28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing, for venue purposes, where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Karlen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-07-14(c)(2)

Finally, venue would be proper in Connecticut because Wells Fargo is subject to personal jurisdiction there. See Urista v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-01689-H-AHG, 2022 WL 104278, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 202) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)).

A corporate defendant that waives its personal-jurisdiction objection resides in that district for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2).

Burgard v. Kemper Insurance Company · filed 2022-07-21(c)(2)

Thus, Alpha “resides” in South Dakota and is properly subject to venue in South Dakota under 28 U.S.C § 1391(b)(1).

A corporate defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes, making venue proper in that district.

Sandstone Springs, LLC v. Virag Distribution, LLC · filed 2022-07-29(b)(1), (c)(2)

As held above that New York has specific jurisdiction over Defendant, for venue purposes Defendant also resides in New York, hence venue of this action is this district is appropriate under § 1391(b), (c)(2).

A corporate defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a district is deemed to reside there, making venue proper under § 1391(b)(1) when all defendants reside in that state.

Ahtna Design-Build, Inc. v. Asphalt Surfacing, Inc. · filed 2022-09-06(b)(1), (c)(2)

Therefore, Defendants are deemed “residents” of this judicial district for venue purposes and venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

A corporation resides for venue purposes in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction, making venue proper there under § 1391(b)(1).

Gabet v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2022-09-06(b)(1), (c)(2), (d)

Venue in the federal system is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... The Southern District has specific jurisdiction over Defendant for this suit. Venue, then, also lies in the Southern District.

Sections 1391(b) and (d) govern where venue is proper, including where a corporate defendant is deemed to reside based on its contacts with a district.

Roe v. RPI · filed 2022-09-08(b), (d)

Absent such evidence of RPI’s minimum contacts with California, the court does not have personal jurisdiction over RPI, and, by extension, this matter is not properly venued in this district.

A corporate defendant’s residence for venue depends on whether it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the district.

Mayfield v. Hills Bank and Trust Company · filed 2022-09-20(c)(2)

Due to Plaintiff’s inability to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendant, this Court finds that venue is improper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as a resident of a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Standifer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. · filed 2022-10-04(c)(2)

By admitting that personal jurisdiction is proper in the District of Kansas, J.B. Hunt thereby acknowledges that it is a “resident” of Kansas as that word is defined in § 1391.

An entity subject to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes, and venue is proper in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Taco Mamacita, LLC v. Wilco Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-10-29(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because Wilco and TMHV are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Tennessee, they are deemed to reside in this District pursuant to § 1391(c)(2) for venue purposes. As both are residents of this judicial district, venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(d) applies to an LLC in a state with multiple judicial districts; the LLC resides in a district only if its contacts there support personal jurisdiction.

Jimenez v. JC Resorts Management LLC · filed 2022-12-15(d)

In the absence of a more developed argument, the Court will follow its own precedent in Stohl and apply § 1391(d) in this case. ... Because Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant’s contacts are sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of California, Defendant does not reside here under § 1391(d). Therefore, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Jackson v. Auto Club Services, Inc. · filed 2023-01-10(c)(2)

The general venue statute further states that “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Here, Defendant ACS is subject to this Court personal jurisdiction under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.711. As such, venue is proper for Plaintiff’s ADEA, GADA and ELCRA claims.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

BONNETTE v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2023-02-28(c)(2)

Therefore, Hartford is subject to personal jurisdiction in and deemed to be a resident of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for venue purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Miller v. Cox Operating, L.L.C. · filed 2023-05-01(c)(2)

Under the general venue statute, “an entity with the capacity to sue or be sued . . . shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”15 There is no dispute as to this issue, and based on the record before the Court it is clear that at least four of the defendants in this suit reside in the Western District of Louisiana.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Steen v. Assurant, Inc. · filed 2023-07-06(c)(2)

Under § 1391(c), an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). As general personal jurisdiction exists in Georgia over Defendant, venue is proper in the Northern District of Georgia.

For venue purposes, an entity resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

ResMed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc. · filed 2023-08-22(c)(2)

The Court also concludes, however, that this action could not originally have been brought in the District of Delaware.

Under § 1391(c)(2), an entity defendant resides in a district for venue purposes if it is subject to personal jurisdiction there for the action.

Watts v. Freeman Health System · filed 2023-10-30(c)(2)

This Court does not have specific jurisdiction over this controversy. Therefore, Defendant does not reside in Oklahoma for venue purposes, and venue is improper in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

A business entity resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Wedi Corp v. Hydroblok Grand International Ltd · filed 2023-11-09(c)(2)

For purposes of determining venue, residency of a business entity is coextensive with personal jurisdiction over such entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

An entity defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes, and venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1) when all defendants reside in that state.

Signa Development Services, Inc. v. American International Materials, LLC · filed 2023-12-08(b)(1), (c)(2)

Accordingly, for “venue purposes,” Defendants are “deemed to reside” in the District of Nebraska because Defendants are “subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Because Defendants are “deemed to reside” in Nebraska for venue purposes in this case, and “civil action[s] may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides,” this Court is a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Under § 1391(c)(2), an entity that waives its objection to personal jurisdiction resides in that district for venue purposes.

Jane Doe (K.B.) v. G6 Hospitality, LLC · filed 2023-12-14(c)(2)

As many courts have held, an out-of-state entity “which consents to a court’s personal jurisdiction by waiver is ‘subject to’ that court’s personal jurisdiction for purposes of § 1391(c)(2).” ... Since all of the Defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction by waiver, the Court finds that each of the Defendants resides in Georgia for venue purposes and that venue is proper.

Under § 1391(b)(1) and (c), an entity defendant that waives its objection to personal jurisdiction resides in that district for venue purposes.

Grand Prairie Foods, Inc. v. Echo Lake Foods, Inc. · filed 2024-01-04(b)(1), (c)

Because Echo Lake did not challenge the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over it, Echo Lake waived that argument and venue is proper before this court pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Under § 1391(c)(2), an entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Drake v. FedEx Ground Package System Inc · filed 2024-03-05(c)(2)

The Magistrate Judge also points out that FedEx Ground conceded to personal jurisdiction and venue in the Northern District of Texas by requesting transfer to that district. (Id. at 7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)) (“an entity ‘shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .’”).) Hence, the Magistrate Judge found that the case could have been brought in the Northern District of Texas because that court can exercise personal jurisdiction over FedEx Ground, and venue is proper. Neither party objected to the above finding. The Court therefore ADOPTS it.

Section 1391(c)(2) deems a defendant entity to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Drake v. FedEx Corporation · filed 2024-03-05(c)(2)

The Magistrate Judge also points out that FedEx Ground conceded to personal jurisdiction and venue in the Northern District of Texas by requesting transfer to that district. (Id. at 7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)) (“an entity ‘shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .’”).) Hence, the Magistrate Judge found that the case could have been brought in the Northern District of Texas because that court can exercise personal jurisdiction over FedEx Ground, and venue is proper. Neither party objected to the above finding. The Court therefore ADOPTS it.

Venue is proper under § 1391(b) and (c) where a corporate defendant resides, provides services, and markets its services in the district.

Silva v. Seven Rock Life Corp. · filed 2024-06-28(b), (c)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because Seven Rock Life resides, provides, and markets its services in this judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Mitchell v. Perdido Trucking · filed 2024-08-07(c)(2)

“[A]n entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Venue is therefore proper in the Southern District of Alabama for Mitchell’s claim under the Civil Rights Act and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction; waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense can therefore defeat an improper venue challenge.

Fifth Third Bank National Association v. Tranquillity Chevrolet, Inc. · filed 2024-09-26(c)(2)

Here, venue is also appropriate because a defendant entity like Tranquility is deemed to reside wherever a court may exercise jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Here, as the Court discusses, Defendants waived their defense to personal jurisdiction, which therefore defeats the venue challenge.

Section 1391(d) treats a defendant entity as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Shaw v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC · filed 2025-02-07(d)

Because CoreCivic’s principal place of business is in Brentwood, Williamson County, Tennessee, where it is subject to general personal jurisdiction, CoreCivic resides in the Middle District of Tennessee.

An entity defendant that consents to personal jurisdiction in a district through a forum-selection clause resides there for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2).

Nursa Inc v. South Center Street Nursing Home LLC · filed 2025-08-14(c)(2)

Rather, the court holds only that Defendants’ signing the forum-selection clause makes venue proper under § 1391(b)(1) because of the special residency provision of § 1391(c)(2).

An entity that consents to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2), allowing venue under § 1391(b)(1) when all defendants reside in the state.

Nursa Inc v. St Cloud Rochelle Park LLC · filed 2025-08-14(b)(1), (c)(2)

Since they are entities, that consent makes them residents of Utah for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2) and makes venue proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Shenzhen Yima Technology Co Ltd v. Ming D&Y Inc · filed 2025-09-10(c)(2)

Thus, a proper venue for Yima to sue an entity such as Ming is any district in which Ming is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391 treats an entity defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction and permits venue where all defendants reside in the state.

Nursa Inc v. Younge and Crane Inc · filed 2025-09-19(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because Defendants signed the forum selection clause submitting to the court’s jurisdiction, venue is statutorily proper under § 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2), and “the facts of this case do not require such a judicial boomerang.”

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Dematic Corp. v. Helen of Troy, L.P. · filed 2025-09-26(c)(2)

Because personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), venue in the Western District of Texas is proper, and Dematic could have originally filed its complaint in that court.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Seewald · filed 2025-10-29(c)(2)

Because the Court has found personal jurisdiction exists over 8405 Express, the corporate defendant is considered a “resident” of Illinois for purposes of the venue statute.

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

GS Labs, LLC v. Cigna Health · filed 2025-10-29(c)(2)

Further, for purposes of venue, an entity-defendant resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Therefore, the Court determines personal jurisdiction and venue would be proper for all Defendants in the District of Connecticut.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides; corporate residency is satisfied where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

ARP · filed 2025-11-04(b)(1), (c)(2)

Here, venue is proper under U.S.C. §1391(b)(1) because Defendant resides in the District of Minnesota. 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1). Residency is satisfied pursuant to U.S.C §1391(c)(2) because Defendant’s corporate headquarters and principal place of business are in Eagan, Minnesota, thus establishing personal jurisdiction in the district.

Under § 1391(c)(2), a corporate defendant that waives its objection to personal jurisdiction resides in that district for venue purposes.

Thomas · filed 2025-12-01(c)(2)

That exercise of personal jurisdiction renders Ampersand a resident of this District, and venue in this District is therefore proper.

An entity defendant that consents to personal jurisdiction in a state's courts resides there for venue purposes.

LaCrue · filed 2026-01-08(c)(2)

As the Defendant has consented to the personal jurisdiction of the State of Missouri by virtue of its Terms and Conditions of Retail Customer Sales Agreement, the Court finds that Defendant is a resident of Missouri for venue purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant entity is subject to personal jurisdiction and therefore resides.

Donaldson · filed 2026-02-27(b)(1), (c)(2)

And venue is appropriate in Massachusetts, as Eurofins is subject to personal jurisdiction and thus “resides” there. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1); 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) supports venue in the district where the defendant domain names’ registries are located.

Montblanc-Simplo Gmbh v. Montblancpensale.org · filed 2014-01-24(b)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) and (C) because the domain name registries for defendant domain names are located in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits a WARN Act suit in a district where the defendant resides because the WARN Act’s venue provision does not restrict general venue.

Hampton v. Navigation Capital Partners, Inc. · filed 2014-08-19(b)(1)

Nor is there other specific evidence contradicting a view that the general and specific venue provisions at issue here supplement one another. Delaware is where NCP, as a Delaware corporation, resides.

Section 1391(c)(1) permits an alien to establish domicile for venue when the alien has an intent to remain that is lawful under immigration law.

Fuanya v. United States · filed 2022-04-06(c)(1)

Accordingly, as concerns aliens, Congress intended that domicile may be established where the alien has an intent to remain which is consistent with – that is, lawful under – federal immigration law.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a defendant that does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

AMERICAN EAGLE OUTFITTERS, INC. v. LYLE & SCOTT LIMITED · filed 2021-09-21(c)(3)

Further, “[f]or all venue purposes . . . a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with respect to other defendants.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). Accordingly, this Court is an appropriate venue for resolution of AEO’s claims.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any federal judicial district.

United States v. Flume · filed 2019-06-11(c)(3)

Venue is proper in this District because Defendant Flume is a resident of Mexico and may therefore be sued in any federal judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats a natural person domiciled in a district as residing there for venue purposes, including a paroled asylum applicant without permanent resident status.

Flores v. United States · filed 2015-06-11(c)(1)

Alienage is not a reason stated in the statute as a basis for finding persons outside its reach. When Congress intended to exclude — as it did when “real property is involved” — it said so.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign defendant to be sued in any judicial district.

Tower Laboratories, Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Limited · filed 2018-01-24(c)(3)

More specifically, the five foreign entities can be sued in any judicial district, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), and Lush Cosmetics NY satisfies § 1400(b) because it has four retail stores in Connecticut that sell allegedly infringing products.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits suit against a foreign corporation in any judicial district; the 2011 amendments did not give foreign corporations a venue defense.

In Re: Htc Corporation · filed 2018-05-09(c)(3)

As explained below, we believe Congress did not intend the 2011 amendments to upend the centuries-old understanding that the venue laws (as opposed to requirements of personal jurisdiction) do not restrict the location of suits against alien defendants, unless Congress has specifically provided otherwise.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a foreign corporation to be sued in any judicial district and gives it no venue defense.

In re HTC Corp. · filed 2018-05-09(c)(3)

At the same time, the immediately succeeding paragraph, § 1391(c)(3), uses broad language to deny venue protection to any "defendant not resident in the United States," with no exclusion of foreign corporations.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a patent infringement suit against a foreign corporation in any judicial district.

Largan Precision Co., Ltd. v. Ability Opto-Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. · filed 2020-02-05(c)(3)

As stated earlier in this Order, when a foreign corporation is sued for patent infringement, it is subject to suit in any judicial district. Luminati Networks Ltd. v. BIScience Inc, No. 2:18-cv-483, 2019 WL 2084426, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 13, 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3); In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Therefore, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(c)(3) requires a defendant outside the United States to be disregarded when determining where an action may be brought against the other defendants.

Emrit v. Horus Music Video Distribution · filed 2020-04-10(c)(3)

Because Horus is alleged to be a British company with its principal place of business in Great Britain, it is disregarded for purposes of determining where this action may be brought.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits suit against a defendant who does not reside in the United States in any judicial district.

Tube-Mac Industries, Inc. v. Campbell · filed 2020-04-20(c)(3)

Venue is proper over the foreign patentee Defendants in any district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign defendant to be sued in any district for venue purposes.

Nationwide Property & Casualty Co. v. Rockford Commercial Warehouse, Inc. · filed 2020-04-28(c)(3)

Venue is proper over Shenzhen Carku, a company “organized and existing under the laws of the People’s Republic of China,”4 in any district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(1) allows a noncitizen lawfully admitted to the United States to establish residence for venue by forming an intent, consistent with immigration law, to remain indefinitely.

Luna v. United States · filed 2021-02-22(c)(1)

The legislative history supports an interpretation of § 1391(c)(1) that allows an alien who (i) has been lawfully admitted to the United States and (ii) has formed an intent, consistent with the immigration laws, to remain in the United States indefinitely to establish residency.

Section 1391(c) permits a defendant that does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

NCS Multistage Inc. v. TCO Products Inc. · filed 2021-05-28(c)

Section 1391(c) in Title 28 of the US Code states that “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” Because personal jurisdiction is found and TCO AS is not resident in the United States, venue is proper in the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(c)(1) allows a lawfully present asylum seeker who can form the lawful intent to remain indefinitely to establish residence in a judicial district.

Tanyike v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement · filed 2022-05-13(c)(1)

Thus, if an individual lawfully enters the country using the immigration laws, such as those for asylum seekers, that individual can form the lawful intent to remain in the United States and claim residency under the venue statute.

Section 1391(c)(1) allows a lawfully present noncitizen to establish venue residence without permanent resident status if immigration law permits the person to intend to remain indefinitely.

E.L.A. v. United States · filed 2022-06-03(c)(1)

Under the amended language, Congress did not restrict the statute to apply only to ... those with legal permanent residence (“LPR”) status, per se, but rather more broadly to aliens “lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.” ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have the ability under the immigration laws to form the intent to remain in this country indefinitely. This requirement does not require Plaintiffs to show that they have the ability to remain indefinitely, but rather the ability to form the lawful intent to remain.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign corporation to be sued in any judicial district.

SZ DJI Technology Co. Ltd. v. Bell Textron Inc. · filed 2023-10-06(c)(3)

In addition, venue is proper as to Bell Canada in the NDTX, because it is a foreign corporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Tew v. MCML Limited · filed 2024-09-27(c)(3)

First, “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Thus, Defendant’s venue argument is unavailing.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Collectanea J. Limited v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A · filed 2024-10-29(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), a “defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district,” meaning that Collectanea may proceed against it here.

Section 1391(d) does not establish venue for domestic defendants in patent infringement actions.

WSOU Investments LLC v. ZTE Corporation · filed 2021-08-06(d)

First and foremost, WSOU makes the argument that 28 U.S.C. 1391(d) creates a residence for both ZTA and ZTX. The Court disagrees. This reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) goes against Supreme, Federal, and District Court precedent in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) to domestic defendants.

Section 1391(c) does not alter the patent venue rule in § 1400(b), so a defendant could have raised an improper venue defense before TC Heartland.

Mantissa Corp. v. Ondot Systems, Inc. · filed 2017-07-26(c)

The Court agrees with this reasoning. ... Because TC Heartland did not change the law in this regard, the improper venue defense was available to Ondot at all relevant times.

Section 1391(c)(2)’s corporate residence rule does not determine residence for patent infringement venue; under the patent venue statute, a domestic corporation resides only in its state of incorporation.

FrenchPorte LLC v. CHI Overhead Doors Inc · filed 2021-01-25(c)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), “for all venue purposes,” a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such ... defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” ... Rather than predict what the Supreme Court may do in the future, as an inferior court, this Court will simply apply the clear holding of TC Heartland and find that C.H.I does not reside in this district for the purpose of venue in this patent infringement litigation.

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the individual is domiciled; incarceration alone does not establish domicile in the district of confinement.

Kramer v. United States · filed 2026-05-11(c)(1)

For purposes of venue, a party is “deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). ... Because plaintiff does not allege facts establishing that his current location at FCI-Oxford is his domicile, and the events underlying his lawsuit plainly occurred in Alabama, his lawsuit was not properly filed here.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats a natural person as residing in the judicial district where that person is domiciled.

Wright v. United States · filed 2021-07-19(c)(1)

A person is deemed to reside in the judicial district where that person is domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391 treats a natural person as residing in the district where that person is domiciled; incarceration in another state does not itself change a prisoner’s domicile.

Doe v. Cotterman · filed 2018-03-09(c)(1)

In the context of venue, a natural person is a resident of “the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” Id. § 1391(c). ... Accordingly, because Cotterman cannot show he is domiciled in Oregon, he cannot establish that venue is proper in the District of Oregon under section 1404(a).

For venue purposes, a person resides in the district where the person is domiciled; a prisoner is presumed to retain the domicile held before incarceration unless evidence rebuts that presumption.

White v. United States · filed 2020-02-11(c)(1)

For purposes of venue, a party “is deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). ... The court cannot find that the evidence currently in the record is sufficient to rebut the presumption that White remains domiciled in the jurisdiction where he resided before his incarceration—the Western District of Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where the defendant resides; a natural person resides where domiciled.

Corbishley v. Napolitano · filed 2020-10-21(b)(1)

Because Defendant is domiciled in New Jersey, and nearly all the events giving rise to suit occurred outside this District, venue is improper under §1391(b)(1) and § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(c)(1) treats a natural person as a resident of a district where the person lives and lawfully intends to remain, even without permanent resident status.

COYOY v. United States · filed 2021-03-18(c)(1)

I hold that a natural person is a resident of any district in which he or she is lawfully domiciled.

For venue purposes, a natural person resides in the judicial district where that person is domiciled.

Brown v. O'Malley · filed 2023-03-28(c)(1)

For the purposes of determining the proper venue, the residence of a natural person is “the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).

For venue purposes, a natural person resides in the judicial district where that person is domiciled.

Brown v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-28(c)(1)

For the purposes of determining the proper venue, the residence of a natural person is “the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).

Section 1391(c)(1) treats a person as residing in the district of domicile; incarceration generally does not change that domicile.

Brown v. United States · filed 2023-07-25(c)(1)

Venue in federal district courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides in part that, “a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c)(1). ... This Court finds that FCI Williamsburg is not located in this district, and, prior to his incarceration, the Plaintiff was not domiciled in this district.

For venue purposes, a natural person resides in the district where the person is domiciled, even if another district can exercise personal jurisdiction over that person.

Kumaran v. National Futures Association · filed 2024-05-22(c)(1)

Mr. Kadlec, however, does not reside in Connecticut, even assuming he is subject to personal jurisdiction there. Under 28 U.S.C § 1391(c)(1), as a “natural person,” he is “deemed to reside in the judicial district in which [he] is domiciled,” which, as Judge Aaron properly held, is not Connecticut.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats an individual as residing, for venue purposes, in the district where the individual is domiciled.

Carzoglio v. Klimek · filed 2024-07-08(c)(1)

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is “domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). ... Thus, the Court cannot determine where Plaintiff resides for the purposes of venue.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats an individual as residing, for venue purposes, in the district where that person is domiciled.

McCarthy v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2024-09-10(c)(1)

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is “domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). ... Venue of the FOIA claim lies in the District of Columbia or in the Eastern District of New York, where Plaintiff is domiciled.

Under § 1391(c), a person whose temporary F-1 student visa requires maintaining a foreign domicile does not reside in a U.S. judicial district for venue purposes.

Patel v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-05-23(c)

Plaintiffs’ temporary visas condition their admission into the United States on their agreement not to establish domicile here but instead to maintain their domicile in India and agree to return there once their visas expire; they therefore are not residents of this District—or anywhere in the United States—for venue purposes.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats an individual as residing, for venue purposes, in the district where the individual is domiciled.

Fouts v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) · filed 2025-07-08(c)(1)

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is “domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is domiciled.

Fouts v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) · filed 2025-07-18(c)(1)

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is “domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is domiciled.

Sweigert · filed 2026-03-13(c)(1)

For venue purposes, an individual resides in the district where the person is “domiciled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). ... First, Plaintiff states in the complaint that he resides in Box Elder, South Dakota, thus making the District of South Dakota—not this district—a proper venue.

Section 1391(e)(1) treats a state suing federal officers as residing in every judicial district within its borders.

State of California v. the Little Sisters of the Poor · filed 2018-12-13(e)(1)

The text of the statute therefore dictates that a state with multiple judicial districts “resides” in every district within its borders.

Section 1391(c)(2)'s entity residency rule does not apply to a sovereign state; a state resides in every judicial district within its borders.

Pennsylvania v. Trump · filed 2019-01-14(c)(2)

Here, Congress's differentiation between "an entity" and "States" within Section 1391 indicates that Congress did not intend to include the latter within the definition of the former.

A state plaintiff resides throughout its territory for venue purposes under Section 1391(e)(1)(C).

State of Texas v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2023-03-10(e)(1)(C)

Accordingly, the Court finds, consistent with what the Fifth Circuit and every other federal court to have addressed the issue have held, Texas resides at every point within the boundaries of this State, including the Victoria Division.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue where a plaintiff resides in a suit against a federal officer, and a state resides throughout its borders.

State of Utah v. Walsh · filed 2023-03-28(e)(1)(C)

But Plaintiffs have established venue is proper by showing two plaintiffs reside in this District under Section 1391(e)(1)(C).

Section 1391(c)(2) does not define a sovereign state's residence; a state plaintiff resides in every federal district within its borders.

State of Texas v. Department of Justice · filed 2023-07-28(c)(2)

By its plain terms, Section 1391(c)(2) refers to corporations and unincorporated associations—not sovereign states. Thus, the Court joins every other court to consider the issue by finding that a state resides, for venue purposes, in every district within its borders. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas.

Under § 1391(e)(1)(C), a state plaintiff resides in every division within its borders for venue purposes.

State of Texas v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-08-29(e)(1)(C)

The Court remains steadfast in its interpretation of Section 1391 and the conclusion that a state is a resident at every point within its borders. For the same reasons, the Court denies the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of improper venue.

Section 1391(b)(1) governs venue for ADEA claims and permits suit in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in that state.

Dariz v. Republic Airline Inc. · filed 2019-05-01(b)(1)

As the ADEA has no special venue provision, claims under the statute are governed by the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides in relevant part that a plaintiff can bring a civil action in "a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) permits an ADEA claim to be brought where the defendant resides or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Clark v. American Airlines · filed 2019-07-09(b)

She could also have brought her ADEA claim in that division because it is where Defendant resides, and where the events or omissions giving rise to her claim occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) governs venue for ADEA claims and permits suit in a district where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gonzalez v. Apttus Corporation · filed 2021-03-10(b)

Under both Title VII’s and the general venue provisions, this District is not a proper venue for this action, because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in San Mateo, California, and she does not allege that Defendant resides in this District.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for ADEA claims and requires a proper district based on the defendant’s residence or the events giving rise to the claim.

Roe v. City of New York · filed 2021-03-12(b)

Claims brought under the ADEA are governed by the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Under both Title VII’s and the general venue provisions, this District is not a proper venue for this action, because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in San Mateo, California, and she does not allege that Defendant resides in this District.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for ADEA claims and allows suit where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Campbell v. Almost Home Restaurant · filed 2021-08-13(b)

Claims brought under the ADEA are governed by the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... And Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant resides in this State, or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in New York.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for an ADEA claim against a federal officer where the plaintiff resides or where the cause of action arose.

Fort v. Wilkie · filed 2021-12-21(e)(iii)

Pursuant to the general venue statute, an action may be instituted in the District where plaintiff resides, the defendant resides, or the cause of action arose. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(iii). This means that the District of New Jersey is a proper venue under ADEA and HIPAA due to the fact that the cause of action arose within that District.

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules for ADEA claims.

Steele v. USPS · filed 2022-10-25(b)

Under the ADEA, the general venue provision applies: ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue for an ADEA claim where a substantial part of the events occurred or, if no real property is involved, where the plaintiff resides.

Bradley v. Cardona · filed 2023-12-07(e)(1)

Under that statute, venue is proper in a jurisdiction where (1) “a defendant in the action resides,” (2) “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” or (3) “the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). The Northern District of Georgia meets the second and third requirements.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for ADEA claims; venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York because all defendants resided there and the relevant events occurred there.

Stilwell v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2025-02-18(b)

Venue is not proper in this district as to the ADEA claim, which is subject to the general venue statute. The proper venue for that claim is the Eastern District, as that is where all the defendants reside and all the events relevant to the case occurred. See § 1391(b).

For an ADEA claim against one defendant, Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hickman v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2025-06-11(b)(1), (b)(2)

With respect to Plaintiff’s ADEA claims, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in the Northern District of California, where Meta resides. Although Plaintiff alleges that some events occurred in this District, a large majority of the events giving rise to her claims appear to have occurred in either San Mateo County, California or Florida. Venue for her ADEA claims is therefore proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Northern District of California or in a district court in Florida.

Section 1391(b) supplies the general venue rules for ADEA claims, and a plaintiff whose choice of venue is challenged must establish that the district is proper.

Goode v. amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2025-10-27(b)

The ADEA, by contrast, keys off the default venue provision for civil actions, such that a plaintiff may bring suit where: (1) “any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located”; (2) “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or if neither applies, then (3) where “any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction” for the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In short, Goode fails to carry his burden to demonstrate the correctness of venue in this District, and the Court agrees with Amazon that the District of Columbia is not a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b) defines proper venue but does not itself authorize transfers between districts.

DIPIETRO v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2019-08-28(b)

However, that statute defines proper venue and does not, in and of itself, authorize inter-district transfers.

For venue purposes, the United States does not reside in a district merely because it has a United States Attorney there.

Downey v. US of America · filed 2019-08-30(e)(1)(A)

The fact that there is a United States Attorney for the District of Hawai`i does not render the United States a resident of Hawai`i for purposes of venue.

Venue for a § 1983 claim is improper in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the relevant events occurred.

Wood v. Purdue Pharmasutical Company · filed 2021-08-27(b)(1)-(2)

Moreover, venue for the Steuben County claims is not proper in this Court. Venue for section 1983 claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which provides: ... Steuben County, where the underlying events occurred and where any individuals personally involved in those events presumably reside, is located in the Western District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(d). Plaintiff does not allege that any of the relevant events occurred within this District, or that any defendant resides in this District.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil rights claim to be brought where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Walker v. Davis · filed 2019-11-12(b)

Moreover, under the statute governing venue for civil-rights claims, venue would be improper in this judicial district because the events giving rise to a potential claim took place in Jefferson County in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division.1 ... However, a civil-rights claim must be brought in a judicial district in which a defendant resides or “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases; when jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity, venue is proper where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Dobbs v. Texas Dept of Child Family Services · filed 2020-01-09

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 permits a civil rights action in the judicial district where the defendant resides or the claim arose.

Tabler v. Davis TRANSFERRED TO THE LUFKIN DIVISION. · filed 2020-03-20

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. ... As a result, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391 permits venue in a nondiversity civil rights case only where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Miller v. Martinez · filed 2020-03-25

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 governs venue for civil rights claims without a specific venue provision and permits venue where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Miles v. Collier · filed 2020-05-04

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. ... Accordingly, venue for such claims is not proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for § 1981 and state discrimination claims and permits suit where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

YELVERTON v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS · filed 2020-05-08(b)

Likewise, venue for Plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1886, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act, Title 19, Del. Code § 710 et seq. is proper in both the Eastern District and the District of Delaware under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a civil rights action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Perry v. Washington · filed 2020-06-10(b)

Venue is in the judicial district where either all defendants reside or where the claim arose. ... The Court concludes that venue in this § 1983 lawsuit lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, where plaintiff alleges that the civil rights violations occurred.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper for a civil rights action in a district where none of the alleged acts, events, or omissions occurred.

Perry 231579 v. Washington · filed 2020-06-10(b)

Venue for plaintiff’s civil rights lawsuit is not proper in the Eastern District of Michigan, because plaintiff has failed to allege that any of the acts, events, or omissions which form the basis of his lawsuit took place in this district.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a civil rights action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Lester v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-06-11(b)

To the extent that Petitioner seeks relief under the civil rights statute, venue is not proper in this district. Venue is in the judicial district where either all defendants reside or where the claim arose. ... The Court concludes that venue in this lawsuit lies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, where Petitioner alleges that the civil rights violations occurred.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a civil rights action in the district where the defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Lester 161276 v. Horton · filed 2020-06-11(b)

To the extent that Petitioner seeks relief under the civil rights statute, venue is not proper in this district. Venue is in the judicial district where either all defendants reside or where the claim arose. Al-Muhaymin v. Jones, 895 F. 2d 1147, 1148 (6th Cir. 1990); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions that lack a specific venue provision; venue is proper where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Tolar v. Hays · filed 2020-06-19

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(b) places venue for claims about conditions at an Arizona prison in the District of Arizona rather than the District of Hawaii.

Brisken v. Whiteing · filed 2020-09-25(b)

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to challenge the conditions of his confinement at the SCC, this is not the proper venue for those claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), 1406; Dermendziev v. Washington, 624 F. App’x 454, 455 (9th Cir. 2015). The proper venue for those claims is the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Section 1391 governs venue for civil rights claims without a specific venue provision and permits venue based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the underlying events occurred.

Hawkins v. Advisory Committee TRANSFERRED TO SD/TX HOUSTON DIVISION · filed 2020-10-20(b)(1)-(2)

Defendants are not residents of the same state, so 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) does not apply. As far as the undersigned can tell from reading Plaintiffs handwritten complaint, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated” in Houston, Texas. § 1391(b)(2). ... Accordingly, venue is not proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hafer v. Unknown · filed 2020-10-30(b)

Separately, reviewing the Second Action broadly potentially to assert a civil rights claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), proper venue over such an action would properly lie only in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. Here, the Second Filing does not identify any defendant and all the alleged events or omissions giving rise to any purported claim occurred in Kern County, within the Eastern District. Thus, on the face of the Second Filing, if it is treated as a civil rights action, it could only have been properly brought in the Eastern District.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases and permits venue where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Watkins v. Putnam Case electronically transferred to the Tyler Division. · filed 2020-11-23

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 places venue for a civil rights suit in the judicial district where the defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Richard v. LaRule Case transferred to the Lufkin Division · filed 2021-03-25

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. The claims which form the basis of plaintiff’s complaint occurred at the Lewis Unit which is located in Tyler County. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 124, Tyler County is located in the Eastern District of Texas. As a result, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a Section 1983 claim in a district where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Meyers v. Special Needs X-Press, Inc. · filed 2021-06-17(b)

But the issue is venue, not jurisdiction. Section 1983 claims may be filed only in a judicial district in which a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391 governs venue in § 1983 suits and permits venue in the district where the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

SCOTT v. DEPUTY CLOSE · filed 2021-06-28(b)

Because § 1983 contains no specific venue provision, the general venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 are applicable to this suit. ... Here, Plaintiff does not allege that venue is not proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and, in fact, it is.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Walls v. Mershon · filed 2021-11-01(b)

Venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) under which such actions may be brought only in (1) the judicial district where any defendant resides (if all defendants reside in the same State), (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. Because Dixon is located in the judicial district for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, see 28 U.S.C. § 93(a), it is the appropriate forum for the claims remaining in this case.

Section 1391 governs venue for civil rights claims without a specific venue provision and permits venue where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Oliphant v. Taylor · filed 2022-09-20

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district or division where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions; the court applied it to require filing where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Valle v. Medical Director · filed 2023-05-15(b)

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. ... As a result, venue is not proper in this court.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases without a specific venue provision; the court applied it to the district where the defendants resided and the claims arose.

Taylor v. Payne · filed 2023-11-17

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the Defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 controls venue for a civil rights action without a specific venue provision; the court held that venue is proper where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Johnson v. Fredricks · filed 2024-06-21

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases and permits venue in the district where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Chatton v. Unknown · filed 2024-06-28

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. ... As a result, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases and permits venue where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Rivera v. Unknown Defendants CASE TRANSFERRED TO THE SD/TX · filed 2024-06-28

As Walker County is located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, venue in the Eastern District of Texas is not proper.

Section 1391(b)(1)–(2) permits venue where defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

CISNEROS-GONZALEZ v. HERNANDEZ · filed 2024-07-16(b)(1)–(2)

Here, both remaining Defendants reside in Hardee County and all the substantial events underlying the Complaint (i.e., Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiff’s mail) took place at the Hardee Correctional Institution in Hardee County. (See Compl. 2, 5). Since Hardee County is in the Middle District of Florida — not the Southern District of Florida — venue for any section 1983 action brought against Defendants Alejandra and Alex exclusively lies in the Middle District of Florida.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases and permits suit in the district where the defendants reside or the claims arose.

Sanchez v. Nursing Case transferred to the Tyler Division. · filed 2024-07-29

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claims arose. ... As a result, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil rights suit in a district tied to the defendants or to a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim.

Davison v. Carothers · filed 2024-07-31(b)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that suits filed under § 1983 may be brought only in (1) the judicial district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. Knox County falls within the jurisdiction of the Central District of Illinois, 28 U.S.C. § 93(b), so the Court finds it appropriate to transfer Plaintiff’s allegations in Claim 1 to the Central District of Illinois for further consideration.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases without a specific venue provision and permits venue where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Hamilton v. State of Texas CASE TRANSFERRED TO SD/TX · filed 2024-09-18

As Chambers County is located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, venue in the Eastern District of Texas is not proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) govern venue for § 1983 claims based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

(PC) Bazzo v. State of California · filed 2025-02-06(b)(1)-(2)

From the face of the complaint, it is clear that, under Section 1391(b)(1) or (2), this Court is not a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims for actions that took place at Ironwood State Prison.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions when the governing statute has no specific venue provision.

Rideaux v. Cheyenne Center & Staff · filed 2025-05-12

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1981, et seq., under which this case is brought, does not contain a specific venue provision. Accordingly, venue in civil rights cases is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for § 1983 actions, including claims arising from events in a particular judicial district.

Obamedo · filed 2026-05-08(b)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) guides the proper venue for federal civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Botai during Plaintiff’s detention in the Jail, which lies within Cook County, Illinois, must be filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(b) permits a civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Augusta · filed 2026-05-28(b)

Venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Plaintiff alleges events that occurred in Knox County, Illinois, which is situated in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 93(b). The defendants and any witnesses presumably reside in this district, and Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that establish a connection to any other district. The Court finds that venue is appropriate in this district.

Section 1391 permits a civil action to be filed in any division of a judicial district where venue is proper.

Garrett v. Hanson · filed 2019-12-19

Conversely, § 1391 permits a civil action to be filed in any division, so long as the division is within a proper judicial district.

Section 1391 determines the proper division under a local rule that adopts its venue rules, even when another statute determines the proper district.

Hughes v. DynCorp International LLC · filed 2020-05-06

Therefore, only § 1391, as modified by Local Rule 3(C), proves relevant to determining the proper division in which to bring a civil suit, regardless of the statute that initially places venue in this District.

In the Eastern District of Virginia, § 1391(b) applies by division under Local Rule 3(C); the Norfolk Division was improper because no defendant resided there and no events giving rise to the claim occurred there.

Tak v. Vyas · filed 2021-10-05(b)

Whether venue is proper is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (“§ 1391”) as modified by the Eastern District of Virginia’s Local Rule 3(C) (“Local Rule 3(C)”). ... The Court finds that the Norfolk Division is not the proper venue for this action, as none of the Defendants are residents of the Norfolk Division and the events or omissions that gave rise to the claim did not occur in the Norfolk Division.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; a local rule applies those tests to divisions.

Jenkins v. NVR, Inc. · filed 2021-12-03(b)(1), (b)(2)

Additionally, Plaintiff Christenson and Plaintiff Bailes worked in the Alexandria Division, along with their managers, which indicates that a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims occurred in the Alexandria Division. Consequently, venue is proper under either § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Section 1391(b)(2) determines venue by judicial district, so a case may be filed in any division of a district where venue is proper.

War Eagle Farms, LLC v. American Agri-Business Insurance Co. · filed 2022-11-22(b)(2)

The parties’ arguments here focus on the “substantial part” language of § 1391 while ignoring that § 1391 provides in which district an action may be brought, rather than in which division.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not restrict which division within a proper judicial district may hear a suit.

Godines v. Johnson · filed 2023-08-23(b)(2)

Notably missing from the general venue statute is a limitation as to which division of a district suit must be filed. Accordingly, venue is not improper.

Under § 1391(d), a defendant’s residence for venue purposes depends on its contacts with the forum; consent to personal jurisdiction alone does not establish residence under § 1391(b)(1).

Multiscaff Limited v. Aptim Federal Services, LLC · filed 2023-10-06(b)(1), (d)

In this residential venue analysis, § 1391(d) leaves no room for consideration of a consent-based personal jurisdiction theory.

Section 1391 addresses venue by judicial district and does not distinguish between divisions within a district.

Tana Exploration Co L L C v. Haaland · filed 2023-10-26

The general venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not distinguish between divisions, only by judicial districts.

Section 1391 governs venue by judicial district and does not distinguish among divisions within a district.

PetroQuest Energy L L C v. Haaland · filed 2023-10-26

The general venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not distinguish between divisions, only by judicial districts.

Section 1391(b) governs venue by district, not the choice of division within a district.

Gueltzau · filed 2025-11-04(b)

Plaintiff hits no nearer the mark when he cites 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which pertains only to venue within a district, not to venue within a division.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; a transfer between divisions of that district leaves venue proper.

Tucker v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2010-08-04(a)(2)

In the case at bar, defendants seek a transfer to a different court within the same district, the District of Connecticut. Venue would thus remain proper for purposes of diversity of citizenship, and, in accordance with plaintiffs Complaint, would remain in the “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2); Tucker II, Doe. # 1, p. 3 (¶ 3).

Section 1391(b), as modified by the district’s local rule, makes venue improper in a division where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Qiu v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-01-29(b)

Questions of venue are determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as modified by the Eastern District of Virginia’s Local Civil Rule 3(C) (“Local Rule 3(C)”). ... The Richmond Division is not the proper venue for this action.

Venue is improper under Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) when no defendant resides in the district and none of the alleged events occurred there.

Musk · filed 2026-05-22(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant resides in this district, or that the alleged events occurred in this district, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this Court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Friedeberg v. Dollar Tree Corp. · filed 2025-06-03(b)(1), (b)(2)

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1391(b)(1) and (2), therefore, appears to be a more convenient forum for this action.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) allow venue where a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in that state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ojo v. We Pebble Point, LLC · filed 2025-05-16(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiff filed this action regarding events occurring in Indianapolis, Indiana, where Defendant is located, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that venue is not proper in this court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Valdera v. Walmart Inc. · filed 2025-05-22(b)

Accordingly, because neither Party resides in the Southern District of New York, and because the circumstances underlying the Action took place in New Jersey, venue is not proper in this District.