20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

In the Eighth Circuit, the five Polaski factors govern symptom review, and the two additional § 404.1529(c)(3) factors need not be separately analyzed.

Wharton · filed 2026-03-12(c)(3)

However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529 includes treatment other than medication and measures used to relieve symptoms among the factors for evaluating a claimant’s symptoms.

Minor v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2022-10-28(c)(3)(v)-(vi)

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529(d)(4) requires the RFC determination to consider the limiting effects of all impairments, including non-severe impairments, and any related symptoms.

Dunphy v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2023-03-31(d)(4)

The ALJ must consider the limiting effects of an individual’s impairments, even those that are non-severe, and any related symptoms.

Section 404.1529(d)(4) requires the adjudicator to consider the effects of related symptoms, including pain, on the claimant's residual functional capacity.

Bazile v. Apfel · filed 2000-09-20(d)(4)

In cases such as Bazile’s in which the claimant has a medically-determinable severe physical impairment that is of less severity than the impairments described in Appendix 1, Subpart P, of the Regulations, the administrative law judge must consider the impact of the related symptoms, including pain, on the claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Section 404.1529(d)(4) requires the administrative law judge to consider the effect of related symptoms, including pain, on the claimant's residual functional capacity.

Wells v. Barnhart · filed 2003-06-19(d)(4)

The regulations establish that in cases such as Wells’ — in which a claimant has a medically-determinable severe physical impairment that is of less severity than the impairments described in the appendix, such that the administrative law judge proceeds to steps four and five — “the administrative law judge must consider the impact of related symptoms, including pain, on the claimant’s residual functional capacity.”

Section 404.1529(d)(4) requires symptoms such as pain to be considered along with impairments when determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Annie Bell Brown v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2004-12-02(d)(4)

Symptoms such as pain are considered along with any impairments when determining a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d)(4). ... The ALJ properly considered Brown’s complaints of pain. ... For these reasons, the ALJ, while fully considering Brown’s subjective complaints of pain, discounted them in light of other evidence in the record as a whole.

Section 404.1529 requires the symptoms of both severe and non-severe medically determinable impairments to be considered when setting a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Weitzel v. Colvin · filed 2013-08-23

The Social Security regulations contemplate the administrative law judge considering whether there are any medically determinable impairments and then when setting a claimant’s residual functional capacity considering the symptoms of both medically determinable severe and non-severe impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. ... However, all of the medically determinable impairments both severe and non-severe must be considered at step two and then at step four when setting the residual functional capacity. The social security regulations mandate such consideration and this court has repeatedly so indicated.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider medication side effects and pain when determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

O'Brien v. Berryhill · filed 2020-03-11(c)(3)

The ALJ is obligated to consider medication side effects and pain in determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). Here, the ALJ heard testimony at the hearing regarding both. R. 50, 62-63. In his decision, the ALJ wrote, “[O’Brien’s] medications also cause drowsiness and he allegedly takes two to three naps per day.” R. 20. The ALJ later noted that O’Brien reported “some uptick in his knee pain.” R. 21. The ALJ concluded, however, that O’Brien’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms are not entirely consistent with the evidence. R. 21.

Section 404.1529(d)(4) limits residual-functional-capacity consideration to functional limitations resulting from medically determinable impairments, including related symptoms.

Hacker v. Saul · filed 2022-09-19(d)(4)

Because ALJs must only consider functional limitations that result from a claimant’s medically determinable impairments, the ALJ’s failure to mention this treatment note does not constitute an error. 20 CFR § 404.1529(d)(4); SSR 96-8, 1996 WL 374184 (June 2, 1996).

An ALJ determining residual functional capacity must consider all relevant evidence, including evidence concerning nonsevere limitations.

Houghton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-20(a)

In making a proper RFC determination, an ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, even evidence relating to limitations that are not severe. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).

An ALJ may partially credit excessive-sleepiness allegations and address them through an RFC restriction when the degree credited is consistent with the record as a whole.

Crespo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-26(c)

The ALJ next discussed the medical evidence, specifically referring to Plaintiff’s reports of “excessive daytime sleepiness” and recognizing that “a polysomnogram shows moderate obstructive sleep apnea.” Tr. at 28 (citation omitted). The ALJ credited the sleep apnea diagnosis and credited in part the sleepiness allegations, finding that Plaintiff “cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds” as a result. Tr. at 28. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s assigned RFC “is supported by the objective evidence of record, [Plaintiff’s] allegations to the extent consistent with the record as a whole, the opinions of record and prior administrative medical findings . . . and other evidence of record.” Tr. at 31. The ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including her complaints of excessive sleepiness, and the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

An ALJ must consider subjective complaints in light of the record, explain whether the record supports them, and include supported limitations in the RFC.

Semidey v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-26(c)

In rendering the decision, the ALJ identified some of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints but failed to properly consider them in light of the evidence of record (Tr. 18-24). Such failure is especially important here, where Plaintiff was at or approaching advanced age and the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards, and the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Upon remand, the ALJ should consider Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and symptoms, provide an explanation as to whether the record supports them, and, to the extent that the ALJ concludes that the subjective complaints are supported by the record, incorporate limitations into the RFC to account for them.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to discount allegations about symptom intensity, persistence, or limiting effects when the evidence does not fully support them and to include only credited limitations in the RFC.

ROSARIO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-11-17

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s allegations about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of his symptoms where the evidence does not fully support those allegations, and “need only include in the RFC those limitations which he finds to be credible.” Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 229 F. App’x 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929; see also Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016).

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ determining RFC to consider symptom statements with the pertinent objective and other evidence.

Shotts v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-04-08(c)

The ALJ’s decision shows that he properly evaluated the record as a whole in accordance with the pertinent regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 404.1545(a)(3).

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ making an RFC assessment to consider all symptoms and the extent to which they are reasonably consistent with objective and other evidence.

Ojeda v. O'Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-07-31

In making the RFC assessment, the ALJ must consider all symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which these symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *1 (Oct. 25, 2017); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to address all symptoms and sequelae of an impairment when formulating a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Esquivel v. King · filed 2025-02-18

An ALJ must address all symptoms and sequelae3 of an impairment on a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. ... As the ALJ did not discuss these headaches beyond acknowledging Plaintiff’s allegation that she experiences them, the ALJ did not give any basis to discount the severity or frequency of these symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (requiring the ALJ to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting claimant’s testimony). Accordingly, the ALJ’s treatment of the symptoms of Plaintiff’s right-eye blindness is not supported by substantial evidence and is harmful error given that Plaintiff alleged that the pain from the headaches interferes with her ability to work.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ who proceeds beyond step two to consider all of the claimant’s impairments and symptoms when evaluating residual functional capacity.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-02

However, if the claimant has at least one severe impairment or combination of impairments, then the evaluation continues, and the ALJ considers all impairments and symptoms when evaluating RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, 404.1545(a)(2).

Section 404.1529(a) does not require an ALJ to include alleged symptom limitations in the residual functional capacity after the claimant’s statements about their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects have been properly discounted as unsupported.

Roberts v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-03-25(a)

Thus, because the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s subjective statements, the ... ALJ was not required to incorporate Plaintiff’s statements regarding intensity, persistence, ... and limiting effects in the RFC assessment.

Section 404.1529(c) requires the adjudicator to assess the credibility and limiting effects of symptoms using the listed factors, and the claimant's RFC is not one of those factors.

Chartier v. Social Security · filed 1998-11-30(c)

The ALJ must assess the credibility of claimant's subjective complaints of pain (along with the other factors identified above) before she determines whether he has the RFC to perform sedentary work. She should not first conclude that he has such an RFC and then use that determination as evidence that his complaints of pain are less than credible. Stated somewhat differently, a claimant's RFC is not one of the factors that should be considered when assessing his subjective complaints of pain under Avery, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), or SSR 96-7p.

Section 404.1529 requires an adjudicator evaluating a claimant’s symptoms to assess them against objective and other evidence of record, rather than against the adjudicator’s own RFC determination.

Kameisha v. Colvin · filed 2015-04-03(a), (b), (c)

Reading the governing regulations and the case law of this Circuit, the hearing officer ought indeed assess a claimant’s credibility with regard to the objective evidence and not his own administrative determination of the RFC.

Section 404.1529 requires the RFC to be determined from the evidence, including symptom testimony; an ALJ may not determine the RFC first and then reject symptom reports because they conflict with that predetermined RFC.

Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-30(a)

The ALJ’s statement about the claimant’s symptom reports “reducing” the claimants RFC––as well as the Commissioner’s assertion that an ALJ can “reject” symptom reports that “conflict with the RFC determination”––err in “put[ting] the cart before the horse, in the sense that the determination of capacity must be based on the evidence, including the claimant’s testimony, rather than forcing the testimony into a foregone conclusion.”

Section 404.1529 requires a two-step assessment of whether an impairment could produce symptoms and whether those symptoms are consistent with the record, before the RFC is determined.

Feliciano v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-20

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ was also required to account for Plaintiff’s “reports of pain and other limitations,” after analyzing the credibility of his statements through a “two-step process”: (i) considering if his impairments could “reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms” he testified about; and (ii) evaluating the extent to which these symptoms were “consistent” with the rest of the record. Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to consider a claimant's ability to maintain part-time employment as one factor in determining whether the claimant is disabled.

Miller v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2013-04-22(c)(3)

Further, the ALJ did not err by considering Miller’s ability to maintain part-time employment as one factor relevant to the determination of whether he was disabled. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1571, 416.929(c)(3), 416.971.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ evaluating subjective complaints to consider objective support, treatment, medication effectiveness, compliance, daily activities, improvement, receipt of unemployment benefits, and post-injury employment.

Woods v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2021-03-25(c)(3)

In the present action, this Court finds the ALJ properly addressed and discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. In his opinion, the ALJ addressed the factors from Polaski, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929, and stated inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the record. (Tr. 15-18). Specifically, the ALJ noted the following: (1) Absence of objective medical findings to support Plaintiff’s alleged disabling pain, (2) Conservative medical treatment, (3) Conditions controlled by use of his medications, (4) Noncompliance and lack of effort with physical therapy, (5) Plaintiff’s described activities of daily living allow for active lifestyle, (6) Conditions improved with medical treatment, (7) Receipt of unemployment benefits for a period of time, and (8) Employment at substantial gainful activity for years following reported back injury. Id. These findings are valid reasons supporting the ALJ’s credibility determination, and this Court finds the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. See Lowe, 226 F.3d at 971-72. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff complaints of pain. Thus, the Court cannot find a basis for reversal on this issue. See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that deference is warranted where the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by good reasons and substantial evidence).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to consider the claimant’s work record when assessing reported symptoms, including evidence that seeking disability may have been motivated by non-disability reasons.

Wasemiller v. Saul · filed 2021-03-24(c)(3)

The ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s reported disability symptoms because his decision to seek disability appeared to be motivated for non-disability reasons is supported by substantial evidence and is a clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s reported disability symptoms. ... See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (work record can be considered in assessing reported symptoms); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 (same).

An ALJ may not treat unsuccessful work attempts and the collection of unemployment benefits as undermining symptom allegations without considering the attempts’ duration, outcomes, and reasons for failure.

ALLEN v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-09-23(c)(3)

Here, the ALJ did not explicitly consider the facts of Rhonda A.'s case concerning her work attempts and collection of unemployment benefits. She fulfilled her obligation to receive unemployment benefits by not only seeking employment but attempting to work several jobs during the period under review. The ALJ did not explicitly consider the outcome of Rhonda A.'s several work attempts, the short duration of each work attempt that lasted only a couple of weeks or maybe a couple of months, and the reasons that the work attempts were not successful. (See Filing No. 11-2 at 47-51 (Rhonda A.'s relevant testimony).) For example, she tried working for the Salvation Army because she believed that the employer's experience with disabled people would make it a good fit, but she was “somewhat on suspension” for missing days because she could not “get out of bed.” (Filing No. 11-2 at 48.) Rhonda A. also attempted two jobs that required lifting 50 pounds, but she testified that she could not perform them for that reason. (Filing No. 11-2 at 49-50.) Those jobs' lifting demands exceeded the ALJ's assessment of her lifting capability during the period under review. She was not able to sustain work at any of these jobs, but she continued to try to work at new jobs. Her attempts to do so do not detract from her credibility.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits sustained post-onset work at substantial-gainful-activity levels to show symptoms were not as limiting as alleged, even if financial hardship motivated the return to work.

Melvin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-18(c)(3)

While Claimant’s motivation for returning to work may have been financial, that does not change the fact that she was able to successfully work at SGA levels for a significant period of time. ... The ALJ concluded that Claimant’s work activity at SGA for more than a year at the time of the hearing “supports a finding that the claimant was not experiencing symptomology so severe as to significantly limit her ability to attend to her activities of daily living; maintain concentration, attention, and pace; interact with others, including patients; or manage herself.” ... The ALJ properly considered Claimant’s work history in assessing her RFC and cited substantial evidence supporting his conclusions. ... Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in considering Claimant’s work history.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to use part-time or unreported work activity, together with contemporaneous records, to discount testimony that the claimant cannot sustain full-time work.

Mafara-Reed v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2025-10-06(c)

An ALJ is entitled to rely on work activity along with other contemporaneous records to discount Plaintiff’s testimony. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (“ALJ may consider any work activity, including part-time work, in determining whether a claimant is disabled.”). ... These citations to the record suggest that Plaintiff was working under the table, which can be used to undermine a claim for disability.

Section 404.1529 requires evidence beyond a claimant’s symptoms alone, but medically acceptable psychological diagnostic techniques may support the claimant’s symptom testimony.

Taylor v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1989-12-20

While the regulations do require that there be observable evidence other than symptoms, they also allow diagnoses that are based on "medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques." In the context of psychological or psychiatric exams, these standards, if strictly applied, would be difficult to reconcile since mental health professionals commonly rely on patient interviews. Psychological examinations can support a claimant's testimony within the meaning of the regulations if the examinations employ medically acceptable diagnostic techniques.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) treats evidence obtained through medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques as objective medical evidence, while providers’ documentation of a claimant’s own symptom reports remains subjective evidence.

Roche v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-03-25(c)(2)

However, “[o]bjective medical evidence” is “evidence obtained from the application of medically acceptable clinical ... and laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); see also Attia v. Astrue, No. 1:06–cv–00778–SMS, 2007 WL 2802006, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2007) (“‘Objective medical evidence’ refers to any evidence that an examining doctor can discover and substantiate; it is not limited to concrete physiological data, but includes all evidence that is amenable to external testing.”) (citing Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 162 (10th Cir. 1987)). Plaintiff’s vertigo symptoms are her own reports to providers and thus not “obtained from the application of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques[.]” Id. Otherwise stated, the “document[ation]” of plaintiff’s reports of vertigo symptoms is subjective, not objective, medical evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits rejecting symptom testimony solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate it, but permits discounting testimony that affirmatively contradicts objective medical evidence.

MISTY SMARTT V. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-11-17(c)(2)

Thus, the regulations and Burch are in full accord. But neither Burch nor the regulations prohibit ALJs from doing what they do all the time: relying on any contradictions between a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony and the objective medical evidence in the record to discount the symptom testimony.

An ALJ should evaluate testimony about symptom severity in relation to objective medical and other evidence.

Stewart v. SSA · filed 2022-08-30(c)(4)

However, as the ALJ's opinion sufficiently details, the ALJ appropriately evaluated the testimony in relation to “the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).

An ALJ must consider subjective complaints but may discount them when contradicted by medical evidence and the claimant’s own descriptions of daily activities.

CAESAR v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-08-18

While the ALJ is required to consider Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, they must be supported by the medical evidence in the record. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. Here, Plaintiff’s subjective complaints are contradicted by several positive examinations in the record which highlight normal findings of strength in all four extremities, (AR 1157), and high tonicity of her neck muscles with diminished range of motion, but no abnormal findings, (AR 1250). Plaintiff’s complaints are also at odds with her own description of her daily activities, which include performing light household chores, preparing simple meals, doing online shopping for herself and her family, and visiting her family once per month.

An ALJ must consider inconsistencies within the evidence and between symptom statements and history, laboratory findings, and source statements.

Godwin v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-08-19(c)(4)

While evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider whether inconsistencies exist within the evidence or between the claimant’s statements and the evidence, including his history, laboratory findings, and statements by medical or other sources about how his symptoms affect him. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4) & 416.929(c)(4).

After objective evidence shows an impairment that could produce symptoms, an ALJ must determine how consistent the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects are with the whole record and their likely effect on work capacity.

Teresa May Williams v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-22(a), (c)(4)

Accordingly, when a claimant presents “objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms [the claimant] alleged,” the ALJ is required to determine the extent to which the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his or her subjective symptoms (“subjective statements” or “subjective complaints”) are consistent with the record evidence as a whole and, consequently, whether any of the individual’s symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions are likely to reduce the claimant’s capacity to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(4), 416.929(a), (c)(4); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4-*10.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires the ALJ, when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, to consider inconsistencies within the evidence and between the claimant’s statements and the other evidence.

Rider v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-05-18(c)(4)

While evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider whether inconsistencies exist within the evidence or between the claimant’s statements and the evidence, including his history, medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements by medical sources or other sources about how her symptoms affect her. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4) & 416.929(c)(4). ... In sum, the ALJ correctly considered “the consistency of [Rider’s] statements” with the remainder of the evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires the ALJ, when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, to consider inconsistencies within the evidence and between the claimant’s statements and the other evidence.

Murphy v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-05-18(c)(4)

While evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider whether inconsistencies exist within the evidence or between the claimant’s statements and the evidence, including his history, medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements by medical sources or other sources about how his symptoms affect him. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4) & 416.929(c)(4). ... In sum, the ALJ correctly considered “the consistency of [Murphy’s] statements” with the remainder of the evidence.

Section 404.1529(c) makes symptom allegations less likely to establish work-related limitations when they are inconsistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record.

Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-18(c)

A claimant’s statements about intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms, which are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, are less likely to reduce his capacity to perform work related activities. SSR 16-3p, at *7; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). ... Consistent with the governing regulations, the ALJ here considered the entire record in evaluating the subjective complaints. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings on the subjective symptom evaluation and the RFC.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ assessing a claimant’s disability allegations to consider how consistent those allegations are with the objective and other evidence in the record.

Price v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-24(c)

When assessing the reliability of a claimant’s disability allegations, an ALJ considers the extent to which such allegations are consistent with the objective evidence and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). ... In sum, this Court finds the ALJ pointed to clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence to conclude that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments were not as severe as she alleged. AR 21.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits an ALJ to consider inconsistency between subjective symptom statements and objective medical evidence, but that inconsistency cannot be the sole reason for rejecting the statements.

Duran v. Saul · filed 2021-05-27(c)(2)

The ALJ properly considered how consistent Plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements were with this objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). This could not be the ALJ’s sole reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s statements about his symptoms, but it was a factor that the ALJ was permitted to consider. ... Thus, the lack of consistency between Plaintiff’s medical records and his testimony was a proper basis for the ALJ’s discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars an ALJ from rejecting symptom testimony solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate it, but permits lack of objective corroboration to be considered as one factor.

Kiran v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-28(c)(2)

The ALJ may not, however, discount testimony “solely because” the claimant’s symptom testimony “is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (noting that the Commissioner “will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements”). An ALJ may consider the lack of corroborating objective medical evidence as one factor in “determining the severity of the claimant’s pain.” ... These conflicts between what Plaintiff told medical providers and what she told the Commissioner are exactly the type of inconsistencies on which an ALJ may rely to reject a Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to evaluate symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects by considering inconsistencies with medical evidence, treatment history, reported activities, and statements to treating physicians.

Lux v. Saul · filed 2021-06-17(c)

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ provided several valid reasons supported by the record for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Soc. Sec. R. 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, *7 (March 16, 2016) (itemizing factors to consider in evaluating the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms). First, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with the medical evidence, most notably the opinion of Dr. Zelby, the objective medical records, the nature and extent of treatment Plaintiff had received, as well as the activities and symptoms Plaintiff reported to his treating physicians. [R. 110-11.] See Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]lthough an ALJ may not ignore a claimant’s subjective reports of pain simply because they are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, discrepancies between objective evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration.”); accord Sienkiewicz, 409 F.3d at 804.

Sections 404.1529(c)(1) through (3) permit an ALJ to consider inconsistencies between a claimant’s subjective statements and other evidence alongside the objective medical evidence, although the statements need not be entirely consistent with the record.

Washington v. Saul · filed 2021-06-18(c)(1)-(3)

Although there may not be a requirement “that a claimant’s subjective statements be entirely consistent with the other evidence of record,” Pl.’s Br. at 13, the regulations do provide that the ALJ may take into consideration such inconsistencies, in addition to the objective medical evidence, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)–(3), 416.929(c)(1)–(3). That is exactly what the ALJ did here—he noted the inconsistencies and considered them alongside the objective medical evidence. See A.R. at 25.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires an ALJ, after identifying an impairment that could produce the alleged symptoms, to evaluate statements about symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects against objective medical evidence and other evidence.

Bush v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-06-30(c)(4)

Once an ALJ identifies an underlying medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ evaluates the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). ... Here, the ALJ determined that Ms. Bush’s migraines could reasonably be expected to produce some of Ms. Bush’s alleged symptoms. (R. 33). However, the ALJ also determined that Ms. Bush’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (R. 32–33). ... Because the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court will not disturb it.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider inconsistencies within the evidence and between the claimant’s statements and evidence from medical and other sources.

Partridge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-07-16(c)(4)

While evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider whether inconsistencies exist within the evidence or between the claimant’s statements and the evidence, including her history, medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements by medical sources or other sources about how her symptoms affect her. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4) & 416.929(c)(4). ... In sum, the ALJ correctly considered “the consistency of [Partridge’s] statements” with the remainder of the evidence. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8. The ALJ’s determinations are supported by substantial evidence and this claim is without merit.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ to compare a claimant’s symptom allegations with the rest of the evidence and permits discounting testimony when supported by specific record inconsistencies.

Pospical v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-07-19(c)

The ALJ compares a claimant’s allegations to the rest of the evidence to determine whether the claimant’s statements are consistent. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). With respect to symptom testimony, an ALJ’s findings must be “properly supported by the record and sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding [symptoms].” ... In this case, the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff’s testimony unpersuasive. The ALJ provided clear, cogent, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding pain symptoms. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s treatment records and examination findings were inconsistent with her alleged symptoms. AR at 20–21. Inconsistencies between a claimant’s allegations and the relevant medical evidence is a sufficient reason to reject a claimant’s testimony.

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) and (c)(4) permit an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider medication used for relief and inconsistencies or conflicts between the claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence.

Puckett v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-21(c)(3)(iv), (c)(4)

The ALJ also noted inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there were conflicts between Plaintiff’s statements and the rest of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); SSR 16-3p. Another factor the ALJ considered was the medications used to alleviate Plaintiff’s alleged pain and other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); SSR 16-3p. The undersigned concludes the above-mentioned findings regarding Plaintiff’s subjective statements are supported by substantial evidence and fully comport with applicable law.

Sections 404.1529(b)-(c) permit an ALJ to give subjective statements less weight when they conflict with objective evidence, provided the decision applies the two-step framework and considers both objective and subjective evidence.

Hiott v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-09-30(b)-(c)

The undersigned is unable to find any reversible error in the ALJ’s decision, as this was the proper analytical framework for the ALJ to follow. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)–(c); Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993) (“What we require is that the ALJ sufficiently articulate [her] assessment of the evidence to ‘assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence . . . [and to enable] us to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.’” (first alteration added) (citation omitted)). When objective evidence conflicts with a claimant’s subjective statements, an ALJ is allowed to give the statements less weight.

Under section 404.1529(c)(4), treatment notes that do not discuss recovery from a procedure do not contradict a claimant’s testimony about post-procedure pain and resulting work absences.

Picardi v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-10-18(c)(4)

While the ALJ is correct that the treatment notes of Dr. Goldner and Dr. Courey do not mention that Picardi reported symptoms that would require an absence from work while recovering from the injections, nothing exists in those treatment notes that contradicts Picardi’s testimony that he experiences pain following each injection procedure that requires three to five days for him to recover.

Section 404.1529(c) requires comparison of symptom allegations with objective and other record evidence, and asserted inconsistencies must clearly support discounting the testimony.

Fletcher-Silvas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-11-02(c)

When assessing the reliability of a claimant’s disability allegations, an ALJ considers the extent to which such allegations are consistent with the objective evidence and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of pain in her neck and knees are not clearly inconsistent with the objective evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not provide clear or convincing evidence for discounting Plaintiff’s pain testimony based on inconsistencies with the medical record.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) allows an ALJ to consider inconsistencies between alleged symptoms and the other evidence and to omit limitations the ALJ reasonably finds unsupported.

Tackett v. SSA · filed 2021-11-12(c)(4)

So, while the ALJ may not have reduced Tackett’s RFC to the extent he desired, the ALJ properly considered the inconsistencies in the evidence and addressed the limitations she reasonably believed to be caused by his gout.

Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to find symptoms less work-limiting when treatment improvement and daily activities conflict with the claimant’s allegations.

Bosworth v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-01-26(c)

Because both her improvement with treatment and daily activities were inconsistent with Claimant’s subjective allegations, the ALJ was free to determine that Claimant’s symptoms are less likely to reduce her capacity to perform work-related activities. The Court is, therefore, satisfied that the ALJ properly discharged his duties under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) and SSR 16-3p and his conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529 requires alleged symptom intensity and functional effects to be evaluated against medical signs, laboratory findings, and other evidence, and permits an ALJ to resolve supported inconsistencies.

Conrad v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-02-15(a)-(c)

Here, the ALJ permissibly discounted Conrad’s testimony about the extent of her symptoms, based on the inconsistency of Conrad’s testimony compared to the medical records in the case.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits an ALJ to compare the asserted severity of symptoms with the medical evidence when the decision identifies the specific inconsistencies.

Carey v. Saul · filed 2022-03-01(c)(2)

The ALJ then explained that she found Plaintiff’s assertions about the severity of his symptoms and limitations not entirely consistent with the medical evidence. (R. 19; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2).) Her discussion of the evidence highlighted the ways in which Plaintiff’s assertions varied from the evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(1)–(3) permits the ALJ to compare symptom descriptions with medical evidence, daily activities, medication, treatment, and other factors without making a general character judgment.

Jones v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-05-05(c)(1)–(3)

In context, however, the ALJ was simply noting the absence of medical evidence; he was not evaluating Plaintiff’s overall “truthfulness,” and in the remainder of the paragraph, the ALJ relies on discrepancies between Plaintiff’s statements about other periods of time and the medical evidence in the record—which the ALJ is certainly entitled to do.

Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to consider objective evidence and inconsistencies between allegations and the record, while symptom allegations alone are not conclusive of disability.

Lentz v. Saul · filed 2022-05-09(c)

While the Seventh Circuit has said that ALJs ought not to focus exclusively on objective medical evidence when assessing a plaintiff’s allegations, ... the court has also made it clear that ALJs are entitled to “consider several factors, including objective medical evidence and any inconsistencies between the allegations and the record.” ... That’s because a plaintiff's allegations, “taken alone, are not conclusive of a disability.”

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to discount subjective complaints that conflict with the record and requires symptom statements to be evaluated against objective medical and other evidence.

SPINELLI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-06-27(c)(4)

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints if they are inconsistent with the evidence of record. 20 CFR § 404.1529(a); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, an ALJ will consider a claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms, but will evaluate those statements “in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence,” in reaching a conclusion as to whether a claimant is disabled. 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(4). ... In reviewing these findings, there is substantial evidence supporting ALJ Toland’s evaluation of the intensity and persistence of Plaintiff’s symptoms.

An ALJ must examine inconsistencies within the evidence and between a claimant’s statements and other evidence, and may recognize symptom-related work limitations only insofar as they reasonably accord with the record.

Wines v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-07(c)(4)

The ALJ must consider whether inconsistencies exist within the evidence or between the claimant’s statements and the evidence including the claimant’s history, medical signs, and ... statements by medical sources or other sources about how her symptoms affect her. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). The ALJ may use symptoms to diminish the claimant’s capacity for basic work activities to the extent that their alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence. Id.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires only reasonable—not complete—consistency between alleged symptoms and the medical and other evidence, and the ALJ must explain the rejection of reasonably consistent, uncontradicted symptom testimony.

Engle v. Saul · filed 2022-07-13(c)(3)

The ALJ, however, in determining whether an individual is disabled, must consider all of the individual’s symptoms, “including pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the individual's record.” See SSR 16-3p. Complete consistency is not required, only reasonable consistency. Absent contrary medical evidence, Engle’s remaining alleged symptoms are reasonably consistent with her medical evidence and testimony. Therefore, the ALJ erred when he failed to provide a reason for rejecting Engle’s subjective testimony regarding her symptoms.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to discount allegations about symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects when the evidence does not fully support them and to include only credited limitations in the residual functional capacity.

SANTANGELO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-07-14

Further, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and symptoms. (R. 16–20.) “Allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). An ALJ may discount a claimant’s allegations about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of his symptoms where the evidence does not fully support those allegations, and “need only include in the RFC those limitations which he finds to be credible.” Salles v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 229 F. App’x 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929; see also Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016). ... Accordingly, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC, and the evidence taken as a whole supports the ALJ’s decision.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) assesses how symptoms limit work capacity by comparing intensity, persistence, and limiting-effect statements to objective and other evidence and considering inconsistencies and conflicts.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-10(c)(4)

To determine how much symptoms affect a claimant’s capacity to perform basic work activities, the SSA considers statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms; the statements in relation to the objective medical and other evidence; any inconsistencies in the evidence; and any conflicts between the statements and other evidence, including history, signs, laboratory findings, and statements by others. Id. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4).

After objective evidence shows an impairment that could produce symptoms, an ALJ must assess the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects against the record as a whole and determine their likely effect on work capacity.

Tracy v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-08(a), (c)(4)

Accordingly, when a claimant presents “objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms [the claimant] alleged,” the ALJ is required to determine the extent to which the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his or her subjective symptoms (“subjective statements” or “subjective complaints”) are consistent with the record evidence as a whole and, consequently, whether any of the individual’s symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions are likely to reduce the claimant’s capacity to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c)(4); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4-*10.

After objective evidence shows an impairment that could produce symptoms, an ALJ must assess alleged symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects against the whole record and determine their likely effect on work capacity.

Denham v. Saul · filed 2022-09-08(a), (c)(4)

Accordingly, when a claimant presents “objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms [the claimant] alleged,” the ALJ is required to determine the extent to which the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his or her subjective symptoms (“subjective statements” or “subjective complaints”) are consistent with the record evidence as a whole and, consequently, whether any of the individual’s symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions are likely to reduce the claimant’s capacity to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(4), 416.929(a), (c)(4); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4-10.

An ALJ must evaluate statements about symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects in relation to objective medical and other evidence when deciding disability.

Harris v. Social Security Administration, Commisioner · filed 2022-09-08(c)(4)

Then, according to both caselaw and the applicable regulations, an ALJ “will consider [a claimant’s] statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms,” and “evaluate [those] statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence, in reaching a conclusion as to whether [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); see Hargress v. Social Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018).

An ALJ must evaluate statements about symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects in relation to objective medical and other evidence when deciding disability.

Ditto v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-09-09(c)(4)

Then, according to both caselaw and the applicable regulations, an ALJ “will consider [a claimant’s] statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms,” and “evaluate [those] statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence, in reaching a conclusion as to whether [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); see Hargress v. Social Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2018).

Symptom-related functional limitations need only be reasonably consistent with objective and other evidence; an ALJ errs by requiring them to be fully supported.

Stewart v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-15(c)(4)

The problem with this theory is that an ALJ is not free to disregard a claimant’s proposed limitations simply because they are “not fully supported.” Rather, a claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, will be determined to diminish [his] capacity for basic work activities to the extent that [the] alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to symptoms, such as pain, can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(4). In requiring that Stewart’s proposed limitations be fully supported, the ALJ may have impermissibly excluded some limitations (such as the need to walk around) that were merely “consistent with the objective medical evidence,” but not totally unimpeachable. This, too, would be error.

An ALJ may discount symptom statements by comparing them with daily activities and medical records, identifying inconsistencies, and adequately articulating those inconsistencies.

Barrett v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-09-26(c)(3), (4)

The Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Plaintiff’s subjective statements. The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s claims in light of her daily activities and medical records, identified inconsistencies, and adequately articulated them. See R. 34–36. Ultimately, he did not find the statements to be credible, and the Court may not disturb that finding. Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.

An ALJ may partially discount symptom complaints without relying solely on daily activities when the decision analyzes the whole record and explains conflicts with objective and other evidence.

Howland v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-26(c)(4)

As previously discussed, the ALJ did not rely solely on Plaintiff’s participation in some daily activities when discounting her symptoms. Rather, the ALJ provided a detailed analysis of the evidence of record, articulated the reasons why she discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and supplied a rationale for her findings. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ did not totally discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, but considered them along with the record as a whole, including objective and other evidence, in formulating a limited RFC. Therefore, the ALJ did not err when considering Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

Section 404.1529(a) requires an ALJ to consider all symptoms, including pain, and determine how far they are reasonably consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.

Olejnik v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-03(a)

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider all symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which those “symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). ... In sum, while plaintiff identifies shortcomings, he fails to demonstrate reversible error in the ALJ’s assessment of the impact of his pain.

Section 404.1529(a) directs an ALJ to assess how far a claimant's symptoms are reasonably consistent with the objective medical evidence and other record evidence.

Velic v. Saul · filed 2022-11-08(a)

In assessing a claimant’s symptoms, the regulations direct an ALJ to “consider “the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); SSR 16-3p. ... The Court finds the ALJ reasonably considered the evidence of record and found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.

Section 404.1529 permits discounting subjective complaints only when they are inconsistent with the record as a whole, including objective evidence, medical-source observations, and reported activities.

Emerson v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-12-02(c)

Claimant’s subjective complaints may be discounted only if found to be inconsistent with the record taken as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d at 1218. ... Having reviewed the record, the court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s RFC determination and final decision regarding Emerson’s ability to perform sedentary work.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to discount subjective complaints after weighing them against the overall medical record and daily activities, so long as the decision is sufficiently specific for review.

Harvey v. Saul · filed 2022-11-28(c)(3)

For the following reasons, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law. ... Second, the ALJ reasonably found Plaintiff’s complaints of totally disabling pain and limitation inconsistent with her activities of daily living, which included light household chores, personal care, and driving short distances.

An ALJ may compare a claimant’s statements with the rest of the evidence and need not expressly enumerate every symptom-evaluation factor in the decision.

Fulton v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2023-03-30(c)(4)

The ALJ will also consider whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence, including the history, signs and laboratory findings, and statements by treating and non-treating sources or other persons about how the symptoms affect the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). “However, Eleventh Circuit case law does not require an ALJ to enumerate every factor in every decision.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of all the claimant's symptom statements and permits acceptance of those symptoms only to the extent reasonably consistent with objective medical evidence.

Elysia K. v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-31(c)(3)

The ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s statements about his symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49462; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits an ALJ assessing symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects to consider consistency with objective medical evidence and the claimant's other statements.

Connelly v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-04-12(c)(2)

When considering a claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms, the ALJ may consider whether the claimant’s statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and other statements a claimant makes.

Section 404.1529(a) directs an ALJ to judge a claimant’s symptom allegations by their consistency with other evidence, including objective medical evidence.

Zimmermann v. O'Malley · filed 2024-08-19(a)

The ALJ also contrasted Plaintiff’s subjective allegations with contradictory evidence, highlighting the inconsistencies therein. [R. 17; see 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (ALJ judges claimant’s symptom allegations based on their consistency with other evidence, including objective medical evidence). ... Accordingly, the ALJ cited enough (i.e., substantial) evidence in finding Plaintiff overstated her mental limitations.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) treats subjective symptoms as reducing a claimant’s capacity for basic work activities only to the extent they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the evidence.

Guminski v. O'Malley · filed 2025-03-21(c)(4)

A claimant’s subjective symptoms “will be determined to diminish [their] capacity for basic work activities to the extent [they] can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the… evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).

Subsection (c)(4) requires an ALJ to consider medical and nonmedical evidence and compare symptom statements with objective and other evidence when evaluating intensity and persistence.

PERNA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-01-31(c)(4)

The ALJ was therefore obligated to consider all evidence in the record, medical and nonmedical, which could support or refute such a claim and speak to the intensity of Perna’s symptoms. This analysis includes “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of symptoms, and “statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). The ALJ properly considered whether Perna’s testimony regarding the intensity and persistence of her symptoms was consistent with the medical and other evidence.

Subsection (c)(4) requires symptom statements to be evaluated in relation to objective and other evidence, including inconsistencies and conflicts with medical findings and statements by others.

Rivera v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-28(c)(4)

To determine the extent to which the claimant’s symptoms affect his capacity to perform basic work activities, the SSA considers statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms; the statements in relation to the objective medical and other evidence; any inconsistencies in the evidence; and any conflicts between the statements and other evidence, including history, signs, laboratory findings, and statements by others. Id. § 404.1529(c)(4).

Subsection (c) permits an ALJ to reject symptom allegations that are inconsistent with the claimant’s activities and medical evidence.

B.A.Y. v. Commissioner, SSA · filed 2024-06-05(c)

Her rejection of Mr. Y’s testimony on the ground that his allegations were not entirely consistent with his activities and the medical evidence also complied with applicable standards. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (listing factors relevant to considering symptoms).

Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to consider objective medical evidence alongside other evidence when evaluating symptoms, but forbids relying solely on its absence to discount a claimant’s statements.

Metaferia v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-02-14(c)

In other cases, the ALJ may consider that objective evidence, or lack thereof, in conjunction with other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). In any case, the ALJ may not rely solely on the lack of objective medical evidence to discredit a claimant’s subjective statements. Id. ... Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision in this regard.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires the ALJ to consider whether a claimant’s subjective complaints are consistent with the evidence.

Majkut v. Commr. of Social Sec. · filed 2010-08-30(c)(4)

Regulation 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1529(c)(4) and 416.929(c)(4) require the ALJ to consider the consistency of subjective complaints.

Subsection 404.1529(c)(3) evaluates whether symptom statements are consistent with the record rather than examining the claimant's character, but the substantive analysis remains largely the same as the former credibility inquiry.

Hicks · filed 2026-01-06(c)(3)

This was once referred to as a credibility determination, but the agency has now eliminated use of the term “credibility” to clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character. However, the analysis remains largely the same, so the Court’s use of the term credibility refers to the ALJ’s evaluation of whether a claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 n.6 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that SSR 16-3p “largely changes terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints).

SSR 16-3p eliminated the term “credibility” from subjective-complaint analysis without changing section 404.1529's symptom-evaluation requirements.

Draper · filed 2026-01-14

Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminated the term “credibility” from the analysis of subjective complaints. However, the regulations remain unchanged; “Our regulations on evaluating symptoms are unchanged.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 n.6 (8th Cir. 2020).

Section 404.1529 does not require an ALJ to make an express credibility determination when evaluating subjective complaints.

Henderson v. O'Malley · filed 2024-08-28(a), (c)

But Section 404.1529 does not require the ALJ to do so. ... Thus, the ALJ did not err by failing to make a credibility determination when evaluating Henderson’s subjective complaints.

The Tenth Circuit’s three-step Luna framework remains the proper symptom-evaluation standard under Section 404.1529, except that examining the claimant’s character is prohibited.

Lawrence v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-08-11

Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on September 9, 2020, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent that, and only to the extent that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

The Tenth Circuit’s three-step Luna symptom framework remains the proper standard under Section 404.1529.

Lawson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-08-05

Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on February 24, 2021, when this case was decided.

Section 404.1529’s requirements for evaluating a claimant’s symptoms were not substantively changed when SSR 16-3p eliminated the term “credibility” from the analysis.

Niemann v. Saul · filed 2021-05-25

Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminated the term “credibility” from the analysis of subjective complaints. However, the regulations remain unchanged; “Our regulations on evaluating symptoms are unchanged.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. ... Plaintiff has failed to establish that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints.

The symptom-evaluation procedure under § 404.1529 was not materially changed by replacing credibility terminology, and the Tenth Circuit’s three-step Luna framework remains the proper standard.

Hoeltzel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2021-11-05

Although that term is no longer used, the applicable regulation never used that term and the procedure for evaluating a claimant’s allegations of symptoms has not significantly changed. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844-01, 5,871 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held its approach to credibility determination is consistent with the approach for evaluating allegations of symptoms set forth in SSR 16-3p. Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 Fed. Appx. 542, 546 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on December 27, 2019, when this case was decided.

Section 404.1529 requires evaluating each alleged symptom rather than making a blanket character-based credibility finding from an accusation that the claimant lied on one form.

Warren v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-01-07(c)(3)

Thus, it appears that the ALJ made a general credibility determination about the Plaintiff rather than assessing the credibility of her symptoms and limitations individually. ... The problem here was the blanket fashion in which the ALJ discounted all the Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations (as well as medical opinions) based on allegations related to a specific disability form. ... On remand, the ALJ will have an opportunity to reconsider these allegations and offer an explanation as to which specific assertions they may affect.

The symptom-evaluation factors under § 404.1529 were unchanged by SSR 16-3p’s removal of credibility terminology.

Pipkins v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-01-25

In 2017, the Social Security Administration issued a new ruling that eliminated the use of the term “credibility” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements of symptoms, clarifying that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Oct. 25, 2017) (republished). The factors to be considered in evaluating a claimant’s statements, however, remain the same. See id. at *13 (“Our regulations on evaluating symptoms are unchanged.”). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.

The symptom-evaluation factors under § 404.1529 were unchanged by SSR 16-3p’s removal of credibility terminology.

Simmons v. Saul · filed 2022-02-09

The factors to be considered in evaluating a plaintiff’s statements, however, remain the same. See id. at *13 (“Our regulations on evaluating symptoms are unchanged.”). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.

The three-step Luna framework remains the proper standard under § 404.1529 after SSR 16-3p, but an ALJ may no longer evaluate a claimant’s character as part of that analysis.

Fuerst v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-03-02

Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on November 22, 2019, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

The symptom factors under § 404.1529 remained unchanged when SSR 16-3p eliminated credibility terminology.

Fisher v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-03-24

The factors to be considered in evaluating a claimant’s statements, however, remain the same. See id. at *13 (“Our regulations on evaluating symptoms are unchanged.”). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) evaluates whether symptom statements about intensity, persistence, and limiting effects are consistent with objective and other record evidence.

Cooper v. Saul · filed 2022-03-25(c)(3)

However, the analysis remains largely the same, so the Court’s use of the term credibility refers to the ALJ’s evaluation of whether a claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 n.6 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that SSR 16-3p “largely changes terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints).

The regulation retains the Tenth Circuit’s three-step symptom framework, but subjective credibility measures may not be used to examine a claimant’s character.

Kendrick v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-07-06

Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on December 17, 2020, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent, and only to the extent that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

The Tenth Circuit’s three-step symptom framework remains valid under Section 404.1529 after SSR 16-3p, except that character-based credibility assessment is prohibited.

Schlein v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-07-18(c)(3)

Although that term is no longer used, the applicable regulation never used that term and the procedure for evaluating a claimant’s allegations of symptoms has not significantly changed. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844-01, 5,871 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held its approach to credibility determination was consistent with the approach set forth in SSR 16-3p. Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 F. App’x. 542, 546 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on December 19, 2019, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

The Tenth Circuit’s three-step Luna symptom framework remains the proper standard under Section 404.1529 after SSR 16-3p, except that character-based credibility measures are prohibited.

Everhart v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-08-16(c)(3)

Although that term is no longer used, the applicable regulation never used that term and the procedure for evaluating a claimant’s allegations of symptoms has not significantly changed. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844-01, 5,871 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held its approach to credibility determination was consistent with the approach set forth in SSR 16-3p. Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 F. App’x. 542, 546 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on March 17, 2021, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent that, and only to the extent that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

Section 404.1529’s symptom-evaluation factors remain unchanged after SSR 16-3p eliminated character-based credibility terminology.

Gould v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-09-16

The Social Security Administration issued a new ruling that eliminated the use of the term “credibility” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements of symptoms, clarifying that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Oct. 25, 2017) (republished). The factors to be considered in evaluating a claimant’s statements, however, remain the same. See id. at *13; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.

Section 404.1529(c) requires weighing subjective complaints with objective and other evidence and explaining how the regulatory factors produce the result without assessing character credibility.

Ickes v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-19(c)

“When determining disability, the ALJ must weigh these subjective complaints, the relevant objective medical evidence, and any other evidence of the following factors: ...” ... Acevez, 2014 WL3767679, at *11; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). An ALJ must adequately explain how an evaluation of these factors led to the result in the decision. ... The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms pursuant to the factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) and SSR 16-3p, without assessing “credibility” in the older sense.

The Tenth Circuit’s Luna symptom framework remains valid under § 404.1529 after SSR 16-3p, except that character-based credibility assessment is prohibited.

Brozek v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-09-26(c)(3)

Luna, Thompson, and Kepler were decided when the term used to describe the evaluation of a claimant’s allegations of symptoms resulting from her impairments was “credibility determination.” Although that term is no longer used, the applicable regulation never used that term and the procedure for evaluating a claimant’s allegations of symptoms has not significantly changed. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844-01, 5,871 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit held its approach to credibility determination was consistent with the approach set forth in SSR 16-3p. Brownrigg v. Berryhill, 688 Fed. Appx. 542, 546 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on December 18, 2020, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent, and only to the extent, that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) evaluates whether symptom statements are consistent with the objective medical and other evidence rather than assessing the claimant’s character, while leaving the substance of the prior credibility analysis largely unchanged.

Gapsch v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-30(c)(3)

This was once referred to as a credibility determination, but the agency has now eliminated use of the term “credibility” to clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character. However, the analysis remains largely the same, so the Court’s use of the term credibility refers to the ALJ’s evaluation of whether a claimant’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record.” See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3); Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 n.6 (8th Cir. 2020) (noting that SSR 16-3p “largely changes terminology rather than the substantive analysis to be applied” when evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints).

Section 404.1529(c), as clarified by SSR 16-3p, focuses on whether symptoms are consistent with the objective and other record evidence rather than on character, without substantially changing the prior symptom-evaluation law.

Kissel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-04-11(c)

An ALJ's assessment of subjective symptoms, formerly referred to as the “credibility” determination in SSR 96-7p, was clarified in SSR 16-3p to remove the word “credibility” and refocus the ALJ's attention on the “extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the individual's record.” ... Under SSR 16-3p, an ALJ is to consider all of the evidence in the record in order to evaluate the limiting effects of a plaintiff's symptoms, including the following factors: ... Id., 2017 WL 5180304, at *7–8; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c) and former SSR 96-7p. Despite clarifying the basis for the analysis and elimination of the term “credibility” from the text in order to avoid “character analysis,” SSR 16-3p was not intended to substantially change existing law.

Section 404.1529’s two-part symptom inquiry must evaluate whether an impairment could produce the symptoms and then their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects without framing the determination in terms of the claimant’s “credibility.”

STILLWILL v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-06-12

In evaluating a Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the ALJ must first “consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairments” that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or other symptoms. ... Following this inquiry, the ALJ must then evaluate the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms” to determine the extent to which the individual’s ability to do basic work activities is limited. ... This two-part inquiry should be used to evaluate impairment-related symptoms alleged by a claimant and must be completed without using the term “credibility” in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. ... Here, the ALJ followed this two-step evaluation process.

Section 404.1529 directs the symptom inquiry toward whether an impairment could produce the symptoms and whether their intensity and persistence limit work, not toward the claimant’s overall character or truthfulness.

Turnpaugh · filed 2025-12-11(c)

Social Security Ruling 16-3p explains factors to consider in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms. 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Notably, ALJs “will not assess an individual’s overall character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an adversarial court litigation.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *11. Instead, ALJs should “focus on whether the evidence establishes a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s symptoms and . . . whether the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to perform work-related activities.” Id.

The symptom-evaluation procedure under § 404.1529 remains substantively unchanged after SSR 16-3p, except that evaluating a claimant’s character is no longer a valid factor.

Killgore v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-05-04

Therefore, the framework set out in Luna, based on 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on September 2, 2020, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent, and only to the extent, “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler, 68 F.3d at 391; relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

Section 404.1529’s symptom-evaluation procedure was not materially changed by SSR 16-3p, but character-based credibility judgments are expressly prohibited.

Mai v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2023-07-14

Although that term is no longer used, the applicable regulations never used that term and the procedure for evaluating a claimant’s allegations of symptoms has not significantly changed. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844-01, 5,871 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). Therefore, the three-step framework set out in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987), based on 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (2017) is still the proper standard to be used as explained in the regulations in effect on January 12, 2022, when this case was decided. Nonetheless, to the extent, and only to the extent, that “subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ;” Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995); relate to an examination of a claimant’s character, it is specifically prohibited by SSR 16-3p, and is no longer a valid factor to be considered.

Section 404.1529(c) does not permit an ALJ to infer that intermittent migraines are non-disabling merely because the claimant attended medical appointments between migraines or was not debilitated continuously.

McCracken v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-12-27(c)(2)-(3)

The fact that he is not debilitated all … of the time is not substantial evidence that he is not debilitated some of the time.

An unremarkable MRI does not make migraine allegations inconsistent under Section 404.1529(c)(3), because MRI testing rules out other causes but does not detect the occurrence or severity of migraines.

Davis v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-07-14(c)(3)

But the ALJ’s reference to the “unremarkable” MRI does not support any finding of an inconsistency with Plaintiff’s reports of debilitating migraine headaches. Instead, this indicates a misunderstanding of the assessment of migraine headaches. See generally, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/migraine-headache/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20360207. Neither the occurrence nor the severity of migraine headaches is specifically detectable through such testing. Id. MRIs are used, not to positively diagnose migraines, but to determine other cause(s) of the patient’s affliction.

Section 404.1529 does not require an ALJ to accept reported migraine frequency when the reports are not corroborated by treatment documentation and the claimant’s symptom allegations are inconsistent with the record.

Beashore v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-10-27

This is not documentation of headaches but documentation of reports of headaches. Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of symptoms were not consistent with the record, and this is further reason to discount Plaintiff’s reports of headaches.

Sections 404.1529(c)(2) and (4) allow an ALJ to reject alleged migraine limitations after considering objective evidence, treatment effectiveness, and consistency with the record; the ALJ need not accept subjective testimony without question.

ECKARD v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-12-30(c)(2), (4)

In sum, the ALJ’s decision not to adopt Plaintiff’s subjective statements regarding her migraines, and instead to rely primarily on the medical evidence, was appropriate. The Court again emphasizes that the ALJ did, in fact, include some limitations in the RFC to account for Plaintiff’s headaches.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to discount migraine complaints based on the whole record, including denials of headaches, effective nerve blocks, activities, and work, rather than objective evidence alone.

Beyes v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-02-03

The Court finds the reasons offered by the ALJ in support of her analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding migraine headaches are based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)–(4) allow an ALJ to discount migraine allegations using medical records and daily activities when the decision evaluates the whole record and explains the inconsistency.

Harris v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2023-02-27(c)(3)–(4)

Given the objective medical evidence of record as a whole and Harris’s daily activities, the ALJ did not err by concluding that Harris was not as limited by migraines as he alleged.

Sections 404.1529(c)(2)–(3) permit an ALJ to evaluate migraine severity using activities, medication response, treatment history, and examinations, provided lack of objective corroboration is not the sole reason.

Hagopian v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-28(c)(2)–(3)

In sum, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective statements and therefore the RFC determination.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ to explain how medication and daily activities are inconsistent with alleged migraine frequency and severity before relying on them to discount those allegations.

Wegleitner v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-27(c)

However, upon review of the record, it is unclear how Wegleitner’s treatment with prescribed medications and daily activities were inconsistent with her statements regarding the frequency and severity of her migraines. ... Without further explanation, I am unable to determine whether the ALJ properly discounted Wegleitner’s statements.

Because migraines are not necessarily susceptible to objective findings, § 404.1529 does not permit discounting migraine reports merely because imaging and clinical examinations are normal; the ALJ must explain the objective evidence’s relevance.

Tomer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-06-28(c)(2)-(3)

However, as previously discussed above, migraines are not necessarily susceptible to objective findings. ... “Holding the absence of an objective diagnostic test for migraines against a claimant and finding the claimant’s subjective complaints not credible as a result makes no sense. The claimant is no more or less credible based on the state of [the] medical field’s development in migraine diagnosis and treatment.” ... Thus, the relevance of the objective evidence is not clear from the ALJ’s decision. ... In considering Plaintiff's subjective reports, the ALJ followed the correct legal standards, as set forth in SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8 and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). However, her conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

For episodic migraines, § 404.1529(c)(3) requires the adjudicator to explain how cited findings conflict with migraine symptoms and to address alleged monthly absences; normal neurological and cervical findings do not inherently establish the absence of migraines.

Howard v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-20(c)(3)

However, the ALJ did not give specific, clear and convincing reasons to reject Claimant’s testimony about the severity of his migraine symptoms, nor does the ALJ address the fact that Claimant must take up to two days off per month with medications. ... In other words, the ALJ rejected Claimant’s subjective complaints of migraine pain without elaborating how—or where in the medical records it is specifically stated—that “intact” cranial nerves, “normal” cervical spine, “deformity or tenderness of the cervical spine” mean the absence of migraines. ... But the ALJ failed to provide specific, convincing and clear reasons why Claimant’s inability to do any activities one- to two-days out of the month would preclude his ability to do any other activity the rest of the month.

Normal head, neurological, and physical findings do not establish the absence or low severity of headaches when those findings are not probative and other records document recurring headache symptoms.

Fromm v. Social Security Administration · filed 2023-09-28(c)(3)

The Court is unpersuaded that a normal head examination or normal physical findings indicate that Plaintiff did not suffer headaches or that they were not intense or frequent. ... But the absence of an observable head injury or swelling does not equate to the absence of a headache. ... Here, the ALJ apparently rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of headache pain by citation to records that are not probative regarding headaches, while also failing to address probative evidence supporting her headache pain. ... The Court finds the ALJ’s discussion of the severity of Plaintiff’s headaches is not supported by substantial evidence and does not satisfy SSR 16-3p, as he cited irrelevant findings in support of his conclusion, ignored probative evidence in this record supporting the severity of her headaches, and selectively cited records to support his conclusion.

Section 404.1529(c) requires a migraine symptom evaluation to account for consistent treatment records, reasons for discontinuing ineffective treatment, and the limited significance of normal imaging that merely rules out other causes.

ERVINE v. O'MALLEY · filed 2023-12-19(c)

The Court finds that the ALJ made several errors in assessing Chelsie's credibility that require remand. Most troubling is his finding that Chelsie's medical records contradict her testimony regarding the frequency and severity of her migraines.

Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to reject alleged migraine limitations after considering the whole record, including conservative treatment, medication improvement, and the claimant’s own reports.

GREGGS v. O'MALLEY · filed 2024-03-15(c)

In the present case, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the AL] provided more than conclusory statements discounting Plaintiffs testimony. As instructed by the regulations, the ALJ considered the entire case record and explained his reasons for deviating from Plaintiffs statements regarding the impact of her symptoms on her ability to work.

Subsections (c)(1), (c)(3), and (c)(4) require evaluation of symptom intensity and persistence against objective and other evidence without rejecting symptoms solely for lack of objective substantiation, and the decision must explain the resulting functional limits.

Collins v. Saul · filed 2022-05-26(c)(1), (c)(3)-(4)

Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms which can be reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). Symptoms will be determined to reduce a claimant’s functional capacity only to the extent that the alleged limitations and restrictions can reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). However, an ALJ should not reject statements about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of a symptom solely because it is not substantiated by objective evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). ... Because the Commissioner’s final decision lacks sufficient explanation of the RFC determination, this Court cannot determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment nor whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Collins’s migraines. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s final decision will be remanded so that the ALJ can more clearly explain how he arrived at his findings.

Section 404.1529(c) permits discounting alleged migraine limitations when an ALJ considers the entire record and explains the inconsistency using symptom-validity evidence, medical findings, treatment history, improvement, and activities.

FREEZE v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-09-01(c)

In the present case, as instructed by the regulations, the ALJ considered the entire case record and explained the reasons for deviating from Plaintiff's statements regarding the impact of her headache symptoms on her ability to work. The AL] reviewed the medical evidence, Plaintiffs testimony, and other record evidence, such as Plaintiffs activities, in considering Plaintiffs subjective complaints. She then concluded that the extent to which Plaintiff's migraine symptoms limited her ability to work was not as extensive as Plaintiff alleged.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) permits discounting alleged headache severity after considering the entire medical record, conservative treatment, reported improvement, daily activities, and medication use.

WOOD v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-09-29(c)(4)

Given the record, the ALJ had the discretion to reject her testimony on the debilitating effects of her headaches. Garrett, 274 F. App’x at 164 (finding ALJ properly discounted claimant’s testimony on the limiting effects of his impairments by examining the conservative treatment claimant received and his daily activities). The Court also finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards by looking to SSR 16-3p’s factors for guidance.

Although subsections 404.1529(c)(1)-(3) permit comparing symptom testimony with objective evidence, normal strength, sensation, reflexes, alertness, or lack of acute distress do not contradict fibromyalgia symptoms because those findings are compatible with the disease.

Collins · filed 2026-03-20(c)(1)-(3)

In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ may consider whether it is consistent with objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)-(3), 416.929(c)(1)-(3); SSR 16-3p, available at 2017 WL 5180304, at *7–8. ... Plaintiff is correct to argue the ALJ erred by finding his normal status exams established inconsistency between his symptom testimony and the objective medical evidence. Pl. Br. 13–14, ECF 12. As explained above, someone with fibromyalgia “may have muscle strength, sensory functions, and reflexes [that] are normal.” Revels, 874 F.3d at 663 (simplified).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars requiring objective evidence to substantiate symptom severity and, for fibromyalgia or another disease that does not produce such evidence, forbids using objective medical evidence even as one of multiple factors to discount subjective complaints.

Tilghman Sterling v. Saul · filed 2021-05-26(c)(2)

As to the long-recognized error, because “a claimant is entitled to rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove the second part of the [symptom-evaluation] test,” the Court noted that the ALJ in Arakas “improperly increased [the plaintiff’s] burden of proof by effectively requiring her subjective descriptions of her symptoms to be supported by objective medical evidence.” Id. (quoting Hines, 453 F.3d at 565 and Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2017)); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain . . . solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5. ... The Court “join[ed] those circuits by holding that ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.” Id. ... Thus, because the ALJ discounted plaintiff’s fibromyalgia symptoms using irrelevant, objective evidence, remand is necessary.

Section 404.1529(c) does not generally require objective evidence of pain intensity at the second step and, for fibromyalgia symptoms, forbids reliance on normal objective evidence even as one of several reasons to discount subjective complaints.

Green v. Saul · filed 2021-09-01(c)

Second, if the ALJ finds a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ assesses the plaintiff’s symptoms to determine how the symptoms’ intensity and persistence affect the plaintiff’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p. At the second step, the plaintiff is not generally required to produce objective evidence of the pain itself or its intensity. Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1989). ... Because “[o]bjective indicators such as normal clinical and laboratory results simply have no relevance to the severity, persistence, or limiting effects of . . . fibromyalgia,” the Fourth Circuit held that “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia.” Id. ... It is clear from the foregoing citation that the ALJ used normal, objective evidence as a factor in discounting plaintiff’s subjective complaints about the limiting effects of her fibromyalgia. 2 See Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97. This is error after Arakas. See id.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating fibromyalgia pain to consider the entire record, including daily activities, treatment, attempts to obtain care, and other persons’ symptom statements.

DEJESUS v. SAUL · filed 2022-04-08(c)(3)

When evaluating a claimant’s fibromyalgia symptoms, if the medical records do not support a claimant’s complains of pain, the ALJ must take all evidence in the record under consideration, “including the person's daily activities, medications or other treatments the person uses, or has used, to alleviate symptoms; the nature and frequency of the person's attempts to obtain medical treatment for symptoms; and statements by other people about the person's symptoms.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of the specified symptom factors and all record evidence; for fibromyalgia, an ALJ may not rely on the lack of objective evidence without reconciling non-objective evidence supporting the claimant’s reports.

Meza v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-01(c)(3)

When evaluating a claimant’s testimony, the ALJ should consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment other than medication for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures a claimant uses to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning a claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Ross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 858, 867 (11th Cir. 2019). The ALJ should consider these factors along with all of the evidence of record. ... But relying on the lack of objective medical evidence to discount her subjective complaints as to fibromyalgia is insufficient. See Horowitz, 688 F. App’x at 863. Thus, it is impossible to determine whether the ALJ’s evaluation of fibromyalgia is supported by substantial evidence and therefore warrants remand.

Section 404.1529 requires consideration of symptom testimony and permits objective evidence as a factor, but bars negative findings based solely on lack of objective substantiation, especially for fibromyalgia.

Brown v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2022-08-16(a), (c)(2)

An ALJ must consider a claimant’s symptom testimony, including statements regarding pain and workplace limitations. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). Where there is objective medical evidence in the record of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. ... It is proper for the ALJ to consider the objective medical evidence in making a credibility determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2); 416.929(c)(2). However, an ALJ may not make a negative credibility finding “solely because” the claimant’s symptom testimony “is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence.” ... Here, because of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia diagnosis, it is particularly troubling that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony solely due to a lack of objective medical evidence.

An ALJ may not use objective evidence, even as one of several factors, to discount symptoms of fibromyalgia or another disease that does not produce objective evidence.

Myers v. Saul · filed 2022-09-09(c)

“ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.” Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 97 (4th Cir. 2020). ... The ALJ fails to provide adequate analysis at the second step of evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, thus I am unable to find that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence and find that remand is required.

Objective examination and diagnostic evidence may be used to assess the functional limitations caused by fibromyalgia even though objective tests may not establish the condition’s existence or severity.

Anderson v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-26(c)(2)

Thus, the ALJ did not err, as a matter of law, by considering diagnostic testing and other objective medical evidence is assessing Ms. A.’s alleged symptoms. Here, as in Tarpey, the ALJ relied on examination records from a pain clinic indicating Ms. A. had normal strength, sensation, reflexes, coordination, and range of motion, and was able to ambulate and change positions without difficulty. (Tr. 24 (citing id. at 824–25, 830).) Where the Tenth Circuit has approved consideration of this type of evidence for a claimant with fibromyalgia, the ALJ did not err in relying on it.

Section 404.1529(c) must be applied to fibromyalgia through recognition that its symptoms are entirely subjective, so an ALJ may not use lack of objective evidence even as one of several reasons to discount those symptoms.

Bentzen v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-28(c)

As the Fourth Circuit clearly noted in Arakas, fibromyalgia is “a disease whose ‘symptoms are entirely subjective,’ with the exception of trigger-point evidence” so “ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or lack thereof)— even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia . . . .” 983 F.3d 83, 97 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thus, because the ALJ failed to comply with the requirements of Arakas, remand is warranted here.

Section 404.1529(c) permits objective evidence to be considered in evaluating fibromyalgia symptoms.

Eck v. Saul · filed 2023-03-23(c)

The Court finds no error in this assessment.

Because fibromyalgia commonly lacks objective indicators, § 404.1529(c) forbids discounting related testimony solely for lack of objective support and requires consideration of activities, medication, treatment, and other record evidence.

Cox v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-11(c)(2)-(4)

However, an ALJ may consider the lack of objective evidence in conjunction with other factors, such as the claimant's activity levels and the treatment she received to alleviate the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4); Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 519 (7th Cir. 2009). ... Thus, an ALJ may not discount a claimant's testimony solely because it is not substantiated by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); SSR 16-3p; Adaire v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2015).

For fibromyalgia, normal objective findings cannot be used even as one of several factors to discount subjective symptom allegations; objective evidence is relevant only insofar as it substantiates them.

BRUNSON v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-09-11(c)(2)-(3)

Plaintiff is correct. ... Under SSR 12-2p, as confirmed by Arakas, objective medical results should only ever be considered insofar as they “substantiate” the claimant’s subjective statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his or her symptoms. ... However, although the ALJ should consider longitudinal records, insisting on confirmatory objective results – such as positive physical examination findings – within those records is improper. ... Due to the ALJ’s legal error in evaluating Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, this matter is remanded.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)'s symptom factors apply generally, while fibromyalgia may require special treatment of objective indicators because normal findings do not show severity.

Mania v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-05-01(c)(3)

[O]bjective indicators such as normal clinical and laboratory results simply have no relevance to the severity, persistence, or limiting effects . . . , based on the current medical understanding of the disease.

Section 404.1529(c) requires assessment of symptom intensity and persistence and work effects without improperly demanding objective corroboration of fibromyalgia symptoms.

McElroy v. Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-14(c)

Governed by the standard articulated in Arakas, the Court agrees that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia.

At the second step of evaluating fibromyalgia symptoms, § 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to discount the symptoms’ impact based on the regulation’s listed factors.

McCauslin v. O'Malley · filed 2025-05-06(c)(3)

However, the second step of the process outlined in SSR 12-2p permits an ALJ to discount the impact of FM based on the other factors listed at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). If that step shows that permissibly considered evidence would have forced the same conclusion, the error is harmless.

For fibromyalgia, finding the condition medically determinable completes the first symptom-evaluation step, and the ALJ must then assess its limiting effects using the whole record rather than relying solely on objective evidence.

BONILLA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2025-08-21(b)

Such is not the case here where the ALJ found fibromyalgia to be a medically determinable impairment and did not rely solely or unduly on a lack of objective medical evidence. Instead, the record shows that the ALJ properly analyzed Plaintiff’s subjective pain complaints pursuant to SSR 12-2p when determining Plaintiff’s RFC.

An ALJ evaluating fibromyalgia must distinguish which symptoms are discounted by which evidence and may not rely on objective evidence, even as one factor, to discount fibromyalgia symptoms.

McDonald v. Bisignano · filed 2025-08-22(c)

We are therefore constrained to assume that all symptoms were discounted by the cited evidence, meaning the ALJ relied, at least in part, on objective evidence to discount McDonald’s alleged symptoms. ... Therefore, on this record, we cannot be sure that fibromyalgia was properly evaluated.

Fibromyalgia symptoms must be assessed holistically over the longitudinal record, including recent evidence of pain, abnormal findings, treatment, and functioning rather than cherry-picked normal examinations.

Diaz · filed 2025-11-17(c)(3)

In short, the ALJ erred by concluding that Bertha’s pain was overstated because her examination findings were normal and her treatment sparse, while failing to consider more recent evidence reflecting pain, abnormal findings, and treatment.

In a fibromyalgia claim, § 404.1529 requires particular justification for discounting pain and fatigue because objective findings are often unhelpful and cannot substitute for a full symptom evaluation.

Stewart · filed 2026-01-27(c)

But the ALJ said nothing about why the record failed to support plaintiff’s claims on disabling pain and fatigue from fibromyalgia. Id. “And given the nature of fibromyalgia, where subjective pain complaints play an important role in the diagnosis and treatment of the condition, providing justification for discounting a claimant’s statements is particularly important.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248. The ALJ’s failure to provide justification for discounting plaintiff’s claims of disabling pain and fatigue is reversible error.

Section 404.1529(c) requires evaluation of symptom intensity and persistence using the whole record; normal objective findings cannot be used to discount fibromyalgia symptoms.

Shumard v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-01-13(c)

Second, if the ALJ finds a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ evaluates the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms by considering the record of evidence in its entirety. Id. § 404.1529(c). ... Accordingly, remand is warranted for the ALJ to properly analyze plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and related subjective complaints in accordance with existing precedent, including Arakas and SSR 12-2p.

Section 404.1529 does not permit an ALJ to discount subjective fibromyalgia symptoms based on objective medical evidence or its absence.

Griffee v. Saul · filed 2022-08-09

Because the ALJ “rel[ied] on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof) . . . to discount [Griffee’s] subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia,” his determination of her RFC was based on an incorrect legal standard and is thus erroneous.

Section 404.1529(c) does not permit an ALJ to discount subjective complaints of fibromyalgia symptoms based on objective medical evidence or its absence, even as one of multiple factors.

Arakas v. Commissioner, Social Security · filed 2020-12-14(c)

Today, we join those circuits by holding that ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.

Section 404.1529(c) requires evaluation of a claimant’s symptoms and their limiting effects; fibromyalgia pain cannot be discounted for lack of objective evidence.

Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-17(c)

Although the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s “complaints of various aches and pains throughout the medical record,” she erroneously sought objective evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegations of fibromyalgia-related pain.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of daily activities, symptom characteristics and triggers, medication, treatment, relief measures, and other functional restrictions, but the decision need not discuss every possible factor.

Davis v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2023-09-21(c)(3)

The ALJ must consider certain factors when evaluating a claimant’s alleged symptoms, including complaints of pain, such as: (i) the claimant’s daily activities; (ii) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain or other symptoms; (iii) precipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate the pain or other symptoms; (v) treatment, other than medication, a claimant receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (vi) any measures the claimant takes or has taken to relieve the pain or other symptoms; and (vii) other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. The decision need not contain discussion and citations as to every possible factor to be sufficiently specific.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of daily activities, symptom characteristics and triggers, medication, treatment, relief measures, and other functional restrictions when evaluating reported symptoms.

Sanders v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2023-09-29(c)(3)

In evaluating a claimant’s reported symptoms, an ALJ must consider: (i) [the claimant’s] daily activities; (ii) [t]he location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [the claimant’s] pain or other symptoms; (iii) [p]recipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) [t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication [the claimant] take[s] or ha[s] taken to alleviate . . . pain or other symptoms; (v) [t]reatment, other than medication, [the claimant] receive[s] or ha[s] received for relief of . . . pain or other symptoms; (vi) [a]ny measures [the claimant] use[s] or ha[s] used to relieve . . . pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and (vii) [o]ther factors concerning [the claimant’s] functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Leiter v. Comm’r of SSA, 377 Fed. Appx. 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2010).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider all symptom statements for consistency with objective evidence and to assess pain characteristics, triggers, medication, treatment, functional restrictions, and daily activities.

Susan R. v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-15(c)(3)

The ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s statements about his symptoms, including pain, and determine the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49462; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). In determining whether the medical signs and laboratory findings show medical impairments which reasonably could be expected to produce the pain alleged, the ALJ must apply the First Circuit’s six-part pain analysis and consider the following factors: (1) The nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2) Precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions); (3) Type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) Treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; (5) Functional restrictions; and (6) The claimant’s daily activities. Avery v. Sec’y of HHS, 797 F.2d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1986).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating symptom intensity and persistence to consider the record, claimant and source statements, daily activities, symptom characteristics and triggers, medication, treatment, relief measures, and other functional restrictions.

Aragon v. Social Security Administration · filed 2023-02-14(c)(3)

The ALJ considers the record evidence, the claimant’s statements, the medical and non-medical source statements, and a non-exhaustive list of factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), which include: 1. Daily activities; 2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; 6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and 7. Any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. Id. at *7-8.