28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; continued harm there alone does not establish venue.

Graciano · filed 2025-11-12(b)(2)

Plaintiff’s allegations of continued harm while living in Connecticut do not meet subsection (2)’s requirement that a “substantial part” of the underlying events occur in Connecticut for venue to be proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Young · filed 2025-11-17(b)(2)

The complaint’s allegations do not establish that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Venue does not properly exist in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even if venue may also be proper in another district.

Ramjas · filed 2025-11-19(b)(2)

Even if the Court did assume that at least one defendant resides in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens and Nassau Counties, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

Jane Doe (S.E.S.) v. Choice Hotels International · filed 2025-11-25(b)(2)

A “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred in the Southern District of Alabama because that is where Doe alleges the sex trafficking took place.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Hammond · filed 2025-12-01(b)(2)

A substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim clearly occurred in Maryland, making venue in this Court proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a close nexus between the district and the events or omissions giving rise to the claims; a defendant’s general business presence there does not establish venue.

BYD Sports, LLC and BYD Management, LLC v. King · filed 2025-12-01(b)(2)

Even if Defendants have “a substantial presence” in New York’s entertainment industry, such a broad assertion about Defendants’ participation in this District’s economic life does not establish that the District bears a “close nexus” to Plaintiffs’ claims, as necessary to establish venue under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Groskopf · filed 2025-12-02(b)(2)

The Court also concludes that venue is appropriate in the District of Wyoming. ... See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”); see also [Doc. 7-1 at 1 (Plaintiff’s “Report of Personal Injury or Occupational Illness” reporting that the alleged injury occurred in Wyoming)].

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Abler · filed 2025-12-04(b)(2)

For those reasons, venue is not proper in this District unless a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred here or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Plaintiff has not alleged anything in the Complaint that would allow the Court to conclude that Defendant’s conduct occurred in this District or that property situated in this District is involved. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that venue in this District is improper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Cvijanovic · filed 2025-12-09(b)(2)

Because the court has personal jurisdiction over Bear Fox and because events underlying the lawsuit occurred in this district, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) bases venue on where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, not where the plaintiff later received treatment for resulting injuries.

Behnam · filed 2025-12-10(b)(2)

Section 1391(b)(2) controls where venue lies in this case. ... Here, neither Armfield nor Foundation Radiology administrated any medical care to Behnam in the City of Charlottesville or Albemarle County. Accordingly, venue is not proper in the Charlottesville Division.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to have occurred in the district where suit is brought.

Barrett · filed 2025-12-10(b)(2)

Second, venue is improper under § 1391(b)(2) because no substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Thelen · filed 2025-12-18(b)(2)

Venue is otherwise proper in this district because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Thelen alleges that he is a citizen and resident of North Carolina and worked remotely for FHA as its Chief Operating Officer from North Carolina.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue where a substantial part of the events underlying the claim occurred, even when venue is also proper elsewhere.

Sierra Club v. National Marine Fisheries Service · filed 2025-12-22(e)(1)(B)

Thus, although the plaintiffs’ claims have evolved somewhat since Sierra Club I, the “entire sequence of events underlying” their claims is substantially connected to the Western District of Louisiana, and venue would be proper there.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where corporate decisions and profit-sharing substantially give rise to a claim, even when the underlying harm occurred elsewhere.

Jane Doe (A.S.F.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts · filed 2025-12-24(b)(2)

And Wyndham’s corporate decision-making—which includes decisions related to its policies, reporting requirements, and its supervision and training of Shailey—and its profit-sharing from its corporate headquarters in New Jersey mean that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” A.S.F.’s claims occurred here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; a defendant’s residence alone does not satisfy that test.

Dosso · filed 2025-12-29(b)(2)

Dosso does not show that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in Virginia.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if more substantial events occurred elsewhere.

Koltys · filed 2026-01-07(e)(1)(B)

Section 1391 does not limit venue to the district where the most substantial events or omissions giving rise to the action occurred.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

1st Bank Yuma v. Southwest Heritage Bank · filed 2026-01-07(b)(2)

Because a substantial part of the events occurred in Arizona, venue is satisfied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even if substantial events also occurred elsewhere.

Hart Investment Group, LLC v. Taylor Veterinary Imaging · filed 2026-01-08(b)(2)

In sum, Plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of proper venue in Kansas under § 1391(b)(2); therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where an underlying lawsuit triggered an alleged indemnification obligation.

Humana Inc. v. Merck & Company · filed 2026-01-14(b)(2)

The district of New Jersey is a district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Third-Party Complaint occurred—i.e., it is the district in which the underlying action was filed giving rise to the alleged obligation to indemnify.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district containing a substantial part of the property at issue or the events giving rise to the claim.

Nicholson · filed 2026-01-14(b)(2)

Thus, because the property at issue is located in Grand Prairie, Texas, within the Northern District of Texas, see 28 U.S.C. § 124(a)(1), (2), and because a significant portion of the alleged events have occurred in Tarrant County, also within the Northern District of Texas, see id., the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Arena Food Service, Inc. v. The Estate of Linda Yannone · filed 2026-01-16(b)(2)

Because a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this judicial district, the Court concludes that venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Callaway Blue Bottling, LLC v. Busse/SJI · filed 2026-01-16(b)

Venue is proper here because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Callaway Blue’s claims occurred in Harris County, which is in the Middle District of Georgia.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if venue may also be proper elsewhere.

Werner · filed 2026-01-16(b)(2)

Even if that allegation was sufficient to lay venue in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Massachusetts, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the District of Massachusetts.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Brown · filed 2026-01-16(b)(2)

Because Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred in Brooklyn, Kings County, which lies within the Eastern District of New York, not within this judicial district, see § 112(b), (c), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and not this court, is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s remaining claims, under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Johnson v. Queens County · filed 2026-01-20(b)(2)

Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens County, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred.

Livingston v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-America · filed 2026-01-22(b)(2)

Lastly, venue would also be proper because “a ‘substantial part’ of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district, where Plaintiff resided, worked remotely, and the alleged effects of the challenged employment practices were experienced.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Atlantic Oceanic LLC v. FleetZero Inc. · filed 2026-01-28(b)(2)

First, venue is proper in the Western District of Louisiana. The venue statue provides that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 USC § 1391(b)(2). The Vessel that is the subject of the arbitration proceeding primarily operated in the Western District of Louisiana for the pendency of the parties’ charter. Dkt. No. 13 at 10. Thus, venue is proper in that district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits an FMLA claim to be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Williams v. Long Island Railroad · filed 2026-01-28(b)(2)

Even if the Court did assume that Defendants reside in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Queens County, venue for her FMLA claims would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Brady · filed 2026-01-29(b)(2)

Accepting the allegations as true, none of the alleged wrongdoing occurred in New Mexico. The claims stem from events in a Colorado prison and/or a Colorado criminal proceeding.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Coury · filed 2026-02-02(b)(2)

Because a substantial part of the events in this action occurred in Arizona, venue is satisfied.

Venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Couch · filed 2026-02-04(b)(2)

Venue is proper because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [Plaintiff’s] claim[s] occurred” in Montgomery County, Alabama.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a federal civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Moon · filed 2026-02-04(b)(2)

Venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... However, the only surviving claims in this case took place while Moon was housed at Menard Correctional Center which is located within the federal judicial district for the Southern District of Illinois. 28 U.S.C. § 93(c). Thus, his remaining claims are in the proper district, and his motion to transfer is DENIED as moot.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gorbunov · filed 2026-02-06(b)(2)

Accordingly, venue lies in the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and in the interest of justice, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Woodgrain, Inc. v. BKD Enterprise · filed 2026-02-09(b)(2)

I also find that these contacts establish proper venue.* ... Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred.

Baiting Jiang v. NBCUIVERSAL Media · filed 2026-02-10(b)(2)

Regarding § 1391(b)(2), plaintiffs’ allegations don’t plausibly suggest that a substantial part of the events underlying their claims occurred in Wisconsin.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where the alleged injury occurred.

Cox v. Gritman Medical Center · filed 2026-02-11(b)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... Because Plaintiffs allege that Susan ingested her prescriptions, overdosed, and died near her home in Albion, Washington, the record establishes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Eastern District of Washington and that venue therein is proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not make venue proper where a plaintiff feels the effects of conduct that occurred elsewhere.

Macon · filed 2026-02-11(b)(2)

That Plaintiff feels the effects of the actions in Arizona is not enough to make venue proper in this District, however.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Laccinole · filed 2026-02-11(b)(2)

Therefore, a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia because the calls were allegedly made by local Virginia numbers on behalf of two local companies. Thus, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred; a complaint alleging no related events in the district does not establish venue there.

Jan · filed 2026-02-24(b)(2)

Nor does the Complaint include any allegations suggesting that any events related to Jan’s claims took place in Utah—let alone a “substantial part” of the events.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

In re Eisner Advisory Group, LLC Data Breach Litigation · filed 2026-02-25(b)(2)

That standard is met here. Defendant has established that “a substantial part of the events” transpired in the District of Minnesota because that is where the data breach and related activities giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred. See Dkt. Nos. 28-1, 28-2. Venue in the District of Minnesota is therefore proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ouellette · filed 2026-02-25(b)(2)

Defendant has established that “a substantial part of the events” transpired in the District of Minnesota because that is where the data breach and related activities giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

Watzka · filed 2026-02-25(b)(2)

That standard is met here. Defendant has established that “a substantial part of the events” transpired in the District of Minnesota because that is where the data breach and related activities giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred. See Dkt. Nos. 28-1, 28-2. Venue in the District of Minnesota is therefore proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Rushing · filed 2026-02-25(b)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). That standard is met here. Defendant has established that “a substantial part of the events” transpired in the District of Minnesota because that is where the data breach and related activities giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred. See Dkt. Nos. 28-1, 28-2. Venue in the District of Minnesota is therefore proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bailey · filed 2026-02-26(b)(2)

Nor did any of the relevant events occur here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where significant events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Lincoln Benefit Life Company v. Wilmington Trust · filed 2026-03-05(b)(2)

Here, a substantial portion of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in S.D.N.Y.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not make venue proper where a phone call was only a distant cause of claims arising from a contract, conduct, and injury elsewhere.

Cherkassky v. High-End Services · filed 2026-03-06(b)(2)

Plaintiff primarily relies on § 1391(b)(2) in arguing that his phone call to Sub-Zero is a substantial part of the events giving rise to his claim.5 As already discussed above, however, plaintiff’s phone call to Wisconsin is a distant, but-for cause of the events giving rise to his breach of contract and negligence claims here, rather than a substantial part of them, since the formation and performance of the contract at issue and the acts and injury comprising the alleged torts all ... occurred in Florida.6 As such, venue is improper in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Telephone Science Corporation v. Harris & Harris Ltd. · filed 2026-03-09(b)(2)

Moreover, venue is proper where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The calls at issue were allegedly placed by H&H employees to the honeypot from H&H’s Chicago office, its principal place of business. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Br., 7-8. The Court therefore finds the threshold inquiry satisfied and moves on to evaluate the private and public interest factors.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; a governing-law clause and economic harm felt there do not establish venue.

Bevard · filed 2026-03-11(b)(2)

In short, a “substantial part” of the actions underlying the claims did not occur in Utah and venue is improper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, even if material events also occurred elsewhere.

Gal-Invent Korlátolt Felelősségű Társaság v. Vanessa Research Holdings · filed 2026-03-12(b)(2)

Gal-Invent has demonstrated a prima facie case that venue is proper in this District under § 1391(b)(2).

Under § 1391(b)(2), unauthorized credit inquiries are substantial events giving rise to an FCRA claim, so venue lies in the district where the inquiries were made.

Williams v. Direct Auto CDJR · filed 2026-03-13(b)(2)

But any harms Williams may have suffered were not “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[.]” 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2). Rather, Direct Auto’s alleged, unauthorized credit inquiry is what gave rise to her claims.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; the place of an alleged injury can establish proper venue.

Cox v. Gritman Medical Center · filed 2026-03-16(b)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... Because Plaintiffs allege that Susan ingested her prescriptions, overdosed, and died near her home in Albion, Washington, the record establishes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Eastern District of Washington and that venue therein is proper.

Section 1391(b) does not make venue proper solely because a plaintiff feels harm in a district after moving there.

Anaya · filed 2026-03-16(b)

Similarly, and consistent with the Court’s RICO venue analysis, Plaintiff’s late-asserted claim that he was harmed in Virginia following his relocation does not, standing alone, make venue proper under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(f)(1) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to an FSIA claim occurred, including where the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were most felt.

LEX BARKER, an individual, ISS AVIATION INC. (U.S.), a Wyoming corporation, and INSTANT SECURITY SERVICE INC. (DE), a De · filed 2026-03-16(f)(1)

Plaintiffs have alleged that they suffered injuries in the United States, and we can presume that Florida would be the district in which they are most felt. Venue is proper under the FSIA “in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Mason Sales, LLC v. Talent Creation · filed 2026-03-17(b)(2)

The Court finds that venue is proper. A substantial part of the events giving rise to Mason Sales’s claims allegedly occurred in this district, including the parties’ Tennessee-centered relationship, Defendants’ communications and payments into Tennessee, shipments into Tennessee, and the termination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Fortier · filed 2026-03-18(b)(2)

Therefore, the events and omissions giving rise to a substantial portion of Nationwide’s claim occurred in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Court finds that the Eastern District is a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where allegedly defamatory online conduct targeted the plaintiff and his business, even when the defendants are located in another state.

Fischer · filed 2026-03-18(b)(2)

Venue lies either where “any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” or where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2). Even though Defendants are located in Minnesota, plainly the offensive and allegedly disparaging online conduct was targeted at Fischer and his business in Maryland. ... Thus, venue is proper in Maryland, and the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) is denied.

A plaintiff’s wire transfer from Maryland to an out-of-state defendant, by itself, does not establish venue in Maryland for a contract claim.

Anderson v. Monique Turner/Kingdom Global · filed 2026-03-23(b)(2)

The complaint relies on the wire transfer from Maryland as the basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendant regarding this transaction. That is not enough, either for personal jurisdiction or venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Holcomb · filed 2026-03-24(b)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), a civil action may be brought in a judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Here, Plaintiff alleges that she “worked primarily at Defendants’ Clarksburg location” and her claims relate to her employment at this location. ... Thus, venue is proper in the proposed transferee district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Citizens Bank, N.A. v. Wisznia · filed 2026-03-24(b)(2)

Plaintiff alleges that the Loan and Guaranty documents were executed in this district and the Defendants are domiciled in this district. Accordingly, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits a civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Manzi · filed 2026-03-24(b)(2)

Because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Manzi’s claim in Count 1 took place while he was housed at Lincoln Correctional Center in Logan County, the appropriate forum for the adjudication of those claims is the federal judicial district for the Central District of Illinois.

Section 1391(b)(2) makes venue improper in a district where no substantial part of the events occurred or the property at issue is situated.

Ympoka v. United States Department of Interior · filed 2026-03-25(b)(2)

First, venue is not proper under § 1391(b)(2). The “substantial part of the events” giving rise to Ympoka’s claims occurred in the Virgin Islands, where a “substantial part of property that is the subject of th[is] action” is also situated.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bellamy · filed 2026-03-25(b)(2)

Pursuant to § 1391(b)(2), venue is proper if a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this district. ... Although she worked remotely from her home in Ohio, for all intents and purposes, Plaintiff worked in South Carolina, the alleged discrimination occurred in South Carolina, and, as such, the District Court of South Carolina is the proper venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including receipt of allegedly unlawful debt collection communications.

Mahdi · filed 2026-03-30(b)(2)

Venue is proper because “the allegedly unlawful communications were received here,” id. at *4, and because MCM initiated a debt collection action in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (venue is proper where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, considering the full sequence of events underlying the claim.

Gaikwad · filed 2026-04-06(b)(2)

In this case, the actions Plaintiff alleges occurred in Massachusetts cannot be said to be a “substantial part the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant prepared fabricated evidence while in Massachusetts, the actual use of said evidence to initiate the restraining order and criminal proceedings—the conduct that forms the basis of the present civil claims—occurred entirely in Florida. See supra Section III. Therefore, venue is improper in this District.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other districts are also suitable venues.

Kelly-Leppert · filed 2026-04-22(b)(2)

Because (1) Monsanto sells Roundup throughout Missouri, which includes the Western District of Missouri, and (2) the decedent’s alleged exposure to Roundup occurred in part while he and Kelly-Leppert resided in the Western District of Missouri, the Court finds that the Western District constitutes “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where allegedly infringed rights originated because a substantial part of the relevant events occurred there.

Steelite International U.S.A., Inc. v. Anfora International · filed 2026-04-24(b)(2)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of proper venue in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). When allegedly infringed rights originated in a judicial district, a substantial part of the relevant infringing events necessarily occurred therein.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Jane Doe (C.M.B.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts · filed 2026-04-27(b)

The Court accordingly holds that the District of New Jersey is a proper venue pursuant to Section 1391(b), as it is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Fallon · filed 2026-04-27(b)(2)

Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred inside of the Wilson Medical Center in North Carolina and HCA Kendall Hospital in Florida, venue would be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of North Carolina and in the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not permit venue in a district with no alleged connection to the events giving rise to the claim.

Gaines · filed 2026-05-12(b)(2)

With no factual allegations tying this action to the Western District of Missouri, the Court finds that venue is improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the effects of the alleged tortious conduct occurred.

Global Reach, Inc. v. Hawkwood Group LLC · filed 2026-05-13(b)(2)

Venue is proper in the District of Columbia because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), a civil action may be brought in “[a] judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Here, much of the effects of the tortious conduct manifested in the District of Columbia where plaintiff has incurred more than $94,000 in damages and its engagement with Nuñez’s fiancée continues with Nuñez remaining detained in Guinea due to defendants’ allegedly tortious actions.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where remote employees worked and allegedly incurred unpaid wages when a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims occurred there.

Sterling-Gooden · filed 2026-05-13(b)(2)

Given plaintiffs worked remotely in the Eastern District of Tennessee, and this is where they allegedly incurred unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, and similar compensation deficits, the Court finds that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this judicial district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Wilson · filed 2026-05-18(b)(2)

Because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in New Jersey, venue is proper in this District and the Court will therefore analyze the propriety of a transfer pursuant to Section 1404(a).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Carrion · filed 2026-06-08(b)(2)

“A civil action may be brought in […] a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred […].” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... Thus, an objection to this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction due to improper venue is unfounded since the requirements for the general venue statute are met, and no other statutory venue provisions apply to the facts of this case.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where substantial events closely connected to the claims occurred, even if other material events occurred elsewhere.

Sullivan · filed 2026-06-10(b)(2)

These events have a close nexus to Plaintiff’s claims because they form the basis for his alleged interest in the partnership. Thus, venue is proper in Utah.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred; a related state case does not establish venue for claims arising from conduct elsewhere.

Buttars · filed 2026-06-12(b)(2)

The fact and existence of the separate case filed in Idaho state court by PRS seeking to collect on the same underlying debt allegedly owed by Buttars do not demonstrate a basis for venue in this District for the FDCPA claims against Johnson Mark under any of the Section 1391(b) categories.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if other events occurred elsewhere; the location of the plaintiff’s harm may also matter.

American Academy of Pediatrics v. Uthmeier · filed 2026-06-22(b)(2)

For venue to be proper, a “substantial” part of the events giving rise to the claim needs to occur in the venue, but not all parts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The location of the plaintiff’s harm is not irrelevant in the venue analysis.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not establish venue where federal agencies are headquartered when the alleged unlawful conduct occurred elsewhere.

Pinkerton v. Reinhardt · filed 2026-06-24(b)(2)

The Court concludes that venue is not proper in this district. Even assuming that plaintiffs are correct in their assertions of entanglement or enablement of tortious conduct by federal agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia, this does not demonstrate that the alleged unlawful conduct occurred in the District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the events giving rise to the claim; the court found venue proper where the defendant repeatedly conducted business with residents over the Internet.

Siegel v. Homestore, Inc. · filed 2003-03-19(a)(2)

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that acts or omissions must be more than tangentially connected to qualify as “substantial” under § 1391(a)(2). ... Indeed, it does appear from the pleadings and from the company’s website that Homestore’s business is all conducted entirely over the Internet and that this regularly involves entry into contractual relationships and the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the web to Pennsylvania residents. Accordingly, we find that venue Mes in this district as well as in California and the motion to dismiss must therefore be denied.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Armour v. Santos · filed 2020-03-26(b)

Venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Such actions may be brought only in (1) the judicial district where any defendant resides (if all defendants reside in the same State), (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. The case was transferred to this district because, based on the allegations in the Complaint, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this judicial district. Venue is, therefore, proper in this court.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

(HC) Houston v. North Kern State Prison · filed 2021-06-23(b)(2)

Because the events giving rise to the cause of action occurred in Monterey County, which is within the venue of the San Jose Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Petitioner should have filed the pleading in that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2); see also Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing federal court jurisdiction and venue in a § 1983 action).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Donegan v. The Toro Company · filed 2023-06-05(b)(2)

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (providing that “[a] civil action may be brought in” (among other venues) “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”), with Dahl Decl. at 14, and Sexton Decl. at 17–18 (indicating that a substantial portion of the events at issue here occurred in the Northern District of Texas’s Fort Worth Division, where Plaintiff lived and worked).

In a tort action, the location of the injury is relevant to whether a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in a district; detailed allegations of ongoing injury there can establish venue.

Stone v. California Department of Justice · filed 2025-10-08(b)(2)

In the Ninth Circuit, “the locus of the injury” is a relevant factor in determining where venue may lie under § 1391(b)(2), at least in a tort action. ... Plaintiff’s detailed allegations regarding the injuries he suffered in Arizona, including that he continues to suffer from ongoing injuries in Arizona as a result of the challenged conduct, are enough to satisfy § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) places venue for a petition challenging a conviction in the district where the conviction occurred.

(HC) Medina v. Cates · filed 2021-11-01(b)

In this case, the petitioner is challenging a conviction from Santa Barbara County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal civil rights action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Broomfield v. Pritzker · filed 2022-07-21(b)

Venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) under which such actions may be brought only in ... (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or ... Because Dixon is located in the judicial district for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, see 28 U.S.C. § 93(a), it is the appropriate forum for the claims remaining in this case.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a civil action occurred.

(HC) Mina v. Macomber · filed 2023-10-03(b)(2)

In this case, the petitioner is challenging a conviction from Riverside County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in the judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Thomas v. On Habeas Corpus · filed 2024-08-12(b)(2)

In this case, the petitioner is challenging a resentencing hearing on his conviction in Ventura County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the district where the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

(HC) Gholar v. Jones · filed 2024-10-28(b)

In this case, the petitioner is challenging a conviction from Los Angeles County, which is in the Central District of California. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where the plaintiffs feel the effects of a challenged state law.

Emison v. Catalano · filed 1996-01-12(b)(2)

If the Registry of Election Finance imposed on either plaintiff a civil penalty under the Campaign Contribution Limits Act, the penalty would affect that plaintiff here. In such circumstances, venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) is properly laid in this judicial district.

For a petition to compel arbitration, § 1391(a)(2) looks to the events underlying the substantive dispute; venue is proper where a substantial part of those events occurred.

W.J. Nolan & Co. v. Midway Federal Credit Union · filed 1996-01-31(a)(2)

The underlying “claim” is not the petition itself, but the substantive dispute to be litigated, or arbitrated, as the case may be. ... It is, therefore, evident that a substantial part of the events allegedly constituting securities violations, or fraud, on the part of petitioners occurred here and that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391 does not establish venue for a § 2241 petition in a district based on the Bill of Rights’ nationwide reach.

Al-Pine v. Richerson · filed 2019-02-13

Mr. Al-Pine briefly argues that venue was appropriate in the District of New Mexico under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because his “property” is the “U.S. Bill of Rights,” which is located “all ‘over’ the United[] States[] of America!” Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 3. This particular argument borders on the fatuous.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue when neither subsection (a)(1) nor (a)(2) provides it; another district with personal jurisdiction does not defeat venue under (a)(3).

Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Donald A. Stuart and Martin Schwarze · filed 1996-06-04(a)(3)

The phrase “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought” indicates that venue may be based on § 1391(a)(3) “only if neither [§ 1391(a)(1) or (2) ] can be satisfied.” 1A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.342[3], at 4083. It does not mean that venue is improper in one district merely because there is another equally appropriate district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on defendants' personal jurisdiction only when venue under (a)(1) and (a)(2) is unavailable.

Reynolds Publishers, Inc. v. Graphics Financial Group, Ltd. · filed 1996-08-23(a)(3)

The purpose of the final clause was to make clear that venue under subsection 1391(a)(3) (i.e., venue in the district in which defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction) is available only if venue under section 1391(a)(1) (where a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state) and 1391(a)(2) (where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the subject property is located) is unavailable.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction in the district only if no other district is available for the action.

Hickey v. St. Martin's Press, Inc. · filed 1997-09-29(a)(3)

Finally, venue clearly does not exist under § 1391(a)(3). Plaintiff obviously cannot satisfy that requirement inasmuch as he must show that there is no other district where he could have sued in order for venue as to Menninger to exist in New Hampshire.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue only when no other district has both personal jurisdiction and venue over all defendants.

FS Photo, Inc. v. PictureVision, Inc. · filed 1999-04-23(b)(3)

As a matter of first impression, I interpret this language to mean that section 1391(b)(3) may only be utilized if there is no other district which would have both personal jurisdiction and venue as to all defendants. ... Since the entire case could have been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia, section 1391(b)(3) does not apply by its terms.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only if the action cannot be brought in another district.

Banner Promotions, Inc. v. Maldonado · filed 1999-06-29(a)(3)

The venue statute permits an action to be brought in a judicial district in which the only basis is that a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction only “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). This action could clearly be brought in California, the state of which the defendant is a resident and domiciliary.

Section 1391(a)(3) does not provide venue in a district that lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Jamik, Inc. v. Days Inn of Mount Laurel · filed 1999-11-30(a)(3)

Because the court does not have personal jurisdiction over defendants, venue is not proper in this court.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

ZPC 2000, INC. v. SCA Group, Inc. · filed 2000-02-14(a)(3)

As a result, we can find no reason that this suit could not be brought in another district, making venue here improper under § 1391.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s contacts with a district only if the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

Greenberg v. Greenberg · filed 2000-08-18(a)(3)

Appellee contends the first ruling was legal error in light of language in § 1391(a)(3) that this provision is only to be relied upon to establish venue “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” Id. Appellant appears to concede the point, and we agree that this ruling of the district court was error.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant may be found only if the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

Weinstein v. Todd Marine Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2000-10-03(b)(3)

Second, under § 1391(b)(3), venue is proper “in a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” Not only is Miller Yacht not subject to jurisdiction in Virginia, but the Plaintiffs are unable to show that there is no other jurisdiction where this action may be brought.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant may be found only if the action cannot be brought in another district.

Graves v. Pikulski · filed 2000-08-30(b)(3)

Under § 1391(3), venue is proper in any judicial district in which any defendant may be found, but only if there is no other district in which the action may be brought. ... Consequently, there is another district in which this action may be brought, the Eastern District of Virginia, and venue is therefore not proper in Illinois under § 1391(3).

Section 1391(a)(3) permits fallback venue only when the action cannot be brought in another district.

Drayton Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Dunker · filed 2001-03-30(a)(3)

Clearly, plaintiff could have brought this action in the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to subsection (1), but it chose not to do so. Thus, since Oklahoma was available, subsection (3) cannot apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue only when the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

Taylor v. Armstrong · filed 2002-06-14(b)(3)

Subsection 1391(b)(3) would allow venue in Indiana because of Warden Lappin’s residence there only if “there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought”; because this action may be prosecuted in Connecticut, this option is unavailable.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no district is available under the statute’s first two venue provisions.

Hoffman v. FAIRFAX CTY. REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2003-07-11(a)(3)

Finally, the third basis for venue as provided under section 1391(a)(3) is applicable only if there is no district in which venue is proper under one of the venue statute’s first two provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). As just indicated, however, venue in this case is only proper in the Eastern District of Virginia under either of section 1391(a)’s first two provisions. Therefore, the parties cannot resort to the statute’s third possibility for venue.

The court treated a prior personal-jurisdiction finding as support for venue under § 1391(a)(3) in this action.

Pro Edge, L.P. v. Gue · filed 2005-06-01(a)(3)

Further, the previous finding of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Gue supports the court’s finding of appropriate venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) which states that the matter can be brought in a “judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district is available for the action.

Medicap Pharmacies, Inc. v. Faidley · filed 2006-02-22(a)(3)

The provision has thus been interpreted according to its plain meaning, making it inapplicable to a situation where, as here, there is another appropriate and available forum for Plaintiffs grievances to be addressed.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district is available.

Seijo v. Miller · filed 2006-03-31(a)(3)

Since the defendants are subject to specific in personam jurisdiction in Puerto Rico, subsection (3) of the federal venue statute is satisfied here. Venue is therefore proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant may be found only if the action cannot be brought in another district.

Kazenercom Too v. Turan Petroleum, Inc. · filed 2008-12-19(b)(3)

Second, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” Id. at § 1391(b)(3). But as explained below, this action can be brought in the Central District of California, so this provision does not apply.

Section 1391(a)(3) applies only when no district is a proper venue under the other venue provisions.

Long John Silver's, Inc. v. Diwa III, Inc. · filed 2009-01-15(a)(3)

Further, because it is clear that subsection 2 authorizes venue in at least the Northern District of Georgia, subsection 3 of Section 1391 is not applicable.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only if no other district is available.

Corbett v. Jennifer · filed 2012-08-29(b)(3)

Last, the case may not be brought in the District of Columbia because there is another district in which the action may be brought: the District of Maryland. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no other district provides proper venue.

Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC · filed 2013-03-20(b)(3)

As venue in the Northern District of Florida is proper under subparagraph 1, plaintiff may not rely on the fallback provision of subparagraph 3.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when another district qualifies under subsection (b)(1).

Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. v. Bivins · filed 2013-10-21(b)(3)

Since venue would be appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) in the Middle District of Florida, (b)(3) is irrelevant to this case.

Section 1391(b)(3)'s fallback venue provision does not apply when the action could have been brought in another district under the ordinary venue rules.

Brodt v. County of Harford · filed 2014-01-31(b)(3)

The catch-all provision in section 1391(b)(3) does not apply here because the action could have been brought in the District of Maryland, where a substantial part of the alleged events or omissions took place and where the defendants reside.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only if no other district qualifies under the venue statute.

Amr v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2014-07-15(b)(3)

Here, there is another district in which the action “may otherwise be brought as provided in this section”: the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction only when no other district provides venue under the preceding provisions.

Hamilton v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, National Association · filed 2015-08-04(b)(3)

Additionally, because venue would be proper in the Southern District of California, the remaining claims cannot be brought under the third prong of Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(3) supports venue in a district where the parties agreed to litigate and agreed venue was proper.

Myers Industries, Inc. v. Schoeller Arca Systems, Inc. · filed 2016-03-21(b)(3)

Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because the parties have agreed to litigate in the federal or state courts of New York ... and agreed that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district is an appropriate venue.

Fam v. Bank of America NA (USA) · filed 2017-02-22(b)(3)

Finally, if no other district is appropriate, venue is proper in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). In this case, venue is proper in another district, rendering this prong of the general venue statute unavailable here.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no district qualifies under another part of § 1391.

Buc-ee's, Ltd. v. Bucks, Inc. · filed 2017-08-02(b)(3)

However, it is undisputed that the Southern District of Texas is a proper venue as to BSD and Richardson because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Buc-ee’s claims against BSD and Richardson took part here. Section 1391(b)(3) is therefore inapplicable.

Section 1391(b)(3)'s fallback provision considers whether the entire joined action, rather than each plaintiff's claim separately, could be brought in another district.

Garcia v. Peterson · filed 2018-07-20(b)(3)

However, as the McCaskey court noted, the fallback provision does not separate the plaintiffs. It states that it applies if there is no other district in which an action may otherwise be brought, see § 1391(b)(3), which is different than the use of the term "claim" in § 1391(b)(2). ... The fallback provision applies, and the plaintiffs have asserted a prima facie case that venue is proper in the Souther District of Texas under this provision-so long as the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no other district has venue under the residence or events provisions.

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2019-01-09(b)(3)

Finally, the fallback provision is inapplicable to Plaintiff’s personal-capacity claims because the alleged conduct occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia, which has transactional venue over those claims.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction only when no district is available under the other venue provisions.

Gage v. Somerset County · filed 2019-03-28(b)(3)

Despite Plaintiff’s inability to avail himself of the first two options under Section 1391(b), Plaintiff cannot resort to the residual opportunity to lay venue in simply any federal district court where personal jurisdiction may lie, for there is a federal district court in which venue would be proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits residual venue only when no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

Gage v. State of New Jersey · filed 2019-03-28(b)(3)

Despite Plaintiff’s inability to avail himself of the first two options under Section 1391(b), Plaintiff cannot resort to the residual opportunity to lay venue in simply any federal district court where personal jurisdiction may lie, for there is a federal district court in which venue would be proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no district is available under the earlier venue provisions.

Thrasher v. Biomet Inc · filed 2019-04-22(b)(3)

However, as stated above, the third venue instance is applicable only if the first two are not. In other words, if a judicial district exists in which a substantial part of the events at issue occurred, venue cannot be found based on the third venue factor.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not establish venue in a district when the action could be brought in another district under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

McCormick v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Division · filed 2019-08-01(b)(3)

Finally, because this action could have been filed in another jurisdiction where venue would be proper under either §1391(b)(1) or (2), namely in the Southern District of Ohio, §1391(b)(3) does not establish venue in Arizona.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue in a district when the action can be brought in another district.

Huertas v. Ward · filed 2019-10-21(b)(3)

Furthermore, this action may “otherwise be brought” in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when venue would not exist elsewhere.

Greene v. United States Postal Service · filed 2019-11-27(b)(3)

An exception exists when venue wouldn’t exist anywhere. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). But that exception doesn’t exist here.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not permit venue in a district where none of the defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Emrit v. National Football League · filed 2020-02-28(b)(3)

Further, in light of the analysis in Discussion Section I, venue in the District of Hawai`i is not appropriate under § 1391(b)(3) because none of the Defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no other district is available under the section.

Virgin Enterprises Limited v. Virginic LLC · filed 2020-04-10(b)(3)

The Court is a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). ... The improper venue defense therefore cannot succeed in any circumstance, and it is stricken from the twenty-fourth affirmative defense.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction only when no district qualifies under the other venue provisions.

LLOYD v. POKORNY · filed 2020-05-04(b)(3)

Also, venue does not lay in this district pursuant to Section 1391(b)(3), which applies only when “there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought,” because Plaintiff could have brought this action in either the Northern or Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when the action can be brought in another district.

Roberts v. Bishop · filed 2020-05-26(b)(3)

For these reasons, because defendants are located in Maryland and plaintiff’s claims took place in Maryland, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) does not apply, because venue would be proper in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

Miracle Moringa Direct Inc. v. EyeFive, Inc. · filed 2020-08-26(b)(3)

However, this provision is only triggered when there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. As Defendant points out, the action could have been brought in the District of Colorado where Defendant has its principal place of business.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on personal jurisdiction only if the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district.

(PS) Wade v. Kerner · filed 2021-03-19(b)(3)

Finally, because there is another district in which this action could have (and should have) been filed—namely the District of Columbia—the third basis for venue is not triggered.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when the action cannot be brought in another district under the section.

Taylor v. City of Three Rivers Michigan · filed 2021-04-20(b)(3)

Since this action may be properly brought in the Western District of Michigan, Plaintiff cannot rely on § 1391(b)(3) to establish venue in this district, which only applies “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.”

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when another district qualifies under Section 1391(b)(2).

Zorikova v. Gish · filed 2021-10-05(b)(3)

In turn, therefore, Section 1391(b)(3) is inapplicable, and venue is improper in the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue only when no district qualifies under § 1391(b)(1) or (b)(2).

Burgard v. Kemper Insurance Company · filed 2022-01-24(b)(3)

Subsection (b)(3) applies only where venue cannot be established under (b)(1) or (b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district provides proper venue.

Steffen v. Vader Mountain Capital · filed 2022-03-14(b)(3)

Under its plain language, this subsection only applies if there is no district in which venue would be proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) provides a fallback venue only when the action cannot otherwise be brought in another district under § 1391(b).

Arrestouilh v. Adams County Web-Ex Court Proceedings · filed 2022-10-14(b)(3)

Subsection (3) does not apply because Plaintiff can file an action in the Colorado Federal Court for purposes of § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue in a district where the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction.

Hastens Sangar AB v. The Garrigan Group, LLC · filed 2022-11-21(b)(3)

Section 1391(b)(3) of the venue statute does not help Hästens either. As discussed, the Garrigan Group is not subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction here.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply when venue is proper under subsection (b)(2).

Sonate Corporation v. Dunkin' Brands Group, Inc. · filed 2023-03-24(b)(3)

Thus, any analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) as to whether Massachusetts had personal jurisdiction over Defendants is irrelevant.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide venue when the action can be brought in another judicial district.

Jackson v. Pilgrim Psychiatric Center · filed 2023-05-26(b)(3)

Third, the Complaint does not allege circumstances under which Section 1391(b)(3) would apply because the action could be brought in another judicial district – namely, the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b)(3) applies only when no district is available under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Alcantara-Alcantara v. Met Express Inc. · filed 2023-07-05(b)(3)

Finally, Section 1391(b)(3) applies only if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought pursuant to subsections (b)(1) and (2).

Section 1391(b)(3) provides a fallback venue only when the action cannot be brought in a district under the other venue provisions.

Kaddy v. Kaddy · filed 2023-07-19(b)(3)

Finally, § 1391(b)(3) does not apply because there is no indication that Kaddy’s lawsuit cannot be brought in the District of New Hampshire, where all parties reside.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in a district where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if no district otherwise provides venue.

Lewis v. Hill · filed 2023-07-24(b)(3)

Having previously determined that the state of Florida has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Hill, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Stoller, I conclude that § 1391(b)(3) allows any judicial district in Florida to provide a venue.

Section 1391(b)(3) applies only when no other district is a proper venue.

Athens v. Copidas · filed 2023-10-03(b)(3)

Subsection (b)(3) of the venue statute only applies if there is no district in which venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(3) applies only when the action could not have been brought in another district.

Robinson v. Hinninger · filed 2023-10-10(b)(3)

And because this case could have been brought in the Western District, subsection (b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district provides venue under Section 1391.

Shepperson v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 2024-03-06(b)(3)

However, Section 1391(b)(3) only applies “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought” under Section 1391. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). That is not the case here.

Section 1391(b)(3) applies only when venue cannot be established in another district.

Ballon Stoll, P.C. v. Cutler · filed 2024-03-25(b)(3)

Because Ballon Stoll has not shown that venue cannot be established in another district—such as the District of Arizona, where the CPA Defendants reside—§ 1391(b)(3) is inapplicable.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue based on a defendant’s personal jurisdiction only when no other district is available under the section.

Anthony v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27(b)(3)

But venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia. Thus, the third option does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue in an otherwise unavailable judicial district only if a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Alefosio v. American Samoa Government · filed 2024-05-24(b)(3)

in light of the foregoing, the first and second means of obtaining venue under Section 1391(b) clearly did not apply, and, as for the third, Alefosio alleged no facts that would give rise to this Court exercising personal jurisdiction over the American Samoan Government.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits fallback venue only when no district is available under the other venue provisions.

Owens v. TransUnion, LLC · filed 2024-12-02(b)(3)

That subsection applies only if the party seeking transfer shows that “there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas under § 1391(b)(2), as Owens admitted in his operative complaint, Dkt. 120 at 2, and concedes in his motion to transfer, Dkt. 188 at 1. By virtue of its opening clause, subsection (b)(3) does not apply.

Section 1391(b)(3) permits venue only when no district is available under another provision of § 1391.

SHELTON v. CHAUDHRY · filed 2025-01-27(b)(3)

venue would not exist under subsection (b)(3) as it can only be invoked “[i]f there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section…” That requirement cannot be met here because venue indisputably exists in the Middle District under (b)(2).