28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no district is available under the other venue provisions.

Gilberti v. World Bank Group · filed 2025-04-25(b)(3)

Third, because Section 1391(b)(2) tends to point toward Florida as an appropriate venue, the “catch-all” provision of Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide a fallback venue when the action can be brought in another district.

Lopez-Acevedo v. Unknown Party · filed 2025-05-08(b)(3)

Subsection (3) does not apply because Plaintiff can file an action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

MEASUREMENT SPECIALTIES, INC. v. EXERGEN CORPORATION · filed 2025-06-20(b)(3)

Finally, § 1391(b)(3) only applies “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section.” ... At the very least, Exergen may be sued in Massachusetts, where it is incorporated and where its principal place of business is. Section 1391(b)(3) therefore does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district qualifies under the section.

The Medical Society of Virginia v. Safe Haven Behavioral Health & Wellness, LLC · filed 2025-07-08(b)(3)

Thus, because “there is no district in which [the] action may otherwise be brought”, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia because Defendants are subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b)(3) applies only when no district is available under the other venue provisions.

Farney v. Securus Technologies LLC · filed 2025-07-23(b)(3)

As such, because there is a district in Florida in which this action may be brought, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no district is available under the first two venue provisions.

Garnier · filed 2025-12-19(b)(3)

The third subsection, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3), does not save the day. It only applies “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought” under the first two subsections. The facts alleged in this case establish that there are two proper venues: (1) Tennessee, where Defendant resides; and (2) Missouri, where a substantial part of the events occurred. Accordingly, § 1391(b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when the action could have been brought in another district.

Polonsky · filed 2026-01-29(b)(3)

Finally, since venue would have been proper in Pennsylvania, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when the action could have been brought in another district.

Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2026-01-29(b)(3)

Finally, since venue would have been proper in Pennsylvania, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district otherwise qualifies under § 1391(b).

Nemec · filed 2026-04-10(b)(3)

Here, Kelsey Alao resides in Oregon, see ECF 1 ¶ 2, is subject to personal jurisdiction in this District, see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014), and there is no district in which this action may otherwise be brought as provided in § 1391(b). Thus, venue is proper in this District.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not permit fallback venue when another district qualifies under the residence or substantial events provisions.

Drone · filed 2026-06-01(b)(3)

Thus, venue is proper in the Western District of Wisconsin, which precludes venue in the Northern District of California under Section 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides; in a state with multiple districts, residence depends on whether the corporation’s contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

HARRISON v. UNEQUAL TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY · filed 2025-04-21(b)(1)

Because the Court would be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over Unequal if the Western District was a hypothetical separate state, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(d) requires a corporate defendant’s contacts with a district to satisfy the fairness prong of personal jurisdiction before the defendant is deemed to reside there for venue purposes.

Broadway National Bank v. Plano Encryption Technologies, LLC · filed 2016-03-28(d)

Absent Federal Circuit authority for doing so, the Court refuses to read the fairness prong of the personal jurisdiction inquiry out of § 1391(d).

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides for venue purposes in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction; incorporation elsewhere in the state is insufficient.

Sanders v. Seal Fleet, Inc. · filed 1998-03-23(c)

The court agrees that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as amended, is more restrictive than its predecessor. It is not enough to establish venue in one district of a multidistrict state to simply show that the defendant is incorporated in another district within the same state. Rather, the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the district, contacts that would otherwise justify personal jurisdiction over the defendant within that district.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporate defendant resides in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan Computer Corp. · filed 2000-03-23(c)

If a state has more than one judicial district, a defendant corporation is deemed to reside in any district “within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Thus, although the parties do not raise the issue, personal jurisdiction in this district would be proper ... under the effects doctrine. Accordingly, the Court denies the defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Langton v. Cbeyond Communication, L.L.C. · filed 2003-09-18(c)

Thus, the only question before the Court is whether Cbeyond “resides” in the Eastern District of Texas under § 1391(c). ... Because Cbeyond would be subject to general jurisdiction in the Eastern District, were it a separate state, venue is proper in the Eastern District.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(c) determines a corporation’s residence for venue by assessing its contacts with each district as if that district were a separate state.

Avery Dennison Corp. v. Alien Technology Corp. · filed 2008-12-04(c)

Instead, the applicable definition of “resides” at § 1391(c) requires the Court to treat the Northern District of Ohio as a separate state and to determine whether Alien is subject to personal jurisdiction based on Alien’s contacts solely within the Northern District of Ohio.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides in the district where it has its most significant contacts if no district's contacts independently support personal jurisdiction.

American Environmental Services, Inc. v. Metalworking Lubricants Co. · filed 2009-06-12(c)

Yet even were I to find that general jurisdiction does not arise within this District, such a conclusion is not fatal to the issue of venue. Section 1391(c) provides that, “if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts.” There can be no doubt that Metalworking has the “most significant contacts” with the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district of a state with multiple districts when its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Aten International Co. v. Emine Technology Co. · filed 2009-06-25(c)

A corporation is deemed to reside within a judicial district located in a multi-district state like Texas if “its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... As the accused products can be purchased in numerous locations within this district, sufficient contacts exist in the Eastern District of Texas to subject Emine to venue here under § 1400(b).

Section 1391(d) treats a corporation as residing in a district of a multidistrict state when its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a state.

Kimmel v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, PC · filed 2012-02-28(d)

As Judge Baylson has explained, “Pennsylvania has more than one district. Therefore, to determine if venue is proper in this Court, one must analyze whether, treating the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as though it were its own state, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania could exercise personal jurisdiction over [the defendant].” ... Based on the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint' and supporting documents, we are satisfied that if this District were a State, we would have personal jurisdiction over PHS. We will conse: quently deny PHS’s motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3).

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation's residence for venue depends on whether it has sufficient contacts with the district where suit was filed.

Garnet Digital, LLC v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2012-09-27(d)

The question of personal jurisdiction in the context of venue is limited to the judicial district where the suit was brought. Therefore a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the district where the suit was brought to show venue was proper. ... U.S. Cellular lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(d) determines venue in a state with multiple federal districts by assessing a defendant’s contacts with each district as if it were a separate state.

Graham v. Dyncorp International, Inc. · filed 2013-09-19(d)

The Court will thus conduct a personal jurisdiction “contacts” analysis, but with the Southern District of Texas, rather than the State of Texas, being the relevant jurisdiction.

Section 1391(d) determines a corporation’s residence in a state with multiple federal districts by its contacts with the particular district.

Global Touch Solutions, LLC v. Toshiba Corp. · filed 2015-06-15(d)

In conducting the jurisdictional and venue inquiries based on the standards set forth above, in certain circumstances, it is important to distinguish between the contacts considered for the jurisdictional analysis, which look to a party’s contacts with the entire state, and the contacts considered for the venue analysis, which as stated in § 1391(d), are limited to those contacts with the particular federal district within such state.

Section 1391(d) permits venue in a district of a multidistrict state when the defendant’s contacts there support personal jurisdiction.

Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. v. Plano Encryption Technologies · filed 2018-12-07(d)

We conclude that PET is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas, and that venue is proper in the Northern District.

Section 1391(d) does not make a corporation a resident of every district in a state merely because it is incorporated there; its contacts must support personal jurisdiction in the district treated as a separate state.

In re Nissan North America, Inc. Litigation · filed 2019-09-23(d)

Accordingly, because NNA is registered in the Eastern District of California and its principal place of business is in Tennessee, see McPherson Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, NNA is not subject to general jurisdiction in this district under § 1391(d).

Section 1391(d) requires a district-specific assessment of a defendant’s contacts in a state with multiple judicial districts; texts sent to a number with the district’s area code alone do not establish residence there for venue purposes.

Griffith v. Boll & Branch, LLC · filed 2020-02-03(d)

The only connection between this district and the instant case consists of Defendant’s text messages to a (619) area code. This, standing alone, is insufficient for venue.

Section 1391 permits venue in a judicial district where an entity defendant resides; in a state with multiple districts, its contacts with a district can establish residence there.

Mitek Systems, Inc. v. United Services Automobile Association · filed 2020-04-21(b)(1), (c)(2), (d)

Whether the action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Texas turns on 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute. ... The above sufficiently establishes general jurisdiction in the Eastern District.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(d) determines corporate residence for venue district by district.

Ucarer v. ALA Turk, Inc. · filed 2020-11-30(d)

Here, because Ala Turk maintains its principal place of business in the Eastern District, see ECF No. 52-1, at 59, and the Individual Defendants are all residents of New York State, see ECF Nos. 53, 58, 59, venue would also be proper in the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides for venue in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Rucker v. Great Dane Petroleum Contractors, Inc. · filed 2021-05-17(d)

In multidistrict states—like Florida—a corporation is “deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). ... At bottom, the Court holds venue is proper in the Middle District.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(d) treats a corporation as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Healy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-01-11(d)

In a state with multiple districts, a “corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” Id. § 1391(d). Thus, venue will be proper in the Northern District of California if the Court determines that Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in that district.

Section 1391(d) bases a corporate defendant’s residence in a state with multiple judicial districts on its contacts with the specific district.

eQHealth AdviseWell, Inc. v. Homeland Insurance Company of New York · filed 2022-01-11(d)

Rather than broaden venue options in the manner urged by eQHealth, § 1391(d) narrows them by focusing on the corporation’s contacts with a specific judicial district.

Section 1391(d) treats a corporation in a state with multiple judicial districts as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Trisvan v. Biden · filed 2022-07-30(d)

Trisvan also alleges no facts indicating that the Corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction in this District if it were a separate state. Accordingly, Trisvan’s Section 1983 claim against the Corporation should have been brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which encompasses New York County.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(d) determines a corporate defendant’s venue residence by treating each district as a separate state for personal jurisdiction.

Hill v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc · filed 2023-04-26(d)

Because Kentucky has multiple judicial districts—the Eastern and Western Districts—the Court treats the Eastern District and the Western District as if they are separate states for determining where the Defendants reside.

Section 1391(d) requires a corporation’s contacts with a district in a state with multiple districts to be sufficient for personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

SMA v. Salesforce · filed 2023-08-23(d)

But, under § 1391(d), to establish residency of a corporation, the Jane Doe Plaintiffs must show both Salesforce and Backpage possess contacts in the Southern District that would “subject [them] to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” ... Thus, the Jane Doe Plaintiffs have not shown that venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(d) allows a corporation to reside in multiple districts of a state when its contacts with each district would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Brown v. XGen Pharmaceuticals DJB, Inc. · filed 2023-12-04(d)

But for corporations, section 1391(d) disposes of the concept of residence in a single district. ... And by force of that provision, XGEN “resides” not only in the Western District, but also here.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides in a district for venue if its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction treating that district as a separate state.

Johnson v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-12-14(d)

The Northern District of California, when analyzed as if it were its own state, could not exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over Ford, and Ford therefore does not “reside” in the Northern District for purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Poer v. FTI Consulting, Inc. · filed 2024-11-20(d)

Venue is proper because FTI has sufficient contacts with the hypothetical state of the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(d) treats a corporation as residing in a district of a multidistrict state when its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Loyalty Conversion Systems Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2014-09-02(d)

A different subsection of the same statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), provides that when a suit is filed against a corporate defendant in a multidistrict state such as Texas, the corporation is “deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.”

Section 1391(b)(2) requires the plaintiff to establish that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the chosen district.

Johnson v. NBF Securities (USA) · filed 2025-04-10(b)(2)

For venue to be proper, Johnson bears the burden of establishing that the District of Nevada is one “in which a substantial part of the ... events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) requires a plaintiff to establish that venue is proper for each claim and defendant in the chosen district.

Mitchell v. The Attorney Generals · filed 2025-04-11(b)

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint does not establish any nexus between any specific individual in Georgia that could be alleged to connect them with Virginia. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that this is the proper venue to bring his claims.

Section 1391(b) places the burden on the plaintiff to establish proper venue when a defendant challenges it.

American Homecare Federation, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp. · filed 1998-10-26(b)

Where venue is challenged by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that venue is in the forum state.

Section 1391(b) does not justify transfer based solely on an unsupported assertion that venue is improper.

Cytomedix v. Little Rock Foot · filed 2002-12-12(b)

Defendants also assert that venue in Illinois is improper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1409(d). However, I find no authority to justify ... transferral on either ground, and with respect to § 1409(d), I find that it does not apply because plaintiff alleges misconduct both before and after the commencement of its bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim, and § 1391(c)(2) ties an entity defendant’s residence to personal jurisdiction.

Carrington v. Israel Emergency Alliance Fund · filed 2022-04-08(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(2)

In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish venue under either §1391(b)(1) or (2). Initially, defendant does not reside in this district because it is not subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction as to the instant action. ... Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish that venue is proper under §1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permit venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

DiDomenico v. Superintendent · filed 2020-07-08(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claim arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendants reside or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Williams v. Washington · filed 2020-06-09(b)

Venue is therefore proper in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, not this Court.

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Richards v. Perta · filed 2020-06-04(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue for a civil action brought in federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Venue, therefore, is proper in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and not this Court.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendants reside or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smolen v. Brauer · filed 2016-04-15(b)

Therefore, for purposes of venue, each Defendant was a resident of the Western District. Additionally, not just a substantial part, but rather all of the underlying events allegedly occurred at Wende, ie., within the Western District. (Dkt. 116 at 16-20). Accordingly, there is no basis for venue in the Southern District, and Plaintiffs motion to transfer venue must be denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property at issue is situated.

Benton v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2016-02-09(b)(2)

As to (b)(2), Defendants are correct that no relevant events occurred in this city, and the property at issue is situated in Maryland and Virginia.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside and the claims have no connection to the district.

Greene v. County of Horry · filed 2016-05-25(b)

It is apparent from Greene’s complaint that there is no conceivable basis for venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because none of the defendants is alleged to reside there and because her allegations are not related in any way to that District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides or where the property at issue is located.

TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. LaMarsh · filed 2015-04-10(b)(1)-(2)

Finally, the Court finds that venue is proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania. This Court is the appropriate venue because this is the judicial district in which LaMarsh resides and where the property to be foreclosed upon in satisfaction of the judgment lien is located.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a nondiversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

in Re Rowland Martin · filed 2015-03-13(b)(2)

Moreover, all of Martin's allegations concerning the events giving rise to his claims occurred in San Antonio. Thus, Martin's suit could have been brought in the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 ("A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity ofcitizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in ... (2) ajudicial district in which a substantial part ofthe events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part ofproperty that is the subject ofthe action is situated....").

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or the property at issue is situated.

Rowland Martin, Jr. v. Edward L. Bravenec and 1216 West Ave., Inc. · filed 2015-06-03(b)(2)

Moreover, all of Martin's allegations concerning the events giving rise to his claims occurred in San Antonio. Thus, Martin's suit could have been brought in the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division.

Section 1391(a)(1) and (a)(2) provide alternative grounds for venue in a diversity action; venue where all defendants reside does not preclude venue where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Gregory v. Pocono Grow Fertilizer Corp. · filed 1999-01-26(a)(1)-(2)

I find, therefore, that both (a)(1) and (a)(2) provide alternative bases for venue. Accordingly, although venue would be proper under (a)(1) in the Middle District of Pennsylvania because all the defendants reside there, venue also would be proper in this District if a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claim occurred here.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) provide alternative grounds for venue, so a district where a substantial part of the events occurred may be proper even when all defendants reside in the same state.

Wise v. Lindamood · filed 1999-09-28(b)

For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that § 1391(b)(1), (2) are alternative grounds for venue.

A district with a substantial connection to the claim can be a proper venue under § 1391(b)(2) even when another district is also proper.

Wells' Dairy, Inc. v. Estate of Richardson · filed 2000-03-16(b)(2)

Therefore, while Texas is a proper venue, the court concludes that Iowa is also a proper venue based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events occurred, even when venue is also proper under § 1391(b)(1) where the defendants reside.

Hall v. South Orange · filed 2000-03-20(b)(2)

The statute clearly offers two possibilities for an appropriate venue. If Congress had intended to make (b)(2) available only if (b)(1) could not be satisfied, presumably language indicating this limitation would have been included in the statute. It was not.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal-question action in a district where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Liggett Group Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2000-05-30(b)(1), (b)(2)

Based upon the foregoing, it appears pursuant to Section 1391(b)(1) and Section 1391(b)(2) the instant action “might have been brought” in the proposed transferee forum, the Middle District of North Carolina.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) can make more than one district a proper venue for the same action.

Smiley v. Reno · filed 2001-01-11(b)(1), (b)(2)

Sections 1391(b)(1) and 1391(b)(2) suggest that both the Middle and Western Districts are proper venues for this case. A substantial part of the events giving rise to Smiley’s claims occurred in each district, and the defendants reside in both districts.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a federal question action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. McDonnell · filed 2001-06-19(b)(2)

Based upon the same facts set forth in the discussion of personal jurisdiction, I similarly deny the Trust’s motion to dismiss or transfer pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue. In a federal question action, venue is proper in any “[jludicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2) provide alternative grounds for venue; a district may qualify under (b)(2) even when another district qualifies under (b)(1).

ConocoPhillips Co. v. Jump Oil Co. · filed 2013-05-31(b)(1)-(2)

The Court finds the majority position to be persuasive and the Court will treat § 1391(b)(1) and § 1391(b)(2) as alternative, rather than hierarchical, venue provisions.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside in the district or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; either ground suffices.

Pappas v. Town of Enfield · filed 2014-05-07(b)

Since all the defendants reside in this district and all the events and omissions give rise to the plaintiffs claim occurred in this district, thereby fulfilling (1) and (2) under Section 1391(b), when either alone would suffice, venue is proper in this judicial district.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the events occurred when another district provides proper venue.

Kungle v. Executive Officers, State Farm Insurance · filed 2014-06-16(b)

Even giving the plaintiff the benefit of his pro se status, his position is meritless and therefore the Court finds that the District of Columbia is not a proper venue for the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Inno360, Inc. v. Zakta, LLC · filed 2014-06-19(b)

In light of the court’s analysis above, and because defendant neither resides in Delaware nor did a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occur in Delaware, venue is inappropriate in this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where the defendants reside or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Johnson v. Town of Onondaga · filed 2020-01-27(b)(1), (2)

Venue is therefore not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Calvino v. Backslash · filed 2020-01-27(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that the defendant resides in this judicial district or that the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this judicial district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where defendants reside or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gallipeau v. DeYoung · filed 2020-02-10(b)

Venue is proper where defendants to a lawsuit reside or where the events giving rise to the claim took place. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Gallipeau has alleged that all defendants reside in Fox Lake, Wisconsin. ... Finding venue improper in the Western District of Wisconsin, the court further concludes that transfer, rather than dismissal, serves the interest of justice.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Deshpande v. Methodist Hospital of Southern California · filed 2020-01-27(b)

Because Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendant does not reside and no claim-related events or omissions occurred when another district is available.

Hurt v. Bailey Realtor Inc. LLC · filed 2020-01-28(b)

None of the requirements of § 1391 are present in this case. Accordingly, venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is not proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Coston v. Commissioner of N.Y.S.D.O.C.C.S. · filed 2020-01-17(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiffs do not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that any of the events or omissions giving rise to their claims arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) do not permit venue in a district where no defendant is alleged to reside and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Sharpe v. Moss · filed 2020-01-17(b)(1), (b)(2)

Because Plaintiffs do not allege that any defendant resides in this district or that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to their claims arose in this district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Calvino v. Holyoke City Massachusetts · filed 2020-01-16(b)(1), (2)

Because the defendant does not reside in this judicial district, and because none of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this judicial district, venue is not proper in this Court under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Nicholas v. Mobile Infirmary Association · filed 2020-01-10(b)(1), (b)(2)

As to whether this action could have been brought in the Southern District originally, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that an action may be brought in a judicial district “in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” or a judicial district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, and, based on defendants’ responses, the court finds that the Southern District of Alabama is a venue in which this case could have been brought in the first instance.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Brown v. National Basketball Association (NBA) · filed 2019-12-26(b)

She does not allege that Young resides in this State or judicial district or that any of the alleged events that are basis of her claims against Young occurred in this judicial district. Thus, this Court is not a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims against Young.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

J.B.S. CRANES & ACCESSORIES, INC. v. ALL-CAL EQUIPMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2020-01-02(b)

Here, All-Cal does not reside in this District, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim did not occur in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Accordingly, All-Cal’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue is also granted.

Section 1391(b) does not support venue in a district with no connection to the remaining claim after the local defendants are dismissed.

DAY v. STATE OF MAINE · filed 2019-12-20(b)

Furthermore, with the dismissal of the state of Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, Justice Gorman, Ms. Grey, and Mr. Grey (the Maine Defendants), even if Mr. Day could successfully invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction over his claim against 21st Century, venue would not lie in this Court because, in the absence of the Maine Defendants, Mr. Day’s claim lacks any nexus to Maine. ... Venue, therefore, is improper in the District of Maine under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Perrott v. Coffee · filed 2019-12-16(b)(1), (b)(2)

As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia because Defendants do not reside in this District and none of the events that give rise to Plaintiff’s claims are alleged to have occurred here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence when all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Munns v. Clinton · filed 2011-09-29(b)(1), (b)(2)

Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that both Defendants reside in the Eastern District of California. Venue under Section (b)(1) is therefore improper. ... For the same reasons Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants, those allegations are insufficient to support venue in this Court as well. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for improper venue is granted with leave to amend.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Wyandotte Nation v. Salazar · filed 2011-11-22(e)

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) provides that venue is proper in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.” ... Given that the District Court of Kansas would have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute, and that venue would be proper in that court, this case may have been brought in, and accordingly may be transferred to, that district.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Parker v. United States Department of Education · filed 2011-05-04(b)

Second, venue is not proper in the District of ... 3 ... Columbia where all of the Seminary Defendants are located in Virginia, and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and defines corporate residence for venue purposes.

AGCS Marine Insurance v. Associated Gas & Oil Co. · filed 2011-03-28(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), (d)

By the same reasoning, venue also would have been proper in the Western District of Louisiana under §§ 1391(b)(1) and (2) at the time this action was filed. At least one defendant — Smith Maritime— resides in that District, and, as discussed above, all Defendants are deemed to reside in Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c) and (d). In addition, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim — namely the purchase and transport of the Cargo — occurred there.

Section 1391(b) requires an action to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Monroe v. Wise · filed 1987-04-14(b)

Monroe filed his. claim in the Eastern District of North Carolina asserting that he was subjected to unconstitutional prison conditions in the Middle District. The defendants were residents of the Middle District. Monroe's case was referred to a magistrate who determined that the venue was improper. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b) (action must be brought where all defendants reside or where claim arose). ... We find that the magistrate's reasoning justified his recommendation of dismissal and that the district court acted properly in dismissing Monroe's action without prejudice.

Section 1391 provides the basis for laying venue in the district.

HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat · filed 1972-01-25

Venue is properly laid in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 can make venue proper even when the court dismisses the action under forum non conveniens.

Mohr v. Allen · filed 1976-01-28

Venue of this action is unquestionably “proper” under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but defendant asserts, and this Court agrees, that the Southern District of New York is neither an appropriate nor convenient forum for the resolution of the issues raised by the complaint.

Section 1391(b) provides a basis for finding venue proper when the defendants may be found in the district.

Dollcraft Industries, Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Manufacturing Co. · filed 1978-08-03(b)

Venue is proper in this judicial district under the directives of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1400(a) (1976) because the defendants may be found in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant does business or where the infringement claim arose.

Beecham, Inc. v. Certified Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1979-06-04

Furthermore, I find that venue was properly laid in this District. Not only was Certified “doing business” in New York by virtue of its New York sales, but the claim of infringement arose in New York by virtue of these very sales. Both grounds are sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to place venue in the Southern District.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where the parties do not reside and the causes of action arose elsewhere.

In Re Alien Children Education Litigation · filed 1980-07-21(b)

It would have been inappropriate for this court to grant a motion for a change of venue transferring the cases originally filed in the other districts to this court; they could not “have been brought” here. The plaintiffs and defendants do not reside in this district and the causes of action arose elsewhere. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) & 1404(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside and the action arose.

Sheck v. Baileyville School Committee · filed 1982-01-22(b)

Venue lies in the District of Maine where all defendants reside and the action arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in more than one federal district for the same action.

Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc. · filed 1982-03-19(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue is proper in this action either in the District of Colorado or in the District of Montana.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claim arose and the defendant resides.

Mobil Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Commission · filed 1982-10-14(b)

Venue also is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) since the claim arose in the District of Columbia, and the defendant SEC “resides” there.

Section 1391 permits venue where the claims arose and the defendant is a municipal corporation of that state.

Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City · filed 1982-12-22

Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 since the claims arose in the District of Utah and the party Defendant is a Utah municipal corporation.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the plan is administered and the challenged acts occurred.

Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. · filed 1983-02-09

Venue is proper, since the plan is administered, and the acts complained of occurred, in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue in a district where the claims arose and the corporate defendant does business.

State of Montana v. SuperAmerica · filed 1983-02-24(b), (c)

2. Venue in this action is properly in this judicial district pursuant to section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). The defendant maintains an office, transacts business, has an agent, and is found within the District of Montana. All claims alleged arose within the District of Montana.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside and the action arises.

Stanton by Stanton v. Brunswick School Dept. · filed 1984-01-23(b)

Venue is properly laid in the District of Maine where all Defendants reside and the action arises. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue for a claim against an employer under § 185(a) where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Brown · filed 1984-07-27

Venue is proper under § 1391 in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391 provides grounds for venue based on the plaintiff’s principal office, the defendant’s business, and where the claims arose.

Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. · filed 1986-01-10

Venue is proper in this District under all three grounds of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The plaintiff has its principal office at White Plains, New York, and defendant does business in the Southern District of New York. The claims arose in this District.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where all defendants reside and the claims arose.

SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston · filed 1986-06-03

Venue of this action is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all Defendants reside in, and all claims alleged herein arose in, the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendants reside or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Watts v. Kroczynski · filed 1986-06-10(b)

Venue rests with the Court because both defendants reside within the Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division and are principally employed in their governmental capacities in said district. Moreover, the searches and seizures complained of by plaintiffs occurred within the Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rule for an action related to a bankruptcy case when the bankruptcy venue provision does not require transfer.

Brock v. American Messenger Service, Inc. · filed 1986-10-09

Under the applicable non-bankruptcy venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper, therefore the ac ... tion will not be transferred to the District of Maine.

Section 1391(b) permits a claim to be brought in the district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Bryant v. Carlson · filed 1987-01-30(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), plaintiff’s claim may be brought only in the district where all defendants reside or the claim arose. ... As stated above, the claim arose in Kansas. In addition, defendant O’Brien resides in Kansas. Thus, venue is not proper here.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant resides and the alleged trademark infringement occurred.

Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. Hibernia Bank · filed 1987-03-03(b) and (c)

Venue is proper in the Northern District of California, because the defendant resides in this district and the acts of trademark infringement occurred here.

Section 1391(b) made the District of Colorado a proper district in which this action could originally have been brought.

Luise M. Ross, as Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels and Credits of Sonya C. Ross, Deceased v. Colorado Outward Bound · filed 1987-09-14(b)

Likewise, it correctly recognized that the District of Colorado was the proper district in which the action originally could have been commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant is found or where the claim arose.

International Communications, Inc. v. Rates Technology, Inc. · filed 1988-01-28(b)

Finally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper only in the district where the defendant is found or in which the claim arose. ... Finally, this cause of action arises not in this district, but in the states of New Jersey and New York, where the complaint alleges that the defendant had been threatening and harassing plaintiffs customers. The proper forum in which this suit could have been brought would have been in the Eastern District of New York, where both defendants reside.

Section 1391(b) makes venue proper in the district where a claim arose and supports dismissal without prejudice to refiling there.

Battle v. O'Keefe · filed 1988-03-24(b)

This claim arose in the Western District of Michigan following plaintiff's transfer to the Marquette Branch Prison; proper venue is therefore within that district. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b). Thus, dismissal without prejudice to plaintiff's right to refile this claim in the Western District of Michigan was appropriate.

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Davis v. Louisiana State University · filed 1989-06-28(b)

However, venue was improper in Texas, since all defendants in this suit reside in Louisiana, and the events giving rise to the cause of action took place in Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Rodman v. Richard P. Seiter Raymond E. Capots Haralson Gordon Klein, Mr. Len B. Pohlod Bruce M. Brunswick Jerr · filed 1989-09-28(b)

Venue is proper "only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose...." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b). Here, it is undisputed that all defendants except one reside in the Southern District of Ohio. Thus, plaintiff's complaint improperly laying venue in the Northern District of Ohio was properly dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff's right to refile his complaint in the Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendant resides or where the claim arose.

Providence Washington Insurance v. Independent Wrecker & Towing, Inc. · filed 1990-06-20

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as this is the district where the defendant resides and it is also where the claim arose.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant resided when suit was filed and some acts giving rise to the claims occurred.

Martin v. Rison · filed 1990-06-26(b), (e)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (e) (1982), because one defendant resided in this district at the time the suit was filed and some of the acts that ... gave rise to plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendant is located and the claims arose.

Professional Firefighters v. City of Clayton · filed 1991-04-03

Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because defendant is located herein and the claims arose in the district.

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue where the violations occurred, an individual defendant resides, and corporate defendants are incorporated.

United States v. MPM Contractors, Inc. · filed 1991-04-18(b), (c)

Venue also exists under subsections (b) and (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as each violation occurred in the District of Kansas, McGill resides in the District of Kansas, and MPM and ARC are incorporated in the District of Kansas.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

In Re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation · filed 1991-07-02(a)

Venue is proper in the Eastern District because each third-party defendant conducts business in the district sufficient to support a finding of residency and because a “substantial part of the events or omis ... sions giving rise to the claim” occurred in the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant conducted business and the causes of action arose in part.

Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Building Products Co. · filed 1991-10-04(b)

Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) since the defendant has transacted or conducted business in this district, and the causes of action arose in part in this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) ties venue to where the events occurred, and subsection (a)(3) ties it to the defendant’s personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. · filed 1992-12-29(a)(2), (a)(3)

Venue is proper in the Central District of California because Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Central District at the time the action commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). Venue is also proper in the Northern District of Texas because the airplane crash occurred in Dallas, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Thus, the resolution of this motion turns on whether transfer will serve the interests of justice.

Section 1391(a) and (b) place venue where the defendant resides or where the claim arose.

Heulon L. Perrin, Jr. v. Trw Information Services · filed 1993-03-16(a), (b)

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it lacked venue over the action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) or (b), venue lies where the defendant resides or where the claim arose. Appellant's complaint alleges that defendant TRW is located in Dallas, Texas, and that the claim arose in Texas. Appellant has set forth no facts supporting a basis for venue in the Eastern District of California.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant does business and the claims arise in substantial part.

Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Crown Nation Bancorporation, Inc. · filed 1993-04-15

2. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, since the defendant, Crown, is a North Carolina corporation and does business in this district and since the claims stated herein arise in substantial part in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue where the defendant resided when the action was filed and the claim arose.

Vencor, Inc. v. Webb · filed 1993-07-20(a)

Venue in this court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) as Webb was a resident of this district at the time of filing and the claim arose here.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant does business and the plaintiff’s claims arose.

Breakers of Palm Beach, Inc. v. International Beach Hotel Development, Inc. · filed 1993-06-15

Venue lies in this District as Defendant is located and does business here, and the claims of Plaintiff arose here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendants do business.

Birthright v. Birthright, Inc. · filed 1993-07-23

Venue is proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because thé defendants are doing business within this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) and (2) permits venue where the defendant resides or where the events giving rise to the action occurred.

McCrory Corp. v. 99¢ Only Stores (In Re McCrory Corp.) · filed 1993-10-26(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue is proper in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and (2). 99 Only resides and has its principal place of business there, and the events giving rise to the adversary proceeding took place within that district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the defendants are located and the claims arose.

National Football League v. Rondor, Inc. · filed 1993-12-30(b)

2. Each defendant is located in this district, and the claims arose in this district. Venue in this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendant does not reside and no substantial part of the events occurred when the action could have been brought in another district.

Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc. · filed 1994-02-10(b)

Because none of the bases for venue exist in this case, venue within this judicial district is improper under section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendants reside and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred.

Brown v. Quigley · filed 1994-05-19(b)

Venue is proper in this district as the defendants reside in, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred in, this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the events giving rise to the action occurred and the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Johnston v. Foster-Wheeler Constructors, Inc. · filed 1994-11-08

Venue is proper there since all of the events relating to this cause of action occurred in Florida, and the Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) places venue in the district where the defendants reside and the alleged civil rights violations occurred.

Hinds v. State of Tenn. · filed 1995-05-31(b)

The Court first notes that venue in this matter resides in the Middle District of Tennessee, where the plaintiff is confined and the defendants reside and where he alleges the civil rights violations occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendants reside and certain property at issue is located.

Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York v. Lang · filed 1995-07-28

Venue is proper in this District, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as this is the District within which the Defendants reside and in which certain of the transferred property is located.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district merely because a related class action is pending there when no defendant resides there and the events giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

Gilbert v. Texas Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1995-05-16(b)

Because none of these statutes contains a specific venue provision, the Court looks to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in considering Defendants’ request. ... Consistent with Savidge II, supra, the Court concludes that venue in this district is improper and that this case must be transferred to the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Section 1391(a)(2) and (3) supported venue for a counterclaim where substantial events occurred in the district and its defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc. · filed 1995-12-18(a)(2), (a)(3)

The undisputed facts set forth herein establish that venue is proper over this Counterclaim in the Eastern District of Wisconsin because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Counterclaim occurred in this District (28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2)), and because Forman and Composto are subject to personal jurisdiction in this District (28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3)).

Section 1391 does not permit venue in a district with no connection to the parties or events of the action.

Whitworth v. TNT Bestway Transportation Inc. · filed 1996-01-17

Because this Court can see no reason under 28 U.S.C. section 1391 that the Eastern District is a venue which bears a color-able relation to the events or parties of this ... action, let alone the question of convenience, this action will be transferred to a more appropriate forum.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside and the acts giving rise to the claim occurred.

United States v. Greenstreet · filed 1996-01-18(b)

In addition, venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all of the Defendants reside within this district, and the acts giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for relief occurred within this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the claims arise entirely within its geographical boundaries.

Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1996-04-24(b)

The Eastern District of Wisconsin is the proper venue for this cause of action because the claims arise entirely within the geographical boundaries of the Eastern District, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendants are located and the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Smith v. City of New York · filed 1996-12-09

All of the defendants in this action to- recover damages for violations of federal law are located in Manhattan, and all of the events complained of occurred in that borough. Therefore, the Southern District would have had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, and venue would have been proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Clipp Designs, Inc. v. Tag Bags, Inc. · filed 1998-01-07(b)(1), (b)(2)

Venue is proper in both this Court and in the District of Minnesota. Clipp’s alleged injury to its trade dress occurred in this district and plaintiffs business records are located here. These contacts are substantial and venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Further, because Tag Bags, Inc. resides in Minnesota, venue is also proper in the District of Minnesota. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b) and (c) permit venue based on the parties’ residence and where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred.

GTE South Inc. v. Morrison · filed 1998-05-19(b), (c)

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). A significant portion of GTE’s property is located in the Eastern District of Virginia. Defendants Morrison, Moore and Miller reside in the Eastern District of Virginia. Cox’s registered agent is located in Richmond, Virginia. Finally, a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to this action occurred in Richmond, Virginia.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the actions complained of arose.

United States Ex Rel. Haskins v. Omega Institute, Inc. · filed 1998-07-02

Venue in the District of New Jersey is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in that the actions complained of arose in this district and all named plaintiffs reside in Gloucester County, New Jersey.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred and treats a corporate defendant as residing where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

In Re Consolidated Parlodel Litigation · filed 1998-07-27

In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs could have brought these actions in their home districts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) (venue proper in any district where “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (venue is proper in any district where a defendant resides) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (a corporate defendant resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred and a defendant can be found.

Prime Media, Inc. v. Primedia, Inc. · filed 1998-11-30(b), (c)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim occurred in this district and defendant PRIMEDIA Intertec can be found in this district.

Section 1391 does not permit venue in a district that satisfies none of its listed grounds.

Yurman Designs, Inc. v. A.R. Morris Jewelers, L.L.C. · filed 1999-08-11(b)

As to any remaining claims, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides, that in a case where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity, venue is proper only in ... None of these provisions authorizes venue in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendant managed the indebtedness at issue.

Acequia, Inc. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1999-11-01

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, since Prudential has managed the subject indebtedness from its office in Lisle, Illinois.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where defendants reside and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Sony Computer Entertainment America Inc. v. GameMasters · filed 1999-11-04(b)

Venue is proper in this Federal District court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b) and 1400(a) because defendants reside within this judicial district and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the alleged claims occurred in this district.

A district satisfies § 1391(b) when both defendants reside there and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred there.

Matt v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 1999-11-16(b)

Because both defendants reside in that district and a substantial part of the occurrences giving rise to the claim occurred there, venue would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in the Eastern District of New York for federal claims concerning medical treatment at Sullivan Correctional Facility.

Webb v. Goldstein · filed 2000-09-29(b)

Although no motion is made on behalf of the medical staff at Sullivan, this court finds that any federal claims against them for inadequate medical treatment are not properly venued in this district.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Kimball International Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2000-10-04

First, venue is proper in this district because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this district and defendant Kimball is subject to personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) ties venue to the defendants’ residence or the place where the relevant events occurred.

Keaveney v. Larimer · filed 2000-12-19(b)

There is no dispute that New Mexico was the wrong venue in this case, since the defendants reside in Arizona and all of the relevant events took place there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp. · filed 2001-03-15

Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this judicial district and Compaq does business in this judicial district.

Section 1391 permits venue where substantial events giving rise to the claim occurred or where a corporate defendant resides because it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

TM Claims Service v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines · filed 2001-06-07(b), (c)

The Northern District of Georgia is, in fact, a proper -venue for this action because: (1) substantial events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred there; and (2) KLM conducts business in the State of Georgia and is subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred and, for a corporate defendant, where the court has personal jurisdiction.

Forum Financial Group v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 2001-11-19(a), (c)

Because the District of Maine has personal jurisdiction over Defendants and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Maine, venue is proper in Maine, and transfer to Massachusetts is unnecessary under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

Section 1391(a) and (c) do not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides or is subject to personal jurisdiction and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Cinalli v. Kane · filed 2002-03-12(a), (c)

Venue is also lacking in this district because none of these Defendants resides in Pennsylvania; the Defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction in this district; and a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims did not occur in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the parties reside and the acts underlying their claims occurred.

Allergy Asthma Technology, Ltd. v. I Can Breathe, Inc. · filed 2002-04-10(b)

All of the parties are citizens and residents of the Northern District of Illinois, and the acts of which Allergy Asthma and I Can Breathe complain took place here. Venue in this district exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).