28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if more substantial events occurred elsewhere.

Morgan v. North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2005-12-02(b)(2)

Indeed, under § 1391 a plaintiff does not have to select the venue with the most substantial nexus to the dispute, as long as she chooses a venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. ... Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue is therefore denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and Jenkins Brick.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Costaras v. NBC Universal, Inc. · filed 2005-12-16(a)(2)

Finally, review of the facts adduced regarding personal jurisdiction confirms that this District is not the site of a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims at issue. Accordingly, venue is not proper in this District for Defendants Glassman and Krasnow.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Brannen v. National Railroad Passenger, Corp. · filed 2005-12-19(a)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Here, the train derailment took place in the state of Maryland. ... The court, therefore, concludes that venue is proper in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; more than one district may qualify.

Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. National Ass'n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. · filed 2006-01-27(b)(2)

The requirement of § 1391(b)(2) is met here, since this is a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

MC ASSET RECOVERY, LLC v. Southern Co. · filed 2006-02-15(b)

Undoubtedly, venue would be proper in that district for the further reason that it is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smith v. Molly Maid, Inc. · filed 2006-02-16(b)

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Plaintiff resides in this district and a substantial part of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Walsh Ex Rel. Estate of Walsh v. Chez · filed 2006-03-06(a)

Under Section 1391(a), when there is diversity of parties, a suit may be brought in a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Defendants argue, as they did above, that the cause of action brought by Plaintiffs arose as a result of actions which occurred in Illinois. However, as discussed above, this is not so, since a substantial part of the claim arose out of the medical monitoring and advice provided by Dr. Chez to Plaintiffs while the Plaintiffs were in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district is also a proper venue.

Genesis Insurance v. Alfi · filed 2006-03-23(a)(2)

Accordingly, while California may be a proper venue in this case, the facts indicate that because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Genesis’ claims also occurred in the Southern District of Ohio, this Court is a proper venue as well.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where many events giving rise to the suit occurred.

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell · filed 2005-12-02(b)(2)

Venue is proper here. Many of the events giving rise to this suit occurred in Lucas County. Plaintiffs could properly file their claims here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if a key act occurred elsewhere.

Boehner v. Heise · filed 2006-01-20(a)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper “in any district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that a substantial part of the events giving rise to this cause of action pertain to the Southern District of New York, and therefore, the venue choice by Plaintiffs, should not be disturbed.

Section 1391(a) does not establish venue in a district where no events relevant to the claim occurred when the events giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Mirage Systems, Inc. · filed 2006-03-08(a)

When a court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, venue is established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... The Court concludes that this is an improper forum for an action against the individual defendants. All parties agree that the main issue in this case is ownership of the patents-in-suit. All of the events and omissions leading up to the ownership dispute occurred in the state of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in the judicial district where the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Klump v. Nazareth Area School District · filed 2006-03-30(b)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims allegedly occurred in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, which is located in this judicial district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Plunkett v. Valhalla Investment Services, Inc. · filed 2006-01-03(a)(2)

With respect to the question of venue, defendants’ substantive arguments also lack merit. A substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Massachusetts and, therefore, venue is appropriate.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc. · filed 2006-05-25

Venue is appropriate in this district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in Pennsylvania or were intended to have consequences in Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where forum activities played a substantial role in the events giving rise to the claim, even if venue may also lie elsewhere.

Mohr v. Margolis, Ainsworth & Kinlaw Consulting, Inc. · filed 2006-06-13(b)(2)

Venue is proper in Kansas because activities in the forum state played a substantial role in the circumstances leading to the plaintiffs claim.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gone to the Beach, LLC v. Choicepoint Services, Inc. · filed 2006-06-15(a)(2)

The Court thus ... finds that because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred within the Western District of Tennessee, venue is proper in this Court.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even if substantial events also occurred elsewhere.

Modaressi v. Vedadi · filed 2006-07-24(b)(2)

Simply put, even if a substantial part of the events in this case took place in Maryland, that does not preclude plaintiff from filing suit in the District of Columbia if a substantial part of the events took place here, as well. The Court concludes that the events that plaintiff alleges to have occurred in the District of Columbia, if proven, would constitute a substantial part of the events that give rise to plaintiffs claims, and therefore that this district is a proper venue for all of plaintiffs claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sanders, O'Hanlon & Motley, P.L.L.C. v. Chicago Insurance · filed 2006-07-31(a)(2)

Accordingly, the Plaintiff predicates venue on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... Based on the foregoing and without ruling on the validity of the Plaintiffs claims, the court concludes that this court has a substantial connection to the Plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, venue is proper in this court.

Venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the activities giving rise to the claims occurred, even if substantial activities also occurred in another district.

Street v. Smith · filed 2006-08-15(a)(2)

It does appear that a substantial part of the activities giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred in Louisiana, as contended by defendants, so that Louisiana is a proper venue. But that does not disqualify Mississippi as a proper venue, if a substantial part of the activities also took place in Mississippi, as it appears is the case.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where plaintiffs feel the effects of a challenged state statute, even if it was enacted elsewhere.

Bishop v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Edmondson · filed 2006-08-16(b)(2)

The Court concludes that venue is proper in the Northern District of Oklahoma under § 1391(b)(2) because it is a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. ... In this case, the effects of the Oklahoma Amendment will be felt in the Northern District in that Plaintiffs Bishop and Baldwin are denied the right to marry in Tulsa County based on their status as a same-sex couple.

In a diversity case, venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

First National Bank v. El Camino Resources, Ltd. · filed 2006-08-16(a)

Venue is also proper in California because, in diversity cases, jurisdiction is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). El Camino is a California corporation. The substance of FNB’s claim arises from El Camino’s alleged breach of their security agreemént. Any omission on the part of El Camino occurred in California. Clearly, FNB could have brought this action in California had they chosen to do so. Thus, for purposes of this motion, venue is also appropriate in California.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district has a stronger connection.

Dedvukaj v. Maloney · filed 2006-08-31(a)(2)

Venue is proper in any judicial district in which a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan because a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred here. It follows, therefore, that Defendant’s Request to Transfer Venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the district.

Allen v. American Federation of Government Employees AFI-CIO · filed 2006-09-01(b)(2)

This allegation fails to establish a substantial connection with New Hampshire because most, if not all, of the other events described in the complaint concern rapes and other abuses appellant claims to have suffered during his incarceration in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other material events occurred elsewhere.

Panterra Engineered Plastics, Inc. v. Transportation Sys. Solutions, LLC · filed 2006-10-12(b)(2)

Here, although TSS and the individual defendants are now located in North Carolina and manufacture their products there, a number of significant events occurred in Connecticut: the alleged scheme for stealing the IP, of which TSS’s purchase of the machines at the IM & T bankruptcy auction and luring essential IM & T employees were a part, was hatched in Connecticut. This is sufficient for proper venue to lie in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez · filed 2006-10-25(b)(2)

This Court is a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Phoenix’s claims occurred within the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where defendants sent alleged misrepresentations into the district and those communications were substantially connected to the claims.

Estate of Moore v. Dixon · filed 2006-10-27(a)(2)

To reiterate, here the plaintiff has identified two communications sent by the defendants to this district which allegedly contained misrepresentations upon which Ms. Moore and/or her accountant relied. I am persuaded that there is a sufficient relationship between these two communications, which the defendants directed at Wisconsin, and the plaintiffs causes of action. Thus, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in this district and venue is proper.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

National Wildlife Federation v. Harvey · filed 2006-06-15(e)(2)

In the case currently before the Court, venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ elaims-the Corps’ management of Lake Okeechobee and its impact on the snail kite population-took place in Southern Florida.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where communications directed into the district form a significant part of the events underlying the claim, even if another district also has a strong connection to it.

FC INVESTMENT GROUP LC v. Lichtenstein · filed 2006-07-21(a)(2)

Even if Illinois, the site of many of the actions leading to the alleged fraud, has a strong connection to the claim, it is now recognized that more than one forum can be an appropriate venue for a claim so long as § 1391(a)(2) is satisfied. ... Because the communications by Mr. Lichtenstein to Mr. Eisenberg in the District of Columbia were a significant part of the sequence of events underlying the claims, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Domino's Pizza PMC v. Caribbean Rhino, Inc. · filed 2006-09-13(b)(2)

Consequently, because these actions constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim, venue in the Eastern District of Michigan is proper with respect to Defendant Martineau.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if the defendants reside elsewhere.

Selective Ins. Co. of South Carolina v. Schremmer · filed 2006-10-24(a)

Although Defendants assert the right to be sued in their home state, § 1391(a) does not mandate such a result; the statute also says venue is proper where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a non-diversity civil action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Boateng v. General Dynamics Corp. · filed 2006-11-02(b)

In a civil action not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Accordingly, this action could have been properly brought in the Western District of North Carolina.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred; in an action to enforce a judgment, entry of the judgment can establish that connection.

AmericanAnglian Environmental Technologies, L.P. v. Doherty · filed 2006-11-14(a)(2)

The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, is applicable to the case at hand. ... We turn to subsection (2) and must determine whether a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this claim took place in the Eastern District. ... Thus, the central focus for purposes of determining proper venue is the entry of the May 4, 2006 judgments, which took place in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where substantial legal services were performed.

Braude & Margulies, P.C. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2007-01-07(b)(2)

Inasmuch as B & M is located in Washington, D.C., and thus must have rendered a substantial portion of the legal services at issue in its D.C. office, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where significant events material to the claims occurred, even if more events occurred elsewhere.

Sea Tow Services International, Inc. v. Pontin · filed 2007-01-18(b)(2)

In sum, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the Court finds that New York may be considered a substantial situs for all of the plaintiffs claims under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. Bank of New York · filed 2007-01-29(b)(2)

Alternatively, as the FDIC has argued, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). “[A] substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Count I occurred in this district because it was here that the FDIC first decided to enforce the Master Indenture’s regular repayment schedule notwithstanding the ipso facto clause, that it communicated its decision to BNY, and that BNY first challenged the propriety of the FDIC’s actions.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred.

Armstrong v. ATLAS-TELECOM SERVICES-USA, INC. · filed 2007-03-20(a)

Thus, under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(a) venue is proper in the Dallas Division of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, as Millennium’s business office is located, and its transactions occurred, in that city.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other events occurred elsewhere.

Fletcher v. District of Columbia · filed 2007-03-26(b)(2)

The venue statute does not require a plaintiff to establish that every event that supports his claim occurred in the chosen forum. ... Based on the language of the statute and the relevant events of this case, the Court concludes that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 2007-06-01(a)

Finally, venue would properly lie in the District of Massachusetts because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim (i.e., the prescription, purchase, ingestion, and exposure) occurred in that district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

S & D Trading Academy, LLC v. Aafis, Inc. · filed 2007-06-13(a)(2)

In a diversity case, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... Thus, contrary to AAFIS’s assertion, a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in Texas.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district has stronger contacts.

Electroplated Metal Solutions, Inc. v. American Services, Inc. · filed 2007-06-18(b)(2)

The Court finds these circumstances to be “substantial” enough to make this district a proper venue under Section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if substantial events also occurred elsewhere.

Kelly Services, Inc. v. Noretto · filed 2007-07-09(a)(2)

Although it is clear that there may be substantial events that occurred in Oregon that are relevant to this dispute, the facts indicate that “a substantial part of the events” and the property at the heart of the dispute are centered in the Eastern District of Michigan. Accordingly, Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that venue is improper; venue is proper in this district and the Court will deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss or transfer the action.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if substantial events also occurred in another district.

Kay v. National City Mortgage Co. · filed 2007-07-09(b)(2)

Additionally, venue would be proper in South Carolina under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” arose there. This is true even if a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims are found to have occurred in Ohio. The fact that substantial activities took place in Ohio does not disqualify South Carolina as a proper venue as long as “substantial” activities took place there, as well.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other relevant events occurred elsewhere.

Traynor v. Liu · filed 2007-07-17(b)(2)

Based on these factual allegations, the court is satisfied that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [plaintiffs] claim” occurred within plaintiffs chosen venue, the State of Delaware. Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), therefore, is denied.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Hensley Properties, LP · filed 2007-07-17(a)(2)

BoA asserts that venue is also proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, subsection (a)(2), which states that a civil action may be brought in a district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” However, BoA has not pointed to a single event or omission giving rise to its breach of contract claim that took place in this District, and it is undisputed that the properties to which the parties’ transactions related are not located in this District. Accordingly, this argument must be rejected.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if substantial events also occurred in another district.

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Miski · filed 2007-07-30(b)(2)

Under section 1391(b)(2), venue is appropriate in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the District of Columbia is an appropriate venue for the litigation of the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even when substantial activity also occurred elsewhere.

Toledano Ex Rel. Estate of deToledano v. O'Connor · filed 2007-08-17(b)

Although plaintiffs suggest that this action could not have been brought originally in that district, venue there would have been proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that a civil action may be brought in a judicial district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Kelly v. Omni Lingual Services, et al · filed 2007-09-06(b)(2)

Thus, venue in New Hampshire is not properly grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which also points toward the Central District of California.

In a diversity case, § 1391(a) permits venue in a district where significant events material to the claim occurred, even if other material events occurred elsewhere.

Katz v. Mogus · filed 2007-09-07(a)

In any event, as a number of meetings occurred in Manhattan, allegedly giving rise to almost one-fifth of the claimed damages, this court finds that significant events material to Plaintiffs claim occurred within the SDNY sufficient to justify venue in that district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if more substantial activity occurred elsewhere.

Red Bull GmbH v. RLED, LLC · filed 2007-09-18(b)(2)

Giving plaintiffs ah of the inferences properly due them at this stage of the case, the Court finds that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s]” occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Venue in this district is therefore proper for counts two through seven.

Section 1391(b)(2) places venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Lee v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2007-11-26(b)(2)

The Court accordingly finds that because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in Mississippi, not Hawaii, venue in this district is improper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where dissemination of allegedly defamatory statements and resulting local injury form a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim.

Morton Grove Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Pediculosis Ass'n · filed 2007-11-30(a)(2)

Under § 1391(a)(2), “[t]he test is not whether a majority of the activities pertaining to the case were performed in a particular district, but whether a substantial portion of the activities giving rise to the claim occurred in the particular district.” ... Economic and reputational injury, in conjunction with other activities such as ... the dissemination of allegedly defamatory newsletters within the district qualify as substantial parts of the events giving rise to MGP’s claim.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if more events occurred elsewhere.

Kelly Services v. Eidnes · filed 2008-01-10(a)(2)

A substantial connection is sufficient for venue even if a greater part of the events occurred in another venue. ... For these reasons, Defendant Eidnes has not met her burden and the Court DENIES her motion to dismiss this matter for improper venue.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue for contract claims where the contracts were negotiated, executed, and principally performed, if those acts constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims.

Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G. · filed 2008-02-06(a)(2)

Accordingly, because the underlying contracts were negotiated, executed, and ... principally performed in the District of Columbia, the Court concludes a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Elemary’s breach of contract and quantum meruit claims occurred here.

Section 1391(a)(2) and (b)(2) place venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Stutes v. Tipton · filed 2008-02-08(a)(2), (b)(2)

The next subsection of each statute determines venue based upon where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the events occurred....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), (b)(2). ... In this case, the principal events took place at the correctional facility in Oklahoma. Accordingly, venue is most appropriate in that state under subsection (2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other events occurred elsewhere.

State Farm Mutual, Automobile Insurance v. V'Chesed · filed 2008-02-26(a)(2)

With respect to the second ground for venue, all of the events need not take place in a venue for it to be proper, nor even most of the events, just a substantial part. ... Here, the complaint clearly alleges that a substantial part of the events took place in this district, thus satisfying the requirements for venue.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Coppola v. Ferrellgas, Inc. · filed 2008-03-06(a)(2)

The Complaint at issue clearly alleges that a substantial part of the events took place in New Jersey, thus satisfying the requirements for venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Thornberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-03-07(b)(2)

Under subsection two, though, venue would lie in the Eastern District of North Carolina, where the violations are alleged to have occurred.

Section 1391(a)(2) does not establish venue where a plaintiff continues to suffer injuries if the tortious events occurred elsewhere.

Dong v. Garcia · filed 2008-04-23(a)(2)

The fact that he alleges to have suffered from his injuries after returning to Illinois does not constitute “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim.”

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Veney v. Starbucks Corp. · filed 2008-06-19(a)(2)

Section 1391(a)(2) provides that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... Because all of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Alexandria, Virginia — a city within the transferee district — the defendant has established that the plaintiff could have originally brought this action in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if relevant events also occurred elsewhere.

Marcus v. American Contract Bridge League · filed 2008-06-20(b)(2)

As such, Connecticut is one place where substantial and material events giving rise to this claim occurred. Thus, venue is properly established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even if another district has stronger ties.

Leone v. Cataldo · filed 2008-08-11(a)(2)

Although § 1391(a)(2) does not require a court to select the best forum, it does not permit a plaintiff to bring suit in an unlimited number of forums. ... Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Therefore, I deny Cataldo’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true when deciding a motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Hicks v. Clay County · filed 2008-10-30(b)(2)

The venue statute applicable to this action provides that such actions may be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Subsection (2) applies in this situation. ... This Court finds plaintiffs allegations sufficient to support venue in this district. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue will be DENIED.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to have occurred in the chosen district; a third party’s awareness of the events or the plaintiff’s continuing psychological effects there does not establish venue.

McClintock v. School Board East Feliciana Parish · filed 2008-11-12(b)(2)

Venue cannot be based solely on the presence of a third party who is aware of the events underlying a plaintiff’s claim, particularly when the information was, as here, reported in a newspaper. Venue also cannot lie simply because a plaintiff continues to experience the psychological effects of an injury in a particular place.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not establish venue for a trademark claim merely because a defendant’s Google Maps listing is accessible in the district, absent alleged passing off or resulting confusion there.

Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill · filed 2009-01-23(b)(2)

This allegation, absent something more, is insufficient to make venue proper in Arizona because there is no alleged “passing off’ or resulting confusion in Arizona.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if significant related events occurred elsewhere.

Ventura v. BEBO Foods, Inc. · filed 2009-02-02(b)(2)

Plaintiffs’ allegations establish that their claims arose in the District of Columbia such that venue is proper in this Court with respect to all defendants. While significant activities related to this action occurred outside of the District of Columbia after plaintiffs were transferred to Donna’s restaurant in Virginia, a substantial amount of relevant events also occurred during the preceding time period while plaintiffs were employed within the District, and it is those events from which this claim truly arose.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. Meissner · filed 2009-03-16(b)

Venue is proper under 1391(b) where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Therefore, under both 1391(b) and 1400(a), venue is proper in this court.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if venue is also proper elsewhere.

Demery v. Montgomery County, Md. · filed 2009-03-18(b)(2)

Here, however, the plaintiffs have alleged that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the District of Columbia, such as Johnathan's arrest, his initial confinement in jail, and the searches and seizure of the plaintiffs' dwelling. Unlike Clark, this case is not one where one venue is improper and the other is proper; venue is proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim against a federal employee occurred.

Mohammadi v. Scharfen · filed 2009-04-07(e)(2)

Accordingly, because the majority of the events or omissions giving rise to the [plaintiffs] claim occurred in Maryland, the plaintiff could have brought suit in the District of Maryland and venue is proper there.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where disputed attorney fees were earned and paid.

Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham · filed 2009-04-24(b)(2)

The Court finds venue to be proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to its claim occurred in Tulsa County.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a federal-question case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Askew v. Cook County Sheriff · filed 2009-05-18(b)(2)

The County would have had no conceivable defense to venue, which is proper in a federal-question case where (among other places) a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred (here, the Cook County jail, which sits in the Northern District of Illinois), and so there would have been no occasion to dismiss under Rule 19(a)(3).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

KISSI v. Mead · filed 2009-06-10(b)(2)

Given all the parties’ involvement in prior proceedings in the District of Maryland and the apparent connection between the Maryland proceedings and the claims the plaintiff raises in this action, it appears that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in Maryland. The Court therefore concludes that this action could have been brought in the District of Maryland.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Hantzis v. Grantland · filed 2009-04-01(b)(2)

Under the circumstances presented, the proper venue for litigating this case against the movant is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because nothing is alleged to have occurred (or to be situated) in the District of Columbia, Ms. Grantland rightly asserts that this venue is improper for litigating the claims.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Specht v. Google, Inc. · filed 2009-08-03(b)(2)

Here, the FAC alleges that Specht, an Illinois resident, and ADC and ADI, Illinois corporations, presently suffer from injuries in Illinois. The alleged infringement took place on an international scale, including in Illinois. Taking these factors into consideration, the Court concludes that Illinois is not an improper venue for this case.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for an FMLA claim in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

James v. VERIZON SERVICES CORP. · filed 2009-08-03(b)

Because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the [FMLA] claim[] occurred” in Maryland, venue for that claim is proper in Maryland.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Levin v. Majestik Surface Corp. · filed 2009-09-17(a)(2)

This case “might have been brought” in the Eastern District of Virginia, for venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(a)(2). Virginia is a proper venue because plaintiffs’ residence is located in Virginia and the contract was created and performed entirely in Virginia.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Edens Technologies, LLC v. Kile, Goekjian, Reed & McManus, PLLC · filed 2009-09-18(a)

Venue is appropriate in a district in which a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Accordingly, Edens has sufficiently alleged in its Complaint that a “substantial part of the events or omissions” of malpractice occurred in this District, satisfying the technical requirement of venue under the statute.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires significant events material to the claim to occur in the district; a possible sale by an unrelated third party does not suffice.

Cavit Cantina Viticoltori Consorzio Cantine Sociali Del Trentino Societa' Cooperativa v. Browman Family Vineyards, Inc. · filed 2009-09-27(b)(2)

Venue cannot here be predicated on § 1391(b)(2). ... This does not rise to the level of “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the elaim[s]” in this case.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. FPM Group, Ltd. · filed 2009-09-28(b)(2)

Thus, according to these alleged facts, the subsequent pleadings, and relevant exhibits, the Court finds that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the Commission’s claim against FPM occurred in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Therefore, venue in this Court is proper and FPM’s motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons · filed 2009-09-29(b)

As to any surviving retaliation claims, defendants correctly argue that this venue is improper for litigating those claims because none of the alleged misconduct occurred in the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (designating the proper venue as the judicial district where a substantial part of the events occurred).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal question action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

NOKOTA HORSE CONSERVANCY, INC. v. Bernhardt · filed 2009-10-20(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that, in actions where federal jurisdiction is based at least in part on a federal question, venue is proper in the federal district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. ... The Association plans to attend and solicit its registry at the roundup sale in North Dakota which will likely cause confusion. Additionally, the Robsons and the Fjetlands have previously purchased Nokota horses in North Dakota. See Docket Nos. 45, 46, 47 and 48. At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the Court finds that venue is proper in federal district court in North Dakota.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Homebuilders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Brandon · filed 2009-07-16(b)(2)

Venue is proper in this Court because all of the events or omissions giving rise to the subject claims occurred in the City of Brandon, Mississippi, which is located in the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; in a First Amendment challenge, the district where speech was suppressed can qualify even if the challenged policy was adopted elsewhere.

Kalman v. Cortes · filed 2009-07-28(b)(2)

The suppression itself is a more “substantial” event than the decision to suppress the speech, and is the most important event in the origin of this suit. Plaintiffs inability to exercise his freedom of expression by doing business under the name he desires is clearly “substantial.”

Section 1391(b) governs whether the district where a claim is filed is a proper venue based on where the underlying conduct occurred.

Young v. Martinez · filed 2009-08-31(b)

The conduct giving rise to the claim is not alleged to have occurred in the District of Columbia and therefore this venue is not proper for litigating the plaintiffs claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if other districts may also be proper.

Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden America, Inc. · filed 2009-10-22(a)(2)

Given that a substantial part of Astro-Med’s claims involved Rhode Island and proceeding in Rhode Island would not thwart the underlying purpose of the venue statute, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the claims pending against Nihon Kohden in Rhode Island for improper venue.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Wins Equipment, LLC v. Rayco Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2009-11-02(a)(2)

In a civil action where subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, as in this case, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ...” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... There are sufficient facts in the record to show that venue is proper in this court.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, focusing on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or closely related acts.

Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. MidSouth Capital, Inc. · filed 2009-11-05(a)(2)

Venue is improper in the Southern District of Florida because Hemispherx has failed to allege that Defendants’ tortious conduct or any acts with a close nexus to their tortious conduct, occurred within the Southern District of Florida. Venue is not proper merely wherever a company’s Chief Executive Officer happens to be located at a given point in time.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; for unpaid wage claims, where payments were computed and processed can be that location.

Shay v. Sight & Sound Systems, Inc. · filed 2009-11-09(b)(2)

Because the claims here center around the defendants’ alleged failure to compensate the plaintiffs for prior employment, a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the litigation occurred in Virginia where the wage payments were computed and processed. Thus, venue is improper in the District of Columbia under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

United States v. Lucky Dragon Development Co., LTD · filed 2009-12-11(b)(2)

Venue is proper in this judicial district, the District of Guam, because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred here.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Kelly Law Firm, P.C. v. an Attorney for You · filed 2009-12-16(a)(2)

The court concludes that because the dispute concerns a contract that was negotiated by Kelly in Houston, and arises from a business relationship in which Calliope provided referrals of potential Texas clients to Kelly in Houston, the Southern District of Texas is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Venue is thus proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred, including the place of an alleged failure to perform.

United States v. Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2010-01-11(b)(2)

This case arises from obligations Defendants owed on three immigration bonds, which Defendants allegedly breached when they failed to secure the delivery of the three bonded individuals into the Government’s custody in Memphis. This alleged failure of performance gives rise to specific personal jurisdiction and provides a basis for venue in the Western District of Tennessee under § 1391(b)(2) as a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if another district has more substantial contacts.

Shannon's Rainbow, LLC v. Supernova Media, Inc. · filed 2010-01-26(a)(2)

While it is true that there might be more substantial contacts with other venues, like Pennsylvania where the film was filmed, there are sufficient contacts with Utah for venue to be proper here.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, and the place where an FCRA plaintiff suffered injury is relevant to that determination.

Gordon v. DTE ENERGY · filed 2010-01-26(b)(2)

Because subject-matter jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under that statute, venue is proper in a judicial district if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... The Court has already found that Plaintiff suffered harm in Washington. Therefore, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Washington. The Western District of Washington is a proper venue for this case.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sibley v. Sibley · filed 2010-02-01(a)(2)

As an initial matter, the court finds that this case "might have been brought” in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida because it is a "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a diversity claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Balentine · filed 2010-02-16(a)(2)

The Court finds that these facts are sufficient to demonstrate that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim, and a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action, are within this forum. As such, venue is not improper under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(a).

Section 1391 places venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is located.

Hantzis v. Grantland · filed 2009-10-30

Because none of the alleged wrongdoing occurred in the District of Columbia, this Court is not the proper venue for litigating claims arising therefrom. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (designating the proper venue under the circumstances presented as the “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”). The Court therefore grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the nonFOIA claims under Rule 12(b)(3).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; communications directed there may qualify.

Silver v. Brown · filed 2009-11-30(a)(2)

A defendant’s communications directed at the district where venue is sought by the plaintiff may constitute the events or omissions that satisfy the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if venue is also proper in other districts.

Lunatrex, LLC v. Cafasso · filed 2009-12-01(b)

Venue is also proper here. When this court’s jurisdiction arises from a federal question, venue is proper where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); ... Here, the plaintiffs’ claims arise at least in substantial part from events occurring in Indiana. ... The fact that venue also would have been proper in other districts does not make it improper in this one.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred; peripheral meetings and consequences do not establish venue.

Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency · filed 2010-02-26(b)(2)

The Court finds that appropriate venue for this action under § 1391(b)(2) is the Eastern District of Virginia. The overwhelming bulk of events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred; peripheral meetings and consequences do not suffice.

Ciralsky v. Cia · filed 2010-02-26(b)(2)

The Court finds that appropriate venue for this action under § 1391(b)(2) is the Eastern District of Virginia. The overwhelming bulk of events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not make venue proper where a defendant’s federal regulator is located when the challenged foreclosure occurred elsewhere.

Ulloa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2010-03-04(b)(2)

However, that defendants do business under a regulatory regime overseen by the federal government has no bearing on the location of the foreclosure proceeding that plaintiff challenges in his complaint. That event did not take place in the District of Columbia, but rather in the Northern District of New York, where the property at issue is located.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Nalco Co. v. Environmental Management, Inc. · filed 2010-03-08(a)(2)

Venue is also proper in the Southern District of Mississippi. In a case such as this, which is in federal court solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Despite Nalco’s claims to the contrary, a substantial part of the events underlying this dispute occurred in the Southern District of Mississippi. The chemical spill took place in Natchez, Mississippi, and, by extension, so did the clean-up project, the storage of the chemical, the second spill, and the second clean-up.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where distribution of copyrighted works constitutes a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims.

Pearson Education, Inc. v. Kumar · filed 2010-04-16(b)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Subsection (b)(1) does not apply, since all Defendants do not reside in the same state. However, subsection (b)(2) is satisfied, since the copyrighted works at issue were distributed in this district and that distribution comprises “a substantial part of the events” giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ three claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred.

Praetorian Specialty Insurance v. Auguillard Construction Co. · filed 2010-05-20(a)(2)

The Western District of Louisiana is an appropriate venue for the declaratory judgment action at bar because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this insurance coverage dispute occurred in the Western District of Louisiana,' specifically in Shreveport, Louisiana.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the claims even if another district has stronger ties.

RECEIVER OF ASSETS OF MID-AMERICA v. Coffman · filed 2010-05-21(a)(2)

While, as the defendants point out, this case certainly could have been brought in the Eastern District of Kentucky, the task of the court here is not to find the district with the most substantial ties to the case but it is, rather, to evaluate whether the chosen district has a “substantial connection” to the case. Given the presence of MAE and MAO & G in this district and the defendants’ close and prolonged association with those companies, there is a “substantial connection” between the claims in this case and this district. Therefore, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue will be denied.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred, even if another district is also a proper venue.

Art Technology Group, Inc. v. Puritan's Pride, Inc. · filed 2010-05-27(a)(2)

In the instant case, such a review compels the conclusion that venue is proper in Massachusetts. As detailed above, the contract negotiations took place in significant part in Massachusetts, ATG performed a significant part of its duties in Massachusetts, extensive discussions took place in Massachusetts, payments were made into Massachusetts, and the contract was terminated through correspondence directed to Massachusetts. These facts, among others, make venue proper in Massachusetts.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if other districts have stronger connections to the claim.

Adams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2010-06-07(e)

In light of the foregoing, this court is convinced that the events alleged to have occurred in Massachusetts, together, constitute a substantial and consequential portion of the factual predicate giving rise to Plaintiffs claims. And the fact that there may be other judicial districts with greater connections to this action cannot suffice to overcome the strong presumption in favor of maintaining this lawsuit in Plaintiffs original choice of forum. Accordingly, this court must conclude that venue in this judicial district is proper.

Federal regulation of a defendant from a district does not make that district the location of the events giving rise to a claim under § 1391(b)(2).

Ulloa v. Mid Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union · filed 2010-03-04(b)(2)

However, that defendants do business under a regulatory regime overseen by the federal government has no bearing on the location of the events that gave rise to the foreclosure that plaintiff challenges in his complaint. Those events did not take place in the District of Columbia, but rather in the Northern District of New York, where the property at issue is located.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Enviroglas Products, Inc. v. Enviroglas Products, LLC · filed 2010-04-06(b)(2)

However, the court finds that venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires venue to be established for each claim based on a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to that claim.

Basile v. Walt Disney Co. · filed 2010-06-14(b)(2)

In a case such as this, for which subject matter jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 defines when venue is available. ... Since venue must be demonstrated with respect to each claim, the facts relating to custody proceedings in this district do not render venue proper for claims one through four, which are based on different facts occurring outside this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Doe v. Lucero · filed 2010-06-15(a)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). A review of the complaint shows that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" not in the District of Columbia, but in Salt Lake City, Utah and surrounding areas.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Leonard v. Mylan, Inc. · filed 2010-06-21(b)(2)

Nor is venue proper here under § 1391(b)(2). The events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims all occurred in the Western District of Michigan, not the Southern District of West Virginia. Ms. Leonard was prescribed the patch in Michigan, she filled her prescription there, she overdosed there, and she died there. Conversely, no material facts relating to the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in the Southern District of West Virginia. Therefore, the Western District of Michigan, rather than the Southern District of West Virginia, is the appropriate venue for this case.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Butler v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2010-07-09(a)(2)

After consideration of the Complaint and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that Venue in the District of South Carolina is also improper under 28 U.S.C. 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the claim even when another district also qualifies.

AVIVA LIFE AND ANNUITY CO. v. Goldstein · filed 2010-07-13(a)(2)

Several districts may qualify as a site of “substantial” activities for the purposes of § 1391(a)(2). ... Therefore, the Southern District of Iowa is a proper venue for this declaratory action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; an interview in a district may be insufficient when most relevant events occurred elsewhere.

Kapordelis v. Danzig · filed 2010-07-19(b)

The interview has relevance to those claims, but it is not, standing alone, a “substantial” part of the events giving rise to them when viewed alongside everything else that happened in Georgia and overseas.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if events also occurred elsewhere.

General Motors Co. v. DiNATALE · filed 2010-07-20(a)(2)

However, the events in this case took place in both states, with communications occurring by phone and the Internet. ... Venue is proper in this district, and there is no good reason to transfer venue.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events underlying the claim occurred, even if substantial events also occurred elsewhere.

Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc. · filed 2010-09-07(a)(2)

Under that provision, venue is not limited to the district with the most substantial events or omissions. ... Thus, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Duke Energy International, L.L.C. v. Napoli · filed 2010-09-21(a)(2)

Simply put, Duke has alleged ample facts to establish that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Duke’s claims occurred in this District. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(f)(1) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the district; incidental local contacts do not establish venue.

Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq · filed 2010-06-29(f)(1)

Accordingly, Wye Oak has failed to establish venue in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(l); and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4), the case will be transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sds Korea Co., Ltd. v. Sds USA, Inc. · filed 2010-08-04(b)(2)

Setting aside the admissibility problems with Plaintiffs evidence, none of the alleged events that give rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred in the Southern District of California. ... Because the Southern District of California is not a proper venue for Plaintiffs claims, its complaint is subject to dismissal.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, including online sales and customer relationships in the district.

JAGEX LIMITED v. Impulse Software · filed 2010-08-16(a)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in a district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... Here, the defendants’ promotion and sale of their Bots over the internet to Massachusetts residents, as well as the contacts and contractual relationships they have established with those residents, are sufficient to give rise to venue in this jurisdiction.

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

SJ Properties Suites v. Specialty Finance Group, LLC · filed 2010-08-25(a)(2)

This action focuses on the events surrounding the Milwaukee Project; therefore, venue is proper.

Signing a contract in a district does not alone establish venue there when the negotiations and events giving rise to the claims occurred elsewhere.

MB Financial Bank, N.A. v. Walker · filed 2010-09-23(a)(2)

Based on the parties’ affidavits, the only thing that happened in Illinois that has anything to do with this lawsuit is that Mr. Walker signed the agreement here. That, alone, is not enough. The fact that Mr. Walker flew to Illinois to sign some documents and then flew back to Nevada is not substantial when the agreements were solicited and negotiated in Nevada, the money went to a Nevada company, and all the purported wrongdoing concerning that money — the acts that truly gave rise to the Bank’s lawsuit— happened in Nevada.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where an injurious misrepresentation reaches the plaintiff through an intermediary who was meant to convey it.

Fox v. DREAM TRUST · filed 2010-09-28(a)(2)

To the extent that the claims arise out of the negotiations regarding the loan, an injurious misrepresentation knowingly conveyed through a third party to a party within the forum is sufficient to make this forum the proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) as “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

A district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim occurred may be a proper venue even if another district is also appropriate.

MacKAY v. Donovan · filed 2010-10-14(a)(2)

Venue does not have to be the “best forum” for the action, as multiple districts could be proper. ... However, Plaintiff Celebrity Foods, Inc. has its principal place of business within this District and the Settlement Agreement between the parties was entered into in this District at a time when Versa Card also had its principal place of business here. ... The Court will deny Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(3) motions because this Court may appropriately retain personal jurisdiction over all named parties in the litigation, and venue is proper.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if some relevant events occurred elsewhere.

TriState HVAC Equipment, LLP v. Big Belly Solar, Inc. · filed 2010-10-20(b)(2)

In this case, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [TriState’s] claim” occurred in this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, even if substantial activity also occurred elsewhere.

Pesmel North America, LLC v. Caraustar Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-11-24(a)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... Here, venue is proper based on the same factors relevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis: 1) the defendant faxed the Agreement to the plaintiff in Massachusetts for the plaintiffs signature, 2) the defendant repeatedly communicated by phone, mail and fax to the plaintiff in Massachusetts, 3) payments were made into Massachusetts, 4) there was an ongoing contractual relationship between the parties and 5) the contract was terminated through correspondence directed to Massachusetts.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where the insurer contracted to insure the plaintiff and the injury underlying the coverage claim occurred.

Malveaux v. CHRISTIAN BROTHERS SERVICES · filed 2010-11-30(a)(2)

Because Christian Brothers contracted to insure Sister Philomena in the District of Columbia and she was injured in that forum, the Court finds that venue is also proper pursuant to § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a diversity claim occurred.

Bederson v. United States · filed 2010-12-21(a)(2)

Additionally, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Count II occurred in Maryland: Dr. Bakshi’s and Bederson’s relationship was centered in Maryland and Dr. Bakshi performed Bederson’s esophagogastroduodenoscopy in Maryland.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; communications only tangential to a legal malpractice claim do not establish venue there.

Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory v. Ropes & Gray LLP · filed 2011-01-22(b)(2)

Thus, because the Defendants did not commit any of the alleged acts or omissions underlying the legal malpractice claim in the Eastern District of New York, and any relevant communications were tangential to the legal malpractice claim, venue is not proper in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Abuhouran v. Nicklin · filed 2011-02-11(b)

Few, if any, of the events giving rise to the claims made in Counts 1-9 occurred in the District of the District of Columbia. However, a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims against these defendants occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which USP Canaan is located. ... Therefore, venue is not proper in this judicial district, but is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if venue is also proper in another district.

Marley v. JETSHARES ONLY, LLC · filed 2011-02-14(a)(2)

The Court agrees with the plaintiff that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in this district. The fact that the plane was chartered to fly out of Miami and return to Miami and that the cancellation of the plaintiffs chartered flight took place while the plane was in Miami is sufficient to find that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, considering the entire sequence of events rather than only the event that prompted the suit.

Optos, Inc. v. TOPCON MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2011-03-07(a)(2)

In a diversity action, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... In this case, venue is proper in this district. Although Schafer’s misappropriation of Optos’ trade secrets arguably occurred in California, outside this judicial district, that misappropriation was merely the “triggering event” prompting Optos’ complaint; the entire sequence of events includes Schafer accessing those alleged trade secrets from computer servers in Massachusetts and acquiring additional confidential information on a thumb drive sent to him from Massachusetts. ... Accordingly, Massachusetts is a proper venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where communications directed to the district form the basis of the claim.

Kbr Inc. v. Chevedden · filed 2011-03-09(b)(2)

The basis for KBR’s claim is two letters Chevedden sent to Houston asking that his proposal be included in KBR’s proxy materials for its annual shareholder meeting in Houston. Because these letters form the basis of KBR’s claims, venue is appropriate in Houston.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, including the district where a required payment was not received.

American General Life Insurance v. Rasche · filed 2011-03-22(a)(2)

Rather, the General Agent Contract entered into with a Texas corporation is the source of American General’s right to relief, and Rasche’s alleged failure to repay unearned commissions thereunder is the omission giving rise to American General’s claim. This omission occurred when American General failed to receive repayment of the commission at its office in Houston, Texas.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to have occurred in the district for venue to be proper there.

Lopiccolo v. American University · filed 2011-03-31(a)(2)

Because nothing in the record occurred in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, let alone a substantial part of the acts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims, venue is improper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

MORO AIRCRAFT LEASING, INC. v. Keith · filed 2011-06-09(a)(2)

In this case, venue is proper as to Keith because he is a resident of Ohio, and he admits that the relevant contacts that give rise to Plaintiffs claims against him occurred in Ohio.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in a Bivens action and permits suit in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Gonzalez v. Hasty · filed 2011-06-22(b)

In a Bivens action, venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that where jurisdiction is not founded on diversity of citizenship, a civil action may be brought only in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if more of those events occurred in another district.

Treppel Ex Rel. Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Reason · filed 2011-06-27(a)(2)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, then, the Court finds that, while the most substantial portion of the relevant events giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia, at least a substantial part of the events did, in fact, take place in this district. Hence, the District of Columbia is a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) for plaintiffs claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Agri-Best Holdings, LLC v. Atlanta Cattle Exchange, Inc. · filed 2011-08-02(a)(2)

TACE’s challenge to venue is even more perfunctory than its challenge to personal jurisdiction, and is equally without merit, as the facts set forth above show that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where an allegedly defective product caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Kopfman v. Ensign Ribbon Burners, LLC · filed 2011-08-08(a)(2)

The explosion that caused Kopfman’s injuries took place in Illinois. As a result, a substantial part of the events giving rise to his claim occurred in the Northern District of Illinois, making this district a proper venue.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to occur in the chosen district; a tangential broadcast there does not suffice.

Stars for Art Production Fz, LLC v. Dandana, LLC · filed 2011-08-22(a)(2)

Subsection (a)(2) does not apply because the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs claim occurred outside of Massachusetts. ... The lone exception is Dish’s broadcast of the music channel signal into states all across the country, including Massachusetts. This exception, however, is a mere outgrowth and tangential to the sequence of events underlying Plaintiffs claims and therefore does not approach the requirement of being a “substantial” event.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including a district that received communications and documents related to the claim.

Schwarz v. Sellers Markets, Inc. · filed 2011-09-07(b)(2)

Section 1391(b)(2) provides that venue is proper in any district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). ... These circumstances are more than sufficient to establish venue in this District under § 1391(b)(2).

Reputational harm felt in a district does not establish venue under § 1391(b)(2) when the alleged unlawful acts occurred elsewhere.

Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. HIFI · filed 2011-09-12(b)(2)

Bel Canto argues only that it felt harm to its reputation in Minnesota. Without more, such harm is insufficient to support venue in this action.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; in a tort action, the place where the injury was felt is relevant.

Fiore v. Walden · filed 2011-09-12(b)(2)

Taking all these events together, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in Nevada. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Venue is proper in the District of Nevada.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including a district where the effects of the challenged conduct were felt.

Amazon.com, Inc. v. National Ass'n of College Stores, Inc. · filed 2011-09-26

In light of the court’s conclusion that the effects of NACS's NAD challenge were felt in this district, where Amazon’s principal place of business is located, NACS’s venue argument lacks merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (venue is appropriate in a "judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred").

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action when a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred in the district, considering the entire sequence of events.

Henderson v. Laser Spine Institute LLC · filed 2011-09-28(a)(2)

Looking to the entire sequence of events underlying his claim, many of the claims arise out of the Defendants’ contact with Mr. Henderson in Maine — fraud, unfair trade practices, fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as breach of the part of the contract that promised the Defendants would take all reasonable actions necessary to ensure insurance coverage. Given that a substantial part of Mr. Henderson’s claims took place in this state, the Court retains venue in the District of Maine.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Wills v. Rosenberg · filed 2011-09-30(b)(2)

As previously discussed, see Mem. Order (Sept. 7, 2010), venue is therefore proper in the Eastern District of Virginia because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Young v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2011-11-21(b)

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that venue is proper in the judicial district where defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. Defendant May does not reside in Washington D.C. and Plaintiffs allegations do not suggest that a substantial part of the events giving rise to his claims occurred in D.C. Consequently, the District of Columbia is an improper venue for Plaintiffs claims against Defendant May in his individual capacity.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

LOUISIANA FORESTRY ASS'N, INC. v. Solis · filed 2011-12-13(b)(2)

Accordingly, venue is proper in any district listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), including “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The DOL revised the H-2B wage rate as a direct result of the rulings and orders that took place in the litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; therefore venue of the present suit would be proper there.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including contract formation and the resulting injury.

Young Again Products, Inc. v. Acord · filed 2011-12-23(b)(2)

As to Acord, we find that venue in the District of Maryland was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which states that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.”