Statute Annotations › Federal › 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

Evaluation of symptoms: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Federal
Case notes
7,433
Cited in passing
1,235
Citing cases indexed
13,219
Case dates
1981–2026
Screened through
2026-06-18
Checked for later law changes
2026-09-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

8,668 citing cases reviewed of 13,219 in the citation index: 7,433 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,235 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-18 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1984-10-09 Congress added the pain and other symptoms standard to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A): symptoms alone are insufficient, but medical signs need only establish an impairment reasonably expected to produce them, with all evidence considered. Source
  • 1991-11-14 SSA replaced § 404.1529’s earlier symptom rule with a two-stage evaluation: establish a medically determinable impairment, then assess symptom intensity, persistence, and work effects using objective and other evidence; lack of objective support alone cannot defeat the statements. 56 FR 57941. Source
  • 1996-07-02 SSR 96-7p formalized a credibility finding when assessing symptom statements; SSR 16-3p later superseded that policy. Source
  • 1997-07-18 SSA made a technical § 404.1529 amendment, replacing “Secretary” with “Commissioner” and correcting the appendix reference. 62 FR 38451. Source
  • 2006-03-01 SSA revised § 404.1529 to refer to treating and nontreating sources, clarified how listing symptoms are evaluated, and changed medical equivalence under subsection (d)(3) from “medical evidence only” to all relevant case evidence under § 404.1526(b). 71 FR 10429. Source
  • 2006-03-31 SSA added Part 405 pilot-review personnel and procedures to § 404.1529(b)’s impairment inquiry; those references were removed in 2011. 71 FR 16445. Source
  • 2010-10-13 SSA excluded fully favorable determinations made by State disability examiners alone from § 404.1529(b)’s consultant-participation requirement. 75 FR 62681. Source
  • 2011-05-03 SSA removed the Part 405 pilot-review references from § 404.1529(b). 76 FR 24807. Source
  • 2016-03-28 SSR 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p: adjudicators assess the consistency of symptom statements with the whole record, not a claimant’s general character, and consider reasons for limited treatment; the regulatory factors remain in force. Source
  • 2017-03-27 The January 18 final rule revised § 404.1529 to require objective evidence from an acceptable medical source to establish an impairment and to refer medical-opinion evaluation to § 404.1520c for claims filed on or after this date; that section rejects controlling weight in favor of supportability and consistency. 82 FR 5871. source Source
  • 2017-10-25 SSA revised SSR 16-3p to clarify that adjudicators apply it to decisions issued on or after March 28, 2016, while courts review earlier decisions under the rules then in effect; § 404.1529 itself was unchanged. 82 FR 49462. Source

Evaluating symptoms and pain

Section 404.1529 requires symptoms, including pain, to be evaluated in relation to a medically determinable impairment, and pain alone cannot establish disability unless medical signs or findings show a condition reasonably expected to produce it.

Jean M. Gallagher on Behalf of Eleanor Gallagher v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1983-01-03

The effects of all symptoms, including severe and prolonged pain, must be evaluated on the basis of a medically determinable impairment which can be shown to be the cause of the symptom. We will never find that you are disabled based on your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings show that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce those symptoms.
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Law changed since The 1991 revision of § 404.1529, implementing § 423(d)(5)(A), requires an impairment reasonably expected to produce the symptoms, then evaluates their severity using the whole record; objective corroboration of the alleged severity or proof of a direct cause is not required.

Section 404.1529 permits consideration of pain symptoms only when they can be traced to a medically determinable impairment.

Robinson v. Heckler · filed 1984-06-22

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1983), the AU may consider only those symptoms of pain which can be directly traced to a medically determinable impairment.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1529 requires subjective symptoms, including pain, to be corroborated by medical signs or findings that could reasonably produce disabling symptoms before they can establish disability.

Lucas v. Bowen · filed 1987-02-11

His alleged symptoms, including pain, are not sufficient to prove disability, unless the subjective complaints are corroborated by medical signs or findings that would reasonably result in disabling symptoms. ... Therefore, the court finds that the AU’s determination of Lucas’ credibility is supported by substantial evidence.
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Section 404.1529 requires the adjudicator to sufficiently consider a claimant's evidence of pain when evaluating disability.

Roger WAITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appell · filed 1987-06-01

First, the ALT specifically addressed Waite's complaints of pain in the discussion section of his order, noting that Waite complained of periodic headaches and pain in his left arm. This reveals that the ALT sufficiently considered the evidence of pain, as the statute requires him to do. Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.1985).
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Section 404.1529 requires consideration of pain and other symptoms when medical evidence shows an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce them.

Chrupcala v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1987-09-28

No challenges have been leveled against the techniques by which Doctors Ferretti and Bevan arrived at their respective impressions and diagnoses. The medical conditions from which appellant suffers could reasonably be expected to produce the pain that appellant alleges he has. The reports of Dr. Kubiak and Dr. M. Jaffari that appellant suffered from no serious orthopedic impairments are not inconsistent with this. Appellant’s testimony regarding his pain was uncontradicted. It is therefore apparent that the Appeals Council’s finding— that appellant’s testimony regarding pain was not supported by the evidence and therefore not credible — was not based on substantial evidence.
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Section 404.1529 requires medical signs or findings showing a condition reasonably expected to produce the alleged pain; a proven physical cause is not required, and subjective pain symptoms remain relevant.

Johnson v. Heckler · filed 1985-05-06

However, the regulations require that there be medical signs or findings showing that there is a medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Thus, the AU can disregard a plaintiff’s self-serving allegations of pain if they are unsupported by objective evidence. ... The requirement of objective evidence and medically acceptable clinical techniques is not, however, a requirement for a proven physical etiology of pain. To the contrary, a plaintiff’s subjective symptoms of pain are a significant factor to be weighed in determining whether a disability, as defined in the Act, exists.
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Section 404.1529 requires medical signs or findings of a condition reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms before disability can be based on symptoms such as pain.

Donald HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis W. BOWEN, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-04-02

We will never find that you are disabled based on your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings show that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce those symptoms.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1529 requires evaluating disability based on pain by considering whether a medically determinable impairment could produce symptoms of the severity alleged, not merely whether any underlying medical condition exists.

Estate of Duplissis v. Bowen · filed 1986-07-16

However, the Secretary’s regulations required not simply an underlying medical condition for a finding of disability based on pain, but one expected to produce symptoms of the severity alleged.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant to provide medical signs or findings showing a medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms.

Dixon v. Bowen · filed 1988-08-30

Mrs. Dixon is required, under the Secretary’s regulations to provide evidence of “medical signs or findings ... that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce those symptoms.” 20 CFR § 404.1529 (1987), Sparks v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.1986).
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Section 404.1529 does not permit subjective allegations of disabling symptoms, including pain, alone to establish disability; objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition is required.

Jackie D. Price v. Secretary of Health & Human Services · filed 1989-12-12

This court has previously held that subjective complaints of pain may support a claim for disability. Duncan v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 852 (6th Cir.1986). However, subjective allegations of disabling symptoms, including pain, cannot alone support a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. To support a claim for disability there must be objective medical evidence in the record of an underlying medical condition. Duncan, 801 F.2d at 853. If this requirement is met, the court must also determine either that the objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged disabling pain arising from the condition, or that the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain. Id.
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Section 404.1529 requires objective evidence of an underlying medical condition and, beyond subjective symptoms alone, either confirmation of the alleged pain's severity or a condition reasonably expected to produce disabling pain.

Ronald M. TYRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1990-02-23

However, subjective allegations of disabling symptoms, including pain, cannot alone support a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1989). To support a claim for disability there must be objective medical evidence in the record of an underlying medical condition. ... If this requirement is met, the court must also determine either that the objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged disabling pain arising from the condition, or that the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain.
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Section 404.1529 can require the Secretary to credit a claimant’s pain testimony when a medically established condition could reasonably produce pain, medical evidence supports the testimony, and no other credibility concerns undermine it.

Martin v. Sullivan · filed 1990-10-23

Similarly, when a physician finds that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce pain, the Secretary may be bound to accept the claimant’s testimony if the testimony is supported by medical evidence and absent other signs of lack of credibility. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.
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Section 404.1529 requires medical evidence of an impairment reasonably expected to produce the symptoms, but once that threshold is met, the adjudicator must consider symptom severity and may not reject it solely for lack of objective corroboration.

Bunnell v. Sullivan and Rice v. Sullivan · filed 1991-10-01

These regulations require a claimant to present medical findings establishing an impairment. Once the claimant satisfies this prerequisite, the adjudicator must then consider the claimant's alleged severity of pain. Sections 404.1529 and 416.929 read in full: ... The effects of all symptoms, including severe and prolonged pain, must be evaluated on the basis of a medically determinable impairment which can be shown to be the cause of the symptom. We will never find that you are disabled based on your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings show that there is a medical condition that could be reasonably expected to produce these symptoms. ... Accordingly, under the Cotton-Varney-Gamer precedent, once the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant alleging disability due to pain to first show a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain.

Carbone v. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-04-14

Any claimant alleging disability due to pain has the threshold burden of establishing a clinically determinable medical impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Avery v. Secretary of HHS, 797 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir 1986).
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Section 404.1529(a) requires that pain or other symptom statements alone cannot establish disability; medical signs and laboratory findings must show an impairment reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms, which must be considered with all other evidence in determining disability.

Shaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-10-29(a)

Subjective complaints of pain must be substantiated by objective medical evidence showing the existence of a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged by the claimant, and the evidence of pain must be such that, either singly or in combination with other evidence, it leads to the conclusion that the claimant is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) ("statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence ... would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled"). Cf. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847 (6th Cir.1986). Under these standards, and viewing the record as a whole, we are not prepared to say that the Secretary was required to find that Ms. Shaw's pain and other problems were disabling.
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Section 404.1529 requires objective medical signs or findings showing a medically determinable condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimed symptoms, including pain, before disability can be found based on those symptoms.

Fowler v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services · filed 1993-04-14

Health and Human Services regulations state: "We will never find that you are disabled based on your symptoms, including pain, unless medical signs or findings show that there is a medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit requires that objective medical signs and findings show a condition that would reasonably be expected to produce the degree of pain alleged. See, e.g., Clark v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 175, 177 (7th Cir.1989). ... The court finds that the ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that Fowler's pain was not of disabling severity, so as to preclude him from returning to his prior work.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider all of a claimant’s symptoms, including pain, in light of objective medical evidence and testimony about resulting functional limitations.

Binion v. Shalala · filed 1994-01-03

The ALJ is required to consider all of the claimant’s symptoms, including pain, in light of objective medical evidence. The ALJ must also consider testimony by the claimant and other witnesses familiar with her daily activities to determine how any restrictions due to pain affect the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.
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Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to credit a medically determinable impairment while disbelieving allegations of pain beyond the limitations supported by medical evidence.

Faford v. Shalala · filed 1994-06-24

Faford maintains that the ALJ’s analysis was inconsistent with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 because he failed to search for a medically determinable impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain. The ALJ did find, however, that Fa-ford suffers from probable, degenerative disc disease. The ALJ also incorporated the conclusions of Dr. Spear by placing a restriction against excessive bending, twisting or stooping on Faford’s work capability. The ALJ merely found not credible Faford’s complaints of pain beyond that which was medically verifiable.
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Section 404.1529 is part of the authoritative regulatory standard for evaluating pain in disability determinations and controls post-effective-date SSDI determinations.

Nannie MICKLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1994-07-18

On November 14, 1991, the Secretary, acting pursuant to the rulemaking authority delegated by Congress in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1302, substantially revised the regulations governing the evaluation of pain in SSDI and SSI disability determinations. See 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1529, 416.929 (1993). These regulations provide the authoritative standard for the evaluation of pain in disability determinations, see Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 485-86 (7th Cir.1993), and control all determinations made since their effective date, including the instant case.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the ALJ to consider daily activities, symptom characteristics, precipitating and aggravating factors, treatment or medication effectiveness, and other evidence of functional limitations when evaluating a claimant's pain.

Murillo v. Shalala · filed 1995-05-04(c)(3)

The ALJ must inguire about the claimant's daily activities; the location, duration, freguency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the characteristics and effectiveness of any medication, treatments, or other measures the claimant is or has taken to relieve pain; and any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations due to pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); Avery, 797 F.2d at 23. ... In partially discounting Murillo's subjective pain complaints, the ALJ considered all of the relevant information required by Avery and the applicable pain regulations.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ, once a medically determinable impairment that could cause the alleged pain is established but the pain's intensity or persistence is not substantiated by medical records, to weigh all relevant evidence and factors in evaluating the impairment's effect on the claimant's ability to work.

Herron v. Shalala · filed 1994-03-21

Once the presence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment is established that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, but the intensity or persistence of the pain is unsubstantiated by the medical record, the ALJ is obliged to examine and weigh all the evidence including observations by treating and examining physicians, third-party testimony, the claimant’s testimony and daily activities, functional restrictions, pain medication taken, and aggravating or precipitating factors to evaluate how much the claimant’s impairment affects his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1993); Pope, 998 F.2d at 482, 485; see also Social Security Ruling 88-13, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Pain and Other Symptoms.
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Once a medically determinable impairment is established, the effects of pain must be considered at every step of the sequential disability evaluation, using medical history and objective evidence to assess the intensity and persistence of the pain.

McCarthy v. HHS · filed 1995-08-09(d)

Once a medically determinable impairment is documented, the effects of pain must be considered at each step of the sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). A claimant's medical history and the objective medical evidence are considered reliable indicators from which the ALJ may draw reasonable conclusions regarding the intensity and persistence of the claimant's pain. Avery, 797 F.2d at 23; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). However, situations exist in which the reported symptoms of pain suggest greater functional restrictions than can be demonstrated by the medical evidence alone. Id.
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step evaluation of subjective pain: establish a medically determinable impairment capable of producing the alleged pain, then evaluate the pain's intensity and persistence alongside the medical evidence and its effect on work capacity.

Salazar v. Chater · filed 1995-10-06

The Social Security regulations provide for a two-step process to be used in evaluating whether subjective complaints of pain contribute to a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. For pain to contribute to a finding of disability, the claimant must first establish, by medical signs and laboratory findings, the presence of a medically determinable physical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged. Once such an impairment is established, allegations about the intensity and persistence of pain must be considered in addition to the medical signs and laboratory findings in evaluating the impairment and the extent to which it affects the claimant's capacity for work. Id.; see also Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Section 404.1529 requires considering all evidence about the intensity, persistence, and functional effects of pain or other symptoms, in addition to medical signs and laboratory findings, once an impairment that could produce the symptoms is established.

Josephine A. FOOTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-11-03

A claimant may establish that her pain is disabling through objective medical evidence that an underlying medical condition exists that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 provides that once such an impairment is established, all evidence about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical signs and laboratory findings in deciding the issue of disability.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider a claimant's pain and other symptoms at every step, including factors such as daily activities, pain characteristics, medication, treatment, and functional limitations.

Reil v. HHS · filed 1996-03-11(d), (c)(3), (c)(4)

Once a medically determinable impairment is documented, the effects of pain must be considered at each step of the sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). ... The ALJ is required to consider the following seven factors: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms, past or present; (5) treatment, other than medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms, past or present; (6) any measures used, past or present, to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Avery, 797 F.2d at 2 3 , 2 8 . If the claimant's complaints of pain are found to be credible under these criteria, the pain will be determined to diminish the claimant's capacity to work in Steps 4 and 5 of the sequential analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain when a medically determinable impairment can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain.

Ranlet v. HHS · filed 1996-03-19

The ALJ is reguired to consider the subjective complaints of pain or other symptoms by a claimant who presents a "clinically determinable medical impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 797 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
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Section 404.1529 requires objective medical evidence of an impairment that could produce the alleged pain, followed by evaluation of pain intensity and functional limitations consistent with objective medical and other evidence.

Wilson v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1996-09-27(b), (c)(4)

A two-step process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled by pain. First, objective medical evidence must show the existence of a medical impairment that reasonably could be expected to produce the pain alleged. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b) (1996); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir.1996). If such an impairment is established, then the intensity and persistence of the pain and the extent to which it affects a claimant's ability to work must be evaluated. Id. at 595. When a claimant proves the existence of a medical condition that could cause pain, "the claimant's subjective complaints of pain must be considered by the Secretary, and these complaints may not be rejected merely because the severity of pain cannot be proved by objective medical evidence." Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 919 (4th Cir.1994). Objective medical evidence of pain should be gathered and considered, but the absence of such evidence is not determinative. Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 337 (4th Cir.1990). A claimant's symptoms, including pain, are considered to diminish his capacity to work to the extent that alleged functional limitations are reasonably consistent with objective medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4) (1996).
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Section 404.1529(a) provides that pain or other symptoms alone do not establish disability; the claimant must have a medically determinable impairment reasonably expected to produce them, and adjudicators consider them with all available evidence.

Melanson v. SSA · filed 1996-10-21(a)

statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled. In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your symptoms, including pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including your medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings and statements about how your symptoms affect you.
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Section 404.1529(c) requires the adjudicator, when a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms, to evaluate their intensity and persistence and consider all available evidence, including objective medical evidence and the claimant’s statements.

Corchado v. Shalala · filed 1996-12-20(c)

When medical signs or laboratory findings indicate that the claimant has “medically determinable impairments) that could reasonably be expected to produce [his] symptoms, such as pain, [the adjudicator] must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] symptoms” in order to determine how they limit the claimant’s ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). In making this evaluation, the adjudicator must consider all of the available evidence, including the objective medical evidence and the statements of the claimant.
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Section 404.1529(c) and (d) require consideration of relevant factors when evaluating the severity of a claimant's subjective pain complaints.

Maynard v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 1997-03-20(c) and (d)

The ALJ adequately addressed the relevant factors set forth in the applicable regulations and rulings before concluding that Maynard's condition was not of such severity that it had produced disabling pain.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires the adjudicator to consider a claimant’s pain and other symptoms with the medical and other evidence; lack of objective findings alone cannot justify rejecting disabling-pain allegations, though an adverse credibility finding must state specific reasons.

Harrison v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1995-10-19(a)

Plaintiff has established that she has a medically determinable impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce severe pain. The ALJ recognized that “the claimant has the following severe impairments based upon the medical evidence: (1) low back pain; (2) osteoarthritis; (3) lumbar radiculopathy; (4) scoliosis of the thoracic spine; and (5) lumbar lordosis.” Tr. 27. Thus, if the ALJ rejected plaintiffs allegations of disabling pain due to an absence of objective clinical findings establishing a cause for the pain, he committed reversible error. If, on the other hand, the ALJ found that plaintiffs testimony lacked credibility, he did not err in rejecting it, but it was error not to state with specificity the reasons for the rejection.
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step pain evaluation: establish a medically determinable impairment capable of producing the alleged pain, then consider the claimant’s subjective pain complaints together with the medical evidence when determining work capacity.

Travis RIPLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-10-30

To prove disability resulting from pain, an individual must establish a medically determinable impairment that is capable of producing disabling pain. ... Once a medical impairment is established, the subjective complaints of pain must be considered along with the medical evidence in determining the individual’s work capacity.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant alleging disabling pain to show a medically determinable impairment capable of producing it, after which the ALJ must consider the subjective complaints together with medical evidence when determining the claimant’s working ability.

White v. Callahan · filed 1997-09-15

To prove a pain-induced disability, a claimant must demonstrate a “medically determinable impairment that is capable of producing disabling pain.” ... Once the claimant establishes such an impairment, the ALJ must consider the subjective complaints of pain, along with the medical evidence in determining the individual’s working ability. ... The ALJ articulated in his opinion specific reasons for refusing to grant credence to White’s subjective complaints of pain: ... The Administrative Law Judge has considered the location, intensity, duration and frequency of the subjective complaints, the amount of medication that the claimant takes, the amount of medical treatment that she has, treatment other than medication, her daily activities, and the absence of side effects from medication which the claimant specifically acknowledged. After a complete and thorough evaluation, it is found that the claimant’s subjective complaints are not credible. ... With these specific factual findings, along with the vocational expert’s testimony that White could return to her past relevant work, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision to deny White her claim for benefits.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires an ALJ to weigh a claimant's pain testimony against all other relevant evidence, including medical history and laboratory findings, when determining the pain's intensity and persistence.

Bell v. V. Kenneth S. Apfel , Commissioner of the Social Security and Administration · filed 1997-11-25(a)

However, although an ALJ may not reject pain testimony without clear and convincing reasons, an ALJ must weigh pain testimony against all other relevant evidence, including medical history and laboratory findings, to determine the pain's intensity and persistence. 20 CFR § 404.1529(a) (1997). ... In this case, the ALJ did not totally reject Bell's pain testimony: He accepted that Bell was in pain to some degree and then concluded, on the basis of all the relevant evidence, that her pain was not so great as to keep her from working. Specifically, the ALJ noted the generally normal findings in the medical reports, which we have already summarized above. Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ properly considered the effect of Bell's pain on her ability to perform her past work.
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Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to reject excess-pain testimony only after considering all relevant factors and giving specific, clear, and convincing reasons.

Lindsoe v. John J. Callahan , Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 1997-12-22

As here, an ALJ is permitted to reject excess pain testimony after consideration of all relevant factors if she provides "specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1995); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th Cir.1991).
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Section 404.1529 requires the effects of pain to be considered at each step of the sequential evaluation and provides that credible pain complaints diminish a claimant's capacity to work.

Ranlet v. SSA · filed 1998-02-20(d), (c)(4)

Once a medically determinable impairment is documented, the effects of pain must be considered at each step of the sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d) (1997). ... If the complaints of pain are found to be credible under the criteria, the pain will be determined to diminish the claimant's capacity to work. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d) (West Supp. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (1997).
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating pain and other subjective symptoms to consider the relevant factors, including medication effects and dosage, pain-relief measures, and the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain, and to support the credibility determination with specific record findings.

Henk v. SSA · filed 1998-03-06(c)(3)

While the ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference, it must be supported by specific factual findings which are, in turn, supported by the record. Here, however, the ALJ's credibility determination is not adeguately grounded in the record insofar as it appears that the ALJ failed to give sufficient consideration to the factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) and Avery (e.g., effectiveness, side effects, and dosage of pain medications; any measures used to relieve pain; duration, freguency, and intensity of pain; etc.).
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to analyze the relevant pain-evaluation factors with specific findings and evidence, rather than merely reciting the factors.

Smith v. Chater · filed 1998-03-11

More serious is the ALJ’s failure to make specific analytical findings concerning a number of factors which find support in the record. Although he included a rote recitation of some of the criteria stated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and § 416.929, see Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 36, he did not follow this recital with any specific analysis, and did not indicate what specific evidence he considered relating to these factors to reach his conclusion.
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Section 404.1529(a) allows an ALJ to decline to credit pain allegations that are inconsistent with medical findings about the claimant's condition.

Baird v. SSA · filed 1998-03-24(a)

An ALJ need not give credence to the claimant's allegations of pain, however, if they are inconsistent with the medical findings regarding her condition. See Dupuis v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 869 F .2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1989); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c)(4); Social Security Ruling 88-13.
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Section 404.1529 requires objective evidence of a medically determinable impairment reasonably expected to produce the claimant’s actual alleged pain before the adjudicator evaluates the pain’s intensity, persistence, and functional effects using all available evidence.

Ronda S. CRAIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-02-23(b), (c)(1)-(4)

The regulation thus requires at the threshold a showing by objective evidence of the existence of a medical impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce” the actual pain, in the amount and degree, alleged by the claimant.
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Section 404.1529 requires an in-depth evaluation of pain and other symptoms using the listed factors, rather than merely dismissing the claimant's allegations as not credible.

Geracitano v. Callahan · filed 1997-10-01

The second decision stated that the ALJ evaluated plaintiffs complaints of pain pursuant to Social Security Rule 88-13, but not pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. ... The regulatory section, entitled “How we evaluate symptoms, including pain,” stated in part: ... Factors relevant to your symptoms, such as pain, which we will consider include: ... (i) Your daily activities; ... (ii) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of your pain or other symptoms; ... (iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors; ... (iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate your pain or other symptoms; ... (v) Treatment, other than medication, you receive or have received for relief of your pain or other symptoms; ... (vi) Any measures you use or have used to reheve your pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and ... (vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. ... The ALJ’s second decision demonstrates that he never undertook this type of in-depth analysis with regard to plaintiffs symptoms. ... Despite the regulatory scheme and the Appeals Council’s direction, he merely dismissed the allegations of pain by finding that plaintiff was not credible. ... Upon remand, an evaluation of plaintiffs symptoms can and should be fully addressed.
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Section 404.1529 provides that statements about pain or other symptoms alone do not establish disability and directs the Commissioner to consider other evidence and factors when objective medical evidence does not show disabling severity.

Clarence WALTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-10-15(a), (c)(3)

An individual’s statements as to “pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [he is] disabled....” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). ... The regulations indicate that if disabling severity cannot be shown by objective medical evidence alone, the Commissioner will also consider other factors, such as daily activities and the type and dosage of medication taken.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, then evaluate their intensity and persistence against the medical record and their effect on work capacity.

Lord v. SSA · filed 1998-06-14(b)

In evaluating Lord's complaints of pain, the ALJ followed the procedure set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1997). Pursuant to that procedure, the ALJ first found that Lord suffers from a medically determinable impairment -- degenerative disc disease -- that could reasonably be expected to cause pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). The ALJ then evaluated the extent to which Lord's pain affects his capacity to work by inguiring, with reference to the medical record, into the intensity and persistence of that pain. See id. He concluded that Lord's back and leg pain were not so severe as to preclude his performance of light and sedentary work.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires the ALJ to consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain throughout the disability-evaluation process.

Barnett v. Apfel · filed 1998-07-09(a)

Throughout the evaluation process, the ALJ must consider subjective complaints of pain. § 404.1529(a), (d).
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Section 404.1529(a) requires the ALJ to consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain throughout the disability-evaluation process, while permitting the ALJ to assess their credibility.

Marks v. Apfel · filed 1998-07-09(a)

Throughout the evaluation process, the ALJ must consider subjective complaints of pain. § 404.1529(a), (d). The ALJ, though, is “not obliged to accept without question the credibility of such subjective evidence.”
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating pain to consider its characteristics, aggravating factors, medication, other treatment, functional restrictions, and daily activities.

DiVirgilio v. Apfel · filed 1998-09-24

The court has also considered the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiffs pain. In accord with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, the ALJ had to consider (1) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2) precipitating and aggravating factors, for example, movement, activity and environmental conditions; (3) the type, dosage, effectiveness and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) any treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the Plaintiffs daily activities.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to evaluate all symptoms, including pain, using objective medical evidence and other evidence, and to consider relevant factors such as daily activities, medication, treatment, and functional limitations.

Molina v. Apfel · filed 1999-03-16(a), (c)

Contrary to plaintiffs suggestions, the ALJ adopted and applied the multi-factor analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 to evaluate plaintiffs symptoms including his complaints of pain. (R. 13-15). The ALJ considered plaintiffs subjective complaints in the Disability Report, as well as his accounts of his daily activities, the medications he was taking for pain, his testimony at the hearing concerning his pain, and his subjective exertional limitations.
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Section 404.1529(b) requires consideration of available objective medical evidence, and § 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of specified additional factors when symptoms indicate greater limitations than objective evidence alone shows.

Echevarria v. Apfel · filed 1999-05-11(b), (c)(3)

When a medically determinable impairment exists that reasonably could be expected to produce the pain alleged, objective medical evidence must be considered in determining whether a disability exists whenever such evidence is available. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b). If symptoms suggest a greater impairment than can be shown by objective evidence alone, consideration also is to be given to other factors, including (1) the person’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side effects of medication that the person has taken to alleviate the symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms; and (6) any measures which the person uses or has used to relieve the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). An administrative law judge may properly reject claims of severe, disabling pain after weighing the objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant’s demeanor, and other indicia of credibility.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the decisionmaker to evaluate pain and other symptom complaints by considering daily activities, symptom characteristics, precipitating and aggravating factors, medication and other treatment, functional restrictions, and any other relevant factors.

Dunn v. SSA · filed 1999-12-10(c)(3)

Although I render no opinion on the merits of Dunn's other claims on appeal, on remand the ALJ should thoroughly evaluate the credibility of Dunn's pain complaints in light of all the evidence that relates to any of the following factors: (1) Dunn's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, freguency, and intensity of Dunn's pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any pain medications Dunn has taken; (5) any non-medication forms of treatment for pain relief that Dunn has received; (6) any functional restrictions; and (7) any other relevant factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) (3), 416.929(c)(3) (1999); Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 797 F.2d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1986) .
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After a claimant shows a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, the ALJ evaluates their intensity and persistence to determine how they limit the claimant's capacity for work.

Poland v. SSA · filed 1999-12-22(c)(1)

Second, if this showing is made, the ALJ evaluates "the intensity and persistence of [the claimant's] symptoms so that [the ALJ] can determine how [the claimant's] symptoms limit [his or her] capacity for work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1).
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider specified factors when evaluating pain and prohibits rejecting subjective pain complaints solely because objective evidence does not substantiate them.

Lewis v. Apfel · filed 1999-04-22(c)(4) (c)(2)

This finding must be based upon consideration of the following factors: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medications that the claimant is taking or has taken to alleviate the pain; (5) any treatments, other than medication, that the claimant is receiving or has received for relief from pain; (6) any other measures that the claimant uses or has used to relieve the pain; and (7) any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Social Security Ruling 96-7p at 34485. ... Furthermore, a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain may not be rejected solely because the available objective evidence does not substantiate the complaints. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Social Security Ruling 96-7p at 34487.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant's pain allegations to be evaluated alongside medical findings after a medically determinable impairment capable of producing the alleged pain is established.

Hodes v. Apfel · filed 1999-09-01

The regulations provide the process for evaluating whether subjective complaints of pain should contribute to a finding of disability' — the claimant must establish a medically-determined physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or the symptoms alleged. Once such an impairment is established, allegations about the intensity, persistence, and functional effects of pain or other symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical findings in evaluating the impairment and the extent to which it may affect the claimant’s capacity for work.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating pain and other symptoms to consider factors beyond objective medical evidence, and to explain those factors sufficiently for meaningful review when the objective evidence is sparse.

Machos v. SSA · filed 2000-06-15(c)(3)

Where the objective medical evidence of the extent of claimant's pain is sparse, an ALJ must provide thorough written discussion of the Avery factors in support of his or her credibility determination, otherwise meaningful review is simply not possible. Here, such a discussion is lacking and, based upon the record before it, the court cannot conclude that the ALJ's credibility determination was based upon substantial evidence. Because that credibility determination was a substantial factor in the ALJ's conclusion that claimant can perform a range of light work, a remand to the ALJ for further discussion of the factors outlined in Avery and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 is necessary.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires medical signs and laboratory findings showing an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain or symptoms, and requires consideration of all available evidence in evaluating their intensity, persistence, and work-related effects.

Clifford v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2000-09-14(a)

However, the ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective complaint of pain if supported by medical signs and findings. ... The Social Security regulations provide that "there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that [the claimant] ha[s] a médical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that [the claimant] is disabled. In evaluating the intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms, including pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including [the claimant’s] medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings and statements about how [the claimant's] symptoms affect [the claimant].... We will then determine the extent to which [the claimant’s] alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the claimant’s] ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).
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Section 404.1529(c)(2) bars an ALJ from rejecting a claimant's symptom statements solely for lack of supporting medical evidence, but permits considering that lack of evidence, including clinical signs and laboratory findings, when evaluating symptom intensity, persistence, and work-related effects.

Clint Smith v. Kenneth Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2000-11-03(c)(2)

It is true that, under the regulatory scheme, an ALJ may not reject a claimant's statements concerning the intensity or persistence of his symptoms solely because they are not fully supported by medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. sec. 404.1529(c)(2); see also Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1995). However, it is also true that an ALJ may consider the lack of medical evidence as probative of the claimant's credibility. See Powers, 207 F.3d at 435 ("The discrepancy between the degree of pain attested to by the witness and that suggested by the medical evidence is probative that the witness may be exaggerating her condition."). Clinical signs and laboratory findings are useful indicators of disability and can assist the ALJ in making reasonable conclusions about the intensity and persistence of the claimant's symptoms and the effect those symptoms may have on the claimant's ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. sec. 404.1529(c)(2).
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Section 404.1529(a) requires the ALJ to determine whether a claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain before evaluating the pain's severity and its effect on the claimant's ability to work.

Brown v. SSA · filed 2000-12-22(a)

When a claimant alleges disability due to pain, in assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ must first determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is reasonably likely to produce the pain claimed.
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Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires the ALJ, when objective medical evidence does not support the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of pain, to consider specified additional factors, including daily activities, pain characteristics, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, other relief measures, and other functional limitations.

Hannaford v. SSA · filed 2001-01-15(c)(4)

Once it is determined, as it was here, that a claimant has an impairment (or impairments) that are capable of causing pain, the ALJ must "evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the [pain] to determine the extent to which the [pain] limit[s] the individual's ability to do basic work activities." Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p (July 2, 1996) . If the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of the pain are not supported by the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must look beyond the objective medical evidence and consider the following factors: ... (7) any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4); SSR 96-7p; Avery v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 797 F.2d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
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Section 404.1529(a) makes a claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms insufficient by themselves to establish disability, while subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) require the agency to evaluate symptom intensity and persistence and consider specified factors once a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce the symptoms.

Thompson v. Apfel · filed 2001-03-08(a), (c)(1), (c)(3)

A claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms are insufficient in themselves to establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2000). ... When the medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, the Secretary must evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms in order to determine how they limit the claimant’s capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1) (2000). In making his determination, the Secretary is to consider daily activities; location, duration, frequency and intensity of symptoms; precipitating or aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications; treatment other than medications received for relief; other measures used to relieve symptoms; and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (2000). ... While the ALJ took note of the factors to be considered listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and referred to claimant’s testimony as to each, he made no attempt to evaluate plaintiffs subjective claims as to pain and other symptoms in light of the medical evidence. Nor did he articulate any reasons to support his determination that plaintiffs statements were not credible. ... It is the opinion of the undersigned that the ALJ’s determination that plaintiffs testimony, absent sufficient support therefor, is not supported by substantial evidence. It is the opinion of the undersigned that this matter be remanded to the ALJ for an articulation of his reasons for findings made concerning plaintiffs credibility.
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Once an impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms, the adjudicator must consider those symptoms and evaluate their intensity and persistence.

David v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 00-1046 (2001) · filed 2001-05-10(b)

Since the plaintiff has a "medically determinable impairment," the next step in this sequential evaluation process is that the adjudicator (DHS) "must consider that the individual has an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's symptoms associated with CFS., as required in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (b) and 416.929(b), and proceed to evaluate the intensity and persistence of the symptoms. Thus, if an adjudicator concludes that an individual has a a medically determinable impairment, and the individual alleges . . . symptoms consistent with CFS, these symptoms must be considered in deciding whether the individual's impairment is `severe.'" (Emphasis added.)
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider all symptoms, including pain, and assess whether their intensity, frequency, and duration are reasonably consistent with the objective medical evidence.

Mastro v. Apfel, Commissioner · filed 2001-07-05

An ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain must "consider all . . . symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires an ALJ to evaluate a claimant's symptoms, including pain, for consistency with objective medical and other record evidence, but does not require precise medical corroboration.

Poland v. SSA · filed 2001-08-02(a)

In assessing the credibility of a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider whether these complaints are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). While a claimant's complaints of pain must be consistent with the medical evidence to be credited, they need not be precisely corroborated with such evidence.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the ALJ to consider daily activities, medications, and other treatment or measures when objective medical evidence does not fully support subjective symptom complaints.

Tappan v. Halter · filed 2001-05-31(c)(3)

Because the ALJ determined that the objective medical evidence did not fully support plaintiffs subjective pain complaints, the ALJ was required to consider other factors in evaluating those complaints such as her daily activities, medications taken, and other treatment or measures taken to relieve symptoms.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to consider a claimant's symptom allegations, first determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce them, and, if so, evaluate their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects using objective and other evidence.

Ramos v. SSA · filed 2002-04-30(a), (b), (c)

An ALJ is required to consider a claimant's allegations about his own impairments, including pain, in making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). The ALJ must first determine whether the claimant has a "medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms, such as pain." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). A claimant's "complaints of pain need not be precisely corroborated by objective findings, but they must be consistent with medical findings." Dupuis v. Sec'v of Health & Human Servs., 869 F.2d 622, 623 (1st Cir. 1989). If so, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms, considering the claimant's objective medical evidence along with other evidence, to determine whether the symptoms limit the claimant's capacity for work. See § 404.1529(c).
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Section 404.1529(a) directs the adjudicator to determine how alleged pain-related functional limitations and restrictions affect ability to work by assessing their consistency with medical signs, laboratory findings, and other evidence.

D'Aurelio v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2002-06-06(a)

This conclusion is properly within the sound discretion of the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (1991) (“We will then determine the extent to which your alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how your symptoms affect your ability to work.”).
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step evaluation of subjective pain complaints: determine whether the pain could reasonably result from a medically determinable impairment, then assess its intensity, persistence, and effects on ability to work using all available relevant evidence.

Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2002-06-12(b), (c)(1), (c)

First, when considering a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. First, an ALJ must determine if the alleged disabling pain could reasonably result from the medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Second, an ALJ must consider the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s disabling pain, and the extent to which it affects his ability to work. 20 C.F.F. § 404.1529(c)(1). In doing so, an ALJ must consider all of the available evidence including any factors relevant to the claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). In this case, while the ALJ made no specific finding concerning the first prong of the “pain analysis,” the ALJ’s decision concerning the second prong is sufficient to support the ALJ’s final decision.
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Section 404.1529 requires medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce alleged pain and requires evaluation of symptom intensity, persistence, and limiting effects using the relevant evidence.

Steward v. Barnhart · filed 2002-08-30(a), (b), (c)

A claimant’s statements about his pain will not be sufficient, standing alone; there must be medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (b); ... If, as the plaintiff contends, the further requirements of SSR 96-7p are triggered in this case, the administrative law judge complied with those requirements, which incorporate 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c). SSR 96-7p at 135. He considered all of the available medical evidence, Record at 15-16, and asked the plaintiff about his activities of daily living and what precipitated the plaintiffs inability to straighten his back, ... The administrative law judge was entitled to accept the plaintiffs testimony on this point.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating symptom testimony to consider the claimant’s statements, treatment history, and objective medical evidence before discrediting the testimony.

Lorenzo Lopez, on Behalf of Roberta Lopez, Deceased v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2003-07-09

And though the ALJ discussed Mrs. Lopez’s testimony, her treatment history, and the objective medical evidence before discrediting her testimony, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, he did not explain the apparent conflict between that information and his conclusion that Mrs. Lopez was not credible.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider specified factors, including pain characteristics, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, functional restrictions, and daily activities.

Southard v. Barnhart · filed 2003-07-28(c)(3)

As part of this evaluation process, the ALJ recognized his obligation to consider subjective allegations, and to give careful consideration to the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; treatment, other than medication, for pain relief; functional restrictions; and plaintiff’s daily activities. Id. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3); 416.929(c)(3) (also listing any measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms). It is not enough, however, for the ALJ simply to recite the factors described in the regulations. Instead, the determination “must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record” and be “sufficiently specific” to inform subsequent reviewers of both the weight the ALJ gave to a claimant’s statements and the reasons for that weight.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider a claimant's symptoms and evaluate their intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects when determining the claimant's capacity for work.

Ranfos v. SSA · filed 2002-01-24(a), (b), (c)

The ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of the claimant's symptoms so that the ALJ can determine how the claimant's symptoms limit his or her capacity for work.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant to show a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably cause the alleged symptoms, and requires the ALJ to evaluate relevant evidence, including objective findings, treatment, medication, and the claimant’s reports about symptom effects.

Delgado v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2002-03-04(b), (c), and (c)(2)

To establish a disability, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable impairment that reasonably caused the pain or disabling symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). The ALJ evaluates all relevant evidence offered to support the alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). Relevant evidence includes objective medical evidence, medications, treatments, and subjective reports of aggravating and ameliorating conditions and the effects of the symptoms on the claimant’s daily life. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-3; SSR 96-7p.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating symptoms such as pain to consider all symptoms and their consistency with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.

Joyce v. Barnhart · filed 2004-02-05

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, an ALJ considers “all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
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Section 404.1529(a) requires a claimant's alleged pain or other symptoms to be associated with an impairment that could produce them and supported by medical signs and laboratory findings.

Melloni v. Massanari · filed 2004-05-19(a)

Although the degree of pain or the severity of other alleged symptoms need not be the inevitable result of an objective medical impairment, it must be associated with an impairment that could give rise to the symptoms. ... In addition to such descriptive testimony as is available, there must be “medical signs and laboratory findings” demonstrating a medical impairment that reasonably could produce the pain or other' symptoms, thereby leading to a conclusion that the individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).
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Section 404.1529(a) requires considering all symptoms, including pain, and assessing the extent to which they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical and other evidence when determining disability.

Allison v. Comm Social Security · filed 2004-06-08(a)

Indeed, the ALJ’s question is entirely proper under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, which states that in determining whether an individual is disabled, “we consider all of your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider subjective complaints of pain once the claimant establishes a medically determined impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain.

Indoranto, Kim v. Barnhart, Jo Anne · filed 2004-06-29

In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider subjective complaints of pain if the claimant can establish a medically determined impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain.
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Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ evaluating pain symptoms to consider their intensity and persistence in light of relevant objective medical evidence.

Busby v. Barnhart · filed 2004-07-13(c)

Further, in light of the fact that plaintiffs argument relies on § 404.1529(c), it appears that plaintiff is contending the ALJ did not properly evaluate the relevance of this procedure in determining the intensity and persistence of her pain symptoms. The ALJ, however, properly understood that the procedure involved a numbing of the nerves, and thus the ALJ appropriately recognized the procedure as a pain management tool. ... The court is persuaded that the ALJ properly considered the relevant objective medical evidence regarding this procedure, even if the ALJ did not necessarily understand that the precise mechanics of the procedure involved severing nerve roots in order to achieve the end result of blocking the pain.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to evaluate symptoms, including pain, in light of objective medical evidence and other evidence, and not find disability based on subjective symptoms alone.

Bush v. Barnhart · filed 2003-08-28(a), (c)(3)

According to the governing regulations, an ALJ may not find a claimant disabled based on subjective symptoms alone. ... Therefore, the court must conclude that the ALJ was in compliance with the regulations in finding that the objective diagnostic and clinical signs were inconsistent with Bush’s claim of disabling pain.
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step evaluation of pain: objective medical signs or laboratory findings must first establish an impairment reasonably expected to produce the alleged pain, after which the adjudicator evaluates the pain’s persistence, intensity, and effect on the claimant’s ability to work using the available evidence.

Butler, Joan S. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B. · filed 2004-01-13(a)-(b), (c)(1)-(4)

The applicable regulations prescribe a two-step process to determine whether a claimant suffers from symptoms (including pain) that affect her ability to perform basic work activities. ... First, the claimant must adduce ‘‘medical signs or laboratory’’ findings evidencing a ‘‘medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce’’ the alleged pain. ... Once the claimant crosses this threshold, the second step assesses the persistence and intensity of the claimant’s pain as well as the extent to which it impairs her ability to work.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating subjective complaints to confirm a medically determinable impairment reasonably expected to produce the symptoms and consider relevant factors such as daily activities, symptoms, medication, treatment, other relief measures, and functional limitations.

Arruda v. Barnhart · filed 2004-04-12(b), (c)(3), (c)(4)

The ALJ recited the aforementioned relevant factors to consider and applied them to Arruda’s complaints and allegations of pain. ... The summary comports with the relevant analysis required under the regulations.
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant to show by medical signs or findings a condition reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms and requires the ALJ to consider specified factors, including daily activities, medication, and causes of pain, when symptoms exceed objectively verifiable evidence.

Taylor v. Barnhart · filed 2003-11-21(a)-(b); (c)(3)(i)-(iv)

Plaintiff must demonstrate by medical signs or findings that she has a condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms. ... When the claimant alleges pain that exceeds the objectively verifiable evidence, the ALJ must consider several evaluative factors, including daily activities, medication, and causes of the pain, in order to determine the extent to which the pain affects the claimant’s functional capabilities. ... Thus, the ALJ properly considered the evaluative factors set forth in the regulations, and his determination that plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain should be discounted is supported by substantial evidence.
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Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ assessing a claimant’s symptoms to consider all of the evidence in the record and give specific reasons for the weight assigned to the claimant’s testimony.

Johnson v. Barnhart · filed 2003-12-23(c)

In assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the record and give specific reasons for the weight accorded to the claimant’s testimony.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating subjective complaints of pain to consider all seven specified factors.

Canales v. Barnhart · filed 2004-03-17(c)(3)

Based on the record of this protracted case, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny plaintiff benefits was not supported by substantial evidence in that the ALJ did not adequately discuss all seven factors required to evaluate subjective complaints of pain.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires an ALJ to accept alleged functional limitations from pain and other symptoms only to the extent that they can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs, laboratory findings, and other evidence.

Randolph v. Barnhart · filed 2004-09-13(a)

In light of these inconsistencies between Randolph's testimony and the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ did not err in partially discrediting the testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a) & 929(a) (recognizing that "alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain and other symptoms" must be accepted by the ALJ only to the extent that they can "reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence").
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant's pain symptoms to consider the claimant's daily activities, pain characteristics, medications, treatment, measures used for relief, and other limitations or restrictions.

Audette v. SSA · filed 2004-11-17(c)(1), (c)(3)

The ALJ is required to consider the claimant's descriptions of her daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of her pain; the type and amount of any medications she is taking or has taken for pain or other symptoms; other treatments she has received or is receiving for pain or other symptoms; any measures she is using or has used to relieve pain, and other information about her limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. §§ 404.1529(c) (3) & 416.929(c) (3).
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Section 404.1529(c)(1) requires evaluation of the intensity and persistence of symptoms when medical signs or laboratory findings show a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce them.

Baranich v. Barnhart · filed 2005-04-19(c)(1)

In assessing Baranich’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ explicitly stated that he was following the “requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and Social Security Ruling 96-7p.” These provisions govern the evaluation of subjective medical complaints. In particular, “[w]hen the medical signs or laboratory findings show that you have a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce your symptoms, . . . we must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of your symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). As this court has recognized, this analysis is not markedly different than the Duncan analysis. See McCoy v. Chater, 81 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the most recent version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 is “in no way . . . inconsistent with the standards applied by this court” in Duncan). The ALJ did not commit error in failing to explicitly follow Duncan.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to evaluate subjective pain complaints using objective medical evidence and other consistent evidence, considering factors such as daily activities, pain characteristics, medication, and treatment.

Cross v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-06-14(c)(3)

The regulations set forth factors that the ALJ should consider in assessing credibility. These include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and treatment or measures, other than medication, taken to relieve pain. ... As a practical matter, in the assessment of credibility, the weight of the objective medical evidence remains an important consideration. The regulation expressly provides that “other evidence” of symptoms causing work-related limitations can be considered if “consistent with the objective medical evidence.” ... The specific factors identified by the regulation as relevant to evaluating subjective complaints of pain are intended to uncover a degree of severity of the underlying impairment not susceptible to proof by objective medical evidence. When a claimant presents credible evidence of these factors, such proof may justify the imposition of work-related limitations beyond those dictated by the objective medical evidence. The discretion afforded by the courts to the ALJ’s evaluation of such evidence is extremely broad.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating pain and other subjective symptoms to assess their severity and effect on work, using relevant factors such as daily activities and consistency of the claimant's statements.

Scatorchia v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-06-15(c)

Under the applicable Social Security regulations, allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms advanced by a claimant must be supported by objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. If an ALJ concludes that the available medical findings and evidence could reasonably cause a claimant’s alleged subjective symptoms, the ALJ must attempt to ascertain and evaluate the severity of the claimant’s pain as well as the degree to which it may limit the claimant’s ability to perform various types of work. “This obviously requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). When an ALJ undertakes this required credibility determination, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) and Social Security Ruling 96-7p provide necessary guidance. SSR 96-7p articulates several factors for an ALJ to consider in making the credibility determination about pain and subjective symptoms, including, inter alia: “the individual’s daily activities” and “the consistency of the individual’s own statements.” SSR 96-7p. Those are the factors that the ALJ considered here in determining that Scatorchia was not fully credible.
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Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to evaluate pain and other symptoms under its requirements without explicitly following the Sixth Circuit’s Duncan framework.

Pasco v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-06-23

To the extent that Pasco alleges that the ALJ failed to analyze Pasco’s complaints of pain and other physical or mental limitations under Duncan, we find that this allegation has no merit. The ALJ specifically noted in his decision that he had evaluated her symptoms, including pain, under the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, and Social Security Ruling 96-7p. (J.A. at 19). This Court has previously held that analysis under these regulations is not inconsistent with the standards we set forth in Duncan. McCoy v. Chater, 81 F.3d F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1995). We thus agree with other panels of this Court that an ALJ who follows the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 does not commit error by failing to explicitly follow Duncan. See Baranich v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 894363, *5 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
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Section 404.1529(c) requires an ALJ assessing pain allegations to consider relevant evidence, including medication, daily activities, and consistency with objective medical evidence, but does not require a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation.

Carson v. Barnhart · filed 2005-07-05(c)

Mr. Carson next argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), Mr. Carson’s allegations of totally disabling pain, and failed to discuss all of the pertinent factors. We disagree. ... In finding Mr. Carson’s pain only “limiting,” the ALJ properly considered factors pertinent to deciding, at the third prong, whether Mr. Carson’s complaints of severe pain were credible: the medication Mr. Carson takes for pain, the alleged effect of Mr. Carson’s symptoms on the activities of daily living and basic task performance, and the consistency of his subjective complaints with the objective medical evidence. ... And despite Mr. Carson’s assertion, the ALJ did not err by failing to “discuss all of the factors” identified in Luna. ... An ALJ is not required to step through “a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.” ... “So long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant’s credibility,” which the ALJ in this case did, “the dictates of Kepler are satisfied.”
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Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to reject alleged pain when it does not arise from a medically established affliction.

Edwards v. Barnhart · filed 2005-08-05

The ALJ may reject claims of pain that do not seem to come from any medically established affliction.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to apply its listed factors when evaluating a claimant's subjective symptoms, including pain.

Lockhart v. Barnhart · filed 2005-09-16

The record establishes that the ALJ applied the proper factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, did not reject the complaint of pain solely due to a lack of objective medical evidence, and provided several clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to justify his credibility determination.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to acknowledge conflicts in evidence about a claimant's symptoms and explain why one view is accepted over another.

Johnson v. SSA · filed 2005-11-08

But, when there is such a conflict in the evidence, the ALJ must acknowledge that conflict and state his or her reasons for adopting one view and rejecting the other. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. See also Social Security Ruling 96-7p, Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual's Statements. 1996 WL 374186 (July 2, 1996). Here, the ALJ appears to have overlooked that conflict or, perhaps, simply forgot to include a discussion of it in his opinion. Accordingly, remanding this matter to the ALJ for further consideration seems the most appropriate course of action.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of a claimant's daily activities, pain characteristics, medication, and other measures used to alleviate pain when evaluating subjective pain complaints.

Arroyo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-11-16(c)(3)(i-vii)

It is true that pain “might suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone.” A claimant may therefore submit other evidence for consideration, such as his daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; the types of medication taken for the pain; and any other measures taken to alleviate pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i-vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i-vii).
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Section 404.1529, together with related authorities, requires an ALJ to give specific reasons for discounting a claimant’s subjective testimony and bars relying solely on a conflict with objective medical evidence.

Schmidt, Robert E. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne · filed 2005-01-14

These regulations and cases, taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from “merely ignoring” the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating subjective complaints to consider relevant evidence and explain how the factors support the credibility determination.

Schmidt v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2005-01-14

By considering these factors and explaining how they factored into his credibility analysis, the ALJ properly followed the requirements for evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s subjective complaints.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires medical signs and laboratory findings showing a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain or other symptoms; subjective reports alone do not establish disability.

Fisher v. Barnhart · filed 2005-03-24(a)

Subjective reports will not alone establish a disability; objective medical evidence must also be present. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)(“... there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged....”).
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant's symptoms to consider the relevant evidence and adequately articulate the reasoning for the credibility determination, but it does not require separate discussion of every listed factor.

Masch v. Barnhart · filed 2005-12-20(c)(3)

While SSR 96-7p and § 404.1529 do not require the ALJ to analyze and elaborate on each of the seven factors when making a credibility determination, the ALJ must sufficiently articulate her assessment of the evidence to assure the court that she considered the important evidence and to enable the court to trace the path of her reasoning.
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step evaluation of symptoms: first determine whether a medically determinable impairment could produce the alleged symptoms, then assess their intensity, persistence, and work-related functional effects using all available evidence.

Brown v. Barnhart · filed 2006-01-12(b), (c)(1)

First, the claimant must show, citing “medical signs and laboratory findings,” the existence of “a medically determinable impairment ... which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b). This finding “does not involve a determination as to the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of [the] symptoms.” ... Then, the judge must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain along with the extent to which the symptoms or pain limit the claimant’s capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). In making this determination, the judge considers “all of the available evidence, including [the claimant’s] medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, and statements from [the claimant], [the claimant’s] treating or examining physician or psychologist, or other persons[.]”
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to articulate specific, evidence-based reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony about limitations and does not permit relying solely on a conflict with objective medical evidence.

TREGLER v. Barnhart · filed 2006-02-06

As the Seventh Circuit has noted, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and numerous Seventh Circuit decisions, taken together, “require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from ‘merely ignoring’ the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.” ... In this case, the ALJ simply stated that “the undersigned finds claimant’s allegations regarding his limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision” but he fails to set forth any reasons in the body of the decision.
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Section 404.1529 requires the ALJ to evaluate alleged pain and other symptoms by considering whether objective medical evidence shows an impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms, and by considering their intensity and persistence in assessing the claimant's capacity for work using all available evidence.

Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-03-01

In evaluating a claimant’s allegations of pain and limitations, the ALJ considers (1) whether the objective medical evidence shows “the existence of a medical impairment(s) which ...could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged;” and (2) the intensity and persistence of the symptoms to evaluate a person’s capacity for work, considering all available evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ’s determinations of credibility are given great weight, and are reviewed for substantial evidence.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ first to determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce the claimant's pain and then to consider factors such as daily activities and pain treatment in assessing how much the pain limits basic work activities.

Hillman v. Barnhart · filed 2006-03-20

Under the regulations, the ALJ must first determine whether there is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain. If the ALJ finds such an impairment, he then has to consider a variety of factors, including the claimant’s daily activities and treatment for pain, to determine the extent to which the pain limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.
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Section 404.1529(b) requires medical signs and laboratory findings to show an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain, while pain severity remains a subjective matter that cannot be confirmed or refuted solely from objective medical evidence.

Johnson, Michelle M. v. Barnhart, Jo Anne B. · filed 2006-06-05(b)

“Medical signs and laboratory findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, must show the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) (emphasis added), but the word we have italicized underscores the difficulty of confirming or refuting pain testimony. Even when as in this case the claimant attributes her pain to a physical rather than a psychological cause, the administrative law judge cannot disbelieve her testimony solely because it seems in excess of the “objective” medical testimony.
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Section 404.1529(b) permits symptoms to affect a claimant’s ability to work only when they result from an underlying physical or mental impairment established by medical signs or laboratory findings, and complaints of pain lacking full objective support must be considered but need not be credited.

Dixon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-06-07(b)

The regulations state that symptoms will only be considered to affect a claimant’s ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Further, while complaints of pain not fully supported by objective medical evidence should be considered and not discounted without contrary medical evidence, they do not have to be credited. See Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.3d 1269 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Section 404.1529(c) requires the ALJ, when evaluating disabling pain, to consider factors including daily activities, pain characteristics, medications and their side effects, and other treatment or measures used to relieve pain.

Almeida v. Barnhart · filed 2006-06-30(c)

At the second step, the ALJ should consider factors such as the claimant’s daily activities; the location, frequency, duration, and intensity of the pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medications taken; and any other treatments the claimant has received or measures used to reheve pain. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant's pain and other symptoms to consider all relevant evidence, not merely objective medical evidence or a conclusory credibility statement.

David v. Barnhart · filed 2006-08-14

When assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider subjective complaints of pain. Where a claimant presents evidence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, the ALJ is obliged to examine and weigh all the evidence, regardless of whether the intensity or persistence of the pain is substantiated by objective medical evidence. ... It follows that observations by treating and examining physicians, third-party testimony, the claimant’s testimony and daily activities, functional restrictions, pain medication taken, and aggravating or precipitating factors may all be relevant to the pain and credibility assessment. ... 19 F.3d at 334; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929(c); SSR 96-7p. Thus, it is not sufficient for the ALJ to make a single, conclusory statement that “the individual’s allegations have been considered” or that “the allegations are not credible,” nor is it enough for the ALJ to simply recite the factors described in the regulations for evaluating symptoms. ... Ultimately, the objective evidence contradicting Plaintiffs claims provides a sufficient reason for the ALJ to grant less credit to Plaintiffs statements concerning his back pain.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3)(I) permits an adjudicator to consider household and social activities when evaluating complaints of disabling pain or other symptoms.

Powers v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-08-17(c)(3)(I)

Indeed, Powers’s daily activities of crocheting, grocery-shopping, cooking family meals, visiting with her sister-in-law, hanging laundry, attending church, and outdoor walking for roughly a mile and a half, belie any subjective claims of pain. See Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The ALJ may consider the household and social activities in evaluating complaints of disabling pain or other symptoms.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(I).
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Section 404.1529 requires a claimant to show a medically determinable condition reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms, and permits consideration of statements, daily activities, pain, medication, and treatment when symptoms appear more limiting than the objective evidence.

Jenkins v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-08-18(b), (c)(3)

It was Jenkins’ burden to demonstrate by medical indications or findings that an underlying condition existed, which would reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms complained of. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b). If the symptoms suggest a greater functional restriction than is demonstrated by the objective evidence alone, the Commissioner considers evidence such as the claimant’s statements, daily activities, duration and frequency of pain, medication, and treatment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). The Commissioner has discretion to evaluate the credibility of the claimant’s complaints and draw a conclusion based upon medical findings and other available information. The ALJ’s rejection of Jenkins’ subjective complaints is consistent with the medical evidence in this record.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires adjudicators to consider all of a claimant’s symptoms, including pain, against objective medical evidence and other evidence.

Johnston v. Barnhart · filed 2005-07-08(a)

ALJ’s are required to evaluate a claimant’s credibility according to the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, which states in relevant part: ... in determining whether you are disabled, we consider all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the ALJ to consider seven specified factors when assessing the credibility of a claimant’s asserted subjective symptoms.

Kratman v. Barnhart · filed 2006-06-30(c)(3)

When assessing the credibility of a claimant’s asserted subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider a series of factors. ... 1. The individual’s daily activities; ... 2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms; ... 3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; ... 4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; ... 5. Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; ... 6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and ... 7.Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider a claimant’s statements about symptoms and their effects on daily activities and ability to work, assess them against the medical evidence, and account for their total limiting effects.

Rivera v. Barnhart · filed 2005-07-28(a), (c)(3)

As the Government argues and acknowledges, the ALJ should have evaluated whether Rivera’s complaints were consistent with the medical evidence, especially since Rivera has severe impairments. ... Full consideration of these symptoms and complaints was necessary for the ALJ to determine the “total limiting effects” on Rivera’s ability to perform substantial gainful activity.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to determine whether an impairment could reasonably be expected to produce pain and, if so, consider factors such as daily activities and pain treatment in assessing how pain limits basic work activities.

Ward v. Barnhart · filed 2006-08-02(b), (c)

Ward also argues that the ALJ failed to follow the requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 for evaluating her allegations of disabling pain and the resulting limitations on her ability to work. Under the regulations, the ALJ must first determine whether there is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s pain. If the ALJ finds such an impairment, he then has to consider a variety of factors, including the claimant’s daily activities and treatment for pain, to determine the extent to which the pain limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. ... Here, the ALJ evaluated Ward’s testimony in light of all the objective medical evidence and concluded that the evidence did not support her pain allegations to the extent alleged. ... The ALJ applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the claimant’s pain, and there is substantial evidence in the record to support his conclusion that her pain is not as limiting as she reports.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to assess a claimant’s statements about symptoms and their functional effects when a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce them, and bars rejecting those statements solely because objective medical evidence does not affirmatively substantiate them.

Robbins v. Social Security Administration · filed 2006-10-26

When giving such consideration, if the record establishes the existence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably give rise to the reported symptoms, an ALJ must make a finding as to the credibility of the claimant’s statements about the symptoms and their functional effect. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7p (July 2, 1996) (“SSR 96-7p”), 1996 WL 374186, at *1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). ... While an ALJ may find testimony not credible in part or in whole, he or she may not disregard it solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence.
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Section 404.1529(d)(1) requires the ALJ to consider subjective symptom testimony along with medical evidence when assessing the severity of an impairment.

Petersen v. Barnhart · filed 2006-12-20(d)(1)

However, the ALJ was required to consider subjective symptom testimony, in addition to medical evidence, when assessing the severity of Petersen’s MS. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d)(1).
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms to consider the relevant factors and give specific, evidence-supported reasons for the credibility determination, but it does not require formalistic rules of articulation.

Undheim v. Barnhart · filed 2007-01-19(c)

He specifically argues that the ALJ did not follow 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), which requires an ALJ to consider a list of factors when evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms. When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s subjective allegations of pain, an ALJ must give specific reasons for his findings. The reasons must supported by the evidence in the case record, and they must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the claimant and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the claimant’s statements and the reasons for that weight. An ALJ is not required to follow formalistic rules when articulating the reasons for his credibility determination. ... In this case, the opinion as a whole gives sufficient reasons and documentation for the ALJ’s credibility determination. ... The ALJ’s discussion was therefore sufficient to meet the requirements of section 404.1529(d).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the adjudicator to consider specified factors, including daily activities, symptom characteristics, aggravating factors, medication, and other relief measures, in addition to objective medical evidence when assessing the credibility of a claimant's statements.

Ramsey v. SSA · filed 2007-02-13(c)(3)

In recognition of the fact that an individual’s symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater level of severity of impairment than can be shown by the objective medical evidence alone, 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c) describe the kinds of evidence, including the factors below, that the adjudicator must consider in addition to the objective medical evidence when assessing the credibility of an individuals’ statements. ... Those factors include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the type dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes (or has taken) to alleviate pain or other symptoms; and any measures other than medication that the claimant receives (or has received) for relief of pain or other symptoms. Id. See also Avery, 797 F.2d at 2 3 ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
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Section 404.1529(c) permits an ALJ to evaluate a claimant's subjective symptoms using factors including daily activities, the frequency of pain, medication and its side effects, and other treatment that relieves pain.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2006-04-03(c)

In so concluding, the ALJ properly considered plaintiffs testimony and weighed it in accordance with various factors, including plaintiffs daily activities, the frequency of pain, the type, dosage, and side effects of medication, and other treatment that relieves pain. (T. 25).
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Section 404.1529(b) requires objective clinical signs and laboratory findings showing a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's alleged symptoms.

Jopson v. Astrue · filed 2007-09-24(b)

The court understands that, however genuine a claimant’s complaints may appear to be, the regulations require objective clinical signs and laboratory findings which demonstrate the existence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating complaints of pain.

Lanier v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2007-10-26(c)(3)

The ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating her complaints of pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of a claimant’s statements and other evidence, including daily activities, symptom characteristics, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions, when objective evidence alone does not establish symptom severity.

Rasmussen, Tamera v. Astrue, Michael · filed 2007-11-06(c)(3)

Although an ALJ may not ignore a claimant’s subjective reports of pain simply because they are not fully supported by objective medical evidence, discrepancies between objective evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration. Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ properly considered Rasmussen’s testimony in light of the factors enumerated in SSR 96-7p and concluded that Rasmussen had significant functional limitations that precluded some, but not all, work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
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Section 404.1529(b) requires an ALJ first to determine whether objective medical evidence shows an underlying medical condition and then to determine whether that evidence confirms the alleged pain's severity or shows that the condition could reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain.

Sullenger v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2007-11-28(b)

The analysis under 20 CFR § 404.1529 is two-pronged. Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). First, the ALJ must examine whether there is “objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition.” Id. If there is objective medical evidence, then the ALJ must decide if the objective medical evidence: (1) confirms the severity of the alleged pain; or (2) if the established medical condition is of such a severity that it can be expected to produce the disabling pain. Id. In the case at bar, there is some objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. The Second ALJ determined, however, that the weight of the objective medical evidence, particularly the numerous MRIs, CT scans, and examinations by medical personnel, does not confirm the severity of the alleged pain. For that reason, he found Sullenger not credible. We will not disturb ALJ Craig’s credibility determination.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, including pain, to consider their consistency with the objective medical and other evidence and explain the reasons for discounting the claimant’s complaints.

Barton v. Astrue · filed 2008-03-10

Although the ALJ in this case wrote that he had considered plaintiffs complaints pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929, and Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which correspond to Polaski and credibility determination, he failed to list even one of the necessary factors, and failed to offer any discussion indicating his reasons for discrediting plaintiff.
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Section 404.1529 requires evaluation of the intensity and persistence of symptoms only after medical evidence establishes a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce them.

Robinson v. Astrue · filed 2008-03-25(c)(1)

Robinson argues that the ALJ failed to conform to the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 by neglecting to address the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of her self-reported symptoms. That was not necessary, however, because the medical evidence did not confirm that Robinson had a medically determinable impairment.
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Section 404.1529(a) requires an ALJ to consider all symptoms and determine whether alleged functional limitations are consistent with objective medical and other evidence, while subsection (c)(3) identifies factors relevant to that evaluation.

Temple v. Astrue · filed 2008-04-17(a), (c)(3)

Administrative Law Judges are required to evaluate a claimant’s credibility concerning pain according to the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, which states in relevant part: ... In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your symptoms, including pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including your medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings and statements about how your symptoms affect you. ... 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). ... Factors relevant to your symptoms, such as pain, which we will consider include: ... (vii) Other factors concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. ... 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). ... Similarly, the ALJ’s credibility assessment is also supported by substantial evidence.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints to consider and specifically address the relevant factors, including medication side effects and the claimant’s treatment history.

Kirby v. Astrue · filed 2008-06-27(c)(3)

On remand, the ALJ must consider and specifically address each of the factors laid out in SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s symptoms to consider the claimant’s daily activities, the characteristics and triggers of the symptoms, medication and other treatment, measures used for relief, and functional limitations.

Neave v. Astrue · filed 2007-08-31(c)(3)

Rather, this is but one factor to consider, along with the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication the claimant takes; treatment other than medication; any other measures the claimant has used to relieve the pain or other symptoms; and functional limitations and restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 96-7p.
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Section 404.1529(b) requires objective medical signs and laboratory findings to show a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain.

Sloan v. Astrue · filed 2008-03-13(b)

First, “[mjedical signs and laboratory findings ... must show the existence of a medical impairment(s) ... which could reasonably be expected to produce,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b), “the actual pain, in the amount and degree, alleged by the claimant.”
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s symptoms to consider all available evidence and determine whether the alleged limitations are consistent with the medical signs, laboratory findings, and other evidence.

Keith v. Astrue · filed 2008-04-28

In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your symptoms, including pain, we will consider all of the available evidence, including your medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings and statements about how your symptoms affect you.
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Section 404.1529(c)(4) requires an ALJ to consider a claimant's symptoms limiting only to the extent that the alleged functional limitations are reasonably consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence.

Newton v. Astrue · filed 2008-06-16(c)(4)

A claimant’s symptoms, including pain, are considered to diminish her capacity to work to the extent that alleged functional limitations are reasonably consistent with objective medical evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).
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Section 404.1529(a) requires a claimant's statements about pain or other symptoms to be supported by medical signs and laboratory findings showing an impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms, considered with the other evidence, before they can establish disability.

Cox v. Commissioner of Social Securit · filed 2008-09-30(a)

Under the SSA regulations, a disability claimant’s statements about his or her pain or other symptoms, standing alone, cannot establish that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). Rather, “there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that [the claimant has] a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the intensity and persistence of [the] pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that [the claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).
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Section 404.1529(c) requires an administrative law judge evaluating symptoms to consider the entire record and specified factors, rather than reject symptom statements solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.

Brihn v. Astrue · filed 2008-10-22(c)

When conducting this evaluation, the administrative law judge may not reject the claimant’s statements regarding her symptoms on the sole ground that the statements are not substantiated by objective medical evidence. Instead, the administrative law judge must consider the entire case record to determine whether the individual’s statements are credible. Relevant factors the administrative law judge must evaluate are the individual’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; other treatment or measures taken for relief of pain; the individual’s prior work record and efforts to work; and any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions. SSR 96-7p; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
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Section 404.1529(c) requires adjudicators evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms to consider the entire case record, including objective medical evidence and factors such as daily activities, medication, treatment, work history, and functional limitations.

Hofer v. Astrue · filed 2008-11-17(c)

Relevant factors the administrative law judge must evaluate are the individual’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; other treatment or measures taken for relief of pain; the individual’s prior work record and efforts to work; and any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions. SSR 96-7p; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). ... Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the administrative law judge properly considered the objective medical evidence and the other relevant factors listed in the regulation in making his credibility determination.
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Section 404.1529 requires the adjudicator to consider a claimant's daily activities, symptom characteristics, medication, treatment methods, and other functional-limitations factors when evaluating subjective complaints.

Rohrbaugh v. Astrue · filed 2008-12-05

Factors the A.L.J. must consider in evaluating the veracity of a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain include, among other things, consideration of Plaintiffs daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain and other symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; other treatment methods used by the claimant and other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations due to pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529; 416.929.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms to consider factors including daily activities, the nature and intensity of symptoms, aggravating factors, medication side effects, and treatment or relief measures.

Schuhardt v. Astrue · filed 2008-12-17(c)(3)(i)-(iv)

When evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider the following factors, among others: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) adverse side effects of medications; and (5) treatment or measures taken by the claimant for relief of symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(iv).
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step evaluation of subjective symptoms: the claimant must show an impairment that could reasonably cause the symptom, and the adjudicator must then assess the symptom's intensity, persistence, and functional impact using relevant factors.

DaSilva-Santos v. Astrue · filed 2009-02-10

When a claim of disability is based on a subjective symptom such as pain, a two step analysis is conducted. First, the claimant has to show that there are medical records of the impairments that reasonably can be expected to cause the pain. Second, the hearing officer has to consider the intensity and persistence of the pain and its functional impact on the claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Several factors such as daily activities, medications, and measures to relieve pain are considered.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ first to determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms and then to evaluate their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects using relevant factors such as daily activities, symptom characteristics, medication, treatment, and other measures.

Addison White, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2009-02-24(a)

First, the ALJ will ask whether the there is an underlying medically determinable physical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Second, if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, then he must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. Id. Relevant factors for the ALJ to consider in his evaluation of symptoms include the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate the symptoms; other treatment undertaken to relieve symptoms; other measures taken to relieve symptoms, such as lying on one’s back; and any other factors bearing on the limitations of the claimant to perform basic functions. Id. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). ... Here, the ALJ found that White’s “description of his limitations exceeds medical substantiation, is not consistent with other evidence and is not credible.” A.R. at 19 (ALJ Decision at 6). ... But this “mischaracterizes [White’s] testimony regarding the scope of [his] daily activities [and] fails to examine the physical effects coextensive with their performance.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248-49. ... White’s subjective complaints are consistent with this testimony and with the activities questionnaires he completed as part of his application. ... As in Rogers, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision “fails to ‘contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record’” and is not “‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to [White’s] statements and the reasons for that weight.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248-49 (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4).
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Section 404.1529 requires an adjudicator first to find a medically determinable impairment reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms, then evaluate the symptoms’ intensity, persistence, and functional limits on the claimant’s ability to work.

Allen v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2009-03-27(b), (c)

When evaluating Allen's statements of subjective pain, however, the ALJ was required to go further and determine the actual intensity and persistence of Allen's symptoms and how these symptoms limit Allen's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) ("When the medical signs or laboratory findings show that you have a medically determinable impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce your symptoms, such as pain, we must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of your symptoms so that we can determine how your symptoms limit your capacity for work."); see also § 404.1529(b) ("The finding that your impairment(s) could reasonably be expected to produce your pain or other symptoms does not involve a determination as to the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of your symptoms.").
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Section 404.1529 requires objective medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms before subjective complaints can establish disability.

POUPORE v. Astrue · filed 2009-04-16(b), (c)

Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Poupore's subjective complaints of pain were insufficient to establish disability. His subjective complaints were unsupported by objective medical evidence tending to support a conclusion that he has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b), (c).
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Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to determine that a claimant's subjective complaints of pain are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record.

McQueen v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2009-04-23

An ALJ is permitted to determine that subjective complaints of pain are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence on the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362 (observing that ALJ must evaluate “the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he . . . is disabled by it”).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ evaluating pain to consider a claimant’s daily activities, precipitating factors, medication, and other treatment.

Boehm v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2009-05-06(c)(3)

The ALJ also can consider the plaintiffs daily activities, the precipitating factors and the effect of medication and other treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(3).
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Section 404.1529 requires objective medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms before subjective complaints can establish disability.

Poupore v. Comm'r of Social Security · filed 2009-05-19(b), (c)

Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Poupore’s subjective complaints of pain were insufficient to establish disability. His subjective complaints were unsupported by objective medical evidence tending to support a conclusion that he has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b), (c).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the adjudicator to evaluate pain and other symptoms using the claimant's work history, symptom characteristics, aggravating factors, medication and treatment, functional restrictions, and daily activities.

Peterson v. SSA · filed 2009-06-12(c)(3)

The ALJ's decision demonstrates that he followed the Avery guidelines and the regulations in evaluating plaintiff's alleged disabling pain. The ALJ considered all of plaintiff's symptoms and the extent to which they were consistent with the objective medical evidence, other evidence, and the opinion evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 & 404.1527 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-4p, 96-5p, 96-6p, 96-7p and 06-3p. See CR at 18. He specifically noted that "whenever statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the [ALJ] must make a finding on the credibility of the statements based on a consideration of the entire case record." CR at 18. To that end, the ALJ evaluated plaintiff's prior work record, his activities of daily life ("ADL"), the location, duration, frequency and intensity of his pain, factors that precipitate or aggravate the symptoms, what medications plaintiff was taking to alleviate the pain, what treatment other than medication plaintiff had received to reduce the pain, any non-treatment measures plaintiff had pursued to relieve his pain, and finally any other factors concerning his functional limitations and restrictions due his pain and other symptoms. See CR at 19.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the ALJ to consider specified evidence and factors when evaluating a claimant's pain and other symptoms.

McQuestion v. Astrue · filed 2009-06-23(c)(3)

Rather, the ALJ must consider all of the evidence, including the claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medication the claimant takes to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain or other symptoms; any measures the claimant uses to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his back, standing for fifteen to twenty minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 96-7p.
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Section 404.1529(a) provides that a claimant's statements about pain or other symptoms alone do not establish disability.

Smith v. Astrue · filed 2009-07-07(a)

As the relevant Social Security regulations make clear, however, a claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); ... The Court finds, therefore, that there exists substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s credibility determination.
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires the agency to carefully consider evidence from other persons about the extent of a claimant’s pain and how it affects the claimant’s ability to function.

Willcockson v. Astrue · filed 2008-08-28(c)(3)

And we question whether witness statements corroborating a claimant’s subjective complaints can logically be treated as cumulative by assuming that they would have been rejected for the same reasons that the claimant statements were rejected, where the agency itself says that because subjective complaints are hard to document, it will “carefully consider” evidence from other persons addressing the extent of the claimant’s pain and how it affects his or her ability to function.
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Section 404.1529(c)(1) requires the Commissioner to evaluate the intensity and persistence of pain, and how it limits work capacity, when medical signs or laboratory findings document an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain.

Stanton v. Astrue · filed 2008-09-30(c)(1)

Additionally, the Regulations state that when the medical signs or laboratory findings document a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, the Commissioner must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of the pain to determine how it limits the claimant’s capacity for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1).
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Section 404.1529 requires pain and other symptoms to be considered as part of the overall five-step disability analysis and evaluated in combination with objective medical evidence and all other relevant information.

Green v. Astrue · filed 2008-12-05(a), (d)

Consideration of pain and other symptoms should be analyzed as a part of the overall five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d). An individual’s statements about his or her symptoms are not enough to establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment or that an individual is disabled. SSR 96-7p. While subjective complaints of pain and other symptoms are considered to be an integral part of the evaluation and, indeed, all stated symptoms must be considered, they are assessed in combination with objective medical evidence including laboratory findings and medical signs. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).
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Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of a claimant’s pain and other symptoms using the listed factors.

McPherson v. Astrue · filed 2009-03-02(c)(3)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ properly considered Claimant’s pain and other symptoms pursuant to the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3).
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Section 404.1529 requires a two-step symptom analysis: the ALJ must determine whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms and then evaluate their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects on the claimant’s capacity to work.

Rockwood v. Astrue · filed 2009-04-30(a), (c)

The “ALJ’s credibility assessment must be based on a two step analysis of pertinent evidence in the record.” ... First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has medically determinable impairments, “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2. ... Second, if medically determinable impairments are shown, then the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s capacity to work.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ assessing a claimant's credibility to consider objective medical evidence and evidence about the claimant's daily activities, symptoms, aggravating factors, medications, pain relief, non-treatment measures, and other functional limitations.

Wynn v. Astrue · filed 2009-05-08

In assessing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must consider the objective medical evidence, as well as evidence concerning: (1) the plaintiffs daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency and intensity of the plaintiffs pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate or aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of plaintiffs medications; (5) other means of pain relief received by the plaintiff; (6) non-treatment measures used by plaintiff for pain relief; and (7) any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions.
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Sections 404.1529(b) and (c) require objective medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms when evaluating subjective complaints.

Poupore v. Astrue · filed 2009-05-21(b), (c)

His subjective complaints were unsupported by objective medical evidence tending to support a conclusion that he has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged.
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Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ evaluating subjective symptoms to determine whether a medically determinable impairment could produce them, assess their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects, and consider their consistency with objective medical and non-medical evidence.

Ray v. Astrue · filed 2009-01-07(a), (b), (c), (c)(3)-(4)

As to a claimant’s alleged “subjective symptoms,” including pain, they “must be supported by objective medical evidence.” ... In giving evidentiary weight to these symptoms, the Commissioner first determines whether a medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. ... Next, the Commissioner evaluates the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms to determine the extent to which those symptoms actually limit the claimant’s capacity for work. ... In making this evaluation the Commissioner looks at the consistency of the subjective symptoms with first the objective medical evidence and then the non-medical evidence.
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Notes 1–150 of 7,433, oldest cases first.

1,235 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Hillhouse v. Harris, the statute appears in a footnote reporting the Secretary's summary-judgment argument and quoting the regulation; the court expressly states that it need not resolve the regulation's validity, so it does not construe or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Nickson v. Schweiker, the regulation is mentioned in the plaintiff’s argument as one of the challenged regulations, but the court expressly held that the ALJ did not apply it. The court decided the class-action amendment issue on standing and typicality, not on what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Avery v. Heckler, the court cited § 404.1529 only to identify the regulation directly challenged by plaintiffs and to decide whether exhaustion should be waived. It did not interpret or decide what the regulation substantively means or requires. opinion →
Lyons v. Heckler, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a string of supporting authorities for a general statement about the severity of pain; it did not construe the regulation or decide a statutory issue under it. opinion →
Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the court cited § 404.1529 only to describe the regulatory approach while discussing the temporary statutory pain standard. It expressly applied the statutory standard and did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Barge v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, the regulation appears only in a string citation following Nelson as supporting authority. The court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529; its discussion and ruling relied on the Social Security Act and Seventh Circuit precedent concerning evaluation of pain. opinion →
Joyce M. JOHNS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a “see also” reference while stating and applying the statutory pain standard. It does not construe the regulation or decide what it independently requires; the remand concerns the ALJ’s failure to apply the alternative statutory pain test. opinion →
Guillermina GONZALEZ GARCIA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant, Appellee, the court cited § 404.1529 only as supporting authority for its substantial-evidence review of the agency’s factual finding about the claimant’s pain. It did not interpret or independently apply the regulation as a legal rule. opinion →
Mendoza v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1529 for a general proposition about subjective pain complaints but does not interpret the regulation or decide how it independently applies. The reversal rests on Cotton’s requirements for specific credibility findings, the lack of substantial evidence, and the failure to consider combined impairments. opinion →
Mendoza v. Bowen, the court cites § 404.1529 as supporting authority for the general importance of pain testimony, but does not interpret the regulation, state what it requires, or independently decide how it applies. The ruling instead addressed whether the agency's position was substantially justified under the Equal Access to Justice Act. opinion →
Jones v. Heckler, the court reports the magistrate’s characterization of § 404.1529 in the procedural history, but does not construe or independently apply the regulation; it affirms on the record’s lack of objective evidence and failure to establish a severe impairment. opinion →
Marcia C. BUNNELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant, the majority's holding interprets and applies the parallel regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 416.929, rather than § 404.1529. The only discussion of § 404.1529 is in the dissent's argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Serra v. Sullivan, the court cites § 404.1529 only as supporting authority for the objective-medical-evidence rule stated from 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). It does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its holding concerns the ALJ’s credibility determination and the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Galliher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, the statute is cited in the dissent as support for a general proposition about subjective allegations and objective evidence. The majority opinion does not discuss or apply § 404.1529, and the dissent does not construe its meaning or requirements. opinion →
Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, the only citation to § 404.1529 appears in the attached magistrate judge's report, stating the lower court's understanding of the regulations. The Sixth Circuit did not independently construe or adopt that rule; it decided the appeal on substantial-evidence and credibility grounds. opinion →
Gary JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee, the citation appears in a footnote as background about the court’s general standard for evaluating subjective complaints. The court expressly states that Jones did not challenge that standard, and the opinion decides only whether the ALJ actually considered his pain. opinion →
Flecha v. Shalala, the court cites § 404.1529 in passing as support for its affirmance of the ALJ's assessment of the medical evidence and subjective complaints; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Field v. HHS, the court identifies § 404.1529 only as part of Field's argument and expressly declines to address that argument; the decision instead turns on the ALJ's use of the wrong legal standards for determining disability onset. opinion →
Dunn v. Shalala, the court merely reported that the ALJ considered the claimant’s subjective symptoms pursuant to § 404.1529 and then upheld the ALJ’s evidentiary credibility assessment; it did not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires or how the regulation independently applies. opinion →
Laird v. Ramirez, the only reference to § 404.1529 is in the court’s quotation of a complaint allegation. The court addressed subject-matter jurisdiction and did not interpret, apply, or rule on what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Gernavage v. Shalala, the court affirmed the Secretary under deferential substantial-evidence review and cited § 404.1529 only in a footnote as general support for discussing credibility and subjective symptoms; it did not construe the regulation or independently decide its requirements. opinion →
Colbert v. Chater, the court merely reports that the ALJ used §§ 404.1529 and 416.929 when assessing residual functional capacity and considered pain and functional limitations. It does not construe § 404.1529, identify its legal requirements, or independently decide how the regulation applies. opinion →
Giancola v. Shalala, the court cites § 404.1529 as part of the general framework for evaluating pain, alongside § 416.929 and Avery, but does not construe or independently apply the regulation. Its substantive discussion relies on Avery and 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), and the citation to § 404.1529 is incidental to the substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Scales v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a parenthetical to identify the interaction of objective and other evidence; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. The holding rests on substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's assessment and denial of benefits. opinion →
Wilson v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, Department of Health & Human Services, the court cited § 404.1529 in a supporting parenthetical while affirming on the separate twelve-month duration requirement; it did not analyze, construe, or independently decide the regulation. opinion →
Rivera v. Chater, the court cited § 404.1529 in a general citation supporting a broad statement about evidence considered in residual-functional-capacity analysis. It did not interpret or independently apply this regulation; the decision rested on substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings. opinion →
Spaw v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reports the Appeals Council's finding under § 404.1529 in the procedural history; it does not interpret, explain, or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Francis v. Chater, the court only described the ALJ’s use of § 404.1529 in evaluating plaintiff’s pain allegations; it did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Schonewolf v. Callahan, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while reporting the Appeals Council’s earlier finding about the ALJ’s treatment of pain complaints. The court does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its holding concerns the ALJ’s failure to explain and weigh the medical and testimonial evidence adequately. opinion →
Dewey v. Chater, the court cites § 404.1529 in a string cite while reciting the general evidence considered in residual-functional-capacity review; it does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed issue about its application. opinion →
Burnette YANCEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant-Appellee, the court only recounts that the Appeals Council ordered further evaluation under § 404.1529 as part of the procedural history. The court's holdings concern the subpoena request and psychiatric evaluation, and it does not decide what § 404.1529 means or how it applies. opinion →
Blevins v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only to support the description of the ALJ's reasoning about daily activities. The court affirmed the disability decision on substantial-evidence grounds and did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). opinion →
Day v. Chater, the court merely reported that the ALJ evaluated subjective pain complaints under § 404.1529; because claimant did not develop a challenge, it declined to review the issue and did not interpret or establish what the regulation requires. opinion →
Pilet v. Apfel, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a see-also citation accompanying the statutory pain standard and Avery. It does not interpret the regulation or decide a requirement specifically under it; the discussion instead addresses the general pain-and-credibility standard and the ALJ’s decision. opinion →
McNeil v. Apfel, the court cites § 404.1529 only as “See also” support for the standards stated in Bunnell and related precedent. It does not interpret the regulation or decide what it independently requires; the citation is incidental to the court’s review of the ALJ’s credibility findings. opinion →
Ranchez v. Apfel, the court cites § 404.1529 only as secondary support ('See also') for the credibility standard it derives from Bunnell and Smolen. It does not construe the regulation or decide its requirements independently; the holding concerns whether the ALJ properly evaluated Ranchez’s testimony. opinion →
Ortiz v. Apfel, the opinion merely reports the ALJ’s finding and cites § 404.1529 in the recitation of the administrative findings. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Graham v. Apfel, the regulation appears only in the ALJ’s quoted rationale for finding the claimant’s allegations and impairment evidence insufficient. The court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529; it decided the case on the severity and twelve-month duration requirements. opinion →
Mangold v. Apfel, the court merely reported that the ALJ considered the factors required by § 404.1529 while reviewing the claimant's testimony; it did not construe or independently decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Marshburn v. Callahan, the court cites § 404.1529 only as support for its conclusory affirmation that the ALJ made a proper credibility finding. It does not interpret the regulation, state what it requires, or analyze its application; the citation is incidental to affirming the benefits decision. opinion →
Scott v. Apfel, the regulation is mentioned only in a block quotation reporting the reasoning of the district court in Dykes v. Apfel. Scott v. Apfel does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529; its holding concerns the Commissioner's two-fold step-five burden under Eighth Circuit precedent. opinion →
DiNunzio v. Apfel, the statute appears only in the attached remand order as an instruction describing what the administrative law judge should do on remand. The opinion does not interpret, explain, or decide any requirement of § 404.1529. opinion →
Lowe v. Apfel, the court merely reported that the ALJ considered the claimant’s allegations under the regulation and upheld the pain determination under judicially developed factors; it did not interpret, explain, or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Fish v. Apfel, the regulation is mentioned only to describe the ALJ's framework in the procedural history; the court did not construe § 404.1529 or decide what it requires, and instead held generally that the ALJ's pain determination was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Balenton v. Halter, the opinion attributes the credibility factors to SSR 96-7p and cites § 404.1529(c) only parenthetically; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Mersman v. Halter, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only as supporting authority in a general list of factors relevant to credibility. It did not construe the regulation or decide a legal issue about what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Stambough v. Apfel, the court cited § 404.1529 parenthetically while describing the regulatory framework, but decided the appeal under the Sixth Circuit’s Duncan two-pronged standard and the substantial-evidence review; it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Combs v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites the regulation only in passing to support the factual observation that medication controlled Combs’s headaches; it does not construe or apply what the regulation requires. opinion →
Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1529 parenthetically through Hartranft while discussing the ALJ's duty to explain the rejection of testimony; it did not interpret, apply, or decide the meaning or requirements of § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Reed v. Massanari, the regulation appears only in a footnote as a supporting citation for the relevance of subjective allegations; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529, and its ruling instead addressed the ALJ's credibility findings and the required specificity of reasons for rejecting testimony. opinion →
Renfro v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1529(a) only as supporting authority for the Sixth Circuit's preexisting two-prong pain-evaluation test. It did not interpret the regulation or decide its independent meaning or application. opinion →
Robbins v. Barnhart, the court merely identifies § 404.1529 as one of the authorities cited by the ALJ for the factors used to assess symptom credibility. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Castro v. Barnhart, the court merely appended § 404.1529 to a generic five-step sequential-evaluation list; it did not interpret, explain, or apply this regulation. opinion →
Mazur v. Massanari, the citation appears in the ALJ’s quoted reasoning. The appellate court affirmed the ALJ’s credibility finding as supported by substantial evidence but did not construe, explain, or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Smith v. Massanari, the court’s citation is a passing reference supporting its summary of the evidence considered by the ALJ; the court did not construe § 404.1529(a) or decide an issue about what the regulation requires. opinion →
Bell v. Barnhart, the opinion reports that the ALJ considered other symptom evidence pursuant to § 404.1529(c)(3), but the court does not interpret the regulation or independently decide what it requires; the citation is part of its review of the ALJ’s overall weighing of the evidence. opinion →
Cichon v. Barnhart, the court merely reports that the ALJ considered § 404.1529; it does not interpret or apply that regulation as its own holding. Its substantive discussion of pain evaluation cites SSR 96-7P and § 416.929 instead. opinion →
Schoofield v. Barnhart, the regulation is cited in the Commissioner’s argument and in the ALJ’s quoted decision. The court’s own analysis and remand ruling rely on the two-step framework from Craig v. Chater, without interpreting or independently applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
Dolph v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court's rule and application concern the judicially created Polaski standard; § 404.1529 appears only as a supporting parallel citation and is not independently construed or analyzed. opinion →
Buck v. Barnhart, the opinion affirms the ALJ’s credibility determination, while § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) appears only in a footnote parenthetical citing another decision for the general proposition that daily activities may be considered; the court does not construe or independently apply this subsection. opinion →
Wallace v. Barnhart, the opinion mentions § 404.1529 only in a footnote reporting that the ALJ cited it below. The court’s own analysis applies the Eleventh Circuit’s judicial pain standard and does not decide what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Deitemeyer v. Barnhart, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while recounting the claimant’s argument that the ALJ ignored medical signs and findings. The court does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires; it instead upholds the credibility determination based on the objective medical evidence and clinical findings. opinion →
Dolph v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1529 only as additional support for the Polaski framework; it does not interpret the regulation or decide an issue specifically about its meaning or requirements. opinion →
Irelan v. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1529(c) parenthetically as support for Hartranft’s general rule concerning evaluation of subjective pain complaints; it did not construe the regulation or decide its requirements independently. opinion →
West v. Barnhart, the regulation is mentioned only in the procedural account of what the ALJ did below. The court's own discussion applies the Eleventh Circuit's subjective-symptom standard and does not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Sanchez v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1529 only parenthetically to explain that the Social Security Administration evaluates symptoms, including pain; it does not construe or apply the regulation’s requirements. opinion →
Padilla v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529 parenthetically while discussing the ALJ's credibility determination, but did not interpret or apply the regulation as an independent holding; it affirmed based on substantial evidence. opinion →
Gibbons v. Barnhart, the regulation appears only in a “See also” string citation following the court’s reliance on Luna and Social Security Ruling 96-7p; the court affirmed the ALJ based on substantial evidence without construing or deciding any requirement of § 404.1529. opinion →
Rallis v. Social Security Admin., the regulation appears only in a “see also” string citation following the court’s reliance on Avery and SSR 96-7p; the court did not separately construe or decide what § 404.1529(c)(3) requires. opinion →
Whittaker v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a footnote as general support for the statement that symptoms are considered in disability determinations; it does not separately construe or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Moisa v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) in a string citation alongside Ninth Circuit cases, but its decision applied precedent governing the rejection of subjective pain testimony and did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Vitatoe v. Comm Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only as a “see also” authority supporting a proposition attributed to Hartranft; it does not construe or separately decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Huhta v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1529 only as support for its conclusion about rejecting the claimant's subjective complaints; it does not construe or explain the regulation. opinion →
Smith v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1529 only as supporting authority for its conclusion that the ALJ adequately considered Smith’s symptoms; it does not construe or apply any specific requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Mays v. Comm Social Security, the court merely reported and upheld the ALJ's evidentiary finding; it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Quintana v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute appears only in a numbered list of factors attributed to the administrative law judge; the court does not interpret or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Dixon v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court merely cited § 404.1529(c)(3) and (c)(3)(v-vi) while reciting the Polaski factors and reviewing whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision; it did not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(b) only as support for its separate step-two substantial-evidence analysis; it did not interpret or decide the meaning or requirements of § 404.1529. opinion →
Schwabe v. Barnhart, the court merely noted that the ALJ cited § 404.1529 and discussed symptom factors; its ruling concerned the ALJ's failure to connect that discussion to an explicit credibility determination under SSR 96-7p, not the meaning or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Butts v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only while recounting the ALJ's step-four review in the background; it does not decide what the regulation means or apply it as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Vakas v. Barnhart, the court merely recounted and agreed with the district court's account that the ALJ cited and applied the regulation; it did not construe § 404.1529 or decide what the regulation requires. The appellate decision instead upheld the credibility finding as affirmatively linked to substantial evidence. opinion →
Brewster v. Barnhart, the court merely reported that the ALJ cited § 404.1529 in making a credibility determination and did not decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Redfield v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(b) only as additional support for the Sixth Circuit’s pain-evaluation framework; it did not interpret or apply the regulation as a legal rule. opinion →
Hennes v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court merely noted that the regulation contains the same language as the Holt judicial pain standard; it did not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires, and its ruling addressed whether the ALJ properly applied the judicial standard and supported the credibility finding. opinion →
Morgan v. Barnhart, Comm, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) in a general statement about evidence relevant to RFC; its ruling concerns the vocational expert’s faulty hypotheticals and the substantial-evidence support for the ALJ’s credibility findings, not the meaning or application of this regulation. opinion →
Allen v. Comm Social Security, the regulation appears only in the Appeals Council procedural history; the court’s holding concerns reliance on SSR 85-15 and vocational evidence, not the meaning or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Allen v. Joanne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation appears only in the Appeals Council procedural history; the court’s holding concerns reliance on SSR 85-15 and vocational evidence, not the meaning or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Ortiz v. Barnhart, the court merely cited § 404.1529(c)(2) as support while affirming the ALJ’s credibility finding; it did not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Cefalu v. Barnhart, the court recited this pain-and-symptom-evaluation standard in a general discussion, but decided the case on the claimant’s unraised mental-impairment issue; it did not apply or construe § 404.1529. opinion →
Dutil v. Barnhart, the statute is cited only in the plaintiff's argument concerning the ALJ's evaluation of pain complaints. The court did not adopt that argument or construe § 404.1529; its remand addressed the ALJ's treatment of fibromyalgia and related symptoms generally. opinion →
Johnson v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529 only as a see-also authority for a rule quoted from Craig; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Phillips v. Barnhart, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only as a supporting reference for the Avery factors and does not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Rush v. Barnhart, the opinion mentions § 404.1529 only in a footnote stating that the Polaski factors are embodied in the regulation; it does not construe or apply the regulation as an independent legal rule. opinion →
Cunningham v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation appears only in Cunningham's argument identifying credibility factors; the court did not construe or adopt its requirements and instead decided whether the Commissioner's position was substantially justified under the EAJA. opinion →
Greenwood v. Barnhart, section 404.1529 appears only in Claimant’s argument. The Court analyzes the credibility issue under SSR 96-7p and does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
McClanahan v. Comm Social Security, the statute appears only in a parenthetical citation within the ALJ’s quoted credibility finding; the appellate court did not construe § 404.1529 or decide what it requires. opinion →
McClanahan v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute appears only in a parenthetical citation within the ALJ’s quoted credibility finding; the appellate court did not construe § 404.1529 or decide what it requires. opinion →
Johnson v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, the court quoted subsection (b) while discussing the difficulty of evaluating pain testimony, but its operative ruling came from precedent and it did not construe or decide the statute's meaning or requirements. opinion →
Holiday v. Barnhart, the court recited the pain-evaluation standard, citing § 404.1529, but the parties did not dispute the ALJ’s subjective-complaint findings and the court did not decide an issue about the regulation. opinion →
Arnold, Steven v. Barnhart, Jo Anne, the regulation is cited only in the plaintiff’s argument as support for the requirements of SSR 96-7p. The court’s own holding addressed compliance with the ruling and did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Arnold v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the court cited § 404.1529 alongside SSR 96-7p while reviewing the ALJ’s compliance with the ruling; it did not interpret the regulation or decide an issue about what the regulation requires. opinion →
JURCEVIC v. Astrue, the only reference to § 404.1529 is the court's report of the ALJ's statement in the procedural and factual history. The court did not decide what the regulation means or requires; its remand rested on the ALJ's failure to comply with SSR 96-7p. opinion →
Shaw v. Astrue, the court merely cites § 404.1529 while reporting the ALJ’s finding; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Smith v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1529(d) only in a parenthetical string cite supporting a general RFC discussion; it does not construe the provision or decide how it applies. opinion →
Stiles v. Astrue, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529; it merely reproduced the ALJ’s citation while affirming the ALJ’s symptom-credibility findings as supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Blackstock v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1529 only inside a parenthetical string cite supporting a general discussion of subjective complaints; it does not independently construe the regulation or decide how it applies. opinion →
Blakeman v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1529(b) once to introduce the background rule for considering fatigue, but it does not construe or apply that regulation; its decision addresses the ALJ's credibility finding under Polaski and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Blakeman v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1529(b) only while describing the general framework for reviewing the ALJ's credibility finding; it does not construe the regulation or decide a distinct issue about its meaning or requirements. opinion →
Franzen v. Astrue, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ stated she applied § 404.1529; the court does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Vance v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529(a) only in a parenthetical citation to Walters; it does not interpret or independently apply this regulation, instead deciding the credibility issue under the substantial-evidence standard and existing precedent. opinion →
Orellana v. Astrue, the court recites § 404.1529 as part of the general step-two framework, but its remand rests on finding a severe impairment and the need for additional record development; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Goldthrite v. Astrue, section 404.1529 is mentioned only in a string cite with the parallel SSI regulation, § 416.929. The court's ruling concerns the SSI claim and relies on § 416.929, case law, and SSR 96-7 without construing § 404.1529. opinion →
Kenefick v. Astrue, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining that SSR 96-7p’s symptom-evaluation factors are codified in § 404.1529; the court decided the credibility issue under the ruling and did not independently construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Banks v. ASTURE, the court recites the statute in its general standard of review but does not construe or decide an issue under § 404.1529; its ruling addresses the ALJ’s hypertension, vocational-expert, and SSR 96-8p arguments. opinion →
Shafer v. Astrue, the statute appears in a footnote and in the court's account of the earlier panel's procedural-error ruling. This opinion decides only whether the government's defense of those errors was substantially justified under the EAJA; it does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Shafer v. Astrue, the opinion reports the prior appeal's description of the ALJ's procedural errors and includes § 404.1529 in a citation to governing regulations; this EAJA decision does not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Hernandez v. Astrue, the court did not construe § 404.1529; it merely reported that the ALJ said he followed its requirements while reviewing pain allegations, and affirmed on substantial-evidence grounds. opinion →
Chanbunmy v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529 only as authority for the general statement that the ALJ makes credibility determinations. It did not interpret or apply the regulation's requirements; its decision addressed whether the ALJ's credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Knox v. Astrue, the opinion cites § 404.1529 only in a footnote describing factors associated with SSR 96-7p; the court decides the ALJ's credibility challenge under the ruling and does not construe or apply § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Berry v. Commissioner of Social Securit, the court cites § 404.1529 only parenthetically as authority for a treating-physician rule derived from Kirk; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Griffis v. Astrue, section 404.1529 appears only as the third citation in a string cite, and the court did not construe or independently apply it; the ruling addressed the ALJ’s treatment of vocational evidence and the substantial-evidence basis for remand. opinion →
Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the Appeals Council’s criticism of the ALJ’s decision; the court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Ridinger v. Astrue, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529; it mentioned the regulation only as part of the ALJ’s boilerplate symptom statement while ruling that the ALJ inadequately considered the combined effects of the impairments under § 404.1523. opinion →
Giordano v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529 in passing alongside case law and a Social Security Ruling to support its affirmance of the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not interpret the regulation or independently decide what it requires. opinion →
Giordano v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529 in passing alongside case law and a Social Security Ruling to support its affirmance of the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not interpret the regulation or independently decide what it requires. opinion →
Russell v. Astrue, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the ALJ's reasoning in the procedural history; the court did not decide what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Nicholson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1529(d)(3) in a footnote as support for the general duty to determine whether an impairment equals a listing, but does not interpret the regulation or decide how its symptom-evaluation requirements apply. opinion →
Farnsworth v. Astrue, the opinion merely cites § 404.1529(d)(3) in a general statement about determining whether an impairment medically equals a listing; it does not interpret or apply that subsection in deciding the case. opinion →
Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Bowens, the court mentions § 404.1529 only to describe the federal regulations interpreted in Houston and distinguish them from Kentucky law; it does not construe or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Rupard v. Astrue, the regulation is cited in the magistrate judge’s discussion of the ALJ’s credibility determination, which the recommendation expressly declined to further address; the district court’s adopted remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to consider the hand impairment at step two. opinion →
Webster v. Astrue, the court included § 404.1529 in a string citation supporting a general credibility rule, but did not interpret or independently apply the regulation; the remand rested on the ALJ's treatment of a psychological consultant's findings. opinion →
Abrams v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1529 only while reciting a general legal standard in the Applicable Law section; it does not decide what the statute means or apply it to the claim in a way that resolves an issue about the statute. opinion →
MUCKLER v. Astrue, the court reports the ALJ’s step-two standard and the statute’s citation, then expressly states that the claimant did not challenge the legal standard but challenged only the ALJ’s evidentiary conclusion. The court therefore did not construe or decide what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Walker v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a footnote as support for a general RFC statement; the court’s pain analysis relies on case law and does not construe or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
GRBA-CRAGHEAD v. Astrue, the regulation is cited only to report the ALJ's reasoning and in a general statement of legal standards; the court does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Cunningham v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) only in connection with the claimant’s daily activities as evidence supporting the ALJ’s credibility finding. It did not construe the regulation, state its requirements as an independent rule, or decide how the regulation applies. opinion →
Lynch v. Astrue, the court reports what the ALJ did under § 404.1529 and then defers to the ALJ’s credibility judgment under case law; it does not construe or independently decide the regulation’s meaning, requirements, or application. opinion →
Lorence v. Astrue, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the ALJ’s step-four findings; the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Naylor v. Astrue, the opinion merely summarizes SSR 96-7p's discussion of § 404.1529 and does not construe or decide anything about that regulation; its proposed finding cites § 416.929(b) instead. opinion →
Ambrosini v. Astrue, the court recited the symptom-evaluation standard and cited § 404.1529(c) in its general standards discussion, but it did not decide compliance with or otherwise apply that provision; the remand rested on the lack of substantial medical evidence concerning substance-abuse materiality. opinion →
Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529; it appeared only in a parenthetical citation to Hartranft’s statement about objective medical evidence. opinion →
Massey v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529; it mentioned the provision only in a footnote explaining the status of policy interpretations from SSR 88-13 while deciding the separate issue of lay-witness testimony. opinion →
Johnson v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a passing “See also” citation within the claimant’s argument. The court decided the issue under Polaski and the medical-record evidence, without construing or independently applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
Thompson v. Astrue, Incidental: § 404.1529(e) is cited alongside Villano and SSR 96-7p as authority for a general credibility standard; the court remanded for failure to clarify the treating physician’s opinion and did not decide what the regulation means or make it the basis of its ruling. opinion →
Walton v. Astrue, the court expressly said it was acting without deciding the credibility issue and mentioned § 404.1529 only in a footnote explaining that the ALJ should reconsider relevant evidence on remand. The operative holdings concerned the failure to consider treating-physician opinions and the requirements for a Sentence Six remand, not the application or meaning of § 404.1529. opinion →
Betancourt v. Astrue, the statute is cited only in support of Plaintiff’s evidentiary credibility argument. The court expressly declined to consider those arguments and decided the case on a separate due-process issue. opinion →
Millen v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529 only in its general statement of applicable law about assessing pain and symptoms; it did not apply or decide compliance with the regulation, and the remand rested on omitted pace restrictions in the vocational hypothetical. opinion →
Hollins v. Astrue, the statute is cited in the general Applicable Law discussion, but the court did not analyze or apply the pain-symptom standard in deciding the case; the remand rested on treating-source evidence, the RFC hypothetical, and consideration of combined impairments. opinion →
Gray v. Astrue, the court cites § 404.1529 only while summarizing general applicable law; it does not apply or decide that standard in resolving Gray's appeal, which is remanded for consideration of overlooked medical evidence. opinion →
Norris v. Astrue, the opinion contains only a footnote string cite to § 404.1529(c)(3), with no discussion or ruling construing or applying the regulation. opinion →
Freels v. Astrue, the citation occurs in the court’s procedural summary of the ALJ’s stated methodology. The court did not construe § 404.1529 or adopt a holding about what the regulation requires; it reviewed the administrative decision on other grounds. opinion →
Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, the court cited § 404.1529 only to describe a Social Security disability framework and expressly stated that those concepts were not directly applicable to this ERISA case; it did not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Bracciodieta-Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929 only in a string cite supporting the general relevance of daily activities to credibility; it does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Lill v. Astrue, the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529; it appeared only in Lill’s description of the authorities supporting her argument, while the court analyzed the issue under Avery and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Clark v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a parenthetical string cite to Salles and Burbs while addressing witness credibility; it did not interpret or apply the regulation as a statute-specific holding. opinion →
Nishke v. Astrue, the court merely reported that the ALJ said he considered symptoms under § 404.1529; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation, instead reviewing the credibility determination under Polaski and substantial-evidence standards. opinion →
Warner v. Astrue, section 404.1529(c)(2) appears only in a string cite supporting the court’s discussion of the ALJ’s credibility analysis; the court does not independently construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Hootman v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529; it appeared only in a parenthetical citation to Lewis’s statement about the medical-evidence requirement for listing equivalence, while the court decided whether the claimant equaled the listings. opinion →
Pellam v. Astrue, the court did not construe § 404.1529 or announce a rule about its requirements; it only reported the ALJ’s citation and consideration of factors in upholding the ALJ’s credibility finding. opinion →
Agan v. Astrue, the court merely reports the ALJ’s citation to § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) while discussing the objective medical evidence; it does not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Hunter v. Astrue, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only as see-also support in a string cite while stating a credibility standard drawn from precedent; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
McDade v. Astrue, the court mentions § 404.1529 only in a string citation, alongside § 416.929, after stating the Polaski factors; its decision rests on Polaski and substantial-evidence review and does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Rogers v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(c) only as background for ordering a new credibility evaluation on remand; it does not decide what the regulation means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Farringer v. Colvin, the court recited § 404.1529 while describing the ALJ’s symptom-evaluation procedure and the ALJ’s findings, but it did not decide whether the regulation was satisfied; it expressly said it was unnecessary to consider Farringer’s other arguments and reversed on treating-source weight. opinion →
Doucette v. Astrue, the regulation appears only in a footnote as one item in a string citation to another case; the court did not interpret or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Lippincott v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(1) in a general summary of the step-three legal standard; it did not construe the regulation or make a statute-specific ruling. opinion →
Cheetham v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(b) in a general statement of the credibility framework, but does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling concerns whether the ALJ's credibility assessment was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Hartung v. Colvin, the court merely reported the ALJ’s stated use of the two-step process and did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529; the substantive ruling concerned the separate drug-and-alcohol regulation, § 404.1535(b)(2). opinion →
Max v. Astrue, the opinion mentions § 404.1529 only while reporting the ALJ’s stated basis for the RFC finding; the court did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Vantuyl v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 only to note that the Polaski factors appear in the Commissioner’s regulations; it did not interpret or apply this regulation as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Karabinas v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while quoting and citing Hall v. Astrue’s criticism of an ALJ’s incomplete discussion of the record; it does not construe or independently apply this regulation. opinion →
Winslow v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529(a); it cited the regulation only after explaining why substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s credibility determination. opinion →
Springer v. Colvin, the court cited 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) while reciting the general standard for evaluating subjective symptoms, but it did not interpret or independently decide anything about the regulation; its ruling concerned whether the ALJ’s credibility assessment was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Donnelly v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a parenthetical citation to Genier while discussing the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Garcia v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(d)(3) only in a parenthetical attribution to Lewis while stating a general rule about medical equivalence; it does not interpret or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Phillips v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1529(a) only in a footnote as a parallel citation supporting discussion of the medical evidence and alleged pain; it does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Forrest v. Comm'r of Social Security, the court merely cites the regulation while discussing the ALJ’s credibility finding and does not construe or decide what § 404.1529 requires or how it independently applies. opinion →
Raid Elfadly v. Commissioner Social Security, the regulation is cited only in the opinion's report of the District Court's credibility ruling; the appellate court does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Bilak v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 in a string cite while stating the treating-physician-weight rule, which it attributed principally to § 404.1527; it did not construe or apply § 404.1529's symptom-evaluation requirements. opinion →
Trumbull v. SSA, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only for a general list of evidence considered in assessing symptom credibility; it did not construe or decide the regulation’s meaning or application. opinion →
Burnside v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a string citation supporting a general credibility-factor statement attributed primarily to SSR 96-7p; it does not independently construe or decide what the regulation requires or how it applies. opinion →
Stephen John Langone, Claimant v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant, the court merely cited § 404.1529 as authority for affirming the ALJ’s credibility finding and did not decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Iordan v. Commissioner, Social Security Asmnistration, the court cited § 404.1529 in passing, alongside Wilson, as support for affirming the ALJ's credibility determination; it did not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Capman v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) as supporting authority while affirming the ALJ’s credibility analysis, but it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Markland v. Colvin, section 404.1529 appears only in a string cite supporting the court’s general discussion of credibility and subjective complaints; the court does not independently construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Rock v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 alongside § 404.1545(a)(3) while affirming the ALJ’s credibility determination and did not interpret or identify any specific requirement of § 404.1529. opinion →
Orosco v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1529(f) only in a general description of the fifth-step sequential evaluation. The case was decided and remanded at step four based on a defective vocational-expert hypothetical, so the court did not decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Bell v. Colvin, the citation appears only in the court’s report of the ALJ’s reasoning. The court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529; its holding concerned whether a marked limitation in one ADL area was compatible with the RFC. opinion →
Allums v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) parenthetically as support for the ALJ’s credibility determination, but did not interpret or independently apply the regulation; the holding concerned whether the ALJ’s reasoning was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Jutta Spies v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) only as a parenthetical citation to Loveless while describing the ALJ’s credibility reasoning about daily activities; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Jutta Spies v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) only parenthetically through Loveless while reviewing the ALJ’s credibility finding; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Turk v. Comm'r of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) only in a parenthetical quoting Workman for the proposition that an ALJ may consider medication effectiveness; it did not analyze or decide the regulation’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Gallo v. Colvin, the statute is mentioned in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation as support for a proposed credibility ruling, but the district judge rejected that recommendation and affirmed without adopting or construing § 404.1529. opinion →
Monroe v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 in a general overview of symptom-evaluation rules, but it did not construe or apply that regulation as the basis for its disposition. The reversal rested on the ALJ’s function-by-function RFC analysis and inadequate explanation under SSR 96-8p. opinion →
Stacy v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court cites § 404.1529 parenthetically as describing symptom evaluation, but its holding applies the judicial pain standard and credibility rules without construing or deciding anything about the regulation. opinion →
Romo v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 in passing to support the observation that pain may exceed objective medical evidence while addressing the ALJ's treatment of a physician's opinion; it did not analyze or decide the regulation's meaning, requirements, or application. opinion →
Forster v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a string citation supporting a general statement of the credibility factors, without construing the regulation or independently deciding how it applies. The court’s actual holding was that the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
McCleary v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a string citation supporting a general statement of the credibility factors; it did not construe the regulation or independently decide how it applies. opinion →
Salaiz v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(2)-(4) only in a parenthetical string citation supporting a list of credibility factors; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Alvarado v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(I) in a parenthetical as support for considering daily activities while reviewing the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Barrett v. Colvin, the court merely reported the ALJ's consideration of symptom-related factors and cited § 404.1529(c)(3); it did not construe or decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Hersey v SSA, the court attributed the symptom-evaluation framework to SSR 96-7p and cited § 404.1529 only in a secondary ‘see also’ citation; it did not construe or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Villarreal v. Colvin, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ said he considered the claimant’s symptoms under § 404.1529; the court did not construe or apply that regulation. The remand rested on inconsistencies between the RFC’s light-work label and its two-hour standing/walking limitation. opinion →
Craig v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion recites the regulation’s two-step symptom-evaluation standard in its general discussion, but does not apply or decide compliance with it; the remand rested on the ALJ’s treating-physician analysis and failure to develop the record, and the court expressly declined to address Craig’s other arguments. opinion →
Rothery v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(4) only as support for affirming the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Ward v. Berryhill, the statute is cited only in the defendant’s argument about the ALJ’s evaluation of subjective complaints; the court did not adopt that argument or decide the issue, and instead remanded on other grounds. opinion →
Brownrigg v. Berryhill, the court noted that the ALJ cited § 404.1529 generally, but the court did not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its remand rested on the ALJ's failure to follow the Luna pain-analysis framework and adequately explain the findings. opinion →
Corless v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529(c)(2); the regulation appears only in a supporting citation after the Ninth Circuit's rule about the reasons required to reject symptom testimony. opinion →
Bryant v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only as a see-also authority for the Polaski factors while reviewing the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not construe the regulation or decide a requirement specific to it. opinion →
Marsh v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) in a footnote while rejecting Marsh’s challenge to the ALJ’s consideration of her work history, but did not interpret or independently apply the statute. opinion →
Walker v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a string cite for a general credibility proposition; it does not construe the regulation or make a statute-specific holding. opinion →
Smith v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(c) only to identify the general symptom-evaluation framework; its disposition rests on the ALJ’s credibility findings under Kepler and substantial-evidence review, without interpreting or deciding a requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Voorhees v. Colvin, the court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529; the regulation appears only in a string citation with § 416.929, while the operative discussion quotes and applies § 416.929(c). opinion →
Shumaker v. Colvin, the court cited subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3)(i) as support for the factors used in reviewing the ALJ’s credibility finding, but did not construe the regulation or decide what it independently requires. opinion →
Nowling v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a parenthetical quotation from Willcockson; it does not construe or apply this subsection, and its remand rests on the ALJ's failure to consider lay testimony and other regulations. opinion →
Nowling v. Colvin, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a parenthetical quotation from Willcockson while discussing lay-witness testimony; it does not independently interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Siegmund v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(a) only for a general background proposition; it did not construe or apply that provision, and its remand concerned development of treating-source evidence. opinion →
Robitaille v SSA, the court cites § 404.1529 only as a “see also” authority appended to a credibility framework attributed to SSR 96-7p and Comeau; it does not construe or separately decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Adams v. Colvin, the regulation appears only in a string citation supporting a general RFC statement; the court did not construe or specifically apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Earley v. Colvin, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) as supporting background while reviewing the ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions; it does not independently construe or decide the regulation’s application. opinion →
Kanika Revels v. Berryhill, the court states the third-party-report standard from Ninth Circuit precedent and merely adds § 404.1529(c)(3) in a “see also” citation; it does not interpret or apply that subsection. opinion →
James v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court reported that the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints under § 404.1529, but the court’s decision addressed the ALJ’s treatment of a physician’s opinions and did not interpret or apply this regulation. opinion →
Vandermolen, o/b/o Frances M. Czarnecki, (deceased) v. Colvin, the regulation appears only in a “See also” string citation after the court attributes the symptom-evaluation standard to SSR 96-7p and Arnold. The court did not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Grant v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only as authority alongside § 416.929(c) while affirming the administrative law judge’s credibility finding; it did not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Cervantez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the opinion cites § 404.1529(c)(1) in a general recitation of the symptom-testimony legal standard, but it does not construe or decide any issue about the regulation; its ruling concerns whether the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for discounting the claimant’s testimony. opinion →
Barrett v. Berryhill, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ considered symptoms under § 404.1529; the court remanded on treating-physician and single-decisionmaker issues and did not reach the plaintiff's credibility challenge. opinion →
Webb v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 in a general statement of the symptom-evaluation framework, but does not interpret the regulation or decide a statute-specific issue. opinion →
Nichols v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) only in passing as support for the ALJ’s general step-four responsibilities while upholding the credibility and opinion-weighing analysis; it did not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Bishop v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only in a string cite supporting a general symptom-evaluation rule; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Meyer v. Berryhill, the opinion mentions § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a footnote describing regulations incorporated by SSR 96-7p; the court does not construe or independently apply the provision. opinion →
Bickham v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court merely reports the ALJ’s use of § 404.1529 in evaluating subjective complaints and summarily affirms the ALJ’s decision; it does not decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Coskery v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(3) only to identify the regulation addressed by the Social Security Rulings; its decision construes and applies SSR 16-3p, not § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Gammill v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 in a string cite while affirming the ALJ’s credibility finding; it did not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Swenson v. Berryhill, the court recited the symptom-evaluation standard and cited § 404.1529(c)(3) in its general credibility discussion, but expressly declined to decide whether the ALJ erred in the credibility determination; the remand rested on other issues. opinion →
Richards v. Berryhill, the court mentioned § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a parenthetical citation to Simila while discussing the ALJ’s consideration of work history; it did not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Richards v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) as supporting authority while deciding whether the ALJ properly considered Richards’s limited work history in an adverse credibility determination. It does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Walker v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(2) only in a parenthetical reporting Briscoe's explanation. Walker's holding concerns the disability onset date and the ALJ's evaluation of the record, not the meaning or application of this regulation. opinion →
Plessinger v. Berryhill, the opinion cites § 404.1529(c) only while reporting the ALJ's procedural history; the appellate court did not construe or apply the regulation as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Moffitt v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court merely identifies § 404.1529 parenthetically as one of the regulations underlying SSR 16-3p; its ruling was that the ALJ did not violate SSR 16-3p, not a construction or independent application of this regulation. opinion →
Blankenship v. Berryhill, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The court’s own analysis concerns the step-three listing requirements under other regulations and does not construe or apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
London v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the regulation appears only in the court's summary of the ALJ's RFC finding; the court did not construe or otherwise decide what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Ledbetter v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529 as an alternative source for the Polaski factors and mentioned additional regulatory factors in a footnote, but reversed for failure to comply with Polaski; it expressly declined to require the additional factors. opinion →
Martino v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., the court merely reported the ALJ's RFC formulation, which cited § 404.1529; it did not interpret or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Wilkinson v. Social Security Administration, the statute appears only in a general recitation of the rules for evaluating subjective complaints, in a string citation with § 416.929; the court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529 in resolving the remand issues. opinion →
Byrd v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529 as an alternative source for the Polaski factors and discussed its additional factors only in a footnote; its disposition rested on the ALJ's failure to comply with Polaski, and the court expressly declined to require those additional factors. opinion →
Callaham v. Commissioner of SSA, the regulation appears only in a footnote to the court’s statement that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard; the court did not explain, construe, or independently apply § 404.1529, so the citation is incidental. opinion →
Barbarigos v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a “see also” string cite supporting a general credibility standard attributed to SSR 96-7p and precedent. It did not construe or independently apply the regulation; the remand addressed the ALJ's credibility analysis under the cited ruling and case law. opinion →
Wilson v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court mentions § 404.1529 in explaining the regulatory factors but resolves the case under Polaski, expressly declining to require those additional factors; it therefore does not hold about § 404.1529. opinion →
O'Connor v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Rollins supporting a general evidentiary principle; the court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529 in resolving the case, which turned on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's characterization of the medical findings. opinion →
Dennis v. Berryhill, the opinion recites § 404.1529(a) and (c)(1) as part of the general RFC standard, but the remand holding concerns unexplained social-interaction limitations and does not construe or apply this regulation. opinion →
Bearden v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529 as an alternative source for the Polaski factors and discussed its additional factors only in a footnote; its disposition rested on the ALJ's failure to comply with Polaski, and the court expressly declined to require those additional factors. opinion →
Conetta v. Berryhill, the court merely reports that the ALJ considered § 404.1529 and cites it alongside other authorities in a general discussion of listing criteria; it does not decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Clark v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529 as an alternative source for the Polaski credibility factors, but decided the appeal under Polaski and expressly declined to require the regulation's additional factors; it did not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Ailor v. Saul, the court cited the statute only in instructions for the ALJ on remand and did not interpret or apply it in deciding the claim. opinion →
Khan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., section 404.1529 appears only in a footnote's parenthetical citation to Meadors, which quotes the regulation while citing related Social Security authority; the court did not independently construe or apply the regulation as the basis for its decision. opinion →
Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(b) in its recitation of the symptom-evaluation standard, but its decision addressed the ALJ's unsupported credibility reasoning and did not construe or independently decide anything about the regulation. opinion →
Geisinger v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529(c) as part of a general reference to the Agency’s symptom-evaluation policy, but does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires; its remand concerns the ALJ’s treatment of daily activities and medical noncompliance/substance abuse. opinion →
Schaepe, the court expressly declined to address the objective-evidence issue associated with § 404.1529(c)(2). Its citation to § 404.1529(c)(3) merely supports a general lay-witness rule and does not construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Butts v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only in a string cite supporting its finding that the ALJ failed to discuss significantly probative symptom evidence; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Schwandt v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(c) only in a “see also” citation supporting the Polaski factors; it did not separately construe or apply the regulation. opinion →
Smith v. Saul, the court recited § 404.1529's symptom-evaluation framework while describing the administrative process, but its remand holding addressed the ALJ's weighing of the treating physician under § 404.1527(c)(2), not the meaning or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Ragsdale v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, section 404.1529 appears only in a string cite supporting a general RFC background statement; the court does not construe or apply it, and its symptom-evaluation ruling relies on § 416.929(a). opinion →
Frigon v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(4) in a general credibility standard, but does not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling upholding the ALJ rests on Ninth Circuit precedent and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Larsen v. Saul, the opinion cites § 404.1529 only while reporting the ALJ’s decision; the court did not construe or apply the regulation as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Blanchard v. Saul, the opinion cites § 404.1529 only while reporting the ALJ’s decision; the court did not construe or apply the regulation as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Claggett v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely recites the regulation’s two-part test for evaluating subjective symptoms in its background discussion. It did not decide a dispute about § 404.1529 or apply that regulation to resolve the case; its rulings concerned RFC limitations for concentration and social interaction, medical-opinion weighting, and vocational-expert testimony. opinion →
Winkle v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529 as an alternative source for the Polaski factors and mentioned additional regulatory factors in a footnote, but reversed for failure to comply with Polaski; it expressly declined to require the additional factors. opinion →
Moody v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Ripley; the court’s symptom-evaluation discussion adopts SSR 16-3p and resolves whether the ALJ gave specific reasons, without construing or independently applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
Stenholtz v. Saul, the citation appears only in the court’s summary of the ALJ’s RFC determination; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529, and its substantive symptom-analysis discussion cited § 416.929 instead. opinion →
Roberts v. Saul, the court merely recited this citation as part of the general RFC background; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
Dorta v. Commissioner Of Social Security, the opinion cites § 404.1529(a) and (b) while reciting the general two-step framework for evaluating symptoms, but expressly declines to address credibility and remands on other errors; it does not decide what the regulation means or requires in this case. opinion →
Jackson v. Berryhill, the court recited § 404.1529(c)(4) in describing the general rules for evaluating symptoms, but it did not apply or construe that provision in resolving the case. It expressly declined to address the plaintiff’s credibility argument, and remanded instead for inadequate explanation of the RFC assessment. opinion →
Osborn v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(2) only parenthetically as support for a rule stated from Ninth Circuit precedent; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Mainella v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii) in a string citation accompanying a general list of evidence considered in RFC assessment. It did not construe the provision or decide that it required or prohibited anything in this case. opinion →
Gossett v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) only in a parenthetical supporting its discussion of daily activities as evidence relevant to Gossett’s pain allegations; it did not construe or decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
McKeever v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529 in describing the ALJ’s and Commissioner’s symptom-evaluation discussion, then reviews the ALJ’s reasons under the substantial-evidence standard. It does not interpret or independently apply any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Reinert v. Commissioner Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(a) in its general discussion of the subjective-symptom standard and § 404.1529(c)(3) in a footnote listing regulatory factors. Its remand decision turned on the ALJ’s discounting of the treating physician’s opinions and the evidence concerning the cane, rather than on a construction or application of this statute. opinion →
Rosa Maria Pena Martinez v. Berryhill, the opinion only identifies § 404.1529 as the unchanged regulation governing symptom evaluation while explaining why SSR 16-3p applies; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Tobin v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court merely reported that the ALJ considered the claimant’s allegations under § 404.1529 while describing the administrative decision; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about what the statute requires. opinion →
Niskar v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(a) only for a general proposition, while deciding the case under Ninth Circuit standards governing the ALJ’s credibility assessment; it did not interpret or apply the regulation as such. opinion →
Pitts v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a footnote explaining that SSR 16-3p applies because § 404.1529 had not changed; the court does not construe or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
(SS) Massimo v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute is cited only in the plaintiff’s contentions; the court did not adopt that argument or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Prines v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(a) while generally describing the disability-evaluation process; it did not decide a dispute about the regulation or apply it to resolve the case. opinion →
Williams v. Saul, section 404.1529 appears only in a string cite in the summary of the ALJ’s decision. The court’s symptom-evaluation discussion cites § 416.929 and SSR 16-3p, but does not construe or apply § 404.1529 specifically. opinion →
Johnson, Emily v. Berryhill, Nancy, the court cited § 404.1529(d)(3) in a general statement about the standard for listed impairments, then decided the Listing 12.04 challenge based on the evidence and the ALJ’s weighing of it. It did not decide what § 404.1529 means, requires, or how its symptom-evaluation provisions apply. opinion →
Mackey v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the court mentioned § 404.1529(c)(3) only while reciting the ALJ’s evaluation framework; it did not construe or apply the provision to resolve a disputed issue. opinion →
Owens v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii) in a general description of evidence considered during RFC assessment, but does not construe the regulation or decide a disputed requirement specifically under it. opinion →
Gibson v. Colvin, the court cited § 404.1529 only in its general description of the disability-evaluation process and did not decide a disputed issue about the regulation; its remand instead addressed the ALJ’s failure to consider non-severe impairments in the RFC analysis under § 404.1545. opinion →
Debaker v. US Social Security Administration, Acting Commissioner, the court quoted § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a footnote while discussing the evidence supporting the ALJ's RFC and its treatment of the claimant's mother's testimony. It did not construe or independently apply this provision as a holding. opinion →
Gunter v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the court merely cited § 404.1529(c)(1)–(c)(2) in the applicable-law discussion as a regulation outlining pain evaluation; it did not decide what the regulation means or requires, and its remand recommendation addressed unresolved pain complaints under SSR 16-3p without construing this regulation. opinion →
Fuller v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a parenthetical string cite identifying factors for evaluating subjective complaints; it did not construe the regulation or decide its application independently of the broader substantial-evidence review of the RFC assessment. opinion →
Loose v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529 only while generally describing the ALJ’s RFC process; it did not construe or apply this statute, and its remand rulings rested on substantial-evidence and explanation requirements. opinion →
Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a general description of the RFC assessment and subjective allegations; it does not interpret or apply the regulation, and its ruling addresses the ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions under § 404.1527. opinion →
Moore v. Saul (CONSENT), the court merely noted that the ALJ cited § 404.1529 and that the regulation tracks the Eleventh Circuit’s pain standard; it did not construe or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Remelius v. Saul, the court merely reports that the ALJ considered pain under § 404.1529 in the procedural history; it does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Cook v. Saul, the court merely recited this citation as part of the general RFC background; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
JEWETT v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER, the statute appears only in a string citation within the opinion's quotation of Bachelder; the court does not interpret or apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Hallemann v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a footnote as a parallel reference to the symptom-evaluation regulations; it does not interpret or apply this regulation as the basis of its ruling. opinion →
Doucette v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1529 in describing the plaintiff’s argument and in a footnote noting that the symptom-evaluation regulations were unchanged, but it does not interpret or apply the regulation as the basis of its ruling. opinion →
Acton v. Berryhill, the court merely reported § 404.1529 as support for the defendant’s argument about whether a possible MS diagnosis satisfied the Act; it did not adopt that argument or construe the regulation. opinion →
Turner v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1529 only in a footnote citing it alongside SSR 16-3p and § 416.929. It does not construe the regulation or decide that it required or prohibited anything in this case. opinion →
Pickerell v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a general explanation of RFC evaluation and in a string cite; it did not construe or apply the regulation to decide the case, which concerned the ALJ’s weighing of medical opinions and RFC evidence. opinion →
Lee v. Saul, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a footnote as authority for the statement that the symptom-evaluation regulations were unchanged; it does not interpret or independently apply this regulation, and its discussion of subjective symptoms relies on SSR 16-3p and case law. opinion →
Topalovic v. Saul, the opinion merely reports that the ALJ assessed the claimant’s knee pain under the regulation; the court does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529, instead reviewing the ALJ’s symptom evaluation under SSR 16-3p, the Polaski factors, and the substantial-evidence standard. opinion →
Walsh v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a footnote as an additional citation to the general statement that symptom-evaluation factors remain unchanged; the court did not interpret or apply § 404.1529 as an independent basis for its decision. opinion →
Klotz v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while reporting the ALJ’s RFC analysis; it does not interpret or apply the regulation itself. opinion →
Bean v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(2) parenthetically as support for a rule stated from Ninth Circuit precedent, but does not interpret or independently decide what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Prichard v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1529 only in a bare “See also” citation to the regulations; its analysis relies on SSR 16-3p and Polaski factors and does not interpret or apply this regulation as such. opinion →
Dodson v. Berryhill, the regulation is mentioned only in a footnote as an example of unchanged symptom-evaluation regulations; the court applies SSR 16-3p and Polaski and affirms under substantial-evidence review without deciding what § 404.1529 means or requires. opinion →
Mullins v. SSA, the court quotes § 404.1529(c)(1) only while reciting the general regulatory framework, then decides the treating-physician opinion-weight issue under § 404.1527. It does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Hurd v. Berryhill, the opinion cites § 404.1529(b) only in a general background statement about the Commissioner’s role; the court’s remand decision turns on the treating-source analysis under § 404.1527, not on any construction or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Eddingfield v. Saul, the court mentions § 404.1529 only in a footnote stating that the regulations on evaluating symptoms were unchanged; its analysis applies the Polaski factors and does not interpret or apply this regulation as such. opinion →
Naberhaus v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a “see also” citation supporting an Eleventh Circuit rule about observing a claimant’s demeanor; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Portal v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a footnote encouraging the Commissioner to address credibility factors; it made no specific finding regarding the ALJ's credibility assessment and did not construe the regulation. opinion →
Williams v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the regulation is cited only while reporting the ALJ’s RFC analysis; the court does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529, instead resolving the challenge under the Eleventh Circuit pain standard and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
Daniel v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a footnote string cite to support the observation that the symptom-evaluation regulations were unchanged; it did not interpret or apply that regulation, relying instead on SSR 16-3p and precedent. opinion →
Mortell v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of, the court merely reported that the ALJ evaluated the allegations under § 404.1529 and upheld an unchallenged consistency finding; it did not interpret or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Tate v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the regulation is cited only in the general legal-standards discussion as support for a list of credibility factors. The court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529(c)(4); it decided the symptom-testimony issue under the Ninth Circuit’s clear-and-convincing-reasons standard. opinion →
McKinney v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) only as supporting authority for its review of the ALJ’s treatment-based credibility rationale; it did not interpret the regulation or decide an issue about what it requires. opinion →
Elliott v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute is cited only in the Commissioner's argument concerning medication side effects; the court does not construe or adopt a rule about § 404.1529. opinion →
McColl v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Meadors supporting a general credibility-inquiry standard; the Court did not construe or decide any specific requirement of § 404.1529. opinion →
Rasmussen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the regulation is cited only in passing as additional support for the ALJ’s treatment-based credibility finding; the court does not interpret or independently apply § 404.1529 itself. opinion →
Parker v. Saul, the opinion mentions § 404.1529 only in a footnote identifying the parallel symptom-analysis regulations; its ruling applies § 416.929 and does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Kahler v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 in its general background discussion of the RFC and symptom-evaluation framework, but the remand decision rests on the ALJ’s failure to account for moderate concentration, persistence, or pace limitations; the court does not construe or apply § 404.1529 to decide the case. opinion →
Bedeski v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529(c) only in a parallel citation with § 416.929(c) and SSR 16-3p while describing general symptom-evaluation factors; it does not separately construe or decide anything about § 404.1529. opinion →
Ward v. Commissioner Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(b) only to note that an ALJ may ask for and consider a medical-expert opinion while evaluating alleged symptoms; the court’s decision concerned whether an additional medical opinion was required and resolved that issue under precedent because the record was sufficient. opinion →
Lund v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the regulation is cited only in Plaintiff’s argument; the Court did not construe or apply § 404.1529, instead resolving the issue based on the evidence concerning the alleged side effects. opinion →
Thaxton v. Commissioner of Social Security, section 404.1529 appears only in a string citation supporting a general statement about assessing subjective allegations; the court did not interpret or apply the regulation to decide the case. opinion →
Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recites § 404.1529’s general medically-determinable-impairment standard while deciding whether the ALJ adequately developed the record concerning Plaintiff’s cognitive impairment; it does not construe or independently resolve an issue about the regulation. opinion →
Hanna v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(d)(3) only in a general explanation of medical equivalence; it did not interpret or apply the regulation, and its analysis instead decided whether the claimant met Listing 14.02. opinion →
Hultz v. Saul, the opinion merely recites the regulation’s general two-stage symptom-evaluation framework in its background discussion of RFC. It does not decide a disputed issue under § 404.1529 or apply the regulation to resolve the appeal; the remand rested on omitted impairments and a vocational-evidence conflict. opinion →
Rousseau v. Saul, the statute appears only in the court’s summary of an argument in the plaintiff’s brief; the court did not adopt, analyze, or rule on that argument, so the citation is incidental. opinion →
Patterson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 as authority while reviewing the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, but it does not interpret the regulation or decide a requirement specific to it. opinion →
Lyons v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court mentions § 404.1529(b) only in a footnote explaining the ALJ's reported two-step symptom-evaluation process; it does not construe or apply the regulation, and its holding instead concerns the weighing of medical opinions and fibromyalgia evidence. opinion →
Frazier v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recited symptom-evaluation factors from SSR 16-3p and included § 404.1529(c) only in a string citation. It did not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling addressed whether the ALJ’s reasons for evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom testimony were supported by substantial evidence. opinion →
Giles v. Colvin, the court mentioned § 404.1529 while reciting the general RFC and disability-evaluation framework. It did not interpret or apply the regulation to resolve the case, which concerned vocational-expert conflicts and the number of available jobs. opinion →
Billups v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529(a) and (c)(3) only within a parenthetical supporting a general point about family testimony while reviewing the ALJ’s reasoning; it did not construe or decide anything about the regulation itself. opinion →
Duncan v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 while reciting the general RFC symptom-evaluation framework; its discussion and ruling concerned SSR 12-2p’s requirements for evaluating fibromyalgia, not the meaning or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Nalley v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(a) only while reciting the general RFC and symptom-evaluation standard from Lewis; it did not construe or apply the regulation to decide the cane issue. opinion →
Gaines v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited subsection (c) as part of a general description of permissible factors in evaluating symptoms, but did not interpret or independently apply the regulation; its ruling addressed whether the ALJ’s analysis contained reversible error. opinion →
Collings v. Kijakazi, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a supporting footnote for the parenthetical “effectiveness of treatment”; it does not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Shadle v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1529 only to note that the regulation had not changed; it does not interpret or apply the regulation. opinion →
Clark v. Saul, the court expressly declined to fully address the work-history and credibility argument; its citation to § 404.1529(c) appears only in a passing observation and does not construe or apply the regulation in a holding. opinion →
BARNETT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, the court reports the ALJ’s use of § 404.1529 in the background but does not interpret or apply the regulation in its own decision; the remand rests on inadequate step-two analysis under SSR 85-28 and related case law. opinion →
Hawkins v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a parenthetical citation to Rollins. The court did not interpret or decide anything about § 404.1529; it applied the general rule on evaluating subjective testimony and objective medical evidence. opinion →
Jacobson v. Berryhill, the court stated the general symptom-evaluation standard while discussing RFC, but remanded for failure to evaluate combined impairments and expressly did not address the subjective-pain argument. opinion →
Fenwick v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(4) while reciting the general framework for evaluating symptoms in an RFC discussion. It did not construe or decide the regulation’s meaning or application; the remand rested on the ALJ’s unexplained treatment of concentration and persistence limitations. opinion →
Real de Ragan v. Colvin, the court recited § 404.1529 in a general description of the RFC and symptom-evaluation framework, but its remand analysis relied on SSR 96-7p and Ninth Circuit precedent without construing or independently applying the regulation. opinion →
Decorrevont v. Commissioner of Social Security, the statute appears only in plaintiff's description of an alleged error; the court did not adopt or construe § 404.1529. opinion →
Wilson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while reporting the ALJ’s reasoning. The court’s own analysis applies the Eleventh Circuit pain standard and SSR 16-3p, without deciding what § 404.1529 means or independently construing or applying it. opinion →
Poltz v. Saul, the citation appears in the procedural history as part of the court's report of what the ALJ stated. The court did not construe § 404.1529 or decide what it requires; it affirmed the RFC based on substantial evidence. opinion →
Morgan v. Saul, the court quotes § 404.1529(a) and (c)(1) while reciting the general RFC and symptom-evaluation framework, but it does not construe or decide a dispute under this regulation; the decision turns on the ALJ’s analysis of the claimant’s mental limitations. opinion →
Beaupre v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529(a) only while generally describing the disability-evaluation process; it does not apply, construe, or decide an issue under the regulation. opinion →
Newman v. Berryhill, the opinion recites § 404.1529’s general two-part symptom-evaluation framework in its background discussion, but the court did not apply or construe that regulation. The remand rested on the ALJ’s failure to explain how a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace was addressed in the RFC under Mascio. opinion →
Tolbert-Taylor v. Social Security Administration, the court merely reported that the ALJ stated he complied with § 404.1529; it did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. The separate citation to § 404.1529(c)(2)(i) appeared only in the Commissioner’s argument and was not adopted by the court. opinion →
Brown v. Berryhill, the court recites § 404.1529 as part of the general framework for evaluating subjective symptoms, but it does not apply, construe, or decide anything about that regulation; the remand rests on the ALJ's concentration, persistence, or pace analysis under Mascio. opinion →
Schwalm v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 in a general statement of the RFC standards, but does not apply or interpret it. The decision instead turns on whether substantial evidence showed that Schwalm could perform her past relevant work and whether the VE testimony conflicted with the DOT. opinion →
Tilley v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a general RFC standards discussion and expressly declined to address Tilley’s subjective-testimony argument; it did not construe or apply the regulation in deciding the case. opinion →
Bryan v. Berryhill, the opinion recites § 404.1529’s two-part symptom-evaluation framework in its background discussion, but expressly declines to discuss Plaintiff’s credibility argument and remands on RFC-analysis grounds; it therefore does not decide anything about this regulation. opinion →
Schultz v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only while reciting the general disability-evaluation process; it did not construe or apply the provision, and its remand turned on the number of jobs at step five. opinion →
(SS) Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a string citation accompanying a general credibility standard drawn from Ninth Circuit precedent; it does not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Kirk v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(3) as a source for symptom-evaluation factors while reviewing the ALJ’s symptom analysis, but did not construe or decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Tweedy v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 while generally describing the disability-evaluation process. It did not construe or apply the regulation; the decision addressed the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion, and its brief reference to subjective testimony only rejected conflating that issue with the opinion-evidence analysis. opinion →
Munoz v. Berryhill, the court gives only a general RFC legal standard and cites § 404.1529 in a string cite with § 404.1545; it does not construe or apply this regulation in deciding the appeal. opinion →
Hyde v. Saul, the court recites a general requirement during its description of the disability-evaluation process, but does not construe or apply § 404.1529 in resolving the appeal; its analysis concerns the ALJ’s assessment of medical opinions and the RFC. opinion →
Brierley v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(3) only within a quoted secondary authority; its own analysis applies § 416.929 and does not separately construe or decide what § 404.1529(c)(3) requires. opinion →
Dawson v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, the statute appears only in the plaintiff’s description of an alleged error in the briefing. The court did not analyze or adopt a statute-specific interpretation or application of § 404.1529. opinion →
Kiphart v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 in a general statement of the evidence considered when assessing residual functional capacity. It remands because the ALJ lacked substantial evidence for attributing all of the claimant’s decompensations to medication non-compliance, without construing or independently applying § 404.1529. opinion →
Duffy v. Berryhill, the opinion mentions § 404.1529 in a string citation to Cotley and uses § 404.1529(c)(4) only as a see-citation for the objective-evidence consistency standard. The court's actual ruling was that the ALJ's credibility determination complied with Avery and was supported by substantial evidence; it did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Bradt v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the court cited § 404.1529 only as additional support while reciting the Ninth Circuit’s symptom-testimony standard; it did not interpret or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Chadwell v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion recited § 404.1529(a)’s symptom-evaluation standard but expressly declined to separately address the claimant’s subjective-complaints arguments; the remand was based on the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinions, so the court did not construe or apply this regulation as part of its holding. opinion →
Zavala v. Berryhill, the statute appears only in a footnote noting that the symptom-evaluation regulations had not changed; the court did not construe or apply § 404.1529 in its holding. opinion →
Kiphart v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only in its general description of the disability-evaluation process and did not decide a disputed issue about the regulation; its remand instead addressed the ALJ’s failure to support the RFC treatment of Plaintiff’s decompensation periods and medication non-compliance. opinion →
Robertson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court reports the plaintiff’s argument that § 404.1529(c)(3) required consideration of all established impairments, but does not interpret the regulation or decide what it requires; the court instead upholds the RFC based on the ALJ’s evidentiary analysis. opinion →
Belieu v. O'Malley, the court cited § 404.1529 in a footnote to a claimed error, but upheld the ALJ's symptom evaluation on two other grounds and did not construe or apply this statute. opinion →
Patterson v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 in a general description of the RFC framework, but it did not construe or independently apply the regulation; the remand concerned the ALJ's treatment of cane evidence and the RFC determination. opinion →
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court mentions § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) only in a passing citation supporting a general statement that an ALJ need not refer to every piece of evidence. It does not interpret or apply this subsection; the decision instead addresses the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions under § 404.1527. opinion →
Wiggins v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recited the symptom-evaluation standard and cited § 404.1529, but expressly declined to separately address the subjective-complaints issue; the remand rested on weighing medical opinions. opinion →
Wilson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, the court cites § 404.1529 only as additional support for the Eleventh Circuit’s pain standard and, elsewhere, reports that the ALJ used the regulation in formulating the RFC. The court’s actual analysis concerns the ALJ’s fibromyalgia findings and compliance with SSR 96-8p, without construing or independently applying § 404.1529. opinion →
Watson v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court recited § 404.1529 as part of the general RFC evaluation framework, but it decided the case based on the ALJ’s failure to give specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the treating physician’s opinion. It did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
Fugle v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only in a footnote as support for the general proposition that other source evidence should be considered; the court's holding concerns the treating-physician rule in § 404.1527 and does not construe or independently apply § 404.1529. opinion →
McDaniel v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529(c)(3) only as a general supporting authority for the symptom-evaluation standard, without interpreting or specifically applying the regulation. opinion →
Rycroft v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court cites the regulation while summarizing the general disability-evaluation framework, but it does not construe or decide anything about § 404.1529; its ruling concerns the ALJ's explanation for discounting a treating physician's opinion. opinion →
Gutierrez v. Berryhill, the regulation appears only in a footnote string cite listing authorities associated with the magistrate judge’s credibility analysis; the district court did not interpret or independently apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. opinion →
Bailey v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529(a) and (c)(1) only in the general standard-of-review discussion, quoting the rule from Lewis. It did not independently construe or apply those provisions; the remand rested on the ALJ’s inadequate RFC explanation and other errors. opinion →
Johnson v. Berryhill, the court merely recites these provisions in a quotation from Lewis as part of the general RFC review framework; it does not decide what § 404.1529 means or apply it as the basis for its ruling. opinion →
Bryant v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, the citation appears only in the district court's report of the magistrate judge's finding; the court does not construe § 404.1529 or independently decide what it requires. opinion →
Porras v. Berryhill, the court mentions § 404.1529 only while reporting that the ALJ considered evidence under the regulation; it does not interpret the regulation or independently decide its requirements or application. opinion →
Campbell v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the regulation appears only in a footnote as background for the court’s use of the term ‘credibility’; the court did not interpret or decide what § 404.1529 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Petty v. Saul, the court cited § 404.1529 only while reciting the general RFC and symptom-evaluation standard quoted from Fourth Circuit precedent; it did not construe or independently apply the statute in deciding the case. opinion →
Mallard v. Berryhill, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a string cite to SSR 96-8p and § 404.1545 while reciting the RFC evidence standard; although it discusses the ALJ’s symptom assessment, it does not independently construe or decide what § 404.1529 requires. opinion →
Juarez-Ray v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529(c)(2) only parenthetically as support for a general credibility-evaluation rule; it decided whether the ALJ properly assessed the evidence, not what the regulation means or requires. opinion →
Fox v. Saul, the court cites § 404.1529 only in a footnote supporting the general statement that the regulations on evaluating symptoms were unchanged; it does not construe or decide anything about this section. opinion →
Weinberg v. Commissioner of Social Security, the opinion cites § 404.1529(b) for a general statement about the Commissioner’s disability determinations, but does not interpret or apply the regulation; its analysis concerns medical-opinion weighting under § 404.1527 and remands for failure to weigh Dr. Pfeil’s opinion. opinion →
Minor v. Saul (CONSENT), the court merely reports that the ALJ considered symptoms under § 404.1529; it does not construe the regulation or decide what it requires. opinion →
Gallegos v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, the court mentioned § 404.1529 only while reporting that the ALJ considered symptoms under the regulation; it did not interpret or apply the regulation in its own analysis. opinion →
Davenport v. Berryhill, the court merely recites a two-step framework from Genier and cites § 404.1529 parenthetically while discussing the ALJ’s residual-functional-capacity analysis; it does not construe or independently decide what the regulation requires. opinion →
Dais v. Berryhill, the Court merely cites § 404.1529(c)(2) in a footnote to define “objective medical evidence” while directing the ALJ to defer to medical testimony; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of the regulation. opinion →
Lynch v. Berryhill, the court cited § 404.1529 only in a “See also” string cite while discussing SSR 16-3p and reviewing the ALJ’s symptom evaluation; it did not construe or independently apply the regulation. opinion →
Lewis v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of, the regulation appears only in a footnote citation after a general list of factors supporting the Luna pain-evaluation framework. The court did not construe or independently apply § 404.1529; it reviewed the ALJ's symptom assessment under Luna and substantial-evidence review. opinion →
…and 835 more.

Rulemaking authority

Authority for 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950- )), which contains this section:

Secs. 203, 205(a), 216(j), and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 403, 405(a), 416(j), and 902(a)(5)) and 48 U.S.C. 1801.

From the part's authority statement in the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (eCFR).

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