ADA’s effective date and other provisions, including §§ 12117, 12112(a), and 12111(5)(A), not § 12101. opinion →
Milton v. Bob Maddox Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation in defendants’ summary-judgment argument. The court does not construe or apply § 12101; its substantive discussion concerns the ADA’s disability, qualified-individual, and discrimination provisions in §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112. opinion →
Mannell v. American Tobacco Co., section 12101 is cited only as the general ADA statutory source in describing jurisdiction; the court does not interpret or apply § 12101, and its ADA analysis concerns other provisions. opinion →
Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool & Child Care Center, Inc., the court cites § 12101(a)(7) only as background for Congress's findings while discussing the separate preemployment-inquiry restriction in § 12112(d)(2). It does not construe or apply § 12101(a)(7) itself. opinion →
Patterson v. Downtown Medical & Diagnostic Center, Inc., the court merely identified the ADA claim as one count in the amended complaint. Its analysis and ruling addressed ADA §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), and 12102(2), not § 12101, so it made no holding about § 12101. opinion →
State Ex Rel. McCormick v. Burson, section 12101 is not construed. It appears only as part of the citation “42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (ADA)” describing the petitioner's claim, while the court's ADA analysis relies on and applies §§ 12131 and 12132. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA. Its analysis and conclusion rely on other provisions, including §§ 12131, 12132, and 12134, and the implementing regulation; it does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only when identifying the ADA in the introductory description of the claim. Its actual analysis concerns other ADA provisions, including §§ 12111(2), 12111(5)(A), and 12112(a), and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Gates v. Rowland, the court cited § 12101(2) as an analogy while deciding a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; its holding that HIV infection constitutes a disability was expressly made under the Rehabilitation Act, not the ADA. opinion →
Dolan v. Bay Construction Group Co., the statute appears only in Dolan's argument supporting an implied-contract theory. The court did not construe § 12101 or decide the ADA claim; dismissal of that count was unopposed. opinion →
Stradley v. Lafourche Communications, Inc., section 12101 et seq. is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court's analysis concerns the specific provisions in §§ 12102(2) and 12112, so it does not decide what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, the court cites § 12101 only in the introductory identification of the ADA; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that section. opinion →
Sheppard v. Texas Department of Transportation, the court cites § 12101 only as the general ADA provision and does not interpret or apply its text. The court's actual holding concerns § 12117(a) and the right-to-sue condition precedent. opinion →
Wann v. American Airlines, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the basis of the claim. Its analysis and judgment concern §§ 12111 and 12112, not § 12101's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Doe v. City of Chicago, section 12101 is mentioned only in a footnote while reporting and rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the ADA makes disability a suspect classification for equal-protection purposes. The court did not construe or apply § 12101; it also held that the complaint contained no ADA claim and therefore defendants’ motions to dismiss ADA claims were moot. opinion →
Howe v. Hull, the court cites § 12101 only to identify the ADA as the basis for federal-question jurisdiction. Its substantive ADA holdings address § 12182 and other provisions, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Gulbenkian v. T.Y. Lin International, the court merely identifies the statute as the basis of the plaintiff's alleged employment-discrimination claim in the procedural background. It does not interpret § 12101 or decide what that section requires; the dismissal rests on the plaintiff's inability to establish that he was an otherwise qualified disabled person, relying on precedent. opinion →
Paxton v. State Department of Tax & Revenue, the court cites and recites § 12101(a)'s legislative findings as background, but does not construe or apply that provision; its ruling rests on Title II regulations and other ADA provisions. opinion →
Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., section 12101 is cited only in identifying the ADA. The court's actual analysis and ruling concern the ADA's incorporation of Title VII procedures through § 12117(a), specifically the § 2000e-5(f)(1) filing period and commencement of suit. opinion →
Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only as a general citation to the ADA when describing the parties’ consent judgment. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101 itself; its rulings concern the stipulated Title II violation, standing, and remedy. opinion →
McKay v. County Election Commissioners for Pulaski County, Arkansas, the court cited § 12101 et seq. and referred to the ADA's congressional findings only as background in deciding conditional class certification; it did not construe or decide what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only when describing the plaintiff's ADA claim. Its analysis concerns other ADA requirements, including qualified-individual status and reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, and does not construe § 12101 itself. opinion →
Hunt v. Bartman, the ADA is cited only in the plaintiffs’ description of the claims they brought. The court does not construe, apply, or decide what 42 U.S.C. § 12101 requires, and the available opinion text contains no holding about the statute. opinion →
Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only in the introductory description of the plaintiff's ADA claim. It does not construe or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis instead discusses §§ 12102 and 12111 and related regulations. opinion →
McDonnell v. Chally, the court only reported the party's ADA argument and declined to consider it because the objection was not preserved; it expressly stated that it was expressing no opinion on the argument's merits. opinion →
Lane v. United States Steel, the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only while recounting the plaintiff's amended-complaint allegations. The court's ADA holding concerns contribution rights and relies on the ADA's enforcement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), rather than construing § 12101. opinion →
People v. Goldstein, the opinion mentions 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 only in describing the respondent’s argument and expressly declines to address the ADA issue; the court therefore makes no holding about § 12101. opinion →
Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only in the introductory list of statutes supporting plaintiff's claims. Its ADA analysis addresses other provisions, including §§ 12112(a) and 12111(8), and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
City of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police, No. Cv 93 0307435 S (Jan. 4, 1995), the opinion mentions § 12101 only while describing the City's argument. The court did not construe or apply § 12101; its discussion instead addressed the ADA confidentiality requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(4)(10). opinion →
Lori L. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department of Administration, James R. Klauser, Lee Martinson, the court mentions § 12101(a), (b)(1), and later § 12101(a)(9) only to describe the ADA’s purpose and legislative background. Its actual rulings concern disability under § 12102 and reasonable accommodation and undue hardship under §§ 12111–12112; it does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Cynthia Real Gerry M. Sebring v. San Diego Dept. Of Mental Health, the statute is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act underlying the plaintiffs' allegations. The court decided that the appeal was not within its jurisdiction because the order denying appointment of counsel was not immediately appealable; it did not interpret or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Kopf v. Chloride Power, the opinion mentions the ADA and § 12101 only to identify plaintiff's claim and in describing a venue/compulsory-counterclaim dispute; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Kopf v. Chloride Power Electronics, Inc., the opinion identifies § 12101 only as the ADA's codification while describing the claims and analyzes whether the ADA claim was a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a); it does not interpret or apply § 12101's meaning, requirements, coverage, or scope. opinion →
Parker v. Metropolitan Life, Insurance, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court's substantive rulings concern Title I and Title III provisions, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Rodriguez v. City of Aurora, the court merely identifies the statutory basis of Rodriguez’s claim by citing § 12101 et seq.; it does not interpret or apply § 12101. The court’s analysis concerns other ADA provisions, especially §§ 12131, 12132, and 12201(c). opinion →
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., the court merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis for the plaintiff's ADA claim. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis concerns the ADA's disability definition in § 12102 and related regulations. opinion →
Scott v. Guardsmark Security, the court cited § 12101(b)(1) only for a background statement of the ADA's purpose. It did not construe or apply that subsection; its ruling concerned whether an employment contract could shorten the ADA's federal filing deadlines. opinion →
Waite v. Blair, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as part of the statutory citation identifying the ADA and in describing the plaintiff's claim. The court does not construe or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis instead addresses disability, qualified individual, and reasonable accommodation under other provisions. opinion →
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only in a list identifying the Americans with Disabilities Act as part of the broader statutory scheme protecting employees. The Court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
McDonald v. STATE OF KS, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, section 12101 is cited only in the introductory description of the plaintiff's ADA claim. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its substantive analysis concerns other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112. opinion →
New York Ex Rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Medical Group, P.C., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only in the introductory list identifying Title III of the ADA. Its ruling concerns whether New York may sue in parens patriae to enforce the ADA; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Marschand v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., section 12101 et seq. is cited only in the introductory procedural description to identify the ADA claim. The court's substantive ADA analysis construes other provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111(8), and 12112(b)(5)(A), and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Ricks v. Xerox Corp., the court cites § 12101 only in the introductory identification of the ADA. Its substantive analysis concerns other ADA provisions and the elements of a disability-discrimination claim, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Flores v. Compañía ABC H/N/C McGaw of Puerto Rico, Inc., the court cites § 12101 et seq. only in the introductory description of the dispute. Its analysis and holding concern the ADA's administrative-exhaustion provision in § 12117(a), and the court does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Robinson v. City of Friendswood, section 12101 appears only in the opinion's introductory string citation to the ADA. The court's substantive discussion and ruling concern § 12132 and whether Title II applies to municipal zoning, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Alexander S. Ex Rel. Bowers v. Boyd, the opinion merely lists the ADA among federal education statutes that might cover juveniles; it does not construe § 12101 or decide what the statute requires or how it applies. opinion →
Gower v. Wrenn Handling, Inc., the court merely identifies the ADA's general codification and the nature of the lawsuit. Its actual statutory analysis concerns other provisions, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 and 12112, so it does not decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Carlson v. Inacom Corp., section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA as the source of the plaintiff’s action. The court’s substantive rulings address other provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112, and do not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Inc., the court cites § 12101(a) only to characterize the ADA's general purpose. It does not interpret or apply that subsection; the actual holding concerns employer knowledge under the ADA's prohibition on discrimination in § 12112. opinion →
James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote describing the court's prior dismissal of ADA claims; this opinion does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. The court’s substantive analysis and holding concern Title II and the requirements in §§ 12131, 12132, and 12134, along with implementing regulations, not § 12101 itself. opinion →
McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., the court only identified § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis for the plaintiff's ADA claim in the complaint; it did not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. The court's ADA analysis concerned other provisions and regulations. opinion →
General Dynamics Corporation v. United States of America Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only as a comparative example of another statute’s express fee-related waiver; it construes § 1324b and the EAJA, not the ADA. opinion →
McNeill v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., the court cites § 12101 only in identifying the statute under which the action was brought. The decision addresses timeliness under ADA Title I's incorporated Title VII procedures and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Wagner v. Fair Acres, the court mentions § 12101 only as part of the statutory basis for an ADA claim in Count Two, then expressly states that the claim was not before it on appeal and that it would not address ADA standards or proofs. opinion →
Margaret C. Wagner, by Her Next Friend George M. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center. Margaret Wagner, by Her Next Fri, section 12101 is cited as part of an ADA claim that was not submitted to the jury; the court expressly declined to address the ADA's standards or proofs and decided the appeal under the Rehabilitation Act. opinion →
Green v. Union Pacific Railroad, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act in the procedural description of the evidentiary dispute. The court's substantive discussion relies on § 12201(b) and evidentiary, ripeness, and offer-of-proof grounds; it does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Keller v. Western-Southern Life Insurance, the court mentions § 12101 only as the statutory basis asserted for the plaintiff’s ADA complaint. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; its discussion concerns ADA discrimination and the definition of disability under other provisions. opinion →
Switalski v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 3, section 12101 is cited only to identify Title I of the ADA as the basis for the lawsuit. The court’s actual analysis and ruling concern the statutory definition of “employer” and “covered entity” in § 12111, not § 12101. opinion →
Passalacqua Corp. v. Restaurant Management II, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only by analogy while explaining that a state-law disability-discrimination claim remains a state claim for jurisdictional purposes; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the ADA. opinion →
Fink v. Kitzman, the court cites § 12101(a) only while recounting the ADA’s legislative findings and general purpose in its background discussion; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything under § 12101. opinion →
McCready v. Michigan State Bar, the statute is cited only in describing the plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim. The court dismisses the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and does not decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Georgia, section 12101 appears only in the opening identification of the ADA. The court's substantive analysis and rulings concern other ADA provisions, especially §§ 12111 and 12112, so the opinion does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Raver v. Capitol Area Transit, the citation to § 12101 et seq. merely identifies the ADA as the basis for the complaint. The court addressed standing and the ADA's enforcement provision under § 12133, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Matthew Staron, Jennifer Champagne, Brandon Naples, and Linda Ravenell v. McDonald Corporation and Burger King Corporati, the court merely recites § 12101(b)(1)-(2) as the ADA’s general purposes while providing background; its actual analysis and holding concern § 12182 and § 12201(b), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Hamm v. Marvin Runyon, Postmaster General, the court decided the plaintiff’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Section 12101 et seq. was cited only to explain that ADA regulations could provide persuasive guidance; the court expressly stated that the ADA was not binding on its interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act and did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, the court mentions § 12101 only in the introductory procedural history identifying the ADA claim. The decision addresses a stay of reinstatement, waiver of a supersedeas bond, and taxable costs, and does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chemtech International Corp., section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA underlying the plaintiff’s allegations. The court’s ruling addressed subject-matter jurisdiction and whether the corporations constituted an integrated enterprise, relying on the ADA’s employer definition in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A), not on § 12101. opinion →
Johnson v. State of Kan., the court addressed Rooker-Feldman subject-matter jurisdiction and rejected using the ADA as a basis for appellate review of a state-court bar-admission decision; it did not decide what § 12101 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Champ v. Baltimore County, the reference to § 12101 appears only in the description of the statute under which Champ filed suit. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis concerned qualification, essential functions, reasonable accommodation, and direct threat under other provisions. opinion →
Barfield v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA in the case introduction. The court's actual analysis and rulings concern other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112, and do not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Bent v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, section 12101 is cited only as a general citation to the ADA in the procedural background. The court's actual rulings concern the ADA's nonretroactivity and Title I's EEOC exhaustion requirement, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Deluca v. Winer Industries, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, section 12101 et seq. is cited only in the opening description of the plaintiff’s ADA suit. The court does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101; its analysis concerns § 12112 and § 12111(8). opinion →
Canon v. Clark, the court cited § 12101 et seq. only as a general reference to the ADA. Its analysis of whether the complaint stated a claim relied on § 12112(a), § 12102(2), and EEOC regulations, not on the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Flory v. Powers, section 12101 appears only as a citation to the plaintiffs’ ADA theory. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis instead quoted § 12102(2) and addressed whether Flory was disabled and had standing. opinion →
Aughe v. Shalala, the court merely identifies the ADA by citing § 12101 et seq. as part of the plaintiff's claims. Its actual ADA analysis concerns §§ 12131(2) and 12132, and it does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Hutchinson v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the court cites § 12101(a)(5), along with other § 12101 provisions, only to recount Congress’s findings and the ADA’s general purpose while providing background for the plaintiff’s ADA claim. It does not construe, define, or apply § 12101. opinion →
Le v. Applied Biosystems, the opinion cites § 12101 as a shorthand citation to the ADA, but the court’s actual analysis and holding concern ADA §§ 12112(a) and 12112(b)(4), not § 12101 itself. opinion →
Piquard v. City of East Peoria, Incidental: the court recites § 12101(b)'s statement of the ADA's purposes while analyzing whether Illinois pension provisions are preempted; it does not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of § 12101(b). opinion →
Poff v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, section 12101 appears only in the background as the statutory citation for the ADA alleged in the complaint. The court did not construe or apply § 12101; its analysis concerned the employer/employee issue under §§ 12111 and 12112. opinion →
Robinson v. Bankers Life, section 12101 is only cited to identify the ADA. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; it resolves the ADA claim under the employer definition in § 12111(5) and the filing deadline in § 12117(a). opinion →
Robinson v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the court merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis of plaintiff's ADA claim. Its rulings concern the employer definition in § 12111(5) and the filing deadline under § 12117(a), not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Billouin v. Monsanto Co., section 12101 et seq. is mentioned only to identify one of the claims in the amended complaint. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its ruling concerns the EEOC's intervention under Rule 24 and the certification requirement in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and 12117(a). opinion →
Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, the court mentions § 12101 only to identify the ADA as the statutory basis of the plaintiff’s claim. The court’s substantive ADA analysis concerns the direct-threat and reasonable-accommodation provisions in §§ 12111(3) and 12113(a)-(b), not § 12101. opinion →
Hendrigsman v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, the court merely cites the ADA, including § 12101, in a footnote while explaining its Social Security disability-benefits analysis; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 12101. opinion →
Schroedel v. New York University Medical Center, the court merely recounts the plaintiff’s allegation invoking the ADA and § 12101. Its decision addresses Article III standing for injunctive relief and does not construe or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Cramer v. State of Florida, the court cites § 12101(b)(1) only in its background summary of Title I's purpose; its operative analysis and dismissal address the ADA's discrimination scope and § 12201(b), without construing or applying § 12101(b)(1) itself. opinion →
Rhodes v. Bob Florence Contractor, Inc., the court quotes § 12101(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b)(1) to describe congressional findings and the ADA's purpose, but it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself; the ruling instead addresses the plaintiff's claim under other ADA provisions. opinion →
In Re Petition & Questionnaire for Admission to the Rhode Island Bar, the opinion describes the ACLU’s ADA challenge to the bar-application questions but expressly declines to reach the ADA, deciding instead to remand for further fact-finding and reformulation of the questions. opinion →
Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas Inc., the court mentions § 12101 only in describing the claims asserted in the complaint. Its ADA analysis addresses other provisions and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Dobard v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, the court only identifies the ADA as one of the statutes invoked in Dobard's action; it decides appellate jurisdiction and Rule 60(b) reconsideration, and does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Najera v. State of California-Prison Industry Authority David King Linda Clifford Rick Reyes, the court merely identifies the ADA and cites § 12101 et seq. in describing the claims. Its ADA analysis concerns §§ 12112(a), 12112(b), and 12113(b), without interpreting or applying § 12101 itself. opinion →
HEATHER K. BY ANITA K. v. City of Mallard, Iowa, the court cited § 12101(a)(2) as legislative-history support in weighing the public-interest factor for a temporary restraining order under Title II. It did not construe § 12101, impose a requirement under it, or decide its coverage or operation. opinion →
Luna v. Walgreens, the opinion merely recounts the plaintiff's complaint's citation to § 12101 et seq. The court decided whether the retaliation claim was within the scope of the EEOC charge, relying on the exhaustion provision in § 12117(a), and did not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Larson v. Miller, the court cites § 12101(a)(7) as support for holding that § 1985(3) protects handicapped people as a class; it does not decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Larson ex rel. Larson v. Miller, the court cited § 12101(a)(7)'s congressional finding as support for its separate holding that handicapped persons are a protected class under § 1985(3); it did not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Johnson v. Hanes Hosiery, the court merely identifies the ADA as one of the statutes under which the action was filed; it decides the appeal based on enforcement of a release and does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Swanson v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, the court cites § 12101 only for the ADA's general purpose while analyzing whether the plaintiff had a disability under other ADA provisions; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 12101. opinion →
Vazquez v. Bedsole, section 12101 is cited only in the procedural statement of the plaintiff's ADA claim. The court's ADA analysis applies other provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112, and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Jones v. Inter-County Imaging Centers, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA claim in the introductory description of the action. Its discussion and ruling concern other ADA provisions, including the definition of employer and representative-capacity liability, without interpreting or applying § 12101 itself. opinion →
Bolt v. ARAPAHOE CTY. SCHOOL DIST. SIX, the opinion mentions § 12101 in describing the school district’s background compliance planning and the purpose of the ADA/AHERA levy. The court did not construe or decide the meaning, coverage, or requirements of § 12101; it decided the levy’s validity under Colorado’s constitutional tax-approval rules. opinion →
Bolt v. Arapahoe County School District No. Six, section 12101 is cited only as the beginning of the ADA's statutory range while the court discusses the school district's compliance efforts. The court decided when the ADA/AHERA tax levy was imposed under Colorado's constitutional voter-approval rule; it did not construe, apply, or decide what § 12101 requires or covers. opinion →
Sharp v. Abate, section 12101 is cited only as part of the introductory citation to the ADA generally; the court did not construe or apply that section specifically, and its analysis concerned the ADA's qualified-individual and essential-functions standards and related regulations. opinion →
United States v. Santiago-Martinez, the footnote only uses the ADA as a premise in rejecting heightened equal-protection scrutiny for obesity discrimination; the court does not interpret § 12101, define its coverage, or decide an ADA claim. opinion →
School Committee of South Kingstown v. State Commission for Human Rights, the citation to § 12101 appears only in a broad range citation within the procedural history describing the Superior Court’s decision. This court did not construe § 12101 or apply its text; its separate statement that the ADA was prospective did not specifically address § 12101. opinion →
Pattison v. Meijer, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only in identifying the statute underlying the action. It does not discuss or construe § 12101's findings, purpose, coverage, or requirements; its ADA analysis concerns other provisions. opinion →
Stephen N. Roth, M.D. v. Lutheran General Hospital, Jerome Kraut, M.D., Seymour Metrick, M.D., section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act in the background description of Roth’s lawsuit. The court does not interpret or apply that section; its analysis of disability status relies on 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and related regulations. opinion →
Torcasio v. Murray, the § 12101 citation appears only within dicta quoted from another case, and this court expressly states that the quoted dicta is not a holding that the ADA applies to prisons; it does not construe § 12101. opinion →
Torcasio v. Murray, section 12101 appears only in a quotation describing dicta from another case; this court expressly says that the other case did not hold that the ADA applies to prisons and that the issue was not decided. opinion →
Stewart v. Weis Markets, Inc., the opinion mentions § 12101 only in a string citation describing another ADA case; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about this statute. opinion →
Johnson v. City of Port Arthur, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA underlying the proposed suit. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis concerns appointment of counsel and the ADA's reasonable-accommodation and qualified-individual provisions. opinion →
Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., section 12101 is cited only in the jurisdictional statement; the court's actual ADA analysis concerns employment discrimination and qualification under § 12112(a), not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Eisenach v. Miller-Dwan Medical Center, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the ADA claim asserted in the complaint. The court decided the motion for a more definite statement under Rule 8(a), without construing or applying 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
County of St. Louis v. Thomas, the opinion only identifies the ADA as one of the statutes underlying the Counties’ challenge and describes the claim in procedural and factual background; it decides intervention and consolidation, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Stola v. Joint Industry Board, the court cited § 12101(b)(2) only in a parenthetical quoting the ADA's general purpose, while deciding the case under the ADA's disability, knowledge, and discrimination requirements. It did not interpret or apply § 12101(b)(2). opinion →
Nunez v. IBP, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to describe claims Nunez attempted to assert; the court decided the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) and did not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general ADA citation while describing the plaintiffs’ argument. The court decided the case under specific Title III provisions, including §§ 12181 and 12182, and did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Stafford v. Radford Community Hospital, Inc., section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA underlying Stafford’s pleaded claim. The court does not construe or apply § 12101; its ADA ruling concerns the EEOC charge requirements discussed under § 12117(a). opinion →
Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., the court cited § 12101(a)(7) only as a parenthetical reference to Congress's findings while analyzing whether alleged harassment was based on disability; it did not construe or apply that subsection as an operative statutory rule. opinion →
Cheatwood v. Roanoke Industries, the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only when describing the statute underlying the plaintiff's ADA claim; it does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. The court's analysis concerns other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111(8), and 12112(a). opinion →
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bratton, the concurrence merely predicts future interaction between workers' compensation law and the ADA, noting that this case predates the ADA; it does not interpret or apply § 12101. The subsequent ADA discussion is hypothetical and concerns § 12111. opinion →
Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc., the court merely cites § 12101 et seq. to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act. Its discussion of the ADA's requirements and jurisdiction relies on §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A), not § 12101. opinion →
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the introductory description of the plaintiff's claims. The court decides motions to quash and compel discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and does not construe, apply, or rule on the requirements or coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Hamros v. Bethany Homes & Methodist Hosp. of Chicago, section 12101 appears only in the introductory list of statutes plaintiff allegedly invoked. The court does not analyze, interpret, or apply the ADA; its rulings concern the FMLA and state-law claims. opinion →
Brown v. Continental Baking Co., the court merely cites § 12101 et seq. as a general reference to the ADA while addressing a claim under § 12112(b)(5)(A); it does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, section 12101(9) is cited only in a concurring footnote to report a legislative finding and discuss Judge Posner’s premise about ADA savings; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that provision. opinion →
Muth v. Cobro Corp., the court merely identifies the ADA claim with a citation to § 12101 et seq.; its legal analysis concerns the ADA's incorporation of Title VII procedures under § 12117(a) and the Title VII filing deadline, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
DB v. Bloom, the court cited § 12101 et seq. only in describing the statute underlying plaintiff's complaint. Its ADA ruling construed and applied § 12182(a) and related provisions, not § 12101. opinion →
Kohler v. Shenasky, section 12101 appears only in the procedural description of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. The court addressed the borrowed statute of limitations and did not interpret, define, or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only in the opening description of the statutory basis for the action. It does not construe or apply § 12101; its analysis concerns other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112. opinion →
Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., the opinion mentions § 12101 only in describing the ADA claim alleged in the complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101 itself; its ADA analysis relies on other ADA provisions. opinion →
Venclauskas v. State of Connecticut, Dept. of Public Safety Division of State Police, section 12101 is cited only as part of the general citation identifying the ADA. The court analyzes other provisions, chiefly §§ 12102(2), 12111(8), and 12112(a), and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Company, Donald Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Company, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA claim; its statutory holding concerns the damages cap in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), not § 12101. opinion →
Charles Fowler, Jr. v. At & T Corp. Ed Wall Bob Alvarez, the court mentioned the ADA only to explain why the proposed amendment was deficient and to support its procedural conclusion that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion; it did not construe or decide a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Robert E. Maddox, III v. University of Tennessee University of Tennessee Board of Trustees Doug A. Dickey, section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA claim. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis relies on §§ 12112(a) and 12114(c)(4). opinion →
Barry v. Burdines, the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only as a general reference to the ADA. Its actual analysis quotes and applies § 12112(a), Title I’s employment-discrimination provision, and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Stewart v. Burlington Northern Railroad, the statute appears only in the defendant's description of the asserted basis for prior vocational consultations. The court did not decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers, and its rulings concerned the Rule 35 examination and jurisdiction over the disciplinary investigation. opinion →
Hardwick v. Curtis Trailers Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA claim. Its actual ruling concerns individual liability under the ADA and relies on the ADA's employer definition and § 12117(a), not on the meaning or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory source for the ADA in the background discussion. The court's actual analysis relies on and applies §§ 12111(8) and 12112, and does not construe or decide what § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., section 12101 is cited only in the introductory description of the ADA and the defendant’s summary-judgment argument. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA analysis instead addresses §§ 12111(8), 12112(a), and 12112(b)(5)(A). opinion →
Dixie v. Resnikoff, the reference to § 12101(a) appears in the claimant's argument and is mentioned only while the court decides the applicable constitutional scrutiny for Florida workers' compensation legislation. The court does not construe § 12101(a), determine its requirements or coverage, or decide how the statute applies. opinion →
Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., the opinion cites § 12101 only to identify the ADA underlying Heise’s claim. Its substantive ADA analysis addresses other provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, and 12112, and does not interpret or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., section 12101 is cited only to invoke the ADA's findings and purpose in weighing the public interest for a preliminary injunction. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA merits analysis concerns other provisions. opinion →
Rogers v. Archer Daniels, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA claim in the introductory description of the case. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers; its ADA discussion merely reports the jury's finding under § 12111(8) and affirms the verdict. opinion →
Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, the opinion merely lists the ADA among federal laws affecting the operation of Denver Public Schools and gives a general description; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Stephen v. Hoerle, the statute appears only as part of the plaintiff’s description of an appellate claim. The court held that the claim could not be reviewed because the appeal was untimely, and did not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Siefken v. The Village of Arlington Heights, an Illinois Corporation, section 12101 is cited only in describing the plaintiff's allegation and as the general citation for the ADA; the court's holding concerns ADA discrimination and accommodation standards under other provisions, not § 12101. opinion →
Felde v. City of San Jose, San Jose Police Officers Association International Association of Firefighters, Local 23, the court cites § 12101 only to identify the ADA as the statute underlying Felde's claim. Its actual analysis and holding concern the ADA's employment-discrimination provisions in § 12112, not § 12101. opinion →
Muller v. Automobile Club of Southern California, section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA in the introductory procedural discussion. The court analyzed the claim under other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102 and 12112, and did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Walters v. United States Gypsum Co., the opinion mentions § 12101 et seq. only while summarizing McKennon’s description of federal employment statutes. The court decided the after-acquired-evidence rule for a state retaliatory-discharge claim, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the ADA. opinion →
Opinion No. (1995), the opinion mentions § 12101 only when identifying the ADA in the questions presented. It does not construe § 12101 or decide what that section means or requires; the discussion instead concerns Title III and cites § 12181(9) on undue burden. opinion →
Solomon v. Godwin and Carlton, PC, section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA underlying the plaintiff’s discrimination claim. The court’s actual statutory holding concerns the aggregate damages cap in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Despears v. Milwaukee County, Milwaukee County Personnel Review Board, and Milwaukee County Medical Complex, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA in the introductory procedural description. The court does not construe or apply § 12101 itself; its discussion concerns ADA disability discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and the criminal-conduct limitation in § 12114(c). opinion →
Sheehan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a Connecticut Corporation Joanna Turner, an Individual, the court mentions § 12101 only in a footnote identifying the statutes under which the plaintiff should have brought a voluntarily dismissed federal handicap-discrimination claim. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
McDonald v. Com. of Mass., the opinion cites § 12101 only in the procedural description of the plaintiff's ADA claim; the court analyzes Title II provisions §§ 12131–12132 and does not interpret or apply § 12101. opinion →
Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory reference for the ADA in describing the plaintiffs' claims. The court's actual ADA analysis concerns disability under § 12102(2)(A) and the employer definition under § 12111(5)(A), not § 12101. opinion →
Ventura County Railway Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport, section 12101 appears only as a citation identifying the ADA; the court's operative discussion concerns standing under the enforcement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), not the meaning or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Martin Jimeno, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Mobil Oil Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, section 12101 is cited only in describing Jimeno’s argument about the 1992 FEHA amendments; the court did not interpret or apply that statute and decided the issue under California law. opinion →
Miller v. Giglio Distributing Co., Inc., section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA as the basis for the suit. The court’s substantive ruling concerns whether an individual agent qualifies as an “employer” under § 12111(5)(A), not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Williams v. City of Charlotte, NC, the court cited § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA. Its actual analysis construed the disability and accommodation provisions in §§ 12102 and 12112, not § 12101. opinion →
Derbis v. United States Shoe Corporation, Women's Speciality Retailing Group, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm, the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act in the case background. Its analysis and holding concern the qualified-individual and reasonable-accommodation provisions in §§ 12111(8) and 12112, not § 12101. opinion →
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA claim in the procedural introduction. The court’s substantive ADA analysis addresses §§ 12102(2) and 12201(c)(3), not § 12101 itself. opinion →
Junot v. Maricopa County, the court mentions the ADA only in a string citation listing statutes within a broader workplace-protection scheme. It decides an after-acquired-evidence issue under the Rehabilitation Act, not what 42 U.S.C. § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Henry v. Guest Services, Inc., section 12101 appears only in the introductory citation to the ADA as a whole. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101's findings or purposes; it decided the claims under other ADA provisions and related Title VII standards. opinion →
Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, the citation to § 12101 appears in a footnote reporting the Court of Appeals dissenters’ view that a workers’ compensation evidentiary burden might conflict with the ADA. The court did not decide or apply that issue and expressly said it was not before the Court. opinion →
Kemer v. Johnson, section 12101 is cited only in a general identification of the ADA. The court’s ruling addresses the ADA’s coverage of federal agencies under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 and 12112, not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Stone v. DAVIESS CTY. DIV. CHILD SERV., the court cites § 12101(b) only for the ADA's general purpose while deciding issues under § 12132 and state termination law; it does not construe or apply subsection (b). opinion →
Stone v. Daviess County Division of Children & Family Services, the court cites § 12101(b) only in a general statement of the ADA's purpose. The court's operative analysis and holding concern the ADA's application to termination proceedings and reasonable accommodation under other provisions, not the meaning or requirements of § 12101(b). opinion →
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges, section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court’s substantive analysis and ruling concern the disability definition in § 12102(2) and the employment-discrimination prohibition in § 12112(a), not § 12101 itself. opinion →
Cohen v. Flushing Hospital and Medical Center, Local 1199 National Health and Human Service Employees Union,, the opinion merely identifies the ADA claim in the procedural history; the appellate court decides the timeliness of the hybrid section 301 claims and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Mohamed v. Marriott International, Inc., section 12101 is cited only in the introductory description of the ADA claims. The court analyzes and applies other ADA provisions, including §§ 12111 and 12112, but does not construe or decide anything about § 12101 itself. opinion →
Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, Inc., the statute appears only in the plaintiff's allegations describing Dr. Hess and the asserted ADA claim; the court decided the motion on statute-of-limitations and pleading grounds without construing or applying § 12101. opinion →
Williams v. General Motors Corp., the opinion mentions the ADA only in describing plaintiffs’ claims and then grants summary judgment because they lacked evidence of discrimination; it does not interpret, explain, or apply any requirement or coverage rule of 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Shah v. Upjohn Co., section 12101 is cited only to identify the statutory basis of Shah’s federal claims in the procedural history. The court does not construe or apply § 12101; its substantive ADA analysis concerns disability and discrimination provisions in §§ 12102 and 12112. opinion →
People v. Schaffer, the court only states, without analysis or construction of the statute, that defendant’s ADA-based contention lacks merit. opinion →
Coffman v. Michigan, the statute is cited only to identify the ADA claim in the procedural history. The court resolved Count I on res judicata and military-personnel deference, without construing § 12101 or deciding its independent requirements or coverage. opinion →
Smith v. State of Indiana, the court merely recites the plaintiff’s allegation citing § 12101; it does not interpret, define, or decide the statute’s requirements or application. opinion →
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., the court identifies the ADA as the basis for the action but does not interpret or apply § 12101; its discussion of the ADA's coverage-discrimination standard cites § 12201(c) and addresses preliminary-injunction relief. opinion →
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., the court merely identifies the statutory basis of the action in the introductory paragraph. It does not interpret, define, or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101; the substantive ADA discussion cites § 12201(c) instead. opinion →
Washburn v. Sauer-Sundstrand, Inc., section 12101 is cited only in the introductory description of the ADA claim. The court's actual analysis concerns the EEOC filing requirement and tolling doctrines under other provisions, and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Gonzalez v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., the statute is cited only to identify the legal basis of plaintiff’s ADA claim. The opinion does not interpret or apply § 12101; its reference to the ADA claim recounts the court’s earlier summary-judgment ruling as procedural history. opinion →
Hoepfl v. Barlow, the court merely recites § 12101's congressional findings and purpose as background. Its decision concerns Article III standing and the ADA's injunctive-relief provisions, principally § 12188, not the meaning or application of § 12101. opinion →
Howard v. Navistar International, Transportation Corp., the court cited § 12101(b) only in passing to support a policy observation during its analysis of whether the employer regarded Howard as disabled. The court’s actual ruling concerned the ADA’s disability definition in § 12102 and did not construe or apply § 12101(b). opinion →
Hites v. Patriot Homes, Inc., the opinion mentions § 12101, et seq. only when describing the statutory basis of Hites's complaint. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its disability analysis instead concerns §§ 12102(2)(A) and (C), along with other ADA provisions. opinion →
Hope v. Cortines, section 12101 et seq. appears only in the opening description identifying the ADA claim. The court's actual decision concerns exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), and does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Hope v. Cortines, the statute is cited only to identify the ADA as the basis of the lawsuit. The court's decision concerns exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA and does not interpret or apply 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Kuehl v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court mentions § 12101 only to identify the ADA as the basis of the action; it does not interpret or apply § 12101. The court's substantive analysis concerns other ADA provisions. opinion →
O'Hara v. A.D. Jacobson Co., section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its brief ADA discussion concerns § 12112(d) and related regulations, and the case is resolved on the workers’ compensation defense elements. opinion →
Maxon v. Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc., the court merely recounts that Texaco removed the case based on an asserted ADA federal question, then declines jurisdiction because the petition did not raise an ADA claim. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement or coverage question under 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Sharrow v. Bailey, the court merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis of the plaintiff's ADA count; its ADA analysis concerns §§ 12102, 12181(7)(F), and 12182(a), not § 12101. opinion →
Gerzog v. London Fog Corp., the statute is mentioned only while describing the Second Circuit’s decision in Smith and its effective-date issue; this court decides an ADEA termination-date question and does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Susan N. David N., Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians to M.N. A Minor v. Wilson School District, the ADA appears only in the procedural-history list of claims the appellants alleged; the court decides IDEA judicial-review and preemption issues and makes no ruling about § 12101. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion merely identifies the ADA as potentially relevant to persons with physical disabilities and expressly declines to analyze its protections because the facts are unspecified; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Alexander S. by and Through Bowers v. Boyd, the opinion mentions the ADA in procedural history and reports the defendants’ concession that it applied to the facilities; the court does not decide what 42 U.S.C. § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., the court merely recites § 12101(b)'s general purpose in describing the statutory framework; its holding concerns the separate pre-offer medical-inquiry restrictions in § 12112(d), not the meaning or application of § 12101(b). opinion →
Hilliard v. BellSouth Medical Assistance Plan, Incidental: the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the source of the plaintiff’s claim; it does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101’s findings and purposes. opinion →
Lipscomb v. Clearmont Construction & Development Co., section 12101 is cited only as the general citation for the ADA. The court applies an EEOC charge-filing prerequisite to ADA claims, but does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., the court cites § 12101(b)(1) only to describe the ADA generally. It does not construe or apply that purpose provision; its operative analysis and rulings concern other ADA provisions, principally §§ 12112 and 12201. opinion →
Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, the court mentions § 12101 only to identify the ADA and reports the arbitrator’s finding; it does not construe or apply that section itself. opinion →
Young v. Easter Enterprises, Inc., the court merely lists the ADA and § 12101 et seq. as part of the jurisdictional basis and mentions an ADA claim in the procedural disposition; it does not interpret, define, or apply § 12101. opinion →
Payne v. Norwest Corp., the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA claim. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; the substantive disability-discrimination discussion concerns prima facie proof under McDonnell Douglas and cites § 12112(a) instead. opinion →
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc., the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the ADA as the statutory basis for the claim. Its analysis and rulings concern other ADA provisions, including §§ 12102, 12111, 12112, and 12113, and do not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Green v. Hooksett Police Department, section 12101 is cited only to identify the plaintiff's underlying ADA claim in the background; the court decides a motion to amend to add a Rehabilitation Act claim and does not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., the opinion does not decide an ADA issue; it cites § 12101 et seq. in a footnote to report the court's earlier AIC Security holding and expressly says the ADA point was not an issue on appeal. The case's actual holding concerns arbitration of ADEA and fraudulent-inducement claims. opinion →
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., the court mentioned § 12101 only in a footnote while discussing an issue not on appeal. It reported the rule from an earlier Seventh Circuit decision but did not decide or apply the ADA employer-definition issue in this case. opinion →
Williams v. Avnet, Inc., the opinion cites § 12101 only in the introductory description of plaintiff’s ADA claims. Its substantive discussion addresses other ADA provisions and accommodation standards, without interpreting or applying § 12101 itself. opinion →
Thomas v. Allen-Stone Boxes, Inc., the opinion merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis of the plaintiff's ADA claim. The court does not construe or apply § 12101; its ADA ruling concerns the separate damages cap in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. opinion →
Hirschhorn v. Sizzler Restaurants International, Inc., the court cites § 12101 only to identify the ADA and the source of the federal claim. The court’s substantive analysis applies § 12112(a) and § 12111(8), and does not construe or decide what § 12101 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Callison v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote identifying a possible ADA claim; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 12101. opinion →
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., section 12101 appears only in the plaintiff’s description of the ADA claim. The court did not interpret or apply § 12101; its ADA discussion relied on other provisions, including §§ 12111 and 12112. opinion →
McCready v. Michigan State Bar Standing Committee on Character & Fitness, the opinion cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the statutory basis of the plaintiff’s ADA claims. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; the decision instead addresses jurisdiction and the ADA self-evaluation claim under other provisions. opinion →
Best v. Shell Oil Co., the court merely cites § 12101 et seq. in describing the plaintiff's ADA claim. Its actual analysis and ruling concern the definition of disability under § 12102(2), not § 12101. opinion →
Lynne S. Ott, Robert L. Brockway, Jr. v. East Central Mental Health Services, Inc., Denis Olsen, Executive Director, the ADA citation appears only in the list of statutes plaintiffs alleged were violated. The court did not construe or apply § 12101 and affirmed dismissal substantially for the district court's stated reasons, which addressed other claims and issues. opinion →
White v. Stackhouse, Inc., the court merely identifies § 12101 et seq. as the statutory basis of White’s allegation. It does not interpret or apply § 12101; the decision concerns the statute of limitations and continuing-violation doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). opinion →
Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the opinion identifies § 12101 in the complaint and reports that the ADA claim was withdrawn; the court expressly declines to address it, so it makes no holding about the statute. opinion →
Brown v. Campbell County Board of Education, the court cites § 12101 only as the general statutory citation for the ADA. Its actual analysis quotes and applies § 12132 and discusses the Rehabilitation Act; it does not construe, explain, or independently apply § 12101. opinion →
Chubb v. Union Pacific Railroad, section 12101 is cited only to identify the ADA; the court's venue analysis construes § 12117 and § 2000e-5(f)(3), not § 12101. opinion →
Poff v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis instead addresses § 12112(a) and the ADA employment-discrimination burden-shifting framework. opinion →
Dean v. Knowles, the court mentions § 12101 et seq. only to identify the statutory basis of the plaintiff's suit in the background; it does not interpret or decide anything about § 12101. opinion →
Patrick v. Southern Co. Services, the court quoted findings from § 12101 as general background about the ADA’s purposes, but its decision rested on the separate statutory definition of disability and the substantial-limitation requirement; it did not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Baustian v. State of La., section 12101 is cited only to identify the Americans with Disabilities Act generally. The court’s actual analysis and ruling concern the definition of current illegal drug use and the safe-harbor provision in § 12114(b), not § 12101. opinion →
In re Karrlo K., the statute appears only in the appellate court’s procedural list of the respondent’s claims. The court does not discuss, interpret, or apply § 12101; it simply affirms the judgment and adopts the trial court’s decision without repeating its discussion. opinion →
Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, the court cites § 12101(b) only for the ADA's general purpose in introductory background. It does not construe or apply § 12101(b); the ruling instead concerns § 12112(d)(4)(A)'s restrictions on disability-related inquiries. opinion →
Joyce v. Suffolk County, section 12101 appears only in the introductory list identifying the ADA claim. The court's substantive analysis and ruling concern the disability definition in § 12102(2), not § 12101. opinion →
Houck v. City of Prairie Village, Kan., the court merely reports that the complaint mentioned the ADA and does not interpret, apply, or rule on 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Bahr v. Council Bluffs Civil Service Commission, the court only identifies the ADA as a possible concern and says the state civil-service commission acted with sensitivity to it; the decision construes Iowa Code § 400.8 and the commission’s authority, not what 42 U.S.C. § 12101 means or requires. opinion →
Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc., section 12101 is cited only in a list identifying the ADA as one of the statutes underlying the plaintiff’s claims. The court’s ADA analysis concerns employer-count and foreign-employer provisions in §§ 12111 and 12112, not § 12101. opinion →
Dennin Ex Rel. Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA claim. The court's substantive ADA analysis addresses Titles II and III and provisions including §§ 12181, 12182, 12131, and 12132, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101 itself. opinion →
Angotti v. Kenyon & Kenyon, section 12101 et seq. is cited only to identify the ADA claims. The court's actual analysis concerns exhaustion and the ADA's enforcement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., section 12101 et seq. is cited only in the procedural background to identify the statute underlying the lawsuit. The court does not construe § 12101; its ADA discussion addresses §§ 12112(a) and 12112(b)(5)(A), and its holding concerns Railway Labor Act preemption. opinion →
Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and Chancellor John Schroe, section 12101 is cited only in the opening identification of the ADA. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis instead concerns §§ 12111 and 12112 and the ADA's reasonable-accommodation requirements. opinion →
Laurina Price v. S-B Power Tool, section 12101 is mentioned only in the introductory citation to the ADA’s statutory range. The court does not interpret or apply § 12101; its analysis instead addresses § 12112(a) and the elements of an ADA employment-discrimination claim. opinion →
Cameron v. Alander, section 12101 et seq. appears only in a string citation identifying the ADA. The court's operative analysis applies the ADA's anti-discrimination provision, identified in footnote 9 as 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and does not construe § 12101's findings, purposes, or requirements. opinion →
Doe v. Judicial Nominating Commission for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, the court cites § 12101 only to describe the ADA’s general purpose and constitutional basis. Its actual ruling concerns Title II, the implementing regulation’s necessity exception, and the overbreadth of the JNC’s questions; it does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Tex., the court merely quoted the ADA's congressional findings in § 12101(a) as background. It did not construe or apply § 12101(a); its operative analysis and holding concerned Title II's § 12132 and related provisions. opinion →
Abbott v. Bragdon, the opinion's substantive analysis repeatedly construes the ADA disability definition in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); the sole reference to § 12101(2)(A) is a misnumbered footnote citation, and the court does not decide anything about § 12101's findings-and-purpose provision. opinion →
Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan Bank, the court merely recited § 12101's congressional findings and purpose in its background discussion; it did not interpret or apply that section. The ruling concerned ADA employment-discrimination provisions, principally § 12112. opinion →
Boyd v. State, the court mentions 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. in a footnote but expressly states that it does not discuss the ADA in its analysis and makes no holding about the statute’s applicability. opinion →
CIVIC ASS'N OF DEAF OF NYC v. Giuliani, section 12101 et seq. appears only in the introductory statement identifying the ADA as a basis for the action. The court's actual analysis concerns Title II regulations and other provisions, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Butler v. Burroughs Wellcome, Inc., the court cites § 12101 et seq. only to identify the statutory basis of the action. Its ruling concerns the scope of discovery and the relevance of the plaintiff’s medical history, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 12101. opinion →
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., section 12101 is cited only as the general statutory citation for the ADA in the case description. The court's ADA ruling instead applies and discusses §§ 12102, 12112(a), and 12116, without construing § 12101. opinion →
Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Systems Group, Inc., the court merely cites § 12101(a)(7) for a congressional finding about stereotypic assumptions; it does not interpret or apply that subsection. The court’s ruling concerns ADA discrimination, qualification, and reasonable accommodation under other provisions. opinion →
Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., section 12101 is cited only in the opening identification of the ADA. The court's operative analysis concerns the qualified-individual definition in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), not § 12101. opinion →
Voytek v. University of California Board of Regents of University of California, the court cited § 12101 et seq. only to identify the statutory basis of the plaintiff's ADA claim. It did not construe § 12101 or decide a distinct issue about that statute; its affirmance rested on the plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie disability-discrimination case and the adequacy of the accommodation. opinion →
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television Inc, the court affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim on res judicata grounds and expressly declined to reach the merits of the ADA argument, so it did not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of 42 U.S.C. § 12101. opinion →
Gardner v. Malone, the statute appears only in Gardner’s newly raised argument. The court declined to consider those fact-bound claims because they were raised for the first time in a postjudgment motion, and it did not construe or apply § 12101. opinion →
Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, Ark., the court merely identifies the city as an ADA employer in its factual background. Its actual ADA analysis addresses disability, qualified individual, and discrimination provisions in other sections, and does not construe or apply § 12101 itself. opinion →
…and 12,194 more.

Statutory history

(Pub. L. 101–336, §2, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 328; Pub. L. 110–325, §3, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3554.)

  • 2008—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 110–325, §3(1), amended par. (1) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (1) read as follows: "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older;".
  • Subsec. (a)(7) to (9). Pub. L. 110–325, §3(2), (3), redesignated pars. (8) and (9) as (7) and (8), respectively, and struck out former par. (7) which read as follows: "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society;".

Enactment and amendment notes are the official text of the United States Code, 2024 edition (laws through 2025-01-06), Office of the Law Revision Counsel, via govinfo.gov.

References in text

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 101–336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 327, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out below and Tables.

Regulations under this section

CFR parts whose authority statement cites 42 U.S.C. § 12101:

49 C.F.R. Part 37 · TRANSPORTATION SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES (ADA)
49 C.F.R. Part 38 · AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) ACCESSIBILITY SPECIFICATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES
49 C.F.R. Part 39 · TRANSPORTATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES: PASSENGER VESSELS

From each part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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