17 U.S.C. § 101

A work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment is a work made for hire, for which the employer is considered the author.

Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Elcon Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-10-04

Under the Copyright Act, an employer is considered the author of a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b). The Court concludes that plaintiff complied with all the statutory requirements for a valid copyright in the Donkey Kong game.

Section 101’s categories of specially ordered or commissioned works do not include house designs or houses.

J.R. Lazaro Builders, Inc. v. R.E. Ripberger Builders, Inc. · filed 1995-01-31

Clearly, neither a house design nor a house itself fits into any of the nine categories of “specially ordered or commissioned” works set forth in the second prong of § 101. Therefore, for the purposes of the instant case, the only relevant prong of the definition of a work for hire is the first or “employee” prong.

Section 101’s work-made-for-hire definition permits a claimant to plead ownership of a commissioned work when its registration certificates identify it as author and claimant and state that the work was made for hire.

Adavco, Inc. v. Deertrail Development LLC · filed 2024-09-09

Adavco has pleaded that it paid for and commissioned the tract maps at issue in this case, and its registration certificates appear to support its allegations in noting that the maps were made for hire. Though Plaintiff did not specify the relationship between it and the party it commissioned (whether, in fact, that was SmithTech), Plaintiff did not need to do so. Likewise, Plaintiff need not allege a “written instrument” transferred ownership of the copyright—because the certificates state that the maps were authored by Adavco and made on a “for hire” basis and that Adavco is the “Copyright Claimant.” This is sufficient to allege the copyright lies with Adavco.

Section 101’s work-made-for-hire definition does not cover photographs that fall outside its specified categories.

Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc. · filed 1983-04-20

First, the photographs do not fall into either category of “works made for hire.”

Under § 101, whether a photographer is an employee for work-made-for-hire purposes depends on control over the work’s creation; a formal or regular employment relationship is unnecessary.

Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. Globe International, Inc. · filed 1985-04-15

In determining whether Graham created the photographs “on commission” or as an “employee,” the extent to which Buckingham Palace controlled the creation of the works is determinative. A formal or regular relationship of employment is not a necessary condition for “employee” status within the meaning of section 101. ... Accordingly, the court cannot find on the present record that Graham’s “understanding” with Buckingham Palace proves the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s motion to amend on this ground therefore fails.

Section 101’s work-made-for-hire definition covers designs created by a contractor under the hiring party’s supervision and direction.

Iris Arc v. S.S. Sarna, Inc. · filed 1985-10-21(1)

It is thus clearly established that the pieces were created for plaintiff as works made for hire within the meaning of section 101 of the Copyright Act.

Section 101 treats a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire.

Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman · filed 1985-12-24(1)

Under the facts found here, regardless of what title Som chose to operate under with regard to his employment by Q-Co, he was an employee working with equipment and supplies owned by his employer Q-Co and was closely supervised by Q-Co’s regular employee, Hoffman. It is clear that Q-Co., the hiring “author” caused the work to be made and exercised the right to “direct and supervise the creation,” through its control over its full time employee, Hoffman. The VPS-500 was, therefore, a “work made for hire” for the hiring author, Q-Co.

Section 101 limits works made for hire to works prepared by agency-law employees within the scope of employment and qualifying commissioned works covered by a signed agreement.

Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises · filed 1987-06-01(1), (2)

Only works by actual employees and independent contractors who fulfill the requirements of § 101(2) can be “for hire” under the new statute. Copyright “employees” are those persons called “employees” or “servants” for purposes of agency law.

Under § 101, drawings prepared by an independent contractor are not works made for hire under the employee clause.

Kunycia v. Melville Realty Co., Inc. · filed 1990-07-16(1)

Once he had started his own business as architect, Kunycia acted as an independent contractor, not as an employee. Thus the drawings he produced for Kay-Bee are not works for hire and proper ownership of them lies with plaintiff.

Section 101(2) does not treat a commissioned work as made for hire unless it falls within an enumerated category and the parties have a written agreement.

Morita v. Omni Publications International, Ltd. · filed 1990-07-16(2)

Section 101(2) provides that work for hire status can also be obtained where a written contract involving a commissioned work in one of nine enumerated classes so provides. This section is inapplicable here, however, since the work does not fall under any of the nine types of work covered by the section and there is no written agreement between Morita and Kan.

An employee’s work qualifies as a work made for hire only if it was created within the scope of employment, including at least some motivation to serve the employer.

Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer · filed 1994-04-06(1)

The presumption of authorial ownership falls, however, if the work is made "for hire," such as one "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737-38, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2171, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (quoting 17 U.S.C. Secs. 101(1), 201(b)). ... Thus, Avtec had to show that Peiffer was at least "appreciabl[y]" motivated by a desire to further its corporate goals in order to satisfy the third element of the work-for-hire test.

Section 101 treats an employee’s work as made for hire when the employee creates it within the scope of employment.

City of Newark v. Beasley · filed 1995-05-05

Because the City of Newark has failed in its burden of proof on all three prongs of the work-for-hire test, the Court finds that Beasley’s creation of the Student Workbook and the Police Officer’s Training Manual was not within the scope of his employment.

Under § 101(1), an employee’s work is made for hire only if prepared within the scope of employment; acts outside assigned duties and not motivated in part by a desire to serve the employer fall outside that scope.

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. · filed 1996-08-16(1)

As Plaintiff notes, “scope of employment” and other phrases used in the Copyright Act are terms of art taken from agency law. ... The videotaping done in Plaintiffs stores meets neither of these conditions, nor any other reasonable, interpretation of scope of employment.

In deciding whether a commissioned work was made for hire under § 101, a court may consider the parties’ course of dealing to determine whether the hiring party motivated its creation.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas · filed 1997-03-26

Accordingly, this Court is free to consider evidence of any pertinent course of conduct between the parties to the extent it finds it persuasive.

Section 101 treats a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire.

he Saenger v. Nationwide Insurance · filed 1997-07-18(1)

Therefore, to the extent that Durkin was the actual author of Life and Property, either in part or in their entirety, under CCNV and 17 U.S.C. S 101, these works fall within the category of "works made for hire."

A work created by an employee within the scope of employment is a work made for hire, even if the employee prepared it on personal time with personal materials.

Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District · filed 1998-08-18(1)

It is undisputed that Vanderhurst prepared the Optline on his own time with his own materials. However, there is no genuine dispute that Vanderhurst’s creation of the Outline was connected directly with the work for which was employed to do and was fairly and reasonably incidental to his employment. Further, creation of the Outline may be regarded fairly as one method of carrying out the objectives of his employment. ... I conclude, therefore, that pursuant to the “work for hire” doctrine, as of 1995, any copyright remaining in the Outline did not belong to Vanderhurst.

A computer program created by an independent contractor is not an employee-created work made for hire; the contractor owns it.

Ron and Judy Kirk, Doing Business as Iowa Pedigree v. Harter · filed 1999-10-13

Whether the computer programs in this case are works made for hire turns on the nature of the employment relationship between Iowa Pedigree and Harter. ... On balance, we conclude that the factors which might support a conclusion that an employer-employee relationship existed are insufficient to overcome the evidence that Harter was an independent contractor.

A work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment is a work made for hire under § 101.

In Re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 2000-11-06

The definition section of the 1976 Act states that “A ‘work made for hire’ is (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her, employment.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The court finds that Wolfman was an employee after January 1, 1977 within the meaning of the 1976 Act and that he created all of the characters after January 1, 1977 within the scope of this agreement.

A work created by an employee within the scope of employment can be a work made for hire even if the employee creates it off-site during non-working hours.

McKenna v. Lee · filed 2002-07-02

Because plaintiff created the license tag design in the course of his employment and with a purpose to serve his employer, thus meeting the first and third prongs of the Restatement test, this court does not find it determinative that the design was created off-site during non-working hours.

Section 101 treats an employee’s work as made for hire when it is the kind of work the employee was hired to perform, is created within authorized time and space limits, and is motivated at least in part by serving the employer.

Genzmer v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County · filed 2002-08-01

The fulfillment of these elements compels the conclusion that the software developed by Genzmer was a work made for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101, and, under 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), Genzmer is not entitled to the copyright.

Section 101 treats a work as made for hire if an employee creates it within the scope of employment or it is commissioned for a listed use under a written agreement.

Fun Spot of Florida, Inc. v. Magical Midway of Central Florida, Ltd. · filed 2002-11-06

Under the statute, there are only two ways in which a work can be considered “made for hire”: 1) if the work was made in the scope of the author’s employment; or 2) if it was specially ordered or commissioned for use for one of several specifically named purposes. ... Defendants have not provided any evidence that they hired Mr. Arie, or that Mr. Arie produced the go-kart track designs within the scope of employment. Nor do the Defendants provide any written agreement or other writing that shows the Defendants’ intent that Mr. Arie’s work be made for hire. Thus, the Court agrees that summary judgment should be granted as to Defendants’ work for hire defense.

Section 101 does not treat a work as made for hire by a corporation that did not exist when the work was created.

Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Novelty, Inc. · filed 2003-05-21

For a number of reasons, Billy-Bob, Inc. cannot claim that the teeth are works made for hire. First of all, the corporation did not exist when the teeth were authored.

Section 101 treats a work created by an employee within the scope of employment as a work made for hire.

Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States · filed 2004-10-20

An employee who creates copyrighted materials while acting within the scope of his employment will generally not be the owner of any resulting copyrights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b). ... As a result, the Court finds that DeFilippis was an employee of Trek Leasing at the time of the Fort Defiance project. The Court further finds that DeFilippis created the copyrighted works within the scope of his employment, a fact which does not seem to be in dispute. Thus, the work for hire doctrine has been satisfied, and the Court holds that Plaintiff Trek Leasing is the owner of the copyrights at issue in this case.

A work made for hire includes a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment; disputed facts about that scope can prevent a court from deciding whether the work qualifies.

Brower v. Martin · filed 2006-08-14

In light of these and other disputed questions of material fact, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law whether plaintiffs songs constitute works-for-hire or to whom the copyright in these songs belongs.

Section 101 excludes sound recordings from the categories of works that can be specially commissioned as works made for hire; a sound recording can qualify only if prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.

Bucciarelli-Tieger v. Victory Records, Inc. · filed 2007-03-01

Sound recordings are notably exempt from the list of works that can be specially commissioned as works-for-hire. ... Therefore, the only way this can be a work-for-hire is if plaintiffs are employees of defendants.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire to include work an employee creates within the scope of employment.

Rouse v. Walter & Associates, L.L.C. · filed 2007-09-20

Plaintiffs have failed to generate a genuine issue of material facts regarding whether an express, written agreement existed between ISU and the Plaintiffs that exempts USOFT from the “work for hire” doctrine.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire to include a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment; employee status is assessed under common-law agency factors.

Textile Secrets International, Inc. v. Ya-Ya Brand Inc. · filed 2007-10-31

By looking to the common law of agency pursuant to Reid, supra, the Court finds triable issues concerning the employment relationship between TSI and the staff designer (Ms. Legler) and, in turn, concerning whether FEATHERS was created by a TSI employee within the course and scope of employment such that the pattern was a “work made for hire.”

Section 101 requires a written instrument signed by the parties for a specially ordered or commissioned work to qualify as a work made for hire.

Cambridge University Press v. Becker · filed 2012-05-11

Although the copyright registration, which lists Sage as the claimant of the copyright, states that each chapter in the book is a work made for hire and therefore that Sage is the initial author of each chapter, there is no evidence in the record that Ellis and Bochner agreed that chapter 28 was a work made for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is ... a work specially ordered or commissioned ... if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”) (emphasis added).

Section 101 excludes software from the categories that may be designated a work made for hire by contract, so copyright ownership depends on whether it was prepared in the course of employment.

Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc. · filed 2012-06-12

Software is considered a literary work for purposes of copyright and is not among the nine categories of subject matter that may be designated a “work made for hire” by contract. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, Brocade has a copyright interest in the He software only if it was “prepared in the course of [He’s] employment.”

Section 101 defines a work made for hire to include a work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment.

Fleurimond v. New York University · filed 2012-07-10

The Copyright Act defines a work “made for hire” to include a work: (1) “prepared by an employee” and (2) “within the scope of his or her employment”. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 requires the parties to expressly agree in a signed writing for a specially ordered or commissioned work to qualify as a work made for hire.

Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc. · filed 2013-06-11

Although the 1976 Act requires the parties to execute an express agreement that a work is "made for ... hire," see 17 U.S.C. § 101, works created prior to 1978 are governed by the 1909 Copyright Act, Martha Graham Sch., 380 F.3d at 633-34. That Act did not require an express agreement; instead, "[t]he copyright belong[ed] to the person at whose 'instance and expense' the work was created." Id. at 634-35.

Section 101 defines a work made for hire and permits commissioned contributions to qualify through a written agreement when statutory requirements are met.

Garcia v. Google, Inc. · filed 2014-02-26

As we’ve recognized, this difficulty is why 17 U.S.C. § 101 “specifically addresses the movie ... industr[y], affording moviemakers a simple, straightforward way of obtaining ownership of the copyright in a creative contribution — namely, a written agreement.” Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558. Youssef didn’t obtain a written agreement, ... and Garcia simply doesn’t qualify as a traditional employee on this record.

Section 101 requires a written agreement between the parties for an independent contractor’s work to qualify as a work made for hire.

Oliver v. Johanson · filed 2018-11-21(2)

Because he was an independent contractor, the work can only be considered made for hire if there was an agreement in writing between the parties that the work should be considered a work made for hire.

Determining whether a work was made for hire requires a fact-specific inquiry; conflicting evidence about the creators’ relationship with the company can require a jury decision.

Roberts v. Gordy · filed 2019-01-04

Accordingly, because the work for hire inquiry is highly fact specific, and because there is conflicting evidence, the issue is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment, and must be determined by a jury.

For commissioned work to qualify as a work made for hire under § 101, hiring alone is insufficient; the parties must expressly agree in writing that it is a work made for hire.

Stiletto Television, Inc. v. Hastings, Clayton & Tucker, Inc. · filed 2019-06-17

For Mallet's work to qualify as a work made for hire, Mallet would have needed to execute an express agreement in writing that the work is a work made for hire by the entity that hired him-PJM.

Section 101’s work-made-for-hire definition can support an ownership claim when the pleaded facts plausibly show that the authors were employees acting through an agency relationship with the claimed owner.

Icc Evaluation Service, LLC v. International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials, Inc. · filed 2020-04-17

The Court therefore finds that it is plausible that ES is the owner of the Legacy Works as a result of the ICBO-to-ICC and ICC-to-ES transfers based on the inference that the Legacy Works were “works made for hire” by ICBO-ES for ICBO.

A work created within the scope of employment can be a work made for hire even if the employee did some of it at home or on a personal laptop.

Belcher · filed 2026-02-11

Whether some portion of this work occurred at home or on Belcher’s personal laptop is irrelevant. IC owns the PMA as a work for hire.

Under § 101, a work can qualify as made for hire when the hiring party supervises and directs its creation, even if its creator is not a regular employee.

Evans Newton Incorporated v. Chicago Systems Software · filed 1986-07-16

The court concluded that nothing in the 1976 Copyright Act or its legislative history indicated "that Congress intended to dispense with ... prior law [the 1909 Copyright Act and cases construing it]" which held that "if an employer supervised and directed the work, an employer-employee relationship could be found even though the employee was not a regular or formal employee." Id. We find the Second Circuit's analysis and conclusion compelling.

Section 101 defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

Healthcare Affiliated Services, Inc. v. Lippany · filed 1988-08-11

Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “a ‘computer program’ is set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” ... No evidence, however, was presented to indicate how the choices among these alternatives, i.e., the methodologies, would translate into “a set of statements or instructions” which could be used in a computer, either directly or indirectly, to bring about a certain result. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their copyright claims.

Section 101 treats a computer program as a work of authorship and a silicon chip as a tangible medium of expression when the program is fixed in that form, making the program copyrightable.

Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. · filed 1981-08-31

Looking first to sections 101 and 102 of that Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, § 102, the court is convinced that under those provisions (1) a computer program is a “work \of authorship” subject to copyright, and (2) that a silicon chip is “tangible medium of expression,” within the meaning of the statute, such as to make a program fixed in that form subject to the copyright laws.

Section 101 treats computer programs expressed in either object code or source code as “literary works” protected from unauthorized copying.

Apple Computer, Inc., a California Corporation v. Franklin Computer Corporation, a Pennsylvania Corporation · filed 1983-09-23

The definition of “literary works” in section 101 includes expression not only in words but also “numbers, or other ... numerical symbols or indicia”, thereby expanding the common usage of “literary works.” ... Thus a computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a “literary work” and is protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or source code version.

Section 101 defines a computer program broadly enough to include instructions used directly or indirectly by a computer, including machine-readable object code stored in ROM chips.

Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon · filed 1983-06-01

And we conclude that Midway’s copyright of the object code computer program stored in ROM silicon chips is valid.

Section 101 defines a computer program broadly as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a result, without distinguishing user-interactive programs from system-management programs for copyrightability.

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc. · filed 1984-02-08

the Act makes no distinction between the copyrightability of those programs which directly interact with the computer user and those which simply manage the computer system.

Section 101's computer-program definition covers microcode made up of statements or instructions used in a computer and treats the resulting microprograms as copyrightable literary works.

NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp. · filed 1986-09-22

3. Defendant’s 8086/88 microcode is a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 protects computer programs in machine-readable object-code form because object code is a compilation of instructions used directly by a computer.

Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp. · filed 1992-09-10

Therefore, Grumman’s argument that the ADEX tapes at issue are not protected by the copyright laws because they are manifested in object code fails.

Section 101 treats computer programs as literary works and defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.

The Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. · filed 1993-10-19

Computer programs aré considered literary works for purposes of copyright analysis. 17 U.S.C. § 101 states: ... A “computer program” is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. ... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977 and Supp.1993).

Section 101 defines a computer program as statements or instructions used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result, and computer macros may qualify as copyrightable literary works.

Butler v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 2000-10-20

The Copyright Act defines a computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.” ... We conclude the macros Butler wrote are protected by copyright as non-literal components of a computer program. ... Whether or not Butler actually received a copyright in the code, we conclude the macro computer programs he wrote constitute “literary works” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. ... We find, as a matter of law, Butler’s computer macros are copyrightable material as literary works under the Copyright Act.

Section 101’s definition of “literary works” encompasses computer programs expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.

Sas Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Limited · filed 2023-04-06

The statutory definition of “literary works” embraces computer programs: ... “Literary works” are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's copyright definitions encompass computer programs as works of authorship eligible for protection when original and fixed in a tangible medium.

Options Unlimited Research Corp v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2025-03-03

After a separate statutory overhaul in the early 20th century, Congress passed the currently operative Copyright Act in 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976). Start with copyright’s scope. The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Savvysoft’s allegations meet every part of that definition. First, an item must be a “work of authorship” to be copyrightable. The statutory definition of that term “embraces computer programs”—like TurboExcel.

Section 101 defines a work of the United States Government as one prepared by a federal officer or employee as part of official duties; an official’s unrecorded conversational words do not qualify merely because they were spoken while carrying out public tasks.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises · filed 1983-11-17

The conversations originated with Ford, and, unlike the testimony before the Hungate Committee, were neither fixed as “writings” nor publicly delivered as part of any person’s “official duties.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1995-01-27

A “joint work” is defined as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1972).

Section 101's definition of a derivative work does not cover mounting unchanged artwork on a ceramic tile, because the artwork was not recast, transformed, or adapted.

Annie Lee and Annie Lee & Friends Company, Inc. v. A.R.T. Company, Also Known as Albuquerque A.R.T. Company · filed 1997-09-18

Assume for the moment that the first sentence recognizes a set of non-original derivative works. To prevail, then, Lee must show that A.R.T. altered her works in one of the ways mentioned in the first sentence. The tile is not an “art reproduction”; A.R.T. purchased and mounted Lee’s original works. That leaves the residual clause: “any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” None of these words fits what AR.T. did. Lee’s works were not “recast” or “adapted”. “Transformed” comes closer and gives the ninth circuit some purchase for its view that the permanence of the bond between art and base matters. Yet the copyrighted note cards and lithographs were not “transformed” in the slightest. The art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed in the process. It still depicts exactly what it depicted when it left Lee’s studio.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building design embodied in any tangible medium, including architectural plans or drawings, so construction is not required.

Hunt v. Pasternack · filed 1999-06-02

The language of the statute confirms Nimmer’s observation. The Act states that it protects the “design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” It is not limited to building designs embodied in constructed buildings.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Bencich v. Hoffman · filed 2000-02-11

According to the Copyright Act, a “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Thus, in order to create joint authorship, each person must (1) intend to create a joint work and (2) contribute copyrightable material to the resulting work. ... Because Hoffman presents evidence with respect to both of these elements and the Screenwriters fail to meet the challenge, the Court holds,' as matter of law, that the screenplay constitutes a joint work.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building’s design embodied in a tangible medium, including its overall form and arrangement of spaces and elements, and excluding individual standard features.

Leicester v. Warner Brothers · filed 2000-11-29

"architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or draw ings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and ele ments in the design, but does not include individual standard features.

Section 101 defines a derivative work as one based on one or more preexisting works, including a work recast, transformed, or adapted.

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-08-09

"A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,” and may include any "form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a derivative work broadly as a work based on or recasting, transforming, or adapting one or more preexisting works, including an otherwise original work containing revisions or modifications.

Sobhani v. @ RADICAL. MEDIA INC. · filed 2003-02-11

A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” ... Because the Spec Commercials are derivative of the Jack-in-the-Box commercials, and in fact use a copyrighted character (the Jack-in-the-Box head), as well as actual footage from those commercials, they seem clearly to fall within the Act’s broad definition of “derivative works.”

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building’s design embodied in a tangible medium, covering its overall form and the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements, but not individual standard features.

T-Peg v. Isbitski, et al. · filed 2005-04-06

An "architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features. ... VTW's timberframe does not reflect any particular "overall form" or "arrangement and composition of spaces and elements" because one of its attractive features is its flexibility - that frame can accommodate multiple building designs including, but certainly not limited to, the design embodied in the second preliminary plans.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc. · filed 2008-06-19

Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).

Section 101 defines a collective work as a work in which separate and independent contributions are assembled into a collective whole, and treats the selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materials as authorship in a compilation.

Greenberg v. National Geographic Society · filed 2008-06-30

The Copyright Act defines “collective work” as a “work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Under the definition of “compilation,” which includes “collective works,” a “collective work” is an “original work of authorship” insofar as it involves the selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materials or data.

Section 101 defines an architectural work to include a building’s overall form and the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements, while excluding individual standard features; combinations of standard features can still be protected.

T-Peg v. Vermont Timber, et al. · filed 2009-03-27

Thus, it is clear that an architectural work can be comprised of otherwise unprotectible standard features. See T-Peg, 459 F.3d at 110 (“while individual standard features may not be individually copyrightable . . . the combination of such standard features may be copyrightable”).

Section 101 does not treat photographs posted on a foreign website as published simultaneously in the United States merely because they are visible worldwide, so they are not thereby “United States works.”

Moberg v. 33T LLC · filed 2009-10-06

The Court does not need to delve into yet another unsettled issue, however, because even assuming that the German website “published” plaintiffs photographs, the Court holds that as a matter of U.S. statutory law the photographs were not published simultaneously in the United States. ... Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs photographs are not “United States works,” and, accordingly, his copyright infringement claims may stand without registration of the photographs.

Section 101 protects an architectural work’s original combination or arrangement of standard features, while the individual standard features themselves are not copyrightable.

Home Design Services, Inc. v. Starwood Construction, Inc. · filed 2011-07-13

With respect to architectural works in particular, “while individual standard features and architectural elements classifiable as ideas are not themselves copyrightable, an architect’s original combination or arrangement of such features may be.”

Section 101(1)(C) treats a work first published simultaneously in the United States and a non-treaty foreign nation as a “United States work”; Internet publication available for downloading and copying can have that effect.

Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley · filed 2011-06-07(1)(C)

We hold that publishing AJE on a website in Australia was an act tantamount to global and simultaneous publication of the work, bringing AJE within the definition of a “United States work” under § 101(1)(C) and subject to § 411(a)’s registration requirement. Gallefoss elected to publish AJE on the Internet and the legal consequences of that decision must apply. Plaintiff was therefore required to register AJE prior to seeking judicial enforcement of its copyright rights.

For purposes of the registration requirement, whether a published work is a United States work depends on where and when it was first published, and proving foreign-work status requires evidence that the distribution constituted publication plus evidence of the first publication’s timing and geographic extent.

Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley · filed 2012-09-14(1)

Because the statutory definition of “United States work” contains strict temporal and geographic requirements (e.g., “first,” “simultaneously,” “in the United States,” “foreign nation,” and “treaty party”), see 17 U.S.C. § 101, a determination that a work was first published abroad requires both: (1) an examination of the method, extent, and purpose of the alleged distribution to determine whether that distribution was sufficient for publication, and (2) an examination of both the timing and geographic extent of the first publication to determine whether the work was published abroad.

Section 101 makes whether a work has been published a key factor in determining whether it is a non-U.S. work.

AFL Telecommunications LLC v. SurplusEQ.Com Inc. · filed 2013-05-20

Whether a work is a non-U.S. work depends largely on whether the work has been published.

Section 101 treats a work expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols as a literary work, while a photograph is separately categorized as a pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work.

Roe v. Amazon.com · filed 2016-03-15

The Court agrees that only the author’s manuscript constitutes the literary or fiction work, since it is made of “words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols...” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The photo of the Plaintiffs is a separate copyrightable aspect from the manuscript. This point is highlighted by the decision to change the photo on the cover of the book. The literary or fictional work itself remained the same. Notably, the Copyright Act defines “photograph” separately under the definition for “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Defendant Doe’s manuscript is not at issue in this case, only Plaintiffs’ image.

Section 101 treats public performance or display alone as insufficient to constitute publication, so first publication must be established separately for a United States-work analysis.

Digitalb, SH.A v. Setplex, LLC · filed 2018-01-11

This too is insufficient to allege where the works were first published because the mere public performance or display of a work does not constitute publication.

Section 101 treats a work as published when copies are distributed to the public by sale or transfer of ownership, while a public performance or display alone is not publication.

UAB "Planner5D" v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2019-11-21

The Copyright Act defines “publication” as the “distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,” and adds that a “public performance or display of a work does not itself constitute publication.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The Complaint does not allege how these works were merely displayed on its website rather than being publicly available so that any user can obtain copies of them. ... Planner 5D must allege facts that show that users were not able to copy the works on its website. ... While Planner 5D has alleged that it authored its works outside the United States, in order to be exempt from the Section 411(a) registration requirement Planner 5D must also sufficiently allege that its works were unpublished.

Section 101’s definition of a United States work determines whether the work is subject to § 411’s registration requirement before an infringement action.

Chiykowski v. Goldner · filed 2020-05-31

A party relying on the § 411 registration exemption “must allege that the works are not United States works within the meaning of [17 U.S.C.] § 101.” ... Third, it alleges that these illustrations are not United States works—and are thus exempt from § 411’s registration requirement—because they were published for the first time in Canada or are unpublished.2 Id. ¶¶ 84, 88, 90; see 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work first published outside the United States as a non-United States work.

Japna, Inc. v. Selfx Innovations Inc. · filed 2024-03-22

Because the work was first published outside of the United States, it is not a United States work, and is exempt from Section 411(a)’s registration requirements.

Section 101 distinguishes published and unpublished “United States works” and requires a plaintiff seeking exemption from registration to adequately allege that its works are not United States works.

Beijing Meishe Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. TikTok Inc. · filed 2024-04-23

The Copyright Act defines a “United States work” differently depending on whether the alleged work is a published work or an unpublished work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... A plaintiff must “adequately allege that its works are not United States works in order to be exempt” from the registration requirement. ... Accordingly, the copyright infringement claims are also dismissed with leave to amend to allege facts indicating that the works are not “United States works” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines a “United States work” differently depending on whether the work is published or unpublished, based on where it was first published and the authors’ nationality, domicile, residence, or headquarters.

Beijing Meishe Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. TikTok Inc. · filed 2024-07-23

The Copyright Act defines a “United States work” differently depending on whether the alleged work is a published work or an unpublished work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. A published “United States work” is defined as a work that is first published – (A) in the United States; (B) simultaneously in the United States and another treaty party . . . (C) simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation that is not a treaty party; or (D) in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party, and all of the authors of the work are nationals, domiciliaries, or habitual residents of, or in the case of audiovisual work legal entities with headquarters in, the United States.” Id. An unpublished “United States work” is defined as a work in which “all the authors of the work are nationals, domiciliaries, or habitual residents of the United States, or, in the case of an unpublished audiovisual work, all the authors are legal entities with headquarters in the United States.” Id. ... The Court finds that Meishe has plausibly alleged that its Copyrighted Works were first published solely in China if published and authored solely by Chinese nationals if unpublished. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this basis is DENIED.

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building design embodied in a tangible medium, including architectural plans or drawings, while excluding individual standard features.

A. Perry Designs & Builds, P.C. v. J. Paul Builders, LLC · filed 2024-11-25

An architectural work is defined as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings,” and covers “the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.” Id. § 101.

For purposes of Section 411, a work first published in the United States is a “United States work,” even if its author is a foreign national.

Sibanda v. Elison · filed 2024-08-14

The former argument is without merit because The Return to Gibraltar is plainly a ”United States work” within the meaning of the Copyright Act, as the copyright page that Sibanda attaches to his pleadings confirms that it was “[p]ublished in United States by Proteus Books,” with an address in North Carolina, FAC Ex. F, and his own (untimely) copyright ... registration indicates that the “Nation of 1st Publication” was the United States, ECF No. 113-6; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing that, “[f]or purposes of section 411, a work is a ‘United States work’” if it is “first published . . . in the United States”).

Section 101 defines an architectural work to include a building's design embodied in a tangible medium such as architectural plans or drawings.

Axelrod & Cherveny, Architects, P.C. v. T. & S. Builders Inc. · filed 2013-05-02

Under the Copyright Act, “the owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: [] to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ...; [and] to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public .... ” 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (“Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship ... [including] architectural works.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “architectural work” to include “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings”).

Section 101 defines an architectural work as a building’s design fixed in a tangible medium, including the building itself, plans, or drawings.

Home Design Services, Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes, Inc. · filed 2015-03-31

An architectural work “is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines an architectural work to include a building's overall form and the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements, while excluding individual standard features.

Home Design Services, Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc. · filed 2016-06-17

Second, and more concretely, the Copyright Act restricts which elements of architectural floor plans are protectable through its definition of a copyrightable “architectural work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines an “architectural work” as “the ... design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual standard features.”

Section 101 defines a derivative work as an original work based on preexisting material that includes the author's modifications.

Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc. · filed 2017-04-03

The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a[n] . . . art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted[, and] . . . consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a ... whole, represent an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a video game's visual presentation as an audiovisual work or motion picture and does not limit copyright protection to the particular medium in which that work is fixed.

Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc. · filed 1981-11-27

Plaintiff’s “work,” the thing that plaintiff has created and desires to protect, is the visual presentation of the “Asteroids” game. That work is copyrightable as an audiovisual work and as a motion picture. 17 U.S.C. § 101; ... Plaintiff’s work also happens to be fixed in the medium of circuitry on a printed circuit board. ... Thus, plaintiff’s work meets both the requirements of copyrightability and fixation and is entitled to copyright protection. The specific medium in which the work is fixed is irrelevant — as long as a copyrightable work is fixed in some tangible medium, the work is entitled to copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The owner of a copyrightable work need not, and indeed, cannot copyright the medium in which the work is fixed.

Section 101 defines an audiovisual work as a series of related images intended to be shown using machines or electronic equipment, with accompanying sounds if any, regardless of the material object in which the work is embodied.

Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman · filed 1981-05-22

“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.

Section 101 defines an audiovisual work as related images intended to be shown using a machine or device, with accompanying sounds if any, regardless of the material object embodying it.

M. Kramer Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Hugh Andrews, Tim Caldwell, Drew's Distributing, Inc., Drew's Distributing Co., and · filed 1986-03-27

The definition demonstrates that “audiovisual works” inherently requires some type of machine or device and that such machine shall embody as a “copy” such work.

Section 101 defines audiovisual works as works consisting of related images intended to be shown using machines or electronic equipment, with accompanying sounds if any, regardless of the material object embodying them.

Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising Inc. · filed 1987-12-08

“Audiovisual works” are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with the accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.

Section 101 treats a video game as an audiovisual work and its sequential display of images during operation as a performance, including a public performance when shown in an arcade open to the public.

Red Baron—Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp. · filed 1989-07-18

We begin with the proposition that the Double Dragon video game is an “audiovisual work” as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101. To the extent pertinent, the statute provides that “audiovisual works” are works which “consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices ... together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects ... in which the works are embodied.” ... We therefore conclude that the operation of a video game constitutes a performance as that term is defined in § 101.

Section 101 defines an audiovisual work as a series of related images intended to be shown by machines or devices, including electronic equipment.

Atari Games Corporation v. Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights · filed 1992-11-20

An audiovisual work is, among other requirements, “a series of related images.”

Section 101 defines a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent and stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration.

G.D. Searle & Co. v. Philips-Miller & Associates, Inc. · filed 1993-10-15

Under section 101, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy ..., by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent and stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Philips-Miller’s 30-page written proposal, (Def.’s Ex. 1), was certainly fixed in a tangible form.

Section 101 defines an audiovisual work as related images intended to be shown using machines or devices, together with accompanying sounds.

Raquel v. Education Management Corp. · filed 1999-11-09

The Copyright Act defines “Audiovisual works” as “works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 defines an audiovisual work as a series of related images intended to be shown using machines or devices, with accompanying sounds if any, regardless of the material object in which the work is embodied.

Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc. · filed 2003-09-23

“Audiovisual works” are “works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the work is embodied.”

Section 101 defines fixation as a sufficiently permanent or stable embodiment and includes photographs within pictorial works.

Toney v. L'OreaL U.S.A., Inc., the Wella Corporation, and Wella Personal Care of North America, Inc. · filed 2004-09-21

The Act’s definitional section, § 101, explains that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression “when its embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. It cannot be disputed that Toney’s likeness in photographic form is an original work and fixed in tangible form (as no one photo of Toney is exactly like another, aside from duplicates produced from néga-tives, both of which are permanent and able to be perceived). Section 101 also states that pictoral works include photographs.

Section 101 defines a phonorecord as a material object in which sounds are fixed, excluding an audiovisual device containing visual images and lyrics.

Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing · filed 2005-12-12

The definition explicitly limits a phonorecord to an object which fixes sounds, and Plaintiffs device contains sounds, and visual images and lyrics.

Section 101's definition of an audiovisual work covers a karaoke CD + G containing synchronized lyric images and accompanying music.

Manno v. TENNESSEE PRODUCTION CENTER, INC. · filed 2009-09-11

But the Copyright Act treats a CD + G disk containing both music and lyrics simply as an “audiovisual work” under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed only when its embodiment in a tangible medium is sufficiently permanent or stable, so embedding without storing the work on the displaying site’s server does not fix it.

Logan v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2022-10-25

“Because [third-parties] d[id] not store the images and videos, they d[id] not ‘fix’ the copyrighted work in any ‘tangible medium of expression.’” Hunley, 2021 WL 4243385, at *2 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). Therefore, third-party embedding did not violate Hunley’s exclusive right to display “copies” of his copyrighted works and failed to constitute direct copyright infringement. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106. ... Logan’s secondary liability claims face dismissal for the same reason as Hunley’s. ... The closest Logan gets to pleading third-party infringement under the server test is by alleging that third parties “can” save his embedded photos onto their servers. ... But the FAC fails to assert that any specific third party actually did so. ... This defectively pleads Logan’s secondary liability claims. ... Therefore, the Court dismisses Logan’s secondary liability claims with leave to amend.

Section 101 treats a work as fixed when its embodiment in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory duration, and a movable material object can qualify as a copy even when it changes shape or pose.

Tangle, Inc. v. Aritzia, Inc. · filed 2025-01-14

Like dance, movies, and music, a moveable sculpture like Tangle’s is sufficiently “fixed” to be entitled to copyright protection, even when its pose changes. Under the Copyright Act, a work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Copies” are simply “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . .” Id. ... Here, Tangle’s sculptures are material objects, so they qualify as “copies.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. In addition, those material objects can be “perceived” and “reproduced” for more than a “transitory” period. See id. As embodied in the sculptures, Tangle’s expression therefore is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium,” even though the sculpture may take different poses. Tangle’s registered copyrights are thus valid and protect its works across their full range of motion.

Section 101 treats works embodied in sound tapes as fixed in a tangible medium for copyright purposes.

Pundzak, Inc. v. Cook · filed 1993-05-19

All of the intellectual property, which embodied the Willard & Rafert concept, was fixed in a tangible medium, sound tapes. As such, they became subject to the copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats audiovisual works stored on printed circuit boards as fixed when they can be perceived for more than a transitory period, even with the aid of a machine.

Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider · filed 1981-07-15

A work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression “when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Under these statutory provisions, it is clear that the plaintiff’s audiovisual works are fixed in the printed circuit boards. The printed circuit boards are tangible objects from which the audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time more than transitory. The fact that the audiovisual works cannot be viewed without a machine does not mean the works are not fixed.

Section 101’s definition of an audiovisual work covers a toy whose cassette-driven animation produces a series of related images accompanied by voices and music.

Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning System, Inc. · filed 1986-10-22

This court is persuaded that Teddy Rux-pin is properly classified as an audiovisual work. Teddy Ruxpin produces a “series of related images” in the form of life-like animation activated by the specially designed cassette tape. The images are accompanied by sounds in the form of Teddy’s voice, the voices of other characters, and music.

Section 101 excludes audiovisual works from phonorecords; discs that display song lyrics with accompanying music qualify as audiovisual works.

Abkco Music, Inc. And Abkco Music and Records, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., and Performance Tracks, Inc. · filed 1996-09-19

Moreover, the term phonoreeord expressly excludes “audiovisual works,” yet CD-I-G’s constitute “audiovisual works,” since they “consist of a series of related images” — the lyrics — “together with accompanying sounds” — the music. 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101’s definition of audiovisual works includes television commercials.

Smart Inventions, Inc. v. Allied Communications Corp. · filed 2000-03-20

There is no question that a television commercial qualify for protection under the Copyright Act.

Section 101 defines an architectural work and requires fixation in a tangible medium by or under the author’s authority.

Sorenson v. Wolfson · filed 2015-03-31

The Copyright Act defines a work as “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when “its embodiment in a copy ... by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent ... to permit it to be ... reproduced.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).

Section 101 excludes audiovisual works from the statutory definition of a phonorecord and defines audiovisual works as related images intended to be shown with accompanying sounds.

Sony/ATV Publishing, LLC v. Marcos · filed 2016-06-09

Moreover, the HFA license is a standard compulsory license limited to distribution of phonorecords and incorporates the statutory definition of that term, which excludes “audiovisual work[s].” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Karaoke recordings are audiovisual works in that they “consist of a series of related images” — in this case the lyrics— “which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices ... together with accompanying sounds.” Id.

Section 101's definitions, including the definition of a joint work, may be at issue in determining whether a claim arises under the Copyright Act.

Lombardi v. Suares · filed 1996-04-29

The Court must decide whether a decision defining whether Plaintiff contributed to a joint work is one of copyright law or one of contract law. The Court finds it is one of copyright law. ... Finding that Plaintiffs allegations require a determination of the applicability of definitions contained in the Copyright Act, this case is found to arise under the Act.

Section 101 treats contributions as a joint work only when they are inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole; illustrations that merely enhance independently readable stories do not create joint copyright.

Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Corp. · filed 1982-03-17

In sum, the Court decided that the text and illustrations in the books are not “inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 treats a work as joint when authors intend their contributions to merge into a unitary whole, and, absent obvious collaboration, a contribution must be significant in both quality and quantity to infer that intent.

Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., Inc. · filed 1986-06-11

Thus, a determination as to whether a work was created jointly involves an examination of both the quantity and quality of the parties' contributions as factors bearing on the ultimate question, intent. While a co-author’s contribution need not equal the other author’s, at least when the authors are not immediately and obviously collaborating, the co-author’s contribution must be “significant” both in quality and quantity in order to permit an inference that the parties intended a joint work.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Sinkler v. Goldsmith · filed 1985-10-01

The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole and a derivative work as one based on one or more preexisting works.

Weissmann v. Freeman · filed 1988-05-06

A joint work is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a derivative work as one “based upon one or more preexisting works.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross · filed 1989-04-04

Under federal law, a “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977). In order for an author to obtain an interest in a “joint work,” federal copyright law requires that the contribution made by that author to the “joint work” is, by itself, protectable under the Federal Copyright Act. ... Because Ross only contributed ideas to the Full Impact interface, which by themselves are not protectable, the program is not a “joint work” between Ross and Wigginton.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors whose contributions are intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Mountain States Properties, Inc. v. Robinson · filed 1988-09-29

A joint work is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of one whole.

Geshwind v. Garrick · filed 1990-04-16

Alternatively, even if Digital is not the sole creator of Japan Fly-By, the work is a joint work of Digital and plaintiff under § 101 of the Copyright Act. ... A "joint work” is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one intended to merge the authors' contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole, and joint authorship requires each author to contribute independently copyrightable material.

Ashton-Tate Corporation v. Ross · filed 1990-10-04

As the district court correctly noted, a "joint work" is "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101 (1977). ... Even though this issue is not completely settled in the case law, our circuit holds that joint authorship requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution. Thus the district court properly decided this issue against Appellants.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by at least two authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole; co-authorship requires substantial and significant contributions to the final product.

Designer's View, Inc. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. · filed 1991-04-19

A work is considered a “joint work” if it is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Although each author’s contributions need not be equal either qualitatively or quantitatively, ... each party must have contributed substantially and significantly to the final product in order for co-authorship to exist.

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Services, Inc. · filed 1991-05-23

The Copyright Act defines a joint work as one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's joint-work definition concerns the authors' creation of the work rather than later joint ownership by assignment.

Childress v. Clarice Taylor, Paul B. Berkowsky, the Moms Company, and Ben Caldwell · filed 1991-09-18

As Professor Nimmer has pointed out, this definition is really the definition of a work of joint authorship.

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Schwasinger v. Price · filed 1992-03-11

A joint work is defined as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101 requires intent to create a joint work; collaboration alone does not satisfy the statutory requirement that contributors intend to merge their contributions into a unified work.

Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc. · filed 1994-01-06

Therefore, reliance on collaboration alone, as Trinity suggests, would be incompatible with the clear statutory mandate.

Section 101's joint-work definition requires multiple authors and intent to merge their contributions; the court held that Sears's involvement could support joint authorship and precluded summary judgment.

Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1993-11-17

code, Sears has demonstrated sufficient involvement in that process that we can not say, as a matter of law, that Sears is not a .joint author.

For a work to qualify as a joint work, the parties must intend at the time of creation that their contributions be merged into a unitary whole; collaboration alone is not determinative.

Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc. · filed 1995-03-31

Although a plain reading of Section 101 of the Act may give the impression that a participant’s collaboration in a work may be determinative of authorship, it is the intention of the parties at the time of the creation, which is the controlling element in determining whether a work is a joint work for purposes of the Act.

Section 101 defines joint works as works intended by multiple authors to merge their contributions into an inseparable or interdependent whole, collective works as compilations of separate independent contributions, and derivative works as original works based on preexisting works; an abridgment must meet the originality threshold to qualify.

Campbell v. James Lavery Internomics, Inc., a California Corporation Amway, Inc., a Michigan Corporation · filed 1997-01-14

A "joint work" is "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The Combined Software Package was a "collective work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'collective work' is a work ... in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.") ... A "derivative work" is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as ... [an] abridgement.... A work consisting of ... modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " 17 U.S.C. § 101. While the software sold to Amway in 1991 is an "abridged" version of the Combination Software Package, the "modification" does not meet the threshold of originality required to make such abridgment an original work of authorship entitled to copyright protection as a derivative work.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors who intend their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole; joint authorship also requires independently copyrightable contributions and mutual intent to be co-authors.

Thomson v. Allan S. Larson, Nanette Larson, and Julie Larson McCollum · filed 1998-06-19

The Copyright Act defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). ... A co-authorship claimant bears the burden of establishing that each of the putative co-authors (1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors.

Section 101's joint-work definition requires two or more authors to intend that their contributions merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Brown v. McCormick · filed 1998-10-08

“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... In this case, neither of these two circumstances exist. ... First, Ms. Brown’s designs are not “inseparable” from the work of others on the quilts. ... Moreover, Ms. Brown’s contributions to the finished quilts were not “interdependent” with others’ contributions, either in fact or in intention. Ms. Brown’s contract and subsequent communications with Ms. McCormick make quite clear that Ms. Brown did not intend to share the creative rights in her designs with anyone; without the intent to become a joint author, there is not a joint work. ... Ms. Brown’s designs therefore have value separate from the defendants’ selections of fabrics with which to make the individual quilts at issue; accordingly, they are not “interdependent” with the defendants’ work, and Ms. Brown’s designs are not a “joint work.”

Section 101 requires a joint work to be prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into a unitary whole, and a valuable, independently copyrightable contribution alone does not establish authorship of the joint work.

Aalmuhammed v. Spike Lee · filed 2000-02-04

A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. ... The statutory language establishes that for a work to be a "joint work" there must be (1) a copyrightable work, (2) two or more "authors," and (3) the authors must intend their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. ... A "joint work" in this circuit "requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution" to the disputed work. ... We hold that authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint work, and that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution. ... A creative contribution does not suffice to establish authorship of the movie.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Brown v. McCormick · filed 2000-03-07

Further, with regard to the Marriage Block, the defendants’ argument is utterly without merit. The statute states that “[a] ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Brown had no knowledge that her work was to be copied to form the basis for the Marriage Block. Accordingly, it is impossible that Brown intended her work to be merged into a greater composition and she cannot be considered to be a joint author along with the other contributors to “Where Love Resides.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to merge into a unitary whole.

Maurizio v. Goldsmith · filed 2000-01-26

[A] work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Section 101 defines a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Visitor Industries Publications, Inc. v. NOPG, L.L.C. · filed 2000-04-03

A “joint work” is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors who intend their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Carell v. Shubert Organization, Inc. · filed 2000-06-27

A “joint work” under the Copyright Act is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The authors of a joint work are “co-authors” or “joint authors,” and if no assignments have been made, “co-owners.” The Second Circuit has established a two-part test for joint authorship, whereby each putative co-author must have (1) fully intended, at the time of creation, to be a co-author, and (2) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work. ... Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that defendants’ claim to joint authorship cannot preclude plaintiffs assertions of her infringement claim. ... In the absence of a joint work, the fact that one party contributes to certain designs, but not to others, does not mean that the party is a co-author of the entire set of designs. Thus, even if plaintiff acknowledged Napier’s co-authorship of some of the Designs, this does not preclude her from bringing an infringement action to enforce her rights to those Designs that she claims she individually owns.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors whose contributions are intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Johnson v. Berry · filed 2001-06-11

The Copyright Act defines a "joint work" as a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp.1993). The parts of a work are "interdependent" when they have some meaning standing alone but achieve their primary significance because of their combined effect, as in the case of the words and music of a song... The requisite intent to create a joint work exists when the putative joint authors intend to regard themselves as joint authors ... It is not enough that they intend to merge their contributions into one unitary work.

Section 101 requires putative joint authors to intend that their contributions merge into a unitary whole; the court found no such intent for the advertisements.

Health Insurance Ass'n of America v. Novelli · filed 2002-05-17

No such intention has been demonstrated to the Court at this juncture.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by at least two authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Ulloa v. Universal Music and Video Distribution Corp. · filed 2004-01-14

A “joint work” under the Copyright Act is one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In order to find joint authorship, the Court must also find that the putative co-authors, at some time, shared an intent to be co-authors.

Section 101 permits joint authorship of a comic-book character when collaborators jointly create a sufficiently distinctive expressive character, even if one contributor's expression would not be independently copyrightable; a character sufficiently distinct from an existing character can also be a copyrightable derivative work.

Gaiman, Neil v. McFarlane, Todd · filed 2004-02-24

Had someone merely remarked to McFarlane one day, “you need a medieval Spawn” or “you need an old guy to move the story forward,” and McFarlane had carried it from there, and if later a copyeditor had made some helpful editorial changes, neither the suggester nor the editor would be a joint owner. ... But where two or more people set out to create a character jointly in such mixed media as comic books and motion pictures and succeed in creating a copyrightable character, it would be paradoxical if though the result of their joint labors had more than enough originality and creativity to be copyrightable, no one could claim copyright. ... Although Gaiman’s verbal description of Cogliostro may well have been of a stock character, once he was drawn and named and given speech he became sufficiently distinctive to be copyrightable. ... The expressive work that is the comic-book character Count Nicholas Cogliostro was the joint work of Gaiman and McFarlane—their contributions strike us as quite equal—and both are entitled to ownership of the copyright. ... But that is enough expressive content for copyrightability, because Spawn itself (the original Spawn, né Al Simmons) is not a stock character (McFarlane would have a heart attack if we said he was). Spawn is copyrightable, and the question is simply whether Medieval Spawn is sufficiently distinct from Spawn also to be copyrightable as a derivative work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103; ... That is no problem here. A Spawn who talks medieval and has a knight’s costume would infringe Medieval Spawn, and if he doesn’t talk medieval and doesn’t look like a knight then he would infringe Spawn.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Team Play, Inc. v. Boyer · filed 2005-09-28

Under the Act, a co-owner of a copyright may not be sued for infringement, nor may his licensees. Plaintiffs contend that Police Trainer was a joint work within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101, which defines a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” In support of this contention plaintiffs cite certain testimony of Boyer which they construe as an admission of the validity of their theory. Boyer testified that he worked jointly with Fred Heyman, an employee of a Pellegrini controlled entity, to “make” the Police Trainer game. Mr. Boyer’s deposition testimony may be at odds with his declaration on this point, but I cannot say that no reasonable jury could rule in Mr. Boyer’s favor. He did not testify that he regarded Mr. Heyman as a co-author of the work, and Mr. Heyman testified that with respect to the Police Trainer game, Mr. Boyer “thought that he was the lord and everyone else were the peons under him.” That attitude would not have been consonant with the descriptions of joint ownership and joint authorship set forth in the cases or in Nimmer, INFORMATION LAW, § 4:39. Further, Mr. Boyer claims he sent a letter to Mr. Pellegrini in 1996 memorializing the terms of their oral agreement which clearly is at odds with this theory. He further claims that a copy of the same letter was faxed on his behalf to Ed Pellegrini’s attorneys in 1997. By the terms of Mr. Boyer’s letter, he was to receive royalties on sales of the game he developed. Mr. Pellegrini denies that he received the letter, but that does not end the inquiry. On the contrary, it poses a material issue of fact which must be decided by the jury.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Price v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 2007-01-26

work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one in which two or more authors intend their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc. · filed 2007-04-27

A “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... A jury could have believed that the contributions of the PODS employees were sufficiently significant to find the employees joint authors of the work.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors who intend their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Tang v. Putruss · filed 2007-10-05

Under copyright law, a “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Accordingly, Defendant Putruss fails to establish that he is. a joint owner of the copyright in the photo images.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors intending to merge their contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Sebastian Music Group, Inc. v. Ayala-Rodríguez · filed 2008-11-24

The Copyright Act defines a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by two or more authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Jordan v. SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC. · filed 2008-11-25

The Copyright Act defines “a “joint work” as a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.

Section 101 defines a joint work by requiring contributions from two or more authors intended to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole; suggestions, criticism, and participation alone do not necessarily make a work joint.

Gaylord v. United States · filed 2008-12-16

However, mere participation in, contributions to, and review of work does not necessarily create a joint work.

Section 101 defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors who intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Sierra-Pascual v. Pina Records, Inc. · filed 2009-09-24

The Copyright Act specifically recognizes that more than one person may be attributed authorship to a particular work. It defines “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A co-authorship claimant bears the burden of establishing that each of the putative coauthors (1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors whose respective contributions would be merged into a joint work.

Section 101 requires a joint work to be prepared by two or more authors intending to merge their contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole, and defines an architectural work as the design of a building embodied in a tangible medium.

Gaylord v. United States · filed 2010-02-25

A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... While the government entities provided some direction and ideas, this effort did not rise to the level necessary for a joint work. ... We see no clear error in the Court of Federal Claims’ determination that Cooper-Lecky and Mr. Gaylord did not intend The Column to be a joint work. ... The Copyright Act defines an architectural work as “the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... We see no clear error in the court’s determination that The Column is not an architectural work under the AWCPA.

Section 101 treats a work as joint only when two or more authors intend their contributions to merge into a unified whole; supplying only ideas or direction is insufficient to make someone a joint author.

Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. Pardini · filed 2010-08-02

According to the Copyright Act, a “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... Under the Copyright Act, however, ideas are not protected. Rather, the execution of the ideas are protected, and the author of the execution of the ideas becomes vested in the intellectual property. ... Based on the evidence presented and the relevant law, this Court finds that CBC fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its joint authorship theory.

Section 101 defines a compilation work by the selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting material into an original work, and a joint work as contributions by two or more authors intended to form inseparable or interdependent parts of a whole.

Tptcc Ny, Inc. v. Radiation Therapy Services, Inc. · filed 2011-05-16

The Copyright Act defines a compilation work as one “formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting material or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The Copyright Act defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, a party claiming joint authorship must show that “that each of the putative co-authors (1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors.”

Section 101 treats the Work as a joint work because Woodard and DeVito were coauthors.

Corbello v. DeVito · filed 2012-01-31

The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs motion and rules that: (1) the Work is a joint work under 17 U.S.C. § 101; (2) Woodard and DeVito were coauthors, and hence, Plaintiff is a co-owner as Woodard’s heir; and (3) U.S. Copyright Reg. No. TXu 454 118, i.e., the DeVito Work, registered by DeVito in his name only, was secured and has been held in part in constructive trust for Woodard, and subsequently for his heir, Plaintiff.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by authors intending to merge their contributions into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

Corwin v. Quinonez · filed 2012-03-12

When a work is “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, the authors create a “joint work,” ... and are considered to be “joint authors.”

Section 101 requires the authors of a joint work to intend that their contributions be merged into the joint work.

Garcia v. Google, Inc. · filed 2014-02-26

A work is joint only if the authors involved in its creation intend that it be so. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

Section 101's joint-work definition covers a song whose contributors each make non-trivial creative contributions intending to combine them, making the contributors co-authors and co-owners.

Marino v. Usher · filed 2014-05-21

For two or more people to become coauthors, each author must contribute some non-trivial amount of creative, original, or intellectual expression to the work and both must intend that their contributions be combined.

Section 101 requires the authors of a joint work to intend that their contributions be joined as a unitary work.

Garcia v. Google, Inc. · filed 2014-07-11

Garcia expressly disclaims such intent and there is no evidence that Youssef intended to create a joint work.

Section 101 defines a joint work by requiring authors to intend that their contributions be merged into a unitary whole, so mere participation in a photo shoot is insufficient.

Foster v. Lee · filed 2015-02-25

Defendants contend that, because Lee and Rodriguez participated in the photo shoot, the resulting photograph is a “joint work” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”). ... There is no evidence on which a reasonable juror could conclude that the parties intended to be joint authors of the photograph. ... In any event, there is no evidence — not even in Lee’s declaration — that any participant in the photo shoot “fully intend[ed]” that Lee, Rodriguez, and Foster “be joint authors.” ... Foster’s motion for summary judgment on this affirmative defense is therefore granted.

Section 101 treats a work as joint when each putative co-author contributes independently copyrightable expression and intends those contributions to be merged into a single work.

Mallon v. Marshall · filed 2015-03-31

In order to establish the first element, co-authorship of a joint work, the claimant must show that each of the putative co-authors: 1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and 2) intended to be co-authors whose respective contributions would be merged into a joint work.

Section 101 defines joint works by the intended merger of authors' contributions and does not bar a work from also being derivative of a preexisting work.

Greene v. General Hospital Corp. · filed 2015-07-16

a work can be both joint and derivative.

Section 101 defines a joint work by the authors’ intent to merge contributions into an inseparable or interdependent unitary whole and treats each fixed version of a work prepared over time as a separate work.

Mallon v. Marshall · filed 2016-09-30

The Copyright Act defines a “joint work” as one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. ... The “work” in question is thus the version that was published in PLoS Biology. ... The record shows that Dr. Mallon’s intent shifted with the development of the project, allowing this court to identify both different versions and a concomitant change in Dr. Mallon’s qualification as a joint author within the meaning set out in the statute.

Section 101 defines a joint work as one prepared by at least two authors intending their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.

UIRC-GSA Holdings Inc. v. William Blair & Co. · filed 2017-08-28

“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepaired by two or more authors with the intention that- their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” ... “While UIRC and Blair may or may not have intended to serve as co-authors for purposes of copyright law, these allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Blair and UIRC intended to work together—and had a contractual agreement, the Engagement Agreement, stating as such— to' create and draft a single, unitary product—the GSA bond solicitation materials over which UIRC claims copyrights.”

Section 101 treats a work as collective when separate, independent contributions are assembled into a whole, and as joint when authors intend their contributions to merge into inseparable or interdependent parts; the court applied those definitions to classify the database and website as collective works and reject joint authorship.

FurnitureDealer.net, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. · filed 2019-03-14

A collective work is a work . . . in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Copyright Office considers automated databases to be compilations, which include collective works. Id. Thus, taking as true that that the registered work is an automated database, the Court finds that it is properly characterized as a collective work. ... A joint work is a “work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). ... Like the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Court is persuaded that “equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in which all participants fully intend to be joint authors.” Id. at 509.