20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to consider medical-source opinions about residual functional capacity but reserves the final RFC determination to the Commissioner.

Moreno v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-23(d)(2)

When making an RFC determination, an ALJ must consider medical opinions regarding the claimant’s functioning and make a determination based on an assessment of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as ...your residual functional capacity...the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Tran v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-11(d)(2)

But it is “the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine [RFC].” ... That is what the ALJ did in concluding that Dr. Franke’s opinion is not consistent with clinical findings of Mr. Denney and Dr. Taylor. ... see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (“the final responsibility for deciding [RFC] is reserved to the Commissioner”); 404.1545(a)(1) (“We will assess your [RFC] capacity based on all the relevant evidence in your case record.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves final responsibility for deciding residual functional capacity to the Commissioner and permits an ALJ to tailor the RFC to the specific record evidence.

Warren v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-25(d)

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s definition of “superficial” is arbitrary and capricious, requiring remand, is similarly unpersuasive. As the Commissioner correctly points out, the ALJ ultimately “has the authority as a decision maker to craft an RFC that is tailored to the specific evidence in the record.” (Doc. #9, PageID #947); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Coldiron, 391 F. App’x at 439 (“The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a physician—ultimately determines a claimant’s RFC.”). If the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence and sufficiently explained by the ALJ, this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because residual functional capacity is an administrative finding, not a medical opinion.

Franks v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2024-09-26(d)(2)

A claimant’s RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical opinion; “the final responsibility for deciding [this issue] is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Huck v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-30(d)(2)

The final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s RFC is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner rather than a claimant's physician.

Mayer v. O'Malley · filed 2024-12-04(d)

The RFC determination is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d); 416.927(d); Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2015); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine [RFC].”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual-functional-capacity findings as administrative determinations within the ALJ’s province, so an RFC need not match a medical source’s opinion.

St. Francis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-01-22(d)(2)

“An RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); see Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78 (rejecting claimant’s argument that, “having declined to afford controlling weight to any of the three physicians’ opinions, the ALJ was thereby prohibited from making an RFC finding whatsoever”). In this case, the record contains sufficient medical findings—acknowledged by the ALJ—upon which the ALJ was able to assess that Plaintiff had no manipulative limitations due to his cervical radiculopathy. The absence of a medical source statement from a treating source did not, in itself, require the ALJ to call a medical expert.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) assigns the ALJ final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity, including weighing the whole record and resolving evidentiary conflicts.

Straniti v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-02-07(d)(2)

The RFC assessment is an administrative determination for which the ALJ bears “the final responsibility.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). When making an RFC determination, the ALJ’s function is to weigh the evidence as a whole and resolve any conflicts. ... As discussed more thoroughly above, while the ALJ did not find any of the medical opinions in the record persuasive as a whole, after the ALJ evaluated the different medical opinions in the record, the ALJ then proceeded to resolve any evidentiary conflicts identified and formulated an RFC analysis that was well-cited and based on the medical evidence in the record and the reports of John S.’s own symptoms. ... By doing this, the ALJ did not commit legal error in the RFC analysis, but rather conducted a proper RFC analysis.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner.

Stiner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-02-13(e)(2)

“The residual functional capacity determination is expressly reserved for the Commissioner.” Ford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 114 Fed. App’x 194, 198 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1546).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical finding, so it need not exactly match a medical opinion if substantial evidence supports it.

Andrisani v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-02-18(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

McArtor v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-03-14(d)(2)

The responsibility for determining the RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“[T]he administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination within the ALJ’s province rather than a medical determination.

Brown v. O'Malley · filed 2025-03-20(d)(2)

An RFC finding is “administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, rather than the claimant’s physicians.

Michael Hayes v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2025-04-03(d)(2)

Rather, the regulations clarify that the task of determining a claimant’s RFC and ability to work is solely within the province of the ALJ, not the claimant’s doctors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“If your case is at the administrative law judge hearing level or at the Appeals Council review level, the administrative law judge or the administrative appeals judge at the Appeals Council (when the Appeals Council makes a decision) is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.”); see also id. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity (see §§ 404.1545 and 404.1546), . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than to a treating or examining physician.

Hearns v. O'Malley · filed 2025-04-14(d)

While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ succumbed to playing doctor by determining that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, it is well settled that “the determination of a claimant’s RFC is a matter for the ALJ alone – not a treating or examining doctor – to decide.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (“…the final responsibility for deciding [your residual functional capacity] is reserved to the Commissioner”). Plaintiff has provided no persuasive argument that the ALJ erred by relying on the state agency consultants’ findings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves residual functional capacity findings to the Commissioner.

Odom v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-05-12(d)(2)

RFC is an administrative finding of fact reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); Deaton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 315 F. App’x 595, 598 (6th Cir. 2009).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) assigns the ALJ final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

Horr v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-06-02(d)(2)

However, the ALJ may incorporate a physician’s opinions in the RFC by assessing limitations consistent with, but not identical to limitations assessed by the physician. See Turner v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, the ALJ bears the final responsibility for deciding an individual’s RFC, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.946(c), and that responsibility includes “translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner as an administrative finding, so the determination need not exactly match any single medical opinion if substantial evidence supports it.

Presley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-06-03(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) makes residual functional capacity a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Adams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-06-13(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the ALJ.

MILLER v. DUDEK · filed 2025-07-18(d)(2)

Assessing a claimant’s RFC is the province of the ALJ. Wilkinson, 558 F. App’x at 256 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner as a legal decision rather than a medical opinion.

Junker v. O' Malley · filed 2025-08-22(d)(2)

The RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Anastasia Joy Stein v. Frank Bisignano · filed 2025-09-15(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Palmer v. Bisignano · filed 2025-11-10(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical finding.

Preston · filed 2025-12-08(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); ... As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not adopt every limitation in a medical opinion merely because the opinion is persuasive overall.

Rosa R. R. v. Bisignano · filed 2025-12-11(d)(2)

The controlling regulations are clear that the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.946(c). Ultimately, an ALJ determines functional capacity from “all of a claimant’s credibly established limitations.” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in original). When an alleged limitation is “supported by medical evidence, but is opposed by other evidence in the record,” the ALJ may choose to discredit it. Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 615. An ALJ is not required to adopt “all of” an opinion solely because the ALJ finds the opinion “as a whole persuasive . . . .” Wilkinson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 558 F. App’x 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2) places final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity with the Commissioner, so the assessed limitations need not correspond to specific statements in the medical evidence or opinions.

Warner · filed 2026-01-06(e)(2)

Moreover, the final responsibility for determining RFC rests with the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1546. ... There is no need in this case, or in any other, for the Commissioner to base the limitations in his RFC assessment upon specific statements in medical evidence or opinions in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner as administrative findings rather than medical findings.

Fahrer · filed 2026-01-12(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as a legal determination rather than a medical determination.

Gonzalez · filed 2026-01-22(d)

The determination of a claimant’s RFC is a legal decision rather than a medical one. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual functional capacity determination to the Commissioner rather than to a medical source.

THOMAS · filed 2026-01-29(d)(2)

The regulations establish that the RFC determination is expressly reserved for the Commissioner, rather than any medical source. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.946(c)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative finding for the Commissioner, rather than a medical finding.

Bird · filed 2026-02-13(d)(2)

“An RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ, as the Commissioner’s regulations make clear.” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. May 14, 2021) (summary order) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). “Indeed, it is the very duty of the ALJ to formulate an RFC based on all relevant evidence, not just medical opinions, in Plaintiff’s record.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(1) requires consideration of a medical opinion’s residual-functional-capacity finding but reserves the final RFC determination to the Commissioner.

Crossett · filed 2026-03-04(e)(1)

For instance, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1) specifically states that an RFC finding in a medical opinion will be considered, but “the final responsibility for deciding th[is] issue[] is reserved to the Commissioner.” ... Thus, the ALJ was free to not adopt the RFC opinions of Drs. Miller and Brauer that limited Leonard C. to sedentary work.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner as administrative findings rather than medical findings.

Norton · filed 2026-03-18(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because an RFC finding is administrative rather than medical.

Stumpf · filed 2026-03-18(d)(2)

Nevertheless, an RFC finding “is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ, as the Commissioner's regulations make clear.” Curry v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an administrative determination within the ALJ’s province, rather than a medical determination.

King · filed 2026-03-30(d)(2)

An RFC assessment is “administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner as an administrative rather than medical finding, so the determination need not exactly match one medical opinion if substantial evidence supports it.

Dennis L. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2026-04-29(d)

The regulations explicitly provide that the RFC is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022) (recognizing that “the ALJ bears ‘the final responsibility’ for making RFC determinations”); see also Desirae D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-cv-00054-JGW, 2021 WL 2042576, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021). As such, the RFC conclusion “need not perfectly match any single medical opinion in the record, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (c)(4) requires an ALJ to consider whether a medical opinion is consistent with the record as a whole.

Scott v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-28(c)(4)

The ALJ reasonably concluded that Mr. Doggett’s opinion was inconsistent with the record as a whole, including Plaintiff’s subjective reports, examination findings, and activities of daily living. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(4) (requiring an ALJ to consider whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ to consider opinions from non-accepted medical sources and explain the weight given when those opinions may affect the outcome.

Hansen v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-10(f)

Under these rules, an ALJ is required to consider “other” medical source opinions and, where the opinion may have an effect on the outcome of the case, explain the weight given to such opinions or otherwise discuss the opinions in sufficient detail to allow a subsequent reviewer to follow the ALJ’s reasoning. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f). In other words, an ALJ may not reject the relevant testimony of a non-accepted medical source without comment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) requires an ALJ to consider opinions from other medical sources using the same factors used for opinions from acceptable medical sources.

McClanahan v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-22(f)(1)

An ALJ must “consider” opinions from other medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1) (the agency “will consider” opinions from other medical sources “using the same factors” considered for the opinion of an acceptable medical source).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(2) requires an ALJ to explain the evidence sufficiently for a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning when an opinion may affect the outcome.

Groom v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-30(f)(2)

In addition, an ALJ is required to “ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For opinions from other or nonmedical sources, the regulation does not require an ALJ to consider every factor in every case because the evaluation depends on the particular facts.

Miller v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-10-08(f)(1)

An ALJ, however, is not required to consider every regulatory factor in every case involving opinions from “other” medical sources, “because the evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source or from a nonmedical source depends on the particular facts of the case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). ... The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the relevant regulatory factors. The Court does not conclude that the error is harmless. On remand, the ALJ should weigh Zientara’s medical opinion evidence using the relevant regulatory factors to inform and explain his determination if he wishes to assign Zientra’s opinion less than full credit.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When evaluating an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source, not every opinion-weighing factor applies in every case; the evaluation depends on the particular facts.

Alcon v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2022-03-31(f)(1)

Not every factor applies in every case when evaluating an opinion that is not from an “acceptable medical source.” SSR 06-03P (“Not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case. The evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’ depends on the particular facts in each case. Each case must be adjudicated on its own merits based on a consideration of the probative value of the opinions and a weighing of all the evidence in that particular case.”) (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1) (“[N]ot every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case because the evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source . . . depends on the particular facts in each case.”) (emphasis added).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) treats counselors as other medical sources whose opinions must be evaluated separately from opinions of acceptable medical sources.

Tjoelker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-18(f)(1)

Under the regulations applicable to this case, “only ‘acceptable medical sources’ can [provide] medical opinions [and] only ‘acceptable medical sources’ can be considered treating sources.” ... But there are “other sources,” such as counselors, who are considered other medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). ... Evidence from “other medical sources” may be discounted if, as with evidence from lay witnesses in general, the ALJ “gives reasons germane to each [source] for doing so.” ... In this case, the ALJ gave Ms. Hartley’s opinion “limited weight,” finding it inconsistent with (1) Plaintiff’s conservative treatment history; (2) “clinical and examination findings of no acute mental complications;” and (3) Plaintiff’s daily activities. ... Without providing further explaining as to how Plaintiff’s presentations necessarily contradict Ms. Hartley’s opinion, the Court cannot say the ALJ provided a germane reason to discount her opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) permits an ALJ to evaluate opinions from other medical sources using the regulatory factors, without giving them the special weight afforded to treating-physician opinions.

(SS) Gilbert v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-08(f)(1)

Unlike the opinions of treating physicians, the opinions of “other” treating sources are not entitled to special weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and (f)(1). An ALJ may reject the opinions of “other” sources by giving “reasons germane to each witness for doing so.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) permits an ALJ to evaluate opinions from non-acceptable medical sources using the factors used to evaluate opinions from acceptable medical sources.

Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-04(f)

Ms. Putaansuu, a registered nurse, is not an acceptable medical source who can give medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The ALJ may evaluate opinions of other medical sources using the same factors used to evaluate medical opinions of acceptable medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ considering an other medical source to address the opinion, explain its weight with enough detail for subsequent review, and justify giving it more weight than a treating source's medical opinion.

Lukcik v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2023-08-11(f)

Effective March 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration amended its regulations and Social Security Rulings ("SSRs") relating to the evaluation of medical evidence, including the consideration of "acceptable medical sources" and "non-acceptable medical sources" or "other medical sources." Most of these changes were effective only for claims filed after March 27, 2017. The Administration, however, implemented revised versions of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f) and 416.927(f) to provide "clear and comprehensive guidance" about how to consider "other" medical sources for claims filed before March 27, 2017. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). Because Plaintiff’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, and the ALJ issued his opinion after March 27, 2017, the revised versions of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, § 416.927, §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 governs Plaintiff's claim. The revised regulations incorporate the policy in SSR 06-03p of separating acceptable medical sources (licensed physicians and certain other qualified specialists) from "other" medical sources, and generally giving less deference to other medical sources. It also incorporates the policies of requiring the ALJ to consider "other" medical source opinions, explain the weight given to such opinions, provide sufficient analysis to allow a subsequent review to follow the ALJ's reasoning, and to provide sufficient detail and explanation if the ALJ gives greater weight to an opinion from an "other" medical source than a medical opinion from a treating source. Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-45; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f). Because Mr. Tash is an occupational therapist ("OT"), he is an "other" medical source. Id.; see also Pl. Br. at 9.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ to consider opinions and work-related observations from medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources and from nonmedical sources, while permitting the ALJ to discount them for germane reasons.

Hamlett v. Kijakazi, Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-09-17(f)

In addition to the medical opinions of the “acceptable medical sources” outlined above, the ALJ also must consider the opinions of other “medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources and [the testimony] from nonmedical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f). The ALJ is required to consider observations by these sources as to how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work. Id. Nonetheless, an “ALJ may discount [the] testimony” or an opinion “from these other sources if the ALJ gives . . . germane [reasons] for doing so.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (cleaned up). “[A]n opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source . . . may outweigh the medical opinion of an acceptable medical source[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). “For example, it may be appropriate to give more weight to the opinion of a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source if he or she has seen the individual more often than the treating source, has provided better supporting evidence and a better explanation for the opinion, and the opinion is more consistent with the evidence as a whole.” Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ evaluating a treating therapist who is not an acceptable medical source to consider the applicable opinion-weight factors or provide another good reason for discounting the therapist’s opinions.

Matias v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-02-28(f)

In any event, the Court agrees with the reasoning expressed in Juman, and finds that the ALJ committed reversible error by rejecting Rodic’s opinions without any ... evaluation of the Burgess factors or other good reason.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ evaluating opinions from non-physician treating sources to explain the weight given or otherwise provide enough reasoning for a claimant or reviewer to follow the decision.

Kancar v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2025-08-13(f)

Although there may be substantial evidence in this record to support ALJ Georger’s treatment of LCSW Reed’s and NP Taber’s opinions, he has not explained how he resolved the conflicting evidence in the record. He has not, therefore, satisfied his obligation to “ensure that the discussion of the evidence . . . allows a claimant or a subsequent reviewer to follow” his reasoning to discount them.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) requires consideration of a physician assistant’s opinion as an opinion from an other source, which may receive less weight than a physician’s opinion.

(SS) Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2020-02-28(f)(1)

Importantly, however, the Regulations clearly state that physician assistants are not considered acceptable medical sources, but rather “other sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(1), 416.927(f)(1). Thus, the ALJ did not err in stating that Mr. Dhaliwal was “not an acceptable medical source,” or that the utility of his statement was diminished on these grounds, compared those of physicians who offered opinions in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) says that not all factors for evaluating medical-source opinions apply to non-medical sources and requires only enough reasoning to let a claimant or later reviewer follow the weight assigned.

Marquez v. Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-24(f)(1)-(2)

Although the Commissioner generally applies the same factors when weighting opinions from medical sources and non-medical sources such as family members, not all of those factors will apply to all sources since evaluation depends on the facts of the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). As such, the ALJ need only provide enough reasoning to “allow[] a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow [her] reasoning” when affording weight to a non-medical source. Id. § 404.1527(f)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) limits medical opinions to acceptable medical sources, so a counselor who is not a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist is not entitled to deferential weight as a treating source.

Mutschler v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-23(a)(2)

After careful review of the record, this Court concludes that the ALJ did not commit reversible error in evaluating the medical source opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental health limitations. The ALJ appropriately declined to afford deferential weight to the opinion of Dr. Knapke, Plaintiff’s treating mental health provider, given his professional status as a counselor rather than a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1513, 404.1527.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) excludes chiropractors from acceptable medical sources entitled to treating-source deference, and § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) requires consideration of listed factors when weighing medical opinions.

Garcia v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-17(a)(1), (c)(1)-(6)

However, a chiropractor–even a treating chiropractor–is not an acceptable medical source entitled to this deference. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1); 416.927(a)(1); SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2263437, at *45594 (Aug 6, 2006). In the absence of a controlling opinion from an acceptable medical treating source, the ALJ must consider the following factors in deciding the weight to be given to all medical opinions: the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the supportability of the opinion, the consistency of the opinion is with the record as a whole, and other factors that “tend to support or contradict the medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6); 416.927(c)(1)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(2) treats only statements from acceptable medical sources as medical opinions, so a chiropractor’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight and may receive little or no weight.

Hubbard v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-12-13(a)(2)

As a preliminary matter, the ALJ did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Perri’s opinion. The applicable regulations provide that “[m]edical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). The regulations provide an exhaustive list of “acceptable medical source[s],” which does not include chiropractors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) limits medical opinions to statements from acceptable medical sources, so a therapist’s opinion may receive less weight.

Raja Pile-Hijr v. Berryhill · filed 2020-05-29(a)(1)

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Gillis, a therapist, is not an acceptable medical source and her opinion may therefore be afforded less weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider every medical-source opinion with the other relevant evidence and evaluate its support, consistency, and the source’s relevant expertise, but it does not require deference to a non-treating, non-examining source.

Faulkner v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2024-01-02(b), (c)(1)–(6)

The regulations require an ALJ to consider each opinion from a medical source along with other relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). An ALJ must consider whether each opinion is supported by evidence, consistent with the record, and consider factors such as a source’s specialized knowledge about disability programs or an area of medicine. § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6). Nothing in the relevant regulations requires an ALJ to defer to an opinion from a non-treating, non-examining medical source.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) treats consistency with the record as a valid reason to give a medical opinion weight.

Burnett v. Saul · filed 2021-06-02(c)(4)

Again, that an opinion is supported by the record is a valid reason to give it weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (effective August 24, 2012 to March 26, 2017 for all claims filed prior March 27, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (effective March 27, 2017). Thus, the Court finds no error here with respect to the ALJ’s reference to the non-examining consultants’ programmatic knowledge, and the Court will not remand on this basis.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) directs adjudicators to give greater weight to medical opinions that are more consistent with the record as a whole.

Antecki v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-25(c)(4)

“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(2) requires an ALJ evaluating an opinion from a nonacceptable medical source to explain the decision sufficiently for a court to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning.

Andrew v. Saul · filed 2021-06-22(f)(2)

Therefore, the ALJ merely needed to write a decision in such a manner that the Court could follow his reasoning. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(2), 416.927(f)(2); Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1163 (“In the case of a nonacceptable medical source . . . the ALJ’s decision is sufficient if it permits us to ‘follow the adjudicator’s reasoning.’”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires opinions from medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources to be considered using factors including the treatment relationship, examination frequency, specialty, testing, consistency, and supportability.

DeVooght v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-08-24(f)

The ALJ also complied with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Section 404.1527(f) provides that opinions from medical sources who are not “acceptable medical sources” must be considered using the following factors: 1) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; 2) the frequency of examination; 3) the medical source’s specialty; 4) the types of tests performed; 5) and the consistency and supportability of the medical source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f). The ALJ here expressly considered the supportability and consistency of APN Livengood’s opinions. ... The Court does not fault the ALJ for failing to expressly consider every factor of Section 404.1527(c) where the ALJ detailed APN Livengood’s treatments notes spanning several years and pertaining to the array of Scott’s physical and mental complaints.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(2) generally requires an ALJ evaluating a potentially outcome-affecting opinion from a nonacceptable medical source either to state the weight given or to explain the evaluation well enough for a claimant or reviewing court to follow the reasoning.

Sallee v. Social Security Administration · filed 2024-03-20(f)(2)

An ALJ must generally weigh opinion evidence from nonacceptable medical sources using the same factors for weighing opinions from acceptable medical sources listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), (f). Further, an ALJ generally should explain the weight given to opinions from [nonacceptable medical] sources or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the [ALJ]’s reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2). ... Here, ALJ Fellabaum failed to state the weight she gave CNP Garfield’s opinions, made statements that appear to both credit and discredit the opinions, and offered no explanation for this apparently inconsistent treatment. Thus, contrary to the Commissioner’s assertion, the Court cannot follow the ALJ’s reasons for the weight she gave CNP Garfield’s opinions, or even discern what that weight is. This failure to give a discernible indication of the weight afforded to CNP Garfield’s opinions was reversible error. Jensen, 436 F.3d at 1165; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight to consider the treatment relationship, examination frequency, physician's specialty, tests performed, and the opinion's consistency and supportability.

Bahr v. Kijakazi · filed 2021-06-01(c)

“If an ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations require the ALJ to consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician’s specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider all medical opinions and evaluate them using specified factors, giving a treating doctor's opinion substantial or considerable weight unless good cause for discounting it is clearly articulated and supported by substantial evidence.

Ramsdell v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-11-04(b), (c)(1)-(2)

An ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to a medical opinion and the reasons therefor. ... In rendering this determination, an ALJ must take into account: (1) whether the doctor has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of the doctor’s relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the doctor’s opinion; (4) the degree to which the doctor’s opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; and (5) the doctor’s area of specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). While an ALJ is required to assess all of these factors, he need not explicitly address each of them in his decision. ... As a result, the ALJ must give a treating doctor’s opinion substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. ... “Good cause exists when (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her own medical records.” ... If an ALJ elects to “disregard a treating physician’s opinion, . . . he must clearly articulate [his] reasons for doing so,” Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1305 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and those reasons must be buttressed by substantial evidence, Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(5) gives greater weight to a specialist’s opinion about medical issues related to the specialist’s area of expertise.

Rodriguez v. O'Malley · filed 2024-04-22(c)(5)

Additionally, although Dr. Kivowitz was a non-treating physician, he is a psychologist, and thus, the ALJ appropriately gave his testimony “significant weight.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Greater weight is also given to the ‘opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty.’” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5))).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f) requires an ALJ to consider other medical source opinions, explain the weight given to them, provide enough analysis for later review, and give sufficient detail when assigning them greater weight than a treating-source medical opinion.

Kiran v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-28(f)

It also incorporates the policies of requiring the ALJ to consider “other” medical source opinions, explain the weight given to such opinions, provide sufficient analysis to allow a subsequent reviewer to follow the ALJ’s reasoning, and to provide sufficient detail and explanation if the ALJ gives greater weight to an opinion from an “other” medical source than a medical opinion from a treating source.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion deference and weigh it under the regulatory factors when it is not entitled to controlling weight; § 404.1527(c)(2) requires good reasons for the weight assigned.

Vanderpool v. Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-25(c), (c)(2)

To receive controlling weight, a treating physician opinion must be both supported by medical evidence and consistent with the record. If not, the opinion may not merit controlling weight but still must be given deference and weighed using the following six regulatory factors: ... What is absolutely necessary, though, is that the ALJ give good reasons—reasons that are “sufficiently specific to [be] clear to any subsequent reviewers”—for the weight she ultimately assigns to the opinion. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2004).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(i) directs an ALJ to consider the frequency of examination when weighing a medical opinion.

Owens v. Saul · filed 2021-06-02(c)(i)

In addition, despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, it was proper for the ALJ to consider the infrequency of Plaintiff’s treatment for vertigo during the relevant adjudicatory period when weighing Dr. Tompkins’ opinions, regardless of Dr. Tompkins’ 2014 statement that Plaintiff had a “poor prognosis” as to her “persistent vertigo.” Tr. 525; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i) (ALJ considers “frequency of examination” in weighing medical opinions).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2) says an ALJ need not accept state-agency consultants’ findings but must consider their findings and opinions.

Parker v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-24(e)(2)

With respect to State Agency reviewing physicians’ opinion, an ALJ must weigh their opinions under the same factors5 as treating physicians, including the supportability and consistency of the opinions, as well as the specialization of the physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. However, ALJs “are not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or psychological consultants, or other program physicians or psychologists.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (I). Nonetheless, because “State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians, psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified physicians, psychologists,” ALJs must consider their findings and opinions. Id.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions under the regulatory factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.

Springfield v. Social Security Administration Commissioner · filed 2021-05-25(c)(2)

Because Plaintiff’s claim was filed before March 27, 2017, the rules for evaluating opinion evidence are set forth by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)-(f) (2017). ... Ultimately, the ALJ must “give good reasons” to explain the weight given the treating physician’s opinion. Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... In weighing the evidence, the ALJ ultimately gave Dr. Harris’s opinion little weight and gave good reasons for doing so. (Tr. 17-18).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) requires the ALJ to consider how consistent a medical opinion is with the medical record when weighing it.

Duran v. Saul · filed 2021-05-27(c)(4)

The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence. 20 C.F. R. § 404.1527(b). ... The ALJ properly found that the opinion of Dr. Easley was inconsistent with the medical records. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4); ... The Court therefore finds the ALJ properly assessed the medical evidence of record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires the agency to evaluate every medical opinion and gives greater weight to a treating-source medical opinion, but not to all medical evidence in a physician’s file or statement.

Britt v. Saul · filed 2021-05-28(c)

Throughout the five-step evaluation process, the agency must evaluate every medical opinion received, regardless of the source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); see Dowling v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2021). ... The administrative law judge must afford this greater weight only to a medical opinion from a treating physician, not all medical evidence in a physician’s file or statement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); see Dowling, 986 F.3d at 384; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 106–07.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) sets out general preferences for giving greater weight to examining than non-examining physicians, treating than non-treating physicians, and specialists than non-specialists.

Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-02(c)

The opinions of examining physicians are generally given more weight than non-examining physicians, treating more than non-treating, and specialists more than non-specialists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) requires an ALJ to consider factors such as the treating relationship, examination frequency, treatment nature and extent, and opinion supportability when evaluating a treating physician’s opinion.

Schlundt v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-25(c)(2)–(6)

An ALJ’s failure to consider factors like the length of the treating relationship, frequency of medical examinations, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, and the supportability of the opinion constitutes reversible error. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 676 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6)). Here, the ALJ recognized that Dr. Williams was plaintiff’s “[p]rimary treating physician.” Tr. 30. Although the ALJ did not expressly discuss the nature, length, and extent of Dr. William’s treating relationship, the ALJ’s decision, which thoroughly discusses plaintiff’s treatment record at step two and step five, demonstrates that the ALJ reviewed Dr. Williams’ treatment notes and gave his opinions the careful consideration owed to them under the regulations. Tr. 21–24, 26–29. The ALJ did not err in this regard.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(b) requires the ALJ to consider all medical opinion evidence.

(SS) Rochert v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-20(b)

“The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(b)(2)(i)–(ii) permits an ALJ to consider the length of a treatment relationship when weighing a medical opinion, but that factor alone does not justify giving the opinion no deference, particularly when the same doctor later treated the claimant and provided additional opinions.

Ryan v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-04-17(b)(2)(i)–(ii)

The ALJ also discounted Dr. Neitzel’s opinion because she had only treated plaintiff for three months, “rendering her opinions somewhat less convincing than” those of Drs. Nelp and Biles. AR 861. Although this is a factor which the ALJ may consider, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)(2)(i)–(ii), it does not by itself justify the ALJ’s decision giving no deference to Dr. Neitzel’s opinion – particularly in a situation where plaintiff was later treated by the same doctor and that doctor provided additional medical opinions. See Revels, 874 F.3d at 664.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats a statement that a claimant is disabled as non-determinative and makes an opinion's supportability and consistency relevant to its persuasiveness.

Manley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-29(d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1)

General statements by a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are not determinative of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1). ... Specifically, federal regulations highlight the importance of “supportability” and “consistency” of medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3) (emphasis on medical signs and laboratory findings that support the opinion); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(4), 416.927(d)(4) (emphasis on consistency of opinion with record as a whole). ... An ALJ may consider a medical opinion less persuasive if it is inconsistent with other medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)-(3) makes a medical source’s knowledge from the treatment relationship and the support the source provides for an opinion factors in deciding the opinion’s weight.

Arnott v. O'Malley · filed 2024-05-17(c)(2)-(3)

As to Dr. Briones, although a treating physician’s opinions may be informative even if the physician provides treatment after the time period in question, see Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. parts 404 & 416, Dr. Briones did not explain the basis for her opinions as to Arnott’s condition in 2012 which was well before she treated Arnott. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(3) (noting that factors considered in weighing a medical opinion include the nature of the treatment relationship (“the more knowledge a treating source has about your impairment(s) the more weight we will give”) and the supportability of the opinion (“[t]he better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight we will give that medical opinion”)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to weigh medical opinions with the relevant evidence, generally give greater weight to treating-source opinions, and consider their support and consistency, while reserving the ultimate decision to the Commissioner.

Beard v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-08-06(b), (c)(3)-(4), (d)(2)

In assessing the various medical opinions, an ALJ evaluates medical opinions together with all the relevant evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (b). A treating physician’s opinion is typically given the most weight. Generally, “the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary.” MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053; Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961-962 (11th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). ... While an ALJ will consider the opinions of medical sources regarding a claimant’s RFC, “the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). When allocating weight to a medical opinion, an ALJ will give greater weight to those opinions which present “relevant evidence to support a medical opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3). ... In evaluating medical opinions, the ALJ “must specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for giving it no weight....” MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053. ... The court finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Pearlman’s medical opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. However, a reviewing court “cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary.” Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). ... In reconsidering this question, if the ALJ again discounts Dr. Pearlman’s opinion, he “must articulate the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion and must articulate any reasons for discounting the opinion.” Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines medical opinions as statements from acceptable medical sources addressing the nature and severity of impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis, capabilities despite impairments, and physical or mental restrictions.

Garza v. Saul · filed 2021-05-25(a)(1)

Of course, this rule applies only to “medical opinions,” which the Social Security Administration defines as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). ... Since the treatment records are not medical opinions, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to afford them controlling weight or to otherwise evaluate them under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) applies the regulation’s evaluative factors to opinions from other medical sources, but those opinions are not entitled to the special weight afforded to treating-physician opinions.

(SS) Valero v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-07(f)(1)

Unlike the opinions of treating physicians, the opinions of “other” treating sources (such as nurse practitioners) are not entitled to special weight. An ALJ may reject the opinions of “other” sources, such as nurse practitioners, by giving “reasons germane to each witness for doing so,” the same standard applicable to an ALJ’s evaluation of lay witness testimony. ... Factors used to evaluate the opinions of “other” medical sources include: (1) examining relationship; (2) length of treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (3) supportability of opinion; (4) consistency with the record; (5) specialization; and (6) other factors supporting or contradicting the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and (f)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to use the regulation’s opinion-weighing factors when evaluating an “other source” opinion, but the ALJ need not consider every factor.

Lamphier-Deuel v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-09-20(c)

When considering an “other source,” an ALJ must use “the same factors for the evaluation of the opinions from [treating sources].” ... The regulatory factors include (i) the frequency of examinations and the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; (ii) the evidence in support of the physician’s opinion; (iii) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; and (iv) whether the physician has a relevant specialty. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) (2), 416.927(c)(2); ... However, the ALJ was not required to consider every factor.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider nonmedical-source opinions as evidence about impairment severity and ability to carry out tasks and to weigh that evidence.

Jones v. SSA · filed 2021-09-23

ALJ was required to consider these nonmedical opinions because they may provide information about the severity of Jones’s impairments and his ability to carry out certain tasks. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The Court finds that ALJ Sheppard appropriately considered and weighed this evidence in his decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to consider medical opinions, including opinions from other sources using applicable weighing factors, generally explaining the weight given without according those opinions special deference.

Fallins v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-12-22(f)(1)–(2)

As set forth above, the ALJ was not required to give chiropractor Holsten’s opinion any special deference, nor to explain in detail how she assessed it; she was only required to consider the statutory factors as they applied to the facts of this case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1)–(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 distinguishes acceptable medical sources from other sources and permits an ALJ to discount opinions from other sources for germane reasons rather than applying the same deference given to physician opinions.

Sawyer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-12-28(b), (f)

The Social Security Regulations differentiate between “acceptable” medical sources, which include licensed physicians, psychologists, optometrists, and podiatrists, and “other” medical sources, which include nurse practitioners, physicians’ assistants, and public and private social welfare agency personnel. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b), (f); SSR 06-03p. An ALJ may discount “other” sources by providing “germane” reasons. ... “Other” sources like NP Fowler are governed by a different standard and their opinions are not entitled to the same deference as physician opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 does not require an ALJ to expressly consider treatment records from other sources that contain no judgment about the nature or severity of an impairment or what the claimant can still do.

Shipp v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-11(a)(1), (f)

The ALJ was not required to consider explicitly any of this evidence in making his determination because none of these records included a statement containing “judgments about the nature and severity of [Plaintiffs] impairment(s), including . .. what [Plaintiff] can still do despite impairment(s).” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1), (f), and 416.927(a)(1), (f).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) recognizes counselors as medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources and treats their evidence as evidence from other medical sources.

Miles v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-09(f)(1)

But there are “other sources,” such as counselors, who are considered other medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)’s medical-opinion evaluation factors may also be applied to opinions from other sources, including physician assistants.

NUNEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-08-04(c)(1)–(6)

The factors used under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 to evaluate medical opinions from “acceptable medical sources” may also be applied to opinion evidence from “other sources.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(f)(1) permits a non-acceptable medical source's opinion to outweigh an acceptable medical source's opinion after the applicable opinion-weighing factors are applied.

Frese v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-09-28(f)(1)

However, “depending on the facts of the case, and after applying the factors for weighing opinion evidence, an opinion from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’ may outweigh the opinion of an ‘acceptable medical source,’ including the opinion of a treating source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f)(1), 416.927(f)(1); SSR 06-03p, at *5. This is because “other sources” may have information “based on a special knowledge of the individual and may provide insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how it affects the individual’s ability to function.” SSR 06-03p, at *2 (emphasis added).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a well-supported treating physician opinion controlling weight when it is not inconsistent with substantial evidence, and otherwise requires it to receive more weight than other reports.

Demosthenous v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-27(c)(2)

The treating physician rule states that the opinion of a treating physician should be “given more weight than other reports and . . . will be controlling if it is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable [evidence] and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.’” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 does not require an ALJ to expressly apply each of its six medical-opinion factors, so an explanation is sufficient when it makes clear the weight assigned and the reasons for it.

Fannin v. Commissioner, SSA · filed 2021-05-24

Relatedly, Fannin asserts the ALJ failed to adequately explain the reasons for the weight she gave to Dr. Turner’s opinion because she did not discuss the factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 or § 416.927.4 But the ALJ need not “apply expressly each of the six relevant factors in deciding what weight to give a medical opinion.” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). The ALJ discussed factor 2, “the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,” by recognizing Dr. Turner was a “non-examining” source, Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 173; factors 3 and 4, “the degree to which the physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence,” and “consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole,” by finding Dr. Turner’s opinion was persuasive when rendered but superseded in part by subsequent record evidence, id. at 174; and factor 5, “whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered,” by noting Dr. Turner was a psychologist, id. at 173. The ALJ decision was therefore “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight [she] gave to the . . . opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Oldham, 509 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider the listed factors when weighing medical opinions, and § 404.1527(c)(2) provides for controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion unless it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence.

Bruton v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-01(c)(2)

The ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give each medical opinion, including: 1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; 2) the length, nature, and extent of the physician’s relationship with the claimant; 3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician’s opinion; 4) how consistent the physician’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and 5) the physician’s specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 416.927(c). A treating physician’s opinion must be given substantial or considerable weight, unless good cause is shown to the contrary. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2); 416.927(c)(2) (giving controlling weight to the treating physician’s opinion unless it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) assigns the ultimate disability and residual-functional-capacity determinations to the ALJ rather than to treating or examining physicians or state agency consultants.

JONES v. O'MALLEY · filed 2025-09-05(e)

Aisha J. is incorrect. “[T]he ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 404.1546(c). “Although reliance on State consultants’ and treating physicians’ opinions is common . . . the regulations do not require ALJs to seek outside expert assistance.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) gives examining-source opinions greater weight than opinions from sources who only review the medical record.

Harris · filed 2025-10-27(c)(1)

Finally, the ALJ discounted all five examining sources’ opinions because they had not reviewed the longitudinal record. See AR 1542–45. As Judge Settle noted, this is not a legitimate reason for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion, since the “regulations place more weight on opinions from doctors who examine claimants than those who simply review medical records.” AR 1653 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1), Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). In sum, the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of examining sources Drs. Connor, Dees, Bowes, Crampton, and Jenkins.