11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(k) permits a damages claim when a creditor with knowledge of the stay allegedly acts for a party without stay relief and causes actual damages.

Boltz-Rubinstein v. BAC Home Loans Servicing/Bank of America, N.A. (In re Boltz-Rubinstein) · filed 2017-09-18(k)

Bank of America indisputably had knowledge of the automatic stay; it was actively involved in the case as of the petition date. Accordingly, if Bank of America acted on behalf of BNY Mellon (rather than NRAC, which had obtained relief from the automatic stay), it may have wilfully violated the automatic stay. The Debtor alleges that this violation has caused her actual and emotional damages. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for a violation of the automatic stay, and therefore, this cause of action will not be dismissed.

Under § 362(k)(1), a creditor can willfully violate the automatic stay by retaining property for several days after learning of the bankruptcy, even if it impounded the property before receiving notice.

Odom v. Philadelphia Parking Authority (In re Odom) · filed 2017-08-10(k)(1)

If the PPA received notice of the bankruptcy case after it had already impounded the Car, but continued to retain the car for several days, that too, could constitute a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k)(1) includes reasonably incurred attorney fees in actual damages and allows a court to exclude plainly excessive fees.

Sundquist v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Sundquist) · filed 2017-11-15(k)(1)

The Ninth Circuit recognizes as part of making an actual damages award under § 362(k)(l) the authority of a bankruptcy court to limit fees to “fees reasonably incurred” and holds that courts awarding fees under § 362(k)(l) “retain the discretion to eliminate unnecessary or plainly excessive fees.” America’s Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In re Schwartz-Tallard), 803 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Applying Schwartz-Tallard, this court in the exercise of its discretion is persuaded that a fee greater than $70,000.00 would be plainly excessive.

Section 362(k)(1) treats a stay violation as willful when the creditor knows of the stay and intentionally commits the prohibited act, even without a specific intent to violate the stay.

Brodgen v. Holmes Motors Inc. (In re Brodgen) · filed 2018-08-29(k)(1)

A violation of the automatic stay is willful "if the violator (1) knew of the automatic stay and (2) intentionally committed the violative act, regardless of whether the violator specifically intended to violate the stay." ... The Court concludes that Holmes' violation of the automatic stay was willful.

Section 362(k)(1) requires an individual seeking damages for an automatic-stay violation to prove willfulness and resulting injury or damages with evidence.

In re McCormick · filed 2018-12-26(k)(1)

McCormick offered no probative evidence of willfulness or of any injury or damages arising from any of the stay violations. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court properly denied his motions.

Under § 362(k)(1), an initially unknowing foreclosure sale in violation of the automatic stay becomes a willful violation when the creditor learns of the bankruptcy case and fails to remedy the sale.

Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc. (In re Houck) · filed 2019-02-15(k)(1)

STS's technical violation of the automatic stay turned into a willful violation, which resulted in injury to the Plaintiff, when STS took no action to restore the status quo after learning about the Plaintiff's active bankruptcy case on the afternoon of December 20, 2011.

Section 362(k) requires proof of a willful stay violation and resulting injury to recover damages.

Lawson v. Shehan (In re Lawson) · filed 2019-03-08(k)(1)

Based on this record, the court cannot conclude that Shehan willfully violated the stay with respect to any contents. To the extent Shehan may have violated the stay regarding the Corolla, the debtor presented no proof of any commensurate damages.

Section 362(k)(1) allows actual damages when a creditor that knows collection of a prepetition debt is continuing fails to take timely steps to prevent postpetition collections that violate the automatic stay.

In re Hunsicker · filed 2019-03-19(k)(1)

The Court concludes that, because IDR took no timely steps to prevent post-petition collections on the Warrant by MCSD even though IDR knew MCSD was engaging in collection activities on account of the purportedly inactive Warrant, IDR willfully violated the automatic stay. Therefore, Debtor is entitled to recover actual damages from IDR with respect to the levy against Debtor's joint account at Old National Bank on or about October 9, 2018, which the Court calculates as $ 1,193.65.

Section 362(k) requires a debtor seeking damages for a willful stay violation to prove an injury; a generalized assertion of distress is insufficient.

Taylor Shameer Collins · filed 2019-08-07(k)

To recover damages for a violation of the automatic stay, the debtor must demonstrate that she was injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay. ... Such a generalized assertion falls below what the Eleventh Circuit rejected in Lodge and is, therefore, insufficient to support Debtor’s allegation that she was injured by Respondent’s violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k)(1) does not permit actual or punitive damages against a creditor absent evidence that the creditor violated the automatic stay.

Henry James Caldwell · filed 2019-10-30(k)(1)

In light of the complete absence of any evidence that Sampson, as opposed to Powell or others, violated the automatic stay, Debtor is not entitled to actual or punitive damages against Sampson under § 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A claim for damages for willful violation of the automatic stay must allege a specific willful act contrary to the stay that caused harm; a blanket assertion of agency is insufficient.

Parker III v. State of South Carolina · filed 2019-10-30

The Complaint does not include factual allegations as to a willful act by the State or Palmetto contrary to § 362 that resulted in harm to Plaintiffs or explain how the State or Palmetto was involved in these events, other than a blanket allegation that all Defendants are agents of each other.

Section 362(k)(1) requires proof of when a defendant learned of the bankruptcy filing to establish a willful stay violation.

Ahlgren, Trustee v. Scott Morrison in his capacity as Trustee of the M · filed 2019-11-05(k)(1)

As discussed above, the Trustee has not established when Morrison and Elkhorn learned about the bankruptcy filing. Absent this finding, the Court cannot find that Morrison and Elkhorn willfully violated the stay.

Section 362(k)(1) requires a claimant seeking damages for a willful stay violation to prove that the violator knew the stay existed, acted intentionally, and violated the stay.

Johnny Wynn Terry · filed 2019-12-23(k)(1)

In order to satisfy the willfulness standard of section 362(k) for the recovery of damages thereunder, the individual claiming injury must establish the following three elements: (1) the violator knew of the existence of the automatic stay; (2) the violator’s acts were intentional; and (3) the acts violated the stay.

Section 362(k) permits a claim for willful violation of the automatic stay to proceed when allegations support that defendants helped hide and convert the debtor’s assets.

Ace Motor Acceptance Corporation v. McCoy Motors, LLC · filed 2020-01-14(k)

Here, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Ace’s favor, Ace could very well prove a set of facts in support of its claim that McCoy III and Flash Autos willfully violated the automatic stay. This is especially true given the many allegations that McCoy III and Flash Autos assisted McCoy Jr., Misty McCoy, and McCoy Motors in hiding and converting assets. Therefore, McCoy III’s and Flash Autos’ motion to dismiss Ace’s claim for violation of automatic stay (Claim 11) is denied.

A creditor willfully violates the automatic stay by intentionally refusing to deactivate a vehicle kill switch, demanding payment of a prepetition debt, and retaining the vehicle after learning of the bankruptcy filing.

Evex Ross Franklin · filed 2020-01-24(k)(1)

The evidence demonstrated that Fields intentionally refused to deactivate the Vehicle’s kill switch that had been activated post-petition, demanded payment of a pre-petition debt, and retained the Vehicle, all in violation of the automatic stay and with full knowledge of the bankruptcy filing.

Section 362(k)(1) treats a creditor’s failure to revoke a contingent collection action as a willful stay violation when the creditor knows of the stay and can prevent the action from violating it.

Dumace Leonard LeGrand · filed 2020-02-06(k)(1)

A creditor who knows of the automatic stay and has the power to revoke some contingent action that would violate the stay but declines to do so acts “willfully” for purposes of § 362(k)(1).

Section 362(k)(1) does not treat a stay violation as willful when there is fair ground of doubt that the creditor’s conduct violated the automatic stay.

Dwain W. Tate - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2020-02-10(k)(1)

The same test applies to a proceeding under § 362(k): a violation of the automatic stay is not “willful” when there is fair ground of doubt as to whether the creditor’s conduct violated the automatic stay.

Under § 362(k)(1), a creditor that files a collection complaint without notice of bankruptcy and promptly dismisses it after receiving notice does not willfully violate the automatic stay.

Yvette D Frasier · filed 2020-02-26(k)(1)

While Thysse may have committed a technical violation of the stay, the totality of the circumstances and Thysse’s prompt dismissal of its Complaint do not amount to a willful violation of the stay.

A Section 362(k)(1) claim for a willful stay violation can proceed when the evidence disputes the creditor’s claimed lack of notice of the bankruptcy.

Schaefer v. IC System, Inc. · filed 2020-03-06(k)(1)

Bankruptcy Code § 362 provides that an “individual injured by any willful violation of a stay” is entitled to “recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.” ... In short, the record does not support ICS’s assertion that it lacked notice; indeed ICS admits that it stopped collection efforts on another debt associated with Plaintiff because of the very same September 20, 2016 bankruptcy petition.

Section 362(k) does not give a Chapter 7 trustee damages as an individual, but the trustee may seek sanctions under § 105(a) for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Gordon v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. · filed 2020-03-31(k)

While Plaintiff is not an “individual” for purposes of § 362(k), he may, nonetheless, recover damages for willful violations of the automatic stay under § 105(a), and the Court will consider Plaintiff’s claim as a claim for sanctions pursuant to § 105(a).

Under § 362(k), a creditor that knows of the automatic stay intends a collection act performed by its software when the software operates as designed, even if a separate system failed to flag the debtor’s bankruptcy.

Chavez-Villasenor v. U.S. Department of Education · filed 2020-04-09(k)

Likewise, when a creditor designs or installs collection software and the software later performs as expected, the creditor is held to have intended the result.

A creditor willfully violates the automatic stay by demanding payment after learning of the bankruptcy filing when it intends to make that demand.

Yuri Lyubarsky and Olga Lyubarsky · filed 2020-04-20(k)

Vertonix’s demand for payment was clearly a stay violation, and it was a willful violation because Vertonix knew about the bankruptcy filing and intended to make the demand.

Section 362(k) requires an award of actual damages, including costs and reasonable attorney fees, to an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Christie v. Fort Gibson State Bank · filed 2020-04-28(k)

As the Court previously stated, § 362(k) provides that an individual injured by a willful violation of the stay shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.

Section 362(k) does not authorize damages for collection actions taken after the automatic stay terminates upon a Chapter 7 discharge.

Backus Electric, Inc. v. Hubbartt · filed 2020-04-10(k)

Therefore, the Court cannot assess sanctions under the authority of section 362(k) because whether the stay was violated became a moot issue once Hubbartt’s general discharge was entered.

Section 362(k)(1) treats a creditor’s deliberate contact with a court despite knowledge of the automatic stay as a willful violation, even when the creditor believes the contact will help the debtor.

Muldoon v. Walker · filed 2020-05-18(k)(1)

The evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Muldoon knew of the existence of the automatic stay but contacted the county court for assistance anyway, under the misguided belief that he would be helping Ms. Walker’s situation. This falls within the definition of a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k)(1) permits damages for a willful automatic-stay violation only when an individual is injured by the violation.

In re Franklin Harris, Jr. · filed 2020-07-17(k)(1)

The relevant automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code provides that only “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay” may recover damages.

A trustee seeking damages for an automatic stay violation under § 362(k) must establish standing under that subsection; liability and damages based on contempt must be analyzed under § 105.

Edwards Family Partnership, LP v. Kristina M. Johnson, Trustee for Community Home Financial Services Corporation · filed 2020-10-02(k)

The issue must therefore be remanded for either an explanation of why the Trustee has standing to pursue damages under § 362(k) or an analysis explicitly grounding liability and damages in § 105’s contempt authority.

Section 362(k) requires a party seeking damages for an automatic-stay violation to prove actual damages caused by the violation with reasonable certainty.

Kinney v. Anderson Lumber Company, Inc. · filed 2021-01-13(k)

The party seeking relief from a stay violation must prove that the violation caused actual damages, which must be proven with reasonable certainty and cannot be based on conjecture.

Section 362(k)(1) does not authorize sanctions for an appraisal caused by an innocent clerical error when the creditor did not willfully violate the automatic stay.

Senetha Michele Montgomery · filed 2021-07-30(k)(1)

Firstly, this Court finds that Nationstar’s conduct was not in willful violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The appraisal was conducted as the result of an “innocent clerical error,” and is therefore not sanctionable in this case.

Section 362(k)(1) does not authorize sanctions for an inadvertent appraisal caused by an innocent clerical error because it is not a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Montgomery v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., as Successor Indenture Tru · filed 2021-07-30(k)(1)

Firstly, this Court finds that Nationstar’s conduct was not in willful violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. The appraisal was conducted as the result of an “innocent clerical error,” and is therefore not sanctionable in this case.

Section 362(k)(1) requires an award of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, when a creditor or its counsel willfully violates the automatic stay.

Christopher Scott Sehman · filed 2021-08-10(k)(1)

Debtor has met his burden to prove that 4 Dakota and the attorneys knew the automatic stay was in place and intended every act that violated the stay. This Court is mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) to award Debtor his actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.

Section 362(k)(1) permits damages when a creditor purposefully pursues a garnishment that violates the automatic stay.

David H. Zimmer · filed 2021-08-11(k)(1)

Sub judice, there is no dispute that the Garnishment Action commenced by the Morris Creditors was purposeful. There also is no dispute that, despite the requests of the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Garnishment Action was not withdrawn or terminated by the Morris Creditors. It is further not in dispute that the Chapter 7 Trustee has had to expend time and effort in bringing this enforcement proceeding. Accordingly, the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) have been triggered.

Section 362(k) leaves in place a defense that sufficiently unsettled law can negate willfulness, separate from its statutory good-faith exception.

Steven Aleckna v. · filed 2021-09-09(k)

Despite some overlap, we continue to read University Medical as establishing a “willfulness” defense that is separate and distinct from one of good faith alone. We, like the District Court, observe no direct conflict between University Medical and § 362(k) and conclude that University Medical remains good law.

Section 362(k) permits actual damages, including attorney fees, for a willful stay violation and punitive damages in appropriate circumstances.

Josue Cepero and Leticia Cepero · filed 2021-10-28(k)

Sanctions for a stay violation under section 362(k) may be awarded when the Court finds that the stay violation was willful. If so, the Debtors are entitled to “recover actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. §362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) allows monetary relief for actual damages caused by a debtor’s willful violation of the automatic stay.

Lim v. Stewart · filed 2021-12-09(k)(1)

And monetary relief also is available for actual damages caused by a willful violation of the automatic stay by a debtor (e.g., a violation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)).

A creditor that uses a computer program to send bills cannot avoid liability for a willful stay violation merely because the program sent a bill without the creditor’s knowledge.

Defeo, Jr. v. Winyah Surgical Specialists, P.A. doing business a · filed 2022-01-14(k)

A creditor who relies on a computer program to send billing invoices cannot escape liability for a stay violation by simply arguing that the computer sent an invoice without its knowledge.

Section 362(k)(1) requires injury caused by a stay violation to recover damages.

Susan Boltz-Rubinstein v. · filed 2022-02-14(k)(1)

To recover damages, she “must be ‘injured’ by the stay violation.”

Section 362(k)(1) treats a stay violation as willful when the violator knows of the bankruptcy and intentionally commits the act that violates the stay, without needing a specific intent to violate it.

Christopher Scott Sehman · filed 2022-02-23(k)(1)

Specific intent to violate the automatic stay is not required for a showing of willfulness; it is sufficient that a party “intentionally committed the violative act.”

Section 362(k)(1) provides no damages remedy when no violation of the automatic stay is alleged and the stay has been lifted for the conduct at issue.

Barbara Albytine Gibbs · filed 2022-03-04(k)(1)

This is not a stay violation case. Debtor has not alleged any violations of the automatic stay and, in fact, the stay was lifted for the parties to continue litigating. Accordingly, the Court finds Section 362(k) is inapplicable and will deny any request for relief pursuant to it.

Section 362(k)(1) allows emotional distress damages when a willful stay violation causes significant harm distinct from the ordinary stress of bankruptcy.

UGARTE v. Northstar Alarm Services · filed 2022-05-11(k)(1)

The record reflects that the Defendant’s conduct exacerbated the Plaintiff’s stress and anxiety, and caused the level of significant harm, distinct from the anxiety and pressures inherent in the bankruptcy process, to support an award of emotional distress damages.

Section 362(k)(1) requires knowledge of the bankruptcy for a creditor’s stay violation to be willful and support damages.

Robin Lynn Busby · filed 2022-08-01(k)(1)

This is fatal to the Debtor’s attempt to recover damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), as without knowledge of the bankruptcy, SMS/Attorney Krengel’s actions in connection with the State Court proceedings simply cannot be considered willful.

Section 362(k) does not warrant damages for an inadvertent stay violation when the creditor did not intend the prohibited sale to proceed.

Sheokie T. Brown and Andre C. Brown · filed 2022-10-05(k)

Although it would have been appropriate for Campbell to take affirmative actions to ensure that the sale did not go forward, the Court does not believe that Campbell understood or intended that the Sheriff would proceed with the sale after the bankruptcy was filed. Therefore, the Court does not find that the violation was willful or that damages are appropriate under the circumstances.

Section 362(k) requires a willful stay violation for damages; a creditor who did not intend a postpetition sheriff’s sale to proceed and tried to undo it did not commit a willful violation.

Campbell, Jr. v. Brown · filed 2022-10-05(k)

The post-petition sale was indisputably in violation of the automatic stay and as a result is void ab initio. However, Campbell’s testimony was sufficient to convince the Court that the violation was not willful. ... Therefore, the Court does not find that the violation was willful or that damages are appropriate under the circumstances.

Section 362(k) requires a claim for a willful stay violation to allege that the defendant knew of the stay and then intentionally acted in a way the stay prohibits.

Tabitha Baker v. Sepich · filed 2022-09-30(k)

In order to properly plead her claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362, Ms. Baker was required to allege several things, including that the defendants knew of the existence of the bankruptcy stay, and that they acted intentionally after knowledge of the stay in a manner prohibited by § 362(a).

Section 362(k)(1) permits damages and fees for a stay violation only when the violation is willful and injures the individual.

Rohe v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA · filed 2022-12-19(k)(1)

Federal law makes such awards possible only when “an individual [is] injured by any willful violation of a stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). And the record lacks evidence that Rohe was injured by any violation of the stay or that Wells Fargo’s actions were willful.

Section 362(k) provides money damages, including attorney’s fees and costs where appropriate, for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

United States v. Colasuonno · filed 2023-01-27(k)

Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code, in turn, specifies that the relief for a willful violation of an automatic stay is money damages, including attorney’s fees and costs, where appropriate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k); see also Pierre v. Aurora Comm. Corp., 620 B.R. 210, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Section 362(k) permits recovery of lost rents, attorneys’ fees, and expenses caused by a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Robinson v. Burden · filed 2023-09-21(k)

Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to impose sanctions against Burden and in favor of Johnnie Robinson as representative of Lorraine Robinson’s bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) and 11 U.S.C. § 105 in the amount of $4,650.00 (representing uncollected rents that are property of the estate), as well as attorneys’ fees in the amount of $20,016.00 and expenses in the amount of $134.82 incurred in protecting property of the estate.

Section 362(k)(1) does not provide damages when an alleged automatic stay violation was not willful.

Diaz v. Northwestern Memorial · filed 2023-09-22(k)(1)

But the bankruptcy court reasonably determined that any violation stemmed from a miscommunication and was thus not willful. ... Section 362(k) simply does not apply.

Section 362(k) permits damages for the cost of reassembling property dismantled in violation of the automatic stay; the amount must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Carmichael v. Balke · filed 2023-10-06(k)

On his account, the Carmichaels were entitled only to the cost of reassembly of the single, aging MST unit that Balke dismantled in violation of the automatic stay. The Carmichaels have failed to demonstrate that this premise was clearly erroneous, so we accept it. ... Applying a preponderance standard and viewing the record holistically, we are persuaded that the Carmichaels’ damages for reassembly exceed $4,000. But we do not attempt to specify the Carmichaels’ reassembly damages here. Instead, we remand so that the bankruptcy court may consider the Carmichaels’ asserted damages under the correct standard of proof.

A court may decline damages under § 362(k) when there is no evidence supporting the required elements and no pending motion seeking that relief.

Deluxe Building Solutions, LLC · filed 2023-10-13(k)

The Court will decline this invitation as it has heard no evidence or testimony that would tend to establish the elements required to award actual or punitive damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) and because there is otherwise no pending motion seeking such relief.

For a willful automatic stay violation, an agent’s knowledge of the bankruptcy filing is imputed to the principal.

Gordon, Trustee v. Hines · filed 2023-10-18(k)(1)

For purposes of a willful violation of the bankruptcy stay, knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal.

Section 362(k) does not support a claim for violating an automatic stay when no stay was in effect.

Bonanno v. 41 Sherbrooke Rd. LLC · filed 2023-12-01(k)

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily fail against these Defendants given, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, there was no stay in light of Judge Trust’s rulings.

Section 362(k)(1) treats an intentional act that violates a known automatic stay as willful even if the actor believed the act did not violate the stay.

In Re: Precision Business Consulting, LLC v. Medley · filed 2024-01-04(k)(1)

But that belief is of no legal moment. “A ‘willful violation’ does not require a specific intent to violate the automatic stay. Rather, the statute provides for damages upon a finding that the defendant knew of the automatic stay and that the defendant’s actions which violated the stay were intentional.” ... Our holding in Bloom thus controls here—Precision willfully violated the stay.

Section 362(k) allows a claim for a willful stay violation to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute about the defendant’s knowledge of the stay and supports intentional acts after notice.

Lysyy v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2024-05-28(k)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, however, the court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether SPS knew by October 12, 2019, that the automatic bankruptcy stay was in place. ... The court concludes that this is sufficient evidence of willfullness to allow the claim to proceed at this time.

Section 362(k)(1) allows an injured debtor to recover attorney’s fees, lost income, and punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Kendall Annemarie Hall · filed 2024-06-12(k)(1)

For these reasons, the Court awards $13,076.12 in attorney’s fees, $350 in lost income, and $500 in punitive damages to Debtor under § 362(k)(1).

A damages award for a willful stay violation may be reduced by a credit for the debtor’s postpetition use and occupancy of the creditor’s property.

Patricia Murphy · filed 2024-06-17(k)(1)

While the Debtor has reaped the advantages of the automatic stay, it is equitable to permit a credit for the Debtor’s use of the Property post-petition. This credit is not a claim in the bankruptcy case and can only be used to reduce the amount of the damages awarded in this Memorandum Decision.

Section 362(k) requires proof that the creditor knew of the bankruptcy case and automatic stay when acting before the debtor can recover for a willful stay violation.

Jackson v. Cash · filed 2025-02-14(k)

Ms. Cash did not introduce any additional evidence at trial that would counteract the record in the underlying case, and therefore the Court finds that she has failed to meet her burden to establish that Mr. Jackson was on notice of the bankruptcy case and the automatic stay on the date that Jackson III was filed in the Superior Court. Having failed to meet that burden, Ms. Cash cannot meet her burden to show that the filing of Jackson III was a willful violation of the automatic stay and is not entitled to relief under § 362(k).

Section 362(k)(1) does not require costs, attorney fees, or punitive damages where the alleged violation is of the discharge injunction rather than the automatic stay.

Laurion v. CorePlus Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-03-14(k)(1)

Unlike In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 357 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003), which the Debtor cited in his papers, this case does not involve an alleged stay violation—let alone a willful one—so the Court is under no obligation to award costs, attorney fees, or punitive damages. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).

Damages for a violation of the automatic stay are not exclusively the debtor’s property and may benefit creditors of the bankruptcy estate.

J. J. Cranston Construction Corp v. City of New York · filed 2025-04-22

Yet, even if preserved below and properly raised on appeal here, Cranston’s contention that stay damages are the sole property of the debtor—out of the reach of the bankruptcy estate and its creditors—is wrong as a matter of law.

Section 362(k) does not provide relief for an alleged automatic stay violation without evidence supporting actual or punitive damages.

Hernandez, Jr. v. GMH of El Paso, LLC, dba Mesa Pawn and Jewelry · filed 2025-04-29(k)

Therefore, the Court finds there is no material triable issue in this case as the determination of the stay violation would not result in any damages and therefore would have no effect on the outcome of the litigation.

A creditor willfully violates the automatic stay by repossessing a debtor’s vehicle after the bankruptcy petition and retaining it after notice of the stay while conditioning its return on a key and compliance with insurance terms.

Robert Weathers and Yolanda Weathers · filed 2025-06-03(k)(1)

The evidence also shows that Dinkins intentionally retained the Vehicle in violation of the automatic stay for six weeks after being notified of the stay violation and improperly conditioned the return of the Vehicle on Debtors tendering a key and obtaining an insurance deductible consistent with their financing agreement. Such acts go beyond mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy case, which the Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Fulton held does not in and of itself constitute a stay violation, because the Repossession changed the status quo as it was as of the Petition Date: Debtors having full possession and use of the Vehicle.

Section 362(k)(1) requires actual damages from a stay violation; an unpaid lis pendens bond did not establish such damages.

Myers v. 3073 Horseshoe Drive, LLC · filed 2025-06-23(k)(1)

Debtor has shown no actual damages as a result of the imposition of the bond because the bond was not paid, and it was not reimposed.

Section 362(k) allows a damages claim to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges a creditor knowingly sent a collection letter in violation of the automatic stay and caused actual damages.

Haywood v. The Villa at City Center · filed 2025-07-22(k)

Construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and accepting all factual allegations as true, the Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint state a plausible claim to recover damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(k)(1) requires the creditor to know of the bankruptcy case when it acts for a stay violation to be willful.

Stephanie Shaw · filed 2025-08-07(k)(1)

Therefore, based on the evidence that the Debtor has presented, AT&T did not have notice of the bankruptcy case when the services were terminated and could not have willfully violated the stay.

Section 362(k) does not require a creditor to know that continuing a collection action violates the automatic stay.

Terrasi-Ruggieri v. Ruggieri · filed 2025-09-29(k)

The fact that the Plaintiff was unaware that the continuation of the state court action violated the automatic stay is not a defense to § 362(k).

Section 362(k) requires evidence of actual damages before a court may award compensatory relief for a willful automatic stay violation.

Christine C Heasley · filed 2025-11-03(k)

Despite the presence of a willful violation of the stay, the Court must deny any compensatory relief because the Debtor failed to present any evidence of damages.

A creditor that learns its foreclosure sale violated the automatic stay must promptly remedy the violation; failing to restore title can make the violation willful.

Howard L Henderson · filed 2026-01-09(k)(1)

Creditor willfully violated the automatic stay because Creditor had an obligation to take immediate steps to remediate the harm created by its stay violation once Creditor learned it violated the stay.

Section 362(k) allows damages for an automatic stay violation only if the violator knew the stay was in effect and intended the act that violated it.

Penelope Ann Johnson · filed 2026-02-02(k)

A stay violation is willful if the party who violated the stay (1) knew the automatic stay was in effect, and (2) intended the actions that violated the stay.

Section 362(k)(1) treats automated collection attempts as intentional stay violations when the creditor knew of the bankruptcy and provides no evidence that it could not stop the attempts.

Williamson · filed 2026-02-06(k)(1)

Thus, with no evidence from Wajda or the firm to the contrary, this Court concludes that this should be deemed a situation where the acts were intentional. Defendants cannot blame acts on their automated computer programs to escape accountability.

Section 362(k) does not allow a trustee acting for the bankruptcy estate to recover damages or punitive damages for a stay violation when the trustee was not individually injured.

Richard N. Berkshire · filed 2026-03-31(k)

The trustee was not individually injured. Under the plain meaning of the statute, she cannot recover damages under § 362(k). Because § 362(k) is the only vehicle through which punitive damages can be awarded, the trustee cannot recover punitive damages from the debtor.

Section 362(k)(1) requires a willful violation of the automatic stay before an injured individual may recover damages.

John Papagno · filed 2026-04-02(k)(1)

Thus, under the statute, it is not enough that a violation of the stay occurred; that violation must have been “willful.”

Section 362(k)(1) imposes liability for a willful stay violation when a creditor with notice of the bankruptcy fails to take effective action to stop continuing wage garnishment.

Kenneth Brewster · filed 2026-06-15(k)(1)

The Court finds that Ms. Brewster willfully violated the automatic stay by failing to take effective action to stop the post-petition wage garnishment after notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case and the asserted stay violation.

Section 362(h) requires proof of an intentional and willful violation of the automatic stay to award damages.

In Re Williams · filed 1989-06-13(h)

Consequently, we deny the debtors’ request for damages against Franklin and the Sheriff’s Office of Luzerne County because of debtors’ failure to show an intentional and willful violation of the automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Allegations unsupported by testimony do not establish a violation of § 362’s automatic stay or resulting damages.

Health Science Products, Inc. v. Taylor (In Re Health Science Products, Inc.) · filed 1995-05-23

MR. TAYLOR DID NOT VIOLATE THE STAY AND NO DAMAGES HAVE RESULTED TO HSP AS A RESULT OF ANY VIOLATION OF THE STAY BY MR. TAYLOR ... Although Mr. Wells was called to testified, no inquiry was made of him regarding the foregoing allegations. No other employee of HSP was called to testify.

Section 362(a)(1) prohibits a lawsuit based on prepetition conduct even when the lawsuit also alleges postpetition conduct.

Hammocks Community Association Inc v. Cepero · filed 2023-06-23(a)(1)

Whether the November 2020 lawsuit included post-petition allegations is therefore irrelevant; it did include allegations relating to pre-petition conduct, which the automatic stay prohibits.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a creditor from filing a postpetition state-court complaint against a debtor on a prepetition claim while the automatic stay remains in effect.

Promise Healthcare Group, LLC · filed 2023-04-20(a)(1)

For this reason, the liquidating trustee is correct that Wassmann’s June 13 complaint violated the automatic stay, and, if the filing of such a complaint were necessary, would not satisfy that requirement.

Section 362(a)(1) prevents a court from deciding a pending motion to dismiss claims against a debtor after the debtor files for bankruptcy because that decision would continue the action against the debtor.

Riddle v. Sherburne County · filed 2023-01-25(a)(1)

In light of the stay, the Court cannot address the MEnD Defendants’ motion to dismiss at this time as a decision on the motion would constitute a “continuation . . . of [an] action or proceeding against the debtor,” here, MEnD.

Section 362(a) halts proceedings against a debtor and precludes even a dismissal or judgment in the debtor’s favor until the stay is lifted.

Sykes v. Genessee, County of · filed 2023-03-28(a)

Indeed, the automatic stay precludes even a dismissal or judgment in favor of a debtor-defendant.

Section 362(a)(1)–(3) automatically stays a case against a defendant that has declared bankruptcy.

Si v. Bed Bath & Beyond Corporation · filed 2023-07-27(a)(1)–(3)

Bed Bath has declared bankruptcy, so the case against it is automatically stayed.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays a pending action against a debtor when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

PCA-Corrections, LLC v. Akron Healthcare LLC · filed 2023-09-01(a)(1)

The filing of these voluntary bankruptcy petitions automatically stays the present action as to the Alleged Debtors. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(a) stays a civil action against a bankrupt defendant for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Dove v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2023-12-08(a)

This action shall be closed as to all Defendants save Defendant Corizon Health, Inc.; this action shall be administratively stayed as to Corizon Health, Inc., for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding identified in ECF No. 14 and pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) stays claims against a defendant that has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Bell v. State of Michigan Administrative Board of Claims · filed 2024-05-01(a)

Because Corizon has declared bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the claims against Corizon are STAYED. (See Notice, ECF No. 134, citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)).

Section 362 stays proceedings against a defendant who has filed a bankruptcy petition.

Kettering Adventist Healthcare v. Jade Designs · filed 2024-07-31

As Snyder has filed a bankruptcy petition, the proceeding against her are stayed.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays the continuation of a prepetition lawsuit against a debtor when the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Fahrni v. County of Tulare · filed 2024-11-18(a)(1)

Accordingly, all proceedings in this matter against Defendant Wellpath shall be stayed pursuant to Section 362(a) of Title 11, United States Code.

Section 362(a) automatically stays claims against a debtor while its bankruptcy case is pending.

Federal National Mortgage Association v. AZ 400 Herkimer LLC · filed 2024-12-02(a)

In light of that proceeding, plaintiff’s claims against AZ 400 are automatically stayed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

Section 362(a) stays pending litigation against defendants who have filed for bankruptcy.

Northpoint Commercial Finance LLC v. Time Out Communities, LLC · filed 2024-12-30(a)

As a preliminary matter, because of the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code, the present litigation is stayed against Defendants Toppos, LLC, Top Park Services, LLC, Prairie Knolls MHP, LLC, Time Out Properties, LLC, Grand Valley MHP, LLC, and Rolling Acres MHC, LLC.

Section 362(a) can stay litigation against a nondebtor codefendant when continuing that litigation would have immediate adverse economic consequences for the debtor’s estate.

Carroll v. Fortuna Auction LLC · filed 2025-04-07(a)

Because the Court finds that continuing the litigation of Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining defendant in this case, Herbert John Saxon, will have immediate adverse economic consequences on Fortuna, this case is stayed as to him as well.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays an appeal against a party that files for bankruptcy.

O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners · filed 1991-06-17(a)(1)

Because Jackson Associates filed for bankruptcy shortly after the district court ruled on the third amended complaint, the appeal with respect to Jackson Associates has been automatically stayed.

Section 362(b)(3) excepts the annual perfection of postpetition ad valorem tax liens from the automatic stay.

Kocurek v. Arnold (In Re Thurman) · filed 1994-01-06(b)(3)

This court is convinced that § 362(b)(3) and § 546(b) provide an exception, which occurs annually as the post-petition tax liability is incurred and as the tax Hen is automatically perfected to secure the Habihty.

Section 362(a)(4) bars creation and perfection of postpetition property tax liens unless the taxing authority had a prepetition interest that qualifies for the statutory perfection exception.

In Re Parr Meadows Racing Association, Inc. · filed 1989-07-24(a)(4)

However, as to all remaining liens, because the county did not possess, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a sufficient "interest in property" to qualify for the Sec. 546(b) exception, we must conclude that creation and perfection of each of these later liens violated the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars creation and perfection of postpetition local property tax liens, but permits perfection when the taxing authority acquired an interest in the property before the bankruptcy petition that qualifies for the statutory exception.

Lincoln Savings Bank, FSB v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n) · filed 1989-07-24(a)(4), (b)(3)

However, as to all remaining liens, because the county did not possess, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a sufficient “interest in property” to qualify for the § 546(b) exception, we must conclude that creation and perfection of each of these later liens violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except postpetition tax liens from the automatic stay when the earliest acts to create the liens occur after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Makoroff v. City of Lockport, New York (In Re Guterl Special Steel Corp.) · filed 1990-02-12(b)(3)

Here, as in W-P Steel Corp., we find that the purported tax liens, the earliest of which was created on September 13, 1982 after the bankruptcy petition was filed on August. 9, 1982, not only violate the automatic stay but do not qualify for an exception. We therefore affirm the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the liens are null and void.

Section 362(b)(3) does not permit postpetition perfection of tax liens for later tax years when the automatic stay prevented those liens from attaching.

Pointer v. City of Farmers Branch (In Re Pointer) · filed 1990-04-13(b)(3)

Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) do not permit the post petition perfection of such interest for the 1987 and 1988 taxes. Any attempted perfection of liens for 1987 and 1988 taxes by the Taxing Units would violate the stay in the VVAL bankruptcy and is accordingly void unless the stay was lifted.

Section 362(a)(4) stays postpetition creation and perfection of liens against property of the estate.

LTV Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In Re Chateaugay Corp.) · filed 1990-05-24(a)(4)

In this regard, the PBGC’s statement failed to acknowledge that the automatic stay prevents not only post-petition perfection of a lien, but also its post-petition creation.

Section 362(a)(4) bars creation of a real property tax lien against estate property after a bankruptcy petition when the tax had not become a lien before the petition.

Watervliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In Re Shoreham Paper Co.) · filed 1990-07-27(a)(4)

The post-petition creation of that tax lien accordingly violates Section 362(a)(4).

Section 362(a)(4) bars postpetition property tax assessments that create liens when the taxing authority acquired no prepetition interest qualifying for the perfection exception.

Makoroff v. City of Lockport, New York · filed 1990-10-19(a)(4)

We hold that the City and County acquired their interest in Guterl's property each year when they took the steps required by statute to obtain a perfectible lien on that property. Because these steps all occurred after Guterl's bankruptcy petition, the assessment of city and county taxes violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(4).

Section 362(b)(3) permits postpetition perfection of a prepetition real property tax interest when the resulting lien is protected under § 546(b).

In Re Summit Ventures, Inc. · filed 1991-09-19(b)(3)

Recognition of the Town’s lien does not violate the automatic stay against “any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate” provided by 362(a)(4), because the lien falls within the exception provided by 362(b) for postpetition perfection “to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b).”

Section 362 prevents a prepetition federal tax lien from attaching to or being perfected against a postpetition inheritance that becomes property of the bankruptcy estate.

United States v. Fuller (In Re Fuller) · filed 1992-01-06(a)(4) and (a)(5)

By the time the inheritance was acquired, whether by the Debtors or by the estate, the automatic stay was in place, preventing the attachment or perfection of the federal tax lien against the inheritance.

Section 362(a)(4) stays the postpetition creation, perfection, and enforcement of tax liens against estate property for postpetition real property taxes when the taxing authority lacks a prior interest that qualifies for the perfection exception.

First American Savings Bank, FSB v. Iron County (In Re United Construction & Development Co.) · filed 1992-01-07(a)(4)

The debtor’s filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code stayed the postpetition creation, perfection, and enforcement of the tax liens for the 1986 and 1987 real property taxes.

Section 362(a) bars enforcement of a tax lien, so a redemption period that requires the lienholder to act cannot begin until the stay is modified.

Matter of Sabec · filed 1992-02-25(a)

Unless and until the automatic stay is modified, Chvala will remain barred from enforcing his tax lien and the second redemption period will not commence.

Section 362(a)(4) bars the creation or attachment of a postpetition property tax lien against estate property when the taxing authority had no prepetition interest eligible for the perfection exception in section 362(b)(3).

First American Savings Bank v. Iron County (In Re United Construction & Development Co.) · filed 1992-05-27(a)(4)

Therefore, the tax liens for 1986 and 1987 are not entitled to priority because the automatic stay prohibits the creation or attachment of these lien post-petition.

Section 362(b)(3) does not except a later property tax lien from the automatic stay when state law gave the taxing authority no prepetition interest in the property.

In Re Glasply Marine Industries, Inc., Debtor. Treasurer of Snohomish County, Washington v. Seattle-First National Bank · filed 1992-07-30(b)(3)

Washington law requires several affirmative acts to determine the property tax and attach a lien. Snohomish County cannot establish that the 1988 and 1989 taxes constitute an exception to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(5) prevents a creditor from creating a judgment lien through recording after the debtor files for bankruptcy, even when the creditor mailed the judgment for recording before the filing.

Moler v. Nonilco Corp. (In re Moler) · filed 1993-03-18(a)(5)

The automatic stay, having intervened between Nonilco’s mailing of the judgment and the actual filing of the judgment by the Recorder of Deeds, is effective against the creation of the judgment lien by filing.

Section 362(a)(4) bars recording a dissolution decree after the bankruptcy petition to perfect a lien against estate property.

In Re Dale · filed 1993-03-23(a)(4)

The recording of the dissolution decree was an act to perfect a lien against estate property and therefore was in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents postpetition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents from acquiring lien status.

United Jersey Bank v. Miller (In Re C.S. Associates) · filed 1994-07-20(a)(4)

In Equibank, we held that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), "prevents the creation of a lien post-petition." 884 F.2d at 84. The only amounts in question in this appeal are post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents, and therefore the City's taxes and rents have not and cannot attain lien status for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(4) prevents post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents from becoming liens against estate property.

In Re Associates · filed 1994-07-20(a)(4)

In Equibank, we held that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(4), "prevents the creation of a lien post-petition." 884 F.2d at 84. The only amounts in question in this appeal are post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents, and therefore the City's taxes and rents have not and cannot attain lien status for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar postpetition recording of an already perfected tax lien when the recording does not create, perfect, or enforce the lien.

Ellenberg v. J.M. Tull Metal (In re McTyre Grading & Pipe, Inc.) · filed 1995-01-10(a)(4)

The recording of the writs was a redundant act designed to provide record notice of the tax Hens but according the City no better Hen status than it had before the writs were recorded. Therefore, because the postpetition recording of the writs of fi. fa. did not act to create, perfect or enforce the City’s Hen, the City’s actions did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to create, perfect, or enforce estate-property liens, but does not prevent a post-petition real property tax lien from attaching automatically.

In Re Sylvia Development Corp. · filed 1995-03-10(a)(4)

Upon the filing of Debt- or’s petition, however, the automatic stay prohibited any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), thus limiting the County’s ability to perfect its interest. With respect to real property taxes, however, the County’s lien attaches despite the filing.

Section 362 makes a notice of tax lien filed during the bankruptcy stay void, but does not bar a new notice filed after the bankruptcy petition is dismissed.

James Rochowicz Maria Rochowicz v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1995-05-02

As such, this notice of lien violated the automatic stay and is concededly void. However, the bankruptcy petition was dismissed with prejudice in January 1990, and the discharge order was vacated in February 1990. The Government thereafter filed a second notice of tax lien in March 1992. Since this second notice of lien did not violate the stay and was within the time limitations for collection of an assessment, I.R.C. Sec. 6502, the lien is arguably valid.

Section 362(b)(18) permits creation or perfection of a statutory lien for ad valorem taxes that come due after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Fischer · filed 1995-07-21(b)(18)

In the 1994 Amendments, the United States Congress amended § 362(b) to include a subsection (18) which allows for the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for ad valorem taxes which come due after the filing of a petition.

Section 362(a)(4) bars entry of a tax lien against estate property while the automatic stay remains in effect, whether the tax liability arose before or after the petition.

In Re Mall at One Associates, L.P. · filed 1995-08-31(a)(4)

It is well established that the entry of a tax lien securing a post-petition tax liability, as well as the post-petition entry of a lien securing a pre-petition tax liability, violates the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from filing a tax lien over a debtor’s property after the debtor files a Chapter 13 petition.

In Re Martinez · filed 1996-05-15(a)

In the case at bar, it is clear that Treasury violated the debtors’ automatic stay when Treasury filed a tax hen over debtors’ property after the Chapter 13 petition had been filed.

Section 362(a)(4) voids an attempt to perfect a lien against estate property after the bankruptcy petition when the good faith purchaser exception in § 549(c) does not apply.

Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville) · filed 1996-05-21(a)(4)

Under these precedents, section 549(c) has no application and the automatic stay voids the attempted perfection of the lien.

Section 362(a)(4) stays a lender from creating or perfecting a postpetition lien against estate property, and a lien created in violation of the stay is void.

Tevis T. Thompson, Jr. v. Margen · filed 1996-05-21(a)(4)

No exception is provided for the creating, perfecting or enforcing of a lien obtained by a simple lender to the estate. ... Under these precedents, section 549(c) has no application and the automatic stay voids the attempted lien.

Section 362(a)(4) does not bar a duplicate tax lien filing that creates, perfects, or enforces no lien rights beyond those acquired before bankruptcy.

Carlson v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1996-07-17(a)(4)

Nor does it appear that the duphcate hen created, perfected, or enforced a hen interest considering that the duphcate hen could not estabhsh any new rights beyond those already acquired by the prior February 9 hen.

Section 362(a)(4) voids an attempted postpetition perfection of a lien against estate property when the good-faith-purchaser exception in § 549(c) does not apply.

Tevis T. Thompson, Jr. v. Margen · filed 1996-09-26(a)(4)

Under these precedents, section 549(c) has no application and the automatic stay voids the attempted perfection of the lien.

Section 362(b)(18) permits a post-petition real property tax lien to be perfected by operation of law without violating the automatic stay.

In Re Soltan · filed 1999-05-20(b)(18)

Because the unpaid post-petition property taxes became a lien against the property on December 1, 1997 by operation of law, and the perfection of such lien does not violate the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(18), the County’s claim is a secured claim.

Section 362(a)(5) stays attachment of a federal tax lien to property acquired during bankruptcy, even when the lien would attach by operation of law.

United States v. Gold (In re Avis) · filed 1999-06-28(a)(5)

Accordingly, we hold that the attachment of a federal tax lien created under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 to property acquired during the bankruptcy proceedings is an "act" that is stayed by operation of § 362(a)(5).

Section 362(a)(4) voids a tax lien created after the bankruptcy petition when the taxing authority had no prepetition property interest that could be perfected under the stay exception.

City of White Plains v. A & S Galleria Real Estate, Inc. (In re Federated Department Stores, Inc.) · filed 2000-01-05(a)(4)

We hold that the determination of taxable status creates no such interest, as is required by § 546(b)(1)(A), about which it could properly be said that subsequent acts perfected the interest into a lien. Rather the lien is created when the pertinent statute says that the tax becomes a lien. In the present case, the charter of plaintiff White Plains provides that real estate taxes do not become a lien until due and payable, in the present instance one-half on July 19,1990 and one-half on January 2, 1991. Conceptually, there is no prior interest such as a security agreement or mortgage which can be perfected into a lien. The lien here is a creature of statute and is not the result of perfection. Plaintiffs lien having been obtained in contravention of § 362(a)(4), it is void.

Section 362(b)(18) does not except a state agency’s lien for a flat-rate production tax from the automatic stay because the exception requires a political subdivision and an ad valorem property tax.

In Re LTV Steel Co., Inc. · filed 2001-07-02(b)(18)

In conclusion, we note that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(18)’s exception to the automatic stay does not apply here because Respondents’ actions were not performed on behalf of a political subdivision of a state. Furthermore, we conclude that the taco-nite tax is not an ad valorem tax.

Section 362(h) affords no remedy for a stay violation when a county sells property to collect postpetition real estate taxes that were not included in the debtors’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

In re Burrell · filed 2002-02-01(h)

This being the case, the Court can easily conclude that Kankakee County and the Kankakee County Treasurer were well within their rights to seek payment of delinquent real estate taxes for the years following 1989, and to sell the real estate for non-payment of those taxes, as has been the case.

Section 362's automatic stay does not affect a prepetition tax lien on disability payments when the right to those payments vested before bankruptcy.

Stinnett v. LaPlante (In Re Stinnett) · filed 2005-02-24

This court agrees: since the government’s tax lien against Stinnett attached to the Guardian payments prior to his petitioning for bankruptcy, the lien was unaffected by § 362.

Section 362(b)(18) permits the postpetition assessment of ad valorem property taxes without violating the automatic stay.

In Re Cachu · filed 2005-02-15(b)(18)

The postpetition assessment of ad valorem property taxes does not violate the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(18).

Section 362(a) does not prohibit refiling notices to preserve existing prepetition federal tax liens during bankruptcy, even if the underlying tax liability is ultimately discharged.

In re O'Callaghan · filed 2006-03-20(a)

The IRS did not violate the automatic stay by re-filing the Notices of Federal Tax Lien while the Debtor’s bankruptcy case was pending, even though the underlying tax liability was ultimately discharged.

Section 362(a)(4) renders tax liens created in violation of the automatic stay void to the extent they attach to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Purcell v. Khan (In Re Purcell) · filed 2007-01-31(a)(4)

Creditor actions in violation of the automatic stay are void. ... Therefore, the liens that arose as the result of the filing of the certificates of delinquency in February, 1999 and July, 2002 are void to the extent that they would have attached to property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(b)(9)(D) permits tax assessments and notice of assessment but does not authorize recording a tax lien against property still in the bankruptcy estate, even for a nondischargeable tax debt.

Copley v. West Virginia State Tax Department (In Re Copley) · filed 2008-03-13(b)(9)(D)

Accordingly, while the automatic stay exception in § 362(b)(9) insulates the Tax Department to the extent it made an assessment and sent notice of that assessment to the Debtor, it was not authorized under § 362(b)(9) to record a lien against the Wayne County property that had not yet been sold by the Trustee. The mere fact that the Tax Department holds a debt that is excepted from discharge does not grant the Tax Department authority to violate the automatic stay.

In cases filed before the 1994 amendments, the automatic stay prevents property-tax assessments from attaching as liens to estate property, and dismissal does not validate those liens.

In Re Keuler · filed 2008-05-14

There is compelling Third Circuit Court of Appeals authority that taxes assessed against property of the estate during a pre-Amendment bankruptcy filing are, at best, unsecured administrative obligations since the automatic stay would prevent attachment of such assessment to property of the estate. ... Violations of the automatic stay are not validated by the dismissal of the bankruptcy.

Filing a nominee tax lien after a bankruptcy petition can state a claim for a willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(a)(4)-(6).

King v. United States (In Re King) · filed 2008-11-03(a)(4)-(6)

Consequently, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have made a “plausible” claim that, if proved, would “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” for willful violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)-(6).

Section 362(b)(18)'s exception for property tax liens does not apply retroactively to a bankruptcy filed before the 1994 amendment, so the automatic stay continues to bar those liens during that bankruptcy.

In Re Keuler · filed 2009-01-25(b)(18)

Here, allowing the imposition of tax liens not imposed because the automatic stay was in effect prior to 1994 would impair rights the debtor possessed before enactment of the legislation. As such, the court cannot apply the 1994 amendments to the bankruptcy filed in 1992. The court agrees with the Bankruptcy Judge that the stay applied to property tax liens imposed during the bankruptcy that began in 1992 and terminated in 1997.

Section 362(a)(4) stays the creation of an attorney’s lien on estate property after the bankruptcy petition, even if state law requires no act of perfection.

In Re Hayes · filed 2010-07-07(a)(4)

Section 362(a)(4) precludes the creation of an attorney’s lien on property of the bankruptcy estate, even when state law requires no special act of perfection.

Section 362 does not prohibit recording a writ for a prepetition ad valorem property tax lien when the lien was already perfected and the recording neither creates, perfects, nor enforces it.

Steed v. GSRAN-Z, LLC · filed 2020-04-01(a)

While neither party focuses on this precise issue in their briefs,2 the Court finds no stay violation because filing each fi. fa. did not “create, perfect, or enforce” any lien on the property.

Section 362(b)(18) permits statutory liens for real property taxes to arise during the automatic stay.

Karen Ann Hartley · filed 2020-04-14(b)(18)

The automatic stay does not prevent the creation of statutory liens on account of real property taxes.

Section 362(a) prevents a prepetition attachment levy from becoming a lien when a postpetition divorce converts property held by the entirety into a tenancy in common.

Hatu v. Southco Distributing Company · filed 2022-05-05(a)

However, because the divorce was granted and the conversion occurred postpetition, the intervening imposition of the automatic stay blocked Southco’s attachment levy from becoming a valid lien against Mr. Hatu’s resultant half interest in these two properties.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a suit against a third party when the complaint excludes recovery from the debtor's insurance proceeds and a judgment against the third party would not effectively be a judgment against the debtor.

Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1987-10-23(a)(1)

Aetna concedes that section 362(a)(1) is inapplicable in the present case because the complaints expressly exclude any recovery from Robins' insurance proceeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that a judgment against Aetna would in effect be a judgment against Robins.

Section 362(a)(1) does not stay a suit against a third party when the claim excludes recovery from the debtor’s insurance proceeds and a judgment against the third party would not effectively be against the debtor.

Oberg v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1987-09-09(a)(1)

Aetna concedes that section 362(a)(1) is inapplicable in the present case because the complaints expressly exclude any recovery from Robins’ insurance proceeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is such identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that a judgment against Aetna would in effect be a judgment against Robins.

Section 362(a)(1) can stay a claim against a nondebtor when a judgment would have an immediate adverse economic impact on the debtor through a contractual indemnification obligation.

Hardy v. Crown Equipment Corporation · filed 2025-03-18(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that a judgment against Womack would have an immediate and adverse economic impact against Amscan such that a stay is warranted.

A nondebtor extension of the automatic stay may last for the life of a Chapter 11 plan when the circumstances warrant it, consistent with § 362(c)(2).

Hal Luftig Company, Inc. · filed 2025-02-24(c)(2)

The Court concludes that, under the facts and circumstances of this case as described herein, the non-debtor stay extension should not be for a limited duration and may extend for the life of the plan, consistent with Bankruptcy Code § 362(c)(2).

Section 362(a)(1) stays proceedings against a debtor who files for bankruptcy, but the stay does not extend to other defendants.

Financial Pacific Leasing, Inc. v. Smoove and Easy Delivery Company LLC · filed 2025-01-22(a)(1)

Thereafter, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the court stayed the proceedings as to Carr. That stay does not extend to the remaining defendants.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against bankruptcy debtors, but generally does not protect non-debtors absent an applicable exception.

The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Plumbing Connection LLC · filed 2024-12-19

Pursuant to 11 U.S. C. § 362, any proceedings against these Defendants in this case are stayed. Defendant Caswell Properties, Inc. has not indicated that it has filed a petition in bankruptcy. Because the automatic stay does not extend protection to non-debtors, and the suggestion of bankruptcy does not assert that any exception to this rule may apply, the proceedings against Caswell Properties, Inc. are not stayed at this time.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays actions against the debtor, but its stay does not extend to nondebtor defendants without a separate injunction under § 105(a).

Fortenberry v. Fuciarelli · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) does not automatically stay an action against a distinct nondebtor affiliate when a judgment against that affiliate would not effectively be a judgment against the debtor.

Seiler Tucker Inc. v. Genie Investments · filed 2024-12-16(a)(1)

Here, Genie II and Genie NV are distinct entities, and only the latter is a debtor in bankruptcy. Therefore, by the express terms of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the bankruptcy proceeding of Genie NV does not automatically operate as a stay of the instant lawsuit against Genie II.

Section 362 automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but its stay does not extend to non-debtor defendants without a separate injunction.

Dykes-Bey v. Grand Prairie Health Care Services · filed 2024-12-04(a)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362 stays proceedings against a bankruptcy debtor but generally does not extend the stay to the debtor’s co-defendants.

Gaedeke Holdings VII Ltd v. Stamps Brothers Oil and Gas LLC · filed 2024-12-10

While section 362 of Title 11 extends the stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to the “debtor,” the rule followed in the Tenth Circuit is that the stay provision does not extend to the debtor’s co-defendant.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against the debtor, but does not extend the stay to nondebtor defendants without a separate injunction under § 105(a).

Savoie v. Oliver · filed 2024-12-04(a)(1)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) automatically stays actions against the debtor, but does not extend the stay to nondebtor defendants without a separate bankruptcy court injunction.

McNees v. Coleman · filed 2024-12-03(a)(1)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a) stays actions against the debtor but does not extend the automatic stay to nondebtor defendants; protecting them requires an injunction under § 105(a).

Alger v. Corizon · filed 2024-12-04(a)

The same is true here; no preliminary injunction has been issued, and neither this Court nor the bankruptcy court can otherwise “extend” the automatic stay to non-debtor defendants.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays litigation against the debtor, but does not automatically protect nondebtor defendants.

Hall v. Masters · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

The protections of this automatic stay generally extend to the debtor alone.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays claims against the debtor, but does not protect nondebtor defendants unless the bankruptcy court extends the stay to them.

Hall v. Masters · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

Because the automatic stay does not protect the defendants and the bankruptcy court has not enjoined litigation of claims against them, this case may proceed.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays litigation against the debtor, but does not automatically protect nondebtor defendants.

Nealy v. Masters · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

The protections of this automatic stay generally extend to the debtor alone.

Section 362(a)(1) generally stays claims against the debtor, but it does not protect nondebtor defendants unless the bankruptcy court extends the stay to them.

Kineard v. Smith · filed 2024-11-21(a)(1)

Because the automatic stay does not protect the defendants and the bankruptcy court has not enjoined litigation of claims against them, this case may proceed.