28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Dysart · filed 2008-12-01(a)(2)

Rather, a sufficiently substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in Arizona to render venue proper in Arizona under Section 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Chase Bank USA N.A. v. Hess Kennedy Chartered LLC · filed 2008-12-12(a)(2)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Delaware, and that venue is thus proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

ANSELL HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS LLC v. Tillotson Corp. · filed 2008-07-30(a)(2)

Venue in that District would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), which allows, in a case based on diversity of citizenship, venue in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.”

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

MacMunn v. Eli Lilly & Co. · filed 2008-06-19(a)(2)

Because complete diversity exists, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; because Massachusetts’s long-arm statute extends to torts allegedly committed in Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3; and because a substantial part of the events occurred in Massachusetts, this case could have been brought in Massachusetts, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b) and (e) do not establish venue where a federal official is named if the challenged conduct occurred in another district.

Marks v. Torres · filed 2008-09-18(b), (e)

The interpretation and implementation of the regulations occurred outside of this district, however. Plaintiff, then, cannot establish venue in this district either on the ground that he challenges an ICE policy or that a high-level ICE official based in Washington, D.C. is a named defendant. The Court concludes that venue is not proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Mulligan v. Frank Foundation Child Assistance International · filed 2008-10-27(a)(2)

Defendant Frank Foundation communicated with Plaintiffs from its office in Washington, D.C. while Plaintiffs were in both Russia and California, but never while Plaintiffs were in Florida. Thus, the second prong of 1391(a) does not allow for venue to be laid in the Middle District of Florida, as it was not home to “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim.”

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including relevant decisionmaking and a prior judgment.

Bank of New York v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2007-11-13(b)(2)

Venue was proper in the district court because the FDIC’s decisionmaking and the prior judgment constitute a “substantial part of the events . . . giving rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The FDIC sued on the basis of the district court’s earlier decision.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where communications tied to a claim form a substantial part of the events giving rise to it.

McQueen v. Woodstream Corp. · filed 2007-08-10(a)(2)

Because the defendant, a Pennsylvania company, initiated numerous telephonic conversations with the plaintiff in the District of Columbia, this district has substantial contacts with the plaintiffs cause of action, rendering it an appropriate venue for this matter.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other substantial events occurred elsewhere.

ANTHONY STERLING v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. · filed 2007-06-19(a)(2)

These constitute a substantial part of the acts giving rise to the claim, and therefore Connecticut could have been a proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if those allegations ultimately fail to prove the claim.

Transocean Group Holdings Pty Ltd. v. South Dakota Soybean Processors, LLC · filed 2007-08-31(a)(2)

For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient conduct in Minnesota to establish venue pursuant to § 1391(a)(2). The allegations are sufficient for venue even if they are ultimately determined to be insufficient as proof of plaintiffs’ underlying claims.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events or property at issue is located when the action can be brought elsewhere.

Perry v. Gray · filed 2007-10-15(b)

None of the defendants resides in this district — indeed, it appears that the Court would not have personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants, all of whom are individuals located in Florida. Moreover, plaintiffs identify no event or omission that occurred here, and the property that appears to be the subject of litigation is located in Florida. As a result, venue is not proper here, and dismissal is appropriate for this reason as well.

When all defendants reside in another state, § 1391(b)(2) permits venue only where a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Moss v. Chrones · filed 2007-05-23(b)(2)

Since all of the defendants reside in California, venue is proper in Utah only if it is where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The events giving rise to M r. M oss’s civil rights claim— the alleged wrongful seizures of his property and interference w ith his right of access to the courts— all occurred in California. Consequently, the District of Utah is not the proper venue to bring this action.

In a diversity case, venue is proper in a district with a substantial connection to the property at issue, including interpleaded funds.

Sentry Select Insurance v. LBL Skysystems (U.S.A), Inc. · filed 2007-05-18(a)(2)

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Because venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Solera/DCM’s Motion to Transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is denied.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Hsi Ip, Inc. v. Champion Window Manufacturing and Supply Co., Inc. · filed 2007-05-25(b)

Venue is permissible in Florida because it is “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated” pursuant to federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) requires a venue with a substantial connection to the litigation; courts need not identify the best venue.

Reliance Insurance Company v. Polyvision Corporation · filed 2007-01-17(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), courts are not, in general, required to determine the "best venue," but merely a logical one with a substantial connection to the litigation.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Joyner v. Reno · filed 2006-12-07(b)(2)

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) controls where venue lies in this case. And, under no scenario can it be said that “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred” in the District of Columbia. § 1391(b)(2). Rather, the substantial part (in fact all) of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, the site of Mr. Frank Joyner’s alleged murder.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not establish venue where only the product was manufactured when the other events giving rise to the claims occurred elsewhere.

Short v. Taser International, Inc. · filed 2006-12-08(b)(2)

Venue was not proper in Arizona because, except for the manufacture of the taser gun, the events giving rise to Short’s claims occurred in West Virginia.

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide a fallback venue when the action can be brought in a district where a substantial part of the events occurred under § 1391(b)(2).

Bunn v. Gleason · filed 2006-11-28(b)

Additionally, as plaintiffs appear to concede, a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s]” occurred in Massachusetts, suggesting that Massachusetts is the appropriate venue for the action pursuant to subsection (2) and thus rendering subsection (3) inapplicable. Therefore, even on the face of plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint and notwithstanding the outcome of any personal jurisdiction analysis, venue is not appropriate in Connecticut.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky · filed 2002-06-06(b)(2)

Thus, because a substantial portion of Defendants’ actions giving rise to Verizon’s claims occurred in Virginia and a substantial part of the property harmed by these actions occurred in Virginia, venue is proper in this forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the events giving rise to the claims, even if another district has more substantial activities.

Steelcase, Inc. v. Mar-Mol Co., Inc. · filed 2002-04-30(a)(2)

Thus, venue is proper in any district having a substantial connection with the events giving rise to the claim. ... The Court concludes that the Western District of Michigan easily meets the “substantial connection” requirement with respect to each of Steelcase’s claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Trinidad v. Pangelinan · filed 2002-03-19(a)(2)

The CNMI is the proper venue in this action because all of the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the CNMI. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) and (2).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial number of the events giving rise to the dispute occurred.

Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China · filed 2002-04-23

Accordingly, the district court correctly held that venue in the Southern District of Texas was proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, assuming the complaint’s allegations are true.

Strasen v. Strasen · filed 1995-08-23(a)(2)

In light of the 1990 and 1992 amendments to section 1391(a), which broadened the range of appropriate fora from those “where the claim arose” to include those where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” and assuming the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint are true, we conclude that the plaintiff has established that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the contract work giving rise to the claim occurred, even if work also occurred elsewhere.

Enviroplan, Inc. v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative · filed 1995-09-19(a)(2)

The plain meaning of the section leads the Court to conclude that venue in the Southern District of Indiana is proper. A review of the facts of the controversy establishes the statutorily required nexus with this forum. Plaintiff alleges that a substantial part of the events giving rise to this dispute occurred in Indianapolis. Plaintiff alleges that it expended 45% of its labor in performing the Contract at its Indianapolis facility, specifically in the design and manufacture of the CEMS, and expended the balance of its labor nearly equally on tasks relating to software customization in New Jersey and certification and support work in Oklahoma.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Frazier v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1995-10-20(b)(2)

It is clear from the record that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs claim occurred” at the LSP within the Middle District.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Seneca Insurance v. Commercial Transportation, Inc. · filed 1995-11-16(b)(2)

However, venue is proper in the Middle District because Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims occurred here.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if the contract was executed elsewhere.

Graf v. Tastemaker · filed 1995-12-15(a)(2)

Although the contract was executed in Ohio, the services under the agreement were to be performed in Colorado. Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiff moved to Colorado and performed all the services of the contract in this state. Moreover, the actions of the Defendant which Plaintiff claims constitute a breach of contract and wrongful discharge occurred through transmissions to Plaintiff in Colorado. Thus, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Geller Media Management, Inc. v. Beaudreault · filed 1996-01-10(a)(2)

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in New York, because much of the dispute concerns whether GMM performed under the contract. Therefore, venue in the Southern District of New York is proper.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim against a federal officer or agency occurred.

Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Babbitt · filed 1996-01-17(e)(2)

Since consultation is the responsibility of the Aberdeen Area Director in this case, and consultation usually occurs with the Aberdeen Area Director, the omission to consult occurred in this district. Further, the Aberdeen Area Office made the decision as to which positions would be subject to the RIF.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if more of the events occurred elsewhere.

Neufeld v. Neufeld · filed 1996-01-23(a)(2)

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) states that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” This provision does not require that plaintiffs establish that the Southern District has “the most substantial contacts to the dispute; rather it is sufficient that a substantial part of the events occurred [here], even if a greater part of the events occurred elsewhere.”

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action when the district has a substantial connection to the claim, even if significant events occurred elsewhere.

May Dept. Stores Co. v. Wilansky · filed 1995-09-19(a)(2)

The Court finds there is a substantial nexus between the events alleged by plaintiff to have occurred in Missouri and this cause of action, although significant events occurred outside this district as well. The Court concludes that venue is proper in this district as to defendant Wilansky under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Salpoglou v. SHLOMO WIDDER, MD, PA · filed 1995-09-26(a)(2)

Because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the breach of contract claim occurred in Massachusetts, venue is proper in this court.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where most of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Healy v. Phillips · filed 1995-11-01(a)(2)

Venue was proper in the Central District because most of the events giving rise to Healy's claims occurred in Los Angeles. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a)(2).

In a negligence action arising from a vehicle accident, medical treatment in another district does not make that district a place where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smith v. Fortenberry · filed 1995-11-20(a)(2)

Thus, nothing in provision (2) countenances plaintiffs proposition that medical treatment in Louisiana was “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim,” and nothing in the cited jurisprudence lends support to plaintiffs misguided epiphany that venue is applicable in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Section 1391(b)(2) focuses on the defendant’s relevant activities when determining where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; the plaintiff’s residence alone does not establish venue.

Woodke v. Dahm · filed 1995-11-28(b)(2)

We think it far more likely that by referring to “events or omissions giving rise to the claim,” Congress meant to require courts to focus on relevant activities of the defendant, not of the plaintiff. ... We therefore reject Mr. Woodke’s argument that venue lies in the Northern District of Iowa simply because that was where he was residing when the passing off occurred.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial connection between the district and the events giving rise to the claim; contract negotiations alone did not establish venue where the contract was executed, performed, and breached elsewhere.

PI, Inc. v. Quality Products, Inc. · filed 1995-12-22(a)(2)

Although § 1391(a)(2) permits venue to exist in more than one district, New York lacks the substantial nexus to the plaintiffs breach of contract claim that § 1391(a)(2) demands.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a claim in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to that claim occurred.

Jones v. Trump · filed 1996-03-27(b)

A district is a proper venue for a claim if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” there. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1994). ... The District of Connecticut is also an improper venue for the remaining claims against Klein and/or the municipal defendants.

Section 1391(b)(2) does not establish venue in a district where preliminary planning was insubstantial in relation to the events giving rise to the claims.

Andrade v. Chojnacki · filed 1996-04-03(b)(2)

The initial planning events do not constitute a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.

Venue is proper where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district is also a proper venue.

Figgie International, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc. · filed 1996-05-02(a)(2)

The court further agrees with Judge Norton’s holding in Sheppard, supra, that it is unnecessary that it find South Carolina to be the only district in which venue would be appropriate. A review of the activities that took place in Puerto Rico reveals that it too would be an appropriate forum and venue for this contractual dispute to be tried. This does not mean, however, that South Carolina is not also appropriate.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Winters-El v. Hawk · filed 1996-05-10(b)(2)

Yet venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" in the Southern District of Indiana.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; related claims arising elsewhere may be heard under pendent venue.

C.H. James & Co. v. Federal Food Marketers Co. · filed 1996-05-29(a)(2)

The Court concludes events that occurred in the Southern District of West Virginia were substantial and significant to this action. ... Furthermore, the alleged acts that occurred outside this district, which form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims of forgery and outrage, are appropriate for local consideration under the doctrine of pendent venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Henderson v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1996-03-19(b)(2)

Individual actions against AT & T could have been brought by Plaintiffs Hariyman, Hipp, and Talbert in the Districts to which AT & T seeks transfer because a substantial part of the actions giving rise to the Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in those Districts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, including a district where the plaintiff suffered substantial injury.

Kennett v. Business and Taxpayers · filed 1996-03-26(a)(2)

That alleged injury in New Hampshire constitutes a substantial event giving rise to the plaintiff's claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bounty-Full Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 1996-04-01(a)(2)

Venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas, when “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) (1996). ... Regardless of whether this Court eventually holds that the plaintiff may recover under its asserted causes of action, this Court finds that the letter in question constitutes a substantial part of the events giving rise to this lawsuit.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue for a breach-of-contract claim where the contract was formed, even if no breach or performance occurred there.

Saferstein v. Paul, Mardinly, Durham, James, Flandreau & Rodger, P.C. · filed 1996-06-10(a)(2)

Although it is not alleged that any breach occurred in New York, or that any part of the contract was to be performed in New York, the creation of the contract between the parties during Rodger’s visit to New Rochelle constitutes a substantial part of the events giving rise to the breach of contract claim. For the foregoing reasons, venue is proper in the Southern District of New York as to plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in each district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

PI, Inc. v. Ogle · filed 1996-07-10(a)(2)

The defendant claims that venue was proper in the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), which provides that venue lies where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). ... As explained above, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that a substantial part of the acts or omissions alleged in the amended complaint occurred in Florida. The fraud claim against Ogle concerns statements he allegedly made at the Toy Fair in New York. None of Ogle’s allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred in Florida.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; documents sent to a district and an arrest decision made there did not establish venue when the defendants' alleged misconduct and the arrest occurred elsewhere.

Barber v. Dennis J. Simpson Paul D. Kothcer Phyllis J. Nelson · filed 1996-08-23(b)(2)

Although Barber alleges that fraudulent documents were sent to, and the decision to have him arrested was made in the Western District of Missouri, these events do not constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to his Bivens claims against these defendants. Both the specific allegedly wrongful conduct of these defendants--the generation of false and fraudulent documents--and Barber's arrest occurred elsewhere.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where the events or omissions underlying the complaint occurred.

Van Loo v. Braun · filed 1996-09-05(b)

Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Wisconsin because the events or omissions that form the basis of the complaint occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Astorga v. Connleaf, Inc. · filed 1996-09-11(b)

Additionally, venue is proper in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if relevant events also occurred elsewhere.

Ervin and Associates, Inc. v. Cisneros · filed 1996-09-12(e)(2)

Ervin has born his burden of showing a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim in this action occurred or will occur in Colorado and that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) are satisfied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if relevant events also occurred elsewhere.

Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Bennett · filed 1996-09-24(b)(2)

Venue would lie in the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a “substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim[s]” asserted in this action occurred in the Northern District of Alabama.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Foy v. S.M.A. Ins. Agency · filed 1996-09-30(a)(2)

The court agrees with plaintiff that this evidence supplies the necessary predicate to support venue, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1392. The court therefore finds and herewith rules that defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where substantial events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, even if more occurred in another district.

Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. v. Beardmore · filed 1996-10-10(b)(2)

Under the new “substantial part of the events or omissions” language in § 1391(b)(2), there may be several districts that qualify for venue purposes. ... Although it appears that events or omissions giving rise to this action may have occurred in greater numbers in another district, since substantial events and omissions also occurred in this district, venue is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in each district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc. · filed 1996-10-17(b)

The current language of § 1391(b), however, recognizes that there may be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and that venue would be proper in each such district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if another district has more substantial events.

F.A.I. Electronics Corp. v. Chambers · filed 1996-11-04(a)(2)

Under that section there may be several districts that qualify for proper venue. ... Thus, a court need not determine which district was the site of the most substantial events or omissions. ... As applied to the case at bar, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) renders Massachusetts a proper venue in which to litigate this action.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Kafack v. Primerica Life Insurance · filed 1996-07-19(a)(2)

In the case at bar, venue is proper in Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) since the plaintiffs claims arise out of a nucleus of facts that, for the most part, took place in Maryland.

Section 1391(2) allows venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Alex M. Wade, Jr. v. Farmers Insurance Group · filed 1996-08-30(2)

Section 1391(2) allows for venue in Indiana since that is where "a substantial part of the events [the accident] ... giving rise to the claim occurred."

Section 1391(e)(2) requires a substantial connection between the district and the events giving rise to the claim; the plaintiffs’ business decisions and harm felt there did not establish venue.

Seariver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Pena · filed 1996-09-06(e)(2)

In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ decisions in Houston regarding the S/R Mediterrean and the harm felt in Houston by the vessel’s inability to sail to Prince William Sound also do not bear a sufficiently substantial connection to the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Estate of Bussell · filed 1996-09-30(a)(2)

However, because we have found that this action is properly characterized as a tort action, and the collision occurred in this district, we must conclude that venue is proper in this district under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a Lanham Act claim where a substantial part of the defendant’s sales and marketing of the allegedly misleading product occurred.

Joint Stock Society "Trade House of Descendants of Peter Smirnoff, Official Purveyor to the Imperial Court" v. Heublein, · filed 1996-08-02(b)

Thus, venue is proper in this district if a “substantial part” of the defendant’s sales and marketing of its allegedly misleading product occurred in Delaware. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... These facts more than support the conclusion that a “substantial part” of defendants’ sales and marketing of Smirnoff® vodka have occurred in Delaware.

Section 1391(b) focuses the venue inquiry in a trademark case on the defendant’s infringing activities in the district; maintaining accounts there does not establish substantial activity.

D'Anton Jos, S.L. v. Doll Factory, Inc. · filed 1996-09-10(b)

Similarly, we reject D’Anton’s argument that J.C. Toys’ maintaining of accounts in New York amounts to substantial activity here. This interpretation would dilute the purpose of the venue statute which focuses on the defendant’s infringing activities rather than its internal administration.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Karriem v. American Kennel Club · filed 1996-12-30(b)(2)

In view of the fact that the incidents constituting the major part of the events at issue here — the encounter with the State Park Police and the FLKC disciplinary action — took place in the Western District of New York and form the basis for the subsequent events involving the AKC, there is no doubt that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district and that venue therefore would be appropriate there as to all defendants.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district with a substantial connection to the claim, even when the injury occurred elsewhere.

Purnell v. Shoreway Acres Resort · filed 1997-03-10(a)(2)

It was these same contacts that led plaintiff to be at Shoreway, where she fell and broke her hip. Therefore, as applied to the case at bar, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) renders New Hampshire a proper venue in which to litiqate this action.

Section 1391(a) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim to have occurred in the district when venue is based on those events.

Woodward Park Imaging, Inc. v. Iwamoto · filed 1997-03-12(a)

Woodward Park’s complaint is devoid of any allegations that indicate that its claim arose, in substantial part, in Illinois. Iwamo-to’s affidavit, in contrast, sets forth the events preceding Woodward Park’s lawsuit, and establishes that most of the events took place in eastern California. Therefore, venue is not proper in this district, but lies in the judicial district encompassing eastern California and specifically, Fresno.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Co. v. Shank · filed 1997-01-16(a)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), in that the events giving rise to the claim asserted by Nationwide arose in the County of Lancaster, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which is included within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Central Sports Army Club v. Arena Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-01-20(a)(2)

Here, plaintiffs have shown that a substantial part of the events giving rise to their claims occurred in New York. ... Thus, the Court finds that venue is proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

YYY Corp. v. Timothy Flynn, et al. · filed 1997-03-18(a)(2)

Together, these factors demonstrate that the events giving rise to YYY Corporation’s action occurred in New Hampshire and venue in this district is proper.

Under § 1391(a)(2), a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim may occur in more than one district, making venue proper in each.

Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Motor Sport, Inc. · filed 1997-04-15(a)(2)

This argument ignores the fact that a “substantial part” of the events or omissions can occur in more than one place, and thus, that venue can be proper in more than one district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred or a substantial part of the property at issue is situated.

Shore Slurry Seal, Inc. v. CMI Corp. · filed 1997-05-12(a)(2)

Venue is proper in “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). The parties signed the sales agreement in New Jersey. Moreover, defendant shipped the equipment to New Jersey, where it now remains. We find that these events constitute a substantial part of the events giving rise to the breach of *155 contract claim. Therefore, we find that venue is proper in New Jersey.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred; advertising and sales in the district can satisfy that requirement for a trademark claim.

Gary Scott International, Inc. v. Baroudi · filed 1997-11-13(b)(2)

These facts are sufficient to find that a substantial part of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in Massachusetts. Therefore, I find that venue is proper in this district and I deny defendant’s motions to dismiss and to transfer the case to the Southern District of California.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a claim occurred.

Brink v. Ecologic, Inc. · filed 1997-11-14(b)(2)

A substantial part of the events underlying plaintiffs state law claims did not occur in Michigan; rather, they occurred in Illinois.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Elbeco Inc. v. Estrella De Plato, Corp. · filed 1997-12-29(a)(2)

It appears that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. Further, this Court has found that all of the defendants had sufficient contacts with this District to be subject to personal jurisdiction. Therefore, we find venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; medical treatment in a district does not establish venue when the alleged negligence occurred elsewhere.

Wisland v. Admiral Beverage · filed 1997-07-16(a)(2)

Wisland claims that venue was proper under (a)(2), however, because a substantial part of the events giving rise to her damage claims occurred in Wisconsin where she received the majority of her medical treatment. She cites no authority for this proposition, and the events giving rise to her action involve the alleged negligence of the defendants in South Dakota, not the nature of her medical treatment in Wisconsin. ... Venue therefore did not lie in Wisconsin so the transfer had to have been under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and the law of the transferee court should be applied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Animation Station, Ltd. v. Chicago Bulls, LP · filed 1998-01-27(b)(2)

Likewise, venue would be proper in the Northern District because it is apparent even from the face of the Complaint that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

F.J. Joseph, Inc. v. Lida Advertising, Inc. · filed 1998-01-30(a)(2)

Moreover, plaintiff demonstrates that venue in this district is proper because a substantial part of the events giving rise its claim occurred here.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Specific Innovations, Inc. v. Gromm · filed 1998-03-31(a)(2)

Venue in a diversity action is proper in a "district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The district court's mischaracterization of SI's action as solely a contracts case apparently caused it to misapply that standard. The district court should have exercised specific jurisdiction over Anvils; venue was proper as to all defendants.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits a diversity action in any district with a substantial connection to the claim, even if another district has stronger connections.

First of Michigan Corporation Michael Sobol v. Carlton Bramlet Dolores M. Bramlet · filed 1998-04-03(a)(2)

In light of the amended language of § 1391(a)(2), we hold that in diversity of citizenship cases the plaintiff may file his complaint in any forum where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim arose; this includes any forum with a substantial connection to the plaintiff’s claim.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Harry Miller Co. v. Carr Chem Inc. · filed 1998-04-13(a)(2)

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). As already noted a “substantial part of the events or omissions” giving rise to this lawsuit have occurred in Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, but limited contacts with a district do not establish proper venue there.

Verbis v. Iowa Dept. of Human Services · filed 1998-04-30(b)

Under the amended statute, venue is proper not merely where the claim arose, but in any district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Under the circumstances, the court concludes that these extremely limited contacts are insufficient to establish that venue is proper in this court.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a defendant allegedly failed to make a required contractual payment, even if significant events occurred in another district.

TruServ Corp. v. Neff · filed 1998-06-02(a)(2)

Section 1391(a)(2) provides that venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. ... Because the alleged failure to perform a contractual duty in Illinois gives rise to the breach of contract claim, venue is proper even though the defendants activities in another forum might be more significant.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a breach-of-contract claim occurred, even if the contract was to be performed in another district.

Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc. · filed 1998-06-02(a)(2)

Thus, to the extent that these events occurred anywhere, they occurred almost as much in Kansas as in Alabama. Therefore, the court concludes that “a substantial part” of the relevant events occurred in Kansas. Accordingly, venue is proper in Kansas, and defendant’s motion' to dismiss for lack of venue is denied.

Section 1391(a)(2) does not make a district a proper venue merely because a plaintiff receives medical treatment there after an injury that occurred elsewhere.

Rodriguez-Torres v. American Airlines Corp. · filed 1998-06-08(a)(2)

Plaintiffs assert that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to their claims occurred in Puerto Rico, and that venue is proper under § 1391(a)(2). The Complaint demonstrates otherwise, however. The entire occurrence from which this action arises took place on the escalator at Miami International Airport. ... Therefore venue does not lie under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) does not permit venue in a district where none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred and none of the property at issue was located.

Gray v. Millers Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-02-24(a)(2)

Nor is venue proper in the Western District of New York in accordance with subsection (2), because none of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred here, nor was any part of the property that is the subject of the action located here.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue for a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, including substantial negotiation, drafting, or execution of the contracts underlying them.

ESI, Inc. v. Coastal Power Production Co. · filed 1998-03-02(a)(2)

Venue may be proper in the district where the contract was substantially negotiated, drafted, and/or executed, even if the contract was not to be performed in that district and the alleged breach occurred elsewhere. ... The Court finds that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York as to all claims which survive the present motion, and therefore denies Coastal’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Saltzman v. Louisiana Auction Exchange, Inc. · filed 1998-03-20(a)(2)

As both New Rochelle and New York City are in the Southern District of New York, this Court finds that a substantial part of the events that give rise to plaintiff’s action occurred in this District, making this a proper venue for the case at bar.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if venue also lies in another district.

Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc. · filed 1998-04-24(a)(2)

While the estate is correct that venue would lie in the Northern District of Illinois under subsection 1391(a)(1), that does not mean that venue is improper here. According to the complaint and plaintiffs’ affidavits, a substantial portion of the underlying events occurred in Wisconsin between Michael and his relatives, satisfying subsection 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

Universal Marine Medical Supply, Inc. v. Lovecchio · filed 1998-06-30(a)(2)

The majority of the relevant acts enumerated in plaintiffs complaint occurred in New York. Therefore, venue on this claim is proper in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the omissions giving rise to a claim occurred, including a failure to provide contracted services in the district.

Trans National Travel, Inc. v. Sun Pacific International, Inc. · filed 1998-07-06(a)(2)

The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant breached its contractual obligations by failing to provide air charter services in Massachusetts. Hence, a substantial part of the omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Massachusetts. Venue is proper in the District of Massachusetts and Section 1406 is inapplicable.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Amermed Corp. v. Disetronic Holding AG · filed 1998-07-21(a)(2)

The primary federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 permits a diversity action to be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Certainly, within the meaning of those provisions of federal law permitting dismissal for “improper” venue, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), or of a case laying venue in the “wrong” division or district, see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), venue in this Court is not statutorily defective.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred.

Figawi, Inc. v. Horan · filed 1998-07-21(a)(2), (b)(2)

In Part III above, I have determined that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to those claims as to which plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of in personam jurisdiction over defendant took place in Massachusetts. ... For those reasons, I conclude that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including officials’ enforcement efforts directed into the district.

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Antt · filed 1998-08-28(b)(2)

Venue is proper here if “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (Supp.1998). The defendants argue that the substantial part of events giving rise to the claim—the enforcement of their regulations—occurred in their states. The court disagrees. Stroman complains of what the defendants have done in Texas: trying to regulate business he does in Texas with non-Californians and non-Floridians that happen to involve property in the defendant states. The contested regulation has included sending letters to Stroman and invoking Texas government to regulate Stro-man. Venue in this district is wholly proper.

Venue is proper where the events giving rise to a claim have a substantial connection to the district, even if more events occurred elsewhere.

United States Surgical Corp. v. Imagyn Medical Technologies, Inc. · filed 1998-09-10(a)(2)

Thus, venue is proper in Connecticut. Although a greater number of events took place in California, Tamura’s negotiation and execution of his contract in Connecticut, along with his training and sporadic visits here, create a sufficiently significant connection to the state to render venue proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where communications negotiating a contract were a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim.

U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co. · filed 1998-09-25(b)

We also hold that venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... These faxes reflect “a substantial part of the events” giving rise to the present claim because the action alleges the creation of a binding charter party through these writings.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including the negotiation and execution of the contracts at issue.

MCNIC Oil & Gas Co. v. IBEX RESOURCES CO., LLC · filed 1998-09-28(a)(2)

However, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” has occurred in Michigan, to wit: the negotiation and execution of the three principal agreements. For this reason, venue is proper in this district and this Court will not dismiss the case for lack of venue.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if more events occurred elsewhere.

Gwynn v. TransCor America, Inc. · filed 1998-10-21(b)(2)

Because jurisdiction is not based solely upon diversity of citizenship, a civil action “may ... be brought ... in ... (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under this provision, several districts may qualify as the location of substantial events. ... Because the events that allegedly took place in Colorado could support Gwynn’s claim even without the events alleged to have occurred in other states, they form a substantial portion of the events giving rise to her claim.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to the action occurred.

Guadamud v. Dentsply International, Inc. · filed 1998-08-10

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to the action occurred here.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Continental Insurance v. Garrison · filed 1998-08-17(a)(2)

The Garrisons’ argument that venue is improper in this district overlooks the fact that the events which give rise to the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants made material misrepresentations all occurred in Sheboygan, Wisconsin which is in the eastern district of Wisconsin.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smart v. Goord · filed 1998-08-19(b)(2)

The events giving rise to Ms. Smart’s habeas claims occurred in the District of New Hampshire, as she asserts that her constitutional rights were violated during her trial and sentencing there. Therefore, venue is proper in the District of New Hampshire under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in the district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Roll v. Tracor, Inc. · filed 1998-09-18(a)(2)

Here, it is clear under § 1391(a)(2) that venue would have been proper in Nevada at the time of the filing of the complaint because the accident which gave rise to the claim occurred in Nevada.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if the defendant lives and does business in another district.

J & J Manufacturing, Inc. v. Logan · filed 1998-09-18(b)(2)

Clearly, Plaintiff J & J seeks to establish venue under the second method emphasized above. Accepting as true the well-pled allegations of Plaintiff J & J, Defendant Logan approached Plaintiff J & J in the Eastern District of Texas in order to procure the services of the machine manufacturer. All of the machinery at issue (specifically, the meat sheer allegedly taken from J & J) was conceived, designed, and manufactured in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including where the alleged contract was negotiated and formed.

Paley v. Estate of Ogus · filed 1998-09-30(a)(2)

A diversity case may also, however, be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Plaintiffs assert that a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in the District of Columbia because the alleged oral contract was negotiated and formed here. ... The Court concludes that venue is appropriate in this Court and denies defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where the allegedly infringing articles were designed and manufactured.

Dakotah, Inc. v. Tomelleri · filed 1998-09-30(b)(2)

Venue in a declaratory judgment action for copyright invalidity and non-infringement is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c). ... Based upon the record before the Court, the alleged infringing articles were designed and manufactured in the District of South Dakota. The copyrights themselves are on record with the United States copyright office. Venue is proper in the District of South Dakota.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Madison Three, Inc. · filed 1998-10-13(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue is proper in Maryland if “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim” occurred in Maryland. I agree with Choice that the statutory test is satisfied. The agreements under which suit is brought were formed in Maryland and Choice secured its right to institute suit by performing its contractual duties in this state. Thus, defendants’ challenge to venue in this district fails.

In a diversity action, venue is proper under § 1391(a)(2) where the agreement was executed and a substantial part of the alleged acquisition of confidential information occurred, even if other alleged conduct occurred elsewhere.

Babn Technologies Corp. v. Bruno · filed 1998-11-10(a)(2)

Accordingly, I find that BABN has sufficiently alleged that “a substantial part” of the events giving rise to its claims “occurred” within Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(b) makes venue facially proper when at least one defendant sold allegedly infringing products in the district.

Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Inc. · filed 1998-11-16(b)

Venue is facially proper to the extent that at least one of the defendants sold some allegedly infringing power tools in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to a diversity claim occurred, even if venue is also proper in another district.

Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. v. Rosenblatt · filed 1998-12-22(a)(2)

In this case, the same facts that make personal jurisdiction proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina make venue proper in this district. The license agreements in question took effect upon their acceptance and execution by Hardee’s in North Carolina. The omissions which are the focus of this case are Defendants’ alleged failures to pay certain fees into Hardee’s Treasury Department in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. While venue would clearly be proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in this case, it is also proper here.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Idaho Potato Commission v. M & M Produce Farms & Sales · filed 1999-01-22(b)

... the Court holds that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the G & T’s and Hapco’s claims occurred within the district. Thus, venue is proper.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in more than one district when a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in each.

Schomann International Corp. v. Northern Wireless, Ltd. · filed 1999-01-26(a)(2)

Because § 1391(a)(2) provides that “there can be more than one district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise the claim occurred,” venue can properly exist in more than one district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, including contract performance and negotiations.

Key Motorsports, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, L.L.C. · filed 1999-01-27(a)(2)

Moreover, Key’s auto racing team, which was the subject of the Agreement, was based in Rowan County, and the Agreement was negotiated, at least in part, in Rowan County. Therefore, “a substantial part of the events or omission giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Republic Mortgage Insurance v. Brightware, Inc. · filed 1999-02-05(a)(2)

Venue also is proper, for according to the allegations of the Complaint, a substantial part of the events giving rise to RMIC’s claims occurred in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, which is located in the Middle District of North Carolina.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity case where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. v. New England Insurance · filed 1999-02-16(a)(2)

Venue is proper in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this judicial district.

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Harrison v. Union Pacific R. Co. · filed 1999-03-11(a)(2)

Therefore, this action might have been brought in the judicial district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). As set forth above, the truck-train collision occurred in Poinsett County, Arkansas, which is in the Eastern District of Arkansas.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where events in the district played a substantial role in the circumstances giving rise to the claim.

Hudye Soil Services, Inc. v. Tyler · filed 1999-04-08(a)(2)

Here, Mr. Tyler’s conversations with Mr. Walker did not play a substantial role in the circumstances leading up to plaintiffs claim for damages to its combines. ... Therefore, as to Mr. Walker and Mr. Baker, proper venue lies only in Arizona.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Old Republic Insurance v. Hansa World Cargo Service, Inc. · filed 1999-06-01(a)(2)

It is undisputed that a substantial part of the events or omissions pertaining to the instant claims occurred in New York. ... Thus, ORIC’s choice of venue was not inappropriate.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; an injury there does not establish venue if it was not an event giving rise to that claim.

Sadighi v. Daghighfekr · filed 1999-01-05(b)(2)

However, Sadighi’s injury in this state was not an event that gave rise to his claim for a RICO violation against the Sealy Defendants within the meaning of section 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if related events occurred elsewhere.

Rothstein v. Carriere · filed 1999-03-24(a)(2)

In sum, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred here, and venue is proper in the Eastern District of New York.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Carekeeper Software Development Co. v. Silver · filed 1999-04-28(a)(2)

Plaintiff asserts, and this court agrees, however, that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. As discussed above, it appears to the court that Defendant had many contacts with Georgia related to his employment, and it is his employment and discharge by Plaintiff that gives rise to this action. Accordingly, the court finds that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, and a well-pleaded common scheme can make the defendants’ actions attributable to one another for that determination.

Heinrich Ex Rel. Heinrich v. Sweet · filed 1999-04-30(b)

Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether venue was proper in New York, this Court holds that the allegation of a common scheme between the defendants was well-pled.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Qwest Communications International, Inc. v. Thomas · filed 1999-06-10(a)(2)

Thus, venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) since a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim for relief occurred in Denver.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if other relevant events occurred elsewhere.

Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Raymond E. Wallace Special Productions, Inc. · filed 1999-06-22(b)(2)

However, the substantiality requirement of Section 1391(b)(2) exists “to preserve the element of fairness so that a defendant is not haled into a remote district having no real relationship to the dispute.” ... Therefore, since this forum has a real relationship to the action and a substantial part of the events which led to this action occurred here, it is fair to hale Wallace into this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

American v. Hayhurst, et al. · filed 1999-06-23(a)(2)

Under the circumstances of this case. New Hampshire is an appropriate venue if "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" in this forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Based upon the record before the court, it is apparent that a substantial number of the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims did, in fact, occur in this forum. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss based upon improper forum is denied.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

First Union National Bank v. United States · filed 1999-06-25(b)(2)

We note that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Philadelphia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Reilly Industries, Inc. · filed 1999-06-30(b)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Velsicol maintains a facility in this district and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Just Wood Industries, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1999-07-29(a)(2)

An action may be brought in a “judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). In this case, the master surety agreement was signed and the bonded work performed on the FWS project in the Northern District of West Virginia.

Section 1391 permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, even if the defendant’s activities were more substantial elsewhere.

McDonald's Licensee Prototype Welfare Plan v. Boldt, Inc. · filed 1999-08-02(a)(2), (b)(2)

The allegations in the complaint together with Ms. Saucier’s affidavit also indicate that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise [to] the claim occurred” in this district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(2) and (b)(2). Certifications of Ms. Morris’ eligibility and monthly coverage payments were sent here and processed here; the insurance claims were also processed here. Because this district’s contacts are substantial, venue is proper “notwithstanding the possibility that [Boldt’s] activities may have been more substantial elsewhere.”

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if another district had more substantial activity.

Wempe v. Sunrise Medical HHG, Inc. · filed 1999-08-26(b)

The court finds that venue is proper in Kansas, even though the defendant’s activities in Texas may have been more substantial.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue for a contract claim where substantial events occurred, including performance of the contract, and for a tort claim where the injury occurred.

Reynolds Corp. v. National Operator Services, Inc. · filed 1999-09-22(a)(2)

When determining, in the context of a contract claim, whether venue is appropriate under section 1391(a)(2), “courts consider a number of factors, including where the contract was negotiated or executed, where it was to be performed, and where the alleged breach occurred.” ... The Court finds that venue as to the contract claims is proper in this district. Although there appears to be some dispute as to where and how the contract was negotiated, it is clear that Reynolds’ performance under the contract occurred in this district. ... The Court is also convinced that venue is proper for Reynolds' tort claims. Although the tortious conduct arguably occurred in Maryland, plaintiffs injuries, albeit economic in nature, occurred in this district.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Armco Inc. v. North Atlantic Ins. Co. Ltd. · filed 1999-09-30(b)

The Court also concludes that venue in this district is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving ris,e to the claim occurred” in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Loudon Plastics, Inc. v. Brenner Tool & Die, Inc. · filed 1999-11-09(a)(2)

For the reasons stated below, however, the Court finds that venue is proper in the Northern District of New York pursuant to § 1391(a)(2). ... Witnesses abound in this case in both Pennsylvania and New York, the product was to be delivered here, Plaintiffs purchase orders originated in New York, and various issues relating to the transaction were negotiated in this state. Plaintiff has therefore established sufficient grounds to uphold venue in this district.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Diamond Offshore Co. v. a & B BUILDERS, INC. · filed 1999-11-16(b)(2)

The propriety of venue is here governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), which provides that where jurisdiction over a civil action “is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship”, venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” ... The Court finds that a substantial part of the underlying events or omissions occurred within the Southern District, and thus venue is proper within this District.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a diversity claim to occur in the district; an event only tangentially related to the claim does not establish venue.

Goff v. Hackett Stone Co. · filed 1999-06-17(a)(2)

The issuance of the order from an Oklahoma court that allegedly led to the discharge is simply too tangential to be considered a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, even when another district is also a proper venue.

Beveridge v. Mid-West Management, Inc. · filed 1999-08-24(b)(2)

As an initial matter, we agree with defendant that our inquiry on this issue boils down to determining, under § 1391(b)(2), where a substantial part of the acts giving rise to these claims occurred. ... Similarly, because it is evident that either Wisconsin, where the alleged contractual breaches, tortious acts and passing-off occurred, or Illinois, where the contracts at the root of these claims were negotiated and performed, is a proper venue, we need not look to § 1391(b)(3).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where substantial events underlying the claim occurred, even if substantial events also occurred in another district.

Superior Precast, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America · filed 1999-10-04(a)(2)

The fact that substantial events or omissions also occurred in the Western District does not affect whether substantial events occurred in this district. Such events did occur here and that is sufficient for § 1391(a)(2) purposes.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim to have occurred in the chosen district.

Medquist MRC, Inc. v. Dayani · filed 1999-11-30(a)(2)

For proper venue to lie in the Northern District of Ohio, MedQuist must show that a substantial part of the events giving rise to its claims occurred in the Northern District of Ohio. Based upon its allegations, MedQuist has not satisfied the “substantial part” test.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Clark v. Kick · filed 2000-01-07(a)(2)

Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees, that venue is proper under § 1391(a)(2), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue in more than one district if a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in each.

PKWare, Inc. v. Meade · filed 2000-01-07(b)(2)

Under the amended law, however, venue may be proper in more than , one district as long as a “substantial” part of the key events or omissions occurred in the district.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Toledo Peoria & Western Railway Corp. v. Southern Illinois Railcar Co. · filed 2000-02-03(a)(2)

Section 1391(a)(2), however, permits venue in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred .... ” As discussed above, the renewal of the contract containing the option clause took place in New York and for purposes of § 1391 venue properly lies in this District.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ciena Corporation v. Jarrard · filed 2000-02-11(a)(2)

We readily conclude that a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise” to CIENA’s claims occurred in the District of Maryland, providing venue there under § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred, even if events in that district did not predominate.

Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2000-03-13(b)(2)

Section 1391(b)(2) does not require that a majority of the events have occurred in the district where suit is filed, nor does it require that the events in that district predominate.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue for a libel claim in a district where the publication circulated and the plaintiff experienced the alleged harm.

Miracle v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc. · filed 2000-03-14(a)(2)

Here, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Defendants do not dispute that the Post circulated newspaper subscriptions in Hawaii, where Plaintiff resides. In addition, according to Plaintiff, the harm she experienced as a result of the article occurred in Hawaii.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the claim even if more significant events occurred elsewhere.

Dorsey v. American Golf Corp. · filed 2000-04-05(b)

The venue statute does not require that the “most significant” event giving rise to the controversy occur in the forum. ... The Court is satisfied that Michigan has a substantial connection to plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue shall be denied.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district with a substantial connection to the events giving rise to the claim.

ALTA Analytics, Inc. v. Muuss · filed 1999-12-08(a)(2)

The evidence has established that Ohio has a substantial connection given the contractual relationship that gave rise to the cause of action. Thus, venue is proper in this Court pursuant to § 1391(a)(2).

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Longo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-12-18(a)(2)

Venue in the District of Arizona would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), as it is the district in which a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires the plaintiff to show that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the chosen district, with venue proper for every defendant.

Overland, Inc. v. Taylor · filed 2000-01-20(b)(2)

This Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that venue is proper in this judicial district under § 1391(b)(2). ... venue must be proper with respect to all Defendants, which Plaintiff has not shown.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Brock Supply Co. v. Moulding Associates, Inc. · filed 2000-01-31(a)(2)

The Court observes that given the facts of this case and the defenses raised by MAI, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Puerto Rico. Brock alleges that MAI breached its contractual obligations by failing to honor an exclusive distributorship agreement to serve to Puerto Rico market. Accordingly, venue is proper in Puerto Rico.

Section 1391(b)(2) requires a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim to occur in the district; local sales and losses do not establish venue when the challenged conduct occurred elsewhere.

McDaniel v. IBP, Inc. · filed 2000-03-21(b)(2)

The court finds, therefore, that the conduct which the Plaintiffs have identified as occurring in Alabama is not a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims.

Section 1391(a)(2) focuses on the defendant’s activities when determining where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

I.M.D. USA, Inc. v. Shalit · filed 2000-04-14(a)(2)

Moreover, the fact that the events and omissions most closely related to the alleged breach-Shalit’s failure to pay for or return the diamonds-unmistakably occurred in South Carolina is material, as the focus under Section 1391(a)(2) is on the activities of the defendant, not the plaintiff.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the omission giving rise to the claim occurred.

Diagnostic Radiology Associates, P.C. v. Jeffrey M. Brown, Inc. · filed 2000-05-10(a)(2)

In a single defendant action in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, as is the case here, venue, so far as is relevant for present purposes, lies only in a judicial district in which (1) the defendant resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. ... Thus, a substantial part of the omission giving rise to the claim that respondent improperly has failed to submit to arbitration as the parties agreed occurred in the Eastern District of. New York.

Section 1391(b)(2) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; a stated place of delivery does not establish venue there without evidence that the goods arrived.

Korea Express USA, Inc. v. K.K.D. Imports, Inc. · filed 2000-06-01(b)(2)

Similarly, § 1391(b)(2) does not control because Korea Express is entirely a New Jersey corporation, Am. Comp. ¶ 3, and KKD operated out of Carlstadt, New Jersey, “from 1996 to May 1999,” Park Aff. ¶ 1. ... Although the bills of lading indicate that New York is the “place of delivery,” Pl. Mem. Ex. A, there is no evidence that they ever reached New York. ... As a result, Southern District of New York has no “substantial” connection to this claim.

Section 1391(a)(2) permits venue in a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2000-06-26(a)(2)

The basic venue statute provides that venue is proper in a judicial district “in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Under this standard, the court finds that venue is proper in the Northern District of California.