20 C.F.R. § 404.1529

Section 404.1529(a) provides that symptom statements alone do not establish disability and requires objective evidence of an impairment that could support a disability conclusion.

Ernest · filed 2026-02-26(a)

“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled. There must be objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source that . . . would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled.”

Section 404.1529(a) provides that statements about pain alone cannot establish disability.

Rodriguez v. Saul · filed 2021-03-22(a)

Congress explicitly prohibits granting benefits based solely on subjective complaints. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (“[S]tatements about your pain will not alone establish that you are disabled.”).

Section 404.1529 provides that allegations alone cannot establish disability and permits discounting subjective complaints that are inconsistent with the record as a whole.

Celestaine v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2023-01-04

A claimant’s allegations alone can never establish that he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. An ALJ can discount a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints when they are unsupported by the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 595 (4th Cir. 1996). ... Based on the evidence before the ALJ, the ALJ conducted a proper evaluation of subjective symptoms and cited substantial evidence to support the finding that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms were not consistent with the record.

Section 404.1529 provides that allegations alone cannot establish disability and permits discounting subjective complaints that are inconsistent with the record.

Dubose v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2023-02-13

A claimant’s allegations alone can never establish that he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. An ALJ can discount a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints when they are unsupported by the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 595 (4th Cir. 1996).

Section 404.1529(a) provides that symptom statements alone do not establish disability, and discrepancies between self-reports and objective evidence may suggest symptom exaggeration.

Van Ness v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-18(a)

There were, and “discrepancies between the objective evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1161 (7th Cir. 2010); Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 746–47. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability....”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a); 416,929(a) (“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled.”).

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to credit only those claimed functional limits supported by the record, while recognizing that a claimant need not be symptom-free to be found not disabled.

Brown v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2023-11-09

A claimant’s allegations alone can never establish that she is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. An ALJ can discount a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints when they are unsupported by the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 595 (4th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is not required to be without symptoms to be found not disabled by the ALJ.

A symptom allegation alone does not establish disability, and § 404.1529(c)(4) permits an ALJ to discount alleged limitations that are inconsistent with objective medical and other evidence.

MARANO · filed 2025-12-30(a), (c)(4)

A claimant’s allegation of pain or other symptoms by itself is not enough to establish an impairment or disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). Instead, an ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective statements when they are unsupported by the evidence. See id. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4) (“Your symptoms, including pain, will be determined to diminish your capacity for basic work activities to the extent that your alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to symptoms . . . can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”) (emphasis added); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 363 (“Although any statements of the individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required to credit them.”) (citation modified).

A claimant’s prior statements that contradict current symptom testimony may provide a specific, clear, and convincing reason to reject that testimony.

Ibarra v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-03-31(c)(4)

Plaintiff’s contrary statements were a specific, clear and convincing reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony that her symptoms began before December 31, 2015. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 489 (9th Cir. 2022).

Section 404.1529(c)(2)-(3) requires an ALJ comparing symptom reports with prior work and daily activities to identify an actual conflict and explain it before discounting the reports.

Marriott v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-05-01(c)(2)-(3)

In that role, the ALJ must compare a plaintiff’s reports to the objective medical evidence and the other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2)–(3), 416.929(c)(2)-(3); SSR 16-3p. ... At bottom, while it is certainly within the ALJ’s vast authority to discount a plaintiff’s testimony due to contradictions between prior work history and daily activities, there must be an actual conflict and the ALJ must explain it. ... Here, on this record, there is no conflict between Mr. Marriott’s testimony and his work history and daily activities.

Section 404.1529(c) requires testing symptom statements for consistency with objective and other evidence, and specific discrepancies in the claimant’s own testimony may supply clear and convincing reasons for discounting them.

Meier v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-06-28(c)

The ALJ was required to “evaluate whether the [symptom] statements [were] consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence,” SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg. 14166, 14169 (Mar. 16, 2016); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (2016), and ultimately concluded that Meier’s symptom statements were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record”—including Meier’s own testimony before the ALJ. By citing the discrepancies in Meier’s testimony and objective medical evidence throughout his analysis, the ALJ provided “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” to support the finding that Meier’s claim of severe impairment was not consistent with the record as a whole.

Symptom statements alone do not establish disability; the ALJ evaluates them against objective and other evidence and considers inconsistencies.

Topham v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-28(a), (c)(4)

The ALJ properly followed these requirements in performing his RFC assessment.

An ALJ must consider inconsistencies within the evidence and conflicts between the claimant’s statements and the rest of the record.

Kerns v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-20(c)(4)

Under § 404.1529(c)(4), an ALJ must “consider whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between [the claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence.” As discussed, the ALJ did just that.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) permits an ALJ to discount symptom reports that conflict with the claimant’s prior statements.

Cleverly · filed 2026-03-06(c)(4)

ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom reports if they are ... inconsistent with her prior statements.

Section 404.1529(c) permits discounting pain testimony based on conflicts with medical-provider reports, prescribed treatment, examination observations, self-reported abilities, and work activity when the ALJ clearly articulates those reasons.

Alston · filed 2026-03-25(c)

The ALJ articulated multiple reasons for discrediting Alston’s testimony, including that it was: (1) not supported by her reports to her medical providers; (2) not supported by the medical treatment prescribed; (3) contradicted by the consultative examiner’s observations; (4) contradicted by her self-reported abilities; and (5) contradicted by her ability to work as a caregiver after her alleged onset of disability. Together, these were proper grounds on which to discredit Alston’s testimony, and the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in this regard.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) permits an ALJ to consider inconsistencies between a claimant’s symptom statements and other evidence when evaluating symptoms.

Peters v. Saul · filed 2021-05-11(c)(4)

Second, the ALJ properly considered internal inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s symptom reporting. In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptoms, “an ALJ may engage in ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as … inconsistencies in claimant’s testimony.” Burch, 400 F.3d at 680; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (“We will consider whether there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts between your statements and the rest of the evidence ….”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (“In evaluating the claimant’s testimony, … the ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct ….”), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in Thomas v. Saul, 830 F. App’x 196, 198 (9th Cir. 2020). The medical records cited by the ALJ indicate that what Plaintiff told medical sources about her functional limitations was less extreme than her hearing testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(4) permits an ALJ to consider inconsistencies in the evidence when evaluating a claimant’s statements about symptoms.

Clement v. Commissioner, Social Security · filed 2020-01-23(c)(4)

In addition, the ALJ should consider inconsistencies in the evidence to determine whether a claimant’s subjective claims regarding her pain symptoms can reasonably be accepted. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4). ... Because the ALJ’s credibility determination was proper and supported by substantial evidence, it is no basis for remand.

An ALJ may consider nonmedication treatment, including a minimal or conservative treatment course, when evaluating symptoms.

Burke v. Saul · filed 2022-09-12(c)(3)(v)

The ALJ also properly considered Plaintiff’s minimal and conservative course of treatment, consisting primarily of medication management without psychotherapy, with little change or adverse side effects. ... See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) (explaining the agency considers the claimant’s “treatment, other than medication, [the claimant] receive[s] or ha[s] received for relief of [the claimant’s] pain or other symptoms” when evaluating symptoms).

An ALJ may consider the course of treatment, including providers’ recommendation of conservative treatment, when evaluating symptom limitations.

Biswabic v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-30(c)(3)(v)

“An ALJ is entitled to consider the course of a claimant’s treatment.” Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 749 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v)). In this case, the ALJ noted that no more than conservative treatment was recommended by her providers to treat her impairments. The ALJ did not err in considering that Plaintiff received conservative treatment.

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) and (v) permit an ALJ to consider the effectiveness of medication and the nature and extent of other treatment, including conservative care and declined treatment options, when evaluating subjective symptoms.

Osborne v. SSA · filed 2021-07-22(c)(3)(iv)-(v)

Despite some abnormalities, Plaintiff’s treatment largely consisted of medications. She admitted that such conservative measures helped at least somewhat; treatment records described her conditions as stable and/or improved, and she declined to pursue other treatment modalities such as physical therapy and home exercise. [see, e.g., Tr. 61-63, 1145, 1155, 1178, 1184, 1255]; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (an ALJ considers treatment and medications). The ALJ also reasonably observed that Plaintiff had not required emergency-level treatment for many of her allegedly disabling conditions, such as pain, diabetes, and headaches. [Tr. 62-63]; see id.; see also Villarreal v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.2d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1987) (in discounting a claimant’s subjective complaints of disability, ALJ reasonably relied on claimant’s “conservative treatment”). For all of these reasons, the ALJ reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disability.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of treatment and other symptom factors, and conservative treatment may support discounting alleged severity.

Higgins v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-08-25(c)(3)

The ALJ properly considered the nature of the treatments that Ms. Higgins received for her pain and found that the treatment was conservative. (Doc. 12, p. 15). Substantial evidence supports that conclusion.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(v) permits an ALJ to treat conservative treatment as evidence bearing on the alleged severity of symptoms when the ALJ also evaluates the medical and nonmedical record.

Megehee v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-10-24(c)(3)(v)

The ALJ considered the entire record when determining Plaintiff’s RFC, as the ALJ properly discussed the medical and non-medical evidence of record. Moreover, the ALJ properly considered that Plaintiff had only received conservative treatment.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(v) makes treatment a relevant symptom-evaluation factor and permits consideration of a claimant's lack of aggressive or surgical treatment.

DRINKALL v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2022-11-03(c)(3)(v)

But treatment is relevant to an ALJ’s evaluation of pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v) (identifying treatment as a factor relevant to evaluation of a claimant’s symptoms such as pain). Therefore, the Court will not fault the ALJ for considering Plaintiff’s treatment—or lack of aggressive/surgical treatment—in her evaluation of Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal pain.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires an ALJ relying on conservative treatment to examine why more aggressive treatment was not pursued and how much pain remained despite the treatment received.

Janes v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-09(c)(3)

As discussed in detail below, the ALJ erred by relying on Tina J.’s conservative treatment without exploring why she did not pursue other treatment and in failing to consider how much pain remained despite some relief from her conservative treatment.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(v) permits discounting symptoms based on routine conservative treatment if the ALJ does not minimize the treatment, play doctor, or assume reasons for noncompliance without inquiry.

Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-01-20(c)(3)(v)

Here, the ALJ abided by all of these tenets, and properly considered Taylor’s treatment history.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) makes treatment relevant to symptom evaluation, but an ALJ’s characterization of treatment as conservative or routine must be supported by substantial evidence.

NOLASCO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-04-03(c)(3)

It is well established that an individual’s treatment is relevant to assessing the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). But the ALJ’s assessment of this treatment, like any other findings of fact, must be backed by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360. ... Even if Plaintiff’s mental health treatment included “medication management with stability noted” and relatively minor changes in the medications and dosages prescribed (see R. 615-16, 618, 621, 623-24, 903, R. 917, 919), substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of “conservative and routine treatment,” because, in addition to several years of psychotropic medications, the Plaintiff received years of psychotherapy and, on multiple occasions, went to the emergency room and/or was hospitalized for inpatient psychiatric care.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) allows an ALJ to consider physical signs when assessing the intensity and persistence of reported pain.

Carl Gebauer, Jr. v. Saul · filed 2020-01-17(c)(2)

Further, the Social Security Administration’s guidance on how to ... evaluate pain (fibromyalgia’s chief symptom) directs ALJs to consider the very symptoms that the ALJ considered here.

Section 404.1529 does not require medical evidence of symptom severity once a claimant shows an impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms.

Quiroz v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-05-04(b), (c)

Once Plaintiff has shown that an impairment exists, he need not provide medical evidence in support of the severity of his symptoms, so long as the impairment “could reasonably be suspected to produce [the] alleged symptoms.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of treatment when evaluating symptom severity, but a claimant’s symptoms may explain failure to follow treatment.

Elmore v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-06(c)(3)

Evidence of conservative treatment is “sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). Here, however, Plaintiff’s persistent and chronic headaches could reasonably prevent her from following through with a prescribed course of treatment. Plaintiff’s apparent failure to seek mental health treatment between 2015 and 2018, however, supports the ALJ’s rejection of her testimony regarding disabling mental symptoms.

Section 404.1529(c) permits consideration of a claimant’s treatment and response to it when evaluating the severity of alleged symptoms.

Badtke v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-03-24(c)

Badtke argues that the ALJ erred in considering her infrequent and conservative treatment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). ... After reviewing the evidence in the record, it was not improper for the ALJ to conclude that the level of treatment Badtke received, and her response to that treatment, was not consistent with her allegations.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) treats the amount of treatment as an indicator of symptom intensity and persistence; an ALJ needs specific record support to discount symptoms based on conservative treatment.

Quigley v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-02-21(c)(3)

The amount of treatment is “an important indicator of the intensity and persistence of [a claimant’s] symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). ... The Court, however, finds that the ALJ failed properly to support her conclusion. ... Although the ALJ erred in failing to cite specific record evidence in relying on routine conservative treatment that effectively treated Plaintiff’s condition and contending that the objective medical evidence failed to support Plaintiff’s claimed to limitations, this error was harmless.

Section 404.1529 permits consideration of medication effectiveness and treatment history when evaluating symptoms, but conservative treatment cannot count against a claimant who could not afford recommended surgery.

(SS) Delsid v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-05-22(c)(3)(iv), (v)

An ALJ is permitted to consider evidence of conservative treatment in evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints. ... see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v) (medication effectiveness and treatment history are relevant factors for evaluating a claimant's symptom testimony). ... The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff “cancelled the lumbar surgery due to the cost,” (AR 31), but nonetheless cited “conservative treatment” as a reason for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. This was error.

Subsection 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits consideration of childcare as a daily activity, but an ALJ must analyze what that care entails and how it is provided before treating it as evidence of an ability to work.

Wantz · filed 2026-01-12(c)(3)(i)

Additionally, although the ability to perform childcare is a factor the ALJ may consider in determining a plaintiff's ability to work, “merely because Plaintiff is stated to care for her children and a relative, it does not necessarily follow that she is not disabled without an analysis of what that care entails and the manner in which it is provided.” Alexandria S., 2023 WL 2863323, at *5; Carvey v. Astrue, 380 F. App’x 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)) (noting that ability to perform childcare is an ADL the ALJ can consider in determining a claimant’s ability to work). Here, the ALJ provides no details regarding the nature and the extent of plaintiff's childcare duties.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to use daily activities as one factor in the whole record when assessing symptom severity, even if those activities do not independently demonstrate an ability to work.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-23(c)(3)(i)-(vii)

Plaintiff erroneously argues plaintiff’s daily activities do not demonstrate her ability to work; however, the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity of her symptoms to the extent that they were inconsistent with other evidence. See Morris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:12-CV-1795, 2014 WL 1451996, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2014). Here, the ALJ cited plaintiff’s activities as one factor in the whole record when assessing the plaintiff's subjective complaints. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii), 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vil). Arriving at his decision, the ALJ considered the objective medical evidence, plaintiffs responses to application forms’ questions and to providers regarding her activities of daily living and medical treatment received including improvement with treatment compliance. No testimony was considered as the plaintiff effectively waived her right to a hearing by not appearing. (Tr. 7).

Daily activities may be considered under § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) as evidence that a claimant is less debilitated than alleged even when the activities do not independently prove an ability to work full time.

Tessier v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-01-17(c)(3)(i)

The ALJ did not rely on Plaintiff’s daily activities to show that she could perform full-time work at the level of the RFC, but rather to demonstrate that Plaintiff was not as debilitated by her impairments as she alleged.

Daily activities may support partial discounting under § 404.1529 when they contradict alleged extreme limitations, even though activities cannot simply be equated with full-time work.

Kovalsky v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-15(c)(1)-(3)

Equating daily activities with an ability to perform full-time work is impermissible error, but the ALJ did not do that here. See Green v. Saul, 781 F. App’x 522, 527 (7th Cir. 2019). Instead, the ALJ appropriately partially discounted Plaintiff’s subjective reports on the ground that her daily activities were not as limited as her dire reports of her capabilities would suggest.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) allows daily activities to be considered as one symptom-evaluation factor without equating those activities with an ability to work.

Edwards v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-27(c)(3)(i)

Based on how the ALJ referred to Claimant’s activities and his extensive discussion of the medical and other evidence discussed above, the Court cannot conclude the ALJ improperly equated her daily activities with Claimant’s ability to work as she contended. Instead, he merely considered her activities as one factor in assessing her subjective allegations as required by the applicable regulations.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to contrast daily activities with medical evidence when assessing symptoms without treating those activities as proof of sustained work capacity.

Sellers v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-27(c)(3)(i)

But the ALJ did not equate Claimant’s daily activities with her ability to performed sustained work. The ALJ instead recounted Claimant’s testimony regarding her daily impairments and her abilities as a contrast to the medical evidence and used this contrast in formulating Claimant’s RFC. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s use of the Claimant’s activities for this purpose; instead doing so is directly consistent with the applicable regulations.

Section 404.1529 permits consideration of daily activities to test the alleged severity and limiting effects of symptoms, but an ALJ may not equate those activities with an ability to work full time.

Mareth v. Saul · filed 2023-04-28(c), (c)(3)(i)

Consistent with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s statements concerning her subjective symptoms and how these statements aligned with the objective medical evidence contained in the record. ... The Court agrees that “an ALJ may not equate activities of daily living with those of a full-time job. But an ALJ is not forbidden from considering statements about a claimant’s daily life. In fact, agency regulations instruct that, in an assessment of a claimant’s symptoms, the evidence considered includes descriptions of daily-living activity.” ... Rather, the ALJ noted some of Plaintiff’s activities of daily living “to determine whether her symptoms were as severe and limiting as she alleged.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) expressly permits daily activities to be one factor in symptom evaluation, but an ALJ must not overread limited tasks as demonstrating an ability to sustain full-time competitive work.

Vasquez v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-06-05(c)(3)(i)

Although ALJs must be careful not to overinterpret a claimant’s ability to perform limited tasks as evidence of the ability to maintain full-time, competitive, remunerative work, the regulations expressly permit consideration of the claimant’s “daily activities” when assessing credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). ... Here, although there is evidence that tends to bolster Plaintiff’s credibility (including an excellent work record), the ALJ offered specific support for the decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including a reasonable reading of the treatment notes and clinical assessments, an appropriate reconciliation of the medical opinion evidence, and proper consideration of the activities of daily living.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)’s daily-activities factor supports an adverse symptom finding when activities either contradict other testimony or occupy a substantial part of the day and involve functions transferable to work.

Andrews v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-06-07(c)(3)

A claimant’s daily activities is a relevant factor in assessing a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). An adverse credibility finding is warranted if (1) Plaintiff’s activities contradict other testimony, or (2) Plaintiff “is able to spend a substantial part of [her] day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” ... The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is able to spend a substantial part of her day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of functions that are transferable to a work setting is a reasonable interpretation of the record. The ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits daily activities to weigh against the reliability of disabling-symptom allegations even when the activities are not equated with an ability to work full time.

Concepcion v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-08-18(c)(3)(i)

The flaw in Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ did not equate her ability to engage in various manipulative tasks with an ability to work. ... The ALJ merely cited those activities as one factor weighing against the reliability of Plaintiff’s statements that she suffers from disabling hand limitations. ... This assessment is not patently wrong and does not amount to reversible error.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits activities outside the home to test alleged symptom severity without equating those activities with the capacity for full-time competitive work.

Hoverman, Nicole v. Kijakazi, Kilolo · filed 2023-09-27(c)(3)(i)

The court concludes that the ALJ did not err in evaluating Hoverman’s activities of daily living when assessing the alleged severity of her mental impairments. ... It was appropriate for the ALJ to consider Hoverman’s daily activities, including her reports of voluntarily engaging in activities outside the home, when evaluating the credibility of Hoverman’s claims that her depression and anxiety disorder prevented her from getting out of bed or leaving the house. ... The ALJ did not find that Hoverman’s activities outside the home meant that she could tolerate a full-time competitive job. ... Instead, the ALJ considered Hoverman’s activities of daily living as part of the ALJ’s evaluation of her statements about the severity of her symptoms and limitations.

Sections 404.1529(c)(2)-(3) require consideration of daily activities, but sporadic activities cannot alone prove continuous substantial-gainful-activity capacity; they may still be weighed with medical, treatment, and symptom evidence.

OWENS v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-09-27(c)(2)-(3)

Further, although Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ’s consideration of his ability to engage in activities of daily living – which he labels as sporadic and transitory – was improper, there is nothing inappropriate per se with an ALJ considering a claimant’s activities of daily living in evaluating the severity of the claimant’s symptoms and limitations. ... In fact, ALJs are required to do so. ... It is true that an ALJ cannot use evidence of sporadic and transitory activities to demonstrate an ability to engage continuously in substantial gainful activity, see Fargnoli v. Astrue, 247 F.3d 34, 40 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001), but that is not what happened here, as the ALJ herself adequately explained. ... The ALJ similarly was correct in considering the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s improvement with medication, his reports of symptoms, and his conservative course of treatment in rendering her decision.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ to consider daily activities when evaluating subjective symptoms, but the activities need not independently establish an ability to perform full-time work.

MUSSER v. O'MALLEY · filed 2024-02-02(c)(3)(i)

However, the ALJ did not so find in this case. Rather, the ALJ mentioned Claimant's activities because she found that they “suggest his conditions are not as limiting as alleged.” [Dkt. 14-2 at 22.] This was not improper; indeed, the relevant regulations require an ALJ to consider a claimant's daily activities in evaluating subjective symptoms allegations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 748 (7th Cir. 2022) ("But it is entirely permissible to examine all of the evidence, including a claimant's daily activities, to assess whether testimony about the effects of his impairments was credible or exaggerated.").

Section 404.1529(c) requires consideration of both the type and extent of daily activities, but the ALJ need not repeat every qualification when the decision shows those restrictions were considered and links supported activities to the RFC.

Fox-Kibler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-02-15(c)

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s decision reflects his consideration of Plaintiff’s ADLs in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, SSRs 96-8p and 16-3p, and Fourth Circuit precedent.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits daily activities to inform symptom evaluation but requires caution against treating limited tasks as proof of full-time work capacity.

Vicari v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-01(c)(3)(i)

Although, as discussed above, ALJs must be careful not to overinterpret a claimant’s ability to perform limited tasks as evidence of the ability to maintain full-time, competitive, remunerative work, the regulations permit consideration of the claimant’s “daily activities” when assessing credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i).

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to consider daily activities when evaluating symptom statements, including activities that indicate the claimant is less limited than alleged even if they do not demonstrate an ability to work full time.

Somers v. Bisignano · filed 2025-06-25(a), (c)(3)(i)

In general, an ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities in determining credibility. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (c)(3)(i) (activities of daily living are relevant to the credibility determination); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). ... Here, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony based on the record of evidence, most notably Plaintiff’s statements indicating that she exercised. A.R. 28. ... Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for not explaining the “nexus” between Plaintiff’s activities and her ability to engage with “the rigors of full-time employment.” Docket No. 9 at 16. However, after properly discounting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony in his decision, the ALJ did not need to include in his list of Plaintiff’s daily activities “all of [his] caveats accompanying [his] description of those activities.” Kijakazi, 53 F.4th at 500, n. 3. An ALJ may properly discount a plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements based on her activities even when they suggest “some difficulty” functioning. Cecilia H.R. v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-7836-JPR, 2022 WL 21320594, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022) (internal citation omitted). The Court finds that the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities are supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) allows daily activities to be considered as one factor when evaluating symptom intensity and persistence, without treating those activities as proof of sustained full-time work.

Harvey v. Saul · filed 2021-09-28(c)(3)

The Regulations expressly identify “daily activities” as a factor the ALJ should consider in evaluating the intensity and persistence of a plaintiff’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s activities demonstrated her ability to perform work on a full-time sustained basis, rather, the ALJ properly determined Plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with her allegation of disabling symptoms.

Daily activities under Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) need not equal full-time job demands; they may be considered insofar as they reveal whether alleged disabling limitations are consistent with the claimant’s typical activities.

Speer v. Saul · filed 2022-03-21(c)(3)(i)

A claimant’s daily activities are just that: activities that one engages in in a typical day – they are not meant to equal the functional requirements of a full-time job (particularly since past work is a separate category the ALJ analyzes), but they can and do provide an ALJ insight ... into whether a claimant’s activities are consistent with their allegations of disability.

Section 404.1529 permits daily activities to be considered as one symptom-evaluation factor when the activities plausibly contradict the claimant’s allegations.

Good v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-03-28

In total, the evidence regarding Plaintiff's claims about her symptoms is plausibly contradicted by other evidence in the record, and the ALJ's negative inference was therefore justified. Amir, 705 F. App'x at 450.

Subsection (c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to consider the nature and extent of daily activities when evaluating whether disability allegations are consistent with the record as a whole.

Cavalieri v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-26(c)(3)(i)

The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff’s continued ability to perform a wide range of daily activities supported the RFC finding for a range of light, simple work. Tr. 953-54, 960, 963. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (An ALJ may consider the nature of a claimant’s daily activities in evaluating the consistency of allegations of disability with the record as a whole.); see also Ewing v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-68S, 2018 WL 6060484, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2018) (“Indeed, the Commissioner’s regulations expressly identify ‘daily activities’ as a factor the ALJ should consider in evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i)); Poupore, 566 F.3d at 307 (claimant’s abilities to watch television, read, drive, and do household chores supported ALJ’s finding that his testimony was not fully credible).

Subsection (a) makes daily activities relevant to symptom evaluation, although occasional routine activities alone do not demonstrate an ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.

ESSAY v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2022-06-14(a)

While Plaintiff is correct that disability will not be disproved merely because a claimant has, on occasion, tidied up his or her residence or gone for a drive, she is incorrect to the extent that she implies a claimant’s daily activities are irrelevant to the determination of his or her RFC. Turby v. Barnhart, 54 Fed. Appx. 118, 121 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002). The regulations make it clear that a claimant’s daily activities are relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (“We will consider all of your statements about your symptoms, such as pain, and any description your medical sources or nonmedical sources may provide about how the symptoms affect your activities of daily living and your ability to work.”); SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *6—7 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) (explaining, inter alia, the relevancy of claimants’ own statements concerning how their symptoms affect their daily activities and medical source statements pertaining to the same).

Subsections (c)(1) through (3) permit consideration of daily activities when evaluating symptoms, but the analysis should use those activities to assess alleged severity rather than equate chores or limited socializing with full-time work.

Brown v. Saul · filed 2022-07-08(c)(1)-(3)

When evaluating a plaintiff’s report of his symptoms, in addition to the medical evidence, the ALJ may also consider a plaintiff’s daily activities, intensity of pain and other symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors, medications and their side effects, treatment received, and any other measures used to relieve symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1-3). ... Further, the analysis made clear that the ALJ was not equating Plaintiff’s ability to do some chores or socialize with an ability to perform full-time work; rather, she was appropriately identifying his daily activities as one reason she did not determine that his reported symptoms were as severe as he alleged. See Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 748 (7th Cir. 2022); Regina P. v. Saul, No. 19 C 3155, 2020 WL 4349888, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 29, 2020) (“The ALJ was permitted to consider [the] mismatch between [plaintiff's] daily activities and [his] symptom description.”).

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to ask about and consider activities of daily living, including caring for a baby, when determining residual functional capacity.

FOSTER v. KIJAZAKI · filed 2022-07-26

It is the ALJ’s responsibility to determine Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and consideration of activities of daily living, such as caring for a baby, are an appropriate part of that determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Thus, this line of questioning by the ALJ at the hearing was appropriate.

Subsection (c)(3) requires discussion only of symptom factors pertinent to the evidence, but an ALJ may not selectively or inaccurately characterize daily activities when assessing symptom severity.

Green v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-22(c)(3)

SSR 16-3p at *7-8; cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ need only discuss those factors that are pertinent based upon the evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ's discussion of the applicable factors “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” Id. at *10. ... The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff lives independently is not “consistent with and supported by the evidence” as required by SSR 16-3p. Nor is it supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom severity signifies an impermissibly selective review of the record.

Subsection (c)(3) permits an ALJ to draw reasonable inferences about work ability from daily activities when those activities are considered with other subjective and objective evidence.

Rasch v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-07(c)(3)

As stated in the above analysis, an ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and functional limitations of reported symptoms by considering objective medical evidence and other evidence—including daily activities—when a Plaintiff asserts symptoms of disabling severity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). It is not error for an ALJ to make inferences about a plaintiff’s ability to work from his daily activities in addition to other subjective and objective evidence.

Subsections (c)(3)(i) and (c)(4) require consideration of daily activities and inconsistencies, but sporadic or transitory activities cannot be used as proof of an ability to sustain substantial gainful activity.

COPPER v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-07-28(c)(3)(i), (c)(4)

There is, of course, nothing inappropriate with an ALJ considering a claimant’s activities of daily living in evaluating the severity of the claimant’s symptoms and limitations. In fact, ALJs are required to do so. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ. 10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). However, as Plaintiff points out, in performing this analysis, an ALJ cannot use evidence of sporadic and transitory activities to demonstrate an ability to engage continuously in substantial gainful activity. See Fargnoli v. Astrue, 247 F.3d 34, 40 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001).

Subsections (c)(2), (c)(3)(i), and (c)(4) require consideration of daily activities and objective evidence while permitting symptom statements to be discounted when adequately explained inconsistencies exist.

WILSON v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-09-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(i), (c)(4)

Here, the ALJ adequately explained his basis for finding that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the record evidence. (R. 19). He discussed Plaintiff’s significant activities of daily living, including her regular care for two children – to the point that she referred to herself as a “nanny” on January 28, 2021 (R. 624) – and the fact that she managed a home by herself. (R. 16, 18, 20). While these activities may not alone support a finding of non-disability, an ALJ can, and in fact must, consider a claimant’s activities of daily living in evaluating his or her testimony. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i); SSR 16-3p, at *7; Wright v. Astrue, No. Civ. 10-942, 2011 WL 4079067, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011).

Subsection (c)(3)(i) permits daily activities to be considered as one component of the overall evaluation of subjective complaints.

Grant v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-06-05(c)(3)(i)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, it is abundantly clear that the ALJ did not rely solely on her reported daily activities to assess her RFC. Rather, Plaintiff’s daily activities were merely one component that the ALJ reasonably considered in evaluating her subjective complaints and the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); SSR 16-3p; Blacha v. Sec’y of HHS, 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990) (as a matter of law, the ALJ may consider a claimant’s household and social activities when assessing credibility).

Daily activities may support discounting subjective symptoms when they rationally contradict the claimant’s testimony about functional limits.

Junker v. O' Malley · filed 2025-08-22(c)(3)(i)

The ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradicted his testimony was rational and the Court must defer to this interpretation.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to consider daily activities and part-time work among multiple factors when evaluating reported limitations, provided the ALJ does not equate those activities with an ability to work full time.

Hendrickson v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-25(a), (c)(3)

Still, “an ALJ is not forbidden from considering statements about a claimant’s daily life. In fact, agency regulations instruct that, in an assessment of a claimant’s symptoms, the evidence considered includes descriptions of daily-living activities.” Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c)(3)). Here, the ALJ referenced Mr. Hendrickson’s daily activities and part-time work as factors among many in determining that his reported limitations were not fully supported by the evidence. In doing so, the ALJ acted within her discretion and did not commit legal error.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to consider childcare as a daily activity bearing on symptom severity and mental functioning, but childcare or other necessary activities cannot alone justify denying benefits when they do not truly demonstrate an ability to work.

Peters v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-27(c)(3)(i)

On the other hand, an ALJ cannot simply cite a claimant's ability to care for her children (or to engage in other activities necessary to her own welfare) as a basis to deny benefits or to disregard other evidence of disability, where such activities of daily living do not “truly show that the claimant is capable of working[.]” ... Here, the Court finds that it was not error for the ALJ to cite Plaintiff’s ability to provide full-time care for a toddler, when assessing her ability to adapt and manage herself, and to maintain concentration and persistence, particularly since she was doing it on a full-time paid basis, forty hours per week.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits consideration of sustained independent writing as evidence of concentration, persistence, and focus when the ALJ does not equate the activity one-for-one with workplace duties.

Gates v. Bisignano · filed 2025-10-01(c)(3)(i)

First off, the ALJ did not make an impermissible, one-to-one comparison of plaintiff’s independent writing to her potential job duties. Rather, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s dedication to her independent writing venture reflected a level of concentration, persistence, and focus incongruent with marked limitations. ALJs may and often do consider a claimant’s daily activities when assessing their functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (daily activities are a factor in considering a claimant’s subjective allegations).

A claimant’s pattern of daily living is an important indicator of symptom intensity and persistence, so recommended daily walking may be considered when evaluating reported pain.

Gemajli · filed 2025-11-10(c)(3)

Thus, the ALJ did not err in considering Plaintiff’s walks, which was done at the recommendation of his treatment providers, as it was pertinent to the ALJ’s conclusion.

Daily activities may support discounting symptom testimony only when they demonstrate transferable work skills or contradict the testimony, though § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires the ALJ to consider them.

Frantz · filed 2025-12-29(c)(3)(i)

Activities of daily living can form the basis for an ALJ to discount a claimant’s testimony in two ways: (1) as evidence a claimant can work if the activities “meet the threshold for transferable work skills,” or (2) where the activities “contradict [a claimant’s] testimony.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). The relevant regulations require an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating subjective symptom statements. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i).

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires consideration of daily activities, which may undercut symptom testimony when they show transferable work skills or contradict the alleged limitations.

Sele · filed 2025-12-30(c)(3)(i)

Activities of daily living can form the basis for an ALJ to discount a claimant’s testimony in two ways: (1) as evidence a claimant can work if the activities “meet the threshold for transferable work skills,” or (2) where the activities “contradict [a claimant’s] testimony.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). The relevant regulations require an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities when evaluating subjective symptom statements. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of daily activities but requires an ALJ to explain how the activities undermine alleged limitations or bear on the ability to meet workplace demands.

STONEBRAKER v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-01-10(c)(3)

However, this explanation is lacking. The ALJ's description is consistent both with the medical evidence and Claimant's subjective symptom reports. However, the ALJ failed to articulate how Claimant's ability to perform the limited activities the ALJ summarized leads to the conclusion that Claimant is not as limited as one would expect, nor how it has any bearing on Claimant's ability to work. ... Therefore, on remand, the ALJ should address how Claimant's ability to perform the summarized daily activities bears on the Claimant's ability, or lack thereof, to meet workplace requirements.

Section 404.1529’s daily-activities factor supports discounting symptom testimony only when the activities conflict with the alleged severity or meet the threshold for transferable work skills, and the ALJ must make specific findings connecting them to work.

Espinoza v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-05-05(c)(3)(i)

In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). ... An ALJ may also rely on a claimant’s daily activities to support an adverse credibility determination when those activities “meet the threshold for transferable work skills”; i.e., where a claimant “is able to spend a substantial part of . . . [his] day performing household chores or other activities that are transferable to a work setting.” ... However, an ALJ “must make specific findings relating to the daily activities and their transferability to conclude that a claimant’s daily activities warrant an adverse credibility determination.” ... The Court finds that the ALJ did not explain how Plaintiff’s limited daily activities as reported to his providers -- even in combination -- contradict his hearing testimony such that his subjective symptom testimony should be discounted, or how those daily activities are transferable to a work setting.

Section 404.1529 does not permit an ALJ to infer light-work lifting capacity merely from childcare activities without evidence that the claimant is the primary caregiver, lifts the child, or can sustain equivalent lifting at work.

Miner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-11(a)

Relevant evidence includes a claimant’s medical history, medical signs, laboratory findings, and statements about how the symptoms affect the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *13–14. ... The ALJ’s reasoning failed to build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusion that Miner’s subjective symptom complaints were only partially consistent with the evidence. ... I find that the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge between his conclusions about Miner’s physical capabilities – resulting from her childcare activities – and the record, which does not show her to be the primary caregiver of her child. Moreover, being able to feed and dress one’s child does not necessarily mean that Miner had to lift her child to do so or that she could lift equivalent weight for up to two hours in an eight-hour workday.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)’s daily-activities factor requires consideration of how the claimant performs the activities and does not permit equating necessary childcare or flexible home tasks with sustained full-time work.

Jelderks v. Social Security Comissioner · filed 2023-07-21(c)(3)

When assessing a claimant’s subjective reports, an ALJ considers: (1) objective medical evidence; (2) daily activities; (3) frequency and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (4) medication, treatment, and other measures to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (5) functional limitations. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7-8 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). ... Additionally, on remand the ALJ should take care not to equate Jeremy’s daily activities—including his ability to care for his child—with an ability to work full time. Any reliance on daily activities must be considered in light of the limitations Jeremy experiences when performing those activities. And the Seventh Circuit has admonished that “sheer necessity may compel one to perform tasks at home no matter how painful, such as taking care of one’s child.”

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(i) and (c)(4) require consideration of both the type and extent of daily activities and an explanation connecting those activities to the alleged symptoms and sustained work capacity.

Ries v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-08-25(c)(3)(i), (c)(4)

However, “[a]n ALJ may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can perform them.” ... These qualifying statements, contained in Plaintiff’s function report, reflect Plaintiff’s position that many of the activities she performs are curtailed due to her impairments. ... While the ALJ need not have accepted these statements at face value, the ALJ was nonetheless required to evaluate them. ... Because the ALJ failed to evaluate these qualifying statements, the ALJ’s decision lacks “an accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to the decision’s conclusions. ... On remand, the ALJ should engage in a more fulsome analysis of whether the type and extent of the activities which Plaintiff can perform suggests an ability to “engage in full-time work on a sustained basis.”

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(i) and (c)(4) require the adjudicator to evaluate qualifications limiting daily activities and, when their extent is unclear, consider developing the record before treating them as evidence of sustained work capacity.

Laborde v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2023-09-06(c)(3)(i), (c)(4)

These qualifying statements reflect Plaintiff’s position that many of the activities he performs are curtailed due to his impairments. ... While the ALJ need not have accepted these statements at face value, the ALJ was nonetheless required to evaluate them. ... Because the ALJ failed to evaluate these qualifying statements, the ALJ’s decision lacks “an accurate and logical bridge” from the evidence to the decision’s conclusions. ... On remand, the ALJ must provide a more robust analysis of whether the type and extent of the activities which Plaintiff can perform suggests an ability to “engage in full-time work on a sustained basis.” ... The ALJ should also consider further developing the record if the extent to which Plaintiff can perform a given activity is unclear.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires an ALJ considering daily activities to assess both the kind of activity and the extent to which the claimant can perform it; sporadic basic activities alone do not justify rejecting subjective complaints.

Blunt, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-02(c)(3)(i)

In assessing a claimant’s daily activities, an ALJ “may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which [they] can perform them.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). Additionally, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the claimant can perform the most basic of daily activities.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires an ALJ to consider not only the type of daily activities a claimant performs but also the extent of performance and whether they demonstrate sustained work capacity.

Kashani v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-26(c)(3)(i)

Nevertheless, the ALJ erred by failing to explain how Plaintiff’s abilities to drive, shop, use stairs, clean, or cook demonstrate the capacity to “persist through an eight-hour workday.”

Section 404.1529 does not permit an ALJ to infer full-time work capacity from school, work, and daily activities accomplished through regular accommodations without explaining why fewer supports would suffice in competitive employment.

Lacerda · filed 2025-10-14(c)

But the ALJ, in his decision, somehow failed to recognize that all the strategies listed are in fact a form of accommodation that plaintiff receives regularly to succeed. The ALJ instead concluded that “evidence indicates [plaintiff] could sustain full-time work if it were in a less stressful environment and with less social interaction, as reflected [in the RFC].” But the ALJ identifies no evidence supporting his conclusion that plaintiff would require fewer accommodations than he receives at his current job, where he has limited interactions, has a routine setting up the food station, is provided extra time to perform that routine, and must still be allowed to take extra five-minute breaks as needed.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) does not permit an ALJ to discount symptom testimony based on daily activities without explaining how those activities contradict the alleged limitations or demonstrate transferable work skills.

Fonseca v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-11-25(c)(3)(i)

However, in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ fails to adequately explain how Plaintiff’s described ADLs conflict with her claimed limitations or demonstrate an ability to function in the workplace. That she at times is able to drive, shop, and do personal care activities and chores does not undermine Plaintiff’s claim she is unable to sustain work without experiencing discomfort or pain. ... For these reasons, the ALJ did not identify a specific, clear, and convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony when he failed to explain how those ADLs either contradicted Plaintiff’s testimony or equaled transferable work skills.

Section 404.1529(c) allows comparison of symptom testimony with objective evidence, but objective inconsistency alone is insufficient and ordinary daily activities must actually conflict with the alleged limitations.

Logan v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-01-12(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)

Here, as in Garrison, plaintiff’s “daily activities, as she described them in her testimony, were consistent with her statements about the impairments caused by her pain.” ... For similar reasons here, the ALJ erroneously rejected plaintiff’s testimony based on her activities of daily living. Because inconsistency with the medical record alone is an insufficient basis upon which to reject plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ erred.

Although daily activities are relevant under section 404.1529(c)(3), an ALJ must consider not only which activities a claimant performs but also the extent and limitations with which she performs them.

Savage v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-10-15(c)(3)

Although a claimant’s daily activities are an appropriate factor to consider in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3), “an ALJ may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can perform them.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3) does not permit an ALJ to treat daily activities as inconsistent with alleged symptom severity without accounting for the claimant’s limitations and explaining the actual inconsistency.

Lucas v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-11-16(c)(3)

However, here every single reason the ALJ has provided fails to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s activities are inconsistent with the alleged severity of her symptoms. Accordingly, the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms cannot be upheld because no logical bridge connects the evidence to the ALJ’s conclusion.

Daily activities do not by themselves constitute substantial evidence of nondisability, but section 404.1529(c)(3) permits considering them with medication, side effects, treatment, and other evidence.

McAlister v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-12-28(c)(3)

Although by themselves, activities of daily living do not constitute substantial evidence, they are a factor the ALJ may consider in determining whether the plaintiff is disabled.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits discounting symptom testimony when everyday activities show capacities transferable to work or conflict with the alleged severity.

Smith v. Saul · filed 2022-02-03(c)(3)(i)

An ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when he reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires an ALJ who relies on daily activities to consider the extent to which the claimant can perform them and explain how those activities translate into an ability to sustain full-time work.

Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-15(c)(3)(i)

“An ALJ may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can perform them.” ... He disregarded Plaintiff’s descriptions of her significant limitations in performing those ADLs she could perform and ignored her progressive decline in abilities over the relevant period. ... The ALJ further failed to explain how Plaintiff’s ability to perform the ADLs he referenced equated to an ability to perform light work over an eight-hour workday.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to discount subjective complaints when the claimant’s actual daily activities conflict with the alleged degree of limitation, even if the activities do not prove an ability to work.

Jordan v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-22(c)(3)

But this does not mean, as Plaintiff appears to suggest, that an ALJ must find that a claimant’s daily activities show an ability to work in order to discount conflicting symptom testimony. To the contrary, “even where a claimant’s activities suggest some difficulty in functioning, an ALJ may give less weight to subjective complaints to the extent a claimant’s apparent actual level of activity is inconsistent with the extent of functional limitation the claimant has alleged.” ... The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s daily activities in the credibility analysis.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires daily activities to be considered as one factor in evaluating whether symptom allegations are consistent with the record, without treating them as proof of ability to perform particular work.

Barber v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-22(c)(3)

Nor does the ALJ cite these activities as demonstrating Plaintiff’s ability to perform a certain type of work. Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s daily activities to show inconsistencies between the allegations and the record. This is entirely appropriate and, in fact, required by the Regulations.

Although § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires consideration of daily activities, those activities do not by themselves contradict disability allegations, and the ALJ must connect them to the functional restriction at issue.

Hilton v. Saul · filed 2022-05-09(c)(3)(i)

An ALJ is entitled, indeed obligated, to consider the claimant’s activities when determining the claimant’s RFC. ... At the same time, without additional adequate evidence supporting an ALJ’s conclusion, a claimant’s daily activities “do not by themselves contradict allegations of a disability.” ... The ALJ thus erred to the extent he considered any of those activities as inconsistent with physical restrictions beyond those he found.

Daily activities are only one symptom-evaluation factor, and objective medical evidence together with response to treatment may provide adequate reasons for partially discounting symptom allegations.

Cheney v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-26(c)

However, consideration of daily activities is but one factor in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. DeMaris v. Barnhart, 306 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (“Although these daily activities alone do not support or disprove disability, they are only one factor to consider in evaluating the subjective complaints of the claimant.”). As discussed above, the ALJ found the medical evidence did not support the extent of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and that was sufficient. See, e.g., Markuske v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App’x 762, 767 (11th Cir. 2014)3 (finding the ALJ’s discussion of objective medical evidence of record provided “adequate reasons” for the decision to partially discredit the claimant’s subjective complaints); Taylor v. Saul, 544 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1240 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (citation omitted) (“The ALJ’s reliance upon the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s response to treatment are adequate reasons to partially reject Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.”); Turk v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-cv-490-SMD, 2022 WL 672152, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2022) (finding the ALJ’s explanation of the objective medical evidence sufficient reason to discount the plaintiff’s subjective allegations.).

A claimant’s treatment reports that she was active, independent in daily living, and able to walk, climb stairs, dress, bathe, and exercise may support finding her less limited than alleged.

Hughes v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-09-26(c)(3)(i)

However, as the ALJ referenced, Hughes self-reported during medical visits for treatment she was “relatively active with her children” and “was able to complete her activities of daily living without assistance.” (Tr. 395, 536). The ALJ further cited instances in the record where Hughes reported walking, climbing stairs, dressing or bathing, and getting occasional exercise. (Tr. 447, 510, 547). The ALJ found, not unreasonably, that this evidence “fails to reflect the extent of the limitation alleged by [Hughes].” (Tr. 29). While Hughes contends the ALJ “failed to accurately describe the daily activities she finds inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s allegations” (doc. 14 at 16), Hughes does not argue that these self-reports do not provide substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination.

Daily activities do not by themselves establish an ability to work full time, but § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) permits an ALJ to consider them with the other evidence when evaluating subjective complaints.

Barry v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-09-29(c)(3)(i)

But while Barry’s daily activities would not in and of themselves equate to the ability to perform full-time work, the ALJ did not consider these activities in a vacuum. Rather, when combined with the other evidence of record, the ALJ concluded the activities undermined Barry’s subjective complaints. That determination found support both in applicable law and in the record evidence.

Daily activities may support discounting symptom testimony when they contradict claimed limitations, without proof that the activities translate into full-time work.

Scolari v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-10-11(c)

Here, the ALJ is relying on the first ground and was not ... required to translate Plaintiff’s activities into full-time work.

Routine daily activities do not support discounting symptom testimony under § 404.1529 when they neither contradict the testimony nor show physical functions transferable to a work setting.

(SS) Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-21(c)(2)

The parties dispute whether the activities the ALJ cited above meet the criteria from Orn. ... As should be self-evident, they do not. ... If there were ever a case for an ALJ to simply forge the obligatory list of “daily activities” in support ... of an adverse credibility determination, this was such a case.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) does not permit an ALJ to treat limited daily activities as inconsistent with claimed functional limits when the activities are compatible with those limits and the record shows the claimant performs them with restrictions or assistance.

Nichols v. Kijakazi (MAG+) · filed 2023-04-07(c)(3)(i)

The ALJ also must consider the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), including (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) any precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of the claimant’s medication; (5) any treatment other than medication; (6) any measures the claimant used to relieve her pain or symptoms other than treatment; and (7) any other factors concerning the claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to her pain or symptoms. ... However, Nichols’s abilities to care for a child, perform some light household chores, and prepare simple meals do not undermine her testimony of significant limitations in the ability to lift, walk, sit, stand, and climb stairs. Those things are not incompatible. ... Accordingly, it was improper for the ALJ to conclude that Nichols’s ability to engage in limited activities of daily living undermined her testimony regarding the limiting effects of her impairments, especially the ability to lift, stand, sit, and walk.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) requires daily activities to be evaluated in their full context, including qualifications, assistance, reduced schedules, and good and bad mental-health days.

Abreu v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-23(c)(3)(i)

In the decision, the ALJ first relied on Plaintiff’s reports of taking care of his children in May 2020 to find his statements inconsistent with the severity of his symptoms. ... But that is not the whole story. ... While the ALJ listed Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in support of finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints inconsistent with these activities, when viewing the daily activities in the context of the whole record, Plaintiff’s statements support his subjective complaints. ... And as with many individuals with mental health problems, Plaintiff had good days and bad days, but overall, his daily activities support his subjective statements and complaints. ... As a result, remand is warranted to reconsider Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) does not permit activities to undermine symptom testimony when the activities precipitated the alleged symptoms or when omitted context shows they were unsustainable.

(SS) Haggerty v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-27(c)(3)(i)

This suggests 35-50 pound printer trash disposal caused some of the very symptoms he contends are disabling, which does not support the notion that he could indeed perform such an activity consistently, nor does it contradict his testimony as to the severity of symptoms. ... This does not suggest he could continue lifting, 35, 60, or 90 pound buckets on an ongoing basis. ... Thus, the road trip to San Diego does not undermine the sitting limitation; in fact, the road trip was the very inciting event giving rise to the sitting limitation.

Daily activities do not support discounting a claimed need to lie down when household chores, interrupted walking, and therapeutic use of a reclining theater chair do not conflict with that specific limitation.

Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-09-29(c)

In short, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living cannot support the discounting of Plaintiff’s specific claims about his need to regularly lie down.

Section 404.1529 permits consideration of objective evidence but does not allow normal muscle strength, range of motion, and gait—findings characteristic of fibromyalgia—to serve as the sole basis for discounting fibromyalgia pain testimony.

Skerei v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-06-29(c)(1)-(3)

In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ may consider whether it is consistent with objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1)-(3), ... The lack of objective medical evidence may not form the sole basis for discounting a claimant’s testimony. ... “What is unusual about the disease is that those suffering from it have muscle strength, sensory functions, and reflexes that are normal.” ... The ALJ’s sole reliance on plaintiff’s normal muscle strength and gait as inconsistent with her testimony ignores plaintiff’s medically diagnosed fibromyalgia and is, therefore, not a clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 404.1529(c)(4), as applied to fibromyalgia in the Fourth Circuit, does not permit normal objective medical findings to be used—even as one of several factors—to discount the impairment’s alleged severity, persistence, or limiting effects.

Riley v. Saul · filed 2021-07-26(c)(4)

The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ complied with the regulations, which provide that adjudicators “will evaluate [a claimant’s] statements in relation to the objective medical evidence and other evidence, in reaching a conclusion as to whether [the claimant] is disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (emphasis added). In instances of fibromyalgia, this regulation must be interpreted and applied through the lens of Arakas. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that, with respect to fibromyalgia, the objective medical evidence bears little to no relation to the disabling limitations caused by that impairment. See Arakas, 983 F.3d at 97 (“Objective indicators such as normal clinical and laboratory results simply have no relevance to the severity, persistence, or limiting effects of . . . fibromyalgia, based on the current medical understanding of the disease.”). Arakas prohibits a specific use of evidence that, with respect to fibromyalgia, runs counter to the present understanding of that disease. Thus, after Arakas, the use of objective medical evidence to discount the disease’s limiting effects is improper in the Fourth Circuit.

Section 404.1529(c) permits objective medical evidence and qualified daily activities to be weighed against disabling fibromyalgia allegations when the adjudicator also accounts for pain, medication effects, and waxing and waning symptoms.

DELPIZZO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-09-29(c)

Additionally, the ALJ also did not totally discredit Plaintiffs subjective symptoms. ... For instance, the ALJ stated: “the undersigned accounted for the claimant’s subjective allegations (including, but not limited to, pain) and potential medication side effects (such as fatigue/tiredness), as well as for the waxing and waning of fibromyalgia symptoms, when making this assessment.” ... Here, the ALJ cited objective medical evidence throughout the record that contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations that her fibromyalgia was disabling. ... As noted above, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff's fibromyalgia in determining Plaintiff's RFC. ... As such, the ALJ did not fail to provide a proper RFC assessment.

At the first step of Section 404.1529, an ALJ rejecting fibromyalgia as a medically determinable impairment must meaningfully address evidence that physicians tested for and excluded other causes of the alleged symptoms.

Baldwin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-29

The ALJ does not discuss the tests run by Plaintiff’s doctor and the Court is “left to guess” about how the ALJ considered this evidence, if at all. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637. Without discussion of this evidence, the determination that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia is not a medically determinable impairment is not sufficiently explained, and consequently the ALJ’s RFC evaluation is deficient as well. The ALJ’s lack of explanation here requires remand.

Section 404.1529(c)(2) requires an ALJ to consider objective medical evidence contained in physical-therapy treatment records even when those records need not be evaluated as other-source medical opinions.

King v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-07-22(c)(2)

Therefore, while the ALJ was not required to evaluate the PT Records as “other source” medical opinion evidence, see Doc. #23-1 at 13, the ALJ had an obligation to consider the “objective medical evidence” contained within the PT Records. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2) (The Commissioner “will consider [objective medical evidence] in reaching a conclusion as to whether [plaintiff is] disabled.”). “Objective medical evidence is evidence obtained from the application of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption.” Id.

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) and (v) require an ALJ evaluating symptoms to consider medication and treatment, including evidence that symptoms stabilized on medication and worsened when medication stopped.

Miller v. Bisignano · filed 2026-04-17(c)(3)(iv)–(v)

Evidence of past treatment and medication provides further substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s discounting of Miller’s testimony. The regulations require the ALJ to consider medication and treatment as factors relevant to a claimant’s symptoms.

Effective treatment may support discounting alleged symptom severity, but limited daily activities do not support rejection when the ALJ fails to explain their inconsistency with claimed limitations.

Ickler v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2022-09-27(c)(3)(iv)-(v)

Thus, the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony regarding her spine impairments as inconsistent with her quite limited activities of daily living. ... The effectiveness of treatment is relevant to determining the severity of a claimant’s symptoms, and an ALJ may properly rely on evidence of effective treatment to discount a claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to consider daily activities, medication, treatment, and the other listed factors when evaluating subjective reports of pain and limitations, and daily activities need not equal full-time work to be relevant.

Reyes v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-20(c)(3)(i)-(vii)

The ALJ considered, inter alia, Plaintiff’s limited treatment and medications, her use of a Smart phone, the fact that she lives alone, and her testimony that she “can shop alone, cook, shower, dress, comb hair, brush teeth and walk to the store . . . She can do laundry (at sister’s house).” T. 739. Plaintiff asserts that the activities of daily living testified to do not equate with working full-time. However, “[t]here is no authority supporting the contention that a plaintiff’s activities of daily living need to rise to a level comparable with full-time sustained employment to be considered not disabled.” Abreu v. Astrue, 11 Civ. 3719 (ALC), 2012 WL 4714892, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143966 *9-10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); compare Batista v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 3:19 CV 1660 (RMS), 2020 WL 6709096, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213454 *6-7 (Nov. 16, 2020) (“the ALJ incorrectly cited to [the plaintiff’s] activities of daily living as examples of improvement and fewer symptoms of her anxiety in 2015 when the documentary evidence did not support that conclusion.”) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to evaluate pain by comparing the claimant’s allegations with daily activities, conservative treatment, and other record evidence.

Lisa M. v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-10-28(c)(3)

As to pain, the ALJ carefully and appropriately considered Plaintiff’s claims of pain, in contrast to Plaintiff’s daily activities and the conservative treatment (including over-the-counter medication and injections for the neck pain) she received. Most importantly, he relied on the expert findings of Dr. Killenberg, whose RFC is expressly based on her consideration of Plaintiff’s claims of pain, environmental sensitivities and cognitive inefficiencies. Tr. 104. This approach is consistent with applicable law and resulted in a credibility finding that is well supported by substantial evidence. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 4790249, at *49462; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) expressly directs consideration of daily activities and the nature of medication and treatment when assessing symptom severity and RFC.

Gilmore v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-01-07(c)(3)(i), (iv), (v)

After reviewing the evidence, the court concludes that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s daily activities and treatment when making his RFC finding. ... Indeed, the regulations explicitly direct the ALJ to consider the claimant’s activities of daily living and the nature of the claimant’s medication and treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i), (iv), (v).

Sections 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) and (v) permit successful treatment measures to be considered together with daily activities when evaluating symptom severity.

Gilbertson v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-01-12(c)(3)(iv)–(v)

Although one need not be “utterly incapacitated” to be disabled, see Vertigan v. Holder, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiffs activities exceed her purported limitations, especially considering the ALJ’s unassailed reliance on successful treatment measures in conjunction with Plaintiff's activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of daily activities without equating them to workplace demands and also permits consideration of the claimant’s course of treatment.

Prill v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-01-13(c)(3)(i), (v)

When evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms, an ALJ should consider the claimant’s daily activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). ... “But it is entirely permissible to examine all of the evidence, including a claimant’s daily activities, to assess whether testimony about the effects of his impairments was credible or exaggerated.” Id. (quoting Loveless, 810 F.3d at 508) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... An ALJ is entitled to consider the course of a claimant’s treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits considering conservative treatment and daily activities as symptom evidence without equating the activities to full-time work.

Martinez v. Saul · filed 2022-01-25(c)(3)(i), (v)

Again, the course of a plaintiff’s treatment is an entirely valid consideration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(v); 416.929(c)(3)(v). ... But the ALJ did not find plaintiff’s activities were probative of a capacity for light work. “She did not equate Plaintiff's activities to full-time work.”

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of daily activities, treatment modalities, and treatment effectiveness when evaluating symptom severity.

Tokarski v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-02-11(c)(3)(i), (iv)–(v)

It was entirely appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in making his disability assessment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i). ... The ALJ was well within his authority to consider Plaintiff’s treatment, or lack thereof, in determining whether he was capable of performing work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits considering daily activities, medication, and treatment when evaluating subjective symptoms.

Pierce v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-02-23(c)(3)(i), (iv)-(v)

Second, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with her allegations of disabling symptoms (Tr. 24). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)(daily activities are properly considered when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms). ... Third, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s treatment history was inconsistent with the degree of limitation alleged (Tr. 23). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (medications taken and treatment, other than medications, are properly considered when evaluating subjective symptom testimony).

Section 404.1529(c)(3)–(4) requires an ALJ evaluating reported symptoms to consider daily activities along with inconsistencies, medication, treatment, and other relevant factors.

Swinson v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-03-29(c)(3), (4)

Plaintiff’s argument fails because not only was it appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s daily activities when evaluating her reports of symptoms, but the relevant regulations required the ALJ to do just ... that. Therefore, the ALJ did not err by considering Plaintiff’s daily activities. Furthermore, the ALJ did not consider only Plaintiff’s daily activities when assessing Plaintiff’s reported symptoms. Indeed, the ALJ also considered other appropriate factors, including conflicts between Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms and the medical evidence, as well as the medications and treatment Plaintiff received for her symptoms.

Section 404.1529(c)(2)–(3) permits an ALJ to consider daily activities together with objective medical evidence, medication effectiveness, and treatment history when evaluating subjective complaints.

Fullerton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2022-03-29(c)(2), (3)

However, the ALJ covered a variety of evidence to support his conclusion, including daily activities, the effectiveness of medication, objective medical evidence, and treatment history. ... The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s daily activities in assessing her subjective complaints. ... The ALJ correctly identified this as evidence that her condition does not totally affect her ability to complete tasks or get along with others.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ evaluating disabling pain to consider daily activities, treatment frequency, and medication use.

Blake v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-29(c)(3)(i), (iv), (v)

A claimant’s level of daily activity is a factor which the administrative law judge may consider in determining the extent to which pain is of disabling severity. ... Additionally, the frequency that a claimant has sought treatment for the allegedly disabling impairments is a factor that may be considered in assessing her subjective complaints. ... Finally, the medication used to alleviate the alleged pain or other symptoms can also be considered as a factor.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) requires consideration of objective evidence, daily activities, pain, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional limitations, and permits effective treatment history to weigh against alleged severity.

Orzoff v. Saul · filed 2022-05-04(c)(3), (c)(3)(v)

The ALJ must justify his or her subjective symptom evaluation with “specific reasons supported by the record,” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013), and in doing so, must consider several factors, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily activities, her level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, course of treatment, and functional limitations. ... So too was it appropriate for the ALJ to consider that a “conservative course of treatment” – namely, compliance with a Keppra regimen to control Claimant’s seizures and medication management for his Wilson’s disease – was effective at treating Claimant’s symptoms.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ evaluating disabling pain to consider daily activities, treatment frequency, inconsistencies, and medication use.

Fulton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-06(c)(3)(i), (iv), (v)

A claimant’s level of daily activity is a factor which the administrative law judge may consider in determining the extent to which pain is of disabling severity. ... The frequency that a claimant sought treatment for the allegedly disabling impairment(s) is also a factor that may be considered in assessing their subjective complaints. ... Finally, the medication used to alleviate the alleged pain or other symptoms may be considered.

Section 404.1529 permits an ALJ to consider activities, treatment course, and treatment benefit and provides that pain statements alone do not establish disability.

Roberts v. Commissioner of SSA · filed 2022-08-26(a), (c)(3)(i)-(v)

The ALJ also considered the course of plaintiff's treatment and the benefit she received, as well as her activities— both of which are valid considerations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(v). The ALJ did not ignore the fact that Plaintiff was unable to perform her daily activities without pain or limitation. ... Complaints of pain alone are not enough to entitled plaintiff to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual's statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability....”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a); 416,929(a) (“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled.”). ... The ALJ thoroughly considered all of Plaintiff’s objective evidence, among the other evidence, in fully evaluating her symptoms.

Conservative treatment, a positive response to treatment, and daily activities may provide sufficient reasons to discount pain testimony.

Terry v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-09-16(c)

Terry’s generally conservative treatment, her positive response to treatments, and her daily activities provided the ALJ with sufficient reasons to discount her pain testimony. As such, the substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination.

Conservative treatment, effective control of symptoms, and daily activities may provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting symptom testimony.

Hamm v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-26(c)

First, the ALJ noted Plaintiff had conservative treatments for her impairments. It noted that Plaintiff’s migraines have been effectively treated with Botox injections. It noted that while Plaintiff has degenerative disc disease, her clinical examination findings have not shown any significant motor strength, sensation or reflex deficits on examination. It noted that with her diabetes, Plaintiff has been able to manage it with insulin therapy and episodes of fluctuating blood sugar has resolved quickly with treatment. Moreover, the record shows that Plaintiff is able to drive, handler her personal care needs, watch her grandchildren, and perform some household chores. These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are clear and convincing.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ evaluating limiting effects to consider a claimant's daily activities and the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication.

Smith v. Kijakazi (CONSENT) · filed 2022-10-05(c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(iv)

Although the record does reflect that Plaintiff’s lumbar impairments limit her functional ability, the record also reflects that Plaintiff is able to perform her personal care tasks without issue, as well as “light” household chores, including cleaning, laundry, ironing, and other tasks. (Tr. 29, 262-63). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (stating that an ALJ should consider a claimant’s daily activities in evaluating the limiting effects of her impairments).

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits an ALJ to consider daily activities, treatment methods, and treatment effectiveness when evaluating symptom allegations.

Custer v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-08(c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(iv), (c)(3)(v)

The ALJ discussed plaintiff’s treatment modalities including post-operative notes and weening off of pain medications after surgery. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (adjudicator properly considers the treatment modalities utilized, and the effectiveness of treatment to relieve pain and other symptoms). ... In making her finding, the ALJ properly considered the totality of the evidence and the RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) permits consideration of daily activities even when their frequency is overstated if the record still shows general self-care, and treatment noncompliance does not undermine symptoms when the ALJ uses it only to explain medical complications and considers the claimant’s reasons.

Ingram v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-11-28(c)(3)

This Court finds that even if the ALJ overstated the frequency of these activities, the record shows Mr. Ingram was generally able to care for himself. ... Thus, the ALJ properly considered Mr. Ingram’s periods of noncompliance.

An ALJ evaluates symptom allegations with objective and other evidence, including consistency, treatment history, daily activities, and medication.

Ramos-Rivera v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-28(c)–(c)(4)

In assessing credibility, the ALJ must evaluate allegations together with the objective medical and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p. The ALJ should also consider the consistency of statements and available evidence, as well as factors such as the individual’s treatment history, daily activities, and medications.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) supports a symptom finding based on evidence beyond objective tests, including the claimant’s own reports, treatment response, medication effectiveness, and daily activities.

STEPKO · filed 2025-11-26(c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(iv)

And, as the ALJ was required to do, he relied on additional information apart from objective medical evidence. The ALJ’s opinion is replete of these considerations, and they substantially support his findings. For example, the ALJ relied on what Plaintiff herself reported during many of her medical appointments and at her hearings, and the treatment plans used to manage her symptoms. ... And the ALJ factored in Plaintiff’s “daily activities,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i), noting that Plaintiff “maintained independence in [activities of daily living], including personal care needs, preparing simple meals, driving, shopping, and volunteering in the community” and was “capable of managing her own funds.” ... At bottom, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and his findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

An ALJ applying § 404.1529 may consider medication response and treatment evidence without penalizing the claimant for an inability to obtain a preferred medication when the decision acknowledges that access problem and does not use it to discount the symptoms.

Vaught v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-29(c)(3)(iv)–(v)

Moreover, the ALJ did not violate SSR 16-3p, as the ALJ specifically noted medication difficulties as a result of Plaintiff’s insurance company, but the ALJ did not use this issue as a means for finding Plaintiff subjective complaints to not be consistent with the medical evidence in terms of intensity, persistence, and limiting effects.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) does not permit lack of treatment to count against symptom testimony when the record establishes that the claimant could not afford the treatment.

Denson v. O'Malley · filed 2023-09-12(c)(3)

However, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff stated he did not seek treatment due to a lack of healthcare coverage and an inability to afford treatment. ... Indeed, this is documented in the record. ... Under these circumstances, the ALJ improperly found Plaintiff less credible for not seeking or receiving treatment. ... Thus, in this case, this is not a clear and convincing reason supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) makes treatment effectiveness relevant to symptom severity, but an ALJ may not characterize treatment as conservative without evidence that a more aggressive option was warranted or available.

Johnson v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-08-27(c)(3)

The effectiveness of treatment is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3) (2011); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). ... The ALJ here did not cite any evidence in the record that suggested Plaintiff opted for conservative treatment in lieu of more aggressive treatment, or that indicated a more aggressive option was recommended or even available. ... This therefore was not a specific, clear, and convincing reason for the ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s testimony.

Section 404.1529(c)(3) makes treatment effectiveness relevant to symptom severity, but the ALJ must identify records supporting a finding that treatment stabilized the claimant’s condition.

(SS) Campos v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-30(c)(3)

The effectiveness of medication or treatment is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). ... The ALJ merely summarized the medical record without specifying which of those records demonstrated stabilization of Plaintiff’s mental health condition when adherent to medication.

Section 404.1529(c) permits consideration of medication effectiveness, but an ALJ must cite evidence supporting claimed improvement before relying on it to reject symptom statements.

(SS) Trujillo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-03(c)

When assessing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). ... The ALJ did not cite any evidence to support these conclusions. Without such citations by the ALJ, the Court is unable to find this is a clear and convincing reason to support the rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective statements.

Section 404.1529 requires an ALJ who relies on medication effectiveness or treatment gaps to consider whether insurance, cost, moving, or other access barriers caused noncompliance and how unstable access affects the ability to sustain full-time work.

Crites v. Bisignano · filed 2025-09-22(c)(3)(iv), (c)(3)(v)

The ALJ did not comment on the stability of plaintiff’s access to her necessary medications, indicate how this may affect plaintiff’s ability to sustain full-time employment, or consider reasons that plaintiff might not be compliant with taking her medications or might not have access to them. Courts and SSR 16-3p recognize a variety of reasons why individuals do not comply with or seek treatment in a manner consistent with their complaints, including lack of insurance, lack of access, inability to afford treatment, and side effects.

Section 404.1529(c) allows an ALJ to consider medication and treatment when evaluating reported symptoms, but treatment must be accurately characterized before it supports rejecting those reports.

Felix v. Bisignano · filed 2025-09-25(c)

When evaluating a claimant's subjective statements, the ALJ may consider “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c). ... Given the failure to acknowledge that Plaintiff’s inpatient care occurred during the adjudicated period, the mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s treatment as conservative, and failure to identify the “greater treatment measures” the ALJ believed were available, the Court is unable to find the treatment received is a clear and convincing reason to reject his subjective complaints.

Subsections (c)(3)(iv) through (vi) make medication effectiveness, other treatment, and measures used for symptom relief relevant when evaluating symptom testimony.

Mills v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-01-04(c)(3)(iv)-(vi)

Relevant factors for the ALJ to consider when evaluating symptom testimony include “[t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” the plaintiff takes to alleviate symptoms, as well as treatment besides medication that relieves symptoms, and other measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(vi).

Subsections (c)(3)(iv) through (vi) make medication effectiveness, other treatment, and measures used for relief relevant to symptom evaluation.

Maier v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-05-02(c)(3)(iv)-(vi)

Relevant factors for the ALJ to consider when evaluating symptom testimony include “[t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” the plaintiff takes to alleviate symptoms, as well as treatment besides medication that relieves symptoms, and other measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(vi).

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) permits an ALJ to consider the type and potency of medication used for symptoms, and a claimant's lack of potent pain medication may undermine allegations of constant, severe pain.

Weston v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-08-09(c)(3)(iv)

Weston alleges her headaches are frequent and disabling. However, there is no medical evidence to support these statements. Weston did not include headaches as a physical condition on her application for disability. (Tr. at 312.) There are only three instances Weston reported headaches to a physician, although she visited numerous physicians on numerous occasions. The only noted medications that she took for her headaches were Ibuprofen and Aleve. (Tr. at 381, 494.) See Harwell v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir. 1984) (indicating a claimant’s lack of use of potent pain medication can undermine allegations of constant, severe pain); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), 416.929(c)(3)(iv). ... In sum, the ALJ articulated in detail his findings that Weston’s subjective complaints were inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Weston’s pain was not as severe as she claimed.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) requires meaningful consideration of a claimant’s medication regimen, its effectiveness, and its side effects when evaluating symptom severity.

Adkins v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-27(c)(3)(iv)

The ALJ’s failure to address the use of those narcotics to relieve his pain, with mixed notes regarding the efficacy of such treatment, leaves a gap in the ALJ’s analysis that warrants reconsideration.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) authorizes consideration of the type of medication used to alleviate symptoms, including prescribed medical marijuana and related medication-monitoring visits.

CRAWN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-07-25(c)(3)(iv)

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration that Plaintiff’s conditions were managed with medication and medical marijuana. ... However, as the Acting Commissioner, points out, Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Rule 9.1, ECF No. 30, pp. 19–20, the regulations authorize an ALJ to consider the type of medication that a claimant takes to alleviate pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv). In the present case, the ALJ expressly noted that Plaintiff was prescribed marijuana, along with other medications, and appeared for medication monitoring visits. ... The Court is not persuaded that remand is warranted on this basis.

Sections 404.1529(c)(2)-(3) permit normal mental-status findings, successful medication management, treatment intensity, and absent side-effect reports to support finding anxiety and depression non-severe.

Schoen v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-09-27(c)(2)-(3)

Instead, Plaintiff typically reported that the medication adequately treated her anxiety and depression. ... While a claimant need not be treated by a mental-health specialist in order to be found with a severe mental-health impairment, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider this fact—as well as the routinely normal mental-health findings—when assessing the severity of Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression. ... Third, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff typically denied significant medication side-effects is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) requires an ALJ evaluating a claimant’s reported symptoms to consider the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication.

Murdock v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2025-03-20(c)(3)(iv)

Though Dr. Simieritsch wrote that Mr. Murdock’s right knee was unstable and that Mr. Murdock had chronic pain “with use,” Dr. Simieritsch prescribed only Meloxicam for pain, the pain medication that Mr. Murdock took for years. (Doc. 4-9, pp. 7-8, 10); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) (directing ALJ to consider the “type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication [the claimant] take[s] or ha[s] taken to alleviate . . . pain or other symptoms”).

An ALJ first determines whether a medically determinable impairment could produce the alleged symptoms and then considers how consistently they accord with objective and other evidence.

Vozzella v. Saul · filed 2022-09-28(b)

The “regulations provide a two-step process for evaluating a claimant's assertions of pain and other limitations.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). First, “the ALJ must decide whether the claimant suffers from a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)). Second, “the ALJ must consider ‘the extent to which the claimant's symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence’ of record.”

An ALJ first determines whether an impairment could reasonably produce symptoms and then assesses their intensity and persistence to determine work effects and disability.

Stone v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-09-28(b), (c)

To evaluate a claimant’s self-reported symptoms, the ALJ must use the two-step framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A., Mar. 16, 2016). Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 95 (4th Cir. 2020). “First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical evidence presents a ‘medically determinable impairment’ that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3). “Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled.”

Symptoms affect work only if tied to an impairment shown by medical findings, after which their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects are evaluated from the entire record.

Mercado v. Saul · filed 2022-09-20(b), (c)

First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–3p.

An ALJ first determines whether a medically determinable impairment could produce symptoms and then evaluates their intensity and persistence to determine work limitations.

Boggs v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of · filed 2022-09-20(b), (c)

Section 404.1529, in turn, dictates how the ALJ is to evaluate a claimant’s symptoms, including pain. Section 404.1529(b) requires an ALJ to first determine whether the medical signs or laboratory findings indicate the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms. Section 404.1529(c) then requires the ALJ to evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms to determine how these symptoms limit the claimant’s capacity for work.

After finding a condition that could produce symptoms, an ALJ must evaluate their intensity and persistence to determine their effect on work capacity.

Hendrix v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-13(c)(1)

If an ALJ determines that the claimant’s medical condition could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms to determine their effect on the claimant’s capacity to work.

Symptom evaluation first asks whether an impairment could produce the symptoms and then evaluates their intensity, persistence, and work limitations using all medical and nonmedical evidence.

Manzanares v. Social Security Administration · filed 2022-09-12(b), (c)

SSA regulations prescribe a two-step process for evaluating a claimant’s statements about their mental impairments. Step one asks “whether there is an underlying medically determinable . . . mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce [the] individual’s symptoms.” SSR 16-3P, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). If such an impairment is established at step one, step two requires the ALJ to “evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s ability to perform work-related activities.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

After an underlying impairment is established, an ALJ evaluates symptom intensity, persistence, and work limits using the entire record, including objective and subjective evidence.

Wilsey v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2022-08-31(c)

Not until such underlying impairment is deemed established does the fact-finder proceed to the second step: consideration of the entire record, including objective and subjective evidence, to evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms to determine how symptoms limit capacity for work. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR16-3p, *4.

An ALJ examines all symptoms for consistency with objective and other evidence, first asking whether an impairment could produce them and then evaluating their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects.

Murphy v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-18(a)-(c)

At this intermediate step, the ALJ examines all of the claimant’s symptoms and “the extent to which [they] can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a). This involves a two-step inquiry in which the ALJ must (1) determine whether an underlying medically determinable mental impairment or impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms; and, if so, (2) evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s functional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b)–(c).

Symptoms affect work only if tied to an impairment shown by medical signs or laboratory findings; the ALJ then evaluates their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects from the whole record.

Olson v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-19(b), (c)

First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16–3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–3p.

An ALJ evaluates symptom intensity, persistence, and work limits using the whole record, including objective and subjective evidence.

Martin v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2022-08-19(c)

Not until such underlying impairment is deemed established does the fact-finder proceed to the second step: consideration of the entire record, including objective and subjective evidence, to evaluate the intensity and persistence of symptoms to determine how symptoms limit capacity for work. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR16-3p, *4.

After identifying an impairment reasonably expected to cause symptoms, an ALJ considers all relevant evidence and the listed factors to determine how symptom intensity and persistence limit work.

Franke v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-22(a), (c)(3)

When evaluating subjective symptoms in a disability claim, the ALJ should first determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce those symptoms. The ALJ should then consider all the relevant evidence in the record to determine how the intensity and persistence of the symptoms limit the claimant’s ability to perform work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 16-3p, Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3-*4 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017); Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2022).

Symptom evaluation first asks whether an impairment could reasonably produce the symptoms and then evaluates their intensity, persistence, and functional limits from all available evidence.

Walker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-05(b), (c)

The ALJ must perform a two-step analysis when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms. First, she must determine whether there are underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Next, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity and persistence of those symptoms considering all the available evidence and determine the extent to which they limit Plaintiffs functional limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v) requires consideration of medication and other treatment when evaluating symptoms, but receiving more treatment does not inherently corroborate greater symptom severity.

Roland v. SSA · filed 2021-08-20(c)(3)(iv)-(v)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider his physical therapy, injections, acupuncture, and medications in 2016 and 2017; but the ALJ discussed his pursuit of these modalities. (See Tr. 88). And contrary to Plaintiff, more treatment does not inherently mean that a claimant’s symptoms are more supported. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v).

Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) makes treatment effectiveness relevant to symptom evaluation, but sporadic improvement and consistent use of a strong opioid analgesic do not establish conservative treatment.

Drivas-Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-08-26(c)(3)(iv)

As for the ALJ’s second reason, a finding that a claimant’s symptoms improved with conservative treatment can serve as a clear and convincing reason for discounting the claimant’s testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) (the effectiveness of medication and treatment are relevant to the evaluation of a claimant’s alleged symptoms); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750–51 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that “evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment”). The evidence cited by the ALJ in support of his conclusion that Plaintiff’s symptoms improved with treatment consists of sporadic instances of reduced pain and increased mobility, and the finding that Plaintiff’s pain was managed with oxycodone. AR 22-24. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have typically found that consistent use of strong opioid analgesics such as oxycodone cannot be accurately characterized as “conservative” treatment, and the ALJ has not provided a clear and convincing reason for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.