18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon whose repeated drug distribution and firearm involvement demonstrate dangerousness.

United States v. Spence · filed 2026-02-18(g)(1)

Spence’s repeated involvement with drug distribution and firearms demonstrates the kind of dangerousness that the statute targets, confirming § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Simmons · filed 2026-02-18(g)(1)

He contends that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... The parties are correct that Simmons’s argument is clearly foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons remains valid under the Second Amendment even when a felon’s prior offenses did not involve firearms or show that he poses a physical danger.

United States v. Telusme · filed 2026-02-19(g)(1)

Here, the government is clearly right as a matter of law that Telusme’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm and ammunition possession by felons withstands the Second Amendment challenge foreclosed by binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Torres · filed 2026-02-20(g)(1)

Torres also argues that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of ammunition are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. But Torres concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Therefore, the district court properly denied Torres’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Williams · filed 2026-02-20(g)(1)

The government is clearly correct as a matter of law that our binding precedent in Rozier and Dubois II forecloses Williams’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing ammunition withstands the facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges foreclosed by Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Dexter Hall · filed 2026-02-24(g)(1)

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion, as Hall’s argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional as applied to felons under the Second Amendment.

United States v. McCoy · filed 2026-02-25(g)(1)

Even assuming we could consider such a challenge, McCoy’s challenge is foreclosed by our own Circuit precedent in Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 135708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), where we expressly held that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment and is constitutional as applied to felons, see id. at 91–96. Since Zherka, we have consistently rejected challenges like McCoy’s, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, No. 24-1539, 2025 WL 2327335, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2025); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 25-181, 2025 WL 3716677, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2025), and we do the same here.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by people convicted of felonies does not violate the Second Amendment on its face or as applied to a felon.

United States v. Cisneros · filed 2026-02-26(g)(1)

So because § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment, Cisneros’s facial challenge fails. See Vincent, 127 F.4th at 1266. And because § 922(g)(1) constitutionally applies to “all individuals convicted of felonies,” Cisneros’s as-applied challenge fails, too.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon remains enforceable against the Second Amendment challenge foreclosed by Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Labs · filed 2026-02-27(g)(1)

Mr. Labs concedes that Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 12, 2025) (No. 24-1155), forecloses his Second Amendment challenge, which he now raises for preservation purposes only. We therefore affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment.

United States v. Powell · filed 2026-03-03(g)(1)

Our precedents control this appeal and foreclose Powell’s arguments. ... that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment.

A Second Amendment challenge to a § 922(g)(1) indictment is foreclosed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hunt.

United States v. Starkey · filed 2026-03-02(g)(1)

David Allen Starkey entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to a plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. ... Starkey’s claim is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025).

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession ban withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges foreclosed by Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Nuno-Lopez · filed 2026-03-04(g)(1)

He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. ... In his brief to this court, Mr. Nuño-Lopez states that in district court he “conceded his claims were foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. May 12, 2025) (No. 24-1155), and that he was raising them for purposes of preservation.” Aplt. Br. at 3.1 He brought this appeal “[f]or preservation purposes,” and makes the same concession. Id. at 4. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands the facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges foreclosed by Diaz and Kimble.

United States v. Casavant · filed 2026-03-06(g)(1)

He argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment on its face and as applied to him in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). ... The Government is correct that Casavant’s arguments are foreclosed. ... Because Diaz and Kimble are clearly dispositive, we affirm the district court’s judgment without further briefing.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit firearm possession by a felon whose criminal history shows a credible threat to public safety.

Washington v. United States of America · filed 2026-03-06(g)(1)

Even so, Mr. Washington's extensive non-stop criminal record – which includes several violent offenses, firearm offenses, and multiple violations of probation – demonstrates that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Mr. Washington, "comports with our nation's history and tradition of disarming those found to pose a credible threat to public safety and/or the physical safety of others." Reed, 2025 WL 3173913 at *5.

Binding Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses a facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Becker · filed 2026-03-09(g)(1)

Because Defendant concedes that we have already decided the issue of § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality against him, he has failed to identify an error upon which we could reverse.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Second Amendment challenge under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Oliver · filed 2026-03-09(g)(1)

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oliver’s motion to dismiss the indictment because this Court’s precedent forecloses his argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitu- tional.

Section 922(g)(1) is not susceptible to a facial Second Amendment challenge under binding Sixth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Chappell · filed 2026-03-12(g)(1)

Chappell next asserts that his statute of conviction—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—is facially unconstitutional under Bruen. ... Our precedent therefore forecloses Chappell’s facial challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to people convicted of felonies, including non-violent felonies.

United States v. Nunamaker · filed 2026-03-16(g)(1)

Defendant is correct that our decision in Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied 2026 WL 568283 (March 2, 2026), upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) over a Second Amendment objection as to any individual convicted of a prior felony, including a non-violent felony offender. ... Because controlling Tenth Circuit precedent compels this panel to uphold the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially invalid under the Second Amendment in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Leonard · filed 2026-03-16(g)(1)

In his sole issue on appeal, he argues that § 922(g)(1) facially violates the Second Amendment. ... The parties are correct that Leonard’s facial constitutional challenge is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) remains subject to Fourth Circuit precedent foreclosing as-applied Second Amendment challenges after Bruen and Rahimi.

United States v. Simmons · filed 2026-03-16(g)(1)

Even assuming the issue was properly preserved, we conclude that it is foreclosed by our decision in Hunt. See id. at 702 (holding that neither New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2002), nor United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), abrogated our precedent “foreclosing as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1) and those decisions thus remain binding”).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Second Amendment challenge, and an as-applied challenge by a person previously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is foreclosed.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2026-03-17(g)(1)

Robinson asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. His facial challenge is foreclosed. See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). Similarly, Robinson’s as-applied challenge is also foreclosed, despite any arguments to the contrary, based on his previous felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional, and it may be applied to a felon whose record and conduct show that he is dangerous.

United States v. Eddie Lee Nailor, III · filed 2026-03-18(g)(1)

Therefore, because binding precedent has foreclosed all facial claims against § 922(g)(1), Nailor’s facial claim fails. ... Applying Williams here, Nailor’s criminal record, the circumstances of his offenses, and the nature of the instant offense all suggest that he is dangerous. ... So, Nailor has not overcome the evidence that he is dangerous, and his as-applied claim must therefore fail.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges by a non-violent felon who possessed firearms for hunting.

United States v. Butts · filed 2026-03-19(g)(1)

Butts asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him as a purportedly non-violent felon who possessed the firearms for hunting purposes. This claim is foreclosed. See United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (“[Section] 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to non-violent felons[.]”), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2026 WL 135692 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges by a purportedly non-violent felon under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Boyd · filed 2026-03-19(g)(1)

Boyd asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him as a purportedly non-violent felon. This claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)'s prohibition on firearm possession by aliens unlawfully in the United States survives a Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Bernabe-Martinez · filed 2026-03-20(g)(5)(A)

Bernabe-Martinez contends that his conviction should be vacated because § 922(g)(5)(A) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him. This claim is foreclosed by United States v. Vazquez-Ramirez, 163 F.4th 706 (9th Cir. 2026), which was decided after briefing.

A defendant challenging § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional as applied bears the burden of showing they are not dangerous; the court must consider their entire criminal history and may consider their status on supervised release.

United States v. Hostettler · filed 2026-03-20(g)(1)

Williams’s analysis conflicts with the district court’s in three important ways: first, the burden lies with Hostettler, not the government, to show he is not dangerous; second, the ... court must consider Hostettler’s entire criminal history, not just his felony convictions; and third, his status on supervised release is potentially relevant.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge by a person with prior felony convictions for discharging a firearm at an individual.

United States v. Williamson · filed 2026-03-23(g)(1)

These offenses are closely analogous to the deadly conduct conviction that we relied on, in part, to reject an as- applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Reyes, 141 F.4th 682, 686– 87 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2025). ... Accordingly, Williamson’s as-applied challenge fails.

Binding Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Lowmaster · filed 2026-03-24(g)(1)

Because Mr. Lowmaster does not address the plain error requirements in his brief, we would “ordinarily deem the issue waived,” United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019), but he cannot show plain error, let alone error, because, as his brief notes, “the issue raised in this case is currently foreclosed by circuit precedent,” Aplt. Br. at 6.

Section 922(g)(9) remains facially constitutional under the Second Amendment following Bruen.

United States v. Delauder · filed 2026-03-26(g)(9)

We agree with the parties that Delauder’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(9) is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th 224, 226, 229-33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 270 (2025).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands as-applied Second Amendment challenges unless the felony conviction was pardoned or the law defining the crime is unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.

United States v. Holman · filed 2026-03-27(g)(1)

As to Holman’s as-applied challenge, it is foreclosed by United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024). In that case, a panel of this court rejected as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) except where (1) the defendant’s “felony conviction is pardoned or [(2)] the law defining the crime of conviction is found unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 700 (quoting Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017)). ... Let there now be no doubt: the rule announced in Hunt covers all as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Christopher Stanton, Jr. · filed 2026-03-30(g)(1)

Because Stanton’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our holdings in Rozier and Dubois II, he fails to demonstrate any error in his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Tavio McNeary, Jr. · filed 2026-03-31(g)(1)

Indeed, the government is clearly correct, as a matter of law, that NcNeary’s argument as to the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under binding Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2026-04-02(g)(1)

Having carefully considered Garrett’s arguments, we conclude the district court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because, as Garrett acknowledges, our precedent forecloses his challenges to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) withstand the Second Amendment challenges raised here under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Riner · filed 2026-04-02(g)(1), (g)(9)

Riner preserved his Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) and (g)(9) through his plea deal, so the standard of review is de novo. ... Regardless of the standard of review, both the Second Amendment challenges fail under controlling circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally disarm a person whose full criminal record establishes dangerousness.

United States v. Wilkinson · filed 2026-04-02(g)(1)

When considered in the aggregate, this lengthy criminal record of felony and misdemeanor offenses demonstrates that Wilkinson “was dangerous enough to be constitutionally disarmed” under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Tyreic Brewer · filed 2026-04-03(g)(1)

In any event, the standard of review is irrelevant because the argument fails under any standard of review; our precedent holds that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Beasley · filed 2026-04-07(g)(1)

Here, both Beasley’s facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment are foreclosed by our precedent in Rozier.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing ammunition is covered by precedent upholding the felon-in-possession ban against Second Amendment challenges.

United States v. Swan · filed 2026-04-08(g)(1)

It is implicit in this conclusion that Vincent I—which upholds § 922(g)(1) as applied to convictions for firearm possession—applies to Mr. Swan’s conviction for ammunition possession, thus defeating the argument he has raised in this appeal attempting to distinguish the two.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Second Amendment challenge under binding Second Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gary · filed 2026-04-09(g)(1)

Indeed, because Gary’s constitutional challenge to his conviction under Section 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our binding precedent, he notes in his brief that he “brings the instant appeal to preserve his rights in the event that Zherka is overturned, or the Supreme Court otherwise holds that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional.” Appellant’s Br. at 9.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Second Amendment challenge under binding Tenth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Davis · filed 2026-04-16(g)(1)

Mr. Davis also appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. As he recognizes, however, our precedent requires us to reject this argument.

Section 922(g)(1) is not subject to as-applied constitutional challenges in the Fourth Circuit under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Lilly · filed 2026-04-17(g)(1)

Appellant’s as applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment and is not subject to as-applied challenges in the Second Circuit.

United States v. Dancy · filed 2026-04-21(g)(1)

Applying that standard, we reject Dancy’s argument. In Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 135708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), we held that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment and is not subject to as-applied challenges, see id. at 91–96.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge by a defendant who possessed a firearm while on probation.

United States v. Moore · filed 2026-04-23(g)(1)

Moore’s as-applied challenge is foreclosed because he was on probation at the time he committed the instant offense.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally bar nonviolent felons, including those convicted of driving under the influence, from possessing firearms.

United States v. Jones · filed 2026-04-24(g)(1)

Because Duarte categorically establishes that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment by barring non-violent felons from possessing firearms, id., Jones’s challenge fails.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon with convictions for assault, attempted robbery, and drug offenses.

United States v. Tristan Grant · filed 2026-04-27(g)(1)

Grant’s felon-in-possession convictions are not unconstitutional because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Augillard · filed 2026-04-27(g)(1)

The fourth and final issue is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied to Augillard. That issue, as the parties properly concede, is foreclosed by our circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(3)’s prohibition on firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Mena · filed 2026-04-29(g)(3)

He argues the district court1 erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional on its face under the Second Amendment. Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion, as Mena’s argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally disarm a person whose predicate felony is dangerous, including possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

United States v. Watson · filed 2026-04-29(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1)’s disarmament of dangerous felons is constitutional under the Second Amendment. Watson’s pred- icate felony—possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it—is a dangerous felony. His as-applied challenge therefore fails.

Section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied when a defendant’s predicate offenses rest on simple drug possession and the government fails to show a historical analogue for disarming him.

United States v. Martin · filed 2026-04-30(g)(1)

In light of the foregoing and the government’s concession of error, the government has not met its burden to show that our history and tradition support Matin’s predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1). We hold that Martin’s convictions violate the Second Amendment as applied to him and REVERSE his convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) convictions are not susceptible to facial or as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment in the Fourth Circuit.

United States v. Graham · filed 2026-04-30(g)(1)

The Bruen challenge raised in the Anders brief is foreclosed by binding precedent. United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 702-08 (4th Cir. 2024) (finding that §922(g)(1) convictions are not susceptible to facial or as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment).

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands an as-applied Second Amendment challenge from a defendant with a prior state controlled substance conviction.

United States v. Neel · filed 2026-05-01(g)(1)

Second, this Court’s precedents squarely foreclose Neel’s as- applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) cannot permanently disarm someone based solely on a felony conviction for simple drug possession.

United States v. Banuelos · filed 2026-05-01(g)(1)

There, we held that “the government did not meet its burden to prove that history and tradition support simple possession as a valid felony predicate under § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 918. We accordingly are constrained to reverse Banuelos’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)'s ban on firearm possession by aliens illegally or unlawfully in the United States is consistent with the Second Amendment because it fits a historical tradition of disarming groups lacking a regulable relationship with the government.

United States v. Vizcaino-Peguero · filed 2026-05-05(g)(5)(A)

We therefore conclude that § 922(g)(5)(A) fits within our nation's tradition of firearm regulation based on the historical analogues on which the government relies, as it is a regulation that disarms a group of aliens determined by the legislature to pose a danger because they ... are "seen as lacking a regulable relationship to the government."

Section 922(g)(5)(A)'s firearm ban survives this as-applied Second Amendment challenge because it fits within the historical tradition of firearm regulation.

United States v. Osorio · filed 2026-05-05(g)(5)(A)

As we explained in Vizcaíno-Peguero, however, if a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A) fails at the second step of the Bruen framework, there is no reason to resolve the first-step question of whether aliens in this country illegally or unlawfully are among "the people" to whom the Second Amendment refers. See Vizcaíno-Peguero, slip op. at 8-10. And, as we will next explain, Rebollar Osorio's challenge fails at the second step just as the challenge in Vizcaíno-Peguero did.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges in the Ninth Circuit.

United States v. Ridgeway · filed 2026-05-07(g)(1)

Ridgeway asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. This claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to non-violent felons under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Perez · filed 2026-05-13(g)(1)

As he concedes, this claim is foreclosed. See United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (“[Section] 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to non-violent felons[.]”), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2026 WL 135692 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession ban withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges by non-violent felons under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rojo · filed 2026-05-13(g)(1)

Rojo asserts that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially ... and as applied to him as a purportedly non-violent felon. This claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons withstands a Second Amendment challenge under Ninth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Registe · filed 2026-05-14(g)(1)

Registe next contends that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. This claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial, individualized Second Amendment, and overbreadth challenges.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2026-05-18(g)(1)

First, Pepple and Richardson ask us to hold that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it categorically bans all felons from possessing firearms. Alternatively, they argue that § 922(g)(1) is subject to as-applied Second Amendment challenges based on individual circumstances, including dangerousness. These arguments are squarely foreclosed by precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally disarm a person whose recent, violent criminal history shows a clear threat of physical violence.

United States v. Postell · filed 2026-05-18(g)(1)

That same historical tradition justifies Postell’s disarmament. Postell, through his extensive criminal history, has shown that he poses “a clear threat of physical violence to another” and “a special danger of misus[ing]” firearms. Id. Postell was recently convicted of multiple dangerous felonies. Disarming individuals in Postell’s circumstances, as the District Court concluded, is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 689 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24).

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a person with a prior felony conviction for burglary of a habitation despite an as-applied Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Morgan · filed 2026-05-18(g)(1)

The parties are correct that Morgan’s challenges to § 922(g)(1) based on the Second Amendment are foreclosed. We rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). Regarding Morgan’s as-applied challenge, Morgan has a prior felony conviction for burglary of a habitation. We have previously held that burglary is a viable § 922(g)(1) predicate.

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Laindrell Cooper · filed 2026-05-19(g)(1)

Cooper asserts his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges where the disqualifying convictions have not been pardoned or invalidated.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2026-05-12(g)(1)

Anderson first asserts that his conviction is infirm because, following New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. ... His Second Amendment claims are therefore precluded by binding circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a person whose felony conviction for evading arrest in a motor vehicle demonstrates a credible threat to others’ physical safety.

United States v. Cordova · filed 2026-05-20(g)(1)

Cordova’s decisions posed a risk to his fellow citizens and demonstrate that he poses a credible threat to the physical safety of others. Thus, his challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails.

A felon challenging § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment as applied to him bears the burden of showing that he is not dangerous.

United States v. Demetrius Cortez White · filed 2026-05-22(g)(1)

But it is White’s burden to prove that he is not dangerous, not the court’s job to prove that he is.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under the Second Amendment, including when the defendant's prior convictions did not involve firearms.

United States v. Hines · filed 2026-05-27(g)(1)

However, we recently confirmed that neither Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), abrogated our previ- ous decision in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010), which held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally disarm a person whose felony convictions show that he is dangerous to others.

United States v. O'Bannon · filed 2026-05-27(g)(1)

Because this conduct endangered law enforcement, the public, and O’Bannon himself, O’Bannon may be disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to felons despite an as-applied Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Sampson · filed 2026-05-29(g)(1)

Sampson contends that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to him. As he concedes, this claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Belk · filed 2026-06-01(g)(1)

Thus, Canada plainly forecloses Belk’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) can be applied to a person with prior felony convictions for evading arrest in a vehicle and burglary of a vehicle.

United States v. Cervantes · filed 2026-06-02(g)(1)

Regarding Cervantes’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge, Cervantes has prior felony convictions for evading arrest in a vehicle and for burglary of a vehicle. We have held these felonies are valid § 922(g)(1) predicates, and Cervantes makes no argument as to why a different result is warranted here.

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to people with nonviolent felony convictions without violating the Second Amendment.

United States v. Carroll · filed 2026-05-27(g)(1)

We recently reexamined that holding in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and determined, once again, that “the Second Amendment doesn’t prevent application of § 922(g)(1) to nonviolent offenders.” ... We AFFIRM the judgment below and DISMISS the appeal.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally disarm a convicted drug trafficker who possesses a firearm inside his home.

United States v. Squire · filed 2026-06-02(g)(1)

We conclude only that § 922(g)(1), as applied to a convicted drug trafficker possessing a firearm inside his home, is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation under Bruen.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under Eighth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Schneider · filed 2026-06-11(g)(1)

Schneider moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment—both facially and as applied. The district court denied his motion, and he preserves the argument on appeal. Our precedent precludes its success.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons does not violate the Second Amendment under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Moore · filed 2026-06-22(g)(1)

Binding Eleventh Circuit precedent forecloses Moore’s claim that his § 922(g)(1) conviction violated the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to a person with a nonviolent prior conviction.

United States v. Mobley · filed 2026-06-23(g)(1)

... reject Mobley’s challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on the Second Amendment. We therefore affirm his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Foster · filed 2026-06-24(g)(1)

Thus, Foster’s facial challenge fails. ... Indeed, Foster concedes that Zherka forecloses his facial and as-applied challenge to Section 922(g)(1) and notes that he raises these arguments to “preserve[] his constitutional challenge for a potential petition for rehearing en banc or a petition for a writ of certiorari.”

Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a person who possesses a firearm while on state probation.

United States v. Darby · filed 2026-06-24(g)(1)

Darby also argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause. He concedes that both arguments are foreclosed by our precedent. First, Darby was on state probation when he possessed a weapon and the Second Amendment permits disarming those still serving criminal sentences, so Darby’s Second Amendment argument necessarily fails.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon who fails to prove that he is not dangerous.

United States v. Hoover · filed 2026-06-24(g)(1)

Because Hoover has not met his burden of proving that he is not dangerous, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment and is not subject to as-applied challenges in the Second Circuit.

United States v. Grant · filed 2026-06-29(g)(1)

Applying that standard, we reject Grant’s argument. In Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 135708 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), we held that section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment and is not subject to as-applied challenges, see id. at 91–96. ... Consequently, Grant’s challenge fails for the same reasons as those set forth in Zherka.

Section 922(g)(1) survives a facial Second Amendment challenge and may constitutionally apply to a person still serving a sentence for a prior felony conviction.

United States v. McCowan · filed 2025-10-06(g)(1)

We rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) under Bruen in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). We have also held that the statute may be constitutionally applied to defendants, like McCowan, still serving a sentence for a prior felony conviction at the time of the § 922(g)(1) offense. ... Accordingly, the Government’s unopposed motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by people convicted of felonies is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

Kinchen · filed 2026-01-05(g)(1)

This statute has been upheld as constitutional under the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1) has constitutional applications and cannot be held invalid on its face under the Second Amendment.

United States v. Prince · filed 2026-04-02(g)(1)

Given the current state of the law, represented by Rahimi, it is difficult to conclude that §922(g)(1) cannot be applied to anyone, even a person with a string of convictions suggesting grave danger.

Section 922(b)(2) looks to the law applicable where a firearm is sold or delivered; a buyer's residence elsewhere does not make that locality's ordinance govern the sale.

Timperio v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. · filed 2019-04-26(b)(2)

As set forth above, the Gun Control Act addresses a sale or delivery that is unlawful "at the place of sale, delivery or other disposition." Here, Bello purchased the AR-15 in Schenectady, not in New York City. New York City Administrative Code § 303 has no applicability in Schenectady, where the firearm was purchased.

Section 922(b)(2) applies the law or published ordinance in force where a firearm is sold, delivered, or otherwise disposed of; the buyer’s residence does not make that locality’s rules govern a sale elsewhere.

Timperio v. Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center · filed 2019-04-26(b)(2)

As set forth above, the Gun Control Act addresses a sale or delivery that is unlawful “at the place of sale, delivery or other disposition.” Here, Bello purchased the AR-15 in Schenectady, not in New York City. New York City Administrative Code § 303 has no applicability in Schenectady, where the firearm was purchased.

Section 922(b)(4) prohibits selling a machinegun without specific authorization; a semiautomatic weapon does not qualify merely because it can easily be modified to fire automatically.

Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. · filed 2024-01-22(b)(4)

The Gun Control Act prohibits selling a "machinegun" without specific authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(4). ... Binding precedent from the Supreme Court and this court forecloses Mexico's interpretation.

Section 922(b)(1) prohibits selling or delivering ammunition other than shotgun or rifle ammunition to someone the seller or deliverer knows or has reasonable cause to believe is under 21.

King v. Klocek · filed 2020-10-09(b)(1)

The federal statute prohibits the sale or delivery of ammunition "other than . . . ammunition for a shotgun or rifle" to anyone the seller or deliverer "knows or has reasonable cause to believe is less than twenty-one years of age" (18 USC § 922 [b] [1]). ... Plaintiffs' allegations, if true, establish that defendant committed a predicate offense under 15 USC § 7903 (5) (A) (ii) and, as a result, establish that this action is not a qualified civil liability action and not subject to immediate dismissal.

A purchaser’s testimony can establish his felony conviction and out-of-state residence for charges under § 922 without corroborating documents.

United States v. Shafer · filed 1971-08-20(b)(3), (d)

However, Radford's testimony was clear that he had given defendant this information, and the jury was entitled to credit his testimony without the necessity of considering corroborative documentary proof.

Sections 922(b)(5) and 922(m) allow an unlicensed person to be held liable through § 2(b) for willfully causing a licensed dealer to sell firearms without the required records, even if the dealer acts innocently.

United States v. Bob H. Smith · filed 1978-11-22(b)(5), (m)

In short Smith willfully caused an innocent licensee to fail to do what the law requires. ... There is no requirement of knowledge on Swat’s part for Smith to be guilty. ... As to Counts 33, 36, 37 and 38, the proof showed that with at least implied authority Smith willfully caused the sale and delivery of firearms which belonged to Swat, a licensee, without maintaining the required records. As to these four counts also his conviction must be affirmed.

State officials’ assurances that a person is not a convicted felon do not bar a federal prosecution under § 922 for receiving firearms.

United States v. Bruscantini · filed 1985-05-28(b)

Here, while state officials provided the interpretation upon which appellant relied, federal officials indicted and convicted him for a violation of federal law. ... Appellant, therefore, is not insulated from prosecution.

Section 922(g)(1) and (5) prohibit convicted felons and illegal aliens from possessing firearms.

United States v. Antonio Vargas, United States of America v. Audel Ceja Berduzco · filed 1994-02-15(g)(1), (g)(5)

However, as Ceja stipulated to the fact that he is an illegal alien and was a convicted felon on probation at the time of his arrest, he was forbidden to possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 992(g)(1) and (5), and 924(a).

Section 922(g) prohibits felons from possessing firearms but does not prohibit merely selling or disposing of firearms without actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Grayer · filed 2015-09-17(g)

It “does not affect[] the right merely to sell or otherwise dispose” of firearms—so long as the felon never possesses them, actually or constructively.

A conviction under § 922(k) for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number requires sufficient evidence.

United States v. Tolson · filed 1995-04-20(k)

The Court also finds that there was sufficient evidence to support all of appellant's convictions except, as the Government concedes, that for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(k), which the Court hereby vacates.

Section 922(g)(8) does not violate Fifth Amendment notice and fair warning principles because ignorance of the law is no excuse.

United States v. Henson · filed 1999-06-14(g)(8)

Defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly untenable. ... Additionally, our Court of Appeals upheld this Court’s ruling that section 922(g)(8) is not unconstitutional and does not violate the notice and fair warning principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment because of the “fundamental principle” that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)’s prohibition on firearm possession by unlawfully present aliens withstands Second Amendment and Fifth Amendment equal-protection challenges.

United States v. Sitladeen · filed 2023-04-04(g)(5)(A)

Therefore, Sitladeen’s contention that § 922(g)(5)(A) violates the Second Amendment cannot prevail. ... Thus, § 922(g)(5)(A) survives rational-basis scrutiny, and Sitladeen’s equal-protection argument fails.

Section 922(g)(5), as then written, prohibited firearm possession by aliens unlawfully in the United States but did not prohibit possession by lawful aliens.

United States v. Ramon Sandoval-Barajas, -Appellant · filed 2000-03-13(g)(5)

The federal statute does not prohibit legal aliens from possessing firearms, but the Washington statute does, unless they obtain licenses.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) bars firearm possession by aliens unlawfully in the United States without requiring an individual assessment of their trustworthiness.

United States v. Carbajal-Flores · filed 2025-07-25(g)(5)(A)

But district courts need not conduct individualized assessments of illegal aliens for pur- poses of § 922(g)(5)(A). The district court here accordingly erred in holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to Carbajal-Flores.

Section 922(g)(5)(A)’s firearm ban for unlawfully present individuals survives facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges.

United States v. Milder Escobar-Temal · filed 2025-12-15(g)(5)(A)

Thus, 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(5)(A) survives Escobar-Temal’s facial challenge. ... Therefore, § 922(g)(5)(A) is constitutional as applied to Escobar-Temal.

A defendant’s sworn statement that he entered on a nonimmigrant visa can support the factual basis for a plea under § 922(g)(5)(B).

United States v. Alando Berry · filed 2005-06-09(g)(5)(B)

We conclude that the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by relying on Berry’s own statement under oath that he was in the United States legally.

A defendant’s admission that he possessed ammunition as a felon can supply a sufficient factual basis for a § 922(g)(1) guilty plea.

United States v. Sears · filed 2024-06-21(g)(1)

But the record establishes that there was a sufficient factual basis to support the guilty plea. Sears also signed a factual basis in which he stipulated that he possessed ammunition and knew it was prohibited because he was a felon.

Section 922(d)(1) requires proof that a person disposed of a firearm to a known felon; the felon’s access to the gun alone does not establish disposal.

United States v. Washington · filed 2006-02-14(d)(1)

Considered in the light most favorable to the government, this proof permits an inference that Washington took no steps to prevent Edwards from having access to her gun. The evidence of record does not, however, permit an inference that Washington “disposed of” the gun to Edwards under any reasonable construction of those words.

Section 922(d)(1) covers allowing a person known to be a felon to gain actual or constructive possession or control of a firearm.

United States v. Saine · filed 2024-07-23(d)(1)

The statute does not define “dispose of,” but we have said it occurs when the defendant allows another person to come into actual or constructive possession or control of a firearm.

Section 922 does not create a private right of action.

Tisdale v. Pagourtzis et Do not docket in the case. Case remanded to (Galveston County Clerk at the Probate Court in Gal · filed 2020-12-07

Section 922, meanwhile, is a criminal-code provision and does not create a private right of action.

Section 922(d)(5) does not create a private civil action for violations of its ammunition sale restriction.

DEBORAH ELKINS, RUSSELL HAMPTON, and SYDNEY CROSBY as next friend of O.H., a minor v. ACADEMY I, LP, JOHN DOE, and NYADI · filed 2021-09-21(d)(5)

Here, nothing in the text or history of § 922 evidences an express or implied intent to create a private, civil liability action premised on failure to comply with this statute.

Section 922 does not provide a private cause of action.

Dorn v. Jefferys · filed 2023-10-17

The statute does not provide for a private cause of action.

Section 922(g) bars firearm possession by felons but creates no private cause of action or standing to challenge a permit issued to someone else.

Landry v. Quintalla · filed 2025-05-05(g)

Nothing in the statute creates a private cause of action or gives Mr. Landry standing to object to the issuance of a permit to another person.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) covers unlicensed firearms businesses, and a conviction under it categorically qualifies as illicit firearms trafficking under the immigration aggravated felony definition.

Chacon v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-18(a)(1)(A)

Given these statutory definitions, the BIA properly concluded that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as a conviction for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C).

Section 922(a)(1)(A)'s unlicensed firearms business offense categorically qualifies as illicit trafficking in firearms, even with the proof of profit exception.

Ronquillo v. Bondi · filed 2025-08-15(a)(1)(A)

We therefore disagree that the “proof of profit” exception makes § 922(a)(1)(A) a broader offense than “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.” We instead find that the two offenses are a categorical match.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to actual possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Jones · filed 2021-03-05(g)(1)

Because voluntary intoxication is not a defense to actual possession, the district court properly denied Jones’s proposed instruction.

An omitted instruction on knowledge of felon status in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution does not warrant a new trial when the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.

United States v. Smith · filed 2023-02-09(g)(1)

Here, the district court did not instruct the jury on the knowledge of status element. ... Nevertheless, Smith is not entitled to a new trial because he cannot show that the error affected his substantial rights. ... There is ample evidence in the record showing that Smith knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm in question.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a defendant to know of his felon status; omission of that element from an indictment or plea colloquy is subject to harmless error review.

Alston v. United States · filed 2023-04-17(g)(1)

A Rehaif error—such as an indictment’s failure to allege that the defendant knew he was a convicted felon, or a plea colloquy’s failure to advise a defendant that knowledge of his status as a felon is an element of violating § 922(g)(1)—is a nonstructural error subject to plain error or harmless error review.

A guilty plea to a § 922(g)(1) charge survives plain-error review when the defendant does not show that a failure to explain the knowledge-of-status element affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Garris · filed 2023-04-14(g)(1)

And because Garris has not established that the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights, we affirm his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Under § 922(g)(1), omitting an instruction on knowledge of a prior conviction punishable by more than one year does not warrant plain-error relief when there is no reasonable probability a jury would find the defendant lacked that knowledge.

United States v. Michell · filed 2023-02-15(g)(1)

Michell’s two DUI convictions, which occurred when he was an adult, unambiguously demonstrate that there is no “reasonable probability” that a jury would find that Michell did not know he had been convicted of a crime punishable ... by a year or more in prison at the time he possessed the firearm.

For an unpreserved error concerning § 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-felon-status element, plain-error relief requires a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that the defendant would have presented evidence that he did not know he was a felon.

Greer v. United States · filed 2021-06-14(g)(1)

In felon-in-possession cases, a Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a suffi- cient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction remains valid after an unpreserved Rehaif error if the defendant does not show a reasonable probability that he would have declined to plead guilty had he known the government had to prove he knew he was a felon.

United States v. Elam · filed 2021-12-16(g)(1)

Elam has not disputed his prior convictions, nor has he argued that he did not know he was a convicted felon at the time of the instant offense. We therefore conclude that Elam’s § 922(g) conviction remains valid because he has not carried the burden of showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the Rehaif error.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction withstands Rehaif review when the defendant’s criminal history and Rule 11 statements show no error.

United States v. Barr · filed 2022-01-14(g)(1)

We have also independently reviewed the record for possible error in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) and Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021). Given Barr’s criminal history and statements he made at his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we find no error.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a defendant knew of his felony status when possessing a firearm; an omitted instruction on that requirement does not warrant plain-error relief without a sufficient showing that the defendant would have offered evidence of ignorance.

United States v. Smith · filed 2023-12-20(g)(1)

But a failure to do so “is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2021). Here, such an argument is unavailing.

Section 922(o)(1)’s machinegun ban does not cover bump stocks because they fall outside the statutory definition of “machinegun.”

Cargill v. Garland · filed 2023-01-06(o)(1)

The definition of “machinegun” as set forth in the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act does not apply to bump stocks.

Section 922(o)(1) does not clearly prohibit bump stocks, so the rule of lenity requires construing its machinegun prohibition in the possessor’s favor.

Hardin v. ATF · filed 2023-04-25(o)(1)

Because the relevant statutory scheme does not clearly and unambiguously prohibit bump stocks, we are bound to construe the statute in Hardin’s favor.

Section 922(g)(5)(A) permits prosecution of an alien without lawful immigration status even when an asylum application is pending.

United States v. Portillo-Saravia · filed 2022-01-31(g)(5)(A)

His pending asylum application also did not constitute a defense to § 922(g)(5)(A). In cases where the defendant does not hold lawful status and has a pending immigration application, we have held the statute sufficiently clear to uphold prosecution under § 922(g)(5)(A).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status requirement narrows the felon-in-possession offense and applies retroactively in an initial § 2255 motion.

Seabrooks v. United States · filed 2022-05-06(g)(1)

As the Rehaif rule narrows the scope of §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) by interpreting the statutes’ terms and modifying the elements of the felon-in-possession offense, we find that Rehaif announced a new rule of substantive law that applies retroactively to ... Seabrooks’s initial § 2255 motion.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he was a felon; it does not require proof that he knew his possession was illegal.

United States v. Rumael Green · filed 2022-05-16(g)

Green’s argument that Rehaif required the government to prove that he specifically intended illegal conduct when he used the gun misreads the case. Rehaif held only that the government must prove “both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”

Section 922(c) requires a sworn statement on a form separate from ATF Form 4473, and that form is not required for an in-person firearm transaction.

People v. Matiala · filed 2023-04-11(c)

A review of that section, the implementing regulation (27 C.F.R. § 478.124(f) (2012)), and ATF guidance on the transactions covered by section 922(c) reveals that the sworn statement referenced and required is not on ATF Form 4473 and is instead the subject of a separate form; more importantly, the form is not required for an in-person transaction as attempted by defendant.

Binding Eighth Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons.

United States v. Clemons · filed 2025-10-08(g)(1)

Clemons also challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), both on its face and as applied. As Clemons acknowledges, binding precedent precludes this argument.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges and a facial Second Amendment challenge.

United States v. Hopps · filed 2025-09-30(g)(1)

We have repeatedly upheld § 922(g)(1) against facial and as-applied challenges based on the Commerce Clause. ... Specifically, we have previously held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional under the Second Amendment and that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” ... Accordingly, Hopps is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons is constitutional on its face and may be applied to individuals whose convictions show they are dangerous.

Jackson v. United States · filed 2025-09-26(g)(1)

Given the extensive authority set forth above, Defendant’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails. Moreover, any intended as-applied challenge also fails.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to nonviolent felons.

United States v. Soria · filed 2025-09-18(g)(1)

Soria’s Section 922(g)(1) count is thus constitutional, both facially and as applied.

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, and its prohibition does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Garza-Gomez · filed 2025-09-12(g)(1)

Garza-Gomez’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional is foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6625, 2025 WL 1727419 (U.S. June 23, 2025). His contention that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause challenge is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons remains constitutional under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Jones v. United States of America (INMATE 1) · filed 2025-09-04(g)(1)

In short, Jones’ claim that his § 922(g) conviction is unconstitutional is foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Gammage · filed 2025-09-02(g)(1)

The government’s position as to Gammage’s Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges to section 922(g)(1) “is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.

Section 922(g)(1) may disarm felons still serving a felony sentence and withstands Commerce Clause challenges.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2025-08-27(g)(1)

Wilson’s Bruen challenge is foreclosed by decisions from this court holding that felons like Wilson may be disarmed while still serving a felony sentence. ... His Commerce Clause challenge is also foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2025-08-18(g)(1)

Sanchez’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 1727419 (U.S. June 23, 2025) (No. 24-6625). He also correctly concedes that his as- applied challenge is foreclosed. See United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 871 (5th Cir. 2025). Additionally, Sanchez’s theory that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction withstands facial Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

As he correctly concedes, our precedent forecloses his arguments that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause and the Second ... Amendment on its face.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally bars firearm possession by convicted felons, including those whose prior felonies were non-violent.

United States v. Duarte · filed 2025-05-09(g)(1)

Accordingly, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Duarte and other non-violent felons.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional on its face and as applied to convicted felons; it does not require a felony-by-felony assessment.

United States v. Marshall · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

As Marshall concedes, however, his arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent. ... The order denying the motion to dismiss and the judgment of the district court are affirmed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands facial Second Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Lusk · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

On appeal, he renews his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) facially violates the Second Amendment ... For the first time on appeal, he argues that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause. ... Lusk is correct that his arguments are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons was not shown to be unconstitutional as applied to a person with a prior felony conviction under plain error review.

United States v. Beaird · filed 2025-05-15(g)(1)

First, Beaird cannot show on plain error review that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because he was previously convicted of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under Bruen and within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Russell · filed 2025-05-08(g)(1)

Russell also challenges his § 922(g)(1) conviction as facially unconstitutional under New York Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and because it exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. His challenges, however, are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons is facially constitutional under the Second Amendment, and individual felons cannot challenge it felony by felony.

United States v. Cantu · filed 2025-04-18(g)(1)

In United States v. Jackson, we held that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, including Bruen and Rahimi. ... We also rejected attempts at “felony-by-felony litigation” challenging the statute’s constitutionality as applied to individual felons. ... However, we are bound by Jackson unless and until an en banc panel of our court overturns it or the Supreme Court issues a decision inconsistent with it.

Section 922(g)(1) was not plainly unconstitutional under the defendant’s conceded challenge.

United States v. La Rosa · filed 2025-03-27(g)(1)

The district court did not plainly err by failing to hold that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Defendant expressly concedes this issue and raises it only for the purpose of preservation.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands the First Amendment challenge raised here.

Nunley v. Goldey · filed 2023-09-18(g)(1)

The court is also unpersuaded by petitioner’s underlying substantive argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and may be applied to a person with felony drug convictions who poses a danger to society.

PORTER v. United States · filed 2023-09-28(g)(1)

Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional. ... Accordingly, the Government has carried its burden of proving that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Petitioner.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a person with a prior felony narcotics trafficking conviction after Bruen.

Alexander v. USA-2255 · filed 2023-10-17(g)(1)

As such, he is not entitled to possess a firearm, and § 922(g) is not unconstitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons remains constitutional under the Second Amendment after Bruen under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Foster v. United States · filed 2023-12-14(g)(1)

Accordingly, Rozier remains the law of this circuit and squarely forecloses Mr. Foster’s argument that his conviction under § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing firearms is not facially unconstitutional under Bruen.

Rice v. United States · filed 2024-01-09(g)(1)

Bruen does not stand for the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing firearms is facially unconstitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons remains constitutional under controlling Tenth Circuit precedent after Bruen.

Ciccolelli v. United States · filed 2024-01-12(g)(1)

Until there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision saying otherwise, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under McCane.