11 U.S.C. § 362

Section 362(h) treats a creditor’s intentional repossession after the debtor says a bankruptcy petition was filed as a willful stay violation even if the debtor provides no corroborating proof of the filing.

Brockington v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina (In Re Brockington) · filed 1991-02-01(h)

This Court concludes and so rules that disbelief of a debtor’s filing because his or her statement is unaccompanied by other proof or corroboration is no defense to a willful violation of the stay.

Section 362(h) does not treat time spent seeking a restraining order and contempt sanctions as actual damages when no other injury is shown.

Thomas G. Lovett, Jr., Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Transportation Systems International, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc · filed 1991-04-15(h)

We do not believe that the time expended bringing the motion for a temporary restraining order and contempt sanctions, in the absence of any other damage, is the type of damage contemplated by section 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits sanctions against a creditor’s attorney who violates the automatic stay by using a coercive letter to a third party to stop annuity payments to debtors.

In re Levine · filed 1991-09-27(h)

Clearly, Pilka’s letter was designed to coerce Jackson National to cease making annuity payments to the Debtors, and it cannot be argued that this is not a violation of the Automatic Stay. In sum, this Court is satisfied that the Debtors’ Motion for Sanctions against Pilka for violation of the Automatic Stay is well taken and should be granted.

Section 362(h) requires a party seeking its remedies to prove a willful violation of the automatic stay by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Re Price · filed 1991-11-26(h)

Before debtors and other protected parties can invoke the benefits and remedies provided by section 362(h), a willful violation must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 362(h) treats an intentional repossession as a willful stay violation when the creditor had notice that the debtor's bankruptcy case was reinstated.

In Re Bennett · filed 1992-01-02(h)

There is no dispute that Huntington intended to repossess the Debtor’s vehicle. Thus, one of the prerequisites for a finding of willfulness has been satisfied. The next issue is whether Huntington had knowledge of the automatic stay when it repossessed the Honda. Specifically, the Debtors must prove that Huntington had notice or knowledge of the reinstatement of the case. The Court finds that Huntington received the Order Vacating Dismissal and, therefore, had notice of the reinstatement of the case. Huntington, thus, willfully violated the automatic stay imposed by § 362.

Section 362(h) provides a remedy only while the automatic stay remains in effect; after completion of a Chapter 13 plan, the discharge injunction replaces the stay.

Leber v. Illinois Department of Revenue (In Re Leber) · filed 1991-12-20(h)

The remedy provided by section 362(h) applies in cases under any chapter where the automatic stay of section 362(a) is still in force and effect. Upon completion of the plan, as is the case at bar, however, the automatic stay is supplanted by the discharge injunction.

Section 362(h) entitles a debtor to actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, and punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Smoot v. Southtrust Mobile Services, Inc. (In Re Smoot) · filed 1991-12-27(h)

Debtor is entitled by 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) to recover actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.

Section 362(h) permits punitive damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay only when the misconduct is egregious or vindictive.

Davis v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1992-01-29(h)

The case law interpreting the “appropriate circumstances” language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) convinces this court that only egregious or vindictive misconduct warrants punitive damages for willful violations of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(h) requires a debtor seeking damages for an automatic stay violation to prove the damages claimed.

In Re Mohar · filed 1992-05-12(h)

Even though § 362(h) makes it mandatory that damages be assessed when a violation of § 362(a) occurs, the Debtor still has the burden to prove damages.

Section 362(h) does not allow a corporation to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay because a corporation is not an individual.

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank · filed 1992-05-18(h)

A single, legal, issue is raised: Whether Conrail, as a corporation, is an individual for purposes of Section 362(h). ... Although the Bankruptcy Code nowhere explicitly defines the word “individual” it leaves no doubt that a corporation is not an individual.

Section 362(h) entitles a debtor injured by a creditor’s willful stay violation to actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees.

In Re Keith v. Pinkstaff Linda L. Pinkstaff, Debtors. Keith v. Pinkstaff Linda L. Pinkstaff v. United States · filed 1992-09-01(h)

A debtor injured by a creditor’s willful violation of a stay is entitled to recover his actual damages, including costs and attorney’s fees, resulting from that violation.

Section 362(h) supports sanctions when a creditor with actual notice of bankruptcy files a state court collection writ without bankruptcy court leave.

In re Tardo · filed 1992-09-11(h)

Finally, the Court finds that the sanctions imposed are appropriate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). Bernstein had actual notice of Tardo’s bankruptcy petition before filing his Writ of Fieri Facias in state court. ... Bernstein’s failure to request leave from the Bankruptcy Court before filing the Writ in state court contravenes both the language and the policy of the automatic stay. When Bernstein failed to do so, he took a calculated risk of being held in contempt.

Section 362(h) requires proof of actual damages apart from legal fees and costs before damages may be awarded for a willful stay violation.

New MMI Corp. v. Robec, Inc. (In Re Micro Marketing International, Inc.) · filed 1992-10-08(h)

The Plaintiff has failed to establish any actual damages apart from legal fees and costs. Accordingly no award for damages shall be assessed pursuant to Section 362(h) of the Code.

Section 362(h) requires a person seeking damages for a stay violation to show actual injury caused by the violation and to connect that injury to the damages sought.

In Re Wright · filed 1992-10-09(h)

Thus, in order to recover damages under § 362(h), Wright must demonstrate that he has suffered actual injury as a result of the IRS’s alleged violation of the automatic stay, and must relate that injury to the damages sought.

Section 362(h) treats a stay violation as willful when the act is deliberate and the violator knows of the bankruptcy; intent to violate the stay is unnecessary.

In Re Markey · filed 1992-09-14(h)

In order for the court to determine that conduct is willful two predicates must be satisfied. First, the act taken in violation of the stay must have been deliberate. Second, the party must be aware of the bankruptcy. Littke, supra at 1490-91. A finding that the action was taken with an intent to violate the stay is not necessary.

Section 362(h) authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for willful stay violations, including creditor threats and repossession after clear warnings of the stay.

Fisher v. Blackstone Financial Services, Inc. (In Re Fisher) · filed 1992-09-16(h)

Based upon the entire record, we find as a fact and conclude as a matter of law that the Defendants’ conduct in (1) contacting the Debtor post-bankruptcy for the express purpose of harassing and threatening her; and (2) in forcefully repossessing her vehicle despite clear and repeated warnings against such action, constitute willful and malicious violations of the automatic stay within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), calling for the award of compensatory and punitive damages.

Section 362(h) allows damages for willful stay violations only to natural persons, not corporate debtors.

In Re Abacus Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1993-01-29(h)

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) does not apply to corporate debtors.

Section 362(h) requires a willful stay violation for damages, and a creditor’s state-court efforts to collect support can violate the stay without being willful.

James v. Moore (In Re James) · filed 1993-01-29(h)

Defendant and Mr. Neal attempted to collect the support arrearage in superior court after they knew that Plaintiff had filed a bankruptcy case. These collection actions violated the automatic stay. The Court is not persuaded, however, that the violations were willful.

Section 362(h) requires a party alleging a willful stay violation to prove actual damages.

Rhodes v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Rhodes) · filed 1993-02-18(h)

Parties alleging willful violations must demonstrate actual damages. ... We conclude the debtors met their burden of establishing actual damages and that the bankruptcy court’s action in offsetting the entire claim of the IRS was correct and proper.

A debtor in possession is estopped from seeking a remedy for a possible stay violation arising from a creditor’s response to an appeal the debtor initiated.

In Re Horkins · filed 1993-03-29(a)(1)

Even assuming WETI’s response to the debtor in possession’s appeal was a technical violation of the stay, the court finds that the debtor in possession cannot maintain, in good conscience, the position that the appeal should be rendered void. Perhaps WETI should have obtained relief from the stay to respond to the appeal, but the debtor in possession is es-topped from claiming entitlement to any remedy for that violation when its privy initiated the appeal.

Section 362(h) allows damages for willful violations of the automatic stay to natural persons, but not corporations or other artificial entities.

Johnston Environmental Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman) · filed 1993-04-23(h)

We conclude that the Second Circuit's determination in Chateaugay is correct: "individual" means individual, and not a corporation or other artificial entity.

Section 362(h) permits an individual injured by a willful stay violation to recover damages, but a corporation is not an individual eligible for those damages.

Johnston Environmental Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman) · filed 1993-04-23(h)

We also find that the Knights willfully violated the automatic stay, but that because the term “individual” in 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) does not include a corporation, the bankruptcy court did not err in refusing to award sanctions.

Section 362(h) provides damages for willful automatic stay violations; an application for estate funds made without knowledge of the estate’s claim is not willful.

In re Walton · filed 1993-06-02(h)

Section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides damages for willful violations of the automatic stay. ... Bartholomew stated he had no knowledge that any of the funds held by Clark represented property of the estate when he applied to the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas for payment of the attorney fees of William Walton. Bartholomew’s uncontradicted testimony stated that the Trustee informed Bartholomew that the Debtors’ estate had no claim against the funds held by Clark. Bartholomew’s application to Clark for payment of attorney fees, therefore, cannot be characterized as willful.

Section 362(h) does not impose damages for a willful stay violation when a creditor reasonably believes the targeted property is outside the bankruptcy estate.

Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,285 in Re Mark Nelson, Debtor, Mark Nelson v. Taglienti · filed 1993-06-03(h)

Given the peculiar “facts” of this case, we hold that Paula could not have “willfully violated” the automatic stay applicable to plaintiffs property, if, in fact, 16 Dorchester Street was ever covered by such a stay. Although Paula could have asked the bankruptcy court to determine whether the property was subject to a stay prior to commencing her equity actions in state court, we hold that it was reasonable for her to believe that the property was not part of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 362(h) makes a creditor liable for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees for a willful stay violation, even if the creditor believed in good faith that it was entitled to the property.

In Re Endres Auto Body and Paint, Debtor. John T. Kendall, Trustee v. Execu-Pac, Inc. · filed 1993-07-28(h)

A creditor who willfully violates a bankruptcy stay is liable for the debtor's resultant damages, including costs and attorney's fees. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(h). The gist of EPI's argument is that, because it believed in good faith that it had a right to the property in question, it should not be subject to section 362(h). This contention not only fails to explain why EPI refused to turn the money over to the Trustee once EPI learned of the mistake, it also flies in the face of our repeated and emphatic rejections of this argument.

Section 362(h) treats a stay violation as willful when the creditor knows of the bankruptcy and continues collection activity; specific intent to violate the stay is unnecessary.

In Re Theodore R. Price and Ollie P. Price, Debtors. Theodore R. Price and Ollie P. Price v. United States · filed 1994-12-14(h)

The violation is also considered willful because the government was aware of the pending bankruptcy proceeding and, despite the several pleas to halt further collection actions, the government declined to intervene. A “willful violation” does not require a specific intent to violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(1) makes a state court order entered after the bankruptcy petition to vacate a prepetition judgment against the debtor void.

In Re Everett · filed 1994-12-20(a)(1)

Significantly, the state court’s postpetition order granting the Debtor’s motion to vacate the LAS Judgment is void as violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).

Section 362(h) allows a damages action for willful violation of the automatic stay to continue after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.

Davis v. Courington (In Re Davis) · filed 1995-02-02(h)

We concur with the authorities holding that dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case does not render moot an action for damages based on willful violation of the automatic stay. Willful violation of the automatic stay is an intentional tort for which compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits natural persons, but not corporate entities, to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Barnett Bank of Southeast Georgia, N.A. v. Trust Co. Bank of Southeast Georgia, N.A. (In Re Ring) · filed 1995-02-21(h)

The term “individual,” however, is limited to natural persons and does not include corporate entities such as Plaintiff.

Section 362(h) does not treat a corporate debtor as an “individual” eligible for damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

United States v. Midway Industrial Contractors, Inc. (In Re Midway Industrial Contractors, Inc.) · filed 1995-03-01(h)

After careful consideration of the issue, we find in favor of the latter approach and hold that a corporate debtor is not an “individual” for purposes of § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(h) treats a stay violation as willful when an entity deliberately acts to violate the stay knowing that the debtor has filed for bankruptcy.

United States v. Washington (In Re Washington) · filed 1995-03-29(h)

For a violation of an automatic stay to be “willful,” all that is required is that an entity engage in a deliberate act to violate a stay with the knowledge that the debtor has filed for bankruptcy.

Section 362(h) treats a stay violation as willful when the defendant knew of the stay and intentionally took the action that violated it; specific intent to violate the stay is unnecessary.

United States v. Flynn (In Re Flynn) · filed 1995-03-31(h)

A violation of an automatic stay under § 362(h) is willful if the defendant knew of the automatic stay and the defendant’s actions violating the stay were intentional. Specific intent to violate the automatic stay is not required.

Section 362(h) requires proof of injury to recover damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay.

In Re Palumbo Family Ltd. Partnership · filed 1995-04-03(h)

In other words, absent proof of injury, a technical violation of the stay, no matter how willful, is not enough to support an award of damages.

Section 362(h) does not award damages for a willful stay violation when the IRS levied property before bankruptcy and the state remitted the property to the IRS after the petition in response to that levy.

Camacho v. United States (In Re Camacho) · filed 1995-05-01(h)

Considering the entire record, I conclude that the IRS has not willfully violated the automatic stay. The IRS conducted a valid levy against John Camacho’s 1992 PFD prior to the time the Camachos filed bankruptcy. The State of Alaska remitted the PFD to the IRS post-petition in response to the levy. Under these circumstances, I find that the IRS’s conduct does not entitle the Camachos to damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) requires a creditor with actual notice of a bankruptcy case to reverse its earlier action violating the automatic stay, and failure to do so may support sanctions for a willful violation.

Mitchell Construction Co. v. Smith (In Re Smith) · filed 1995-04-06(h)

Under § 362(h), a debtor has the burden of providing a creditor with adequate actual notice of a pending bankruptcy case. When a creditor receives such actual notice, the burden is then on the creditor to assure that the automatic stay is not violated or, if it has been violated prior to receipt of actual notice, the burden is on the creditor to reverse any such action taken in violation of the stay. Mitchell failed to sustain that burden when it failed to take any action to nullify the Contempt Order.

Section 362(h) gives a creditor who violates the automatic stay no right to contribution from another party.

Matter of Walker · filed 1995-05-08(h)

Cadle's contention, however, is misplaced, as there is no contribution action in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(h) gives a creditor who violates the automatic stay no right to contribution from another alleged violator.

In the Matter of Irma J. Walker, Debtor. Irma J. Walker v. The Cadle Company v. Denise D. Lindsey and Stan Svara D/B/A S · filed 1995-05-09(h)

The combination of these two factors—the absence of legislative history mentioning contribution and the fact that § 362(h) was not enacted to protect violators of the automatic stay—indicates that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action for contribution in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(h) permits damages for a willful stay violation only when the injured debtor is a natural person; a corporate debtor cannot recover under it.

In Re Ogden Modulars, Inc. · filed 1995-07-19(h)

Section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the recovery of such damages when an individual is injured by a willful violation of a stay. However, only a debtor who is a natural person is an “individual” who can recover under Section 362(h). As a corporate entity, this Debtor is not entitled to such relief in this case.

Section 362(h) does not authorize sanctions when the aggrieved party is a bankruptcy estate rather than an individual.

In Re Cordle · filed 1995-08-15(h)

Since the aggrieved party is the bankruptcy estate, which is an artificial entity rather than an individual, sanctions may not be imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) requires injury from a willful stay violation before damages may be recovered; attorney fees for responding to a computer-generated collection notice may qualify when reasonably incurred.

In Re Brock Utilities & Grading, Inc. · filed 1995-08-25(h)

In a ease in which a computer-generated notice legitimately warrants a debtor incurring attorney fees, such fees may constitute an injury compensable under § 362(h), but this is not such a case. Thus, there was no injured party in this case, and only an “injured” party may recover under § 362(h).

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor’s attorney who learns that a judgment was entered after the bankruptcy filing to take affirmative steps to undo the stay violation; refusing to do so makes the violation willful.

In Re Taylor · filed 1995-12-08(a)(1)

However once notice was given that the petition relief had been filed Mr. Cvelbar had an affirmative duty to undo the technical violation. He was given every opportunity to remedy the situation but refused to do so in no uncertain terms. As a result the court finds that Mr. Cvelbar was in wilful violation of the automatic stay and in contempt as a result of the violation.

Section 362(h) treats an intentional act that violates the automatic stay as willful when the actor knows of the bankruptcy filing.

In Re Sandish Mann and Jaspreet Mann, Debtor, Jonathan E. Tesar, Movant-Appellee v. Harjit Bhambra and Lakbhir Bhambra · filed 1996-03-18(h)

Since the Bhambras acted with knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, they willfully violated the automatic stay when they temporarily took possession of the Manns' AM/PM Mini Market.

Section 362(h) treats a deliberate levy made after the creditor receives actual notice of the bankruptcy as a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Davis v. United States (In Re Davis) · filed 1996-05-24(h)

Therefore, the Government’s levy is a willful violation of the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits sanctions for a willful stay violation when a creditor knows of the bankruptcy and intentionally acts in violation of the stay, even without a specific intent to violate it.

Kirk v. Shawmut Bank (In Re Kirk) · filed 1996-06-27(h)

A willful violation does not necessarily require a specific subjective intent to violate the stay. Rather, a willful violation may be found if the creditor knew of the automatic stay and its actions were intentional.

Section 362(h) does not permit corporate debtors to recover damages for violations of the automatic stay.

Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus. Inc. (In Re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp.) · filed 1996-06-19(h)

Thus, after weighing the different approaches presented in the case law, the court concludes that better reasoning is that of those courts relying on the plain meaning of § 362(h) and § 101(41) to conclude that corporate debtors may not receive an award of damages under § 362(h).

Section 362(h) permits actual and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees for a creditor’s willful collection efforts after notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy.

In Re Miller · filed 1996-07-17(h)

AFSF’s actions constitute an intentional and willful violation of the automatic stay under § 362(h). The Debtors were forced to apply to the Bankruptcy Court in order to compel AFSF to cease harassing the Debtors. The Court determines that AFSF shall be sanctioned $10,000.00 as actual and punitive damages for its willful violation of the automatic stay. Further, AFSF shall pay $300.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Section 362(h) provides damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay but does not authorize denying a setoff in lieu of damages solely because the creditor initially violated the stay.

United States v. Ruff (In Re Rush-Hampton Industries, Inc.) · filed 1996-10-28(h)

Nowhere does this statute give the Bankruptcy Court the authority to deny all or part of a setoff in lieu of damages simply because the creditor initially violated the automatic stay.

Section 362(h) permits damages for humiliation and embarrassment caused by a violation of the automatic stay.

Solfanelli v. Meridian Bank (In Re Solfanelli) · filed 1996-12-13(h)

While we all suffer humiliation and embarrassment at various stages of our life, a finding that this was caused by the Bank’s violation of the automatic stay is sufficient to support an award under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) provides an individual debtor’s remedy for a violation of the automatic stay, so relief should be sought under that subsection rather than through civil contempt.

In Re Daniels · filed 1997-03-13(h)

An individual should seek relief for a violation of the automatic stay pursuant to that section, and not as a contempt matter. ... Accordingly, although the Court denies the motion for reconsideration, the Court will amend the contempt order by vacating the finding of contempt and by stating that the relief sought by the debtor is granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) makes a creditor that intentionally violates the automatic stay liable for consequential damages, including reasonable attorney’s fees.

In re Milto · filed 1997-03-05(h)

Under the authority of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), and further under the Internal Revenue Service Code as discussed in the ease of Grewe v. United States (In re Grewe), 4 F.3d 299 (4th Cir.1993), the Internal Revenue Service is responsible for all of the consequential damages including the reasonable attorney’s fees as identified above.

Section 362(h) authorizes damages for individual debtors injured by willful violations of the automatic stay, but does not authorize such damages for corporate debtors.

Reinert & Duree v. Sosne · filed 1997-03-13(h)

The bankruptcy court ruled that § 362(h) only applies to "individual" debtors, not to corporate entities such as Just Brakes. We agree.

Section 362(h) sanctions may be denied for a co-owner’s retention of estate property when no Chapter 7 trustee has been appointed to receive and administer it.

Thornton v. Thornton (In re Thornton) · filed 1997-04-14(h)

At the time of the hearing, this Court denied the Motion for Sanctions against Betty J. Thornton under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) inasmuch as it was this Court’s understanding that the duty of the co-owner was to transfer property to a Chapter 7 Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542. Unfortunately, the United States Trustee’s Office has not seen fit to appoint a Chapter 7 Trustee to accept such property and, therefore, the Court concluded that Betty J. Thornton’s conduct, in retaining possession of the vehicle, may have been somewhat justified since there was no entity administering the estate.

Section 362(a)(1) bars collection of prepetition claims before discharge; willful violations can subject a creditor to actual and punitive damages under § 362(h).

In Re Latanowich · filed 1997-04-16(a)(1), (h)

The Court also notes that the acts undertaken by Sears before entry of the discharge were willful violations of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (prohibiting any action against the debtor to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case), for which Sears would be subject to actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and punitive damages.

Section 362(h) requires more than knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and an intentional act to establish a willful violation of the automatic stay.

Cadle Co. v. McKernan (In Re McKernan) · filed 1997-04-28(h)

The ruling of the Bankruptcy Court in the Memorandum of November 7, 1995, that all that is required to show a willful violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) is “knowledge of the petition” and that “the act which violates the stay is an intentional act” cannot be affirmed, and the order of summary judgment on which it is based cannot be affirmed.

A creditor willfully violates the automatic stay by continuing to pursue debtors after receiving notice of their bankruptcy filing.

Hobby Horizens, Inc. v. Sapere · filed 1997-08-06(h)

We are satisfied that the record amply supported the district court's findings of fact that Hobby willfully violated the stay. Hobby continued pursuing the Saperes despite notice of the bankruptcy filing.

A violation of the automatic stay by issuing an unnecessary proposed tax assessment notice does not void an assessment made after the stay expires.

Floyd E. Riley, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. United States of America, Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 1997-09-16(a)(6)

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Internal Revenue Code requires that we render “void ab initio” an assessment for $680,000 in unpaid taxes because that assessment was issued after a “void” notice that the agency was under no obligation to issue in the first place.

Section 362(h) does not allow a court to deny an otherwise valid setoff as a sanction for a willful but harmless automatic stay violation.

United States v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 1999-02-23(h)

Under these circumstances, the IRS’s violation of the stay, although not justifiable, was harmless. Furthermore, consistent with Huff, even if the IRS’s violation of the stay was willful, § 562(h) does not permit the bankruptcy court to deny the IRS its right to setoff Debtor’s 1992 tax liability.

Section 362(h) does not authorize sanctions against a creditor that completely disposed of repossessed collateral before the bankruptcy petition was filed, because the creditor then had no duty under the automatic stay to prevent its later disposition.

In Re Ratliff · filed 2000-08-23(h)

Because Debtors failed to satisfy the first element of a § 362(h) sanctions claim, the Court need not inquire as to the second element — whether such a violation was “willful.” Paxon had no duty to refrain from or to prevent disposition of the car because the petition had not been filed until after Paxon had completely disposed of the car.

Remedies for automatic-stay violations lie in the Bankruptcy Code, so an FDCPA claim premised on a Section 362 violation is barred.

Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2000-10-16

To the extent plaintiff premises her FDCPA claim on violations of sections 362 or 524, said claims are barred. Plaintiffs remedies for violations of the Bankruptcy Code lie within the Code itself.

Section 362(h) damages claims for willful violations of the automatic stay must be brought in bankruptcy court.

Eastern Equipment & Services Corp. v. Factory Point National Bank · filed 2001-01-04(h)

They assert that it also stated a federal claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), which allows for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for willful violations of the automatic stay. However, again, such a claim must be brought in the bankruptcy court, rather than in the district court, which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.

Contempt is not a remedy for violating the automatic stay because the stay is statutory rather than a court order.

James v. Planters Bank · filed 2001-01-24(a)

Since the stay is a statutory provision and not a court order, contempt is no longer an appropriate remedy.

Section 362(a)(5) and (6) prohibit acts, so a creditor’s lawyer who stopped collection after learning of the bankruptcy did not violate those provisions by failing to vacate a default judgment before the stay ended.

Siharath v. Citifinancial Services, Inc. (In Re Siharath) · filed 2002-11-06(a)(5), (a)(6)

Section 362(a)(5) and (6) both prohibit acts, not inaction. The Peterson Firm did none of the prohibited acts.

Section 362(h) permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs for a violation of the automatic stay.

Harkin v. Best · filed 2003-10-15(h)

The district court did not err by awarding Best attorney’s fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).

Section 362(h) requires a cognizable injury to recover for a violation of the automatic stay.

Salem v. Paroli · filed 2003-10-28(h)

The district court correctly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Salem’s claim that certain defendants violated the automatic stay in bankruptcy because Salem faded to allege a cognizable injury.

Section 362(h) requires proof that the creditor knew of the automatic stay before a stay violation can be willful.

Soto v. Lanoue (In Re Soto) · filed 2003-11-24(h)

The Court finds that the Defendant did not have notice of the stay when he went to the police department. ... The debtor has the burden of providing the creditor with actual notice ... but the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate the Defendant’s actual knowledge of the existence of the automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court rules that the Defendant’s action was not willful within the meaning of section 362(h).

Sums collected on prepetition attorney retainers during bankruptcy in violation of the automatic stay must be refunded to the estates.

Bethea, Albert v. Robert J. Adams & · filed 2003-12-17

If any sums were collected on account of the retainers during the bankruptcies in vio- lation of the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. §362, these too must be refunded to the estates.

An action for damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay under Section 362(h) survives dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.

Johnson v. Smith (In Re Johnson) · filed 2008-07-10(h)

This Court finds these decisions persuasive, and holds that an action for willful violation of the automatic stay survives dismissal of the main bankruptcy case. Damages caused by a willful violation of the automatic stay do not evaporate once the stay is no longer in force, nor does the public policy of preventing such stay violations.

A bankruptcy court may use civil contempt to void actions taken in violation of § 362(a)’s automatic stay; its relief is not limited to monetary damages.

In Re CW Mining Co. · filed 2010-11-08(a)

Because Skinner did not limit the power of a bankruptcy court to awarding just monetary damages in civil contempt orders, we hold that the bankruptcy court did not exceed its authority by voiding the actions taken by Standard and COP in violation of the automatic stay.

A bankruptcy court may enforce the automatic stay by voiding actions taken in violation of it, rather than limiting civil contempt relief to monetary sanctions.

Standard Industries, Inc. v. Aquila, Inc. · filed 2010-11-08(a)

Because Skinner did not limit the power of a bankruptcy court to awarding just monetary damages in civil contempt orders, we hold that the bankruptcy court did not exceed its authority by voiding the actions taken by Standard and COP in violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 requires a debtor seeking relief for an automatic stay violation to allege that the defendant actually committed the claimed violation; a conditional allegation of improper payment diversion does not state a claim.

Wilson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Ex Rel. Certificate-Holders of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2004-NC3 ( · filed 2010-11-30

The Court agrees that Count IV does not even allege that either defendant violated the stay. She alleges only that “[t]o the extent that Countrywide and/or Deutsche Bank diverted payments by the plaintiff and/or the Chapter 13 trustee to purposes other than for which they were intended, Countrywide and/or Deutsche Bank violated the automatic stay provisions of 11 USC § 362.” This proposition, even if true, is not an allegation that Countrywide or Deutsche Bank actually did divert payments by the plaintiff or the Chapter 13 trustee to improper purposes. This count therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and the defendants are entitled to judgment on this count as a matter of law.

Section 362 permits a bankruptcy court to order an act, including holding an annual meeting, when that is an appropriate remedy for a violation of the automatic stay.

Gordon Properties, LLC v. First Owners' Ass'n (In Re Gordon Properties, LLC) · filed 2011-05-23

This court has the power to remedy a violation of the automatic stay. If the remedy is to ensure that an action that the association has refused to take in violation of § 362, is taken, it may order that action be taken, including holding an annual meeting.

Section 362(a) does not allow a court to strip a secured creditor’s lien as a remedy for violating the automatic stay when the estate suffered no injury.

In Re Cw Min. Co. · filed 2011-09-30(a)

Although the § 362(a) automatic stay should be held inviolable and violations of the automatic stay are of great concern to the Court, an award of damages for violation of the automatic stay is circumscribed by the Bankruptcy Code and this Court's civil contempt powers. This Court may not use its civil contempt powers to strip a secured creditor's lien simply because the creditor violated the automatic stay or to award a judgment unrelated to any damages.

Section 362(a) does not authorize stripping a secured creditor’s lien as a remedy for a stay violation that caused no injury to the estate.

Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.) · filed 2011-09-30(a)

Although the § 362(a) automatic stay should be held inviolable and violations of the automatic stay are of great concern to the Court, an award of damages for violation of the automatic stay is circumscribed by the Bankruptcy Code and this Court’s civil contempt powers. This Court may not use its civil contempt powers to strip a secured creditor’s lien simply because the creditor violated the automatic stay or to award a judgment unrelated to any damages.

Section 362(k) provides the remedy for an automatic-stay violation and precludes a § 1983 claim based solely on that violation.

Zimmerman v. Bellows · filed 2013-12-04(k)

But his indirect claim fails ab initio— to obtain relief for a violation of the automatic stay, Zimmerman must proceed directly under the Code, not through the back door of § 1983.

Section 362(a)(1) requires a creditor that learns of a bankruptcy filing to take affirmative steps to stop pending collection proceedings, including seeking to quash outstanding bench warrants issued for those proceedings.

Gray v. ZB, N.A. (In re Gray) · filed 2017-05-12(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Defendants had an affirmative duty, upon learning of Plaintiffs’ bankruptcy filing, to contact the Cowlitz County Superior Court and inform them of the bankruptcy filing and ensure the orders issuing bench warrants and the bench warrants themselves were quashed.

Section 362(a)(2) and (6) prohibit filing a motion to enforce a prepetition divorce judgment against the debtor, and withdrawing the motion does not undo the stay violation.

Foster v. Burns (In re Foster) · filed 2017-08-04(a)(2), (a)(6)

The mere act of filing the Motion to Enforce violates § 362(a)(2) and (6). Prompt withdrawal may eliminate or reduce any resulting damage, but it does not undo or otherwise recharacterize the act such that a violation never occurred.

A claim seeking relief for violation of the automatic stay must be brought in bankruptcy court; a district court lacks jurisdiction over a state-law claim based on such a violation.

Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-03-31

To any extent that Peterson’s CUTPA claim arises from an alleged violation of the bankruptcy stay, this Court lacks jurisdiction and dismissal of the claim is warranted.

A corporate debtor seeks relief for a violation of the automatic stay through civil contempt rather than the damages remedy for individuals under § 362(k).

Lapeer Aviation, Inc. · filed 2023-05-11(k)

Because CG is a corporate debtor, recovery for violation of the automatic stay proceeds under a civil contempt theory.

Section 362(a)(3) bars taking estate property, including funds from a debtor’s bank account, while the automatic stay is in effect.

Prehired, LLC · filed 2025-05-30(a)(3)

Seizing estate property is an archetypical example of a violation of the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Code section 362.

A violation of Section 362’s stay may be remedied through sanctions restoring the status quo, with damages for proven harm.

Houdashell v. Missouri Public Service Co. (In Re Houdashell) · filed 1981-02-05(a)(7)

But violation of the automatic stay is ordinarily the subject of civil contempt (or, occasionally, criminal contempt) sanctions which are designed to restore the status quo which existed prior to the violation of the judicial order. ... If the plaintiffs have suffered any incidental prejudice, harm, or injury by reason of the absence of judicial sanction in the first instance, that might be the subject of a damage award now to be made to remedy fully the violation of the automatic stay and the above legal principles. But the plaintiffs, although granted an ample opportunity to do so, have neither stated nor shown any such prejudice, harm, or injury which may be remediable in damages.

Section 362 prohibits an attorney from advancing a debtor’s filing fee with the expectation of repayment after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Ricky Baldwin and Lorie Jean Baldwin · filed 2021-10-05

By advising a client to incur debt in order to pay for bankruptcy related legal services, the practice violates 11 U.S.C. § 362 and, assuming the debtor gets his or her discharge, violates 11 U.S.C. § 524.

Section 362(a)(6) stays a creditor’s use of coercion to collect prepetition debts, including preventing a debtor from making mortgage payments to pressure repayment of unsecured debts.

In Re Guinn · filed 1989-06-30(a)(6)

The asserted use of the membership-termination provision so as to prevent the debtor from being able to maintain payments on the real estate mortgage does have sufficient clout as to be coercive and thereby to deprive this debtor of the benefits of having the two unsecured debts discharged in this bankruptcy proceeding. Such coercion is stayed by the provision of section 362(a) and will be forbidden under section 524(a) upon the granting of a discharge to the debtor, there being no indication that progress of the case to the point of discharge of the debtor will meet any effective interference.

The automatic stay permits a secured creditor to accept a debtor’s voluntary payment if the creditor did not improperly induce it.

Chandler v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2019-04-24

Chandler does not allege that Peoples Bank improperly solicited her August 8 payment. Peoples Bank did not violate the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a state from conditioning transfer of a debtor’s liquor license on payment of post-petition interest without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay.

Taxel v. California Employment Development Department · filed 1990-07-10(a)(6)

The State’s threat of denying the transfer of the liquor license without receipt of payment of the post-petition interest, violated the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The State’s refusal to allow the sale of the license to proceed before such payments were made constituted an act to collect or recover a claim in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars withholding approval of a liquor license transfer to collect post-petition interest, while § 362(a)(3) bars using that approval or retaining estate property to exercise control over the estate.

In Re Del Mission Ltd. · filed 1990-07-10(a)(3), (a)(6)

The State's threat of denying the transfer of the liquor license without receipt of payment of the post-petition interest, violated the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The State's refusal to allow the sale of the license to proceed before such payments were made constituted an act to collect or recover a claim in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir.1986). In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) prohibits any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate, or to exercise control over property of the estate. The conduct of the State in disallowing the transfer of the license until receipt of payment, represents an effort to obtain or exercise control over property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay. Finally, the State's continued refusal to refund the property of the estate violates 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(3) bars replacing a debtor as plaintiff in an action involving estate property when the substitution would prevent the debtor from asserting its retained interest.

In Re Hooker Investments, Inc. · filed 1990-07-13(a)(3)

Accordingly, I find that the substitution of Gelina as party plaintiff in the GMCVB Action and the motion to substitute Gelina in the Brickell Action were acts to obtain possession or to exercise control over property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a) bars a creditor from seeking a bench warrant in a prepetition collection proceeding and requires affirmative steps to stop the proceeding.

In Re Shropshire · filed 1982-11-10(a)

The creditor’s application for a bench warrant on April 22,1982, is clearly a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The subsequent efforts made by Grimm Collections, Inc. to abate the issuance of the warrant were not sufficient to discharge its implied responsibility under 11 U.S.C. § 362 to discontinue all collection efforts and legal proceedings. Therefore, the court finds that Grimm Collections, Inc. is in contempt of this court’s order imposing the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a utility from demanding security authorized by Section 366(b).

In Re Santa Clara Circuits West, Inc. · filed 1982-12-10(a)(3)

The Court must presume that Congress intended these two provisions to be consistent with one another and that, therefore, a demand for security authorized by Section 366(b) does not violate Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor from withholding a debtor’s transcript solely to induce payment of a prepetition debt.

Matter of Heath · filed 1980-04-07(a)(6)

As such, the University’s conduct undeniably falls within the scope of section 362(a)(6) and clearly violates the automatic stay.

Section 362’s automatic stay does not prohibit a creditor from merely retaining a vehicle acquired before the bankruptcy filing when its possessory lien was perfected before filing.

In Re Burke · filed 1980-07-30

We also find that Murphy has taken no affirmative action to perfect its lien subsequent to the filing of the petition which can be considered to be in violation of the automatic stay. The subject property was acquired and retained by Murphy prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. This court finds that perfection of the lien occurred prior to the filing and that the mere retention of the automobile by Murphy is not, under this particular factual situation, a violation of the automatic stay.

Section 362 bars the IRS from receiving wages and an employer from paying them over after a Chapter 13 petition when the debtor’s right to receive the wages arises after filing, despite a prepetition tax levy.

In re Babiarz · filed 1980-08-26

On May 16, 1980, § 362 of the Code stayed IRS from receiving the wages and Rochester Products from turning the wages over to IRS.

Section 362(a) permits postponement of a scheduled foreclosure sale to preserve the status quo until the bankruptcy court acts and does not require the creditor to restart foreclosure.

First National Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach) · filed 1980-09-09(a)

However, I conclude that continuation of the sale was made necessary by the filing of the Title 11 proceedings and was effective to stay efforts to enforce the lien until the bankruptcy judge was able to act in the matter. The Bankruptcy Act does not require nor imply that summary foreclosure be terminated upon the filing of a Title 11 so as to require the secured creditor to begin anew at such time as the bankruptcy court may permit.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of support from property outside the estate only after the bankruptcy court determines that the debt qualifies as support.

In Re Lovett · filed 1980-09-26(b)(2)

Section 362(b)(2) excepts from the automatic stay only “the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support” (emphasis added), but before collection can be attempted, what constitutes alimony, maintenance and support such as to survive a discharge in bankruptcy must be determined by the bankruptcy court.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a university from withholding a debtor’s transcript to compel payment of a prepetition debt.

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Howren (In Re Howren) · filed 1980-10-10(a)(6)

In addition to violating § 525, the University’s refusal to release Howren’s transcript violates the automatic stay provisions of § 362.

Section 362 bars a secured creditor from disposing of repossessed collateral after the debtor files for bankruptcy unless the creditor obtains relief from the stay.

ABD Federal Credit Union v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1980-10-21(a)

At a minimum, application to this court would be required to lift the stay to permit disposition of the property by ABD.

Section 362(a)(1) stays the continuation of a prepetition suit against the debtor upon filing, and a later judgment cannot evade the stay by being entered nunc pro tunc.

Cramer v. Grover · filed 1980-11-20(a)(1)

Clearly then, the continuation of the trial on Cramer’s cross-claim was stayed from and after 12:30 P.M. on July 7, 1980. It is equally clear that the state court’s attempt to avoid this stay by making its judgment revert to a time prior to 12:30 P.M. is invalid.

Section 362(a) automatically prohibits enforcing a prepetition eviction judgment against a debtor’s possession of premises upon filing the bankruptcy petition.

Pickus v. Vitagliano (In Re Pickus) · filed 1980-12-31(a)

Thus, the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a) which became effective upon the filing of the petition for relief clearly prohibited interference with the plaintiffs’ possession of the premises. The defendants’ actions in utilizing the execution were therefore in violation of the provisions of § 362(a).

Section 362 permits relief from the automatic stay so a domestic relations court can consider a change in support, and its stay does not apply to collecting support from property outside the bankruptcy estate.

Massimini v. Massimini (In Re Massimini) · filed 1981-01-08

In recognition of this policy 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) also provides that the automatic stay is not applicable to the collection of support from property that is not property of the estate. ... Therefore, so that all these matters may be adjudicated by a court of continuous jurisdiction, this Court grants relief from the automatic stay to the Plaintiff on any claim for change in support which might be properly raised by either party before the Domestic Relations Court of Pennsylvania.

Section 362(a) prohibits a plan trustee from deducting prepetition overpayments from a debtor’s wages after the order for relief, and the deducted sums are recoverable.

National Bank of Detroit v. Olson (In Re Olson) · filed 1981-01-21(a)

The SUB Plan trustee’s deductions from the debtor’s wages after the order for relief were contrary to the stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Therefore those sums are recoverable.

Section 362(a)(5) protects property abandoned by the trustee that revests in the debtor from creditor repossession until the stay ends under § 362(c)(2) or the creditor obtains relief from the stay.

In Re Cruseturner · filed 1981-01-29(a)(5)

The effect of Section 362(a)(5) is to provide the debtor with separate protection of his property. This enables him to exercise his right to redeem either by acquiring refinancing or by otherwise gathering the necessary funds, or to negotiate a reaffirmation. Unless earlier relief is requested by the creditor, the creditor may not repossess property, despite any abandonment by the trustee, until one of the three acts specified in Section 362(c)(2) occurs, the first of which, in this jurisdiction, is likely to be the discharge hearing.

Section 362 does not bar deductions or adjustments that are part of the parties’ performance of an ongoing executory contract.

Blue Cross of Western PA v. Monsour Medical Center (In Re Monsour Medical Center) · filed 1981-01-30

Any deductions or adjustments made by Blue Cross subsequent to Monsour’s filing for reorganization on February 22, 1980, were a part of the performance of the 1976 Agreement and did not violate the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(3)-(6) can reach a creditor’s postpetition transfer of estate property to a third party in exchange for payment of a prepetition claim, even when the act is not directed against the debtor.

Jandel v. Precision Colors, Inc. (In Re Jandel) · filed 1981-01-30(a)(3)-(6)

We find that sections 362(a)(3), (4), (5) and (6) are applicable to the events complained of by the plaintiffs. A careful reading of the above sections reveals that the actions prohibited need not be done directly against the debtor himself.

Section 362(a) takes effect without actual notice to a creditor.

Springfield Bank v. Caserta (In Re Caserta) · filed 1981-03-04(a)

The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) do not require actual notice to be effective, thereby adopting encrusted doctrines.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a college from withholding a debtor’s transcript solely to force collection of a debt.

In Re Ware · filed 1981-02-24(a)(6)

The facts indicate that the sole purpose of Avila College denying a transcript to the debtor is a method used to force debt collection. Such conduct is in clear violation of § 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 362(b)(3) does not permit postpetition perfection of a New Jersey stop notice lien when the creditor had no qualifying prepetition interest under § 546(b).

ATC Systems, Inc. v. Valairco, Inc. (In Re Valairco, Inc.) · filed 1981-02-24(b)(3)

In order to employ the exception as set forth in subsection (b) of Section 546 of the Bankruptcy Code, “an interest in property” must exist. This court sees no such interest established in the instant matter. ... Based upon the foregoing factual findings and legal conclusions, Plaintiff’s complaint to modify the automatic stay so as to permit perfection of a lien is denied.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a lessor from pursuing collection of prepetition rent after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

In Re Oahu Cabinets, Ltd. · filed 1981-02-26(a)(6)

It is apparent, therefore, that Lessor need not have pursued collection or incurred any costs pursuant to the collection of the back rent once Lessor was advised of Lessee’s intent to honor its $19,379.88 debt in full. Also, under the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6), Lessor was expressly prohibited from doing so.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from serving a postpetition demand for a verified statement concerning a prepetition trust claim against the debtor.

Truax & Hovey, Ltd. v. Grosso (In Re Grosso) · filed 1981-03-16(a)(6)

First, the service of such a demand after the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing is in direct violation of the automatic stay provision, § 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars collecting a prepetition claim from a debtor even when the underlying debt was incurred by someone else.

Lanford v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. (In Re Lanford) · filed 1981-03-19(a)(6)

Under § 362(a)(6), the utility or any entity is forbidden to collect any “claim” against the debtor. This section does not require that the claim be based on a debt incurred by the debtor. The only requirement is that the claim arose prior to the entry of the order for relief. The claim of the utility company clearly arose prior to the filing of the debtor’s petition under Chapter 13. By requiring the debtor to pay such a claim, the defendant utility violated § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars any act to collect a prepetition obligation from a debtor.

In Re Reed · filed 1981-05-15(a)(6)

Specifically, respondents’ behavior offends Section 362(a)(6) which proscribes “any act” to collect a prepetition obligation against debtors.

Section 362(a) stays collection against property titled in a nondebtor’s name while the bankruptcy court determines whether the estate has an interest in that property.

Parenteau v. Bellucci (In Re Bellucci) · filed 1981-03-25(a)

It is further ORDERED that, the property standing in Mary Bellucci’s name upon which Eugene and Eva Parenteau have filed an attachment shall remain subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction and the power of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), pending this court’s findings with respect to the relative claims against that property by the trustee and the plaintiffs, herein, and Finally, it is ORDERED, that as the state court proceeding referred to above applies to the bankrupt, Elio Bellucci, the motion to remand is denied and any and all further proceedings upon that suit shall be conducted before this court and in accordance with applicable law.

Section 362(a) stays a secured creditor’s postpetition filing intended to cure a deficient financing statement under a state tax escape statute.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In Re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc.) · filed 1981-04-14(a)(1), (a)(4)

The automatic stay that became effective when Ken Gardner filed was broad enough to have enjoined FMC’s filing in an attempt to comply with the escape statute.

Section 362(a) stays an IRS sale of property seized before bankruptcy when the debtor retains title, and also bars the sale as an act to collect a prepetition claim even if the seizure divested the debtor of title.

United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (In Re Whiting Pools, Inc.) · filed 1981-04-28(a)(5), (a)(6)

Therefore, paragraph 5 clearly applies in this case. Furthermore, even if the seizure had divested the debtor of title to the property, paragraph 6 would prevent the Service from unilaterally exercising its right to sell the property since such a sale would constitute an act to collect a claim against the debtor.

Section 362 automatically stays IRS collection of taxes owed by a debtor after it files a Chapter 11 petition.

Matter of Left Guard of Madison, Inc. · filed 1981-05-08

Once the Chapter 11 petitions were filed, of which the Internal Revenue Service has admitted it had actual notice the afternoon of the filing, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 prevented the Internal Revenue Service from acting to collect any taxes owed by the Madison, Janesville, and Eau Claire restaurants.

Section 362(a) takes effect immediately when a bankruptcy petition is filed and bars creditors from instituting garnishment proceedings.

Matter of Batla · filed 1981-06-30(a)

First of all, the Bank and Mr. Bland violated the automatic stay, which is effective immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, by instituting garnishment proceedings.

Section 362(a) requires participants in a pending garnishment to take positive action to stop it after the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Elder v. City of Thomasville (In Re Elder) · filed 1981-07-10(a)

The automatic stay at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is intended to stop the snowballing, and all who have a part in the garnishment must take such positive action as necessary to give effect to the automatic stay.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from withholding a nondebtor daughter’s transcript, even if her debtor mother may feel obliged to pay the debt.

In Re Brown · filed 1981-07-27(a)(6)

However, Converse College is not denying the debtor a copy of her transcript, but rather, Converse College is denying the debtor’s daughter a copy of her transcript. This distinction is sufficient to take the instant case beyond the scope of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362’s automatic stay applies to a utility’s postpetition disconnection of a debtor’s telephone service.

Matter of Sayman's, Inc. · filed 1981-11-13

The conduct of Southwestern Bell in disconnecting the telephone service of the Debtor amounted to a violation of the language and spirit of the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 and 11 U.S.C. § 366.

Section 362(a) stays a postpetition notice under a worthless-check law when the notice demands payment of the underlying debt.

Barnett v. K-Mart (In Re Barnett) · filed 1981-11-19(a)

In accordance with this opinion, notice under K.S.A. § 21-3707 is a civil collection attempt, is stayed by § 362(a) of the Code and of no effect by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.

Section 362(a)(5) bars a creditor from retaining garnished wages after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.

Baum v. United Virginia Bank (In Re Baum) · filed 1981-11-23(a)(5)

The retention of the funds by the bank was, as set forth in § 362(a)(5), “an(y) act to create, perfect or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.”

Section 362(a)(7) does not prohibit adjustments to current Medicare payments made under modified terms of the debtor’s agreement with the payment intermediary.

In Re Berger · filed 1981-12-16(a)(7)

I agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the adjustments of current payments in accordance with the modified terms of the contractual agreement between the debtor and Group Health, Inc. do not violate the provisions of § 362.

Section 362(a)(3) bars a creditor from collecting a prepetition tax debt from the debtor’s general funds after a Chapter 11 filing.

Bulk Transport, Inc. v. United States (In Re Bulk Transport, Inc.) · filed 1981-12-29(a)(3)

The defendant violated the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(3).

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from trying to collect a prepetition claim from a Chapter 13 debtor through postpetition home visits or harassing phone calls.

In Re Gibson · filed 1981-12-31(a)(6)

This Court, in assessing the credibility of the evidence presented to it, finds that Holton TV, with knowledge of the debtors’ Chapter 13 petition, knowingly violated the provisions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code by its numerous attempts, both by personal visits to the Gibson home, and by phone calls, often harassing in nature, to the debtors in an attempt to collect upon its claim outside the provisions of the confirmed Chapter 13 plan.

Section 362(a) prohibits a creditor with knowledge of a Chapter 13 filing from continuing payroll deductions to collect payments and from refusing to return amounts deducted after the filing.

In the Matter of Bray · filed 1982-01-05(a)

Wherefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Coliseo Federal Credit Union, acting with knowledge of the Chapter 13 filing, is in violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and contempt of the orders of this court, for the improper continued payroll deduction and for the collection of the two (2), payments on June 10, 1981 and July 10, 1981 of $126.00 each, and for failure to return such amounts when requested by debtors’ attorney.

Section 362(a)(6) prohibits a creditor with notice of a bankruptcy filing from directing its collection agent to contact the debtor to collect a prepetition debt.

In re Fultz · filed 1982-03-11(a)(6)

Furthermore, we conclude that PGW was in violation of § 362(a)(6) when it authorized or directed CSC, as its collection agency, to contact the debtors for the purpose of collecting the prepetition debt owed to PGW after the debtors had filed a petition under chapter 13 and after PGW had received notice of that filing.

Section 362(a)(3) does not bar a utility from demanding a cash deposit as adequate assurance of payment for continued service under § 366(b).

Hennen v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (In Re Hennen) · filed 1982-02-17(a)(3)

In addition, DP&L’s action is not violative of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Although Plaintiffs’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate includes all their pre- and post-Petition “property,” (11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 1306), 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) grants DP&L the specific right to adequate assurance in the form of a cash deposit before DP&L is required to continue a debtor’s service.

Section 362(a)(1) bars a utility from pursuing a prepetition debt against a Chapter 13 debtor while the automatic stay is in force.

Doane v. Appalachian Power Co. (In Re Doane) · filed 1982-04-26(a)(1)

Second, Section 362 provides an automatic stay on all entities and prohibits “the commencement ... of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor ... to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before commencement of the case” in bankruptcy. ... APCO was thus prohibited from pursuing its claim against the debtors.

Section 362(a)(6) stays an attempt to collect a prepetition debt owed by the debtor even when the creditor seeks payment from property titled to another entity.

Pioneer Valley Indoor Tennis Center, Inc. v. Community Savings Bank (In Re Pioneer Valley Indoor Tennis Center, Inc.) · filed 1982-06-10(a)(6)

It matters not that the Bank seeks to satisfy that debt out of property which stands in the name of an entity other than the debtor, for § 362(a)(6) makes no such distinction.

Section 362(a)(6) does not prohibit a creditor from depositing postpetition payroll deductions into a debtor’s unrestricted share account without applying them to a prepetition loan.

Wybro Federal Credit Union v. Mann (In Re Mann) · filed 1982-08-03(a)(6)

However, the credit union did not apply those payments to its loan; rather, it put those funds into the debtor’s share account. As a result, we determine that the action of the credit union after November 30, 1981, was not an action to collect a prepetition debt in violation of § 362(a)(6). Furthermore, since there was no evidence that the credit union took any other actions to restrict the debt- or’s use of the funds in question, we find that the credit union did not violate any other provisions of the automatic stay.

Section 362(a) prevents a creditor’s postpetition referral of notes and mortgages to counsel from maturing the debtor’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees.

In Re Banks · filed 1982-12-30(a)

Similarly, the “referral” of the notes and mortgages in the cases at bar occurred after petition and thus the automatic stay prevented maturity of the debtors’ obligation for payment of attorney’s fees.

Section 362(b) permits collection of alimony from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite a bankruptcy filing.

Coleman v. Coleman · filed 1983-03-22(b)

Under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a), alimony debts are not discharged in bankruptcy and under 11 U.S.C. 362(b) the filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not stay the collection of alimony from property that is not a part of the bankruptcy estate. The record is devoid of any indication that plaintiff has attached property belonging to the bankruptcy estate in execution of this judgment.

Section 362 stays the IRS from collecting postpetition rents that are property of the bankruptcy estate, even when the IRS levied on the rents before the petition.

In re BAM Partnership · filed 1983-04-29

For the reasons stated in Whiting Pools, Bristol Convalescent Home, and Deb-mar Corp., cases cited supra, the Court concludes that all the post-petition rental payments are property of the estate and thus the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 apply to enjoin the I.R.S. from further collection of the rental payments.

Section 362's automatic stay can bar a former spouse from writing to a state court judge to seek payment of a divorce debt.

Van Hoose v. Van Hoose (In Re Van Hoose) · filed 1983-06-23(a)(6)

Thus, her “act” of writing to the state court judge was apparently done with knowledge of its ramifications and this Court is constrained to find that Defendant acted in the face of the automatic stay.

Section 362(b)(2) allows a spouse or former spouse to collect alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Murray v. Murray (In Re Murray) · filed 1983-07-14(b)(2)

It appears clear that Congress did not intend that a debtor’s spouse or former spouse should be enjoined from attempting to collect alimony, maintenance or support payments from property that is not property of the debtor’s estate.

Section 362 does not automatically stay a suit against the debtor based on a cause of action that arose after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

R & R Services, Inc. v. Mo-Ark Towing Co. · filed 1983-07-25

The record here indicates that plaintiff’s cause of action did not arise until after the Bankruptcy petition had been filed, and during the pendency of the Chapter 11 reorganization case. Therefore, the automatic stay does not operate to prevent this plaintiff from filing suit against this debtor in the appropriate non-Bankruptcy Court, to attempt to recover damages resulting from post-petition activities.

Section 362(a) generally stays actions involving prepetition debts and did not stay an action on a debt incurred after the bankruptcy case began.

In Re Lewis · filed 1983-09-21(a)

The stay provisions are inapplicable to Seneca in this case because the debt arose after the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) stays actions, generally with regard to pre-petition debts.

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property outside the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Combs v. Combs (In Re Combs) · filed 1983-11-14(b)(2)

It is noted that the filing of the petition under the Bankruptcy Code does not operate under § 362(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as a stay of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from any non-estate property.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from sending a postpetition payment demand that could lead to criminal proceedings over a prepetition debt.

In Re Almodovar · filed 1983-12-12(a)(6)

We must thus conclude, that this post-petition letter is violative of section 362(a). The injunction must therefore, be issued barring Coca-Cola Bottling Co. from any post-petition effort to collect and from pursuing criminal proceedings stemming from such letter.

Section 362(a)(6) bars the IRS from withholding a postpetition tax refund to collect a prepetition tax claim when the IRS has no right of setoff.

In Re Burrow · filed 1984-01-25(a)(6)

But on the facts of this case, the freeze code went too far, namely, by attempting to hold the refund for collection in the absence of a right of setoff. Thus, holding the refund for collection was also an act to collect or recover a debt within the meaning of Section 362(a)(6).

Section 362(b)(2) permits collection of support obligations from property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate despite the automatic stay.

Matter of Coleman · filed 1984-01-31(b)(2)

Actions to collect liabilities for support from property which is not property of the estate are not subject to the stay.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from using the threat of withholding future services to collect a prepetition debt.

Olson v. McFarland Clinic, P.C. (In Re Olson) · filed 1984-03-21(a)(6)

In sum, this Court finds that the Defendant’s letter to the Debtors constitutes an act to collect a claim against the Debtors that arose before the commencement of the case and thus violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). ... However, the Defendant’s letter to the Debtors appears motivated by a desire to collect the pre-petition debt under the guise of termination of future services.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a creditor from applying a debtor’s postpetition payment to a prepetition debt as an act to collect that debt.

In Re J. Levitt, Inc. · filed 1984-03-28(a)(6)

Because any such application would violate section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) and since the creditor has not met its burden of proving that the sum in question was a pre-petition debt, we will grant the debtor’s objection to the creditor’s proof of claim which credited the amount received to the debtor’s pre-petition debt, leaving the post-petition debt (hence, a priority claim) still owing.

Section 362(a)(6) bars a supplier from refusing cash sales to a debtor solely to coerce payment of a prepetition debt.

Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In Re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.) · filed 1984-04-25(a)(6)

On the basis of this testimony the Court finds that defendant’s sole animus in refusing to ship goods to debtor for cash was its desire to coerce debtor’s repayment of its prepetition indebtedness and that this act, albeit a passive one, was an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor” in contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362(a)(6) bars sending a debtor a postpetition notice demanding payment of a prepetition claim.

Doughtie v. Stoughton Electric & Water Utilities (In Re Doughtie) · filed 1984-06-18(a)(6)

The documents sent to the debtors by the Utility were, on their face, in violation of the automatic stay: they called for payment, and were thus delivered “to collect ... a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

Section 362 stays an action to collect child support arrearages, and a technical violation may warrant attorney’s fees without other contempt sanctions.

Gray v. Engesser (In Re Gray) · filed 1984-08-17

It is not questioned that Clark County caused the action to collect the child support arrearage to be commenced, thus violating the automatic stay provisions found in § 362. However, in light of the conflicting testimony as to its knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, its caseload and its mistaken belief that it was acting properly, the Court finds that, although in technical violation of the law, no sanctions for contempt will be imposed against Clark County, other than for Gray’s attorney’s fees in defending the contempt action in Juvenile Court and in bringing this action.

Section 362 bars a regulator from forcing a debtor to repay a prepetition customer refund claim through a rate credit.

In Re Jal Gas Co. · filed 1984-11-25(a)(6)

The PSC is also attempting to preempt the United States Bankruptcy Code by forcing Jal Gas Company to pay a prepetition debt in a manner preferential to all of the other pre-petition creditors of Jal Gas Company. This is expressly forbidden by the Code and thus the Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of the State of New Mexico are in violation of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Section 362(a)(6) does not stay cancellation of an insurance policy when the cancellation is not an act to collect a prepetition debt.

Bogey's Barn, Ltd. v. Indiana Insurance (In Re Bogey's Barn, Ltd.) · filed 1985-02-12(a)(6)

This is not a situation where the cancellation is an act to collect a pre-petition debt owed to the insurer, which would be stayed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). Nothing is owed to this insurer.

Section 362(a)(1) stays claims against a debtor arising from prepetition facts or relationships, including contingent indemnity and contribution claims.

Baldwin-United Corp. v. Paine Webber Group, Inc. (In Re Baldwin-United Corp.) · filed 1985-10-22(a)(1)

Thus, the clear and unambiguous language of § 362 requires that a set of facts that has come about pre-petition creating a legal relationship is a claim that must be stayed unless it is expressly excepted in § 362(b).

Section 362(a) stays actions against the debtor, but does not protect the debtor’s officers or shareholders from collection actions against them.

In Re Idaho Agriquipment, Inc. · filed 1985-11-06(a)

Section 362, Title 11, U.S.Code, stays actions against the debtor, not officers or shareholders of the debtor.