28 U.S.C. § 1391

A corporate defendant that waives its personal jurisdiction defense is treated as residing in the district for purposes of venue under § 1391(b)(1).

Pharmavite LLC v. Netbus Inc · filed 2021-09-15(b)(1)

As a result, the court concludes that Netbus resides in South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins, if the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

Playboy Enterprises International, Inc. v. Smartitan (Singapore) Pte Ltd. · filed 2011-04-07(b)(3)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). ... We have already held that the “courts sitting in Cook County, Illinois” have personal jurisdiction over Smartitan and Eltex by way of the forum selection clause in the PLA.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue for trademark and UCL claims in a district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Adobe System Inc. v. Blue Source Group, Inc. · filed 2015-08-31(b)(3)

The general venue statute provides in relevant part that venue is proper in, inter alia, “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). ... Accordingly, because venue for Adobe’s claims would be proper in any district in which Blue Source is subject to -personal jurisdiction, the Court examines the personal jurisdiction and venue inquiries in tandem to determine if Blue Source is subject to personal jurisdiction in the'Northern District of California.

Section 1391(c), applied with the copyright venue statute, supports venue where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction based on conduct directed at the district.

Autodesk, Inc. v. Kobayashi + Zedda Architects Ltd. · filed 2016-04-22(c)

Under §§ 1391(c) and.1400(a), the Court finds venue is proper in this District. As determined above, -personal jurisdiction over Defendant is- proper in California. Further, the basis for personal jurisdiction is the effects of Defendant’s actions on Plaintiff in San Rafael, California—a city located -within this District.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district is available under the section.

My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi · filed 2016-06-15(b)(3)

For the purposes of venue, “ if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided by this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such” is a proper venue. 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(3). Because personal jurisdiction is proper over defendant Mizrahi, venue in Delaware is also proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) allows venue in a district where any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

BMW of North America LLC v. M/V Courage · filed 2017-05-19(b)(3)

First, as the non-moving parties observe (Docket No. 97, at 16; Docket No. 99, at 19; Docket No. 101, at 22) — and GovLog does not particularly dispute in its reply— venue is plainly proper pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391(b)(3), which provides that a case may be brought in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) (emphasis added).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district, but it does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Estate of Yevgenyi Scherban v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2018-03-22(c)(3)

Plaintiffs additionally argue that because 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district,” Gwynfe may be sued in this court. See Response at 2-3. This provision, however, pertains to venue and not personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Trudel v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2018-03-22(c)(3)

This provision, however, pertains to venue and not personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district is available under the section.

Fintech Fund, FLP v. Horne · filed 2018-07-06(b)(3)

Because the court has concluded that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant, venue in this court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (3).

Section 1391(b)(2) concerns proper venue and does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Pilkin v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC · filed 2019-01-16(b)(2)

And to the extent that Pilkin seeks to establish personal jurisdiction “under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2),” Dkt. 33 at 15, he conflates two distinct requirements: (1) that a court have personal jurisdiction over a defendant and (2) that the action be brought in the proper venue.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district is available under the preceding venue rules.

Pharmacists Mutual Insurance Company v. Namic Insurance Company, Inc. · filed 2019-09-20(b)(3)

Even assuming a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to PHMIC’s claims did not occur in Colorado, having determined that NAMICO is properly subject to personal jurisdiction in this action, venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).’ Therefore, NAMICO’s motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when that subsection applies.

Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc · filed 2019-09-27(b)(3)

Venue is proper because D.C. is “a district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b) supports venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction over the action.

Hill-Rom Services Incorporated v. Convergence Systems Limited · filed 2019-11-01(b)

Because the Court finds that Convergence is subject to jurisdiction in Arizona, venue is also proper in Arizona. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (“A civil action may be brought in . . . any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”); ... Convergence Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when no other district provides venue under the section.

Williams v. The Hon. Warrant Issuing Judge · filed 2020-02-11(b)(3)

Because the defendants are residents of North Carolina and New York, and because the events alleged occurred in two different districts, subparagraph (3) applies to these claims. Moreover, because defendant Shellard is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Western District of New York, venue is appropriate here as to the claims against him.

The court treated a corporate defendant’s lack of specific personal jurisdiction in a district as making venue there improper under Section 1391.

Appotronics Corporation Limited v. Delta Electronics, Inc. · filed 2020-07-22(c)

In sum, the Court concludes it that the Northern District of California does not have personal specific jurisdiction over Delta and therefore venue is not proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

IMM Holdings, Ltd. v, HKParts Incorporated · filed 2020-09-22(b)(3)

Because Defendant is incorporated in Utah and has its principal place of business in Utah, the District Court of Utah may exercise general personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, venue is proper in that court under § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits venue in a district where the airline defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.

KIM v. KOREAN AIR LINES · filed 2021-01-14(c)(3)

Venue would be proper in the EDNY because the airlines are subject to personal jurisdiction there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction in a district when no district qualifies under the other venue grounds.

Motel Inn, LLC v. 9223-6678 Quebec Inc. · filed 2021-03-11(b)(3)

As a result, venue is not improper in this district under § 1391(b)(3) and Defendants’ Motion for dismissal based in improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) must be denied.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction only when no other district is an appropriate venue.

Top Brand LLC v. Cozy Comfort Company, LLC · filed 2021-03-24(b)(3)

Under the venue statute, personal jurisdiction is relevant only if no other district would be an appropriate venue—a test that is not met here.

The court treated personal jurisdiction over the defendants as sufficient for venue under § 1391(b)(3) in this action.

Jamie v. Parts Authority LLC · filed 2021-07-20(b)(3)

Therefore, because the Court has personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction; the court found venue improper after finding no personal jurisdiction.

Cincinnati Insurance Company, Inc., The v. Harbinger, LLC · filed 2021-07-22

Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, so too is proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (providing that venue may be had in any district where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction). Because the court concludes that personal jurisdiction doesn’t exist in Kansas under the facts presented by this case, Cincinnati’s claims also are subject to dismissal for lack of proper venue.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when that subsection applies, and § 1391(c)(2) governs where a corporate defendant resides.

Woolery v. Peery · filed 2022-01-03(b)(3), (c)(2)

Because some defendants are residents of Texas and others are residents of Oklahoma, this action could have been brought in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). At least one defendant—BNSF—has its principal place of business in Fort Worth and therefore resides there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Accordingly, this district is a proper venue, and this case could have been filed in the Fort Worth Division.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

Safelite Group, Inc. v. Lockridge · filed 2022-01-21(b)(3)

Having concluded that each Defendant is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to this action, venue is not improper.

The court treated § 1391(b)(3) as permitting venue where the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.

In the Black Resources, LLC v. Blitz Design,Inc. Case transferred to the Northern District of California. · filed 2022-07-20(b)(3)

Venue is proper in a judicial district in which Blitz Design is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.* Blitz Design is subject to this court’s personal jurisdiction, so venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district qualifies under the section.

Iconic IP Holdings, LLC v. Gerrit's Brands, Inc. · filed 2022-08-05(b)(3)

It is thus clear that the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is a proper venue for this action under § 1391(b)(3).

In this negligence suit, lack of personal jurisdiction over the sole defendant made venue improper under § 1391(b).

Love v. Tytus · filed 2023-01-30(b)

Because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, venue is not proper in this Court, and the Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s arguments relating to her inability to travel and inconvenience to witnesses because retaining this case would require this Court to exercise jurisdiction it lacks. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction when the defendants reside and substantial events occurred in another district.

Gilmer v. Zahnd · filed 2023-03-14(b)

Plaintiff does not allege that venue is proper in this Court based on any of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). To the extent that Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant Zahnd, this is irrelevant given that all defendants reside in the Western District of Missouri and a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred there.

Section 1391 concerns venue and does not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Yang v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2023-03-15

Of note, § 1391 concerns venue, rather than personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(c) permits venue where a defendant's consent makes it subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Mongeon v. KPH Healthcare Services, Inc. · filed 2023-08-03(c)

As a threshold issue, venue is proper in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because Prescribe Wellness consented to the court’s personal jurisdiction when it assumed VoicePort’s rights and duties under the Voiceport Agreement and when it signed the Prescribe Wellness Agreement, the pending case “might have been brought” in the Western or Northern Districts of New York and transfer under § 1404(a) is permissible.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district qualifies under the first two venue grounds.

Mogollon v. The Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2023-08-09(b)(3)

If no district satisfies the first two options, a suit may be brought in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). ... Regardless, however, venue is proper because BNYM is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of New Jersey.

For venue purposes, an entity defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction; consenting to personal jurisdiction can also resolve its venue objection.

WHERE TO BUY, LLC v. DATASEMBLY, INC. · filed 2023-08-17(b)(1), (c)(2)

As such, I consider SPINS and Destini to have also withdrawn their objection to venue as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located[.]”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (“[A]n entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question”); see also Monello Landscape Indus., L.L.C. v. Hatch Landscape & Design, Inc., No. 16-cv-5803 (JMV), 2018 WL 2134058, at *6 (D.N.J. May 9, 2018) (concluding that venue was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) based on the court’s personal jurisdiction over the entity defendant).

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue in a district that lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Wallace v. American International Group, Inc · filed 2023-09-30(b)(3)

Accordingly, the only potential basis for venue is the third prong—namely, personal jurisdiction existing in this District. But as explained above, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Venue, therefore, is not proper in this District.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

Martel Family Realty, LLC v. Bhatia · filed 2024-05-09(b)(3)

Because Defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court, this Court is a proper venue under Section 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391 makes venue improper where the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Baker v. Chin · filed 2024-06-24

Where personal jurisdiction is lacking, so too is proper venue.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction when no other district qualifies under the venue rules.

Lopez v. Janus International Group, Inc. · filed 2024-09-26(b)(3)

Venue is also proper, because the Angel Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the defendants do not all reside in one state and no district contains a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim.

The Republic of Nicaragua v. The Lopez-Goyne Family · filed 2024-10-16(b)(3)

Where, as here, all defendants do not reside in a single state and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim did not occur in any judicial district, venue is proper in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, as set forth above, Barish Respondents are subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the instant enforcement action.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

Admiral Insurance Company v. Kabul, Inc. · filed 2025-07-03(b)(3)

At the very least, the Court has personal jurisdiction over this action for the reasons discussed above, making venue proper in the District of Nevada under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b)(2) concerns venue and does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Froeber v. United Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-08-04(b)(2)

The statute that Froeber cites, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), relates to venue, which is distinct from personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Jane Doe (J.T.A.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts · filed 2026-01-09(b)(3)

However, as previously mentioned, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Franchisee Defendant, thus venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district is available under the preceding venue rules.

Aberu · filed 2026-04-09(b)(3)

Here, only § 1391(b)(3) is applicable, so venue is proper where Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction here, making venue improper.

Section 1391(b)(2) determines venue in a putative class action from the events giving rise to the named plaintiff’s claim, without considering prospective class members’ claims.

Murdoch v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC · filed 2012-07-11(b)(2)

Moreover, the facts giving rise to the prospective claims of potential class members residing in the District of Columbia are not relevant to determining whether venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391 supplies the ordinary venue rules for class actions brought under CAFA.

Mendoza v. Microsoft, Inc. · filed 2014-03-05

Instead, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1392, the usual venue statutes for civil actions apply to class action lawsuits brought under CAFA.

In a class action, § 1391(b)(2) assesses the events giving rise to the named plaintiffs’ claims; unnamed class members’ claims cannot establish venue.

Bozic v. Usdc-Casd · filed 2018-04-25(b)(2)

Whether before or after class certification, the claims of unnamed class members can never make permissible an otherwise impermissible venue. Rather, in a class action, the “events” in question are only those involving the named plaintiffs.

Section 1391(b)(2) determines venue in a class action from events involving the named plaintiffs; unnamed class members' claims cannot establish venue.

Bozic v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Cal. · filed 2018-04-25(b)(2)

Whether before or after class certification, the claims of unnamed class members can never make permissible an otherwise impermissible venue. Rather, in a class action, the "events" in question are only those involving the named plaintiffs.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Freeman v. Jacobson · filed 2021-08-13(b)(2)

Freeman followed the guidelines of the federal venue statue by filing this action in the Defendants’ home district, where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the intellectual property at issue was created and is maintained.

Intellicad Technology Consortium v. Suzhou Gstarsoft Co. Ltd. · filed 2020-06-08(b)(2)

First, the “property” at issue, IntelliCAD and its source code, is the intellectual property of the ITC. The ITC is headquartered in Oregon, and IntelliCAD was created and is maintained in Oregon. This satisfies § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Hunte · filed 2020-06-01(b)(2)

Additionally, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, (see Answer 1), venue is also proper because the Property at question is located in Orange County, New York, which is within the Southern District of New York, (see Compl. 1). Therefore, it meets the requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) that a civil action be brought in a “judicial district in which . . . a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.”

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke · filed 2019-06-21(b)(2)

There is no doubt that Massachusetts is “a judicial district in which . . . a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is located, including a home central to claims arising from its construction.

Scott v. Buckner Co. · filed 2019-05-16(b)(2)

The record amply supports a finding that a substantial part of the real property that is the subject of this action is situated in the judicial District of Colorado. The Home located in Colorado is at the center of each of Plaintiffs' causes of action.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Sears Contract, Inc. v. Sauer Inc. · filed 2019-04-25(b)(2)

Under the federal venue statute generally, venue is proper in "a judicial district in which ... a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Based upon these statutory venue provisions, a proper venue for this action is the Eastern District of North Carolina, because it is the location of contract performance and the project.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Metropolitan Regional Information Systems, Inc. v. American Home Realty Network, Inc. · filed 2012-08-24(b)(2)

Venue is also proper under Section 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated in Maryland.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.

Willis v. Chase Home Finance · filed 2013-02-08(b)(2)

Accordingly, because “[a] civil action may be brought in … a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,” and because the encumbered property that appears to be the subject of Plaintiff’s suit is located in Fort Worth, Texas, venue is proper in the United States Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Abrams v. Stuckey · filed 2014-10-21(b)(2)

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that venue in the Southern District of Georgia is proper, as a "substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated" in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Shaw v. One West Bank, FSB · filed 2017-03-31(b)(2)

The NDGA is the proper venue because the property at issue was located in the NDGA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is located; cattle sale proceeds qualify when their ownership is the subject of the action.

Security National Bank of Sioux City, IA, The v. Kant · filed 2019-07-17(b)(2)

I find that the proceeds held in Iowa constitute property that is the subject matter of this litigation. The cattle have been sold and the core question in this declaratory judgment action is the proper allocation of the proceeds. Because the proceeds are located in Sioux City, Iowa, I find that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the property at issue in an arbitration is principally located.

NORTHEAST NATURAL ENERGY LLC v. LARSON ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2019-09-20

Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the property that is the subject of the underlying arbitration action is located principally in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, which is also within the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated, including the district where the trade secrets at issue were developed.

SWEET CHARLIE'S FRANCHISING, LLC v. SWEET MOO'S ROLLED ICE CREAM, LLC · filed 2020-06-19(b)(2)

Therefore, “a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated” in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, making venue in this Court proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Watson v. Moger · filed 2020-09-16(b)(2)

Venue is proper because Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that “a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated” in Washington.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Zohar CDO 2003-1, Ltd. v. Patriarch Partners, LLC · filed 2020-09-18(b)(2)

This leaves 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) which provides that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” While the Zohar Funds alleged that a substantial portion of the events at issue occurred in this District, (Zohar Compl. ¶ 26), it is clear that much of the property at issue is located in Delaware. Indeed, that is where the bankruptcy estate sought chapter 11, and Counts 21 and 22 deal with ownership of the Delaware entities. Accordingly, this Court finds that this action could have been brought in Delaware and turns to whether the convenience of parties and interests of justice support transfer.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

Portfolio Advisors VIII, LLC v. Bluestone Resources, Inc. · filed 2020-09-30(b)(2)

Inasmuch as it is undisputed that the subject equipment is located in this District, venue is proper here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

LUCKY Bs LLC v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA · filed 2021-01-22(b)(2)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the property is located in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Zayo Group LLC · filed 2021-11-23(b)(2)

Although venue in the Norfolk Division is unsupported by the “events and omissions” portion of § 1391(b)(2), the location of the property described in the Duct Lease, which is the subject of this action, supports a finding of venue in the Alexandria Division under the “property” section of the statute.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district containing a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action.

Tao Group Holdings, LLC v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau · filed 2022-03-08(b)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... Because nearly half of Tao’s properties for which it seeks coverage under the Policy for are based in New York, “a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action” is in New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

W.C. Chapman, L.P. v. Cavazos · filed 2022-05-17(b)(2)

As such, venue would not be proper in the Eastern District of Oklahoma on the basis that the district is where “a substantial part of [the] property that is the subject of the action is situated.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or the property at issue is situated.

C&B Marlborough Associates, LLC v. Marlborough Holding Company, LLC · filed 2022-05-18(b)(2)

This matter concerns a residential lease in Connecticut and an alleged breach of that lease. As a result, venue (and necessarily jurisdiction) would have been proper if it were brought within that judicial district.

Section 1391 permits venue in Colorado when the disputed property and actions are located there.

BBG Holding Corp. v. K Capital, LLC · filed 2022-07-29

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Plaintiff is a citizen of Colorado; the property subject of the transaction is located in Colorado; and the disputed actions took place in Colorado.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Hume v. Poskaitis · filed 2023-06-26(b)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s suit should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

DeBellis v. Woodit · filed 2024-04-01(b)(2)

Venue is proper as Maryland is the last known location of Hip927, □ _ the subject of this action, ECF 41 ] 21; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (“A civil action may be brought in... judicial district in which .. . a substantial part of the property that is subject of the action is situated... .”).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is located; the court does not first decide whether the related claim is plausibly pleaded.

Silverstein v. Wolf · filed 2024-09-13(b)(2)

However, courts determine whether venue is proper by considering whether “a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated” in the forum, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), not whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim related to property located in the forum.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

State of Alaska v. Department of the Interior · filed 2025-06-23(e)(1)(B)

If this action is viewed as one over real property – i.e., the Ondola Allotment – venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) since the Ondola Allotment is located within the District of Alaska.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2025-09-19(b)(2)

Venue is proper in the District of New Jersey where the subject property is located.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not make Florida a proper venue for claims involving trust property and proceedings in Kentucky merely because Florida law governs the trust.

Curtis v. Mislevy · filed 2025-10-01(b)(2)

Though Curtis repeatedly asserted the Trust agreement’s venue clause specified all matters pertaining to the Trust be litigated in Florida, no such clause exists in the Trust agreement. Rather, it only states that certain Florida laws govern the Trust. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the venue was not proper for Curtis’s state law claims, regardless of whether it had diversity jurisdiction to hear such claims.

Section 1391 treats venue as a federal judicial district, so an agreement to arbitrate does not necessarily select a venue.

Washington v. Roosen, Varchetti & Oliver, PPLC · filed 2012-09-17

“Venue” is a place and, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue refers to a “judicial district.” Federal judicial districts are places defined by specific geographic boundaries. Arbitration clauses, unlike forum selection clauses, do not always select a geographic location for the arbitration to occur.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in each district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Goodwyn, Mills & Cawood, Inc. v. Black Swamp, Inc. · filed 2012-10-19(b)(2)

Under the current statute, venue may be proper in any number of districts in which a “substantial part” of the events at issue occurred. As such, in ruling on a motion under § 1406(a), the court is not required to weigh the events that occurred in Mississippi against those that took place in Alabama and choose which venue is more proper; rather, even though “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” the claim in this litigation may have occurred in Mississippi, so long as the same can be said as to the Middle District of Alabama, venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in more than one district when a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in each.

Jenkins ex rel. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller · filed 2013-10-24(b)(2)

Section 1391(b) contemplates that venue will be proper in more than one district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in more than one district; the court found venue proper where the defendants agreed to litigate and were subject to personal jurisdiction.

SKF USA Inc. v. Okkerse · filed 2014-01-15(b)

Although venue may be proper in Louisiana as Defendants suggest, it is clear that venue is also proper in this District in light of the forum selection clause and our determination that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction here.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, venue is proper in a district where a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Valspar Corp. v. Kronos Worldwide, Inc. · filed 2014-10-01(d)

Moreover, venue would be proper in the Southern District of Texas for the same reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (in states comprising several judicial districts, venue is proper in any district in which a corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if another district may also be a proper venue.

Retreat Properties, LLC v. KA Designworks Inc. · filed 2018-09-11(b)(2)

Though Defendants are correct that venue might also be proper in Colorado, Section 1391(b)(2) does not require this Court to determine the best venue.

Section 1391(b) can make venue proper in more than one judicial district.

BEUCHAT v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA · filed 2019-10-08(b)

So, under § 1391(b), venue is appropriate in both the Western and Middle Districts.

Section 1391(b) can make venue proper in multiple districts based on defendants’ residence or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Johnson v. State of New York · filed 2020-03-16(b)

Thus, while this Court is a proper venue for this action under § 1391(b)(1), the United States District Courts for the Northern and Western Districts of New York are also proper venues for this action.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) can make more than one judicial district a proper venue for the same action.

Rush v. Annucci · filed 2020-03-09(b)(1), (2)

Thus, while this Court may be a proper venue for this action based on the events that occurred at Downstate, the United States District Courts for the Northern and Western Districts of New York are also proper venues for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b)(2) allows venue in more than one district; a plaintiff need not sue where the largest share of relevant events occurred.

Rossville Convenience & Gas, Inc. v. Barr · filed 2020-04-08(b)(2)

A plaintiff is not required to “bring suit in the district where the most substantial portion of the relevant events occurred,” Modaressi v. Vedadi, 441 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57 (D.D.C. 2006); courts are directed to undertake a “common sense appraisal” of the “events having operative significance in the case,” Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978), to determine where venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurs, even if another district is also a proper venue.

Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Scott · filed 2020-09-25(b)(2)

In 1990, Congress liberalized Section 1391(b)(2) by altering its prior focus on “the” judicial district in which such events occurred or will occur, to “a” judicial district in which such events occurred or will occur.

Section 1391(b) permits more than one district to be a proper venue for the same action.

Abdullah v. The City of New York · filed 2021-02-05(b)

Thus, this court and the Eastern District of New York are both proper venues for this action under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(d) requires personal jurisdiction for venue purposes to be assessed by district when a state has more than one federal judicial district.

C A D S Construction L L C v. Matrix Service Inc · filed 2021-10-12(d)

Personal jurisdiction for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) must be analyzed at the district level where, as here, a state has more than one federal judicial district. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(d).

Section 1391(d)’s rule for venue in states with multiple districts applies to limited liability companies.

Nunes v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC · filed 2022-01-28(d)

Though § 1391(d) refers to “corporations” and NBCU is a limited liability company, the Court will still apply the multi-district provision found in § 1391(d).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even when another district is also a proper venue.

Economy Preferred Insurance Company v. Lamb · filed 2022-05-17(b)(2)

“[Section] 1391(b)(2) does not require the court to determine the best venue for an action, but merely whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the judicial district in which the action was brought.” ... Based on the record before the Court, venue is appropriate both in this District and in Arizona. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) can make more than one district a proper venue for the same action.

Antrobus v. New York City · filed 2024-03-19(b)(1), (b)(2)

Thus, it appears that this Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York are both proper venues for this action. See § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391 determines venue by judicial district without distinguishing among divisions within that district.

Murray v. City of Copperas Cove, Texas · filed 2024-08-13

Section 1391 refers to judicial districts and does not distinguish between the divisions of a judicial district.

Section 1391 permits more than one district to be a proper venue; it does not require a court to identify the best venue.

Pendleton · filed 2025-11-07(b)(2)

But proper venue is not necessarily limited to one judicial district, and Section 1391 contemplates the propriety of a venue absolutely; it is not concerned with whether one district might be “more” proper than another.

Section 1391 permits venue in multiple districts when the statutory grounds for venue are satisfied in each.

Murphy v. Audubon Companies · filed 2026-03-16(b), (c)

Because venue is proper in all three district courts under Section 1391, the Court will apply the balancing test under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to determine whether the case should proceed in the Western District of Pennsylvania or is properly transferred to Texas or Louisiana.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Doster Construction Company, Inc. v. Expert Climate Control · filed 2026-06-01(c)(2)

“An entity with the capacity to be sued” is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” § 1391(c)(2). Accordingly, this case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 1391(b).

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Hoisington v. WCAX-TV · filed 2024-06-20(c)(2)

Because Plaintiff alleges that WCAX-TV is “a for-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of, and having its principal place of business in, the State of Vermont” (ECF 1, at 1), it is clear that WCAX-TV resides, for venue purposes, in the District of Vermont, see 28 U.S.C. § 126 (the State of Vermont constitutes one federal judicial district).

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, allowing venue there under Section 1391(b)(1).

Sadiant, Inc. v. Penstock Consulting, LLC · filed 2024-05-30(b)(1), (c)(2)

This is because, by virtue of the fact that Defendant is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction, see Section A.2, supra, Section 1391(c)(2) dictates that Defendant “resides” in this District for the purposes of Section 1391(b)(i).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district for venue when the court has personal jurisdiction over it in the action.

Williams v. Apple Inc. · filed 2024-05-27(c)(2)

Although a corporate defendant is deemed to “reside” in a particular district if “such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), Williams has not alleged sufficient facts from which the Court could find that it has personal jurisdiction over Apple.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats Medxcel as a resident of the Southern District of Indiana for venue purposes.

LOBODOCKY v. MEDXCEL FACILITIES MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2024-05-22(c)(2)

For venue purposes, Medxcel is a resident of the Southern District of Indiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (defining residency). Because Defendants have not shown that venue in the Southern District of Indiana is wrong or improper, Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 55, their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), dkt. 23, is denied.

Under § 1391(c)(2), a corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including when it waives that defense.

Embry v. Simon & Simon, PC · filed 2022-04-05(c)(2)

Thus, the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Simon & Simon “with respect to the civil action in question,” meaning that venue is proper in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2); see also Centerville ALF, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-48 (corporation that waived personal jurisdiction made venue proper in that district because its waiver made it subject to jurisdiction in that district).

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where the court has personal jurisdiction over it for the action.

Shenzhen OKT Lighting Co., Ltd. v. JLC-TECH LLC · filed 2021-09-28(c)(2)

Residency for venue purposes is determined in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), which provides that “an entity . . . shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” Since JLC is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, venue is not proper.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Lifchits v. Integon National Insurance Co. · filed 2020-08-17(c)(2)

Because the Court has found it does not have personal jurisdiction over Key 4U, see Section III.A, supra, Key 4U does not “reside” in this judicial district for the purposes of § 1391. Therefore, venue is improper in this judicial district.

Under § 1391, a corporate defendant does not reside in a judicial district where it is not subject to personal jurisdiction, so venue there is improper.

Lifchits v. Key 4U Transporation Corp. Bus · filed 2020-08-17(c)(2)

Because the Court has found it does not have personal jurisdiction over Key 4U, see Section III.A, supra, Key 4U does not “reside” in this judicial district for the purposes of § 1391. Therefore, venue is improper in this judicial district.

An entity defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a judicial district resides there for venue purposes.

Gubagoo, Inc. v. Orlando · filed 2020-07-22(c)(2)

Accordingly, since DAS is deemed to be a resident of this district, venue is valid here.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, including by consent.

Vida Longevity Fund, LP v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New York · filed 2020-07-21(c)(2)

In the end, though, all of this is of little moment, given Defendant’s expressed willingness to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court in the E.D. Pa. On this basis alone, Defendant may be deemed to “reside” in that district for venue purposes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), and to be subject to process there, satisfying the first prong of the transfer statute – which requires that the action “might have been brought” in the district to which transfer is sought, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Venue based on an entity defendant’s residence requires the court to have personal jurisdiction over that defendant.

Wadhams v. American Federation of Teachers · filed 2020-06-12(c)(2)

First, the Court notes that this Court may serve as a proper forum for this lawsuit under the venue statute only if it may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). None of the other grounds for venue apply to this case.

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides and treats an entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Vega v. Craftworks Restaurants & Breweries Group, Inc. · filed 2019-12-18(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because the Court has previously determined that Craftworks is subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado because its principal ... place of business was in Colorado during the events alleged, the Court similarly finds that Craftworks is also a resident of Colorado for purposes of the venue statute. Thus, the Court need not reach the question of whether a substantial part of the events occurred in Colorado, and Craftworks’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391 makes venue proper in the district where both corporate defendants have their principal places of business.

Rojas v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc. · filed 2019-11-26

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue would be proper in the Central District of California because Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants have their principal place of business in Torrance, California.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Speedconnect LLC v. Idaho Falls Wireless Partnership · filed 2013-07-01(c)(2)

As a general partnership, IFWP is an entity with the capacity to be sued as contemplated in § 1391(c)(2). Under § 1391(c)(2), IFWP resides within this judicial district because, as discussed above, it is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction. Because IFWP is a resident of the District of Idaho for venue purposes, the Court finds that venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Ratledge v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. · filed 2013-07-25(c)(2)

Because the Court concludes personal jurisdiction is appropriate in this case based on Bull Moose’s contacts with Tennessee, Bull Moose “resides” in Tennessee, as that term is defined in § 1391(c). Thus, venue is appropriate in the Eastern District of Tennessee.

Section 1391 permits venue where a business entity is subject to personal jurisdiction and therefore resides for venue purposes.

Breathwit Marine Contractors, Ltd. v. Deloach Marine Services, LLC · filed 2014-01-16(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because venue exists where a business entity is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2) (providing that a business entity is a citizen for venue purposes where it is subject to personal jurisdiction), the personal jurisdiction issue also decides the venue issue.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity defendant as residing in each district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Freeplay Music, LLC v. Gibson Brands, Inc. · filed 2016-07-18(c)(2)

Since Gibson is subject to personal jurisdiction in both districts, it resides in the Proposed Transferee Districts for the purposes of Section 1400(a).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance, PLC v. Nippon Express USA, Inc. · filed 2016-08-18(c)(2)

In this action, NEU is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Georgia because it maintains a facility there (see Dkt. No. 42 at 2) and has purposefully availed itself of conducting business there (see Dkt. No. 25 at 1). Therefore, the first prong of the inquiry for a motion to transfer venue is satisfied with respect to NEU.

An entity defendant that waives its objection to personal jurisdiction resides in that district for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2).

Dakota Provisions, LLC v. Hillshire Brands Co. · filed 2016-12-27(c)(2)

And because the defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction in South Dakota, they have also consented to venue in South Dakota as they are “subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question!.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity that can sue and be sued as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Missouri Electric Cooperatives v. Missouri · filed 2017-01-17(c)(2)

Missouri statute provides that the Missouri Ethics Commission may institute judicial proceedings, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.955.14(1), 105.961.5, so it is an entity that can sue and be sued in its own name. The Ethics Commission’s authority extends throughout the state, and so there is no doubt that personal jurisdiction over it is proper in this district. Thus, it is itself a resident of this district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity with the capacity to be sued as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Bigelow v. Garrett · filed 2018-03-13(c)(2)

A corporate defendant or other entity with the capacity to be sued is deemed to reside in “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... For the reasons discussed supra at 6-15, neither defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Bigelow v. Tom Garrett & Tom Garrett for Cong. · filed 2018-03-13(c)(2)

A corporate defendant or other entity with the capacity to be sued is deemed to reside in "any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question ...." ... For the reasons discussed supra at 42-47, neither defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a limited liability company as an entity that resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC · filed 2019-01-08(c)(2)

As a limited liability company, see (Doc. # 13 at 1), Rag-O-Rama is considered an "entity" for purposes of § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Klein v. ODS Techs., LP (In re J & J Chem., Inc.) · filed 2019-01-11(c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), residency for venue purposes for defendants lies "in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the action in question...."

Section 1391(c)(2) treats an entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Heritage Lace, Inc. v. Underwraps Costume Corporation · filed 2019-08-16(c)(2)

Where the defendant is an entity, it is “deemed to reside” in a district where it is “subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Thus, if this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Underwraps in this action, then venue is also proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a), and Underwraps’ motion to dismiss must be denied.

Section 1391(b)-(c) permits venue where the sole corporate defendant has its principal place of business.

Gaby's Bags, LLC v. Mercari, Inc. · filed 2020-01-30(b)-(c)

This case could have been brought in the Northern District of California, where Mercari has its principal place of business. (Doc. 4 at 2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where an entity defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if all defendants reside in that state.

La Huff-Berry v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. · filed 2020-01-30(b)(1), (c)

The record reflects that Defendant maintains its principal place of business in Miami, Florida and thus was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida when Plaintiff filed this action. Consequently, Defendant resides in that District for venue purposes. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff could have commenced this case in the Southern District of Florida, and that the Court may transfer this matter to that District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), if transfer is otherwise appropriate.

Section 1391(c)(2) deems an entity with capacity to be sued to reside in any judicial district whose court has personal jurisdiction over it in the action.

Soundexchange, Inc. v. Music Choice · filed 2020-02-14(c)(2)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), which provides that a corporate defendant or other entity with capacity to be sued “shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[,]” the defendant is deemed to reside in the District of Columbia, and venue is therefore proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, allowing this action against Texas corporations to have been brought in the Southern District of Texas.

FINE AGROCHEMICALS LTD v. STOLLER ENTERPRISES INC · filed 2020-03-02(c)

Each of the Defendants is incorporated in Texas and maintains a principal place of business in Texas. ... See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (“[A] defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action commenced.”); ... The Court, therefore, finds that this action could have been brought in the Southern District of Texas.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction.

Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc. · filed 2020-03-16(b)(1), (d)

However, this argument ignores § 1391(b)(1), which establishes that venue is also proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides,” and § 1391(d), which establishes residency of corporate defendants is “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Venue is proper in the Southern District because Plaintiff’s allegations support a finding that defendant Best Western has had sufficient minimum contacts with the Southern District such that it would be subject to personal jurisdiction in this district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a business entity as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Ingram Barge Company, LLC v. Bunge North America, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17(c)(2)

Bunge’s consent to personal jurisdiction with regard to the SCF Shipments is therefore sufficient to establish statutory venue.

A corporate defendant that consents to personal jurisdiction in a district resides there for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2), making venue proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Fine Tune Business Consultants, LLC v. Custom Assembly, Inc. · filed 2020-05-19(b)(1), (c)(2)

By conceding that clause six avails Custom Assembly to personal jurisdiction in Jefferson County, Custom Assembly is subsequently deemed to reside in Jefferson County under § 1391(c)(2). Venue is, therefore, proper under § 1391(b)(1) because Custom Assembly resides in the Western District of Kentucky.

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Treadway Gallery, Inc. v. John Toomey Gallery, Inc. · filed 2020-07-06(c)(2)

Having conceded that this Court has personal jurisdiction over it for each Treadway Gallery’s claims, by virtue of its failure to raise a 12(b)(2) defense, Toomey Gallery is deemed to reside in the Southern District of Ohio for purposes of venue.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Cahey v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2020-09-01(c)(2)

I find that IBM resides in this District for purposes of § 1391(c)(2). Indeed, IBM does not challenge such a conclusion in its Reply. Accordingly, venue in this District is proper pursuant to § 1391(b)(1).

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where the court has personal jurisdiction over it.

Aldrich v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 2020-09-03(c)(2)

Since the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over NCAA Defendants, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a business as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Bland v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. · filed 2020-11-30(c)(2)

The general venue statute provides that a business is a resident “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Again, they failed to satisfy their burden of establishing venue as to The Jones Financial Companies, LLLP. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that this District is a proper venue for Bell’s § 1981 claims.

Section 1391 treats entity defendants subject to personal jurisdiction in a district as residents there for venue purposes, allowing venue under subsection (b)(1) when all defendants reside in the same state.

National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC · filed 2020-12-23(b)(1), (c), (d)

As noted, Respondents are subject to the forum selection clause in the instant suit—and therefore subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, they are “deemed to reside” in this District for the purpose of venue. See id. § 1391(c)–(d).

An entity defendant resides in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, making venue proper there under § 1391(b)(1).

3DD LLC v. Creative Visions, Inc. · filed 2021-01-11(c)(2)

Given that this Court can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over this suit, Creative Visions is considered a “resident” of Illinois for the venue statute. As a result, this Court is a proper venue for the dispute.

An entity subject to personal jurisdiction in a judicial district resides there for venue purposes under § 1391(c)(2).

The Glenn H. Curtiss Museum of Local History v. Confederate Motors, Inc. · filed 2021-02-11(c)(2)

Because the Curtiss Museum has satisfied its burden to demonstrate the reasonable probability that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this action, and because Defendants are “entit[ies] with the capacity to sue and be sued in [their respective] common name[s] under applicable law,” the action should not be dismissed or transferred under § 1391 for lack of venue.

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

S & P Investment Group, LLC v. Kingdom Materials Holdings LLC · filed 2021-02-11(c)(2)

Here, this suit could have been brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Texas has general personal jurisdiction over KMH because its principle place of business is located there. Compl. ¶ 2; see Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137 (“With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’”). Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas for the same reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (“[A]n entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”)

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a business entity as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

DE LAGE LANDEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. OCEAN AVENUE LLC · filed 2021-03-19(c)(2)

Because Ocean is subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction, this District is also a proper venue pursuant to § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(c)(2) deems an entity defendant to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Richardson v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless · filed 2021-04-06(c)(2)

And, because, under §1391(c), a defendant is deemed to reside in the district where it is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, Verizon resides within the Central District of Illinois.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where the sole defendant has its headquarters and principal place of business.

The State Of Texas V Google, LLC · filed 2021-05-20

Google, the only defendant in this case, has its headquarters and principal place of business in the Northern District of California. Accordingly, the Court finds that this case could have properly been filed in the Northern District of California under both 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 15 U.S.C. § 22.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including through waiver of a personal jurisdiction objection.

Wiggins v. Darden Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2021-06-02(c)(2)

Here, the Defendant did not challenge the Court’s personal jurisdiction in its motion for improper venue. Because of this, the Defendant has waived its objection and consented to this Court’s personal jurisdiction. Consequently, the Middle District is a proper venue under § 1391(c)(2) because the Defendant is “subject to” this Court’s personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the sole corporate defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2021-06-21(b)(1), (c)

On the current record, and with National General offering no other ground that venue is inappropriate, the court finds that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a defendant entity as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the civil action.

Adams v. Experian Information Services, Inc. · filed 2021-10-20(c)(2)

A defendant entity is also a resident of “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Experian is thus a resident of both the present district and the proposed transferee district.

Section 1391 permits venue where all defendants reside in the same state and at least one resides in the district; an entity defendant resides in any district whose court has personal jurisdiction over it in the action.

Dub-L-EE, LLC v. J. Carrizal General Construction, Inc. · filed 2021-10-26(b)(1), (c)(2)

J. Carrizal and CIC—the only defendants in the present action—are both deemed to reside in the District of New Mexico because they are both entities subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Therefore, venue is proper in this Court because both Defendants reside in the District of New Mexico.

Under § 1391(c)(2), defendant entities that waive their personal jurisdiction objections are deemed to reside in the district for venue purposes.

Faulhaber v. Equifax Information Service, LLC · filed 2021-11-04(c)(2)

Because the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas, they are deemed to reside here.

A defendant business entity resides in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action, making venue proper there under § 1391(b)(1).

Electric Buffalo, LLC v. KUHMUTE, Inc. · filed 2021-11-30(c)(2)

The court has determined that Kuhmute is subject to personal jurisdiction in South Carolina with respect to this action. Therefore, for the limited purposes of § 1391, Kuhmute is deemed to reside in South Carolina. Thus, venue is proper in the District of South Carolina under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391 treats an entity defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Juniper Networks Inc. v. Swarm Technology LLC · filed 2021-12-21(c)(2)

Venue is appropriate in “a judicial district where any defendant resides,” and for purposes ... of venue, a defendant is resident in “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because the Court finds that it can exercise personal jurisdiction over Swarm, venue is also proper in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391’s corporate venue rules can make a district containing a defendant’s headquarters a proper venue.

Synergy Hotels, LLC v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, LLC · filed 2021-12-17(b), (c)(2), (d)

Here, the Northern District of Georgia is a proper forum where the cause of action could have been brought. Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of and venue in the Northern District of Georgia because IHG’s U.S. headquarters are located near Atlanta, Georgia (Tidwell Declaration ¶ 4). (Doc. 9 at 13). See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)(2), and (d).

Section 1391 treats a national banking association as residing, for venue purposes, in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Urista v. Wells Fargo & Company · filed 2022-01-11(c)(2)

Thus, venue will be proper in the Northern District of California if the Court determines that Wells Fargo is subject to personal jurisdiction in that district. ... Thus, the Court concludes that Wells Fargo is subject to general personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California.

An entity defendant resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Accord v. Anderson County, Tennessee · filed 2022-02-09(c)(2)

It is not disputed that the Middle District of Tennessee has personal jurisdiction over Cocke County, and therefore under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) Cocke County is properly deemed a resident of the Middle District (as well as the Eastern District and, for that matter, the Western District) for venue purposes, including for purposes of applying Section 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction.

Cienega v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc. · filed 2022-02-04(b), (c)(2)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that this matter could have been brought in the Northern District of Illinois because Echo is subject to that court’s general personal jurisdiction. Mot. at 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) & (c)(2).

Venue is proper in a district where the sole corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction because the defendant is deemed to reside there.

Hope v. Lunarlandowner.com, Inc. · filed 2022-02-28(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). A corporate defendant “shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). As discussed previously, Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Florida and accordingly Defendant shall be deemed to reside in this district as well. Accordingly, venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, which includes a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Caliko, SA v. Finn & Emma, LLC · filed 2022-02-28(b)(1)

Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this District, venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391 makes venue proper in a district where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Tokarski v. Med-Data Inc · filed 2022-03-17(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is proper in, inter alia, “a judicial district where [the] defendant resides,” which is in turn defined for corporate entities as any district in which that defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. ... Venue is proper and the requirement of personal jurisdiction is satisfied as Defendant MedData resides there.

A business entity resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Brock v. Prewett Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2022-03-25(c)(2)

Because B&P is subject to personal jurisdiction in Walls, Mississippi, it is a resident of the Northern District of Mississippi under § 1391(c)(2).