29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

An impairment is substantially limiting if it limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people, even if it does not prevent or severely restrict that activity.

Garcia v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corporation · filed 2019-12-17(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

An impairment can substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity.

Arita v. United States of America · filed 2020-09-11(j)(1)(ii)

“An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.”

An impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to be substantially limiting, but not every impairment qualifies as a disability.

Veldran v. DeJoy · filed 2021-01-13(j)(ii)

"An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting"; however, "not every impairment will constitute a disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(ii).

The term “substantially limits” is construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and need not meet a demanding standard; a temporary condition can qualify as a disability.

Norwood v. Magneti Marelli of Tennessee, LLC · filed 2021-02-12(j)(1)(i)

“Moreover, “‘[t]he term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage’ and ‘is not meant to be a demanding standard.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff on the point that a temporary condition can constitute a disability as defined by the ADA.”

An impairment can be substantially limiting even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict an individual from performing a major life activity.

Camp v. HB&G Building Products, Inc. · filed 2021-03-29(j)(1)(ii)

To be considered substantially limiting, the impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity without preventing or severely restricting it, and evidence that stuttering severely and lifelong affects communication can create a fact issue on disability.

Nordby v. Sherburne County · filed 2021-04-23(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment is substantially limiting if it renders a person unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012). See also Heisler, 339 F.3d at 627, Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1088 (8th Cir.2001). The impairment need not prevent or severely restrict the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting; however, not every impairment will constitute a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2012). ... The Court finds that Nordby has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether her stuttering constitutes a “disability” under the ADA and MHRA. There is no dispute that speaking is a major life activity. Moreover, Nordby testified that her stutter has affected her ability to communicate her entire life and that she has at times taken prescribed medication to cope with anxiety and depression related to her stutter. ... Nordby also presented documentation from her Speech Pathologist that Nordby’s stutter is “severe,” “lifelong,” and “greatly impacts her ability to communicate.”

An impairment is substantially limiting even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a person from performing a major life activity.

Zeltman v. Infinigy Solutions, LLC · filed 2021-05-24(j)(1)(ii)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). ... Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated that his injury constituted a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Chesebro, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139738 at *16–17 (quoting Harvin, 767 F. App’x at 127).

An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity, and the impairment’s duration and actual or expected long-term impact are relevant.

Timmer v. City University of New York · filed 2021-08-13(j)(ii), (j)(2)

Although the Amended Complaint does not allege Plaintiff is unable to walk or work altogether, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Veldran, 839 F. App’x at 579 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)). As for the “duration or expected duration” of Plaintiff’s impairment, “and the existence of any actual or expected permanent or long term impact,” see Capobianco, 422 F.3d at 57, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff filed his Workers Compensation claim in 2015 (see Am. Compl., Dkt. 16, ¶ 25) and continued to suffer from the same condition in 2019 (see id. ¶¶ 71–72). Given Plaintiff’s limited burden at the pleading stage, these allegations plausibly suggest he suffered from a long-term disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

The regulation requires disability determinations to construe “substantially limits” broadly, without using a demanding standard, while still requiring an individualized assessment of the impairment.

Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions, L.P. · filed 2022-01-03(j)(1)(i)

“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). However, this determination does require an individualized assessment to determine whether the plaintiff is disabled by the specified impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) & (iv). ... The alleged bouts of inebriation and consequential inability to think clearly, exercise good judgment, or care for himself are short-term and not permanent. Id.; see Moore, 2020 WL 972711, at *4. While the effects of alcohol-induced inebriation may be an impairment, “the temporary impairments caused by the periodic and frequent overindulgence of alcohol are insufficient to establish a substantially limiting impairment” under the ADA. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 316 & n. 9. Therefore, Mueck’s alcoholism does not constitute a disability as anticipated by the ADA. Id.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity.

Beshaw v. MVP Service Corp. · filed 2022-09-07(j)(1)(ii)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Here, Beshaw asserts facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case for disability discrimination. Beshaw alleges that his diagnosis limits his ability to breathe and engage in physical activity without breaks and that he must avoid sitting for long periods of time. ... Drawing all inferences in Beshaw’s favor, because Beshaw alleges that his pulmonary and cardiac sarcoidosis limits his ability to breath and sit and the term “substantially limits” was intended to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,” Parada v. Banco Industrial v. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 69, n.3 (2d Cir. 2014), MVP’s motion with respect to Beshaw’s claims for disability discrimination under the ADA and New York state law is denied, see 29 C.R.F. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); Urena v. Swiss Post Solutions, Inc., 16 Civ. 1998, 2016 WL 5173389 at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016) (finding that, where the plaintiff alleged that she could not stand or sit for prolonged periods, or lift heavy objects, the complaint sufficiently pleaded that her impairment was substantially limiting).

Section 1630.2(j) defines a substantially limiting impairment by comparing the person's ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person, while § 1630.2(k)(1) recognizes a record of such an impairment when the individual has a history of, or was misclassified as having, one.

The Estate of David Shafer and Colleen Shafer v. The City of Spokane · filed 2023-11-08(j), (k)(1)

A person is substantially limited as to a major life activity if they are either unable to perform the activity or “‘significantly restricted as to condition, manner, or duration under which [they] can perform [the] . . . activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.’” Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (brackets omitted)). A record of impairment may be established “if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1); see Coons, 383 F.3d at 886 (plaintiff did not introduce a record of an impairment substantially limiting any major life activity where the only evidence proffered was a letter from his doctor stating that he suffered from various impairments without references to said activities).

An impairment qualifies as a disability when it substantially limits a major life activity compared with most people in the general population, even if it does not prevent or significantly or severely restrict that activity.

Milam v. ASCAP · filed 2023-09-01(j)(1)(ii)

An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.

The regulation says that determining whether an individual is disabled should not require extensive analysis and that “substantially limits” is not a demanding standard, construed broadly for expansive ADA coverage.

McClinton v. Capstone Logistics LLC · filed 2024-03-27(j)(1)(iii), (j)(1)(i)

Binding precedent holds that whether an individual is disabled “should not require extensive analysis.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). The term “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard” and must be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) provides that an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity to be substantially limiting.

Passante v. Cambium Learning Group · filed 2024-09-12(j)(1)(ii)

As a result, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” Parada, 753 F.3d at 68 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)); see Woolf, 949 F.3d at 94 (noting that “the definition of ‘disability’ is not an exacting one”).

Section 1630.2(k) covers a person who has a record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities.

Carpenter v. Merritt Hospitality, LLC · filed 2025-08-19(k)

Carpenter thus has not come close to establishing that he “ha[d] a history of . . . [a] physical impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” Nyrop, 616 F.3d at 735 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) and (j)(1)(ii) define when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and clarify that it need not significantly or severely restrict the activity, though not every impairment is a disability.

Ruggiero v. Public Benefit Transportation Area of Snohomish County · filed 2025-09-18(j)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

“An impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity when an individual is either unable to perform a major life activity or is “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the average person in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Plaintiff in this case has made no such allegations in his complaint. Indeed, he has alleged only a benefit of natural immunity and made no allegations of negative effects whatsoever. He alleged no symptoms that limited any major life activities nor that he had any limitation as a result of having had COVID-19. ... In sum, Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails because he has failed to allege an impairment that interfered with any major life activity.

An impairment substantially limits reproduction only when the plaintiff proves a significant restriction; unsupported testimony alone does not establish that limitation.

Carrillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc. · filed 2001-06-28(j)(1)

Cruz Carrillo’s testimony, without more, is not enough to shoulder his burden of showing a substantial limitation.

The term “substantially limits” receives broad construction, but whether an impairment is a disability requires an individualized inquiry into the person’s specific limitations.

Smith v. City of Austin · filed 2014-09-30(j)(1)(i)–(ii)

Although, as Smith points out, the term “substantially limits” should be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage of employees, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Definitions), courts must nonetheless make an individualized inquiry into whether the employee has identified any specific limitations due to the disability, ... and “not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning” of the ADA, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment; working at least 40 hours a week does not by itself resolve that question.

Hoppman v. Lmic · filed 2019-08-12(j)(1)(iv)

Determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting “requires an individualized assessment.” Id. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(iv). The district court did not consider the effect of the 2008 amendments. We therefore decline to affirm the district court’s conclusion that Hoppman was not disabled because she was able to work at least 40 hours a week.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats an individual as substantially limited in working only when an impairment restricts access to a class or broad range of jobs, not merely one particular job.

Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. · filed 2001-08-15(j)(3)(i)

significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broadrange of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.

An impairment does not substantially limit the major life activity of working merely because it prevents the individual from performing one particular job.

Talamantez v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2002-03-29(j)(1)

An impairment substantially limits a major life activity if the individual ... (i) is unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; ... (ii) is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. ... With respect to the major life activity of working, the term “substantially limits” means ... significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... This Court finds that Plaintiffs inability, to perform the single, particular job of supervising inmates does not constitute a substantial, limitation in Plaintiffs major life activity of working.

To substantially limit working, an impairment must restrict a person's ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes compared with people of similar training, skill, and ability.

Reis v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd. · filed 2006-07-21(j)(3)(i)

For an impairment to substantially limit an individual’s ability to work, the impairment must restrict her ability to perform either “a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skill, and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats inability to perform one particular job as insufficient to substantially limit working, while subsection (k) addresses having a record of a substantially limiting impairment.

Sarmento v. Henry Schein, Inc. · filed 2007-12-27(j)(3)(i), (k)

Sarmento’s “inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); ... He does not have a “history of’ nor has he been “misclassified as having, a substantially limiting impairment.” ... (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)).

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) requires proof that an impairment prevents performance of a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, rather than merely a narrow range of jobs.

Pinegar v. Shinseki · filed 2009-10-14(j)(3)(i)

To prove that her impairment substantially limits her from working for a living, plaintiff would have to be unable “to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.”

Under the pre-ADAAA regulation, being substantially limited in working means being unable to work in a broad class of jobs, not merely unable to perform one particular job.

Gilliard v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2012-12-07(j)(3)(i)

The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... Because “substantially limiting” requires the plaintiff to allege that she is unable to work in a broad class of jobs, a plaintiff alleging that she was regarded as disabled would need to allege that her disability was regarded as preventing her from performing a broad class of jobs.

Section 1630.2(j)(3)(i) treats a person as substantially limited in working only when restricted from a class or broad range of jobs, not merely one particular job.

Julia v. Janssen, Inc. · filed 2000-03-21(j)(3)(i)

“substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

For the major life activity of working, a substantial limitation means being unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.

Coleman v. Computer Associates International, Inc. · filed 1998-02-06(j)(3)(i)

There is no dispute that Coleman's TMJ condition qualifies as a disability--it substantially limited the major life activity of working. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Her unmanageable pain, caused by tension in the workplace, not only prevented her from performing her job, but precluded her from "a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

The regulation requires “substantially limits” to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage and says that it is not a demanding standard.

Robinson v. BGM America, Inc. · filed 2013-08-08(j)(l)(i)

After the recent amendments to the ADA, which became effective January 1, 2009, the regulations now provide that “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i).

Section 1630.2(p) treats undue hardship as a case-specific burden that can include substantial or disruptive accommodations that fundamentally alter business operations, while § 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Gemmrig v. Asante Three Rivers Medical Center, LLC · filed 2025-09-05(p), (r)

Second, EEOC guidance provides: “Undue hardship refers not only to financial difficulty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. An employer must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a particular reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship.” EEOC ADA Enforcement Guidance (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 29 CFR § 1630.2(p); 29 CFR pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p)). ... The Court agrees with Judge Clarke that, even assuming that the ADA imposes a higher undue hardship standard than Title VII, the same factors that satisfy the Title VII undue hardship standard also satisfy the ADA’s. Allowing Gemmrig to work unvaccinated, even with other preventive measures, would have substantially disrupted the workplace because it would have increased the risk of COVID-19 transmission and attendant morbidity and mortality among patients and co-workers, generated fear that Asante’s facilities were not safe, deterred patients from entering the facilities, increased employee retention challenges, and deterred potential employees from applying. ... A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). ... Given the then-current CDC, NIH, and OHA medical and scientific data about COVID-19 including the delta strain, in this record, the Court determines that the duration of the risk was unknown, the severity of the potential harm was death, the likelihood that harm would occur at harm would occur to medically fragile and other vulnerable patients having repeated close physical contact with an unvaccinated CNA, like Gemmrig, was high, and the imminence of potential harm was great as shown by the transmissibility, morbidity and mortality data and the surge of sick patients coming into Defendants’ facilities. ... In sum, Defendants provided sufficient evidence that any accommodation other than leave for Gemmrig would have constituted an undue hardship or a direct threat under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(p) treats undue hardship as an accommodation that is unduly extensive, substantial, disruptive, or fundamentally alters the business, assessed case by case; § 1630.2(r) defines a direct threat as a significant risk of substantial harm that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate or reduce.

Folin v. Asante · filed 2025-09-05(p), (r)

Second, EEOC guidance provides: “Undue hardship refers not only to financial difficulty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business. An employer must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a particular reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship.” EEOC ADA Enforcement Guidance (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 29 CFR § 1630.2(p); 29 CFR pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p)). ... A direct threat under the ADA is “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.” Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 CFR § 1630.2(r)). A direct threat determination “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”

A reasonable accommodation must enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform essential job functions, and an employer must produce evidence of significant difficulty or expense to establish undue hardship.

Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc. · filed 2000-04-12(o)(ii), (p)(1), (p)

A reasonable accommodation "enable[s] a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of [his] position." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii). ... However, rather than produce evidence that a flexible schedule would present "significant difficulty or expense," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1), MHRI has offered only general statements regarding the snowball effect of such an accommodation – it would eliminate employers' control over the workplace and ability to maintain any standards. ... Instead, to meet its burden, MHRI needs to produce at least some modicum of evidence showing that an open-ended schedule would be a hardship, financial or otherwise.

Section 1630.2(o) defines reasonable accommodation as adjustments enabling a qualified individual with a disability to perform essential job functions, while § 1630.2(p) defines undue hardship as significant difficulty or expense.

United States v. Jewell · filed 2000-06-23(o), (p)

The following relevant definitions are contained at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2: ... (1) The term reasonable accommodation means: ... (ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances-under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position: or ... (1) In general. Undue hardship means, with respect to the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity, when considered in light of the factors set forth in paragraph (p)(2) of this section. ... Thus, the Court has made reasonable accommodation for Perroni under the Rehabilitation Act and it would be an undue hardship to (grant the accommodation he seeks of a continuance until September).

Section 1630.2(o)(2) lists examples of reasonable accommodations, while subsection (p) defines undue hardship as significant difficulty or expense and identifies factors for evaluating it.

Frumusa v. Zweigle's, Inc. · filed 2010-01-14(o)(2) and (p)

Regulations interpreting the ADA state that a reasonable accommodation may include “[m]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” as well as ... [j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. ... As for “undue hardship,” the term is defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p), which states as follows: ... (1) In general. Undue hardship means, with respect to the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred , by a covered entity, when considered in light of the factors set forth in paragraph (p)(2) of this section.

An accommodation is not required if it would cause other employees to work harder or longer hours.

Hawkins v. Smith · filed 2014-08-29(p)(2)(v)

Any accommodation that, would cause other employees to worker harder or longer hours is not required.

Section 1630.2(o) does not require an employer to reallocate or eliminate an essential job function as a reasonable accommodation.

Vaughn v. Nationsbank Corp. · filed 2000-04-25(o)

The ADA does not require employers to reallocate or eliminate essential job functions in order to accommodate an employee.

The regulation treats a person as having a record of impairment when the person has a history of, or was misclassified as having, a substantially limiting impairment, and defines essential functions as fundamental job duties, including duties tied to the reason the position exists.

Haas v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2022-11-07(k), (n)(1), (n)(2)(i)

The ADA’s implementing regulations provide that an individual has a record of impairment if he “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Given these definitions, we find that a removal is based solely on medical history if the only basis for concluding that the employee is medically unable to perform the core duties of his position is the fact that his medical records reflect that, at some time in the past, he was classified as having, was examined for, or was treated for the medical condition or impairment in question. ... The Board has indicated that the core duties of a position are synonymous with the essential functions of a position under the ADA, as amended by the Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 ( ADAAA), i.e., the fundamental job duties of the position, not including marginal functions. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). One of the bases for finding that a function is essential is that it is the “reason the position exists.” Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i).

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Galambos v. Fairbanks Scales · filed 2000-07-21(k)

The Court first considers whether Galambos has made a prima facie showing that Scales discharged him because of a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) ("[A] record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities."). To make such a showing, Galambos must demonstrate both that the record of impairment existed at the time of his termination and that Scales relied upon the record of impairment in making this adverse employment decision. ... Galambos does not claim to have suffered from an actual disability — that is, a permanent or long-term impairment — at the time of his termination, and he has presented no evidence to suggest that he had a record of such an impairment, either. The Court concludes that Galambos has not made a prima facie showing that Scales discharged him because of a record of a disability.

Section 1630.2(k) requires a record of impairment to reflect an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Taylor v. Phoenixville School District · filed 2000-09-19(k)

To meet this definition, an individual must have a history of, or been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limited a major fife activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... To the extent a record of an impairment exists at all, nothing in that record suggests that the impairment substantially limited a major fife activity. Such a showing is insufficient to establish disability based upon a record of impairment. ... As a result, we wifi grant Defendant’s Motion with respect to claims premised on “record of impairment” disability.

A record of impairment requires a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; exclusion from one particular job does not establish such a record.

Foore v. City of Richmond VA · filed 2001-03-23(k)

Under the EEOC’s regulations a plaintiff has a record of impairment if he "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Contrary to Foore’s assertion, the record is devoid of any evidence that would establish a history or misclassification of such an impairment. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Foore’s visual impairment has ever substantially limited his ability to see. Instead, as noted above, the evidence at trial demonstrates that his monocular vision has not limited the major life activity of seeing. In addition, Foore does not have a record of being substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 2001-05-16(k)

“Although the ADA does not define ‘record of impairment,’ the regulations provide: ‘Has a record of such impairment’ means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.”

Section 1630.2(k) covers a person with a history of, or who has been misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd. · filed 1998-01-07(k)

Section 12102(2)(B) extends the coverage of the ADA to persons who “ha[ve] a history of, or ha[ve] been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... Granting Davidson the benefit of the favorable inferences to which she is entitled at this stage of the litigation, we believe that she has presented enough evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether or not she has a “record” of an impairment that would qualify as a disability.

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Gutridge v. Clure · filed 1998-08-26(k)

The EEOC regulations state that "a record of such impairment" means "a history of . . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Gutridge has failed to show that one or more of his major life activities was substantially limited.

A record of impairment requires a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Village School District Board of Education · filed 1999-02-02(k)

The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) indicate that in order to have a “record of’ an impairment, an individual must have a history of, or be misclassified as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

The record-of-impairment definition applies only when the recorded impairment actually substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Hilburn v. Murata Electronics · filed 1999-07-20(k)

Regardless of whether Hilburn is proceeding under a classification or a misclassification theory, the record-of-impairment standard is satisfied only if she actually suffered a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; hospitalization alone does not establish such a record.

Treiber v. Lindbergh School Dist. · filed 2002-04-11(k)

" Has a record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Being hospitalized, in and of itself, is insufficient of establish a record of impairment.

Section 1630.2(k) covers a person with a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lee's Log Cabin, Inc. · filed 2006-06-23(k)

Having a “record of such an impairment” (emphasis added) requires that the impairment “substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.”

Section 1630.2(k) requires a record of disability to show a history of, or misclassification as having, a substantially limiting impairment.

Walton v. U.S. Marshals Service · filed 2007-02-08(k)

Implementing regulations explain that having a “record” of a disability means either having a history of, or having been misclassified as having, a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... For the reasons stated above, Walton has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that this impairment is a substantially limiting impairment; thus, any record of this impairment would not meet the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Adams v. Rice · filed 2007-03-29(k)

A record of impairment means that a person “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... The impairments reflected in this record were of a purely temporary nature, and thus are not impairments that substantially limit a major life activity.

Section 1630.2(k) defines a record of impairment as a history of, or misclassification as having, an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Miles-Hickman v. David Powers Homes, Inc. · filed 2008-12-09(k)

Applicable regulations define a “record of impairment” to mean that an individual “has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... That Hickman believed her alleged impairments were significant enough to warrant medical treatment at some point in the past and that medical professionals compiled records of their treatments of her does not establish a “record of impairment” as used in the ADA.

Section 1630.2(k)(1) requires a record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and subsection (k)(2) directs that this definition be construed broadly; evidence of anxiety and medication without proof of substantial limitation does not establish such a record.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. West Meade Place, LLP · filed 2019-10-22(k)(1), (k)(2)

An individual has “a record of a disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1). The definition is to be “construed broadly.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). ... These two documents do not establish a “record of impairment” under the ADA. They do not show Ms. Kean had a history of anxiety of such severity that it substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence indicating that identification of the medicine Ms. Kean was taking establishes her anxiety rose to that level.

Section 1630.2(g)(3) requires a record showing an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity to establish the ADA’s record-of-impairment disability prong.

Goff v. Performance Contractors, Inc. · filed 2020-04-08(g)(3)

Plaintiff offers no evidence that the “record” he furnished to the third-party medical consultants reflected that his back impairment was substantially limiting in any major life activity. He presents no authorities to support the proposition that simply disclosing a back injury from 1998, even though he has continued to work without limitations in the construction field for the intervening two decades, is sufficient to support a “record of impairment” theory of liability under the ADA. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3) (“record of” prong requires a showing of a record of “an impairment that substantially limits a major life-activity”).

A record of disability requires more than a diagnosis; it must document substantial impairment of a major life activity and be known to the employer.

Strong v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2021-02-02(k)

Establishing discrimination based on a “recorded disability” is a more challenging showing that it would initially appear—a medical diagnosis submitted to an employer will not suffice. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2012); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 nn.7, 8 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the ADA requires “not simply a diagnosis, but a record reflecting the kind of impairment that would impose a substantial limitation on one or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities” and that the employer be aware of this record). To prevail on this basis, Strong would therefore need to allege that her record of disability documented substantial impairments to major life activities and that Quest was aware of this record.

Section 1630.2(k) requires a record of an impairment that substantially limits, or would substantially limit, a major life activity to qualify as a disability under the ADA.

Corrales v. Elite Cable Communications LLC · filed 2021-05-18(k)

Nor does Plaintiff present evidence of “a record of such impairment.” The mere fact that Plaintiff sustained an injury does not suffice because there exists no other evidence that his injury substantially limited a major life activity in the relevant time period. See Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that to prevail under “a record of such impairment” theory, the plaintiff must show again that his impairment “substantially limits one or more major life activities,” and holding that records of injuries and surgeries, on their own, failed to meet this test) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 n.7 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the plaintiff must show “a record reflecting the kind of impairment that would impose a substantial limitation on one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities”).

Section 1630.2(k)(2) defines a record of impairment as a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity compared with most people, or being misclassified as having such an impairment.

Lewis v. Kaleida Health · filed 2021-06-24(k)(2)

To show a record of impairment, a plaintiff must establish that she “has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Lewis’s “failure to plausibly allege a substantial limitation to a major life activity . . . precludes her from asserting that she has a record of disability.” See Kelly v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2015).

The regulation defines having a record of impairment as having a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity compared with most people, or being misclassified as having had such an impairment.

Sayers v. Niagara Falls City School District · filed 2022-03-08(k)(2)

To show a record of impairment, a plaintiff must establish that she “has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(2). Sayers’s “failure to plausibly allege a substantial limitation to a major life activity . . . precludes her from asserting that she has a record of disability.” See Kelly v. N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2016).

Subsection (k) covers an individual who has a history of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Wilson v. IDOC · filed 2022-09-27(k)

For the second way, “[an] [individual] must have ‘a history of ... a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” Id. at 748 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)). There is a disputed fact as to whether Wilson has a record of his impairment as there are numerous medical records detailing his knee issues and his ability to ambulate.

Section 1630.2(k)(2) protects a person with a history of, or who was misclassified as having, an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Speaks v. Health Systems Management, Inc. · filed 2022-08-17(k)(2)

The Company did not classify Speaks as having any “impairment” that limited one of her “major life activities.” Instead, she was simply required to become vaccinated under the Company’s COVID-19 policy applicable to all employees, which, while it ultimately led to Speaks’ termination from Health Systems, plainly did not impair her ability to work (for example, for another company).

Section 1630.2 treats working as a major life activity, requires substantial limitation across a class or broad range of jobs rather than one particular job, and identifies factors relevant to determining a job's essential functions.

Imler v. Hollidaysburg American Legion Ambulance Service · filed 1999-05-25(i), (j)(3)(I), (n), (n)(3)

Working is a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). With respect to “working,” the term “substantially limits” means that the plaintiff is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” ... The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. ... A person with a disability must be able to perform the essential functions of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). Evidence of whether a particular function is “essential” includes, among other things: the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential; the amount of time spent on the job performing the particular function; and the consequence of not requiring the job holder to perform the function. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2(k) requires a record-of-impairment disability claim to show an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, while § 1630.2(n)(3) directs consideration of the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent on the function, and incumbent experience in identifying essential functions.

Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC · filed 2005-06-06(k), (n)(3)

To succeed under this theory, Rooney must again show that his impairment “substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). Rooney did not submit evidence to this effect. ... To determine whether a job function is essential, we look to the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently hold the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); ... In this case, the job description of the Assistant Customer Assurance Manager requires her to “[t]roubleshoot all units, systems, and controls.” Pursell and Sircy both testified that this included performing job-site visits. Moreover, Rooney admitted that job-site visits were a part of his responsibilities. ... Thus, even if Rooney could show that he was disabled for ADA purposes, his own letter admits that he could not, or would not, perform an essential function of the job of Assistant Customer Assurance Manager.

The regulation treats an employee’s actual work experience as relevant to whether a function is essential and requires that a disability substantially limit a major life activity.

Pagonakis v. EXPRESS, LLC · filed 2008-02-14(n)(3)(vi); (g)

Plaintiffs own past work experience in the co-manager position tends to show that working forty hours a week in the store is an essential job function of the co-manager position because she was scheduled each week to work forty hours in the store. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi); (D.I. 51, ex. B at 97-98; D.I. 51, ex. E at 102) Importantly, plaintiffs salary was based on forty work hours per week. ... Plaintiff must show that her disability substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2007). ... After considering the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether plaintiff suffers from a closed head injury that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

The regulation broadly identifies major life activities, treats “substantially limits” as a non-demanding standard, defines a record of disability, and treats fundamental job duties—including production standards—as essential functions.

Marsh v. Terra International (Oklahoma), Inc. · filed 2015-07-09(i)(1)(i), (j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(i), (k), (n)(1)

Although these are some of his life activities or desired life activities, they do not qualify as “major” life activities even under the broadened definition in the regulations. ... Thus, under the broadened definition in the current regulations, the Court finds that “carrying” qualifies as a major life activity. ... With these principles in mind, the Court interprets “substantially limits” as something akin to “materially restricts.” ... Marsh cannot show that he has a “record” of disability for purposes of § 12102(1)(B). ... Based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Marsh was not singled out for different treatment and that Dees simply increased the expectations of the 2A shift to bring it in line with the other shifts. The Court concludes that the increased performance expectation to run two pumps is akin to ány other production standard and qualifies as an “essential function” of the position.

Section 1630.2 treats a physiological disorder affecting a body system as an impairment, interprets substantial limitation broadly, and defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions.

Cooper v. State of Hawaii Department of Taxation · filed 2019-06-20(h)(1), (j)(1)(ii), (n)(1)

An impairment is any “physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more body systems, such as . . . musculoskeletal.” Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428, 434 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)). ... Whether an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity is interpreted broadly—the impairment “need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity” in order to qualify. Nunies, 908 F.3d at 436 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... A “qualified individual” is an individual who can “perform the essential functions of the employment position,” with or without reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Essential functions are “fundamental job duties.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Essential functions do not include “the marginal functions of the position.” Id.

Section 1630.2(h)(1) treats cancer as an impairment, while § 1630.2(n)(1) identifies essential job functions that an accommodation need not reassign.

Woods v. Mann+Hummel Filtration Technology US LLC · filed 2019-08-07(h)(1), (n)(1)

Cancer is considered an impairment under the ADA, 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h)(1); ... Accordingly, Woods medical restrictions on lifting would qualify as a disability, even though they were later removed by his doctor. ... While “reallocating or redistributing nonessential, marginal job functions” is a potential reasonable accommodation, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o), an accommodation is not reasonable under the ADA if it “reallocate[s] essential functions,” id.; ... accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires comparing substantial limitation to most people in the general population; § 1630.2(k) broadly covers a history of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; and § 1630.2(n)(iii) identifies factors such as employer judgment, time spent, consequences of omission, and past incumbents’ experience as relevant to essential job functions.

Freeman v. WY · filed 2023-03-09(j)(1)(ii), (k), (n)(iii)

Specifically, the plaintiff must provide some evidence that a major life activity was substantially limited “as compared to most people in the general population.” Crowell, 572 F.App’x at 658; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... Turning next to the issue of whether Plaintiff had a record of impairment, this rests solely on whether she “has a history of . . . a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). The legislature has directed the courts to construe this broadly and not demand extensive analysis. Id. ... Essential job functions are determined by a variety of factors including, but not limited to “the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; . . . the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; and . . . the work experience of past incumbents in the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(iii).

(j)(ii) provides that an impairment may be substantially limiting without preventing or significantly or severely restricting a major life activity; (n)(1) defines essential functions as fundamental job duties rather than marginal functions, and (n)(3) lists factors for deciding whether a function is essential.

Hopple v. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare · filed 2024-07-23(j)(ii), (n)(1), (n)(3)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). ... “Essential functions are “the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” which do not “include the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (“‘Essential functions’ are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.”). ... Relevant factors include: (1)“[t]he employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential”; (2) “[w]ritten job descriptions”; (3) “[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function”; (4) “[t]he consequences of not requiring the [employee] to perform the function”; (5) “[t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement”; (6) “[t]he work experience of past [employees] in the job”; and (7) “[t]he current work experience of [employees] in similar jobs.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Samson, 746 F.3d at 1201. The employer’s judgment is “entitled to substantial weight in the calculus,” although it is not a conclusive factor. Samson, 746 F.3d at 1201.

Section 1630.2 treats “substantially limits” as requiring a lower degree of functional limitation than the pre-2008 standard, defines physical impairment broadly to include a physiological condition affecting one or more body systems, and treats essential functions as core job duties rather than marginal ones.

Gargas v. Estes Express Lines, Inc. · filed 2025-03-19(j)(iv), (h), and (n)(1)

The statute now commands courts to interpret the term “substantially limits” to require “a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the [2008 Amendments].” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iv); see Morrissey, 946 F.3d at 299 (6th Cir. 2019) ... “Physical impairment” is “defined broadly, to include ‘any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more body systems.’” Id. at 319 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)). ... So, essential functions “are the core job duties, not the marginal ones.” Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 854 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).

The regulation treats working as a major life activity and requires a limitation on a class or broad range of jobs, so inability to perform one job is insufficient; it also defines regarded-as disability by an employer’s treatment of an impairment as substantially limiting.

LaGatta v. PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL · filed 2010-06-30(f), (j), (j)(3)(i), (Z), (0)

An individual is considered to be substantially limited if he or she is (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. ... Ms. LaGatta does not assert that she could not perform her own job, let alone that she could not perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. ... In conclusion, while Ms. LaGatta may have had difficulty at work with her fellow employees and supervisors, there is no evidence on the record that bipolar disorder was the cause of those difficulties. Nor has Ms. LaGatta demonstrated an inability to work a range of jobs. Ms. LaGatta’s own testimony demonstrates that her bipolar disorder did not affect her major life activity of working.

Under § 1630.2(i), (j)(2), and (l), working is a major life activity, substantial limitation depends on the impairment’s nature, severity, expected duration, and long-term impact, and a bare statement that an employee was “crazy” does not establish a regarded-as disability.

Crawford v. AT & T & Communications Workers of America, Local 3250 · filed 2000-09-20(i), (j)(2), (l)

“The phrase “major life activities” includes functions such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). In determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting, the court should consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its expected duration, and its long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that he is substantially limited in a major life activity. ... To be “regarded as” an individual with a disability pursuant to the ADA, one must either (1) have an impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity, but be treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) have no impairment but be treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). ... This statement does nothing to show Mr. Gray or CWA regarded Plaintiff as suffering from an impairment which limited his working ability. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff does not have a disability within the meaning of the ADA.”

Section 1630.2 identifies major life activities, defines when an impairment substantially limits such activities, and specifies the circumstances in which an individual is regarded as disabled.

Laughlin v. United Telephone-Southeast, Inc. · filed 1997-02-27(i), (j), (l)

The term "major life activities" includes functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996). The term "substantially limits" means inability to perform, or a severe restriction on the ability to perform as compared to the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). ... The applicable regulations provide three ways in which a plaintiff can illustrate that the defendant employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled: (1) the individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting but is perceived by the employer as a substantially limiting impairment; (2) the individual may have an impairment which is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) the individual may have no impairments at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). ... Nonetheless, United's refusal to allow Laughlin to return does not require a finding that he was regarded as disabled. Laughlin offers no support, other than his bare allegation, for this contention; without more, he simply fails to prove that United regarded him as disabled. ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly concluded that Laughlin failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

Section 1630.2(j) calls for a case-by-case determination of disability based on how an impairment affects the individual and relevant limiting factors, while § 1630.2(l) recognizes disability when an employer regards an employee as having a substantially limiting impairment.

Reeves v. Dairy Queen, Inc. · filed 1998-01-30(j), (l)

Under federal law, the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity is one that must be made on a case-by-case basis. As noted in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Interpretive Guidelines: The ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are "disabilities." The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), App. at B-9 (1995). Because "the same types of impairments often vary in severity and often restrict different people to different degrees or in different ways," consideration of factors such as the nature, severity, expected duration, and permanent or long-term impact of the impairment is required. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... High blood pressure is an example of such a perceived disability: [S]uppose that an employee has controlled high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting. If an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work because of unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack if he or she continues to perform strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the individual as disabled. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (1995).

Section 1630.2(i) identifies major life activities, while § 1630.2(l) regards a person as disabled only when others treat her as if she were disabled.

Cody v. Cigna Healthcare · filed 1998-03-16(i), (l)

Major life activities include “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); See, Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319 (adopting EEOC guidelines to interpret “major life activities”). ... A person is regarded as having a such an impairment if others treat her as if she is disabled. See Webb v. Mercy Hospital, 102 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1996); Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)).

Section 1630.2 identifies major life activities such as hearing and working, requires a substantial limitation rather than inability to perform one particular job, and includes being regarded as having such an impairment within disability.

Santiago v. Executive Airlines · filed 1999-02-26(i), (j), and (l)

Disability is defined in the statute as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities”. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The phrase “major life activities” includes functions such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998). ... ADA affords protection only if the limitations imposed by the condition are substantial. ... Therefore, only those impairments which prevent or limit a person’s ability to perform major life activities will be considered disabling under the Act. 29 § 1630.2(j) (1998). ... No evidence has been presented by plaintiff to suggest that this particular condition substantially limits her hearing ability or any other major life activity as contemplated by ADA. ... Under these circumstances, we find that plaintiffs ear condition is not of such magnitude as to constitute a disabling condition under ADA. ... The resulting restriction must apply to either a class of jobs or range of jobs in various classes. ... Plaintiff has not cited any other jobs which she has been rendered unfit to perform due to her condition. Therefore, we must conclude that she has failed to establish that she has any substantial limitations in her “major life activity of working.” ... Persons who do not have a disability within the meaning of ADA may still qualify for its protection if they are regarded by the employer as having such an impairment. ... The statute specifically provides that disability also includes “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1998). ... As previously indicated, the only limitation in plaintiffs case is inability to fly in unpressurized airplanes which does not rise to the level of “substantial” limitation of a major life activity as required by the statute inasmuch as it does not prevent her from performing all jobs except those in unpressurized cabins, flying helicopters and scuba diving. ... Again we find no evidence to justify plaintiffs allegations that she was perceived as disabled in her employment.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) identifies evidence relevant to deciding whether a particular job function is essential, including the employer's judgment, preexisting written job descriptions, the consequences of not requiring the function, and the work experience of employees in similar jobs.

Wells v. Shalala · filed 2000-09-21(n)(3)

Evidence of whether a particular function is essential to a job includes (but is not necessarily limited to) (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential, (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, (3) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, and (4) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Section 1630.2 identifies major life activities including working, measures substantial limitation using specified factors, distinguishes inability to perform one job from a limitation in working, and defines a record of impairment and being regarded as impaired.

Smith v. Lattimore Materials Co. · filed 2003-03-24(i), (j)(2) and (3), (k)

Major life activities include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The regulations provide that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is determined in light of (i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ... The inability to perform a single particular job (because the starting time is too early for the Plaintiff) does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(3)(i). ... Has a record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2((). Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence of a record of disability or that Plaintiff was regarded as disabled by Lattimore.

Section (n)(3) lists five factors courts consider case by case in determining whether a job function is essential.

Woodruff v. School Bd. of Seminole County · filed 2008-12-19(n)(3)

The ADA regulations provide that other factors to consider are: (1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Section 1630.2(n)(2) requires courts to determine whether a job function is essential on a case-by-case basis using the listed factors.

Jordan v. City of Union City, Georgia · filed 2016-03-23(n)(2)

We evaluate whether a function is “essential” on a case-by-case basis, considering several factors. Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (listing factors to consider).

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to consider a non-exhaustive, non-dispositive set of factors when deciding whether a job function is essential.

Wagner v. The Sherwin-Williams Company · filed 2016-05-10(n)(3)

Federal regulations implementing and interpreting the Act offer a non-exhaustive list of non-dispositive factors to consider for “[e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential,” the first two of which mirror the statutory factors: ... To determine whether Wagner has raised sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact — and thus avoid summary judgment — it is instructive to consider each party’s evidence under the relevant statutory and regulatory factors. ... On the final count, all relevant factors weigh in favor of finding that driving was an essential function of Wagner’s job as store manager.

Section 1630.2(n)(3) directs courts to consider seven non-exhaustive factors, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring it, collective-bargaining terms, past incumbents’ experience, and current incumbents’ experience, when determining whether a job function is essential.

Westbrook v. Chattanooga Hamilton County Hospital Authority · filed 2024-09-03(n)(3)

EEOC regulations lay out a non-exhaustive list of seven factors for courts to use evaluate whether a job function is essential: (i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).

Subsection (n)(3) lists nonexclusive factors for determining whether a job function is essential, including the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, time spent performing the function, consequences of not requiring it, collective-bargaining terms, past incumbents’ experience, and current experience in similar jobs.

Freudenberg v. Servcon, LLC · filed 2024-09-27(n)(3)

The ADA’s implementing regulations also outline factors that inform the analysis including (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential; (2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (6) the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and (7) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Tartaro-McGowan, 91 F.4th at 165-66 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)); Stephenson, 641 F. App’x at 220. None of these factors are dispositive, not all are relevant in every case, and these factors are non-exhaustive. Stephenson, 641 F. App’x at 220.

Section 1630.2 identifies mental impairments, major life activities, and the degree of limitation required for an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity.

Martin v. Discount Smoke Shop, Inc. · filed 2006-07-05(h)(2), (i), (j)(2), (j)(1)(ii)

A “physical or mental impairment” includes “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” ... Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” ... “Substantially limits” means that “a person is either unable to perform a major life activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the individual can perform the major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population.” ... In determining whether an impairment can be said to “substantially limit” the major life activity of the individual, a court should consider the nature and severity of the limitations, the actual or expected duration of the impairment, and the actual or anticipated permanent or long-term impact of the impairment.

Section 1630.2 defines mental impairment, identifies major life activities, and explains when an impairment substantially limits those activities or is regarded as doing so.

Sever v. Henderson · filed 2005-08-10(h)(2), (i), (j), (j)(2), (I)(l)-(3)

The regulations define mental impairment as “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”

The regulation recognizes disability when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, is recorded, or is regarded by the employer as substantially limiting; an impairment may qualify as regarded-as because of others’ attitudes.

Breitenfeldt v. Long Prairie Packing Co., Inc. · filed 1999-04-28(g), (l)

[a]n individual is considered to have a “disability” if that individual either (1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded by the covered entity [employer] as having such an impairment. ... Moreover, the record creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendant through its employees regarded Plaintiff as disabled. Congress clearly intended to protect individuals from discrimination due to the inaccurate or prejudiced perceptions of third parties that certain impairments are more debilitating than they really are; the E.E.O.C. has stated that “[a]n individual satisfies the second part of the ‘regarded as’ definition if the individual has an impairment that is only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others toward the condition.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) interpretive guidance. The epithets hurled at Plaintiff, the mimicking of his head tilt, the requirement that he wear safety glasses, and the fact that his supervisors told him he was worthless when they learned of his vision problems could all support a conclusion that Mr. Breitenfeldt was “regarded as” substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, whether or not he was in truth so limited, and that he is thus disabled within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1630.2 defines the relevant disability concepts, and the court applied its definitions to hold that a lifting restriction and related attendance evidence did not show a substantial limitation, a record of impairment, or a regarded-as impairment.

Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America, Inc. · filed 1998-09-16(j)(3)(ii)(B), (i), (k), and (1)

The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment. ... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B); 138 F.3d 1366, 1370. ... “Major life activities” is defined as: “Functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). ... The EEOC has defined “a record of such impairment” to be, “a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1996). ... The EEOC regulations define one who is “regarded as having such an impairment” as an individual who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by her employer as constituting such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) has no illness or malady defined by the EEOC as a physical or mental impairment but is treated by her employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).

Section 1630.2(j) makes whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity a case-by-case factual inquiry for the jury, guided by the regulation’s listed factors.

Bristol v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2002-02-26(j)

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). ... As to the third (“substantially limits”) step of the ADA’s disability analysis, we find that the district court erred when it concluded that that step was a question of law for the court to decide. It is a factual question for the jury. Therefore, we grant Appellants’ request and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

The provision defines “substantially limits” and identifies factors for determining whether an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working.

Scarborough v. Natsios · filed 2002-03-20(j)(1), (j)(2)

substantially limits means (i)[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or (ii)[s]ignificantly. restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. ... These factors include (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; (3) the long-term or expected long-term impact of the impairment; (4) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; (5) the job from which the individual was disqualified because of the impairment, and the number of similar jobs from which the individual is also disqualified; and (6) the number of other types of jobs from which the individual is disqualified because of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)-(3).

Section 1630.2(j) defines when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity by comparing the person's ability to perform it with that of an average person in the general population.

Bennett v. Henderson · filed 1998-08-07(j)(1)(i) and (ii)

Part 1630 defines the phrase, however, to mean that the individual is either unable to perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the individual can perform, a major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population.

Section 1630.2(j)(1) defines “substantially limits” by comparing a person’s ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person in the general population.

Ristrom v. Asbestos Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Committee · filed 2004-06-04(j)(1)

“Substantially limits” means “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform” or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 195-96. According to the Supreme Court, “substantially” means “considerable” or “to a large degree.” Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 196 (citation omitted). Thus, we ask whether Ristrom has produced evidence to prove his asserted impairments (i.e., ADD and depression) limit his ability to learn to a considerable or large degree as compared to the average person in the general population.

The regulation defines “substantially limits” by comparing an individual's ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person.

Landry v. United Scaffolding, Inc. · filed 2004-09-27(j)(1)(i)

The term “substantially limits” has been defined in the EEOC regulations as being either “ ‘[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person ... can perform’ or ‘[sjignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.’ ”

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats a person as substantially limited when the ability to perform a major life activity is significantly more restricted than that of the average person.

Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC · filed 2007-05-18(j)(1)(ii)

Because over the course of the day Jenkins’ ability to sit is significantly more restricted than the average person, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1) (ii), the court clearly erred in finding that Jenkins is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(i) defines “substantially limited” by comparing an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity with that of the average person.

Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Department · filed 2007-09-10(j)(i)

Whether a person is “substantially limit[ed]” must be determined by whether the individual is “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform,” or is “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)) (emphasis added).

Section 1630.2(j)(1) says that substantially limiting a major life activity is not a demanding standard, and § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) compares the limitation with most people in the general population.

Latham v. Donahue · filed 2014-05-09(j)(1), (j)(1)(ii)

“ ‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard,” and “an impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l) (2012). ... These facts are sufficient to show that Plaintiff was substantially limited in performing major life activities like sleeping and working, “as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). I find that Plaintiff Latham is disabled for purposes of her claims in this case.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)-(iii) sets a lower, broad-coverage threshold for deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, measured against most people in the general population and without extensive analysis.

Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc. · filed 2016-01-13(j)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(iii)-(iv)

EEOC regulations implementing the 2008 Amendments follow this command in concluding that “the threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis,” and the term “shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied” previously. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)–(iv). The inquiry in this post-amendment case is thus whether Cannon’s impairment substantially limits his ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(i) requires the “substantially limited” standard to be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage without demanding extensive analysis.

Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico · filed 2016-01-29(j)(i)

But courts must construe the "substantially limited" standard "broadly in favor of expansive coverage," without "demand[ing] extensive analysis." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i), (iii). Martínez does allege that her disability "impairs her mobility at a regular rate than other nondisabled individuals." And we must accept this allegation as true at this stage of the litigation. Defendants' argument is at best fodder for a summary-judgment motion, not a motion to dismiss.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as substantially limiting when it limits a person's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people, even without preventing or severely restricting that activity.

Baker v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego · filed 2016-06-23(j)(l)(ii)

An impairment is a disability.. .if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) provides that an impairment need only substantially limit a major life activity compared with most people in the general population; it need not prevent or significantly restrict that activity.

Ehlerding v. American Mattress & Upholstery, Inc. · filed 2016-09-22(j)(1)(ii)

So long as an individual is limited “as compared to most people in the general population,” nothing in the ADA as it currently stands mandates that the alleged impairment prevent or significantly restrict those major life activities in order to be deemed substantially limiting. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii).

The substantially-limited standard does not require an impairment to prevent or significantly or severely restrict a major life activity, but it must substantially limit that activity compared with most people in the general population.

Robey v. City of Chicago · filed 2018-02-02(j)(1)

“An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). ... The impairment need only “substantially limit[ ] the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” ... Here, as in Kiesewetter, Graham, and the other cited cases, Plaintiff has failed to provide any allegations explaining how, if at all, Robey’s bipolar disorder substantially limited her major life activities, and accordingly, she has failed to sufficiently allege that Robey was a qualified individual under the ADA.

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) treats an impairment as a disability when it substantially limits a person's ability to perform a major life activity compared with most people in the general population.

Kane v. City of Ithaca · filed 2019-10-30(j)(1)(ii)

In addition, “[a]n impairment is a disability within the meaning of [the ADA] if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).

Section 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) requires a substantial limitation to be measured against the ability of most people in the general population to perform the major life activity.

Beam v. Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 2020-08-20(j)(1)(ii)

A disability “substantially limits” a major life activity if “it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 387.