20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities, including childcare, as one factor in evaluating the limiting effects of symptoms.

Little v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-10-22(c)(3)(i)

At this second step, the ALJ must consider: (1) plaintiff’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of plaintiff’s pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication plaintiff takes or has taken to relieve her pain or other symptoms; (5) other treatment plaintiff receives or has received to relieve her pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures that plaintiff takes or has taken to relieve her pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors concerning plaintiff’s functional limitations ... and restrictions due to his pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vii). ... Here, the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s ability to parent as one factor in her overall activities of daily living. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not equate the ability to parent with the ability to perform full time gainful employment.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce the claimant’s symptoms and then evaluate their intensity and persistence using objective medical evidence and other relevant evidence, including the listed symptom-related factors.

TUCKER v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION · filed 2020-10-23(c)(3)

Instead, objective medical evidence must corroborate a claimant’s subjective complaints. ... Specifically, an ALJ must follow a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints. ... First, the ALJ “must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms, such as pain.” ... “Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms is established, [the ALJ] evaluate[s] the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s ability to perform work-related activities[.]” ... In this evaluation, an ALJ considers objective medical evidence as well as other evidence relevant to a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3) (listing the following factors to consider: daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment, other than medication, currently received or have received for relief of pain or other symptoms; any measures currently used or have used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of the effectiveness of treatment when determining the severity of a claimant’s symptoms.

Tella v. Saul · filed 2020-10-26(c)(3)

The effectiveness of treatment is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining that conditions effectively controlled with medication are not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a favorable response to treatment can undermine a claimant’s complaints of debilitating pain or other severe limitations).

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to use a two-step process: first determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, then evaluate the symptoms’ intensity, persistence, and limiting effects against objective and other evidence, without rejecting them solely for lack of objective substantiation.

Rettzo v. Berryhill · filed 2020-10-13(b), (c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4)

The ALJ is not only permitted, but also required, to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s statements about all symptoms alleged and must decide whether and to what extent a claimant’s description of his or her impairments may be deemed credible. ... First, the ALJ must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable impairment that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptom alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). If there is no medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the symptom alleged, the symptom cannot be found to affect the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b); SSR 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187; SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029. ... Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms which can be reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). Symptoms will be determined to reduce a claimant’s functional capacity only to the extent that the alleged limitations and restrictions can reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4). However, an ALJ will not reject statements about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of a symptom solely because it is not substantiated by objective evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). ... Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence or limiting effects of her knee pain were not entirely consistent with the evidence. This conclusion appears to be supported by the record, and Plaintiff has cited no evidence that undermines that support. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that remand is required for further consideration of whether the ALJ should have included a requirement that Plaintiff be permitted to work from a reclined position with her legs elevated.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) directs ALJs to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating the severity of the claimant’s symptoms.

Kline v. Saul · filed 2020-10-28(c)(3)(i)

The applicable social security regulation specifically directs ALJs to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating the severity of the claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Thus, the ALJ’s consideration of Kline’s daily activities in this case did not constitute error.

Section 404.1529 identifies treatment and symptom-relief measures as factors in evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, but this court did not require their analysis under Eighth Circuit precedent.

Whittaker v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2020-10-30

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529(a) requires objective medical signs and laboratory findings showing an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain or other symptoms; a claimant’s statement alone is insufficient.

Turner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-10-30(a)

Assessing a claimant’s subjective allegations is an integral step in making the RFC finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). A claimant’s statement that she is experiencing pain or other symptoms will not, taken alone, establish that she is disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain and other symptoms alleged. Id.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ assessing an impairment’s limiting effects to consider all relevant evidence, including objective medical evidence, daily activities, precipitating and aggravating factors, and treatment.

Montoya v. Social Security Administration · filed 2020-11-05(c)

In assessing the total limiting effects of an impairment, the ALJ must consider all of the evidence, including the objective medical evidence, Ms. Montoya’s activities of daily living, precipitating and aggravating factors, and treatment received for an impairment. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

Section 404.1529(c) requires symptom severity to be evaluated using objective medical evidence together with other relevant evidence, including daily activities, work history, and treatment.

Chambers v. Saul · filed 2020-11-03(c)

Indeed, the ALJ reasonably concluded after reviewing the objective medical evidence that Darlene’s symptom allegations concerning her heart condition are not borne out by the findings documented in her treatment notes. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). ... Rather, she appropriately considered Darlene’s daily activities, combined with all other evidence of record, in evaluating the severity of her alleged symptoms. ... Finally, the ALJ considered Darlene’s work history and course of treatment. ... Because the ALJ adequately explained the reasons for discounting Darlene’s symptom allegations, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s symptom assessment.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits considering objective evidence alongside other evidence for ordinary conditions, but objective evidence cannot be the sole basis for discounting symptoms and cannot be used even as one factor for fibromyalgia or another condition that produces no objective symptom evidence.

Anderson v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-10-26(c)(2)

“ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant's subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97. Conversely, in those cases where objective evidence is present, the ALJ may consider that objective evidence, or lack thereof, in conjunction with other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(2). In any case, the ALJ may not rely solely on the lack of objective medical evidence to discredit a claimant’s subjective statements. Id.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits rejecting pain testimony solely for lack of objective support, while allowing medical evidence to be considered in determining symptom severity and disabling effects.

Roper v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-11-04(c)(2)

An ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s pain ... testimony and deny benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged is not supported by objective medical evidence. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1991); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the medical evidence is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a claimant’s pain and its disabling effects. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). ... This was a clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, for the ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s symptom claims prior to the established onset date of disability.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) allows objective evidence to be considered with other evidence for conditions that produce such evidence, but never as the sole reason to discredit symptom statements.

Kreamer v. Saul · filed 2021-11-18(c)(2)

Conversely, in those cases where objective evidence is present, the ALJ may consider that objective evidence, or lack thereof, in conjunction with other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(2). In any case, the ALJ may not rely solely on the lack of objective medical evidence to discredit a claimant’s subjective statements. Id.

Sections 404.1529(c)(2) and (3) permit an ALJ to compare alleged symptom severity with objective medical records when the decision considers the evidence rather than ignoring favorable material.

Zoubouridis v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-01-28(c)(2)–(3)

The ALJ determined that objective medical records did not substantiate plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity and intensity of his limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), (3); Vang v. Saul, 805 Fed. App’x 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ may give less weight to an opinion that is unsupported by objective evidence.”). The ALJ did not ignore evidence favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff does not provide any examples of evidence that the ALJ ignored in reaching her RFC finding.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) treats objective medical evidence as a useful indicator of symptom intensity, persistence, and effect on the ability to work, permitting an ALJ to weigh inconsistencies between subjective allegations and medical findings.

Cox v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-28(c)(2)

The ALJ also considered the objective medical evidence, which was inconsistent with the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2) & 416.929(c)(2) (“Objective medical evidence . . . is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms and the effect those symptoms . . . may have on your ability to work.”). The Court finds the ALJ appropriately considered the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and the medical evidence when discounting Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the severity of his alleged mental impairments.

Objective medical evidence cannot be the sole reason for rejecting symptom statements under § 404.1529(c)(2), but it remains a relevant factor that the ALJ must consider.

Slayton v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-10-11(c)(2)

Although it can’t be the ... ALJ’s sole reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s statements about symptoms, it is a relevant factor that ... she was required to consider. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2).

Objective medical evidence may support an RFC determination under § 404.1529(c)(2) by permitting reasonable conclusions about symptom intensity and persistence.

McGonagle v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-12-16(c)(2)

On this record, we find that substantial evidence, including “[o]bjective medical evidence [that is] useful . . . in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of . . . symptoms,” supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) allows objective medical evidence, including mental-status examinations, to be considered with other reasons when evaluating symptom severity, but it cannot be the sole ground for denial.

Buchheit v. O'Malley · filed 2023-12-27(c)(2)

However, the objective medical evidence is a relevant factor, along with the medical source’s information about the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, in determining the severity of a claimant’s symptoms and their disabling effects. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2). Mental status examinations are objective measures of an individual’s mental health. Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) treats objective medical evidence as a useful indicator of symptom intensity, persistence, and work effects, though not an exclusive basis.

Dodge v. O'Malley · filed 2024-04-18(c)(2)

The Court concludes that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony due to a lack of consistent clinical findings in the record.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars the Commissioner from rejecting a claimant’s statements about symptom severity and effects solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

Murphy v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2025-01-15(c)(2)

While an ALJ may also consider the lack of corroborating objective medical evidence as one factor in “determining the severity of the claimant’s pain,” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001), they cannot reject subjective pain testimony solely on that basis. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (the Commissioner “will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements”). ... As such, the ALJ did not err in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony based on inconsistent evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars an ALJ from rejecting a claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of symptoms solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

(SS) Yang v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-05-07(c)(2)

“The fact that a claimant’s testimony is not fully corroborated by the objective medical findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting it.” Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”). Rather, where a claimant’s symptom testimony is not fully substantiated by the objective medical record, the ALJ must provide additional reasons for discounting the testimony. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) allows an ALJ to consider objective medical evidence when evaluating symptom severity but does not allow symptom testimony to be rejected solely because objective evidence fails to substantiate it.

Ackermann v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2025-05-09(c)(2)

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if that testimony is contradicted by evidence in the medical record. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161; see also Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498 (“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.”). While an ALJ may also consider the lack of corroborating objective medical evidence as one factor in “determining the severity of the claimant’s pain,” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857, they cannot reject subjective pain testimony solely on that basis. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (the Commissioner “will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements”).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits rejecting a claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or work-related effects of symptoms solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

Munguia v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2025-07-29(c)(2)

Second, the ALJ erred by discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony based on the lack of objective medical evidence to substantiate the alleged severity of her symptoms. Doc. 12 at 12; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A]n adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”).

Objective medical evidence is a useful indicator for assessing symptom intensity and persistence under § 404.1529(c)(2).

Duvall · filed 2026-03-16(c)(2)

Objective medical evidence is a “useful indicator” for assessing symptom intensity and persistence, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), and “a discrepancy between the degree of pain claimed by the applicant and that suggested by medical records is probative of exaggeration.” Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2005).

Objective medical evidence is relevant to evaluating symptoms, but a claimant’s pain testimony cannot be rejected solely because that evidence does not fully corroborate it.

(SS) Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-06-05(c)(2)

However, subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). The ALJ did not provide any reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony other than the inconsistency with the medical evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars rejecting a claimant’s statements about symptoms solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them; inconsistencies with the medical record may support discounting those statements.

(SS) Olea v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-02(c)(2)

Subjective pain testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence.” See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“The fact that a claimant’s testimony is not fully corroborated by the objective medical findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting it.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”). ... The ALJ’s reference to the medical records to identify inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony constitutes a specific, clear, and convincing reason supported by substantial evidence in the record that supports the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits consideration of objective medical evidence but bars rejecting a claimant’s symptom statements solely because that evidence does not substantiate them.

(SS) Gitchell v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-06(c)(2)

Generally, as noted, a lack of objective medical evidence is a proper factor the ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s testimony, but it cannot form the sole basis presented by the ALJ for rejecting pain testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) requires reasons beyond a lack of supporting objective medical evidence to discount a claimant’s symptom testimony.

(SS) Salinas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-24(c)(2)

Rather, where a claimant’s symptom testimony is not fully substantiated by the objective medical record, the ALJ must provide additional reasons for discounting the testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits rejecting a claimant’s symptom statements solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them; the ALJ must give additional reasons.

(SS) Castro v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-08(c)(2)

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”). Rather, where a claimant’s symptom testimony is not fully substantiated by the objective medical record, the ALJ must provide additional reasons for discounting the testimony.

A claimant’s symptoms need not be supported by objective medical evidence to be found credible.

Green v. Colvin · filed 2015-03-13(c)(2)–(3)

Although, to be credible, the severity of a claimant’s symptoms need not be supported by objective medical evidence, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)–(3); Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2005), here the ALJ disbelieved Green for reasons that go beyond the absence of objective evidence.

When a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate their intensity and persistence and how they limit the claimant’s capacity for work.

Duvall v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2015-12-29(c)(1)

If the record shows that ... the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce his symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the symptoms in determining how they limit the claimant’s capacity for work. ... The ALJ applied the correct legal standard when reviewing Mr. Duval’s credibility, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination.

Section 404.1529(c) does not permit an ALJ to reject testimony about pain solely because objective evidence does not corroborate its severity once the ALJ has accepted the underlying impairment.

Cochrane v. Berryhill · filed 2017-05-18(c)

And, once he accepted it as a severe impairment, he cannot rely solely on the lack of objective evidence regarding the impairment as a basis for rejecting Plaintiffs testimony regarding the pain it causes.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits consideration of objective medical evidence when evaluating symptoms, but a lack of corroborating evidence alone cannot justify rejecting a claimant’s testimony about their severity.

Guenther v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-11-10(c)(2)

Although an ALJ may consider the medical evidence in evaluating the severity of a claimant’s pain, “‘an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.’” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) makes objective medical evidence relevant to evaluating symptoms, but a lack of corroboration alone does not justify rejecting pain testimony.

(SS) Carrillo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-02-02(c)(2)

Subjective pain testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence,” but the medical evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); SSR 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) does not permit an ALJ to reject symptom testimony solely because objective medical evidence does not fully corroborate it.

Brokenwings v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-12-06(c)(2)

As discussed above, the ALJ’s finding of only sporadic complaints was not supported by substantial evidence. And “subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence….” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)).

Objective medical evidence is useful in assessing symptom severity, but a lack of corroboration alone cannot justify rejecting a claimant's testimony.

Federico v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-11-23(c)(2)

Although objective medical evidence is a "useful" factor when assessing symptom severity, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), the ALJ is required to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant's symptom testimony, Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, symptom testimony "cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence." Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, the additional grounds offered for discounting Federico's symptom testimony were not clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) makes objective medical evidence relevant to symptom severity but does not permit rejection of symptom testimony solely because the evidence does not fully corroborate it.

(SS) Verreault v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-29(c)(2)

Subjective testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence,” but the medical evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)).

Section 404.1529(c)(1)-(3) permits an ALJ to consider whether symptom testimony is consistent with objective medical evidence.

Shields v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-01-03(c)(1)-(3)

In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ may consider whether it is consistent with objective medical evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) allows an ALJ to consider objective medical evidence but bars rejecting symptom testimony solely because that evidence does not substantiate it.

(SS)Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-01-20(c)(2)

That is, a lack of objective medical evidence is a proper factor the ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s testimony, but it cannot form the sole basis presented by the ALJ for rejecting pain testimony. ... Accordingly, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s findings, based on the objective medical record alone, are insufficient to support her adverse credibility determination.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits an ALJ from rejecting a claimant’s statements about the intensity and persistence of symptoms solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

Nitso v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-01-20(c)(2)

This explanation does not satisfy the regulatory requirement that an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s statements about the intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate the claimant’s statements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits an ALJ to consider a lack of objective medical evidence when evaluating symptoms, but that lack alone cannot justify rejecting symptom testimony.

Carver v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-10-19(c)(2)

The absence of corroborating objective medical evidence is not enough, on its own, however, to reject a claimant’s symptom testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) prohibits rejecting statements about the intensity and effects of symptoms solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

Silveira v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-01-23(c)(2)

Accordingly, the ALJ could not discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony on the grounds that the medical evidence did not confirm the extent of her symptoms.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits consideration of objective medical evidence when evaluating symptoms, but a lack of corroborating evidence alone does not justify rejecting symptom testimony.

Salisbury v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-01-23(c)(2)

The absence of corroborating objective medical evidence is not enough, on its own, however, to reject a claimant’s symptom testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5; Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).

Section 404.1529(c)(2) permits an ALJ to consider objective medical evidence when assessing a claimant’s symptom testimony.

Fusselman v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-03-12(c)(2)

An ALJ may consider objective medical evidence when assessing a claimant's testimony and may discount a claimant's statements if medical opinion evidence contradicts the claimant's subjective testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.920(c)(2); Carmickle v. Comm'r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and reasonably concluded that the objective evidence did not support the severity of the alleged limitations.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars rejecting a claimant’s statements about symptom severity or work effects solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

(SS) Cox v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-01(c)(2)

Subjective pain testimony “cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence.” See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“The fact that a claimant’s testimony is not fully corroborated by the objective medical findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting it.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”).

Section 404.1529 does not directly govern a widow’s disability claim, which is determined under the Listing of Impairments.

Chappell v. Schweiker · filed 1983-01-03

Although a widow’s disability is determined under the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, and not directly under the above-quoted regulation, the Listing also contains instructions concerning pain as follows: “Pain may be an important factor in causing [musculoskeletal] functional loss, but it must be associated with relevant abnormal signs or laboratory findings.” 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 1.00 (1981).

Section 404.1529 does not require a claimant to identify the cause of an objectively shown medical abnormality before the claimant's symptoms may be considered.

Dorothy SPARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-12-08

Neither the statute nor the regulation visits claimants with the consequences of shortfalls in medical knowledge, once the impairment is accompanied by objective in-dicia.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the ALJ to analyze symptom evaluation factors, including treatment history; summarizing treatment alone is insufficient.

Fair v. Saul · filed 2020-06-22(c)(3)

While the ALJ provided a chronology of Plaintiff’s treatment she did not analyze that treatment in accordance with the regulatory factors. ... The ALJ’s failure to discuss this, along with the other regulatory factors, was error.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) does not require a mechanical discussion of each symptom-evaluation factor.

Winder v. Berryhill · filed 2019-03-29(c)(3)

The R & R did not err simply because it did not walk through the factors robotically as the Plaintiff would have liked.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) does not require an administrative law judge to discuss symptom evaluation factors in numbered order when the decision's rationale addresses them.

Suarez-Linares v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2013-07-17(c)(3)

While not going down the list in ordinal fashion, the administrative law judge addressed all of the Avery factors (generally mentioned in SSR 96 — 8p), some more than others (except for vi), within the supporting rationale for the final decision.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ to consider the symptom evaluation factors but does not require a detailed discussion of every factor.

Tomeoni v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-30(c)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ was not required to discuss every regulatory factor in detail.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider the regulatory factors when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, including under SSR 16-3p.

Hostetter v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-20

SSR 16-3p continues to require the ALJ to consider the factors set forth in the applicable regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

An ALJ need not list each symptom-related factor by number when the analysis gives appropriate reasons and substantial evidence supports the finding.

Bridge v. Saul · filed 2020-11-24(c)(3)

Although not specifically listing each factor in the regulation by number, the ALJ covered all the appropriate reasons that plaintiff’s allegations were not inconsistent with the medical evidence. Thus the ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff’s symptoms is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to address factors beyond objective medical evidence when evaluating reported symptoms, but failing to do so can be harmless when the record makes the credibility finding obvious.

Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-04-21(c)(3)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred by failing to address the Factors; however, the Joint Memorandum is devoid of any authority providing that this amounted to reversible error. Here, the Court finds that this error was harmless because “the record [is] obvious as to the credibility finding.”

Section 404.1529 requires consideration of treatment other than medication and other measures used to relieve pain or symptoms.

Monts v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2017-11-07

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider the claimant’s daily activities, medications, and possible side effects.

Montoya v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2019-08-14(c)

Not only is this another demonstration of the inadequacies of the ALJ’s assessment of the specialist’s statement, but it is also an inadequate analysis of Plaintiff’s limitations, completely ignoring the requirement that she take into account Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, as well as omitting any analysis of his numerous prescription medications and possible side effects, in contravention of the Agency Regulations.

Section 404.1529 includes nonmedication treatment and other measures used to relieve symptoms among the evaluation factors, but Eighth Circuit precedent does not require separate analysis of those additional factors.

Edgin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2019-09-30

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: ... Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529 includes treatment beyond medication and other measures used to relieve symptoms among its evaluation factors; under Polaski, the court did not require separate analysis of those additional factors.

Goodin v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2020-01-22

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” ... Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529 includes treatment beyond medication and other measures used to relieve symptoms among the factors for evaluating a claimant’s symptoms.

Muldrow v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2021-03-12

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider relevant factors when evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms.

Courtney v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-03-31(c)(3)

Yet, Plaintiff does not explicitly identify any factor set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) or SSR 16-3p that the ALJ failed to discuss.

An ALJ must consider the relevant factors in evaluating symptoms but need not cite or discuss every factor.

Whitaker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-18(c)(3)

At the same time, the ALJ is not required to cite or discuss every factor used to evaluate the consistency of a plaintiff’s description of symptoms with the record evidence. ... The ALJ considered a number of factors in determining symptom consistency, including plaintiffs treatment course, the objective evidence, and clinical findings on examination. The ALJ’s decision in this regard finds substantial support in the record.

Section 404.1529 includes nonmedication treatment and other measures used to relieve symptoms among the factors for evaluating a claimant’s allegations.

Davis v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2022-07-22

Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the analysis of two additional factors: ... Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

An ALJ need not cite or discuss every symptom evaluation factor when assessing a claimant’s statements against the record.

Roush v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-30(c)(3)

At the same time, the ALJ is not required to cite or discuss every factor used to evaluate the consistency of a plaintiff’s description of symptoms with the record evidence.

Section 404.1529 does not require an ALJ to discuss every factor when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms.

Westcott v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-22

An ALJ is not required to discuss each of the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 or 416.929.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of the relevant symptom factors but does not require an ALJ to discuss each factor expressly.

Greene v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-24(c)(3)

And, while the ALJ expressly discussed the relevant evidence and many of the relevant factors from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i-vil), expressly discussing each of the factors is not necessary.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider factors such as daily activities, medication, and treatment when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms.

Fitzsimmons v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-05-31(c)(3)

All of the foregoing demonstrates due consideration by the ALJ of the relevant regulatory factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ’s determination regarding plaintiff’s subjective symptoms is therefore based on substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) directs the ALJ to consider daily activities, symptom characteristics, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, relief measures, and functional limitations when evaluating symptoms.

Hendricks v. Social Security Administration · filed 2024-04-17(c)(3)

As part of the symptom analysis, the ALJ should consider the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3), including: (i) daily activities; (ii) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (iii) precipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken; (v) treatment other than medication for relief of pain or other symptoms; (vi) any other measures used by the claimant to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (vii) any other factors concerning functional limitations. ... His discussion demonstrates that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; factors that precipitate and aggravate her symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of her pain medications; and use of other treatments.

An ALJ evaluating a claimant’s symptoms need address only the factors relevant to the alleged symptoms.

Kern v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-05-16(c)(3)

The ALJ is not required to analyze all seven factors, only those germane to the alleged symptoms.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ to consider the symptom-evaluation factors relevant to the claimant’s alleged symptoms, but not to analyze all seven factors.

Russell v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-08-02(c)(3)

The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors, only those germane to the alleged symptoms.

Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to assess a claimant’s reported symptoms when determining residual functional capacity; the ALJ need not list every test result if the record shows those results were considered.

Jackson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-10-26(a)

The ALJ makes this finding based on a consideration of medical source statements and all other evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c), 416.929, 416.945(a), 416.946(c). ... While the ALJ may not have enumerated each individual blood glucose reading, the results were still considered in the ultimate determination.

Section 404.1529(d)(4) limits the RFC assessment to symptoms related to a medically determinable impairment.

Barnes v. Saul · filed 2022-08-31(d)(4)

Because LCPC Armstrong is not an “acceptable medical source,” Claimant’s depression is not “medically determinable” and the ALJ’s finding to this effect is well-founded. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.921, 404.152 (medically determinable impairments “must be established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source”), as was his decision not to consider Claimant’s non-physical limitations in the RFC assessment. See 20 CFR § 404.1529(d)(4); SSR 96-8, 1996 WL 374184 (June 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including the impact of any related symptoms.”).

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider the effects of symptoms, including pain, when assessing a claimant’s ability to work.

Bright-Stones v. Commissioner, Social Security · filed 2023-09-26

When performing an RFC assessment, an ALJ is tasked with considering all relevant evidence, including ... the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 404.1545. ... In considering the entire record, and given the evidence outlined above, I find that the ALJ supported the RFC determination with substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of agency employees’ observations, but an ALJ need not expressly assess brief observations that do not address functional limitations.

Wielenbeck v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-03-12(c)(3)

In evaluating the record, agency adjudicators may consider observations by agency personnel. ... Here, the observations of Ms. Randall, Ms. Newkirk, and Mr. Roper were based upon brief encounters with Plaintiff, and were intended to gather basic information about Plaintiff’s condition, not to provide testimony about her functional limitations. ... The ALJ did not err in declining to assess this evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider observations by agency employees, though the ALJ need not adopt them.

Stenson v. Saul · filed 2021-01-29(c)(3)

Representative Wong is not a medical doctor; however, the ALJ was nonetheless required 4 to consider the observations recorded in his report. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (“We will 5 consider all of the evidence presented, including . . . observations by our employees[.]”); SSR 16- 6 3P. Therefore, while the ALJ was not required to adopt Representative Wong’s observations or 7 findings, she was required to at least consider them in her analysis.

Section 404.1529 continues to govern disability claims based on pain after the Reform Act’s sunset and authorizes continued use of the Duncan standard.

Elaine I. McCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1989-01-12

We hold that because the standards announced by this court in Duncan were authorized by § 404.1529 as well as by the Reform Act, they continue to apply to cases decided after the sunset of the Reform Act.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits consideration of a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating symptom severity.

Garza v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-07-06(c)(3)(i)

Although these activities are not direct evidence that Plaintiff could work, they are evidence that Plaintiff is less limited than she alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting . . . Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to consider daily activities when evaluating whether a claimant’s symptom testimony is consistent with the claimed limitations.

Dornin v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-05-10(c)(3)(i)

In finding Plaintiff less-than fully credible regarding the extent of his limitations, the ALJ first reasoned that Plaintiff’s ability to perform a wide variety of daily activities contradicted his testimony. Tr. 25; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an ALJ may discredit testimony based on daily activities “to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment”). ... The Court agrees.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of daily activities when evaluating symptoms, but those activities must be assessed in light of the claimant’s limitations.

Mitch C. v. Bisignano · filed 2026-01-06(c)(3)

An ALJ may consider activities of daily living in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). ... For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s daily activities were not a clear and convincing reason based on substantial evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of symptom-related functional limitations reported by nonmedical sources when they are reasonably consistent with the evidence.

House Jr. v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2020-12-14(c)(3)

This is because some “symptoms, such as pain, are subjective and difficult to quantify, [so] any symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions that your . . . nonmedical sources report, which can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, will be taken into account[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider relevant observations from nonmedical sources when evaluating disability.

Olson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-12-18(c)(1)

Despite this, other relevant regulations indicate an ALJ must consider evidence from nonmedical sources when evaluating a claim of disability, which includes observations made by a claimant's family, neighbors, friends, or other persons. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 404.1545(a)(1), 404.1545(a)(3). The ALJ rejected the testimony by plaintiff’s wife as “inconsistent with objective medical findings and other reports from the claimant that he could do more than these reported activities.” Tr. 36. As discussed earlier, these reasons were not substantial enough to qualify as reasonable, let alone as “germane” or supportable.

Section 404.1529 includes statements by others about a claimant’s symptoms and impairments among the evidence considered in evaluating symptoms.

Wolfenbarger v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2019-09-27

Additionally, the ALJ specifically noted that she considered evidence as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, which includes statements by others about a claimant’s symptoms and impairments.

Section 404.1529(a) requires the ALJ to consider available evidence about the effects of a claimant’s symptoms when determining disability.

JANES v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-09-30(a)

But the ALJ did not address this evidence, as she was required to do. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (stating that, in making a disability determination, the Administration "consider[s] all of the available evidence," including "medical history," "laboratory findings," and statements about the effect of symptoms).

Section 404.1529 clarifies the standard for evaluating pain and applies to claims heard before its promulgation.

Elnora G. POPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1993-08-30

Although the new regulations were promulgated after Pope’s hearing, their application in evaluating the standard that the ALJ should have applied is warranted.

Section 404.1529(c) requires consideration of evidence about a claimant’s symptoms; the Appeals Council may adopt an ALJ’s findings that address those factors without conducting a separate analysis.

Salgado v. Astrue · filed 2008-03-28(c)

The Appeal Council’s adoption of the ALJ’s subjective findings, which included the requisite subjective findings on intensity, persistence, and so on, and the Council’s corresponding failure to perform an independent subjective analysis for step 2 of the objective-subjective test, was not legal error.