20 C.F.R. § 404.1527

Law changed since Since March 27, 2017, § 404.1527 applies to claims filed before that date; § 404.1520c governs evaluation of medical opinions for later claims (82 FR 5844).

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ who declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight to consider the prescribed factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned, but failure to discuss each factor explicitly is harmless when the ALJ applies the substance of the treating-physician rule.

Myrick v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-23(c)(2)

The court disagrees that the ALJ “explicitly” reviewed the Burgess factors in determining to give Dr. Gullickson’s opinion only little weight, but such failure is not fatal to Defendant’s motion because the error is merely procedural and thus subject to harmless error review, Schillo, 31 F.4th at 75 (citing Estrella, 925 F.3d at 96), and, moreover, because a plain reading of the ALJ’s decision establishes that despite failing to explicitly consider each of the four factors, the substance of the treating physician rule was applied by ALJ Cordovani.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) defines medical opinions as statements from acceptable medical sources reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments and resulting capabilities or restrictions; treatment recommendations that do not express such judgments are not medical opinions the ALJ must weigh.

Young v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-02(a)(1)

However, these treatment recommendations do not constitute “medical opinions” as contemplated by the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1), 416.927(a)(1) (defining medical opinions as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions” (emphasis added)). As the Commissioner correctly points out, Dr. Barsoum and Dr. Cross did not specify “how frequently [Claimant] could bend nor how much and how frequent [Claimant] could lift[,]” nor whether it would affect Claimant’s ability to complete a normal workday. See Doc. No. 38, at 11–12. Rather, Dr. Barsoum and Dr. Cross made treatment recommendations, which also included the use of moist heat, back strengthening exercises, daily exercises and daily relaxation, and the avoidance of alcohol and coffee.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1), under the former regulations, treated a treating doctor's diagnosis as a medical opinion.

Edminster v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-07(a)(1)

First, under the new . regulations diagnosis are no longer considered “medical opinions,” but are instead considered “other medical evidence.” Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(8).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) calls for medical opinions to be weighed based on the examining and treatment relationships, supporting evidence, consistency with the record, and the physician’s specialization.

Armstrong, III v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-08(c)

The ALJ is to consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give to each medical opinion: (1) whether the doctor has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating doctor’s relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the doctor’s opinion; (4) how consistent the doctor’s ‘opinion is with the record as a whole’; and (5) the doctor’s specialization. ... The ALJ properly determined that Dr. Monette’s opinions were internally inconsistent and inconsistent with his treatment records. Thus, the ALJ provided good cause to afford little weight to Dr. Monette’s opinion and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate medical opinions under the regulation’s hierarchy and may not scrutinize a treating source’s opinion more rigorously than a non-treating source’s opinion.

Lowe v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-01(c)

Moreover, in conducting his review, the ALJ applied a more rigorous scrutiny to Dr. Gollamudi’s opinions than to those of the non-treating and non-examining opinions of Dr. Tangeman. The Sixth Circuit has found that this is precisely the inverse of the analysis that the regulation requires. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 379; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); SSR No. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin July 2, 1996). As a result, the ALJ’s decision indicates that his assessment of the mental health opinion evidence failed to abide by the regulations and, therefore, calls into question the ALJ’s analysis. See Cole v. Astrue, 661 F. 3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) ("An ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations denotes a lack of substantial evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, as the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors is well taken.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for determining residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not adopt a physician’s opinion on that issue.

(SS) Scott v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-17(d)(2)

The ALJ was not required to adopt the findings or opinion of any of the physicians but rather was required to determine the RFC based on all of the evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”); Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“the ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC”); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate and weigh every medical opinion received, regardless of its source.

Goodman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-03(c)

Under the regulations applicable to this case, the ALJ was required to weigh every medical opinion he received. However, in his decision, the ALJ makes no mention of Dr. Bauer's opinion. ... This error is particularly problematic not only because the ALJ was required to evaluate every medical opinion he received, including Dr. Bauer's, but because Dr. Bauer’s opinion was that of a specialist and he opined that Plaintiff needed a job that would allow her to change positions frequently — an opinion consistent with Plaintiff's treating chiropractor, who opined that she needed an at-will sit/stand option.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give good reasons both for denying a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight and for choosing the opinion’s ultimate weight, with only supportability and consistency relevant to the first decision and the regulation’s additional listed factors relevant to the second.

Courtney v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-07-31(c)(2)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the two decisions—whether to give controlling weight versus how much weight to give an opinion not afforded controlling weight—are distinct decisions. Under § 404.1527(c)(2), the ALJ must provide good reasons supporting each decision. But what counts as a good reason for the first inquiry differs from the second inquiry. In deciding whether to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ may only consider whether it is (1) “well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and (2) “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). That is, the regulation restricts the permissible “good reasons” to those two categories alone.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When an ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) requires the opinion to receive deference and be weighed under the listed factors.

Pohl v. Social Security Administration · filed 2023-08-10(c)(2)–(6)

Under the treating physician rule applicable to this case (see id. at 11 n.7), the Commissioner generally affords more weight to opinions from treating sources than from non-treating sources. See Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The ALJ first determines whether an opinion should receive “controlling weight.” See Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119. If an ALJ declines to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the opinion is “still entitled to deference and must be weighed using” the factors discussed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) and 416.927(c)(2)–(6). Id. ... The Court agrees that the ALJ largely failed to analyze the relevant factors in weighing these treating physician opinions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to evaluate whether a treating physician’s opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record.

Kelley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-16(c)(2)

Pursuant to the relevant regulations, the ALJ was required to evaluate whether the opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). As discussed above, the ALJ sufficiently considered Dr. Pulas’s opinion under these standards and provided sufficient reasoning for assigning the opinion little weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) treats a physician’s prescription for a cane as a medical opinion.

Amaral v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-23(a)(1)

As to Plaintiff’s need for an assistive device, the ALJ did observe that Plaintiff “was prescribed an ankle brace,” Tr. at 619 (citation omitted), but did not recognize Plaintiff was also prescribed a cane by Dr. Robinson. This prescription qualifies as a medical opinion under the governing regulation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires further development of the record only when the evidence is ambiguous or inadequate for proper evaluation.

(SS) Trujillo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-14(c)(3)

The ALJ’s duty to further develop the record is triggered only where the evidence is ambiguous or inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(3); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001). ... In sum, Plaintiff does not identify any particular records the ALJ impermissibly or inadequately interpreted, nor is there anything apparently anomalous about the ALJ’s independent review of medical evidence here that would have required an updated opinion of a medical expert.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) does not govern the evaluation of medical opinions for a claim filed in 2019; the later persuasiveness regulations apply.

Moyer v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-07-31(c)(4)

Plaintiff cites to outdated Social Security regulation 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(4) (and presumably 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4)) and outdated case law to support her assertion that “the ALJ must follow a claimant’s doctor’s opinion if it is well supported by medical findings and is not inconsistent with other substantial medical evidence that is in the record.” (Doc. 17, p. 23). Plaintiff’s application was filed on January 7, 2019, meaning 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c are the applicable regulations governing how an ALJ considers medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) does not require an ALJ to expressly discuss every listed factor when the ALJ’s reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.

Mazzola v. Berryhill · filed 2023-09-01(c)

However, even if Plaintiff had properly raised this argument, it would fail regardless: an ALJ is not required to expressly discuss each factor under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). See Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We require no such slavish recitation of each and every factor where the ALJ’s reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”). Here, it is clear ALJ Solomon considered the relevant factors, as he thoroughly assessed Dr. Thukral’s opinion against the record and also noted Dr. Thukral was a consultative examiner who examined Plaintiff only once.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(4) and (c)(6) allow an ALJ evaluating a nurse practitioner's opinion to consider non-medical evidence that bears on the opinion's consistency with the record and tends to support or contradict it.

HENNING v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2023-09-01(c)(4), (c)(6)

When the opinions of nurse practitioners are offered to show “the severity of [an] impairment[] and how it affects [a claimant's] ability to work[,]” 20 C.E.R. § 404.1513(d), an ALJ must evaluate such evidence by considering, inter alia, how consistent the evidence is “with the record as a whole[,]” id. § 404.1527(c)(4), as well as “any factors ... which tend to support or contradict the medical opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(6). The evidence that ALJs can consider when reviewing these factors includes non-medical evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) requires an ALJ to evaluate whether medical evidence supports an expert’s opinion, and the ALJ may rely directly on records that do not require medical expertise to interpret.

Fanning, Stepheny v. Kijakazi, Kilolo · filed 2023-09-22(c)(3)

On the other hand, it is well established that ALJs are required to evaluate whether the medical evidence supports an expert’s opinion, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), and they are not required to rest their decisions on a particular expert opinion, Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). ... In this case, Fanning points to no records that the ALJ relied on that would require expertise to interpret. Rather, the ALJ relied primarily on physical examinations showing full strength, full range of motion, and no abnormalities with Fanning’s left shoulder. The ALJ did not need another expert opinion to find that the examinations undermined Fanning’s testimony and the opinions of Chan and Khorshidi. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Fanning would have some strength or range-of-motion limitations if she were unable to frequently reach overhead.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ weighing a medical opinion to meaningfully consider each of the enumerated factors.

Malone v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2023-09-21(c)(1)-(6)

On remand, the ALJ should meaningfully consider each of the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) factors in alignment with Dowling and Arakas and to the extent improvement in more recent years is relied on by the ALJ in analyzing Dr. Wanamaker’s opinions, the ALJ should resolve conflicting evidence present in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to evaluate every medical opinion and, if a treating source’s opinion is not controlling, weigh it using factors including the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization.

Freeman v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-21(c)

Regardless of the source, the ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion received. ... If the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion should not be considered controlling, the ALJ must then analyze and weigh all of the medical opinions in the record, taking into account the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician’s opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist. ... The ALJ provided several “good reasons” for discounting Pride and Dr. Hosseini’s opinion, discussed the relevant factors, and provided a sufficient explanation linking the evidence to his conclusion from which the court could engage in meaningful review.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For claims filed before 2017, § 404.1527 gives a treating physician’s well-supported opinion controlling weight when it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence, and otherwise requires the ALJ to weigh it under the regulatory factors.

Hatfield v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-09-22(c)(2)–(6)

With regard to the Court’s review of an ALJ’s decision denying an Application for Disability Insurance Benefits filed prior to 2017, such as the one before the Court, while “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical opinions. ... “The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given ‘controlling weight’ so long as ‘it is well–supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the record].”’ Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the relevant factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6) and determine the appropriate weight to give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. ... In the absence of legally sufficient reasons to discount the opinion of Plaintiff’s primary care provider regarding Plaintiff’s chronic migraine headaches, the ALJ erred in giving it no weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e)(2)(iii) permits, but does not require, an ALJ to seek a medical expert's opinion when the record is adequate to decide the claim.

Adams · filed 2025-11-18(e)(2)(iii)

An ALJ’s decision whether to consult a medical expert is discretionary, and an ALJ is not required to consult a medical expert when the record is adequate to render a decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(iii) (stating that an ALJ may, but is not required to, seek the opinion of a medical expert); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, the ALJ clearly determined the record contained sufficient evidence for him to evaluate Claimant’s RFC, and Claimant does not offer any explanation why she contends additional examinations were warranted in this case.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating source’s medical opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.

Young v. Saul · filed 2021-06-03(c)(2)

Under the regulations applicable to Plaintiff’s claim, if the Social Security Administration finds that a treating source’s medical opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” the Social Security Administration will give that opinion “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When weighing a nonexamining medical opinion, the ALJ considers the degree to which the source considered pertinent evidence rather than requiring the source to review all of the evidence.

Price v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-24(c)(3)

There is no requirement that non-examining physicians review “all” of the evidence before rendering an opinion. Instead, the ALJ will look at the “degree to which [they] consider[ed]” such evidence in evaluating the “supportability” factor. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2)(i) makes the length of a treating relationship and the frequency of examination relevant factors in weighing a medical opinion.

Dillard v. Commissioner Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-28(c)(2)(i)

Plaintiff is incorrect. The length of treatment and frequency of examination are relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when determining how much weight to give a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to consider specified factors when weighing a medical opinion, but does not require the ALJ to explicitly discuss each factor.

Sauer v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-02(c)

The Regulations require the ALJ to consider the frequency, length, nature, and extent of treatment; the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and whether the physician is a specialist. See 20 CFR 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c). An ALJ is not required to explicitly go through each and every factor of the Regulation, however ALJ Georger was very thorough in identifying the numerous opinions and citing extensive medical evidence which was inconsistent with Dr. Melgar’s significant limitations. ... Thus, after considering the factors under the treating physician rule in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c), ALJ Georger exhaustively set forth his reasons for the weight assigned to the treating physician Dr. Melgar.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires the Commissioner to consider medical opinions together with the rest of the relevant evidence and reserves responsibility for determining residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Luke v. SSA · filed 2021-06-03(b), (d)(2)

The responsibility for determining the RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (“[T]he administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing your residual functional capacity.”). “Although physicians opine on a claimant’s residual functional capacity to work, ultimate responsibility for capacity-to-work determinations belongs to the Commissioner.” Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F. App’x 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b) (“In determining whether you are disabled, we will always consider the medical opinions in your case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence we receive.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to determine whether a treating-source opinion warrants controlling weight and, if not, consider factors (c)(1)-(6) when assigning weight to the medical opinions.

Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-05-27(c)

As Plaintiff filed his application for Disability Insurance Benefits prior to March 27, 2017, the rules in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 apply to the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the medical opinions in the record. The process of assigning weight to medical opinions in the record begins with a determination whether to assign controlling weight to the medical opinion of the treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). If controlling weight is not assigned to the treating source’s opinion, the Administrative Law Judge must consider the factors in paragraphs (c)(1)-(6) of this section in deciding how much weight to accord each of the medical opinions in the record, including the medical opinion from the treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) generally calls for greater weight for treating-source medical opinions because those sources can provide a detailed, longitudinal view of the claimant’s impairment.

Murphy v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-03(c)(2)

More weight is generally given to medical opinions from treating sources since these are likely to be: most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [Plaintiff’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2)–(3) permits an ALJ to give no controlling weight or special significance to an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, but does not permit the ALJ to ignore it.

Ousley v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-10(d)(2)-(3)

While it is true that opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are not entitled to “special significance” or “controlling weight,’ this does not mean they are improper and therefore to be ignored. Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir.2013) (“Although the ALJ does ‘not give any special significance’ to such opinions, he still must consider ‘opinions from medical sources' in determining the claimant's residual functional capacity.”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(3)); SSR 96–5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *1 (noting that treating source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are “never entitled to controlling weight or special significance,” but that such opinions “must never be ignored”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(1) treats an opinion about whether a claimant can work as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical finding.

Williams v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner · filed 2021-05-26(d)(1)

An opinion on whether Ms. Williams can work is an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner and not a medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). The ALJ thus properly disregarded that part of Dr. Lachman’s opinion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves residual functional capacity assessment to the Commissioner, and § 404.1527(d)(3) provides that an ALJ will not give special significance to the source of an opinion on an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Cantu v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-05-27(d)(2), (d)(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), 416.927(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(e) treats determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

Hoplite v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-01(e)

The determination of RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the Commissioner’s RFC finding.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, while medical sources provide opinions about it.

Shulenburg v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-02(d)(2)

The ALJ is ultimately tasked with reaching an RFC assessment based on the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to evaluate a treating source's opinion using the required factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned.

Theis v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-07-23(c)(2)

Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ failed to provide the detailed discussion of Dr. Griffith’s opinions as required by the regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), and Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors, ECF No. 12, PageID# 944–45. To the contrary, the ALJ expressly noted Dr. Griffith’s specialization as a psychiatrist, the length of her treatment relationship with Plaintiff, the supportability of her opinion, and the consistency of her opinion with the record as a whole, including the opinions of the consulting and reviewing mental health experts. It was only Dr. Griffith’s opinion that Plaintiff would like miss work more than four days per month that the ALJ rejected. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to that effect. In short, the ALJ carefully considered the relevant medical opinions and evaluated those opinions by the appropriate standards. There is substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings in this regard, and Plaintiff’s contention to the contrary is without merit.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence, and otherwise weigh it using specified factors and give good reasons for discounting it.

Brackee, Betty v. Saul, Andrew · filed 2021-09-23(c)(2)

Under the treating physician rule in effect at the time of Brackee’s application, the ALJ had to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it was “well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.” Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 2016); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). If the ALJ does not give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, then the ALJ has to assign it a weight based on factors such as the length and nature of the physician-patient relationship, the opinion’s consistency with the record and the physician’s area of specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Kaminski v. Berryhill, 894 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 2018). An ALJ who chooses not to credit a treating source’s opinion must offer “good reasons” for not doing so. Stage, 812 F.3d at 1126; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an ALJ to give a treating physician’s well-supported, consistent opinion controlling weight, but permits declining that weight when the opinion conflicts with the record and does not require explicit discussion of every weighing factor.

Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-12-14(c)(2)

If the treating physician’s opinion is “well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). ... If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ must meet certain procedural requirements. ... There is no requirement, however, that the ALJ “expressly” consider each of the Wilson factors within the written decision. See Tilley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010) (indicating that, under Blakley and the good reason rule, an ALJ is not required to explicitly address all of the six factors within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) for weighing medical opinion evidence within the written decision).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives a treating source’s opinion controlling weight only when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.

Sposato v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-17(c)(2)

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that this particular opinion was indeed well supported by clinical and laboratory diagnosis techniques, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). (Dkt. No. 10, at 15-18.) Either the record evidence cited by Plaintiff does not constitute medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnosis techniques or it merely supports a finding that this particular opinion was only somewhat supported by those techniques, not that it was well supported by them. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 11, at 11-13.)

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 requires an ALJ to give a treating source's opinion controlling weight when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.

Dudrey v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-03-30(c)(2)

“The ALJ must give ‘controlling weight’ to a treating [source’s] opinion if it ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.’”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives treating-source opinions controlling weight when they are well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and are not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.

Cothran v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2022-05-05(c)(2)

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, treating-source opinions are given “controlling weight” when they are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and are “not inconsistent” with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300. However, the regulations were revised for claims, like plaintiff’s, filed on or after March 27, 2017.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(a)(1) limits a treating source to the claimant’s own acceptable medical source who provides treatment or evaluation and has an ongoing treatment relationship; an outside medical source is not entitled to treating-source deference, though the opinion must still be weighed under the regulation’s factors.

Armstrong v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-12(a)(1)

The regulations define a “treating source” as a claimant’s “own acceptable medical source who provides…medical treatment or evaluation and who has…an ongoing treatment relationship” with a claimant. 20 C.F.R., § 404.1527(a)(1). ... For applications filed prior to March 27, 2017, an “acceptable medical source” is a medical source who is a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, licensed optometrist (for impairments of visual disorders, or measurement of visual acuity and visual fields only), licensed podiatrist (for impairments of the foot, or foot and ankle only), or qualified speech-language pathologist (for speech or language impairments only). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). ... Although he is a medical source, he does not fall within the list of “acceptable medical sources” and therefore is not a “treating source” for the purposes of the “treating physician rule.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 1502(a), 404.1527(a)(1); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242. Thus, the ALJ did not need to evaluate whether Mr. LaVanche’s opinion should be given controlling weight or deferential weight, as his opinion was not entitled to any greater deference. ... Although the ALJ’s decision to evaluate Mr. LaVanche’s opinion under the “treating physician” rule is a legal error, that error is harmless because the ALJ did not assign controlling weight to the opinion. Instead, the ALJ appropriately weighed the factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and discounted Mr. LaVanche’s opinion. The ALJ’s decision to assign only limited weight to Mr. LaVanche’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence and so cannot be reversed by this Court.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) gives a treating source controlling weight only when the opinion is well supported and consistent with substantial evidence, and requires the adjudicator to weigh opinions using the listed regulatory factors.

Dolan v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-05-31(c)(2)-(6)

First, treating physicians, such as Dr. Clark, are only entitled to controlling weight when the opinion is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. ... Here, the ALJ provided good reasons for affording little weight to Dr. Clark’s opinion, based on the regulatory factors at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) and 416.927(c)(2)-(6).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) gives controlling weight to a treating source’s well-supported, consistent opinion and requires good reasons when an adjudicator gives it less than controlling weight.

Courtney v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-08-02(c)(2)

The regulation that applies to this claim states: “If we find that a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it controlling weight.” ... But the undersigned does not read controlling Sixth Circuit case law or the regulations to mandate a rigidly bifurcated articulation of the controlling weight and non-controlling weight analyses. ... In fact, the Sixth Circuit has never required any particular format or number of sentences to satisfy the “good reasons” standard, so long as the explanation is sufficient for this Court to understand the basis for the ALJ's decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires an adjudicator to give more weight to opinions from treating sources than to opinions from other sources.

Wright v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-10-03(c)(2)

The Regulations require that more weight be given to the opinions of treating sources than other sources.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) gives a treating physician’s well-supported opinion controlling weight when it is not inconsistent with other substantial record evidence and otherwise directs weighing medical opinions by the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, and specialization factors.

Ard v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-04-12(c)(2)-(6)

The medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given “controlling weight” as long as it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017). When a treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, it is weighted according to factors such as the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with the record, and specialization of the physician. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6); Id. ... The ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting these opinions, and as such, the ALJ’s assignment of weight to these opinions are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For claims governed by the treating-source rule, a treating physician’s opinion receives controlling weight when it is well supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must weigh the opinion under the regulatory factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned.

Turner v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-31(c)(2)-(4)

Under Sixth Circuit law, the opinion of a treating physician is given controlling weight if such opinion (1) “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and (2) “is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.”...Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ addressed every factor set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) and provided good reasons for her determination that Dr. Blankfield’s 2014 opinions were entitled to “scant” weight.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires controlling weight for a treating source’s well-supported opinion when it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must give good reasons after considering the regulatory factors.

Rodriguez v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-10-08(c)

Under the applicable regulations for cases filed prior to March 27, 2017, the ALJ must give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight “if it is well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.” Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). When controlling weight is not given, an ALJ must offer “good reasons” for doing so, after considering the “length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician's specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician's opinion.” Stage, 812 F.3d at 1126; Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). ... Even if the Court were to disagree with any part of the ALJ’s assessment of the above opinions, she supplied ample reasons pursuant to the regulatory factors in her analysis, which is all she had to do. See Moss, 555 F.3d at 561; 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ to give good reasons for the weight assigned a treating-source opinion but does not require the written decision to articulate consideration of every listed factor.

Bryant v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-12-08(c)

To the extent the R&R recommends reversal on the basis that the ALJ erred by not discussing “the other relevant factors” in Section 404.1527(c), namely, treatment relationship and specialization, the applicable regulations require the ALJ to provide “good reasons” for the weight given to a treating source’s medical opinion (20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)), the Court sustains the Commissioner’s objection because the regulations do not require the ALJ to specifically articulate the consideration of each Section 404.1527 factor in the written decision.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives a treating medical source’s opinion about the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments controlling weight only when it is well supported by acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial record evidence.

Wilds v. SSA · filed 2024-03-19(d)(2)

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), a medical source’s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is given controlling weight only if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is “not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) gives a well-supported treating-source opinion controlling weight when it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must consider the regulatory factors and give good reasons for the weight assigned, but need not provide an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis.

Hellinger v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-24(c)

Under the governing regulations, “[t]reating source opinions must be given ‘controlling weight’ if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’; and (2) the opinion ‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’” ... If an ALJ gives a treating source’s opinion less than controlling weight, she must provide “good reasons” for the weight she assigns. ... However, an ALJ is not required to provide “an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis” of the factors considered when weighing medical opinions. ... Under the regulatory framework and “treating physician rule” applicable in this case, the Court’s analysis must focus on whether the ALJ considered the relevant factors and provided “good reasons” for the weight given to treating opinions, and not on his strict compliance with any articulated framework. ... In the context of the decision as a whole, the Court finds the ALJ sufficiently articulated “good reasons” to support the weight he gave to Dr. Waltman’s opinion, and his findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c)(3) allows an ALJ to give little weight to a treating source’s opinion when the opinion lacks meaningful supporting medical evidence.

Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-10-09(c)(3)

It is the court’s recommendation that ALJ Ramos’ decision to afford “little weight” to Dr. Brundage’s opinion does not warrant remand. Like Drs. Khouzam and Athwal, Dr. Brundage’s Medical Source Statement (T. 2691-94) is in check-box form and is “unaccompanied by [any] meaningful medical evidence in the administrative record.” Colgan, 22 F.4th at 361; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An ALJ need not explicitly discuss every Section 404.1527 factor when declining to give a treating source controlling weight, provided the decision explains the evaluation of the medical evidence sufficiently to permit meaningful judicial review.

BACH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-10-25(c)(2)

As a preliminary matter, “[a]n ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor [under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527] in [her] decision.” ... “Instead, an ALJ need only ‘explain his evaluation of the medical evidence for the district court to meaningfully review whether his [or her] reasoning accords with the regulation’s standards.’” ... Judge Shelton did just that in this case.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ who does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight to meaningfully consider every listed factor and give good reasons for the weight assigned, though the decision need not expressly discuss every factor.

Long v. Colvin · filed 2024-11-06(c)

Although 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) provides that in the absence of a controlling opinion by a treating source, all of the medical opinions must be evaluated and weighed based upon various factors, the regulations do not explicitly require the ALJ to recount the details of that analysis in the written opinion. Instead, the regulations mandate only that the ALJ give “good reasons” in the decision for the weight ultimately allocated to medical source opinions. ... Furthermore, even if the ALJ properly declined to give controlling weight to Dr. Zervos’s opinion, the ALJ did not proceed to consider the regulatory factors in weighing the opinion as required by SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6); and Dowling, 986 F.3d 377, 384–86.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(c) requires an ALJ evaluating a non-treating source's opinion to consider six regulatory factors, but not to give specific reasons for omitting each limitation from the RFC.

Howard · filed 2025-12-02(c)

Dr. Sahner is a non-treating source; she performed a one-time consultative examination of Claimant. ALJ Collins, accordingly, was not required to provide specific reasons for the omission of any limitations from her opinion in the RFC determination. ALJ Collins was only required to consider the six factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). He did so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) leaves final responsibility for determining residual functional capacity to the ALJ, while requiring consideration of medical sources.

ALLEN v. O'MALLEY · filed 2024-09-30(d)(2)

The ALJ has the final responsibility for determining a claimant's RFC, though medical sources are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). ... It was within the ALJ's authority to make inferences from the evidence in the record and find that Plaintiff's additional impairments and symptoms could reasonably limit his RFC beyond the restrictions recommended by the State agency examiners, but less so than his own subjective statements, and provide cane usage for a limited purpose of uneven terrain or ascending and descending slopes, among other limitations accommodating his knee impairments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical source.

Howard, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-09(d)(2)

See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the final decision on a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so an RFC determination is not a medical opinion.

(SS) Linan v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-17(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Ramirez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-06-28(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527 treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner and bars giving special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Hess v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2021-07-06(d)(2), (d)(3)

The RFC determination sets out an individual’s work-related abilities despite his or her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). As such, the ALJ bears the responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC based on all the relevant evidence (20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)) and must consider all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments, both individually and in combination. See SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184 (SSA July 2, 1996).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Blose v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-10-19(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a determination of residual functional capacity as not a medical opinion and reserves it to the Commissioner.

(SS) Corwin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-12-06(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, making the RFC determination administrative rather than a medical opinion.

Conklin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2021-12-06(d)(2)

Additionally, an ALJ’s RFC determination is not fatally flawed merely because it was formulated absent a medical opinion. As stated in the regulations, an RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a residual-functional-capacity determination as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Carbajal v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-01-19(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats the residual functional capacity determination as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Swartout v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-02-24(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the issue of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner as an administrative finding dispositive of the case.

Hauser v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-06-10(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner, and § 404.1527(d)(3) bars giving special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.

Delly v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2022-06-29(d)(2), (d)(3)

A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ “will not give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the determination of residual functional capacity to the Commissioner and does not treat it as a medical opinion.

(SS) Shank v. Commissioner Social Security · filed 2022-07-07(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a determination reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Trogdon v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-07-26(d)(2)

An RFC determination is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding issues such as a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Perez v. Kijakazi · filed 2022-08-30(d)(2)

Indeed, “the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) assigns the ALJ final responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity based on all relevant evidence.

Kerr v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-09-20(d)(2)

The ALJ is charged with the final responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC and must base it on all relevant evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a)(1).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because RFC is an administrative finding that is dispositive of the case.

Scrivani v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-14(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner and does not treat it as a medical opinion.

(SS) Vang v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-19(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a residual functional capacity determination as an administrative decision reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Verreault v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2022-12-29(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a residual functional capacity determination as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Tainter v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-02-03(d)(2)

A determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (d)(2) treats a residual functional capacity determination as a decision reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-03-03(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Former § 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, even though medical source opinions are considered.

Starr v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-04-06(d)(2)

While medical source opinions are considered, the final responsibility for deciding the RFC is reserved to the Commissioner. See former 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a physician—ultimately determines a claimant’s RFC.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion.

(SS) Hernandez Rivera v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-04-11(d)(2)

In fact, the reason Plaintiff’s argument seems internally inconsistent is because Plaintiff’s position is blatantly contradicted by the Regulations, which reserves ultimate determination of the RFC exclusively for the Commissioner. ... As previously noted, the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2); 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Pirro v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-04-26(d)(2)

Further, the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Lombardo v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-05-02(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); ... see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Cavazos v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-05-11(d)(2)

Further, Plaintiff’s position that the ALJ may not review a medical report and incorporate it into the RFC determination without a medical opinion discussing it, is blatantly contradicted by the Regulations, which reserves ultimate determination of the RFC exclusively for the Commissioner. ... As previously noted, the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2); 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner and treats them as issues rather than medical opinions.

Joe Lester, Jr. v. Kijakazi · filed 2023-05-12(d)(2)

Nor did the ALJ err in discounting Dr. Baylor and Oman’s opinions regarding Lester’s functional limitations, despite their medical expertise, because an RFC determination is “reserved to the Commissioner” and is not a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Mercado v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-05-17(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner as administrative findings rather than medical determinations.

Fisher v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-06-08(d)

As explained above, RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical one. Ultimately, an ALJ is tasked with weighing the evidence in the record and reaching an RFC finding based on the record as a whole. ... The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the determination of residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not adopt a physician’s findings or opinion on that issue.

(SS)Kuhn v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-06-14(d)(2)

In sum, the ALJ was not required to adopt the findings or opinion of any of the physicians but rather was required to determine the RFC based on all of the evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”); Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“the ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC”); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not reproduce a medical source’s exact limitations in the RFC.

(SS) Perez v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-06-15(d)(2)

This is because the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). For this reason, as well, Plaintiff’s argument that the RFC was flawed because the ALJ did not incorporate into the RFC the exact limitations identified by Dr. Portnoff is unavailing.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Garcia v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-06-23(d)(2)

As previously noted, the RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545). It is therefore squarely within the ALJ’s province to synthesize the medical evidence, resolve conflicts and ambiguities in the medical testimony, and determine credibility.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(3) leaves responsibility for assessing and assigning a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the ALJ rather than any particular medical source.

WHITTLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-07-24(d)(2)-(3)

The responsibility for assessing and assigning a claimant’s RFC rests solely with the ALJ, not with any particular medical source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(3); 404.1546(c); see also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for determining residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, including translating clinical findings into concrete functional restrictions.

Guillot v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-03(d)(2)

The “final responsibility” for deciding issues such as an individual’s RFC “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.927(d)(2), 416.946(c). That responsibility includes “translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)). Because Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s conclusion was unreasonable, the Court finds no harmful error in the ALJ’s interpretation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves to the Commissioner the final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity.

(SS)Stites-Mounts v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-07(d)(2)

The ALJ considered the weight of these opinions, as the ALJ is charged to do, and rejected limitations to medium or the full range of light exertional activity, finding instead that the opinions—as well as the evidence of record showing Plaintiff’s “orthopedic impairments” and her “subjective allegations of pain”—supported a finding of light work with additional limitations. ... See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (“the final responsibility for deciding [RFC] is reserved to the Commissioner), § 404.1545(a)(1) (“We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all the relevant evidence in your case record.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats the determination of a claimant's residual functional capacity as a legal decision rather than a medical one.

Gibbs v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-21(d)

The determination of a claimant's RFC is a legal decision rather than a medical one. Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because it is a dispositive administrative finding.

Laurie v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-08-23(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) did not treat a doctor’s assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity as a medical opinion.

FOSTER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-09-11(d)(2)

However, even under the prior regulations a doctor’s assessment of a claimant’s RFC was not considered to be a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2016).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) requires an ALJ to consider medical-source opinions about residual functional capacity but reserves the final residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner.

Diaz v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-09-29(d)(2)

When assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider medical opinions regarding the claimant’s functioning and make a determination based on an assessment of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”). ... Accordingly, the ALJ adequately accounted for Dr. Carr’s assessment.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Abdallah v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-10-18(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the ALJ.

CHIARAVALLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2023-10-26(d)(2)

At the outset, the Court notes that a claimant’s RFC is the most that an individual can do despite his or her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a), 416.927(d)(2), 416.945(a). The claimant’s RFC is solely determined by the ALJ. See id. at §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.927(d)(2), 416.946(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical determination.

Ridinger v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-11-06(d)

As explained above, RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical one. The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Demint v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-12-12(d)(2)

The Social Security regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit precedent provide that the ALJ is charged with the final responsibility in determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding the residual functional capacity “is reserved to the Commissioner”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the residual-functional-capacity determination to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not base it on a particular medical opinion.

Al-Maliki v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration · filed 2023-12-14(d)

To the extent Al-Maliki argues the ALJ erred in not basing the RFC on a medical opinion, this Court reiterates the rule that an ALJ is not required to base the RFC determination on a particular medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (“The determination of an individual's residual functional capacity is an issue reserved for the Commissioner.”); Mokbel-Aljani v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 732 F. App'x 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2018) (“We have previously rejected the argument that a [RFC] determination cannot be supported by substantial evidence unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that of the ALJ.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner as an administrative finding rather than a medical opinion.

Schwab v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2023-12-26(d)

As explained above, RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical one. The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves to the Commissioner final responsibility for deciding a claimant’s residual functional capacity, so an ALJ need not adopt a medical opinion verbatim.

Strand v. O'Malley · filed 2023-12-29(d)(2)

In any event, although the ALJ must consider medical source opinions in assessing a claimant’s RFC, there is no requirement that the ALJ’s RFC assessment track verbatim the medical opinions he considers. See Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 83, 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n ALJ must consider the entire record[;] the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions of any of the claimant’s physicians.” (citation omitted)). Again, “the final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives the ALJ final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and does not require the ALJ to adopt any single doctor’s opinion.

Stillwell v. O'Malley · filed 2024-01-10(d)(2)

“An ALJ has ‘final responsibility’ for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and need not adopt any one doctor’s opinion.” Fanta v. Saul, 848 F. App’x 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(2); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not adopt a medical opinion verbatim.

Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-01-10(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. ... see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional. ... Thus, the ALJ did not need to adopt Dr. Ippolito’s opinion verbatim because he gave it great weight, as Plaintiff suggests.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner.

Jennings v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-01-10(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) treats residual functional capacity as a legal determination reserved to the Commissioner, not as a medical opinion.

(SS) Sanchez de Mendoza v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-09(d)

The RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 404.1546(c); Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049 (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the ALJ rather than requiring the ALJ to adopt a medical opinion.

Ascher v. O'Malley · filed 2024-02-20(d)

However, determining a claimant’s RFC “is a matter for the ALJ alone . . . to decide.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an administrative determination within the ALJ’s province, not a medical determination.

Lynch v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-02-21(d)(2)

“An RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ[.]” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). The ALJ is “entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an issue reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Dean v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-02-28(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves the determination of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner because it is a dispositive administrative finding, not a medical determination.

Martz v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-01(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) gives the ALJ final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity from the overall medical record.

Moy v. O'Malley · filed 2024-03-05(d)(2)

An ALJ has the “final responsibility” for determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Fanta v. Saul, 848 F. App’x 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2021). ... The Court also finds that under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) the ALJ did not play doctor but reviewed the overall medical record in determining the RFC, as is required. The ALJ has final responsibility for determining Ferida’s RFC and these cases are unpersuasive.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Hopfer v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-05(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination within the ALJ’s province rather than a medical finding.

Zapata v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-03-12(d)(2)

“[A]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 49 n.3 (2d Cir. May 14, 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves final responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, even though the ALJ must consider all medical opinions.

Luke v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-03-28(d)(2)

Although the ALJ must consider all medical opinions, including the initial State agency determination, the “final responsibility” for determining Plaintiff’s RFC “is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner, so an ALJ need not base the RFC on a specific medical opinion.

CHALMERS v. KIJAKAZI · filed 2024-04-11(d)(2)

The Court notes that the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2); 404.1546(c). ... The RFC is an administrative finding. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Accordingly, ALJs are obligated to review all the evidence and decide what limitations are appropriate for inclusion in the RFC; fulfilling that obligation does not mean an ALJ has inappropriately substituted his or her lay opinion for the medical opinion evidence in the record.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves responsibility for assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-04-15(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner). Determining a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner, not a medical professional.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Kowalski v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-04-29(d)(2)

Moreover, the regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative finding that the ALJ is responsible for determining.

CIPRIANO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY · filed 2024-05-28(d)(2)

The RFC assessment is an administrative finding and the ALJ alone is responsible for determining a plaintiff's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d) reserves residual-functional-capacity determinations to the Commissioner because they are dispositive administrative findings.

Rowsey v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-10(d)

The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner, so the assessment need not mirror a medical opinion.

Bogle v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-07-29(d)(2)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the ALJ properly considered the opinion evidence and relied on other evidentiary sources to make an RFC finding that accounted for all of Plaintiff’s credible limitations, as supported by the record. Tr. 20-30. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. Furthermore, the ALJ was not required to rely on an opinion that mirrored the RFC, as Plaintiff argues. See ECF No. 7-1 at 12-22. As explained above, RFC is an administrative finding, not a medical one. Ultimately, an ALJ is tasked with weighing the evidence in the record and reaching an RFC finding based on the record as a whole. See Tricarico v. Colvin, 681 F. App’x 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56). The regulations explicitly state that the issue of RFC is “reserved to the Commissioner” because it is an “administrative finding that [is] dispositive of the case.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). The ALJ “will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence,” not just medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1), (4), 416.913(a)(1), (4) (explaining that evidence that can be considered includes objective medical evidence, such as medical signs and laboratory findings; as well as evidence from nonmedical sources, including the claimant, such as from forms contained in the administrative record).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) provides that residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion but a legal determination reserved for the Commissioner.

(SS) Alvarez Marin v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-16(d)(2)

Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ requires some type of guidance from a healthcare professional, the determination of residual functional capacity is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion), 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a residual functional capacity determination as a legal decision reserved to the Commissioner, rather than a medical opinion.

(SS) Nichols v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-26(d)(2)

A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) reserves the assessment of a claimant’s residual functional capacity to the Commissioner rather than a medical professional.

Almarawi v. Commissioner of Social Security · filed 2024-08-08(d)(2)

At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing ... the claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); SSR 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471-01 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating the assessment of a claimant’s RFC is reserved for the Commissioner).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as an administrative determination within the ALJ’s province rather than a medical finding.

Blando v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration · filed 2024-08-29(d)(2)

“[A]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its ... determination is within the province of the ALJ.” Curry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats a claimant’s residual functional capacity as an administrative determination reserved to the ALJ rather than a medical finding.

Clark v. O'Malley · filed 2024-09-03(d)(2)

As stated in the regulations, an RFC finding is administrative in nature, not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 404.1527(d)(2) treats residual functional capacity as a legal decision reserved to the Commissioner rather than a medical opinion.

Eterno v. Kijakazi · filed 2024-09-10(d)(2)

The RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional capacity.”).