28 U.S.C. § 1367

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law class claims substantially predominate over an FLSA collective action in the number of plaintiffs, scope of proof, relief sought, and difficulty of managing the claims together.

In Re American Family Mutual Insurance Co. Overtime Pay Litigation · filed 2009-07-28(c)(2)

Given the number of potential class action plaintiffs in relation to the collective action plaintiffs that have affirmatively chosen to join the two consolidated cases, the differences in terms of the scope of proof between the FLSA and the various state law schemes of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois, Plaintiffs’ request' for injunctive relief, and the difficulty in simultaneously managing both the FLSA collective action and various state law class actions, I conclude that the state law claims will substantially predominate over the FLSA claims over which I have original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), and that judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity would be best served by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the circumstances presented in this case.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class claims that would require a substantially broader factual and legal inquiry than the individual federal claims.

Marquis v. Tecumseh Products Co. · filed 2002-03-20(c)(2)

In short, on the legal as well as the factual level, Plaintiffs’ proposed state-law class action, even though limited to a single issue and seeking only injunctive relief, would require a considerably more far-reaching inquiry than is needed to resolve the individual Title VII claims of the named plaintiffs. Consequently, the Court exercises its discretion under § 1367(c)(2) to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the class-based state-law claims advanced by Plaintiffs.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state-law class claim substantially predominates over a federal collective action, including when the state claim requires more extensive proof.

Warner v. Orleans Home Builders, Inc. · filed 2008-05-07(c)(2)

First, as in De Asencio, the WPCL claim would substantially predominate over the FLSA collective action. ... Each of these factors weighs in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(4) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state wage class action that mirrors an FLSA collective action when the class action would undermine the FLSA opt-in requirement.

Woodard v. Fedex Freight East, Inc. · filed 2008-02-19(c)(4)

In this regard, the Court finds a compelling reason to decline jurisdiction. ... Specifically, the Court agrees with FedEx Freight that the opt-in regime of § 216(b) is “inherently incompatible” with the opt-out mechanism of Rule 23.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state wage claims of plaintiffs who opt into an FLSA action, while allowing a court to decline jurisdiction over state class members who have not opted into that action.

Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 2004-12-23

The Court therefore will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the New York state law claims of plaintiff McGruder and any New York plaintiff who is eligible to opt into the federal action and opts in by filing a notice of consent. The Court will not, however, exercise jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs who do not.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state law class claims even for members who have not opted into the federal FLSA action.

Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp. · filed 2005-02-04(a)

Finally, I am not persuaded by defendant’s suggestion that a state law class action would have to be limited to those employees who filed consents to opt into the FLSA action. The supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides that, with some exceptions not applicable here, ... Plaintiffs state law claims unquestionably form part of the same case or controversy as the FLSA claims; indeed, they are virtually identical, except for the fact that the state law claims have a longer limitations period.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law opt-out class claims alongside FLSA opt-in claims because 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) does not expressly prohibit it.

Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 2006-05-26(a)

Likewise with section 216(b)’s relation to section 1367(a)—not only does section 216(b) not expressly prohibit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of opt-out class members, it includes no mention of supplemental jurisdiction at all.

Section 1367 permits employees who opt in to an FLSA collective action to pursue pendent state law claims in that action.

Edwards v. City of Long Beach · filed 2006-12-12(a)

Plaintiffs who opt-in to the § 216(b) collective action may pursue any pendent state law claims as part of the FLSA action.

Section 1367(c)(4) does not treat the difference between an FLSA opt-in collective action and a Rule 23 opt-out state wage class action as a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction.

Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc. · filed 2011-09-26(c)(4)

Accordingly, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that “while there may in some cases be exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, the ‘conflict’ between the opt-in procedure under the FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 is not a proper reason to decline jurisdiction under section 1367(c)(4).”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 23 state wage-law class claim arising from the same operative facts as an FLSA collective action within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Calderon v. GEICO General Insurance · filed 2012-02-14(a)

Pursuant to the mandatory provision of § 1367(a), the clear weight of authority allows a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 23 claim where the Court has original jurisdiction based on a FLSA collective action.

Section 1367 permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law Rule 23 class claims alongside related FLSA collective claims.

Pliego v. Los Arcos Mexican Restaurants, Inc. · filed 2016-02-08

This court likewise finds that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction to combine consideration of the FLSA collective claim and the state law Rule 23 class claims is appropriate in this case.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that share a common nucleus of operative facts with claims properly before the federal court.

Roberson v. Maestro Consulting Services LLC · filed 2020-12-14

Because this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the union class members claims, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining non-union claims.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive class member’s state-law claims unless that member has a claim supporting original federal jurisdiction.

Fielder v. Credit Acceptance · filed 1999-08-31(a)

The district court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over any member of the interest overcharge class who does not have a Truth in Lending claim, because the court has no original jurisdiction over that plaintiff’s case or controversy. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants when the plaintiff and the defendant supplying original jurisdiction are distinct legal entities, even if they participated in an integrated business transaction.

Land Holdings (St. Thomas) Ltd. v. Mega Holdings, Inc. · filed 1999-11-08

Finally, the Court finds no merit to defendants' argument that Mega Holdings is so closely identified with the interests of Land Holdings that this Court cannot exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Land Holdings' dispute with defendants. Mega Holdings and Land Holdings are distinct legal entities that have opted for business reasons to enter into an overall integrated transaction with BNS, only some parts of which are involved in this suit.

Section 1367(a) makes the Rule 13 compulsory-or-permissive classification irrelevant to supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims; the question is whether they form part of the same case or controversy.

MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff · filed 1999-11-27(a)

Since Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in December 1990, the distinction between compulsory and permissive counterclaims no longer bears on the jurisdictional question.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related claims when the court has original jurisdiction over a federal claim, even if joinder of a necessary party destroys diversity.

Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., Inc. · filed 2000-08-01(a)

Joinder of Mattgo would destroy diversity. However, as previously explained, since this court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 over the Lanham Act claim and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over Plaintiffs related claims, I need not rely on diversity of citizenship among the parties, which presently exists, to maintain this court’s jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a co-plaintiff cross-claim arising from the same case or controversy when the co-plaintiff was not made a party under a rule listed in subsection (b).

Ryan v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc. · filed 2001-08-27(a), (b)

The district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claim against Harvey Ryan by the other plaintiffs. ... Here, the plaintiffs’ claim against Harvey Ryan was part of the same case or controversy as the original claims, and Harvey Ryan was not made a party by the other plaintiffs under any of the Rules specified in § 1367(b).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over claims involving third parties, but that jurisdiction cannot be used against an entity that opted out of a class action.

Abbott Laboratories v. CVS Pharmacy Inc · filed 2002-05-15(a)

Ever since 28 U.S.C. sec.1367(a) overturned Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), the supplemental jurisdiction has been capacious enough to include claims by or against third parties. ... So whatever scope may be left, after Peacock, for the adjudication of claims by or against third parties other than attorneys, that power cannot be asserted against an entity that has opted out of a class action.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a class member’s related suit that lacks an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

Turner v. Publishers Clearing House Executives · filed 2002-07-17

Turner’s suit would not come within federal jurisdiction as an original matter, but it was properly resolved under the supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, in light of the class action.

Section 1367(a) gives a court supplemental jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim related to tort claims within its admiralty jurisdiction.

Onebeacon Insurance Group v. Great Lakes Inn Management, Inc. · filed 2002-09-21(a)

Because I have determined that the court has admiralty jurisdiction over the tort claims, it is unnecessary for me to decide whether the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim would provide an independent basis for invocation of the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. In any event, the court at a minimum would have supplemental jurisdiction over such claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law counterclaims that share a loose factual connection with the original claims when none of subsection (c)'s grounds for declining jurisdiction applies.

Adams Street Joint Venture v. Harte · filed 2002-11-12

Not only is there a “loose factual connection” between the original claim and the counterclaim, but it appears that both stem from a “common nucleus of operative facts.” ... Since Harte’s counterclaims invoke supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) and do not warrant dismissal under § 1367(c), this Court will exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 1367 supplies supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, but a counterclaim on the underlying debt in an FDCPA action is permissive and requires an independent jurisdictional basis.

Taylor v. Bryant, Inc. · filed 2003-08-05

In Hart, the district court for the District of Arizona entertained an identical case and found that “every published decision directly addressing the issue in this case has found that FDCPA lawsuits and lawsuits arising from the underlying contractual debt are not compulsory counterclaims.” ... This Court agrees with the district court’s reasoning, and concludes that Ms. Taylor’s motion to dismiss is well taken.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law class claim tied to a federal class claim only for class members who also assert the federal claim.

Bartleson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-12-24(a)

Here, that limitation on supplemental jurisdiction means that only IWPCL class members who have also asserted a FLSA claim in this action are properly in federal court; supplemental jurisdiction cannot extend to IWPCL class members who have no FLSA claim.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claims, even without an independent federal jurisdictional basis.

Harrison v. Grass · filed 2004-02-10(a)

Second, because the counterclaims are compulsory, the court may adjudicate them as a matter of its supplemental jurisdiction under Rule 13(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). It is immaterial whether there would be federal jurisdiction had the counterclaims been filed in a separate lawsuit.

Section 1367(a) permits a permissive counterclaim that is part of the same case or controversy without an independent basis of jurisdiction.

Leipzig, Steven v. AIG Life Insur Co · filed 2004-03-25(a)

Even a permissive counterclaim, if part of the same case or controversy (a condition met here), may be brought under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367(a), without an independent basis of jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim arising from the same case or controversy, even if the counterclaim lacks an independent jurisdictional basis.

Steven Leipzig, Cross-Appellee v. Aig Life Insurance Company · filed 2004-04-15(a)

Even a permissive counterclaim, if part of the same case or controversy (a condition met here), may be brought under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), without an independent basis of jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other class members when the class representatives’ claims satisfy diversity jurisdiction.

Aikens v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2005-12-15

We believe that this court has jurisdiction over the claims of the class representatives based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and over the claims of the other class members based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim that shares many relevant facts with the original claims.

Brown v. Morris · filed 2007-06-28(a)

Needless to say, ABN AMRO’s counterclaim involves many of the facts relevant to Brown’s other claims, including: Brown’s rights and obligations under the note; her failure to make payments; and defendants’ efforts to obtain payment. Accordingly, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim and did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be asserted.

Section 1367(a) provisionally extends supplemental jurisdiction to the remaining claims when one claim is completely preempted and supports removal of the entire action.

Negron-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions · filed 2008-06-18(a)

But any of Negron's claims, if completely preempted, can support removal of the entire action: the rest can be removed as provisionally within a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(a) permits a bankruptcy court to hear a related claim that forms part of the same case or controversy as a claim within its original bankruptcy jurisdiction.

Cooper v. BB Syndication Services, Inc. (In Re 222 South Caldwell Street, Ltd. Partnership) · filed 2009-06-22(a)

This Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to hear Trustee’s related Project claims.

Section 1367(a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims and at least some permissive counterclaims when they are part of the same Article III case or controversy.

Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc. · filed 2010-04-29(a)

In an issue of first impression for this court, we hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, enacted in 1990, gives federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over both compulsory and at least some permissive counterclaims.

Section 1367 gives a federal court supplemental jurisdiction over a breach-of-warranty claim accompanying bankruptcy malpractice claims within its subject matter jurisdiction.

Timmerman v. Eich · filed 2011-09-12

This court also has subject matter jurisdiction over Dean and Ann’s breach-of-warranty claim, as well, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim that fails the Act’s amount-in-controversy or named-plaintiff requirements when another claim supplies federal jurisdiction.

Chambers v. King Buick GMC, LLC · filed 2014-09-02

In such circumstances— as here—the amount in controversy and “100 named plaintiff’ requirements are no obstacles to the claim being heard in federal court because the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the MMWA claim provided another jurisdictional basis exists.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over absent class members’ claims that share a common nucleus of operative facts with a qualifying diversity claim, even when some class members do not allege a sufficient amount in controversy.

Johnson v. Organo Gold Int'l, Inc. · filed 2015-11-20

Because the claims share a common nucleus of operative fact, they are all part of the same case or controversy, and Plaintiff cannot escape Allapat-tah’s holding that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over class actions “where some, but not all, of the plaintiffs ... allege a sufficient amount in controversy.” 545 U.S. at 566, 125 S.Ct. 2611.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over an intervenor’s counterclaim when a federal claim supplies original jurisdiction at intervention, regardless of the intervenor LLC’s membership.

Lombardi v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2018-08-07(a)

Because the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction over the matter when EMI sought to intervene, the court had supplemental jurisdiction over EMI under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) irrespective of EMI’s LLC membership.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim for wrongful use of civil proceedings based on the underlying federal lawsuit.

AURITT v. AURITT · filed 2019-07-23

The claim that this lawsuit5 is a wrongful use of civil proceedings by the plaintiff, however, does lie within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction given the underlying complaint,6 and therefore “Counter Claim #4” survives against the plaintiff (but is ineffective as against the lawyers, who are not parties).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental personal jurisdiction over claims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with claims within the district court’s original jurisdiction.

Protege Biomedical, LLC v. Z-Medica, LLC · filed 2019-07-24(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,” a district court has “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that . . . form part of the same case or controversy.” “This statute confers supplemental jurisdiction with respect to both subject matter and personal jurisdiction where the ‘same case or controversy’ requirement is satisfied.” Silent Drive, 326 F.3d at 1206. “The Supreme Court has held that such claims must arise out of a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Id. (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Here, Protégé alleges that Z-Medica used Protégé’s Trade Secret Information in the same patents that are the subject of the declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference claims. The same Trade Secret Information is involved in Protégé’s breach of contract claim. As such, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Z- Medica with respect to Counts 1-5.

Section 1367(a) bases supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims on their relationship to claims within original jurisdiction, without considering their relationship to affirmative defenses.

Castillo v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-01-30(a)

By its plain language, therefore, the statute speaks only to the relationship between claims and counterclaims. It says nothing about the relationship of affirmative defenses to counterclaims.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over declaratory judgment claims accompanying patent and trademark claims within the court’s jurisdiction.

Match Group, LLC v. Bumble Trading Inc. · filed 2020-03-18

Because the Court has jurisdiction over Match’s patent and trademark claims, it elects to extend supplemental jurisdiction over Match’s declaratory judgment claims, pursuant to 28 USC § 1367.

Section 1367 requires a party asserting a state law counterclaim to demonstrate a basis for supplemental jurisdiction before the court can exercise it.

Raya v. Calbiotech · filed 2020-05-12

Calbiotech ... has not demonstrated that the Court has, and should exercise, supplemental jurisdiction ... the Counterclaim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a state law counterclaim with at least a loose factual connection to the original claims, whether the counterclaim is permissive or compulsory.

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC v. JIM TRUE FORD MERCURY, INC. · filed 2020-05-13(a)

Based on the facts as provided to the Court at this point, there appears to at least be a loose factual connection between True's counterclaim and the original claims underlying this suit. ... Therefore, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over True's counterclaim.

Section 1367(a) does not confer supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim that lacks a common nucleus of operative fact with the original claims.

PRO CUSTOM SOLAR, LLC v. CASTILLO · filed 2020-07-06(a)

Compulsory counterclaims “may be decided under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), without an independent basis for jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ counterclaims are permissive because they do not “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” surrounding Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over related counterclaims regardless of whether Rule 13 classifies them as compulsory or permissive.

Sholtz v. Emergency Medical Transport, Inc. · filed 2021-03-15(a)

Because the reasoning in Edwards is persuasive, the Court agrees that determining whether Emergency Medical’s counterclaims are “permissive or compulsory does not bear on the issue of supplemental jurisdiction.”

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over state-law employer counterclaims that do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the employees’ FLSA claims.

Alley v. Quality Eco Technologies, LLC · filed 2021-03-29(a)

In sum, the Court concludes that despite drawing all reasonable inferences in QET’s favor, the Counterclaims do not stem from the same transaction or occurrence as the Installers’ FLSA claims and amount to permissive counterclaims under Rule 13. Therefore, the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim when it forms part of the same case or controversy as an original-jurisdiction claim, even if the counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence.

Tirone v. American Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities, Inc. · filed 2021-03-30(a)

The test for whether a court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim does not depend on whether the original claim and the counterclaim “arise from the same transaction or occurrence,” but whether the claims are so related that they “form part of the same case or controversy.”

Section 1367(a) permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims that are logically related to federal claims and form part of the same case or controversy.

Alexander v. Golden Margarita LLC · filed 2023-02-08(a)

As explained below, the Court concludes that all of the Moving Defendants’ counterclaims meet the “logical relationship” test, such that they form part of the same case or controversy under § 1367(a) as Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over a crossclaim arising from the same occurrence as the original claims, even when the coparties are not diverse.

Gusman v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-02-23(a)

Consequently, the crossclaim is so related to the original claims as to fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, and it does not destroy diversity jurisdiction since each plaintiff (though opposed to the other in the crossclaim) remains diverse as to the defendant, CSX.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims that share a common nucleus of operative fact with the original claim, including compulsory counterclaims.

Crespo v. True Ride Incorporated · filed 2023-05-30

Since the “common nucleus of operative fact” test is broader than the test for compulsory counterclaims, a court will necessarily have jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Section 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over an intervenor’s claim arising from the same facts as the underlying tort claim, so intervention does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction.

Beckham v. The Monarch Cement Company · filed 2024-10-02(a)

In this case, AFICA’s claim to the recovery arises “out of the same facts as the underlying tort claim.” ... Therefore, joinder of ... AFICA would not destroy the Court's subject matter jurisdiction because supplemental jurisdiction would apply under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims that do not share operative facts with the federal claims.

Garcia-Dipini v. LARRY PITT & ASSOCIATES · filed 2024-12-06(a)

Applying these principles here, it is apparent that Defendant’s counterclaims are permissive rather than compulsory under Rule 13(a), and that the court does not have supplemental jurisdiction of the counterclaims under section 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) does not provide supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law counterclaim that lacks a sufficient factual connection to the claims within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Perez v. Blue Collar Scholars, LLC · filed 2025-02-10(a)

Section 1367(a) provides federal district courts with supplemental jurisdiction “over ‘claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). ... Fourth, this Court does not perceive any logical relationship between Plaintiff’s claims and BCS’s proposed counterclaim sufficient to confer jurisdiction. ... Thus, this Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction of any counterclaim BCS has against Plaintiff for tortious interference with business relationships.

Section 1367(a) gives federal courts supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, including claims against an added party whose presence defeats diversity.

National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA v. Lovekamp · filed 2025-02-12(a)

The court agrees with defendant that his counterclaims are compulsory under Rule 13(a), and it finds that he may add Schneider under Rule 13(h). The court thus has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Section 1367(a) allows supplemental jurisdiction over a crossclaim arising from the same transaction or occurrence as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction.

Barton v. Real Innovation Inc · filed 2025-09-30(a)

The Court finds that the crossclaims relate to the original complaint and arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the initial complaint. Therefore, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the crossclaims.

Section 1367(a)'s standard for supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaims is broader than the standard for compulsory counterclaims.

Nicopior v. Moshi Moshi Palm Grove, LLC · filed 2019-04-05(a)

The standard for asserting supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is broader than the standard for determining a counterclaim to be compulsory.

Section 1367(b) does not prevent supplemental jurisdiction over a nondiverse defendant’s intervening subrogation claim.

Range v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1997-11-03(b)

Finally, although the motion papers do not address the issue, this court is not prevented by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)... from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Medical Mutual’s subrogation claim, even though adding Medical Mutual as a defendant in the case would apparently destroy diversity jurisdiction.

Section 1367 permits supplemental jurisdiction over state law counterclaims whose factual context overlaps with the claims already before the court.

Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson · filed 1992-05-13(a)

Under those principles and § 1367, this court has supplemental jurisdiction over T & T’s counterclaims. Although, strictly speaking, T & T’s termination of Cor-search’s permission to resell output from the TS-State on-line database is a separate transaction from Corsearch’s alleged fraudulent obtainment of the CD-ROM, the factual context surrounding each is overlapping.

A remand under § 1367(c)(3) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while an underlying legal issue is reviewed de novo.

In re: US Healthcare, Inc. (Bauman v. US Healthcare, Inc. et.al.) · filed 1999-09-16(c)(3)

Turning to the merits of the parties' contentions, we review the District Court's decision to remand under ... S 1367(c)(3) for abuse of discretion; however, to the extent that the underlying issue giving rise to that remand decision, in this case the extent of preemption, is one of law, our review is de novo.

Section 1367 requires jurisdiction over an underlying action before a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim.

Murphy v. Board of Education of the Rochester City School District · filed 1999-12-16

The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367, necessarily requires that the Court have jurisdiction over the underlying action before it can exercise pendent" jurisdiction over a state law claim.

Section 1367(a) requires an underlying case or controversy within federal subject-matter jurisdiction before a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Greene v. Simpson · filed 2025-08-25(a)

Of course, a prerequisite to finding supplemental jurisdiction is a case or controversy over which the federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction. We don’t have that here.

Section 1367(d) does not toll the limitations period for a state law claim against an unconsenting state defendant when the claim was first filed in federal court and dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Raygor · filed 2001-01-04(d)

Extension of the University’s exposure to suit in state court because a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment has been filed against it in federal court is an infringement on the University’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we hold that section 1367(d) does not toll the state statute of limitations on the MHRA claims against the University.

Section 1367(d) gives a plaintiff the thirty-day tolling period to refile in state court after voluntarily dismissing a federal action when a basis for supplemental jurisdiction exists.

Blinn v. Florida Dept. of Transportation · filed 2001-02-28(d)

In cases such as this, where the basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction clearly exists, it appears a voluntary dismissal should receive the same treatment as a refusal of the federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, i.e., the plaintiff should have the benefit of the section 1367(d) thirty-day tolling provision to refile the case in state court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a state limitations period for supplemental claims that a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses in federal court.

Napier v. State of Maine, Dep't of Corr. · filed 2002-11-18(d)

In sum, for the reasons here set out, this court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) cannot be interpreted to extend the applicable two-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ MTCA and MHRA claims found at Counts III and IV which they voluntarily dismissed in federal court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll state law claims after their voluntary dismissal when they are refiled in the same federal forum.

Centaur Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund Ltd. v. Countrywide Financial Corp. · filed 2011-01-20(d)

Accordingly, the Court holds that § 1367(d) does not apply to toll Plaintiffs’ state law claims because Argent was voluntarily dismissed and the state law claims were refiled in the same federal forum.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a state limitations period for claims against a nonconsenting state agency when the prior federal action was dismissed by stipulation.

Noak v. Idaho Department of Correction · filed 2012-01-06(d)

Thus, it does not appear that Congress intended to infringe on a state’s sovereign immunity in situations such as that presented here. Accordingly, we hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not toll the two-year statute of limitations in this case.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a local claim pending in federal court when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the federal action in response to a jurisdictional challenge and promptly refiles in local court.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. United Industrial, Service, Transportation, Professional & Government Workers of Nor · filed 2016-01-13(d)

That the DHS voluntarily dismissed its District Court complaint in response to the Union’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than waiting for the District Court to grant the Union’s motion, is irrelevant, for to deny tolling in that situation would promote further delay and unnecessarily squander judicial resources.

Section 1367(d) gives a claimant 30 days after dismissal of a federal action to file a state claim whose limitations period has already expired, even if the provision tolled that period while the federal action was pending.

Gonzalez-Guzman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 2019-07-19(d)

Even if § 1376(d) tolled the statute of limitations during the pendency of that first lawsuit—from May 23, 2016, to November 9, 2016—his window for filing would have expired 30 days later on December 9, 2016. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (tolling the statute of limitations for 30 days after the district court’s dismissal).

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state-law claims dismissed without prejudice so they may be refiled in state court within thirty days.

TOBIA v. LAKEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION (LBOE) · filed 2020-12-14(d)

Pursuant to § 1367(d), the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are dismissed without prejudice, and any applicable statute of limitations is tolled for thirty days, such that Plaintiff may refile these claims in state court.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a supplemental claim after the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the federal action under Rule 41(a)(1).

SPEEDWELL, LLC v. TOWN OF MORRISTOWN · filed 2023-02-24(d)

Given the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply Section 1367(d) to a claim dismissed for reasons not contained in subsections (a), (b), or (c), this Court concludes Section 1367(d) does not apply to Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of Speedwell I pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)—a reason not contained in subsections (a), (b), or (c) of Section 1367.

Section 1367(d) does not toll a dismissed Federal Tort Claims Act claim for refiling in federal court.

Hoot v. The United States of America · filed 2023-04-07(d)

This action is purely a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case and no other claims allow implementation of the 30 days after dismissal to file in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The FTCA case is not tolled by its prior dismissal under this statute so that it can once again be filed in federal court.

Section 1367(d)’s 30-day tolling period does not benefit a prior federal action that contained no state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.

White v. U.S. Center for SafeSport · filed 2025-09-29(d)

As SafeSport explains, because White did not bring any state law claims in his prior federal action, there are no state law claims that would have benefited from the 30-day grace period.

Section 1367(d) does not toll state law claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

Sanders v. University of Idaho College of Law · filed 2022-07-28(d)

The problem Sanders faces, however, is that she could have raised this argument at summary judgment – the Supreme Court decided nearly two decades ago that tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) was not available for claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.

Exercising supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) is an abuse of discretion when local-law issues clearly substantially predominate over the claim within original jurisdiction.

Barwood Inc v. DC · filed 2000-02-04(c)(2)

If, however, they should seek to combine that claim with ones dependent on the District law issues which have hitherto consumed the time of the district court, invoking as they have here at the last minute the "supplemental jurisdiction" provi- sion of 28 U.S.C. s 1367, allowance of such supplemental jurisdiction would either be improper for want of a "common nucleus of operative fact," United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996), or be an abuse of discretion given that the District law issues so clearly "sub- stantially predominate[ ] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. s 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when local-law issues substantially predominate over the claim within its original jurisdiction; allowing jurisdiction in that circumstance can be an abuse of discretion.

Barwood, Inc.,appellees v. District of Columbia,appellants · filed 2000-02-04(c)(2)

If, however, they should seek to combine that claim with ones dependent on the District law issues which have hitherto consumed the time of the district court, invoking as they have here at the last minute the “supplemental jurisdiction” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, allowance of such supplemental jurisdiction would either be improper for want of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” ... or be an abuse of discretion given that the District law issues so clearly “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367 requires state claims to share a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim within original jurisdiction and permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when the state claims substantially predominate.

Eddins v. Excelsior Independent School District · filed 2000-03-15(a), (c)(2)

... the court concludes that the magistrate judge correctly determined that (a) there is no common nucleus of operative facts pertaining to the federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction and plaintiffs’ alleged state law tort actions; and (b) plaintiffs’ alleged state law tort actions would predominate over the single federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when nonfederal claims substantially predominate over the remaining federal claims.

Bostic v. AT & T of the Virgin Islands · filed 2001-09-25(c)(2)

Because I find that Bostic’s non-federal claims would substantially predominate over the remaining federal claims, I shall decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims.

Section 1367(c) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims, but a potentially larger state-law damages award alone does not establish substantial predominance.

Daenzer v. Wayland Ford, Inc. · filed 2002-03-15(c)

The fact that the total worth of the state law claims could potentially amount to a higher damage award than the TILA claims does not make the state law claims necessarily more salient than the TILA claims of the class. The subject matter of this dispute is also not uniquely the province of state government, either. ... Therefore, the Court is not convinced that the state law claims “substantially predominate” over the federal claims, and will not decline supplemental jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1367(c) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over the claim within its original jurisdiction.

Waldschmidt v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare · filed 2002-08-14(c)(3)

Rather, I merely have supplemental jurisdiction over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). ... Because these claims predominate over the one arising under ERISA and asserted against Aetna, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction for substantial predominance only if the state claims actually predominate over the federal claims.

SST GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY, LLC v. Chapman · filed 2003-07-14(c)(2)

For these reasons, I find that the state claims in this case do not predominate over the federal claim. Because a finding that the state claims predominate over the federal claims is necessary to sustain a declination of supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(2) and I make no such finding, I do not find that dismissal of the state claims is appropriate under that subsection.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims substantially predominate over federal claims.

Pejepscot Industrial Park, Inc. v. Maine Central Railroad · filed 2003-09-11(c)(2)

The Court is not persuaded that Counts IV and VI substantially predominate over Count III and further believes that considerations of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants support the Court’s exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims substantially predominate; overlap in the issues, evidence, and remedies weighs against finding such predominance.

McNerny v. Nebraska Public Power District · filed 2004-01-05(c)(2)

Although the plaintiff argues that his state claims substantially predominate over the federal due process claim, the scope of the issues presented, the damages alleged, and the evidence required to prove the state and federal claims are substantially . the same. ... Such circumstances do not support an argument that the federal claim is dominated by or a mere appendage to the alleged state claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to dismiss supplemental state law claims without prejudice when they substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction.

Johnson et al. v. Collins et al. · filed 2004-01-23(c)(2)

Because it appears that the state law claims “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), I propose to sever the state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice so that the Johnsons can litigate them in state court.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims when they arise from the same facts as the federal claims and the state issues do not substantially predominate.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-09-07(c)(2)

In this case, all the claims, state and federal, derive from the same underlying factual assertions. The heart of the case is still the alleged antitrust violation. The state issues are not “more important, more complex, more time consuming to resolve, or in any other way more significant than their federal counterparts.” ... In light of these considerations, I choose to exercise both supplemental jurisdiction over the newly-raised state-law claims and pendent personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants as to all state claims in the Second Amended Complaint.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state law class claim when the federal class is larger, the claims share the same facts, and judicial economy favors hearing them together.

McLaughlin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2004-10-20(c)(2)

The issue presented in this ease is whether I should decline to exercise jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2), where the state law claim “substantially predominates” over the federal claim. ... Although only 13 of the 51 class members are also bringing FLSA claims, the nationwide class action, also before this court, is larger than the state class. The state law claim in this case, unlike in De Asencio, relies on the same set of facts as does the federal claim. ... I conclude that in these circumstances it is within my discretion to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims of the class, and sound reasons of judicial economy favor doing so.

Section 1367(c)(2) assesses whether state claims substantially predominate by the type of claim rather than the relative size of state and federal classes.

Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc. · filed 2007-01-29(c)(2)

Predominance under section § 1367(c)(2) relates to the type of claim being brought rather than the size of the respective classes.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim in the scope of issues raised.

Wolinsky v. Oak Tree Imaging, LP · filed 2007-02-09(c)(2)

Thus, the court finds that it should decline supplemental jurisdiction (to the extent it may exist) over the multiple state-law claims, involving several disputed business transactions and possibly fraudulent conduct, for they substantially predominate over the one federal bankruptcy claim of dramatic insignificance.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows denial of a state-law Rule 23 class when its claims would substantially predominate over the federal claims because the class would cover more people and a longer period than the federal opt-in collective.

Molina v. First Line Solutions LLC · filed 2007-06-28(c)(2)

Under that scenario, the supplemental state law claims would substantially predominate over the federal claims, which is inappropriate.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims and economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor dismissal.

Albertson Water District v. Amerada Hess Corp. · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the state law claims in this case substantially predominate over the TSCA claims. ... Because many defendants have no federal claim pending against them, and the state claims are the real substance of these suits, fairness is served by requiring plaintiffs to proceed in state court.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when the state law claims do not substantially predominate over the federal claims, taking account of fairness, convenience, and judicial economy.

Polacek v. Kemper County, Miss. · filed 2010-06-28(c)(2)

Having considered the parties’ respective positions, the court has determined that the state law claims involving the private defendants do not “substantially predominate” over the federal claims involving Kemper County, and that, in the end it would best serve the interests of fairness, convenience and judicial economy for all the claims to be litigated in a single forum.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain a related state-law claim despite a longer state-law pleading when the state claim does not substantially predominate in proof, remedy, or scope of issues.

MacK v. Bear Stearns Residential Mortgage Corp. · filed 2010-11-30(c)(2)

But the length of the pleadings is not determinative. ... In this case, the proof relating to the state and federal claims will be largely the same. The remedy for both the state and federal claims is damages for the common injuries caused by both the state and federal violations. ... Thus, the Court will not decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state wage claims when they arise from the same facts as the federal wage claims and do not substantially predominate.

Meyers v. Crouse Health System, Inc. · filed 2011-03-08(c)(2)

The type of state law claims here derive from the same set of facts relevant to the FLSA claims and thus the state law claims would not predominate over the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits supplemental jurisdiction over related state wage claims in an FLSA collective action when the state claims arise from the same facts and do not substantially predominate.

Colozzi v. St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center · filed 2011-03-08(c)(2)

The type of state law claims here derive from the same set of facts relevant to the FLSA claims and thus the state law claims would not predominate over the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not permit declining supplemental jurisdiction for substantial predominance merely because a state claim has more plaintiffs when its legal issues are nearly identical to those of the federal claim.

Garcia v. Freedom Mortgage Corp. · filed 2011-06-10(c)(2)

While the NJWHL claim might have a larger number of Plaintiffs than the FLSA claim, the Third Circuit has noted that predominance is not a numbers test, but rather a test of whether a state legal issue predominates over a federal legal issue. It does not in this case, as the legal issues under state and federal law are nearly identical. Therefore absent any compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction, the Court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under the NJWHL.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not treat state disability claims as substantially predominating when they rest mostly on the same ADA violations and require the same proof.

Kohler v. REDNAP, INC. · filed 2011-06-28(c)(2)

The state-law claims do not substantially predominate in terms of proof. Indeed, because the claims are mostly based on ADA violations, the proof for those claims is identical to that needed to prove violation of the ADA.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction.

Rios v. Abc Imaging of Washington, Inc. · filed 2012-10-31(c)(2)

However, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the state law claims substantially predominate over claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state claims even if they substantially predominate when economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor retention.

Kohler v. Islands Restaurants, LP · filed 2013-07-24(c)(2)

Furthermore, even were the Court to find that Kohler’s state law claims substantially predominate over his federal claim, it would retain jurisdiction based on the “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over a federal claim because they involve different rights and factual inquiries.

Manos v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union · filed 2014-03-28(c)(2)

However, Plaintiffs state-law claims concern wholly different rights and raise a substantially different factual inquiry than Plaintiffs ERISA claim, giving grounds for the application of § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims and issues substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Schutza v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2015-02-27(c)(2)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs three state-law claims substantially predominate over Plaintiffs ADA claim. ... Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state-law -claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction over state wage claims that are essentially identical to the federal claims and do not substantially predominate.

McLeland v. 1845 Oil Field Services · filed 2015-03-16(c)(2)

While these might be issues the parties and Court need to address at a later stage, the federal and state claims in the complaint are essentially identical,, so the state claims do not predominate.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate because proving them requires much more case-specific work than proving the federal claims.

Fixed Income Shares: Series M v. Citibank N.A. · filed 2015-09-08(c)(2)

Here, because Plaintiffs will ultimately have to prove them claims loan-by-loan and trust-by-trust, the Court concludes that the state-law claims do “substantially predominate[ ]” over the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when additional claims substantially predominate over the claims within its original jurisdiction, including because they require substantially more evidence and discovery.

Evergreen Indemnity v. Dalomba, et al. · filed 2016-08-23(c)(2)

Therefore, the proposed third-party claims would predominate over Evergreen’s claim for declaratory relief.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims even if they substantially predominate when judicial economy and convenience support doing so.

Malphurs v. Cooling Towers Systems Inc. · filed 2017-09-18(c)(2)

Judicial economy and convenience therefore supported the district court’s decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even if the state claims predominated over the FLSA claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when state claims are intertwined with a federal claim rather than substantially predominating over it.

Oney v. Assured Recovery LLC · filed 2019-07-25(c)(2)

State claims do not substantially predominate where they are so intertwined with a federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that substantially predominate over its original jurisdiction claims when the federal claims are stayed.

Little v. Haddaway-Riccio · filed 2019-09-26(c)(2)

Section 1367(c)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code is relevant here. It provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the supplemental claim “substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In this case, that is certainly the situation. ... Therefore, because I have stayed plaintiffs’ federal claims, I will exercise my discretion and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts Three, Four, Five, and Six, which are raised under Maryland law.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not authorize declining supplemental jurisdiction where state negligence claims are no more complex or burdensome than related federal treaty claims and the federal claims are not merely tangential.

Harraz v. EgyptAir Airlines Company · filed 2019-12-09(c)(2)

Because the Court finds that Harraz’s state law claims do not, in fact, predominate over her Convention claims, the Court lacks the discretion to deny supplemental jurisdiction. ... Here, Harraz provides no reason for this Court to believe that her “simple negligence [claims],” Pl.’s Reply 5, are more complex or burdensome than her claims brought under the Montreal Convention. ... Thus, even if service of the Pilots is perfected, this is not the case where a few tangential federal law claims have been tacked on to a whole host of state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate in their requirements of proof and scope over the remaining federal claim.

ROSADO v. CITY OF COATESVILLE PA · filed 2020-03-30(c)(2)

As a result of the differing requirements of proof and scope of the inquiries, the state law claims would predominate over the lone federal claim. ... The Court accordingly declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when closely related state law claims do not substantially predominate over a federal claim.

Bowie v. Hodge · filed 2020-06-05(c)(2)

As a result, the Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims when their additional proof will not cause them to substantially predominate over the federal claims.

Bhatia v. Vaswani · filed 2020-07-01(c)(2)

Because Counts V through VIII arise from a common nucleus of operative fact and will not substantially predominate over the federal claims, the Court is persuaded that it has and should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims; shared factual issues can favor hearing the claims together.

Brayman v. Keypoint Government Solutions, Inc. · filed 2020-07-07(c)(2)

But because the Court would be exercising its supplemental jurisdiction to hear these state-law claims, the Court has discretion to “decline” to hear them if, among other things, the state-law claims will “substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction [i.e., Brayman’s FLSA claim].” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). ... However, the Court is not convinced that the new claims will substantially predominate. Further, this case will already explore the factual basis for the new claims (KeyPoint’s alleged policies that, according to Brayman, caused KeyPoint employees to work overtime hours without overtime pay). Splitting that inquiry across two lawsuits would not serve the interests of judicial economy.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate, but calling a federal TILA claim a “piggyback” on state claims does not establish substantial predominance.

Kambic v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-07-14(c)(2)

Mr. Kambic’s assertion that the TILA claim “piggybacks upon the State Court claims” does not demonstrate to the Court’s satisfaction that the state court claims substantially predominate over the TILA claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the remaining federal claim in factual scope, legal complexity, and potential damages.

Potbelly Sandwich Works, LLC v. Montalto · filed 2020-08-17(c)(2)

Accordingly, if Potbelly does not attempt to replead its RICO claim—which, unlike the CFAA claim, rests on the same broad factual predicate as its state law claims—or if Potbelly unsuccessfully attempts to replead its RICO claim, its state law claims would predominate over its remaining federal claim, and the court would relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under § 1367(c)(2).

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Whiteslate, LLP v. Third Avenews, LLC · filed 2020-10-29(c)(2)

But the Court has ... discretion to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the non- ... federal claims where they substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction in the proof and issues they require.

FITZPATRICK v. CENTER FOR ADVANCED UROLOGY, LLC T/A MIDLANTIC UROLOGY · filed 2020-12-14(c)(2)

Even assuming that the case or controversy requirement of Article III were met in this instance, I have discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the state law claims substantially predominate over the claims that fall within this Court’s original jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a state law claim substantially predominates over the federal claim.

Cota v. Sushi Ota Inc. · filed 2021-01-11(c)(2)

Here, Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim substantially predominates over her ADA claim.

An Unruh Act claim does not substantially predominate over a related ADA claim merely because it seeks statutory damages or alleges prior notice of violations when both claims require proof of ADA violations.

Rutherford v. Kelly · filed 2021-02-09(c)(2)

ADA violations form the basis for both of Plaintiff’s claims. (See Compl. at 4, 8.) Accordingly, Plaintiff will have to prove ADA violations to prevail on either of his claims. ... The Court is not persuaded that the allegation of prior notice renders the Unruh claim predominant so as to justify burdening two courts with the same dispute and the risk of inconsistent rulings.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Strojnik v. San Diego Farah Partners, L.P. · filed 2021-03-01(c)(2)

His state law claims easily dwarf his federal claim. Moreover, this is the second time his federal claim has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and it is hanging by a thread. Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) is appropriate.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law class claims in an FLSA action when those claims do not substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Arends v. Family Solutions of Ohio, Inc. · filed 2021-04-05(c)(2)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 state law claims do not substantially predominate over their FLSA claim for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). The Court finds that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 state law claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Vox Marketing Group v. Prodigy Promos · filed 2021-08-20(c)(2)

The court may also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if “the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). The court concludes that this is the case for all of the state law claims asserted here.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not favor declining supplemental jurisdiction when state claims and a federal claim arise from the same facts and neither substantially predominates.

Stansbury v. McCarty Corporation · filed 2022-01-06(c)(2)

Thus, Wausau’s third-party claims against Avondale arise from the same factual circumstances as plaintiff’s main demand, and consequently, plaintiff’s state law claims do not predominate.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when their distinct factual issues and evidence would substantially predominate over the federal claims.

DOE v. Ohio Hi-Point School District Board of Education · filed 2022-03-28(c)(2)

It finds that, because Plaintiffs’ state-law claims against Defendant Williams would implicate enough unique factual issues and distinct forms of evidence, their adjudication in this action would “substantially predominate” over Plaintiffs’ federal-law claims. Thus, pursuant to § 1367(c), it dismisses those claims without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when municipal law claims substantially predominate over the federal claims.

Birnbaum v. Municipality of Anchorage · filed 2022-10-11(c)(2)

It is clear that the municipal law claims substantially predominate in this case.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not call for declining supplemental jurisdiction when the state claim shares facts and similar standards with a surviving federal claim and does not substantially predominate.

Sutton v. Hathaway · filed 2022-11-04(c)(2)

Second, Sutton’s negligence claims are substantially intertwined with the Eighth Amendment claim, sharing facts and similar standards. It cannot be said that one claim predominates over the other. ... The Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over a federal claim, including in the workload and attention they require.

Foster v. Sitel Operating Corporation · filed 2023-01-10(c)(2)

The Court need not address Section 13667(c)(4), because it has little trouble concluding that declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law class actions is both authorized by Section 1367(c)(2) and is entirely warranted.

State claims do not substantially predominate under § 1367(c)(2) merely because they outnumber federal claims when both rest on inextricable facts.

Waite v. Eduro Healthcare, LLC · filed 2023-06-14(c)(2)

This Court also notes the FMLA claims are the front of Plaintiff's claims, comprising the first and second counts suggesting primacy. The fact the NMHRA is claimed in more counts - three out of five - is not relevant. More controlling is that the alleged facts underpinning the state claims are inextricable to the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when substantial predominance of the state claims over the federal claim is not apparent from the complaint.

KUSHELOWITZ v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS, USA, INC. · filed 2023-06-29(c)(2)

While further discovery may demonstrate that the NYLL claims “substantially predominate[]” over the FLSA claim, that is not apparent on the face of the Complaint.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that would substantially predominate over surviving federal claims.

Braziel v. Whitmer · filed 2023-09-28(c)(2)

Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state- law claims because those claims would substantially predominate over the federal ones.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when state and federal claims involve substantially the same evidence and the state claims do not substantially predominate.

Signet Maritime Corporation v. Nykanen · filed 2023-10-26(c)(2)

The state and federal claims will involve substantially the same evidence, and the state claims do not “substantially predominate” over the federal claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows state claims to substantially predominate even when they share a common nucleus of operative fact with federal claims.

UBS Securities LLC v. Dondero · filed 2023-12-07(c)(2)

Respondents’ proposed test, however, runs afoul of well-established principles of statutory interpretation, as it would collapse the substantial predominance analysis into the original test for determining whether claims fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction in the first place, thereby rendering 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) a nullity.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction merely because a Rule 23 state-law class may be larger than an opt-in FLSA collective action.

Heppard v. Dunhams Athleisure Corporation · filed 2023-12-08(c)(2)

Finally, though the FLSA collective action could be smaller than a Rule 23 class, this is not an adequate reason to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims in proof, scope of issues, or remedies sought.

Adams v. Grossmont Cuyamaca Community College District · filed 2024-03-15(c)(2)

Plaintiffs therefore fail to show that their state claims predominate on any front.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not require a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when resolving the federal claim will require deciding the same state-law question.

Carr v. Collateral Recovery & Investigation, LLC · filed 2024-03-27(c)(2)

Because the Court must eventually resolve the state-law question of whether Collateral violated the MUCC as an element of Plaintiffs’ federal claim, the same question with respect to Venture in the context of Searight’s MUCC claim would not predominate over Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim. The Court does not decline supplemental jurisdiction over Searight’s MUCC claim against Venture.

Section 1367(c)(2) does not warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction when related state claims do not substantially predominate over the federal claim.

KOVA Commercial of Naples, LLC v. Sabin · filed 2024-05-07(c)(2)

The Court need not reach the Gibbs factors since the state law claims do not substantially predominate over the DTSA claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when related state wage claims do not substantially predominate over federal wage claims.

PARTLOW v. ASHER · filed 2024-07-10(c)(2)

It is well-settled that where state law claims essentially replicate the FLSA claims, they do not predominate such that courts must decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. ... Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the IWPS claim.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate; overlapping FLSA and NYLL claims do not substantially predominate merely because the state-law claims are also asserted.

Van Duser v. Tozzer Ltd. · filed 2024-10-31(c)(2)

Defendants argue that the Court should decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) because the state-law claims “predominate[]” over their federal ones. Given that several of plaintiffs’ FLSA and NYLL claims overlap in substance and standard, the Court disagrees.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when related state-law claims do not substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Tillis v. Worldmark, the Club · filed 2025-04-09(c)(2)

In those circumstances, the Court does not find that the state law claims predominate.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state claims substantially predominate over the claims within its original jurisdiction.

Medrano v. Hobbs Police Department · filed 2025-04-10(c)(2)

This Court finds that Plaintiff’s state law claims do not substantially predominate over Plaintiff’s federal claims, which remain in this lawsuit.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate; the number of claims alone does not establish predominance.

SCX Holdings, LLC v. Gjoka · filed 2025-06-20(c)(2)

As the state law claims do not “substantially predominate,” severing and remanding these claims to state court is not warranted.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to retain supplemental jurisdiction when the state law claim does not substantially predominate over the federal claims.

McDowell v. Foothills Brokerage, Inc. · filed 2025-09-12(c)(2)

As to § 1367(c)(2), the Court does not find that plaintiff’s state law breach of contract claim predominates over his FLSA claims.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law claims substantially predominate; substantial overlap in the claims’ presentation weighs against declining it.

Coleman · filed 2025-11-04(c)(2)

The Court is not persuaded that Coleman’s state law claims “substantially predominate[]” over her civil RICO claim because it seems likely that “presentation of the original and supplemental claims will [likely] overlap substantially at trial,” which suggests that supplemental jurisdiction will “realize economy and efficiency” in this case.

Section 1367(c)(2) allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over federal claims.

Bryant · filed 2025-11-14(c)(2)

Moreover, Counts I, II, IV, and VII are not mere appendages to the state law claims, so the purely state law counts do not substantially predominate over them. Thus, the Court does not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate, but overlapping proof can support exercising jurisdiction.

Finch · filed 2026-02-04(c)(2)

The Court observes that the proof necessary to show that the transaction was unauthorized and whether Defendant Block failed to uphold its responsibilities under the EFTA would also prove various elements of the state law claims. Accordingly, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claims because none of the § 1367(c) subcategories are satisfied.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over claims within its original jurisdiction.

Jackson-Felder · filed 2026-03-31(c)(2)

Section 1367(c)(2) gives the Court the discretion to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” ... In any case, whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the district court’s discretion, id. at 747, and Jackson-Felder has failed to show that doing so here would be an abuse of that discretion.

Section 1367(c)(2) permits a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction when state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim.

Norris · filed 2026-06-08(c)(2)

The Court finds that plaintiff’s remaining state claims substantially predominate over her sole federal claim.

Section 1367(d) tolls the state limitations period for a supplemental claim through an appeal of its federal dismissal and for 30 days after the federal appellate decision.

Estate of Fennell Ex Rel. Fennell v. Stephenson · filed 2000-04-18(d)

If, however, a plaintiff appeals the federal district court’s dismissal of his claims, the plaintiff’s pendent state claims are tolled for a period of thirty days following the date of the decision of the federal court of appeals.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period while a supplemental claim is pending on appeal, and its thirty-day period begins when the appellate court dismisses the claim.

Lucas v. Muro Pharmaceutical, Inc. · filed 1994-12-02(d)

This court finds Lucas’s claims were pending while on appeal to the Court of Appeals. ... Practicality suggests that the thirty days be counted from the Court of Appeals’s dismissal.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for supplemental state claims through an appeal to the federal court of appeals, with the 30-day grace period beginning when that court affirms dismissal; a later petition for certiorari does not extend tolling.

Kendrick v. City of Eureka · filed 2000-07-19(d)

We conclude that the tolling provision of 28 United States Code section 1367(d) includes the time during which a federal appeal with the Court of Appeals is pursued, and the 30-day grace period commences once the judgment of dismissal is affirmed by that court. This tolling is not extended by the later filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

Section 1367(d) keeps a state claim pending for tolling purposes through the time to appeal the final federal judgment when an earlier dismissal of defendants was not appealable.

Okoro v. City of Oakland · filed 2006-08-28(d)

Thus, the action against the unnamed defendants remained pending, for the purposes of section 1367(d), at least through the time for filing an appeal from the court’s final order disposing of the entire action.

Section 1367(d) does not extend tolling through an appeal when the plaintiff did not appeal dismissal of the supplemental-jurisdiction claims.

Communication Management Services, LLC v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2014-12-15(d)

Thus, even if § 1367(d) operates to toll statutes of limitations that apply to supplemental-jurisdiction claims pending appeal, § 1367(d) would not apply in this case because Plaintiffs did not appeal the Court’s dismissal of the state-law claims.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental claim through an appeal when the notice of appeal includes the claim’s dismissal, even if the opening brief does not raise it.

Communication Management Serv. v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2018-02-20(d)

So appealed, those claims remained “pending” for purposes of section 1367(d) until resolved by this court. Therefore, section 1367(d) tolled the limitations periods throughout NPCC I—including the appeal to this court.

Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations period for a supplemental state claim throughout a federal appeal of its dismissal.

DEFORTE v. THE BOROUGH OF WORTHINGTON · filed 2020-05-14(d)

Thus, informed by the remarkable consistency in state court interpretations of § 1367(d), the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ state claims remained “pending” throughout their appeal to the Third Circuit.