28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(d) tolls limitations on supplemental state law claims during an appeal of the related federal claims as of right until the federal appellate court issues its mandate, followed by a 30-day period to refile in state court.

Sales v. City of Tustin · filed 2021-06-08(d)

Because the Ninth Circuit may sua sponte modify or revoke its decision on appeal at any time up to, including, and indeed after it denies a party’s petition for rehearing, we conclude Sales’s appeal was pending until the appellate court issued its mandate on December 5, 2018. Sales therefore timely refiled her state claims within the 30-day tolling window afforded by section 1367(d) when she refiled her case in the superior court on December 19, 2008.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state claims through an appeal as of right until the federal appellate court issues its mandate, followed by a 30-day period to refile.

Sales v. Tustin · filed 2021-06-28(d)

Because the Ninth Circuit may sua sponte modify or revoke its decision on appeal at any time up to, including, and indeed after it denies a party’s petition for rehearing, we conclude Sales’s appeal was pending until the appellate court issued its mandate on December 5, 2018. Sales therefore timely refiled her state claims within the 30-day tolling window afforded by section 1367(d) when she refiled her case in the superior court on December 19, 2008.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a state-law claim while it is pending in federal court, including during a federal appeal.

Uebelacker, Barbara v. Rock Energy Cooperative · filed 2022-06-07(d)

The statute of limitations on a state-law claim is tolled while it is pending in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). And state courts have uniformly concluded that claims remain “pending” throughout the plaintiff’s federal appeal for the purposes of tolling state statutes of limitation.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims when the alleged acts are sufficiently related to the original action.

McMillan v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. · filed 2001-07-13(a)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the alleged acts of the son are sufficiently related to the original case to provide supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claims.

Section 1367(b) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s third-party claim against a nondiverse party when the claim arises from the same nucleus of operative fact.

Grimes v. Mazda North American Operations Ford Motor Company · filed 2004-03-15(b)

The supplemental jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), states congressional intent to prevent original plaintiffs — but not defendants or third parties — from circumventing the requirements of iversity. ... Accordingly, diversity was not destroyed when the Department was added as a third-party defendant and the district court properly retained subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a defendant to implead a third-party defendant of the same citizenship as the plaintiff without destroying diversity jurisdiction.

DeCoursey v. The Sherwin-Williams Company · filed 2019-11-21(a)

While Defendant did not address whether this would destroy diversity jurisdiction, this Court, based on several cases from this District, does not believe diversity jurisdiction would be destroyed by Defendant impleading a third party, pursuant to Rule 14, of the same citizenship as Plaintiff.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party demand without an independent jurisdictional basis when the court has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s complaint.

Gamma Construction Co Inc v. Franks International L L C · filed 2021-07-28

This Court notes that Gulf Coast’s argument regarding the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction lacks merit. “When a federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party demand under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and ‘there need be no independent jurisdictional basis for such a claim.’”

Section 1367 does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over an improperly brought third-party complaint that alleges no direct basis for the third-party defendant’s liability to the defendant.

Morris v. Lenihan · filed 2000-05-02(a)

However, if a third-party complaint is not properly brought, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction, and the complaint should be dismissed. ... Because there is no direct line of liability between the Bristol defendants and the assailants and their parents, the third-party complaint was improperly brought, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter.

Section 1367 does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to third-party class claims that are not part of the same case or controversy as the original claims and would substantially predominate over the individual claims.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Tyner · filed 2006-01-10(a), (c)

And it seems clear that it would be improper to attempt to assert “supplemental jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as to the claims of class members other than the third-party plaintiff, since it cannot be said that such claims “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution;” and for the further reason that the class-action aspects would substantially predominate over the individual claims, so that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... While this court recognizes that American Telephone and Telegraph Co. is not controlling on this issue, it is persuaded by the reasoning of the Pennsylvania district court. ... The Tyners’ third-party class claims are improper and must be dismissed.

Section 1367 allows supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s third-party claim against nondiverse parties when the original claim rests on diversity jurisdiction.

REP MCR Realty, LLC v. Lynch, Michael W. · filed 2006-08-03(a), (b)

Because it was Lynch, the defendant, who impleaded ... the law firm and lawyer, the third-party claim (over which there was no independent diversity jurisdiction, as all were from Illinois) fell within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party complaint whose claim is derivative of the original action.

American Zurich Insurance v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2008-01-15(a)

Cooper Tire’s third-party complaint was entirely proper when it was filed pursuant to the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and Rule 14(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a third-party fraud and misrepresentation claim for indemnification arising from the same circumstances as the federal claim.

Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers' Local Union No. 80 Pension Trust Fund v. Cooling · filed 2008-05-14(a)

The fraud claim arises from the same circumstances that give rise to the plaintiffs contention that W.G. Heating must account for its statutory withdrawal obligations. The defendant’s third-party complaint asserting fraud and misrepresentation against Local 80 therefore is cognizable and within this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims against an additional party in a third-party complaint when the court has original jurisdiction over the underlying claim.

Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B. · filed 2011-12-21(a)

This Court has diversity jurisdiction over the underlying TCPA claim in this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and will have supplemental jurisdiction over the claims alleged by State Farm against Betancourt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over third-party indemnity claims that arise from the same transactions as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Amerik Supplies, Inc. · filed 2012-03-29(a)

Thus, the Court will have supplemental jurisdiction over AMerik’s third-party claims if they arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. The Court finds that AMerik’s claims fit that description. ... Here, AMerik is seeking indemnity and attorneys’ fees in order to shift ultimate liability to Cosmic for the transactions underlying Insituform’s patent-infringement claims. Thus, Insituform’s claims and AMerik’s claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.

Section 1367(b) treats only the original plaintiff as a plaintiff; it does not withdraw supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s Rule 14 third-party claim.

Allstate Interiors & Exteriors, Inc. v. Stonestreet Construction, LLC · filed 2013-09-20(b)

Although we have not previously addressed this issue directly, we now hold that "plaintiff" in section 1367(b) refers to the original plaintiff in the action, and not to a defendant that also is a third-party plaintiff.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against third-party defendants without regard to their citizenship for diversity purposes.

FUJIFILM North America Corporation v. D/C Export & Domestic Packing, Inc. · filed 2018-09-11(a)

The citizenship of Cargo Maritime, although it has been added to the case as a third-party defendant, does not matter because Defendant’s third-party claims against it are within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related counterclaims and third-party claims against nondiverse parties when the court has diversity jurisdiction over the original action.

EMCASCO Insurance Company v. C and C Grocery and Market, Inc. · filed 2021-03-31

As a result, this Court will exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the counterclaim and third party action asserted in this case to avoid piecemeal litigation.

Section 1367(a) can supply subject matter jurisdiction over a defendant’s third-party claim.

Cuddeback v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2022-04-12(a)

Further, the third-party complaint does not contravene customary jurisdictional and venue requirements. A third-party claim must be supported by an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction or by supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the original claims, including related derivative and contract claims.

SHENANGO LLC v. ASHLAND LLC · filed 2022-09-15(a)

Federal courts generally exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims to implead a third- party defendant under Rule 14(a) because they are “so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ... That claim is unquestionably part of the same case or controversy as the claims asserted by Shenango. The Court therefore has supplemental jurisdiction over the unjust enrichment claim. Likewise, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the contractual claims, which are also integrally related to the claims asserted by Shenango.

Section 1367(a) gives a court supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims sufficiently related to a counterclaim within its original admiralty jurisdiction to form part of the same case or controversy.

Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company v. Bindea · filed 2023-02-16(a)

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Bindea’s third-party claims against Uhr, ASAP, and USG because they “are so related to” Bindea’s counterclaim “in the action within [the Court’s] original jurisdiction [under § 1333] that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s third-party claims arising from the same nucleus of operative fact as the original action.

ACLCP South Euclid, LLC v. Ohio CVS Stores, LLC · filed 2025-05-06(b)

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the addition of the Third Party Defendants herein does not destroy diversity jurisdiction. ... Moreover, based on the information before it at this time (and in the absence of any argument to the contrary from either ACLCP or Ohio CVS), the Court finds that Ohio CVS’s claims against Third Party Defendants arise from the “same nucleus of operative fact” as the original action.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a defendant’s Rule 14 claim against a third party potentially liable for the original claim when the original action is within the court’s jurisdiction and the plaintiffs have asserted no direct claims against that third party.

RIMONI v. COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2025-06-18(a)

At this juncture plaintiffs have not asserted claims directly against the third-party defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Therefore, under § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction exists over the claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims involving additional parties when they arise from the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Foster · filed 2025-11-03(a)

Here, the claims in Defendant's third-party complaint arise from the same factual circumstances and controversy as Plaintiff's action against Defendant. ... Accordingly, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant's third-party claims against Morningstar and the Company.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law attorney’s-fee claim alongside a Miller Act claim.

United States Ex Rel. Cal's A/C & Electric v. Famous Construction Corp. · filed 2000-05-25(a)

Because F.D. Rich did not bar supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, there was nothing in that opinion for § 1367 to overrule.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims accompanying Miller Act claims without an independent diversity basis.

United States Ex Rel. Maris Equipment Co. v. Morganti, Inc. · filed 2001-09-20

It need not have done so since supplemental jurisdiction attaches to Miller Act claims.

Section 1367 does not allow supplemental jurisdiction over contract claims against the United States that exceed the Tucker Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

United States v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 2002-08-28

Moreover, the court concludes that it cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims through a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 1367(a) permits parties to be joined in an FTCA suit when a single incident may give rise to claims or liabilities involving multiple parties.

Estate of Nobile v. United States · filed 2000-05-25(a)

We note initially that pursuant to the Congressional amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) approximately ten years ago, parties can be joined in suits under the FTCA where a single incident may give rise to multiple party claims or liabilities.

Section 1367(a) does not supply supplemental jurisdiction across separately filed actions merely because they were consolidated for convenience.

Franceskin v. Credit Suisse · filed 2000-06-05(a)

Even if we assume that we have diversity jurisdiction over appellant’s claims against Lloyds, those claims were brought separately and are legally distinct, albeit now consolidated for purposes of convenience. As a result, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which applies only to “related claims in the action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added), cannot supply the missing jurisdictional link.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims in the same action, but not over claims in separate actions consolidated under Rule 42.

Allied Shipyard Inc v. Moore · filed 2020-12-15

Further, “while supplemental jurisdiction applies to claims asserted in the same action, it does not apply to claims asserted in separate actions consolidated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42.”

Section 1367 does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over a dismissed defendant’s cross claims unless that defendant rejoins the action.

Scottsdale Insurance v. Subscriptions Plus, Inc. · filed 2000-08-11

At this stage of the lawsuit, however, I conclude that this court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over defendant Progressive’s cross claims pursuant to § 1367 because defendant Progressive has been dropped from the case pursuant to Rule 21 and has not re-joined it.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a proper Rule 13(g) cross-claim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the original action, even without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. a & D Interests, Inc. · filed 2002-04-12

Once subject matter jurisdiction is established over the original action, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over cross-claims brought under Rule 13(g), even in the absence of an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367 does not provide jurisdiction over a maritime tort that falls within original admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333.

Ortiz v. Zambrana · filed 2011-09-12

Because this case is a maritime tort, it falls within the jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1333, not 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants when those claims form part of the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s original maritime jurisdiction.

Magana v. Hammer & Steel, Inc. · filed 2002-06-06(a)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims against Hammer and Poston are so related to the claims that fall within the Court’s maritime jurisdiction under the AEA (the claims asserted against Miller) that they form part of the same “case or controversy.”

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy as claims within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

Smith v. Mitlof · filed 2002-04-17(a)

Because plaintiffs’ additional claims form part of the same “case or controversy” as plaintiffs’ admiralty claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) grants this Court supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

Section 1367 may allow supplemental jurisdiction over nonmaritime claims in an action that also includes maritime claims.

Bertucci Contracting Co. v. Wagner · filed 2013-03-19(a)

Where an action includes both maritime and non- maritime claims, supplemental jurisdiction may be available as to the latter.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over non-admiralty claims that form part of the same case or controversy as a claim within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.

Matsuda v. Wada · filed 2000-10-03(a)

It seems uncontroversial that Counts II-VII are so related to Count I that they form part of the same case or controversy — all the counts relate to Defendant’s demand for extra compensation and Plaintiffs damages resulting from Defendant taking the bill of lading. Accordingly, it was proper, under § 1367(a), for this Court to exert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs non-admiralty claims at the time the Complaint was filed.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over tort claims lacking independent maritime jurisdiction when other claims fall within admiralty jurisdiction.

Exter Shipping Ltd. v. Kilakos · filed 2004-03-29(a)

To the extent that maritime jurisdiction is lacking as to any of the other tort claims, such as fraud in the inducement of the charterparty agreements and fraudulent conveyance of assets, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction as to those claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute.

Section 1367(a) permits federal courts reviewing state commission decisions under the Telecommunications Act to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law determinations.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Brooks Fiber Communications of Oklahoma, Inc. · filed 2000-12-13(a)

Although the circuits that have included the state law determinations in their review have not been explicit as to their reasons for doing so, we believe they were, at least implicitly, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these issues under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law issues when a federal court reviews a state commission decision under the Telecommunications Act.

Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. MCI Metro Access Transmission Services, Inc. · filed 2001-01-22(a)

Despite MCI’s contention to the contrary, this Court holds that it has jurisdiction to review the MPSC decision that the electronic processing provision of the Agreement can give way to the faxing provision of Ameritech’s general tariff. ... As the Tenth Circuit reasoned, federal review of State law issues in cases involving the Act represents a proper exercise of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(c) does not provide for vacating a merits judgment on supplemental state-law claims so the litigant can relitigate them in state court; judicial economy, convenience, and fairness guide the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.

Turgeon v. Operating Engineers, Local No. 98 · filed 2001-02-02(c)

Section 1367(c) was not enacted to give litigants two bites at the apple. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction should be guided by considerations of “judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants.” ... All of these considerations counsel against granting the plaintiffs motion. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

McRae v. Tena · filed 1996-01-25(c)(3)

Having concluded that all of the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over their state law claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Becerra v. Asher · filed 1996-04-04(c)

Having concluded that the HISD Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to all claims against said Defendants over which this Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367 permits dismissal without prejudice of a pendent state claim after summary judgment disposes of all federal claims.

Thompson v. Johnson County Community College · filed 1996-06-06(c)(3)

Because the court no longer has federal question jurisdiction in this matter, there is no basis for it to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ pendent state claim. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the court, sua sponte, dismisses Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Spratley v. Hampton City Fire Department · filed 1996-07-18(c)(3)

Because Defendant has been granted summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after all federal claims have been resolved by summary judgment.

Griffin v. City of Clanton, Ala. · filed 1996-07-01(c)(3)

This court, however, chooses to exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims because summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the Defendants on all of the federal claims in this case.

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Lema v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. · filed 1996-08-20(c)(3)

As to supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court will not exercise it in view of its grant supra of summary judgment in favor of defendants as to the federal claims in Count I.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of supplemental state-law claims after all federal claims have been resolved by summary judgment.

Vathekan v. Prince George's County · filed 1996-08-22(c)(3)

An Order will be entered separately, granting summary judgment on the federal claims and dismissing the state-law based claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state claims without prejudice after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Read v. Attaway · filed 1996-09-26(c)(3)

As this Court had granted summary judgment as to all of the federal claims, it finds it appropriate to dismiss the pendant state claims without prejudice.

When federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment, § 1367(c)(3) ordinarily calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.

Dill v. Village of Gowanda · filed 1997-01-21(c)(3)

Where summary judgment is appropriately entered dismissing the claims brought under federal law against a defendant, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-federal claims arising out of the same operative facts.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice after the federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment.

Watts v. Kroger Co. · filed 1997-02-03(c)(3)

With the dismissal of the federal claims on summary judgment, the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining pendent state law claims and shall dismiss them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claim.

Lillibridge v. Wooden Soldier, Ltd. · filed 1997-02-04(c)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Wooden Soldier’s motion for summary judgment on Count I of plaintiff’s complaint must be and herewith is granted. The court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Padob v. Entex Information Service · filed 1997-04-15(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs federal claims, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims under New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights law.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to dismiss supplemental state-law claims against defendants after granting them summary judgment on the federal claims.

Ryan v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services · filed 1997-05-07(c)(3)

Because a number of Defendants have been granted summary judgment on the federal claims, the Court exercises its power to dismiss the pendant state law claims against those Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Rumph v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund · filed 1997-05-08(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs federal claims in Count I, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claim under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367 permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after resolving all federal claims on summary judgment, and to dismiss the state claim without prejudice.

Leisen v. City of Shelbyville · filed 1997-05-22(c)(3)

Because all federal claims have been eliminated by this grant of summary judgment, we decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining breach of contract claim. Accordingly, Leisen’s state law breach of contract claim is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1367 permits a district court to dismiss pendent state law claims without prejudice after granting summary judgment on the federal claims when the relevant factors favor declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Larry Ramone Banks v. Debra Dexter Mark Bourland Michael Corbin Michael Freitas Sandy Roe Margaret Conrad · filed 1997-06-19(c)(3)

Here, the balance of relevant factors supported the district court's decision not to address the remaining state law claims after the court granted summary judgment for defendants on Banks's federal claims. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Banks's state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · filed 1997-08-08(c)(3)

Because this Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Wallin’s federal claims, it is appropriate that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction over all state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-08-13(c)(3)

In light of the fact that the Court will grant Pathmark’s motion for summary judgment on all Mondzelewski’s federal claims, it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims.

Schonfeld v. City of Carlsbad · filed 1997-09-05(c)(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), over plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claim because the Court has granted summary judgment to the defendant on the federal claims originally, joined with the state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal without prejudice of a supplemental state-law claim after summary judgment disposes of the federal claims.

DeVaughn v. City of Clanton, Ala. · filed 1997-10-22(c)(3)

Because the court finds that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal causes of action are due to be granted, the court no longer has jurisdiction over the defamation claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Burton v. Youth Services International, Inc. · filed 1997-11-25(c)(3)

Because I have granted summary judgment on all of Burton’s federal claims, I therefore decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Spencer v. Lavoie · filed 1997-12-01(c)(3)

Since summary judgment has been granted as to all defendants on plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims against the Comforts.

Section 1367 allows dismissal of supplemental state claims after summary judgment disposes of the federal claim supporting them.

Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc. · filed 1998-06-09

Because summary judgment on the plaintiffs federal claim has been granted, plaintiffs pendent state claims are dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a related state-law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claim when judicial economy favors retention.

Bradley v. CMI Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-07-27(a)

In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claim despite its award of summary judgment on his Title VII claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1998-09-01(c)(3)

As we have granted summary judgment on all Plaintiffs federal claims, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims after it has entered summary judgment on all federal claims.

Binkowski v. Family & Children's Services Agency · filed 1998-12-03(c)(3)

Because summary judgment has been entered on all of the federal claims against Defendants, Plaintiffs state law claims will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claim.

Cameron v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. · filed 1998-12-21(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment regarding Cameron’s ADA claim, there is no federal claim pending before this Court. The Court, in its discretion, declines to accept supplemental jurisdiction over Cameron’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c) calls for dismissal of remaining state law claims in a non-diversity case after summary judgment disposes of the federal claim.

Natal v. City of New Bedford · filed 1999-02-23(c)

“[I]t is the settled rule in this Circuit that in a non-diversity case, where pendent state claims are joined with a federal cause of action and that federal cause of action is the subject of a successful summary judgment motion, the pendent state claims should be dismissed.” ... Accordingly, this Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Natal’s remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1998).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Parris v. Town of Alexander City · filed 1999-02-10(c)(3)

However, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, due to its finding that summary ... judgment is due to be granted with respect to Plaintiffs federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Farrokhi v. Laura Ashley, Inc. · filed 1999-03-24(c)(3)

The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims by summary judgment.

J & S OIL, INC. v. Irving Oil Corp. · filed 1999-08-04(c)(3)

In light of the fact that the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs federal antitrust claims by way of summary judgment, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Booze v. Shawmut Bank, Connecticut · filed 1999-07-23(c)(3)

Inasmuch as the Court will grant summary judgment on both federal claims, it will not maintain jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

England v. ENBI Indiana, Inc. · filed 2000-01-14(c)(3)

Since we have granted summary judgment on both of England’s ADA claims, the better course is for us to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Cohen v. Daddona · filed 1999-11-29(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment of plaintiffs’ RICO claims, there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Therefore, the court will exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and will decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits dismissal of a supplemental state law claim after summary judgment disposes of the federal question claim.

Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County, Inc. · filed 2000-02-03(c)(3)

Because the Court has granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs federal question cause of action, the Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS that state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claims, particularly when the remaining legal issues are matters for state courts.

Dancy v. Simms · filed 2000-09-15(c)(3)

Because I have granted summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims and because the legal issues raised by the remaining claims are peculiarly ones of state law properly to be considered by the Maryland courts, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Ihekwu v. City of Durham, NC · filed 2000-12-27(c)(3)

Instead, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims and dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Rogers v. Elliott · filed 2001-02-12(c)(3)

The court has jurisdiction over the federal claims in this case based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court, having granted summary judgment to the defendant on all the plaintiffs’ federal claims, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

McGill v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 2001-04-18(c)(3)

Having granted the summary judgment motion on the federal law claims, we will decline to retain jurisdiction on the state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claim.

Fox Ex Rel. Fox v. Cleveland · filed 2001-08-22(c)(3)

Having granted the summary judgment motion on the federal law claim, we will decline to retain jurisdiction on the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction once the claim supplying original jurisdiction has been resolved, including by summary judgment.

Scenic Galveston, Inc. v. Infinity Outdoor, Inc. · filed 2001-08-30(c)(3)

The Court however, concludes that 1367(c)(3) includes any situation where the jurisdiction conferring claim has been resolved.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Braden v. Cargill, Inc. · filed 2001-10-19(c)(3)

Having granted summary judgment on ad claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the plaintiffs state law claims against the defendant.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a federal court to dismiss remaining state law claims without prejudice after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute · filed 2001-11-08(c)(3)

Having granted Defendants summary judgment on all the federal claims, the Court has discretion to dismiss the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... In the absence of any argument by the parties regarding how the state due process provisions might differ from federal due process provisions, the Court declines to rule on the state law claims and simply dismisses them without prejudice to their being renewed in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and remand them after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Glidewell v. Town of Gantt · filed 2001-12-10(c)(3)

For the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claim asserted in this case and that it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and will remand them to the state circuit court from which they were removed.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Glidewell v. Town of Gantt · filed 2001-12-10(c)(3)

Because this court has concluded that summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the federal claims asserted in this case, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glidewell’s state law claims and those claims will be DISMISSED without prejudice to their being timely filed in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Vohra v. County of Orange · filed 2008-08-01(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after granting summary judgment on the federal claims.

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Root v. Liston · filed 2005-03-28(c)

Having granted summary judgment to Liston on all of Root’s federal claims, the court declines jurisdiction as to Root’s possible state claims. ... Root’s state law claims are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Feinthel v. Payne · filed 2004-12-30(c)

As the magistrate judge granted summary judgment on all federal claims, she could permissibly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to dismiss remaining state law claims without prejudice after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Rieger v. Township of Fairfield · filed 2003-12-02(c)(3)

Her remaining state law claims under the N.J.L.A.D. and based on an implied contract (Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, supra) will be dismissed without prejudice as there are no federal claims remaining in the case after the grant of summary judgment.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after resolving the federal claims on summary judgment.

Moua v. City of Chico · filed 2004-04-09(c)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the municipal defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs’ federal and FEHA claims against them is GRANTED. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law writ of mandate claim under Gov’t Code § 11135.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after it grants summary judgment on the federal claim that supplied original jurisdiction before trial.

Pratt v. Town of Windham · filed 2004-10-13(c)(3)

When, as here, the court grants summary judgment on the federal claim that was the basis of original jurisdiction before trial, the court may in its discretion decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; when federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment, it ordinarily should decline jurisdiction absent extraordinary circumstances.

Angeloni v. Diocese of Scranton · filed 2005-03-17(c)(3)

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of discretion. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”), superseded by statute in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). And, as we have stated, when a federal claim could be, or has been, dismissed on summary judgment, “the court should ordinarily refrain from exercising [supplemental] jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.” Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Univ. of Md. v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1540 (3d Cir. 1993). The District Court properly refrained from exercising supplemental jurisdiction here.

Section 1367(c) permits dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed on summary judgment.

East-Miller v. Lake County Highway · filed 2005-08-31(c)

The district court properly dismissed East-Miller’s state law tort claims without prejudice because the federal claims were dismissed on summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without preju- dice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after dismissing the federal claims on summary judgment.

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Insurance · filed 2006-03-28(c)(3)

Having determined that plaintiffs’ federal claims should be dismissed on summary judgment, I am authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Cunningham v. New Jersey · filed 2006-09-25(c)(3)

For reasons set forth above, with respect to Counts I and II, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of all remaining Defendants. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, Counts III through VI.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it grants summary judgment on all federal claims.

Williams v. Town of White Hall, Alabama · filed 2006-09-29(c)(3)

This court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if ... [it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because summary judgment is due to be granted on Williams’s federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after resolving the only federal claim on summary judgment.

Coppernoll v. Custom Housing Center, Inc. · filed 2007-05-18(c)(3)

Having determined that summary judgment is appropriate on the only federal claim, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims fail at summary judgment.

Daugherty v. Wabash Center, Inc. · filed 2008-07-18(c)(3)

Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after the federal claims have been resolved on summary judgment.

Messer v. Indiana State Police · filed 2008-11-12(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs federal claims have failed to survive summary judgment, this Court fails to see how the state law claims would be more expediously determined in this Court than in some appropriate state court. Further, it is the firm conviction here that those state law claims should be advanced, prosecuted and tried, if necessary in a court of the State of Indiana. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the federal claims fail on summary judgment and remand the state claims to state court.

Browell v. Davidson · filed 2009-01-16(c)(3)

Because Plaintiffs federal claims have failed to survive summary judgment, this Court fails to see how the state law claims would be more expeditiously determined in this Court than in some appropriate state court. Further, it is the firm conviction here that those state law claims should be advanced, prosecuted and tried, if necessary in a court of the State of Indiana. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after it resolves all federal claims on summary judgment.

DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP · filed 2009-01-26(c)(3)

This court thus declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. ... Because the Plaintiffs federal claims have been disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, his remaining claims under Connecticut law are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the Plaintiff bringing those claims in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after granting summary judgment on all federal claims within its original jurisdiction.

D.D. Ex Rel. Davis v. Chilton County Board of Education · filed 2010-04-06(c)(3)

Having concluded that summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to all federal claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, however, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts IV and V of the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state-law claim after granting summary judgment on all federal claims.

Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester · filed 2010-10-06(c)(3)

The Court has granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims except Plaintiffs New York State common-law battery claim. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this claim, and dismisses it without prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing it in state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when it has granted summary judgment on all federal claims, including federal claims against another defendant.

Faragalla v. Douglas County School District RE 1 · filed 2011-01-12(c)(3)

She argues the district court’s continuing jurisdiction over her federal claims against DCSD gave it supplemental jurisdiction over her interrelated state-law claims against DCFCE. But the district court also approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant DCSD summary judgment on all of her claims. Therefore, the court’s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims against DCFCE was appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining state law claim after granting summary judgment on the federal claim.

Gentile v. Nulty · filed 2011-02-25(c)(3)

Because we have granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs federal equal protection claim, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when no claim within its original jurisdiction survives summary judgment.

Krumholz v. Village of Northport · filed 2012-07-10(c)(3)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims given the absence of any federal claim that survives the summary judgment motion and dismisses any such claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed on summary judgment.

Weisbecker v. Sayville Union Free School District · filed 2012-09-12(c)(3)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims given the absence of any federal claims that survive summary judgment and dismisses such state claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed on summary judgment.

Robinson v. Zurich North America Insurance · filed 2012-09-21(c)(3)

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims given the absence of any federal claims that survive summary judgment and dismisses such state claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims after disposing of all federal claims on summary judgment.

Hines v. Town of Vonore · filed 2012-12-05(c)(3)

Thus, pursuant to § 1367(c), and in the exercise of its discretion and in the interests of comity, the Court will decline to exercise continuing “pendent” or supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a remaining common-law claim after granting summary judgment on the only federal claim.

Elshazli v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-11-21(c)(3)

Even putting Chinn aside, the Court would dismiss Elshazli’s negligence claim based on its authority to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Because the Court will grant summary judgment on the only federal claim here, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Elshazli’s remaining common law claim.

Section 1367(a) does not extend supplemental jurisdiction to a settlement breach claim unrelated to a federal claim about cavities discovered after the settlement.

Howard v. Albrecht · filed 2023-06-19(a)

Any claim for breach of the settlement agreement in Case No. 14-cv-1157 is not legally related to the plaintiff’s claim regarding new cavities that he didn’t learn about until after the settlement agreement. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

Section 1367(a) requires the state law claim to be part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim; an earlier assault and a later discriminatory demotion lack a sufficient connection even if evidence of the assault may be admissible on the federal claim.

Roberts v. Lakeview Community Hospital · filed 1997-12-02(a)

Rather, the court finds that it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim in the first place, because the state law claim is not “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” as is required by § 1367 for supplemental jurisdiction to exist. ... Here, however, the fact that there allegedly was an assault and battery does not provide a sufficient nexus between that act and an alleged subsequent act of demoting the Plaintiff to support supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from facts distinct from a federal claim merely because the claims involve the same professional association.

Fullin v. Martin · filed 1999-01-27(a)

The pleadings to date warrant a conclusion that the state law claims fall outside the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction and that the ERISA claim is indeed “separate and independent” from the state law claims.

Section 1367(a) does not permit supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against a separate defendant when they lack a loose factual connection to the federal claims.

Didzerekis v. Stewart · filed 1999-03-23(a)

As such, the court does not find the requisite loose factual connection between plaintiffs’ state law claims against Stewart and those federal and state law claims against the City and Officers. For this reason, it would be improper to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims in Counts IV and V.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims unrelated to a pending federal claim because they do not form part of the same case or controversy.

Calon v. Apfel · filed 1999-04-26(a)

Plaintiff’s possible state law causes of action challenging state laws prohibiting assisted suicide do not state any claim that is “so related” to his claim for his SSA records “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons , 522 U.S. 156, 164-66, 172 (1997).

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim unrelated to the remaining federal claim because the claims do not form the same case or controversy.

Mendez v. Puerto Rican Cement Co. · filed 1999-07-19(a)

The issue of whether just cause existed for Plaintiffs dismissal is not remotely related to wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and cannot form the basis of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that does not share a common nucleus of operative fact with the claims under original jurisdiction.

Schmidt v. City of Lockport, Ill. · filed 1999-10-14(a)

The court refuses to assume supplemental jurisdiction over Count IV (alleging that Konidaris was negligent in preparing the salad) under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because this claim is not so related that it forms part of the same case or controversy.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that lacks a common nucleus of operative fact with the claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Harry Winston, Inc. v. Kerr · filed 1999-10-20(a)

There are few if any operative facts common to the two claims. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that the judicial power does not extend to Bruce’s Rule 14(a) claim and that it therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against additional parties when those claims and the federal claims do not form part of the same case or controversy.

Walters v. City of Andalusia · filed 2000-02-16(a)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that it does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims against the Pace Defendants. Namely, the court finds that Plaintiffs state law claims are not “so related” to Plaintiffs federal claims “that they form part of the same case or controversy.”

Section 1367(a) does not support supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from separate events that lack a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal claims.

Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp. · filed 2000-06-08(a)

The Plaintiffs’ claims here do not derive from a common nucleus of operative fact; instead they purportedly arise from unrelated events whereby Ameritech opened accounts for ... third parties who fraudulently used Plaintiffs’ personal information. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s state law claims, and therefore grants Ameri-tech’s motion to dismiss her claims.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over claims by different proposed subclasses when their claims lack a common nucleus of operative fact, even if they name the same defendant.

Caranci v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield · filed 2000-06-01(a)

There are virtually no overlapping facts between these claims except for the fact that they are made against the same defendant. The claims as asserted by “subclasses” could have easily been brought as four separate class actions and would not ordinarily be expected to be consolidated into one judicial proceeding. Therefore, this is not an appropriate ease for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the Caranci plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a separate state action whose claims are not part of the same case or controversy, even if the federal action stems from testimony in that state action.

Sanders v. Williams · filed 2001-06-11(a)

Although the Plaintiffs current case stems from testimony given in the state court case, these claims are simply not a part of the same case or controversy. The state court case has been resolved except for the issue of damages. In essence, the Plaintiff is asking the Court for an opportunity to re-litigate previously decided issues from the state case. That is not the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the Plaintiffs motion was properly denied by the Magistrate.

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that lack a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal claims.

Lanford v. Prince George's County, MD · filed 2001-12-03(a)

The manner in which Campbell drove, and the emotional toll the driving took on Plaintiff, are completely irrelevant to whether the arrest, detention, and prosecution of Plaintiff were lawful and properly conducted, and whether he suffered physical injuries at the hands of the municipal defendants. The state tort claims against Anthony Campbell do not fall within this court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) requires state and federal claims to arise from a common nucleus of operative fact; challenges to separate portions of a redistricting law based on distinct legal principles do not satisfy that requirement merely because both concern the same legislation.

Deem v. Manchin · filed 2002-03-01(a)

The House section does not arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with the Senate section and challenges a different section of the statute based on entirely different legal principles. Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petition regarding the redistricting of the House of Delegates and declines to consider the merits of the intervenors’ complaint.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a debt-collection counterclaim when its facts are only tangentially related to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim and the claims do not form the same case or controversy.

Unangst v. Evans Law Associates, P.C. · filed 2011-07-20(a)

Because the two claims do not share a sufficient factual relationship to form part of the same case or controversy, Evans’s counterclaim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) requires an adequately pleaded claim before a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.

BVCV High Point, LLC v. The City of Prattville, Alabama · filed 2022-08-29(a)

Count 1 does not embody the required “claim.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added)). The vague reference in Count 1 that the 2021 rezoning ordinance is invalid “under Alabama law” is not enough to allege a plausible state law claim as the basis for a declaratory judgment.

Section 1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to state-law claims, not freestanding motions asking a court to decide a state-law question.

Graciani · filed 2025-11-18(a)

Supplemental jurisdiction applies only to state law claims, however, not freestanding motions requesting the Court interpret and apply state law to an action raising only federal claims.

Section 1367 permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim that plainly fails on the merits when deciding it avoids futile further litigation.

Luce v. Town of Campbell · filed 2015-06-16(c)(3)

The. court could decline to exercise its. supplemental jurisdiction over this claim as well, but as already explained above, the record establishes that Kelemen was acting outside of the scope of his employment, and therefore also outside the definition of “insured” under the policy.

Section 1367(c)(3) ordinarily favors relinquishing a state-law claim when the supporting federal claim is dismissed before trial, but permits deciding a plainly meritless supplemental claim on the merits.

Lydia Korzen and Marsha O'Brien v. Local Union 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1996-01-25(c)(3)

The federal claim to which it is a supplement, although nonfrivolous, was dismissed before trial, and ordinarily when that happens the proper course is to relinquish jurisdiction over' the state law claim in order to minimize federal judicial intrusion into an area of state law. ... But since, as we shall see, the supplemental claim plainly lacks merit, it is better to resolve it on the merits rather than remand for a determination by the district judge whether to retain it as a matter of discretion or remand it to state court.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within their original jurisdiction; before trial, they generally should relinquish state claims unless the outcome is absolutely clear.

Earl R. Key, Jr. v. Lois Drake, Ginger Arvin, Mary Norman, Felicia Boyd-Smith, Ingrid Kipfer, Kim Nelson-Blackburn, Rich · filed 1997-03-25(c)(3)

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) gives the district court discretion to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state claims when, as in this case, all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been dismissed prior to trial. However, the general rule is that when the federal claims have been dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the state claims. ... The one exception to this rule of thumb that is relevant here is that the district court should decide the state law claim when the outcome is absolutely clear. ... Therefore, the principles of federalism and comity counsel that the proper course for the district court would have been to relinquish jurisdiction over these claims. We therefore modify the district court's judgment so as to accomplish this.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction.

Goddard, Inc. v. Henry's Foods, Inc. · filed 2003-09-26(c)(3)

Where, as here, all of the claims which fall within our original jurisdiction have been dismissed, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent State law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim after disposing of the federal claims within its original jurisdiction.

Wright v. Santopietro · filed 2003-09-29(c)(3)

In light of the ruling on the civil rights claims for which it has original jurisdiction, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ pendent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after dismissing the federal claims.

Acro-Tech, Inc. v. Robert Jackson Family Trust · filed 2003-09-30(c)(3)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining non-RICO state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law counterclaim when no claims within its original jurisdiction remain.

United States Ex Rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard · filed 2003-10-08(c)(3)

However, in the absence of any remaining claims over which we enjoy original jurisdiction, the court will decline to hear Irwin’s state law counterclaim.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims, and courts should ordinarily do so.

Denchy v. Education & Training Consultants of PA, Inc. · filed 1992-09-22(c)(3)

Courts should ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed. ... Therefore, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.

Section 1367(c)(3) gives a district court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing the federal claims; ordinarily it should decline.

McKinney v. West End Voluntary Ambulance Ass'n · filed 1992-11-13(c)(3)

Under these circumstances, the decision to entertain or dismiss the pendent state law claims is within the district court’s discretion. Courts should ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed. ... Accordingly, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction, and courts should ordinarily do so.

Flickinger v. Wanczyk · filed 1994-01-25(c)(3)

Courts should ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed.

Section 1367 generally calls for dismissal of remaining state law claims after the claims within original federal jurisdiction are dismissed, absent special circumstances.

In Re Cedar Hill Cemetery Litigation · filed 1994-05-10(c)(3)

Absent special circumstances, not applicable here, where a federal court dismisses claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the court should dismiss the remaining state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally favors dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, and district courts should explain a decision to retain them.

Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc. · filed 1996-08-09(c)(3)

The discretion involved in exercising supplemental jurisdiction has been reposed in the district courts. We will normally review an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of that discretion and remand if a district court does not indicate what motivated its decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when all federal question claims have been dismissed prior to trial. ... District courts should follow the normal procedure of providing reasons for exercising supplemental jurisdiction when choosing to do so contrary to the general rule in favor of dismissing without prejudice pendent state law claims when the basis for federal question jurisdiction is eliminated before trial.

Section 1367(c)(3) ordinarily permits dismissal without prejudice of supplemental state law claims when all federal claims are resolved before trial.

Fucci v. Graduate Hospital · filed 1997-06-27(c)(3)

Where all federal claims are disposed of before trial, however, any supplemental state law claims are ordinarily dismissed. ... Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice to reassert those claims which, upon reflection, he may deem it appropriate to pursue in the state courts.

Section 1367(c) generally permits a court to dismiss supplemental state law claims when it dismisses the federal claims before trial.

Frane v. Kijowski · filed 1998-01-27(c)

To minimize federal involvement in matters of state law, when federal claims are dismissed before trial, the court generally does not retain jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims. ... Thus, the remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1995).

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed, and ordinarily it should.

Smith v. City of Enid Ex Rel. Enid City Commission · filed 1998-07-15(c)(3)

When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, and it generally should do so.

Abe's Free Flow, Inc. v. City of Mishawaka, Ind. · filed 1999-03-11(c)(3)

The court may, and generally should, relinquish supplementary jurisdiction over state-law claims, however, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial. ... That course is appropriate here.

Section 1367 permits a district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claim drops out before trial; ordinarily it should do so.

Martin v. Miller-Eads, Inc. · filed 1999-03-09(c)(3)

The general rule is that when jurisdiction is based on the federal claim and, as here, the federal claim drops out before trial, the federal district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental claims. ... We find no reason to deviate from that principle in this case. Trial is not imminent and, in any event, a great deal of judicial work remains to be done prior to trial. Accordingly, Plaintiffs state law claims against the remaining defendants are dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims are resolved before trial.

Greer v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD. · filed 1999-04-08(c)(3)

It is the general rule in this circuit that once federal claims have been finally resolved on pre-trial motion in such a case, supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims should be declined.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims are disposed of before trial.

Peters v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi · filed 1999-04-13(c)(3)

When the federal claims are disposed of prior to trial, generally the court should decline to exercise pendent, or supplemental, jurisdiction.

When federal claims are dismissed before trial, Section 1367 ordinarily calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.

Costa Del Moral v. Servicios Legales De Puerto Rico · filed 1999-09-01(c)(3)

Nevertheless, where, as here, the existing federal claims warrants dismissal prior to trial, the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

When federal claims are dismissed before trial, § 1367 generally calls for declining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Suarez v. Pueblo International, Inc. · filed 1999-10-01(c)(3)

Nevertheless, where, as here, the existing federal claims warrants dismissal prior to trial, the district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction; doing so before trial is ordinarily within its discretion.

Contreras, Antonio v. Suncast Corporation · filed 2001-01-03(c)(3)

According to the supplemental jurisdiction statute, a district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" over pendent state law claims if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(c)(3). "A decision to relinquish pendent jurisdiction before the federal claims have been tried is, as we have said, the norm, not the exception, and such a decision will be reversed only in extraordinary circumstances." Disher v. Info. Resources, Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 140 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, given that Contreras has refiled these state law claims in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction, we fail to find any extraordinary circumstances that would even approach suggesting that the court, in dismissing the claims, abused its discretion.

Section 1367(c)(3) generally calls for dismissal of supplemental state law claims when all claims within the district court’s original jurisdiction have been dismissed.

McCloud v. Jackson · filed 2001-02-02(c)(3)

In any event, the District Court appropriately dismissed Mr. McCloud’s complaint in its entirety, including the malpractice component, because when all claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction are dismissed, the general rule is that state law supplementary claims should also be dismissed.