11 U.S.C. § 362

Under § 362(d)(1), a presumed setoff right alone does not establish cause for postconfirmation stay relief when the creditor remains adequately protected and the debtor has no postconfirmation default.

In re: Shultz v. · filed 2006-05-19(d)(1)

After confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, relief from stay is only appropriate when the alleged cause for relief arises from postconfirmation circumstances, such as a default by the debtor under the terms of the plan. ... Aside from citing its setoff right, the IRS has offered no specific evidence whatsoever to establish cause for relief from stay. The Debtor’s tax refund remains in the IRS’s possession. Therefore, the IRS’s interests remain adequately protected. Further, as of the date of the bankruptcy court’s opinion, the Debtors were current in their payments under their plan. The IRS has not disputed this fact, nor does it assert any other postconfirmation defaults in support of its motion. In accordance with Wellman, the IRS was not entitled to relief from stay.

In determining cause for relief from the automatic stay, courts may consider disruption of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan and the creditor’s failure to object to confirmation.

LAMARCHE v. Miles · filed 2009-03-31(d)(1)

The disruption and unsettling of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan is a highly significant consideration in determining whether “cause” exists to lift an automatic stay. ... Especially in this context, it was not improper for the bankruptcy court to consider Lamarche’s failure to object, grounded in debtor’s alleged rent gouging, to plan confirmation and to advance his position that the tenancy should be terminated rather than administered.

Section 362(d)(1) does not provide cause to lift the automatic stay shortly after chapter 13 plan confirmation when the creditor relies solely on grounds that existed before confirmation.

In re Morrow · filed 2013-06-27(d)(1)

As noted above, it is within the bankruptcy court’s discretion to determine cause and it is solely cause that is properly the grounds for a postconfirmation relief from stay motion. It is therefore this court’s determination that a relief from stay motion predicated solely on preconfir-mation grounds, especially when brought right after the plan has been confirmed, lacks such cause and is not well taken.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay enforcement of a seaman’s maritime lien for maintenance and cure.

Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC · filed 2018-04-19(a)(4)

We therefore conclude that, under Chandon, the ... bankruptcy stay did not apply to Barnes’s efforts to enforce his maritime lien for maintenance and cure.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay maritime liens for seamen’s wages earned after a debtor files a reorganization petition.

United States v. Chandon · filed 1989-11-06(a)(4)

The automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(4) do not apply to a maritime lien for seamen's wages earned after the filing of a petition for reorganization pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 362(a)(4) stays perfection or enforcement of an asserted maritime lien against a debtor’s vessel after a Chapter 11 filing.

In Re River Princess Corp. · filed 1991-05-06(a)(4)

American is stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) from perfecting or enforcing its asserted maritime lien pursuant to admiralty law.

Section 362(a)(4) does not stay enforcement of a seaman’s maritime lien for maintenance and cure.

Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC · filed 2018-03-28(a)(4)

We therefore conclude that, under Chandon, the bankruptcy stay did not apply to Barnes’s efforts to enforce his maritime lien for maintenance and cure.

Section 362(h) permits debtors and pre-petition creditors to recover for willful violations of the automatic stay, but gives no remedy to third parties outside the stay’s protection.

In Re Prairie Trunk Railway · filed 1990-04-05(h)

The Court holds in this case of apparent first impression that the cause of action created by 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) is available only to debtors or their pre-petition creditors, and does not provide a remedy to third parties not protected by the scope of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(h) permits a corporation to recover actual damages for a violation of the automatic stay.

United States v. Inslaw, Inc. (Inslaw, Inc.) · filed 1989-11-22(h)

As discussed previously, a corporation can collect actual damages for the violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) does not allow corporate debtors to recover costs, fees, or punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

First RepublicBank Corp. v. NCNB Texas National Bank (In Re First RepublicBank Corp.) · filed 1989-12-20(h)

Congress used the restrictive term “individual” in § 362(h) rather than the inclusive term “person” and so the debtors cannot be awarded costs, fees and punitive damages under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits a corporate debtor to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Richie (In Re Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc.) · filed 1990-11-14(h)

Counsel for defendant did suggest that since the debtor was a corporation, debtor could not recover under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). ... The Court apprehends that there are two reasons why defendant’s argument fails. ... Therefore, relying both on 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) and the equitable powers of this Court under § 105, the Court finds the issue for the debtor and against the defendant.

Section 362(h) permits only natural persons, not corporations or other artificial entities, to recover damages for willful violations of the automatic stay.

In Re Prairie Trunk Railway · filed 1991-03-14(h)

The Court concludes that the approach taken in Chateaugay represents the better view that only natural persons can recover damages as individuals under section 362(h).

Section 362(h) does not give corporate debtors a damages remedy for violations of the automatic stay.

Versar Architects & Engineers, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Geotech, Inc. (In Re Versar Architects & Engineers, Inc.) · filed 1992-03-23(h)

The Court finds that Section 362(h) does not apply to corporate debtors.

Section 362(h) does not provide corporate debtors a damages remedy for willful violations of the automatic stay.

In Re Carney & Sons Trucking Services, Inc. · filed 1992-07-06(h)

Accordingly, this Court finds that § 362(h) does not apply in cases involving corporate debtors.

Section 362(h) does not give a corporate debtor damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co. · filed 1992-07-28(h)

Section 362(h) provides that an individual injured by any willful violation of the automatic stay shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages. The provision does not apply to corporations.

Section 362(h) does not allow a corporate debtor to recover compensatory or punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Stockschlaeder & McDonald, Esqs. v. Kittay (In Re Stockbridge Funding Corp.) · filed 1992-10-08(h)

We deny Trustee’s counterclaim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 362(h) for Plaintiffs’ violation of the stay because Stockbridge is a corporate debtor.

Section 362(h) authorizes sanctions for willful violations of the automatic stay only when the injured debtor is a natural person, not a corporation.

Moratzka v. Visa U.S.A. (In Re Calstar, Inc.) · filed 1993-09-30(h)

Section 362(h) protects only human debtors and not corporations.

Section 362(h) does not provide sanctions to a corporate debtor for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Xavier's of Beville, Inc. · filed 1994-09-12(h)

Because debtor is a corporation sanctions are not available under § 362(h), however, the Court has authority to impose sanctions under 11 U.S.C. § 105 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020.

Section 362(h) does not give a corporate debtor a damages remedy for a willful violation of the automatic stay because a corporation is not an “individual.”

A & J Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States (In Re a & J Auto Sales, Inc.) · filed 1996-12-24(h)

The Court agrees with the analysis in Chateaugay and its progeny, which rely on the plain meaning rule set forth in United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 1026,103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), in holding that the term “individual” in section 362(h) does not include a corporation.

Section 362(h) does not permit a corporate debtor to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. v. Colortran, Inc. (In Re Colortran, Inc.) · filed 1997-07-25(h)

However, damages for willful violation of a stay may not be awarded to a corporate debtor under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) limits its damages remedy for willful violations of the automatic stay to individuals; corporations cannot recover under it.

A & J Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States (In Re a & J Auto Sales, Inc.) · filed 1998-04-30(h)

Thus the court concludes that section 362(h), which explicitly limits its application to individuals, cannot be used by corporations.

Section 362(h) permits a corporate debtor to seek damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay despite referring to individuals.

Diamond Industrial Corp. v. Alakrah (In Re Diamond Industrial Corp.) · filed 2003-01-01(h)

Debtor’s status as corporation does not pose an obstacle to its obtaining such relief. Although § 362(h) speaks only of individuals obtaining such relief, a corporate debtor also may qualify.

Section 362(h) provides a damages remedy only for natural individuals, not corporate debtors.

Cables & Accessories, Inc. v. Brewer · filed 2004-02-11(h)

Next, the bankruptcy court properly determined that Cables, as a corporation and not an individual, had no right of action for damages against Brewer for Brewer’s violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) applies only to natural individuals, not to corporate debtors.

Violations of the automatic stay in a corporate debtor’s bankruptcy may be sanctioned through civil contempt, including reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

All Trac Transportation, Inc. v. Transportation Alliance Bank (In Re All Trac Transportation, Inc.) · filed 2004-06-08(a)

A violation of the automatic stay in a corporate debtor bankruptcy case may be sanctioned by a civil contempt proceeding. ... Based on these findings, All Trac is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

Section 362(h) does not provide a damages remedy for corporate debtors injured by violations of the automatic stay.

Limor v. Buerger (In Re Del-Met Corp.) · filed 2005-03-04(h)

This plain reading of the statutory definitions is convincing. Section 362(h) does not provide a damages remedy for these corporate debtors.

Section 362(h)(1) applies only to individual debtors and does not terminate the automatic stay as to personal property securing a claim in a corporate debtor’s Chapter 7 case.

In re First Coast Marine, Inc. · filed 2006-03-27(h)(1)

The motion is denied on the basis that it is not necessary because 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1) applies only to cases filed by individual debtors and not corporate debtors.

Section 362(k) does not authorize damages for a corporate debtor because its remedy is limited to individuals.

Havis v. Norman (In Re Equator Corp.) · filed 2007-02-20(k)

The imposition of such damages under § 362(k) is inapplicable here. Debtor is a corporation, not an individual.

Section 362(h), as it applied before BAPCPA, does not provide a corporate debtor with damages for a violation of the automatic stay.

Butler v. Anderson (In Re C.R. Stone Concrete Contractors, Inc.) · filed 2010-06-09(h)

Although the Trustee, acting on behalf of the corporate Debtor, is not without recourse for the Marini Defendants’ alleged violations of the automatic stay, he is unable to avail himself of the remedy provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

In the Third Circuit, corporate entities qualify as “individuals” under § 362(k) and may recover for willful violations of the automatic stay.

In Re: Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC · filed 2025-08-22(k)

Appellants urge this Court to, in effect, flout the Third Circuit’s precedent in In re Atlantic Business and Community Development Corporation, 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1990), and hold that corporate entities are not “individuals” under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). See, e.g., DI 14 at 22–23. While the Court acknowledges Atlantic Business now stands for the minority view of the meaning of § 362(k), neither it nor a panel of the Third Circuit may overturn that precedent.

Section 362(h) does not allow a corporate debtor to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re San Angelo Pro Hockey Club, Inc. · filed 2003-03-13(h)

As conceded by the parties here, the Debtor, as a corporation, may not recover damages under section 362(h).

Section 362(a)(1) stays a Georgia foreclosure confirmation proceeding to recover a prepetition claim even when the confirmation hearing occurs after the bankruptcy petition.

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Virginia Hill Partners I (In Re Virginia Hill Partners I) · filed 1989-11-29(a)(1)

Bank of America also contends that the stay does not apply because the confirmation hearing occurred postpetition. The court does not agree. ... Because Bank of America’s claim and contract rights arose before the filing of the petition, the court finds and concludes that this is an action to which the section 362(a)(1) automatic stay applies.

Section 362(a) stays judicial confirmation of a foreclosure sale when the debtor still holds legal title to the property upon filing for bankruptcy, even if the debtor has no right of redemption.

United States v. Molitor · filed 1992-04-13(a)

However, they do retain legal title to their property until judicial confirmation of the sale has taken place. That interest is of little actual value to the Molitors, but it did pass into the bankruptcy estate once the Molitors filed for bankruptcy and it is protected by the automatic stay. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to seek relief in the bankruptcy court before proceeding with the hearing on the confirmation of sale.

Section 362(a) stays an action to confirm a foreclosure sale when confirmation is a prerequisite to obtaining a deficiency judgment against the debtor.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Russell Corp. (In Re Russell Corp.) · filed 1993-06-29(a)

An action to confirm a foreclosure sale, which is a prerequisite under Georgia law to obtaining a deficiency judgment, clearly falls under those actions prohibited by § 362(a).

Section 362(a)(1) and (6) bar a creditor from commencing or continuing a state court foreclosure confirmation proceeding against a debtor without relief from the stay.

In re Lamb · filed 2012-02-17(a)(1), (a)(6)

The commencement and continuation of a state court confirmation action without first obtaining relief from the stay is in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) prohibits continuing a foreclosure action against a debtor’s property when the foreclosure sale was incomplete at filing, even if the property was acquired subject to lis pendens.

In Re Webb · filed 2012-04-09(a)

Because a foreclosure sale had not been completed at the time the case was filed, the Debtor's interest in the property became property of his estate under § 541(a) and the continuation of the foreclosure action was prohibited by the automatic stay.

Section 362 automatically stays foreclosure after a bankruptcy petition, and a request to enjoin a future sale is not properly before the district court on appeal while the bankruptcy court has not lifted that stay.

McCune v. Salmon · filed 2023-02-02

Generally, a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay of any action to foreclose against the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362. Here, however, there is no indication that Appellees have moved the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay, nor does Appellant assert that the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting relief from the automatic stay. Because the Bankruptcy Court has not lifted the automatic stay under Section 362, this matter is not properly before this Court on appeal.

Section 362 automatically stays judicial foreclosure proceedings when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

In Re: Andrena Diane Crockett · filed 2023-07-20

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, a bankruptcy filing “trigger[s] an automatic stay in” judicial foreclosure proceedings.

A debtor’s prepetition waiver of the automatic stay is unenforceable against the later Chapter 11 debtor in possession.

DJK Enterprises LLC · filed 2025-02-13

A pre-petition debtor simply lacks the capacity to bargain away rights that arise post-petition in favor of the debtor-in-possession.

A debtor’s prepetition waiver of the automatic stay may support relief from the stay, but the waiver is neither self-executing nor automatically enforceable.

Southwest Georgia Bank v. Desai (In Re Desai) · filed 2002-07-25(d)

Although prepetition agreements waiving the protection afforded by the automatic stay are enforceable, such waivers are not per se enforceable, nor are they self-executing.

Section 362(d)(1) permits a court to consider a debtor’s prepetition agreement to consent to stay relief or not contest it when deciding whether cause exists, but an agreement cannot automatically prevent or vacate the stay.

In Re Shady Grove Tech Center Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1998-01-07(d)(1)

This court holds that prohibitions against the filing of a bankruptcy case are unenforceable, self-executing clauses in prepetition agreements purporting to provide that no automatic stay arises in a bankruptcy case are contrary to law and hence unenforceable, and that self-executing clauses in pre-petition agreements that purport to vacate the automatic stay are likewise unenforceable. However, a pre-petition agreement that consents to relief from stay, or provides that the debtor will not contest a motion for relief from stay, may be considered as a circumstance in determining whether cause exists for relief from stay.

A prepetition waiver of opposition to stay relief is a primary factor in deciding whether cause exists under § 362(d)(1), but the debtor and third parties may still contest relief.

In Re Powers · filed 1994-08-12(d)(1)

My view is that the waiver is a primary element to be considered in determining if cause exists for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1). However, the existence of the waiver does not preclude third parties, or the debtor, from contesting the motion.

A debtor’s prepetition agreement not to oppose relief from the automatic stay can be enforced by disregarding the debtor’s objection, but stay relief still requires a motion and consideration of objections from other parties in interest.

In Re Cheeks · filed 1994-04-25

Enforcement of a forbearance agreement does not in itself mean that in all bankruptcy cases where one exists, the automatic stay will be lifted. These agreements do not oust this Court’s Jurisdiction to hear objections to stay relief filed by other parties in interest. It simply means that this Court will give no weight to a Debtor’s objection as this conflicts with and is in derogation of the previous agreement. When there are no other objections to stay relief, this Court looks upon the motion to lift the stay as being totally unopposed and will render relief as though the motion is in default.

Section 362 does not make a debtor’s waiver of the automatic stay self-executing; relief from the stay requires bankruptcy court authorization.

In Re Sky Group International, Inc. · filed 1989-12-13(d)

Although waiver of a stay by the debtor apparently was possible under the old Bankruptcy Act, such a waiver is not self-executing under the Bankruptcy Code. Relief from stay must be authorized by the Bankruptcy Court.

Section 362’s automatic stay in a chapter 11 case protects the filing debtor but does not extend to a separate corporation solely because an individual associated with it filed for bankruptcy.

In re Morgan · filed 1989-12-18(a)

In chapter 11 there is no co-debtor stay, therefore, the stay only applies to the filing entity. When Charles O. Morgan, individually filed, he received the benefit of the protection of the automatic stay. There was afforded no collateral protection to any corporate entity or entities.

Section 362(a) does not stay recoupment of a claim arising from the same transaction as the debtor’s claim.

In the Matter of Alden D. Holford, Debtor. Alden D. Holford v. Melvin Lane Powers A/K/A Mel Powers and Mel Powers D/B/A · filed 1990-03-16(a)

Because we find that the transaction in question constituted a recoupment and not a setoff, and that a recoupment is not subject to the automatic stay of section 362(a), we REVERSE and RENDER the contempt order of the district court.

The automatic stay does not apply to actions brought by a debtor or Chapter 7 trustee and does not toll the limitations period for those actions.

AMS Realty, Inc. v. Tao (In Re AMS Realty, Inc.) · filed 1990-04-09(a)(1)

In the instant case, the automatic stay would not toll § 337 because § 362 has no application to an action brought by a Chapter 7 Trustee, or for that matter, the Debtor.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent claims against nonbankrupt defendants that do not involve the debtor’s property.

CenTrust Services, Inc. v. Guterman · filed 1990-04-17

Since our review of the record indicates that the first four causes of action of the complaint do not involve the bankrupt’s property, we find that the trial court erred in staying the entire action.

Section 362’s automatic stay is abused when a debtor invokes it through successive filings without intending a realistic reorganization, causing unnecessary and costly delay.

Weiszhaar Farms, Inc. v. Livestock State Bank · filed 1990-04-30

Thus an abuse of § 362 occurs when the debtor has no intention of effectuating a realistic plan of reorganization and the bankruptcy court’s self-executing injunction results in unnecessary and costly delays.

Section 362 does not prohibit a creditor from participating in a regulatory hearing it did not initiate, even when the creditor opposes the debtor’s request.

In Re Oxford Dev., Ltd. · filed 1990-06-08

The fact that an officer of Canterbury appeared at a hearing before a regulatory body which Canterbury did not cause to be convened does not constitute an automatic violation of the automatic stay. The fact that an officer of Canterbury opposed an action sought by Oxford from a regulatory body is not an automatic violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars creditors from closing postpetition aircraft transactions in derogation of a debtor’s surviving contract rights.

Braniff, Inc. v. GPA Group PLC (In Re Braniff, Inc.) · filed 1990-09-10

Because Braniff was not in default of the September Letter Agreement, the Subleases, the Lease Commitment, and the BAC 1-11 Leases, GPA Leasing, GPA Group, and ATL violated the automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code by closing on aircraft numbers 6, 7, 8, and 9 in derogation of Braniff’s rights.

Section 362 does not bar enforcement of a prepetition net settlement agreement in a disputed state-law contract claim where the dispute does not involve withholding the debtor’s property.

In Re The Charter Company · filed 1990-10-11

However, the district court believed that enforcing the net settlement agreement would violate the automatic stay provision. The automatic stay prohibits interference with the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 (1988). This case does not concern issues of withholding property of the debtor. Instead, this case involves a state law contractual dispute, a non-core proceeding.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar enforcement of a net settlement agreement in a disputed contract claim that does not involve withholding the debtor’s property.

Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Exxon Co. (In re Charter Co.) · filed 1990-10-11

However, the district court believed that enforcing the net settlement agreement would violate the automatic stay provision. The automatic stay prohibits interference with the debtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). This case does not concern issues of withholding property of the debt- or. Instead, this case involves a state law contractual dispute, a non-core proceeding.

Section 362(a)(1), (3), and (6) stay postpetition prosecution of prepetition claims and acts to control estate property, including proceeds of a debtor’s exchange membership.

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. · filed 1990-11-14(a)

The acts occurring after May 29, 1990 violated the automatic stay by continuing a proceeding that was commenced prior to that date or to recover a claim that arose pre-petition, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); by taking an act to exercise control over the Proceeds, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); and taking an act to collect, assess or recover a pre-petition claim, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a) does not bar actions concerning an escrow fund that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

Cedar Rapids Meats, Inc. v. Hager (In Re Cedar Rapids Meats, Inc.) · filed 1990-11-20(a)

This Court's finding that the escrow fund is not property of the debtor’s estate also has disposed of C.R. Meats allegations that they are entitled to recover some portion of the fund under either § 542 or § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. ... This finding also disposes of C.R. Meats’ allegations that the Commissioner violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) stays appellate proceedings involving a Chapter 11 debtor after the automatic stay takes effect.

School District of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re School Asbestos Litigation) · filed 1990-12-13(a)

On Sunday, October 28, 1990, National Gypsum Company filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (Dallas Division). Thereafter, on November 29, 1990 the bankruptcy court served an order authorizing notice of the enforcement of the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Accordingly, action in these appeals will be stayed.

Section 362 does not stay an action against a debtor seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent conduct after the bankruptcy petition.

International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1990-12-20

The bankruptcy stay provision is inapplicable because, although this is an action against the debtor, ... the First Amended Verified Complaint seeks only prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. IAM seeks to enjoin Continental from post-bankruptcy petition conduct, i.e. proceeding with the poll after this Court’s TRO expires.

Section 362(a) stays foreclosure against the debtor’s property even when a nondebtor guarantor is named, but does not bar an action on the note against that guarantor.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. 400 Garden City Associates · filed 1991-01-07(a)

Therefore, while plaintiff is stayed from proceeding with its foreclosure action, which by operation of section 362 includes its foreclosure action against VMS, it is not prohibited by the United States Bankruptcy Code from proceeding at law against VMS to recover on the note. Since plaintiff is not stayed by the Bankruptcy Code from proceeding at law against the guarantor VMS, this motion is properly before this court. Plaintiff need not, as argued by VMS, seek approval by Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay because VMS is not subject to the stay on the note.

Section 362(a) stays an action against a defendant that filed for bankruptcy, while the action may continue against other defendants.

Berk v. Ascott Investment Corp. · filed 1991-03-06(a)

Although the debtor, La-venthol and Horwath, falls under the protection of the automatic stay provision found at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), this action continues against the other defendants in the case at bar.

Section 362(a) takes effect when a bankruptcy petition is filed and does not retroactively undo a judgment entered earlier that day.

Miller v. National Franchise Services, Inc. · filed 1991-03-14(a)

The statutory language is clearly prospective. The statute contains no indication that Congress intended to unravel valid, completed judicial process. The federal bankruptcy stay does not reach into the past to undo a valid state judgment.

Section 362(a) automatically stays proceedings against a debtor until the debtor’s discharge, after which a creditor may join the debtor in an action subject to the discharge injunction.

Pittman v. Manion · filed 1991-03-22(a)

When Laird’s discharge was entered, the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code section 362(a) also terminated, and Eater could then proceed with impunity against Laird subject to the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(1) protects the bankrupt debtor’s assets but does not prevent a court from finding the debtor a joint tortfeasor when that finding creates no debt against the debtor.

MCIC, INC. v. Zenobia · filed 1991-03-27(a)(1)

As we have indicated, the automatic stay provision of § 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is intended to protect the assets of the bankrupt from its creditors. In this case, Raymark owes its money judgment by virtue of the release executed by cross-appellants. Therefore, the automatic stay provision does not apply. As a result, the trial court was free to adjudicate Raymark a joint tortfeasor liable for contribution if it considered the evidence of proximate cause sufficient to warrant its finding.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit competitors from soliciting a debtor’s customers when the debtor has no property interest in those customers.

Golden Distributors, Ltd. v. Reiss (In Re Golden Distributors, Ltd.) · filed 1991-06-11(a)

It was previously found that the defendants’ conduct did not violate the automatic stay because the debtor did not have any property interest within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 541 which was interfered with by the defendants in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not protect an account from postpetition collection when a prepetition IRS levy transferred the debtor’s entire interest in the account and kept it outside the bankruptcy estate.

McLaughlin v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1991-06-28(a)

Accordingly, the Investor’s Account did not become part of the bankruptcy estate, and therefore, received no protection from the automatic stay. Thus, the IRS’ recovery of the funds in the Investor’s Account did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay is violated when the IRS contacts a debtor’s employer after the bankruptcy filing and directs it to continue withholding the debtor’s wages.

Hebermehl v. United States Ex Rel. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Kuhr) · filed 1991-07-17

With respect to Debtor’s contention that the IRS violated 11 U.S.C. § 362, this Court finds that, in fact, the IRS did take actions in violation of the automatic stay. The testimony of Ms. Gaudet was clear that she had phone contact with Metro and told them not to release the funds until she had consulted with their legal counsel.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to IRS tax liens against assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Hudgins v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1991-07-23

The ruling of the Bankruptcy Court that the automatic stay provisions apply to the IRS’s liens is AFFIRMED.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an action against a debtor on a prepetition joint obligation and protects the debtor’s interest in property held with a non-debtor spouse as tenants by the entirety.

Boatmen's National Bank v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 1991-09-11(a)(1)

The Debtor individually, and the Debtor’s interest in the estate by the entirety are thus protected by the automatic stay provisions of Section 362. The Movant is stayed from commencing or continuing any action against the Debtor that was or could have been commenced before this bankruptcy case was commenced, and is stayed from any action to recover a claim against the Debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.

Section 362(a) creates an automatic stay only when the bankruptcy petition is filed, so a creditor’s prepetition acts cannot violate it.

Hicks v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Hicks) · filed 1991-10-04(a)

Obviously, there is no automatic stay until the petition is filed. Therefore, because it is undisputed that all of the acts of Fifth Third Bank, i.e., the chargebacks to the Kroger account, occurred prior to the debtors’ filing of their bankruptcy petition, the actions of the defendant could not have violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) does not bar a foreclosure action against a nondebtor owner when the action does not name the debtor or affect property of the debtor or estate.

In Re Sauk Steel Co., Inc. · filed 1991-10-21(a)

The automatic stay prohibits actions against the debtor, the property of the debtor, and the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Since the foreclosure action in the instant case was not against the Debtor, and the order naming Sauk Building Corporation as mortgagee in possession did not affect the property of the Debtor of the estate, there was no violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays an action against a corporation in bankruptcy but does not bar the action against a nondebtor corporate officer in the circumstances of this case.

Morley Music Co. v. Cafe Continental, Inc. · filed 1991-11-04

The bankruptcy proceedings involving CAFE operates as a stay of this action as to the corporation, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, but does not, in light of the facts and merits of this case, bar suit against the non-debtor, COHEN.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings against a debtor in bankruptcy, but does not extend the stay to other members of the debtor’s controlled group.

Local 478 Trucking & Allied Industries Pension Fund v. Jayne · filed 1991-11-27(a)

The automatic stay awarded to the withdrawing employer also does not extend to other members of a controlled group.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against the debtor, but does not stay claims against a nondebtor codefendant or claims the debtor brings against others.

Maritime Electric Co. v. United Jersey Bank · filed 1991-12-02(a)(1)

Applying these principles here, we hold that section 362 stayed only MNY’s conversion claim against Son, but not MNY’s conversion claim against MNJ or Son’s claims against MNY and Father. Only MNY’s conversion claim against Son is an action against a “debtor”, and so only proceedings arising out of that claim were stayed automatically by the filing of Son’s May 18, 1990 bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(a) justifies a debtor’s refusal to produce records for a creditor’s audit while the automatic stay applies; the creditor may seek relief from the stay under § 362(d).

In Re Carmelo Bambace, Inc. · filed 1991-12-03(a)

In this case, Bambace’s refusal was justified under the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) which was implicated upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Pension Fund could have moved for relief in this court under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) but neglected to make such a motion.

Section 362(b) does not except the Department of Education’s collection of a student loan from the automatic stay.

Saburah v. United States Department of Education (In Re Saburah) · filed 1992-01-03(b)

None of the exceptions to the Stay found in 11 U.S.C. Section 362(b) apply to the DOE.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a creditor from litigating lien priority against another creditor when the bankruptcy court has lifted the stay for the foreclosure action.

Cole Taylor Bank v. Cole Taylor Bank · filed 1992-01-17(a)

We find that the bankruptcy stay provided protection for Lofstrom but did not afford the Turovers the right to sit idle with regard to the priority of their lien. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay with regard to the bank’s foreclosure action. The Turovers’ counterclaim challenged the bank’s interest and not the interest of Lofstrom, the debtor. Accordingly, we find the Turovers were not prevented by the stay order from pursuing their equitable lien claim on the property and alleged right to a priority superior to that of other lien interests on the proceeds of the ultimate land sale.

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against entities that have filed bankruptcy petitions but does not protect defendants that have not sought bankruptcy protection.

Kenston Management Co. v. Lisa Realty Co. (In Re Kenston Management Co.) · filed 1992-03-04(a)(1)

However, the Poseidon Subsidiaries, as well as, the Non-Poseidon Defendants, have not sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, the provisions of the automatic stay do not apply.

The automatic stay does not cover property owned by a third party rather than the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Illinois Service Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Academy of St. James College Preparatory · filed 1992-03-16

Because Eberson had acquired the title of the property in June 1976, the property was not part of the Academy’s estate and was not subject to the bankruptcy stay.

A creditor waives Section 362(e)’s thirty-day automatic-termination benefit by setting the stay-relief hearing beyond that period while also requesting additional relief.

In re Alderson · filed 1992-04-12(e)

This Court concludes that when CNB set the hearing date beyond the thirty day period, simultaneously requesting additional relief, it waived the benefit of Section 362(e); and there was no lapse of the stay.

Section 362(a) does not prohibit a tax administrator from issuing a postpetition internal assessment of the validity of its prepetition levy for other government branches.

Front Office Associates, Inc. v. Clark (In re Front Office Associates, Inc.) · filed 1992-06-15(a)

With respect to the Tax Administrator’s November 29, 1991 “declaratory ruling”, which was clearly issued post-petition, this activity does not fall within any of the prohibitions contained in § 362(a), i.e. to “recover a claim against the debtor” (§ 362(a)(1)); to enforce a judgment against the debtor (§ 362(a)(2)); to “obtain possession of property of the estate” (§ 362(a)(3)); to “create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate” (§ 362(a)(4)); or to satisfy any of the other restrictions set forth in subsection (a). Rather, we interpret the declaratory ruling of the Tax Administrator as being its internal legal assessment of the propriety of its pre-petition conduct, for the benefit of other government branches.

Section 362(a) does not stay a contempt finding, fine, or incarceration that occurred before the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Williams v. Piazza (In Re Williams) · filed 1992-06-26(a)

However, in this case the incarceration of Williams occurred prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Since Williams was not a debtor under title 11, there was no automatic stay in place precluding a finding of contempt, imposition of a fine, or incarceration.

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions against the debtor, not actions brought by the debtor, so the stay does not toll the limitations period for the debtor’s own claim.

Victor Foods, Inc. v. Crossroads Economic Development Of St. Charles County, Inc. · filed 1992-09-24(a)(1)

VF's bankruptcy does not toll the statute because the automatic stay applies to actions filed against rather than by VF.

Section 362(a) is not violated merely by asserting rights contrary to those claimed by the debtor.

West Coast Video Enterprises, Inc. v. Owens (In Re West Coast Video Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1992-09-25(a)

We reject this latter assertion, as we do not believe that the Defendants’ actions, which boil down to an assertion of rights contrary to those claimed by the Debtor, are violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) takes effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed, so actions completed before filing do not violate the automatic stay.

In re Rouse · filed 1992-09-29(a)

This court does not find that there has been any violation of the automatic stay by taking any of the actions prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The automatic stay did not come into effect until the filing of a petition under 11 U.S.C. § 302. Upon the filing of that petition, not only was no action taken but the Friend of the Court did all it could to protect the rights of all parties by placing the funds in escrow until determinations could be made as to the rights of the parties.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies only to petitions filed under the Bankruptcy Code; appointment of an equity receiver alone does not trigger it.

Shook v. United States · filed 1992-10-28

Equally untenable is plaintiff’s assertion that the Automatic Stay Provision of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 362, is applicable in the case at bar. By its terms, the automatic stay provision applies solely to petitions filed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a) stays proceedings and enforcement of claims against the debtor but does not suspend the debtor’s obligation to assert his own rights on time.

Steele v. Guardianship & Conservatorship of Crist · filed 1992-10-30(a)

The automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) creates a moratorium on any commencement or continuation of proceedings or enforcement of a prior claim against the debtor. It does not stay the debtor’s obligation to assert his own rights in a timely manner.

Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay when a bankruptcy case is dismissed, allowing tax liens held in abeyance during the case to arise.

In re McConnaughey · filed 1992-11-03(c)

Once the case was dismissed, the debtors’ real estate was no longer property of a bankruptcy estate, nor was there an automatic stay in effect. Although the creation of tax liens may have been prevented or held in abeyance by the automatic stay during the administration of the debtors’ first chapter 13 case, upon termination of the automatic stay, the tax liens automatically came into existence upon the debtors’ real property on December 18, 1990.

Section 362 does not bar withdrawal of a suit against the debtor or dismissal of a remaining moot third-party indemnity claim when the stay’s protective purposes are not implicated.

Jones v. Burr Roofing Co., No. Cv87 0089548 S (Nov. 19, 1992) · filed 1992-11-19(a)(1)

The automatic stay does not apply to a situation where a plaintiff's pending suit "against the debtor" has been withdrawn, the only remaining claim is a debtor's moot third-party claim for indemnity, the policies of 362 are not compromised, and all parties want only to clean up the docket.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not bar proceedings against a nondebtor surety.

Home Indemnity Co. v. Killian · filed 1992-12-07(a)(1)

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of judicial proceedings against "the debtor." Although the Bankruptcy Court has the authority in certain circumstances to enter further orders staying proceedings against other people, if those proceedings would affect the debtor or the debtor's bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay effected by § 362 does not bar proceedings against persons other than the debtor. Collier v. Eagle-Picher, Inc., 86 Md. App. 38, 585 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 323 Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991). The debtor in this case was Celotex, not appellant. It therefore follows that the judgments were not precluded by the § 362 stay.

Section 362(a)(3) stays relief affecting a debtor’s property, but claims against a nondebtor that do not involve the bankruptcy estate may proceed.

Krondes v. O'boy, No. Cv 87 0090909s (Dec. 30, 1992) · filed 1992-12-30(a)(3)

It is therefore apparent that much of the relief requested by the plaintiff, such as specific performance, cannot be granted because of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the complaint also asserts claims which are not directed at the property of the debtor e.g., that the plaintiffs gave Senior the sum of $55,000 which should be returned to them on the basis that Senior has breached the agreement. The automatic stay provisions of section 362 applies only to debtors.

Section 362(a)(7) bars a creditor from setting off debts by self-help and requires a court determination of whether the obligations are enforceable.

Burton v. United States (In Re Selma Apparel Corp.) · filed 1992-12-31(a)(7)

Section 362(a)(7) precludes a creditor from self-help and requires the Court to make a simple determination into the enforceability of the corresponding obligations.

Section 362’s automatic stay may extend to solvent codefendants when a judgment against them would effectively bind the debtor and affect its bankruptcy estate.

Trimec, Inc. v. Zale Corp. · filed 1993-01-13

Permitting such a judgment to be entered against Zale would be inequitable since Zale would not have had the opportunity to defend itself and a judgment in favor of the City could have a significant impact on Zale’s estate in its bankruptcy proceeding. Given the identity of the parties and the effect of this proceeding on the debtor’s estate, an extension of the stay to the solvent parties in this action is clearly warranted as the parties suggest.

Section 362(a)(1) stays rulings on a debtor’s affirmative defenses in an action against the debtor, but does not stay the debtor’s own counterclaims.

Mid Kansas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Wichita Ex Rel. Receiver Resolution Trust Corp. v. Orpheum Theater Co. · filed 1993-02-09(a)(1)

The court agrees. Clearly, to rule on the affirmative defenses defendant has asserted would be to continue a judicial proceeding against the debtor. ... A petition in bankruptcy does not stay claims, including counterclaims, brought by the debtor.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a debtor’s third-party action against others, even when other claims in the same case are stayed.

Carlson v. Norman (In re Duncan) · filed 1993-03-02(a)(1)

We note that the third-party action instigated by the Duncans against the Normans was not subject to the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings and enforcement of judgments against the debtor or estate property, but does not automatically protect a nondebtor guarantor.

F.T.L., Inc. v. Crestar Bank (In Re F.T.L. Inc.) · filed 1993-03-16

The plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides only for the automatic stay of judicial proceedings and enforcement of judgments against the debtor or the property of the estate.

Section 362(c) dissolves the automatic stay by statute; once it has ended, a motion for relief from the stay presents nothing to lift, and denying that motion does not reinstate the stay.

Cooper v. Walker (In re Walker) · filed 1993-03-24(c)

Since there was no automatic stay in effect, there was no issue for the court to decide; there was no stay for the court to lift. Even were the Court to hear the motion for relief from stay, any Order it might issue would be meaningless: a denial of the motion would not reinstate the automatic stay. The automatic stay was already dissolved by statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).

Section 362 does not bar a creditor from filing a Chapter 11 plan, so the creditor need not obtain relief from the automatic stay before filing one.

In Re Strawberry Square Associates · filed 1993-03-30

The creditor need not move to vacate the automatic stay beforehand, because filing a plan is not one of the actions enjoined by a § 362 stay.

Section 362(a) does not stay collection efforts against a third-party garnishee for the garnishee’s personal liability, even when the judgment debtor has filed for bankruptcy.

Wasserburger v. Consolidated Management Corp. · filed 1993-06-02(a)

The automatic stay of § 362(a) does not afford Hughes, as a third party, any protection from Wasserburger's efforts to collect the sums he is entitled to receive from Hughes as a result of Hughes' breach of responsibilities as garnishee defendant.

Section 362 requires an FDIC receiver to file a bankruptcy claim or seek relief from the automatic stay before reaching a debtor’s assets outside that receiver’s own receivership.

First City Asset Servicing Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In Re First City Asset Servicing Co.) · filed 1993-07-01(a)

Under the Court’s previously expressed guidelines, and because the Debtor had already filed its bankruptcy petition, FDIC/Collecting was required to file a claim or to first make a motion to the Bankruptcy Court to have the stay lifted before attempting to reach assets of the Debtor which were outside the Collecting Bank Receivership.

Section 362(c) terminates the automatic stay upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.

United Dominion Industries, Also Known as Amca International Corporation v. Econo-Therm Energy Systems Corporation, and · filed 1993-07-06(c)

Counsel has informed us Econo-Therm has had a plan of reorganization confirmed. Therefore, the automatic stay has terminated.

Section 362 does not bar a trustee’s court filings to resign, seek fees from trust assets, and account to beneficiaries when those filings neither proceed against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate nor create, perfect, or enforce a lien against estate property.

In Re Barbara Gisler Kennerly, A/K/A Barbara Ann Gisler, Debtor in Possession. Barbara Gisler Kennerly, A/K/A Barbara An · filed 1993-07-09

In this way, the filings constituted neither an "action or proceeding" against Kennerly's bankruptcy estate in violation of § 362, Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Lee, 561 A.2d 41, 43 (Pa.Super.Ct.1989), nor a creation, perfection, or enforcement of any lien against the estate's property.

Section 362(a) bars creditors’ claims against a bankrupt company and its officers and directors for unpaid contractual debts.

Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.) · filed 1993-07-23(a)

To the extent that the Preferred Shareholders are alleging that Eastern is not paying contractual debts owed to them, their creditors’ claim against Eastern and its officers and directors is barred by the automatic stay in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362’s automatic stay is violated by releasing mortgage assignments from escrow and recording them after the bankruptcy petition to strengthen a creditor’s claim.

Stockschlaeder & McDonald, Esqs. v. Kittay (In Re Stockbridge Funding Corp.) · filed 1993-09-24

Indeed, to the contrary, appellant concedes that, post-petition, it released from escrow and recorded several mortgage assignments that secured the warehousing loan of its other clients, the Spitzers. ... In any event, the conduct clearly constituted post-petition conduct which violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(e) terminates the automatic stay when the bankruptcy court does not rule on a motion for relief from the stay within thirty days.

Valley Bank v. Stecklein · filed 1993-11-18(e)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) the automatic stay terminates automatically if the bankruptcy court fails within thirty days to rule on a motion to vacate the stay.

Section 362(a) stays claims against a debtor for declaratory or injunctive relief based on conduct that began before the bankruptcy petition and continues afterward.

Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp. · filed 1993-12-13(a)

For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the § 362(a) automatic stay bars claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as claims for monetary relief and that the stay also bars claims based on conduct that commenced pre-petition and continues into the post-petition period.

Section 362(a) does not stay garnishment of a nondebtor’s wages held by a bankruptcy debtor.

Shaheen & Co. v. NationsBank of Georgia · filed 1994-02-08(a)

As this garnishment attempted to collect funds owed by Jacobson that were in Fasteners’ possession, it was not an action against Fasteners which would come within the protection of 11 USC § 362 (a).

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a creditor whose state court claim remains pending from submitting that claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy and seeking a nondischargeability judgment.

Florida v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. of California (In Re Florida) · filed 1994-03-03

While the state court claim for damages remained pending because of the automatic stay, appellee was not precluded from submitting the claim in Florida’s bankruptcy and suing for a judgment of nondischargeability thereon.

Section 362 stays proceedings against the debtor; a nondebtor with a legal or factual connection to the debtor cannot invoke the stay.

State v. DeFranco Ford, Inc. · filed 1994-03-21

An automatic stay of proceedings accorded by 11 USC § 362 may not be invoked by entities such as sureties, guarantors, co-obligors, or others with a similar legal or factual nexus to the debtor (see, Lynch v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F2d 1194; see also, Rosenbaum v Dane & Murphy, 189 AD2d 760).

Section 362(a)(1) stays actions based on claims that arose before the bankruptcy petition, but does not stay actions arising after the petition.

Christen v. Al Copeland Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-04-06(a)(1)

The automatic stay provided for in the above provision of the Bankruptcy Code is limited to actions that could have been instituted before the petition was filed or that are based on claims that arose before the petition was filed. It does not include actions arising post-petition.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal arising from an action brought against the debtor before bankruptcy, even when the debtor is the appellant, while nondebtor parties may proceed with their appeals.

Murray v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp. · filed 1994-04-11(a)(1)

As Keene's appeal arises from an action brought against Keene before the filing of his bankruptcy petition, we must stay Keene's appeal pending the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, as the automatic stay applies only to the bankrupt debtor, we must sever Keene from the instant appeal.

Section 362(a)(1) stays an appeal from an action brought against the debtor before the bankruptcy petition, even when the debtor is the appellant.

Brown v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp. · filed 1994-04-11(a)(1)

As Keene's appeal arises from an action brought against Keene before the filing of his bankruptcy petition, we must stay Keene's appeal pending the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.

Section 362 protects the bankruptcy debtor through an automatic stay but does not extend that stay to other persons or entities.

Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. Israel · filed 1994-04-14

Finally, the automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding applies only to the bankruptcy debtor, and no one else.

Section 362(b) does not except a civil malpractice claim against a debtor clinic from the automatic stay.

Morales Pérez v. Clínica Femenina de Puerto Rico · filed 1994-04-29(b)

Aunque la Sec. 362(b) de la Ley de Quiebras, 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b), establece ciertas excepciones a la paralización automática, la presente reclamación no está compren-dida entre ellas.

Section 362(a) does not prevent a former spouse from obtaining an amended QDRO to enforce an equitable pension interest that belongs to neither the debtor nor the bankruptcy estate.

Bigelow v. Brown (In Re Brown) · filed 1994-05-27(a)

By the same token, since the Plaintiffs equitable interest in the pension fund was neither property of the Debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, nor property of the bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay did not prevent the Plaintiff from filing for an amended QDRO in state court.

Section 362(a) does not stay an order against a nondebtor when the order does not implicate the debtor’s property.

Stephen Investment Securities, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission · filed 1994-06-20(a)

Thus, the SEC’s order does not implicate Oliver’s property, and therefore the SEC’s order does not violate the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay on proceedings affecting Oliver’s property.

Section 362(a) automatically stays a counterclaim filed against a debtor after its bankruptcy petition, and a counterclaim filed in violation of the stay is void.

United Bldg. Co. v. Harp · filed 1994-06-22(a)

The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay that prevents creditors from commencing or continuing judicial or administrative proceedings against the debtor. ... Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void ab initio and are without effect even if there was no formal service of process. ... However, the lessees in the instant suit filed their reconventional demand after the lessor filed its petition for bankruptcy. Therefore, the lessees' demand is void and the trial court's rejection of their claim was proper.

Section 362 stays claims against the debtor, but it does not extend the automatic stay to claims against the debtor’s codefendants.

Textron Investment Management Co. v. Struthers Thermo-Flood Corp. · filed 1994-06-22

Crown suggests that plaintiffs' claim against it is stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362. Crown’s position is erroneous. The automatic stay applies only to claims against the debtor and does not extend to the debtor’s codefendants.

Section 362(a) does not extend a partnership’s automatic stay to the property or assets of its individual partners.

United States v. Wright · filed 1994-07-15(a)

Of course, the automatic stay only applies to property that is part of the bankruptcy estate; it does not operate to protect the property or assets of the individual partners.

Section 362(a) generally stays proceedings against the debtor alone, not against nonbankrupt codefendants, absent unusual circumstances.

Patterson v. State, Department of Agriculture · filed 1994-08-05(a)

Except in unusual circumstances, an automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies to the debtor alone and not to non-bankrupt co-defendants.

Section 362’s automatic stay covers foreclosure proceedings on property securing a note for which the bankruptcy debtor is personally liable.

Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Cary · filed 1994-08-12(a)

It is clear from this record that John Browning is personally liable upon the notes payable to Shearin which were secured by the deed of trust sought to be foreclosed on by Shearin. The automatic stay provisions imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) would have included the foreclosure proceedings because of Browning’s personal liability on the second promissory note.

Section 362(a)’s automatic stay remains in effect for proceedings beyond the scope of a bankruptcy court’s limited approval of foreclosure.

Breeze v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1994-08-29(a)

Breeze had earlier filed for bankruptcy and invoked the automatic stay of proceedings contained in 11 USC § 362 (a). As a result CB&T was prevented from foreclosing on Breeze’s property; the foreclosure sale was conducted pursuant to a stipulation between the parties which was approved by the bankruptcy court. This approval, however, extended only to foreclosing on CB&T’s security interest in the property, and did not extend to other proceedings. Therefore, the stay remained in effect for other purposes.

Section 362 does not bar the sale of repossessed property when the debtor had no lease interest or right of redemption in it when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Estep v. Fifth Third Bank of N.W. Ohio (In Re Estep) · filed 1994-09-29

In view of the fact that Estep did not possess an interest in the Lease or a right of redemption in the Truck on the Petition Date, the Bank’s sale of the Truck did not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 stays a creditor’s action against a debtor to recover rental income, even when the creditor asserts the claim through the debtor’s nonbankrupt spouse.

Community Bank, National Ass'n v. Lyons (In Re Lyons) · filed 1995-01-17

Even if plaintiff were allowed to proceed in this guise it would follow that any actions for excess rents paid to Mr. Lyons must be subject to the automatic stay in place under 11 U.S.C. § 362. To hold otherwise would allow plaintiff to circumvent Mr. Lyons’ bankruptcy protections by the simple expedient of stepping into the shoes of Mrs. Lyons.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar an appeal seeking a nondebtor’s share of a wrongful-death judgment rather than the debtor’s share.

Superior Supply Co. v. Torres · filed 1995-01-24

Considering 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays litigation only against the debtor and the debtor’s estate, we agree with Superior that the automatic stay of § 362 is inapplicable in this case because the property which is being sought in this appeal is Patty Torres’ part of the wrongful death judgment, not the debtor’s, Mr. Torres.

Section 362 requires a creditor to obtain further stay relief before unilaterally withdrawing funds from a debtor-in-possession’s account when the withdrawal is outside the authority granted by an existing stay-modification order.

Marrs-Winn Co. v. Giberson Electric, Inc. (In Re Marrs-Winn Co.) · filed 1995-02-02

Giberson’s withdrawal of the funds from the Magna account also violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. This section of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a creditor from taking actions to obtain possession of property of the estate or to enforce a lien against property of the estate. While the Court’s Order approving the Loan Agreement modified the automatic stay “to permit Giberson to receive the proceeds of accounts receivable as hereinabove authorized,” the withdrawal of the funds by Giberson was unauthorized because it was done without the signature of the Debtor. Giberson did not have the authority decide on its own that the funds in the Magna account should be applied to the Giberson debt. Under these circumstances, Giberson should have sought a modification of the automatic stay before transferring the funds in the Magna account to its own account.

A creditor violates the automatic stay when, after learning that it misallocated a debtor’s payment, it fails to correct the error in a reasonably prudent fashion.

McGee v. Society Bank & Trust (In Re McGee) · filed 1995-03-16(a)(6)

Even if improper allocation of the payment were the result of a mistake on Society’s part, the Court does not feel that such inadvertence would rise to the level of a violation of the automatic stay so as to warrant costs and attorney fees in this ease. Rather, this Court holds that Society violated the automatic stay by not correcting the problem in a reasonably prudent fashion.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a creditor’s direct claim against a bankrupt company’s officer for breach of a fiduciary duty when the claim could never belong to the bankruptcy estate.

Lively v. Carpet Services, Inc. · filed 1995-08-31(a)(1)

The major distinguishing factor between S.I. Acquisition and this case is that the cause of action in this case, at least as between Lively, CSI, and Wayward, could never belong to Wayward. This is not a case based on alter ego. Rather, the statute in this case imposes a fiduciary relationship that can be enforced by a beneficiary (the creditor) directly against a trustee (an owner officer, or director), or in a criminal case, by the state against a trustee. The difference is dispositive; therefore we overrule Lively’s second point of error.

A prepetition waiver of the automatic stay in a forbearance agreement does not apply to a later default after the original default is cured unless the agreement shows that the waiver was intended to continue.

In Re Riley · filed 1995-09-15(a)

Under the circumstances in this case, including the lack of express contractual provisions to show that the parties intended the forbearance agreement to continue beyond a cure of the default, the forbearance agreement entered into by the parties in May of 1993, is not effective as a waiver of the automatic stay for a subsequent default.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not cover a vehicle when a prepetition sale transferred all of the debtor’s rights in it to buyers, even if title paperwork was completed after the petition.

Duffy v. Big Al's Autorama, Inc. (In re Duffy) · filed 1995-09-20

Since the new buyers obtained all the previous rights of the Plaintiff in the vehicle on April 1, 1995, there was no property subject to the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362, and therefore, there could be no violation of the automatic stay.

Under § 362(d)(1), a debtor’s waiver of opposition to stay relief cannot bind other creditors that object to lifting the stay.

In Re Atrium High Point Ltd. Partnership · filed 1995-11-17(d)(1)

As to the third-party creditor issue, there is no question that the automatic stay is designed to protect debtors and creditors alike. A waiver by the debtor cannot bind third parties.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a regulatory action based on a restriction triggered by the bankruptcy filing, because the action could not have been commenced before the case.

Morrow v. Torrance Bank (In Re Morrow) · filed 1995-11-22(a)(1)

While this Court notes at the outset that the government police power exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s stay provisions seems to be applicable to the powers asserted by the Commissioner, it appears unnecessary to reach the issue since, as a matter of logic, (1) the exception applies only to acts within the ambit of § 362(a)(1); (2) subsection (a)(1) of § 362 involves acts against the debtor which were or could have been commenced prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case; and (3) since the Cease and Desist Order was predicated upon Cal.Fin.Code § 6152(a), which forbids Morrow’s participation as a director of the Bank upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. As such, the Commissioner’s actions appear not to be barred by the automatic stay in the first instance.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prevent a third party from pursuing an asserted interest in a leasehold that was not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and does not toll that party’s limitations period.

Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Associates and Aaron Kozak · filed 1995-12-06

There is no merit in Gloria’s contention that the automatic stay of CIT’s bankruptcy proceedings tolled the running of the limitations period as to her. Both the bankruptcy court and this Court have held that CIT’s interest in the Sparrowbush leasehold terminated prior to CIT’s resort to the bankruptcy court and therefore was not property of CIT’s bankruptcy estate. The automatic stay did not preclude Gloria from pursuing the interest against LSA that she now seeks to establish.

Section 362 prevents a creditor from seeking a deficiency judgment during the automatic stay without obtaining relief from the stay.

Integra Bank v. Sixta (In Re Smith) · filed 1996-02-08

The automatic stay imposed by Smith’s various bankruptcy filings prevented Integra from seeking a deficiency judgment without obtaining relief from stay.

Section 362(a) stays an appeal against a Chapter 7 debtor pending the bankruptcy proceedings, but does not protect nondebtor coappellees.

Harkleroad & Hermance, P.C. v. Stringer · filed 1996-02-28(a)

As Harkleroad & Hermanee has filed a notice showing that W. Kenneth Stringer III has filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and therefore is entitled to the automatic stay of proceedings under 11 USC § 362 (a), this appeal, as it concerns Stringer; individually, must be stayed pending disposition of the bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the case as to W. Kenneth Stringer III is remanded to the trial court until the stay of proceedings is lifted. Because Monarch Capital Group, Inc. and the attorneys are not entitled to the protection of the stay of proceedings, however, we will address the issues on appeal as they concern the remaining appellees only.

Section 362 does not require a stay of a lien foreclosure action against a property owner whose legal interests are distinct from those of a bankrupt contractor.

Strober Bros. v. Kitano Arms Corp. · filed 1996-02-29

Likewise, we reject Kitano’s claim that this action must be stayed pursuant to 11 USC § 362. Kitano is not itself a petitioner in bankruptcy and has legal interests quite distinct from those of Lee.

Section 362(a) does not stay proceedings over property in which the debtor has no legal or equitable interest.

Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Celco, Inc. · filed 1996-03-26(a)

For example, if the stipulation reached between Elf Atochem and Celco regarding the trustee’s sale resulted in a transfer of ownership that left Amcico without any legal or equitable interest in the equipment, see § 541(a)(1), then the automatic stay would not have applied to the proceedings in this case.

Section 362(a) does not stay a state court action that is neither against the debtor nor concerns property remaining in the bankruptcy estate.

In Re Elephant Bar Restaurant, Inc. · filed 1996-05-09(a)

The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) will not preclude Tebo and/or Col-Han from instituting an action in the appropriate state court of Colorado to adjudicate the state law issue(s) referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this order because such action (a) is not against the debtor in this case, and (b) is not with respect to property that remains a part of this debtor's bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(a) does not bar a court from reactivating a proceeding after the automatic stay expires.

Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp. · filed 1996-05-29(a)

The district court only reactivated the case after the expiration of the § 362(a) stay, and thus the automatic stay presented no bar to the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 959 does not create an additional exception to § 362’s automatic stay.

State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Park (In Re Si Yeon Park, Ltd.) · filed 1996-07-23

Moreover, § 959 is not an additional exception to the automatic stay of § 362.

The automatic stay does not protect the separate property of a nondebtor spouse who has not filed for bankruptcy.

Brown v. Kastner (In Re Kastner) · filed 1996-08-12

Because Mr. Kastner has not filed for bankruptcy protection, the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 is not applicable to him with respect to his separate property, and the Commissioner may proceed against Mr. Kastner in state court.

Section 362(a)(1) does not bar a court from reactivating a prepetition action against the debtor after the automatic stay expires.

Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corporation · filed 1996-09-06(a)(1)

The district court only reactivated the case after the expiration of the § 362(a) stay, and thus the automatic stay presented no bar to the court's jurisdiction.

Section 362’s automatic stay applies only to debtors.

Barney's, Inc. v. Isetan Co. (In Re Barney's, Inc.) · filed 1996-09-24

By its terms, the automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code applies only to debtors.

Section 362’s automatic stay protecting a bankruptcy debtor also protects its subsidiary, so claims against both are dismissed without prejudice until the stay is lifted.

Goodrich v. Betkoski · filed 1996-11-01

As the automatic stay protecting North Penn necessarily protects its subsidiary, Lombard Brothers, we believe that the claims against both entities should be dismissed without prejudice until the stay is lifted.

Section 362 does not suspend the 60-day redemption period under § 108(b), and the stay does not protect property in which the debtor’s interest expired before repossession and a new bankruptcy filing.

In Re Walker · filed 1997-01-27

This Court has previously held that the automatic stay provision of § 362 does not operate to suspend the sixty (60) day redemption period provided by § 108(b). ... Thus, pursuant to § 108(b), debtor’s right to redeem the title to the truck expired on May 14,1996. ... Thus, on the date of the repossession, the truck was not property of a bankruptcy estate and was not protected by the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not bar recoupment of advances from postpetition payments arising under the same continuing agreement.

In Re CDM Management Services, Inc. · filed 1997-02-26(a)(7)

Unlike the right of setoff, the right of recoupment is exempt from the operation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362’s automatic stay extends beyond the United States and bars a creditor from arresting estate property abroad to collect a prepetition debt.

Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Hanseatic Marine Service, GmbH (In Re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.) · filed 1997-03-12

Further, the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 extends beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.

Section 362(a)(3) stays an action against a third party when it seeks possession or control of the debtor’s property.

Marroquin v. D & N FUNDING, INC. · filed 1997-03-13(a)(3)

Section 362(a)(3) also implements a stay of any action, whether against the debtor or third parties, that seeks to obtain or exercise control over the property of the debtor. ... Because all these situations applied, we conclude that the stay order also protected Mr. Marroquin.

A request to reinstate the automatic stay under § 362(a) is a request for an injunction and must meet the standards for injunctive relief.

In Re Zahn Farms · filed 1997-03-28(a)

A request to "reinstate" the § 362(a) stay is, in fact, a request for an injunction and should meet the standards therefor.

Section 362(a) limits the automatic stay to debtors; it does not extend to nonbankrupt entities.

In Re United Health Care Organization · filed 1997-06-30(a)

Stays pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are limited to debtors and may not be extended to non-bankrupt entities.

The automatic stay does not bar a civil harassment injunction action against a debtor unless the action interferes with the bankruptcy case.

Grant v. Clampitt · filed 1997-07-22(a)(1)

We hold instead that the automatic stay does not apply to actions under section 527.6 against a defendant who files for bankruptcy unless the injunction action interferes with the bankruptcy case.

Section 362(a) takes effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed, so acts completed before filing do not violate the automatic stay.

Cornelious v. Bishop (Cornelious) · filed 1997-09-09(a)

However, in this case the incarceration of Comelious occurred prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. Since Cornelious was not a debtor under title 11, there was no automatic stay in place precluding a finding of contempt, imposition of a fine, or incarceration.

Section 362(a) prevents the Court of Federal Claims from entertaining objections to a proof of claim against a debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

Franklin Savings Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the Treasury · filed 1997-09-11(a)

Moreover, permitting the Court of Federal Claims to entertain the OTS claim objections would violate the automatic stay provisions set out in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).