11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. A payment used to settle a property dispute does not qualify merely because it may benefit the parties’ child.

Clark v. Clark (In re Clark) · filed 2017-09-30(14A)

An obligation qualifies as a DSO if it is (1) owed to a spouse or child of a spouse, (2) “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,” (3) established by a divorce decree before a debtor spouse petitioned for relief under Chapter 13, and (4) “not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, unless that obligation is assigned voluntarily by the spouse, [or] child of the debtor...” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A); In re Hardesty, 553 B.R. at 90. ... Ms. Clark is correct that the first, third and fourth elements the DSO definition are satisfied. The extant question is whether the Parties intended to create an obligation in the nature of “alimony, maintenance, or support” at the time of their divorce. ... Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the remainder of the $40,000 obligation is NOT A DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A)(B) requires an attorney fee award to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation; the parties’ designation alone is insufficient.

Mosely v. Mosely (In re Mosely) · filed 2017-10-31(14A)(B)

It is, of course, insufficient for these purposes that these amounts were “deemed” to be support, or that the parties agreed that it was support or that it was nondischargeable. The attorneys’ fees must actually constitute support.

Section 101(14A)(B) does not make repayment of overpaid food benefits a domestic support obligation merely because the benefits may have supported the debtor’s children.

Halbert v. Dimas (In re Halbert) · filed 2017-11-16(14A)(B)

Therefore, this court concludes that the debt owed to DHS for reimbursement of the funds it paid to the Debtor is not in the nature of support of the Debtor’s children solely on the basis that the use of the overpaid funds had been limited to the purchase of food and had been disbursed based on a household size calculation that included two minor children. The debt owed to DHS is merely a debt to the government for the return of benefits that should never have been paid to the Debtor at all, and that debt does not automatically retain any supportive nature that the benefits may have had.

Section 101(14A)(B)’s support requirement can cover children’s college expenses when the parties intended the obligation as support and it served that function at divorce.

Chamberlain v. Chamberlain · filed 2018-02-20(14A)(B)

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Stephen’s college expense obligation was “in the nature of support” as required for a domestic support obligation under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(14A)(B) generally excludes debt incurred to support a debtor's grandchild unless the debtor has a legal parental relationship with the child.

In re Muhammad · filed 2018-06-01(14A)(B)

Section 101 enumerates the entities for whom support may be applied: namely, spouses and children. The statute does not include grandchildren. ... There is no evidence a state court has issued an order that designates Muhammad as a de facto parent to her grandchild.

Section 101(14A) excludes a divorce award intended to reimburse a former spouse for dissipated marital property rather than provide support.

In re Dekroon · filed 2018-07-19(14A)

Turning first to the language of the state court order, it is clear that its intent in providing the $21,500 award was not to furnish Melissa support payments but rather to divide marital property.

Section 101(14A) includes fees awarded directly to a former spouse and child for obtaining and defending protection orders when the fees are in the nature of support.

Dumitrache v. New (In re New) · filed 2018-09-04(14A)(A)

The Plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state court judgments for the Fees incurred by the Plaintiffs in seeking and defending the Orders of Protection are in the nature of support pursuant to § 101(14A)(A).

Section 101(14A) includes an attorney’s fee award intended to compensate a spouse for the cost of obtaining the support owed to her.

Michael E. Babineau · filed 2018-12-18(14A)

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Claim is a DSO within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) and is entitled to priority and payment in full pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1) and 1322(a)(2).

Section 101(14A)(C)(i) can treat a prenuptial agreement settling the parties’ property interests as a property settlement agreement for purposes of defining a domestic support obligation.

Schubiner v. Zolman (In re Schubiner) · filed 2018-09-18(14A)(C)(i)

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Shelley's claim is a debt "established ... by reason of applicable provisions of" a "property settlement agreement," within the meaning of the DSO definition, 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) excludes attorneys' fees awarded under a divorce settlement's default clause when they are intended to encourage compliance rather than provide support.

Grinspan v. Grinspan (In re Grinspan) · filed 2019-02-08(14A)

Simply stated, the attorneys' fees awarded to Tomor by reason of plaintiff's noncompliance with his obligations under the Settlement do not come within § 101(14A)'s definition.

Section 101(14A)(B) treats a debt to reimburse a government agency for child care assistance as support when the assistance benefited the debtor's children.

In re Hawk · filed 2019-01-09(14A)(B)

The definition of a DSO set forth in section 101(14A) encompasses a debtor's direct liability to a governmental unit to reimburse an overpayment of benefits paid under a program designed to provide public assistance to or for the benefit of children. Where a debtor's child or children benefitted from such payments, the original supportive nature of the funds is retained so that the liability to reimburse those funds is a debt in the nature of support of such child or children under section 101(14A)(B).

Section 101(14A) treats a marital home awarded in lieu of alimony as a domestic support obligation and can include legal fees incurred to establish alimony when the former spouse remains liable for them.

In re Golan · filed 2019-05-03(14A)

By parsing these definitions, the Court finds that the Final Judgment's award of title to the marital home to Ex-Wife as her past-due and future alimony constitutes a domestic support obligation. ... Because Ex-Wife retained her marital counsel, Ex-Wife continues to be liable for the legal fees due her counsel if Debtor fails to pay such fees. As a result, the Court concludes that the legal fees due Ex-Wife's counsel constitute an additional domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) includes interest accruing under applicable nonbankruptcy law in a domestic support obligation, including interest accruing after the bankruptcy petition.

In re Moore-Mckinney · filed 2019-05-09(14A)

Interest, as it "matures" after the petition on a DSO debt, becomes part of the DSO debt itself under § 101(14A) "notwithstanding" any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, post-petition interest on Mr. Moore's DSO claim is allowed and Debtor's plan must provide for the payment of interest accruing pursuant to nonbankruptcy law on his claim.

Attorney’s fees in the state court’s child custody and support judgment qualified as a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

Hurst v. HURST · filed 2019-05-24(14A)

Based on the foregoing, this Court determines the State Court’s Judgment against the Debtor was a DSO under § 101(14A).

A debt to repay government benefits received in error is not a domestic support obligation merely because the benefits were used for support.

Halbert v. Dimas · filed 2019-06-27(14A)(B)

The Debtors do not owe DHS money for support payments; they owe DHS because they received money they were not statuto‐ rily entitled to. Because such a payment is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, we agree with the bank‐ ruptcy court decision that this is merely an overpayment of benefits and not a domestic support obligation.

A bank’s loan used to pay domestic support obligations is not itself a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

North Shore Bank, a Co-Operative Bank v. Bona · filed 2019-11-06(14A)

In examining whether summary judgment would be appropriate under § 523(a)(5), the Court must determine whether the Loan proceeds are a debt (1) incurred in the course of a divorce and (2) owed or recoverable by (i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative or (ii) a governmental unit. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A), 523(a)(5). Facially, the debt at issue does not and could not be deemed non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) can cover an attorney-fee debt that benefits a former spouse even when the debt is payable directly to the former spouse’s attorney.

Cozart v. WILSON · filed 2019-11-13(14A)

The debt at issue has a direct link to one of the payees enumerated in § 523(a)(5), and given that the benefit of the debt flowed to that enumerated payee, the Court cannot find that this debt does not fall within the scope of § 523(a)(5) merely because the debt is payable directly to Mr. Wilson’s ex-wife’s attorney rather that to his ex-wife.

Section 101(14A)(A)(i) excludes debts of a corporate debtor from the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Raymond & Associates, LLC · filed 2019-11-20(14A)(A)(i)

The plain language of 11 U.S.C. §101(14A) (A)(i) dictates that a corporate entity cannot have a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) treats a former spouse’s direct claim for guardian ad litem fees as a domestic support obligation when the fees are in the nature of support, arise from a court order, and the spouse has not assigned the claim.

Jimmie Thad Stuteville · filed 2019-11-27(14A)

In other words, that portion of the Claim in the amount of $10,000 directly owed by the Debtor to Ms. Holcomb under the Supplemental Judgment without the need for Ms. Holcomb to rely on the Assignment qualifies as a DSO because it is an unassigned debt owed to a former spouse for GAL fees in the nature of support resulting from an order of a court of record.

A debt can qualify as a domestic support obligation even if it arose before the bankruptcy petition.

Joanne Doughty v. Douglas · filed 2019-12-17(14A)

When the fees were incurred is irrelevant because the definition of a DSO expressly includes pre-petition debts.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Joseph L LaSpina · filed 2020-01-03(14A)(B)

Accordingly, whether the Award constitutes a domestic support obligation depends on whether the Award is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Section 101(14A) excludes a division of marital assets from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the debt is not in the nature of support.

Yao v. Kao · filed 2020-02-06(14A)

Second, the debt is not a domestic support obligation as described in section 523(a)(5) and defined in section 101(14A).

Domestic support obligations include attorney’s fees incurred to enforce child support or custody rights, but exclude discovery sanctions that do not support the children.

Carpenter v. Amos · filed 2020-02-24(14A)

Attorney’s fees incurred by a party enforcing or defending rights to child support payments or custody are domestic support. ... The sanctions entered against Debtor for failing to comply with discovery requests are not domestic support obligations and, therefore, are dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) treats a debt’s characterization under state law as one factor in deciding whether it is a domestic support obligation.

Sodergren v. Rychlik · filed 2020-03-11(14A)(A)–(B)

But the state-law characterization of the debt is just one factor indicating that the debt is for “alimony, maintenance, or support” of the former spouse for purposes of federal bankruptcy law.

Section 101(14A) treats a divorce-related payment as a domestic support obligation only if it is in the nature of support, as determined by the parties’ intent when they agreed to it.

Quintanilla v. Crews · filed 2020-03-30(14A)(B)

The element at issue herein is whether the equalization payments were in the nature of spousal support. This question is a matter of bankruptcy law, and the intent of the parties when the settlement agreement (here, a consensual Dissolution Judgment) is executed is dispositive.

Guardian ad litem fees for work supporting a debtor’s children can qualify as a domestic support obligation even when payable directly to the guardian ad litem.

Bitner v. Reed · filed 2020-05-05(14A)

Thus, based on the above discussion, this Court finds that §101(14A)(A) and (B) have been met.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation; an assumed divorce debt qualifies only if it is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Brett Elliott Hayes - ABOVE MED · filed 2020-05-21(14A)

An obligation must satisfy the requirements of §101(14A) to be given priority treatment as a domestic support obligation. ... After examining the evidence before it, the Court finds that the debt underlying Claimant's proof of claim is not in the nature of a domestic support obligation and thus, the Claim should be allowed as a nonpriority unsecured claim rather than an unsecured priority claim.

Section 101(14A) covers a divorce judgment debt when its label and other indicia show that it is intended for a former spouse’s support.

Hauk v. Valdivia · filed 2020-05-22(14A)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that under the appropriate analysis based on Sorah, there is no genuine dispute of any material fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, that all of Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff is a support obligation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) treats a divorce decree’s home equity award as a domestic support obligation when the award is intended to support a former spouse.

CARLOS A. DILLON, SR. · filed 2020-07-14(14A)

Defined as to this dispute, a domestic support obligation (“DSO”) is a debt (1) owed to or recoverable by a former spouse; (2) in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, regardless of whether the debt is expressly designated as such; (3) established by the applicable provisions of a divorce decree or other court order before, on, or after the date the bankruptcy case was filed; and (4) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... Accordingly, the $9000 award is in the nature of support.

A debt arising from a divorce judgment can qualify as a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

David L. Valdivia · filed 2020-07-16(14A)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that under the appropriate analysis based on Sorah [v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998)], there is no genuine dispute of any material fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, that all of Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff is a support obligation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) covers a debt to a former spouse that constitutes a support obligation.

Hauk v. Valdivia · filed 2020-07-16(14A)

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that under the appropriate analysis based on Sorah [v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998)], there is no genuine dispute of any material fact, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, that all of Defendant’s debt to Plaintiff is a support obligation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a debt to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Welch v. Welch · filed 2020-07-28(14A)(B)

The Court concludes that neither the parties (at the time they entered into the Contract), the Divorce Court nor the Plenary Court intended Danny's agreement to pay the parties' mortgage to be "in the nature of support", and the Divorce Court's explicit determination that the Contract was outside the scope of the Divorce Action is dispositive. Therefore, the Debt is not a DSO as defined in § 101(14A) and is not excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) excludes a debt that divides marital property rather than providing alimony, maintenance, or support from the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Davidson v. Havard · filed 2020-11-12(14A)

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the debt underlying Davidson’s claim is a property settlement and not a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and thus cannot qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) excludes a property settlement from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the debt is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Ginger Leigh Havard · filed 2020-11-13(14A)

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the debt underlying Davidson’s claim is a property settlement and not a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and thus cannot qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) treats attorney fees tied to child support, custody, or visitation as domestic support obligations when they affect the children’s welfare.

Carpenter v. Amos · filed 2021-02-01(14A)

Upon our de novo review we identify no error in the conclusion that the attorney fees imposed on Amos by the state court are domestic support obligations under the bankruptcy code and are therefore not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) does not treat a debt owed to a debtor’s spouse’s former spouse as the debtor’s domestic support obligation merely because the debtor is married to the person who owes it.

Levandowski v. DiPasquale · filed 2021-03-12(14A)

Here, the bankruptcy court found that the underlying stipulated judgment is not a domestic support obligation of Ms. Levandowski’s. (Doc. 6 at 47.) This ruling is correct as a matter of law because Ms. DiPasquale is not herself a “spouse, former spouse, or child of” Ms. Levandowski. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

A custody litigation fee award can be a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) when the awarding court intended it to support the child.

Morrell v. Stamp · filed 2021-04-08(14A)(B)

Based on my analysis of the Gianakas factors, it follows that Fee Award is a DSO, see 11 U.S.C. §101(14A), and is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation to include a court-ordered debt owed to a former spouse that is in the nature of alimony or support and has not been assigned to a nongovernmental entity.

Valdivia · filed 2021-05-13(14A)

A “domestic support obligation” includes those debts that are (1) owed to a former spouse; (2) are “in the nature of” alimony or support to the former spouse; (3) established by “an order of a court of record”; and (4) “not assigned to a nongovernmental entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

A guardian ad litem is not a legal guardian entitled to receive a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A)(A)(i).

Keith Michael Corson · filed 2021-05-21(14A)(A)(i)

A “legal guardian” or “guardian” is different than a guardian ad litem.

Attorney’s fees and costs awarded to a former spouse in child custody proceedings qualify as a domestic support obligation when they are in the nature of support for the child.

Simpson v. Carter · filed 2021-06-23(14A)

The fees and costs were incurred during proceedings that affected the welfare of the child and, therefore, are in the nature of support for the Defendant’s minor child.

Section 101(14A)'s definition of a domestic support obligation can include counsel fees from a custody dispute when the award functions as support for the children.

BISBING VS. GLENN R. BISBING, III (FM-19-0324-14, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-07-07(14A)

We conclude that the court properly determined the counsel fee award here to be non-dischargeable under Section 5, as it was a domestic support obligation and was "in the nature of support."

Section 101(14A) treats debts owed to a parent for children's medical and college expenses as domestic support obligations.

RASMUSSEN VS. ROBERT W. RASMUSSEN (FM-02-1134-05, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) · filed 2021-07-13(14A)(A)(i), (B)

Further, applicable case law and the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i), (B), supports the finding that the children's medical and college expenses are a domestic support obligation.

A property settlement dividing marital assets is not a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A)(B).

Charles Dallas Hunsucker · filed 2021-08-03(14A)(B)

Applying the factors with the appropriate weight to each, examining the language in the divorce documents, and deferring to the chancery court’s thorough findings, this Court finds that Dallas’s obligation is not a domestic support obligation, but a property settlement.

An attorney fee award may be a domestic support obligation even when it relates to a property settlement; the award’s intended function controls.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 2021-08-30(14A)

The mere fact an attorney fee award is related in some way to a property settlement does not necessarily make the award a component of that property settlement.

Section 101(14A) treats divorce-related attorneys’ fees awarded to a spouse based on financial need as a domestic support obligation when the statute’s other conditions are met.

Campagna Johnson Mady, P.C. v. Kalsi · filed 2021-09-02(14A)

The attorneys’ fees are therefore clearly (A) owed to or recoverable by a spouse,2 (B) are “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support,” (C) ... established before the petition date by an order of a court of record, and (D) not assigned to a governmental entity. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A)(B) does not require proof that a domestic court considered the parties’ finances for attorney’s fees awarded in a custody proceeding to qualify as support.

Sealock v. Portivent, esq. · filed 2021-10-05(14A)(B)

This Court concludes as a matter of law that it is not necessary to show that the domestic court considered the parties’ financial circumstances in awarding fees in a custody proceeding to establish that the award is in the nature of support and, therefore, a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations to include debts in the nature of support owed to a former spouse or children under a court order, if they have not been assigned to a nongovernmental entity.

Kanwaldeep Singh Kalsi · filed 2022-03-03(14A)

The Court finds that the Domestic Support Awards are “domestic support obligations” as defined in section 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code and are excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations to include qualifying child support, maintenance arrears, and support-related insurance awarded in a divorce.

Purewal v. Estate of Kanwaldeep Kalsi · filed 2022-03-03(14A)

The Court finds that the Domestic Support Awards are “domestic support obligations” as defined in section 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code and are excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5).

An obligation to pay a home equity loan can be a domestic support obligation when it was intended to help a former spouse and child remain in the family home.

Erlandson v. Erlandson, II · filed 2022-03-28(14A)

The Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that “there is no evidence” to establish an intent that the HELOC assumption was intended to be a DSO. On the contrary, several factors support finding the obligation to pay the HELOC a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) can cover an agreement labeled as employment when the parties intended its payments to support a former spouse.

Michael Christopher Wibracht · filed 2022-03-31(14A)

In conclusion, the Court finds the Employment Agreement, enforced through the final judgment, is a domestic support obligation. This debt is a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) and entitled to priority status under § 726(a)(1).

Section 101(14A) includes divorce-related attorneys’ fee awards based on a disparity in the parties’ finances within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Esther Elizabeth Collins · filed 2022-07-13(14A)

An award for attorneys’ fees in a divorce proceeding based on a disparity of the parties’ financial circumstances qualifies as a domestic support obligation as defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) and is nondischargable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). ... In considering the evidence presented, the Court finds the Movant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a domestic support obligation against to the Respondent.

Section 101(14A)(B) excludes damages for breaching a divorce stipulation’s indemnification and fee provisions from domestic support obligations when those damages are not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Monassebian v. Monassebian · filed 2022-08-17(14A)(B)

The debt is not a domestic support obligation, as the term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code, because it is not “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support … of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent.” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B). Rather, the debt is for damages awarded to the Plaintiff for the Defendant’s breach of the Stipulation based on the Stipulation’s indemnification and fee-shifting provisions.

Whether a divorce-related debt is a domestic support obligation depends on the parties’ intent, and disputed facts about that intent can prevent summary judgment.

Jeffrey Paul Reid · filed 2022-08-31(14A)

The determination of whether a debt is a DSO is highly factual, there do appear to be disputes of fact that bear on the parties’ intent at the time of the divorce, and facts remain unknown to the Court that could bear on this issue (for example, although the Court knows the amount of the 2015 Tax Obligation paid by Link, neither party has disclosed the total amount of the 2015 Tax Obligation). For these reasons, the Court will not grant summary judgment.

Section 101(14A) requires a debt under a divorce decree to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2022-09-26(14A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “domestic support obligation,” in relevant part, as a debt, including interest, established by a divorce decree and owed to a former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such [] former spouse . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... For these reasons, and regardless of any finding by the state court that the business supported the parties during the marriage, Plaintiff has failed to a state claim that the Business Debt should be excepted from Debtor’s discharge as a domestic support obligation under § 523(a)(5).

A debtor’s conclusive admission that an obligation is a domestic support obligation establishes that it satisfies Section 101(14A)’s definition.

Rannick v. Santos · filed 2022-09-26(14A)

Plaintiff’s DSO definitively satisfies Section 101(14A), and further proceedings under Count 13 are unnecessary under Civil Rule 56(f).

A domestic support obligation includes a support debt established by a court order, including a judgment fixing the amount owed.

Dougherty-Kelsay v. Kelsay · filed 2022-10-17(14A)

And the Code defines a domestic support obligation as “a debt” that is “in the nature of” support and is “established” by a court order. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). Read together, these provisions describe what the circuit court did when it heard testimony, when it resolved Michael and Michelle’s disputes over childcare expenses, and when it entered a judgment fixing the debt Michelle owed as support.

A debt must be established by a qualifying agreement, court order, or governmental determination to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Lowe v. Wibracht · filed 2022-11-08(14A)(C)

The Court first turns to examine § 101(14)(C), requiring that the debt be established by “a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement[,] an order of a court of record[,] or a determination made in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law by a governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C). Conducting a de novo review, the Court finds that the salary claim in the Employment Agreement was not established by an order of a court of record.

Section 101(14A) allows an attorney fee award to qualify as a domestic support obligation even when it is payable directly to the attorney.

Malakatas v. Smikle · filed 2022-12-09(14A)(A)(i)

Thus, here, it is not dispositive whether the obligations of Debtor owed under the Legal Fee Order and Money Judgment is owed to Plaintiff or Goody.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a domestic support obligation in a divorce decree to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Bently v. Phillips · filed 2022-11-07(14A)(B)

In order to be considered a “domestic support obligation,” the obligation in a divorce decree must be in the nature of “alimony, maintenance, or support.”14 The Court was presented no evidence as to the nature of the Navy Federal Debt but notes that most of said debt was incurred after the parties divorced. For those reasons, the Court does not consider § 523(a)(5) applicable in this adversary proceeding.

Section 101(14A) excludes fees a debtor owes her own attorney under their agreement when the debt is not in the nature of support.

Esther Elizabeth Collins · filed 2022-12-20(14A)

The debt owed to Movant thus arises from the contractual attorney-client relationship between Debtor and Movant and is not in the nature of support. The Court finds Movant’s claim fails to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A)’s definition of a domestic support obligation includes attorney fees awarded to a child’s parent for custody litigation when the fees are in the nature of support.

Baxter v. Baxter · filed 2023-01-26(14A)

The issues before the Court are (1) whether the obligation to Father constitutes a “domestic support obligation” under § 523(a)(5), as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) and (2) if not a “domestic support obligation,” is it an obligation nevertheless non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). ... For the reasons stated above, there is no doubt that the attorney fees award was clearly related to child custody issues and constitutes a non-dischargeable “domestic support obligation.”

A support obligation payable to a trust can qualify as owed to a former spouse when the payments are structured for that spouse’s support.

Hundt v. Ventrone · filed 2023-01-31(14A)(A)

Given the language of the PSA and Plaintiff’s acceptance of this repayment in lieu of traditional alimony, the Marital Obligation is structured as support for Plaintiff, and therefore, the underlying obligation is considered owed to or recoverable by Plaintiff.

A support obligation payable to a third party may still be owed to a former spouse when it is structured to support that spouse or their children.

Ventrone v. Hundt · filed 2023-01-31(14A)(A)

Obligations payable to entities other than a debtor’s spouse are nonetheless considered ‘owed’ to a former spouse for the purposes of Section 523(a)(5) where the obligation is structured and designed in the nature of that spouse’s and/or their children’s support for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

A former spouse’s claim must be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to qualify as a domestic support obligation; an unexplained judgment does not establish that character.

Timothy Wayne Tarver · filed 2023-02-13(14A)(B)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tarver’s objection is sufficient to rebut the priority status of Davis’ claim at this juncture. The Third Contempt Order does not contain an itemization or any specific findings to explain whether such award is an obligation “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.”

Section 101(14A) includes attorney fees owed to a child’s parent for custody litigation within the definition of a domestic support obligation when the fees are in the nature of support.

Summer D Baxter · filed 2023-01-06(14A)

For the reasons stated above, there is no doubt that the attorney fees award was clearly related to child custody issues and constitutes a non-dischargeable “domestic support obligation.”

Section 101(14A) excludes an indemnity for a former spouse’s vehicle debt from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the agreement allocates property rather than provides support.

Bailey v. Judzewitsch · filed 2023-03-29(14A)

The second element became satisfied when the Court concluded above that any indemnification for the Explorer debt would not qualify as a domestic support obligation as defined in Sections 101(14A) and 523(a)(5) under the Sixth Circuit test.

Section 101(14A) includes court-ordered support owed to a debtor’s child or that child’s parent within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Marriage of Ruiz CA5 · filed 2023-04-27(14A)

Jacob’s court ordered support payments are a “debt” owed to children of the debtor and such children’s parent, i.e., Bianca and her children. Those support payments are literally support payments, i.e., in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support. Accordingly, the court did not lack jurisdiction to modify the support orders.

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation, regardless of how an order or judgment labels it.

Rita Katherine Luetkenhaus · filed 2023-04-28(14A)(B)

In view of the “without regard to” phrase, whether an order or judgment is a DSO can’t be determined by any particular wording in the order or judgment.

A divorce debt is a domestic support obligation when it is in the nature of support, regardless of how the parties label it.

LOWELL E BASHAM · filed 2023-05-25(14A)(B)

It is therefore the determination of this Court that based upon the evidence presented and testimony of the parties, upon consideration of the relevant Ninth Circuit factors, the Equalization Payment, as evidenced by the Equalization Judgment, is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support” and is therefore a domestic support obligation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) covers attorney’s fees awarded in a child custody proceeding when the fees are in the nature of support.

Smith v. Sanford · filed 2023-06-26(14A)

Therefore, the Court finds that the fees awarded to Defendant were in the nature of support, such that the debt for the fees is a DSO within the meaning of § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) excludes a debt from the definition of a domestic support obligation if it is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

In Re: Levenstein · filed 2023-07-06(14A)

Second, the debt—a credit for marital funds used to pay a criminal judgment against Levenstein—is not in the nature of maintenance, alimony, or support (and thus, is not a domestic support obligation under Section 523(a)(5)).

A debt owed to a former spouse under a divorce decree is a domestic support obligation only if it is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; this division of marital debt did not qualify.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2023-08-10(14A)

A DSO is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A), which provides in part that it is a debt owed to a spouse or former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support…of such spouse” as established by a divorce decree or court order. ... Instead, the Plaintiff’s Claim arises from a division of marital debt and is ineligible for treatment as a priority ... claim under Section 507(a)(1)(A).

Section 101(14A) includes a support debt owed to a debtor’s child or the child’s parent within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Ruiz v. Ruiz · filed 2023-11-30(14A)

Like the California Court of Appeal, we view the “debt” that was the subject of the state-court proceeding as the support obligation that Mr. Ruiz owed to Ms. Ruiz. Accordingly, Mr. Ruiz sought to modify a “debt” (the support obligation) “owed to or recoverable by” a “child of the debtor or such child’s parent” (the Ruizes’ children or Ms. Ruiz). And that “debt” was “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such . . . child of the debtor or such child’s parent.”

Guardian ad litem fees incurred to represent a child in a custody dispute can be a domestic support obligation even when owed directly to the guardian ad litem.

Hagemann v. Durkin · filed 2023-12-20(14A)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment that her claim against Defendant for the guardian ad litem work is a “domestic support obligation” under § 101(14A) and thus is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) includes divorce attorney fee awards as domestic support obligations when they satisfy its requirements for the recipient, nature of support, source of the obligation, and assignment.

Akmal H. Sadikov · filed 2024-03-11(14A)

In general, it must be shown that the attorneys’ fees are (i) clearly owed to or recoverable by a spouse; (ii) are in the nature of “alimony, maintenance, and support”; (iii) established by a pre-petition order of a court of record; and (iv) not assigned to a governmental entity. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). Here, each of these elements is satisfied.

Section 101(14A) includes attorney’s fees incurred to enforce child support when the award serves a support function.

Todd Armstrong · filed 2024-03-18(14A)(B)

This award is in the nature of support, as it directly relates to the children’s welfare and stems from litigation related to enforcing issues involving child support.

Section 101(14A) includes a debt owed to a former spouse in the nature of support when it is established by a court order, even if the order was not entered by a divorce court.

Pitt v. Darrell · filed 2024-04-15(14A)

The Debt did not arise from a court order dissolving the Parties’ marriage, but the statute does not mandate that a debt be decreed by a divorce court to be a domestic support obligation. Indeed, a debt owed to a former spouse in the nature of support established by an order of a court of record would fall within § 101(14A)’s definition.

Section 101(14A) can cover a debt in the nature of support even when the parties waived maintenance.

Richard L. Komprood, Jr. · filed 2024-06-04(14A)

First, simply because the parties waived maintenance doesn’t mean they waived support. The terms maintenance and support are related but distinct. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) (defining a DSO as a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support).

Section 101(14A)(C) does not require a court to determine the existence or amount of a domestic support obligation before the bankruptcy filing.

Stewart v. Warren · filed 2025-03-04(14A)(C)

Thus, the statute does not support any requirement that a judicial determination must be made regarding the existence of the debt, or the amount, before the filing of the bankruptcy case.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a divorce debt to be in the nature of support; when a divorce court orders the payment after a contested trial, the inquiry considers that court’s intent and the payment’s substance.

Lana Kay Paggen · filed 2025-03-11(14A)(B)

Since there was no definitive separation agreement between the Debtor and Mr. Sherbon, when assessing intent under the Taylor, 737 F.3d 670, “dual inquiry” approach, the Court must assess the intent of the Divorce Court rather than the intent of the Debtor and Mr. Sherbon.

Section 101(14A) treats attorney fees awarded to a spouse in a divorce based on the spouses’ relative financial means as a domestic support obligation.

William Curtis Wood · filed 2025-05-13(14A)

Here, the state court required the Debtor to pay $75,000 in attorneys’ fees “in connection with,” id. at 371, the Debtor’s divorce proceeding based on the court’s conclusion that the Debtor is “the more-monied spouse,” July 29, 2024 State Court Order. Therefore, the payment obligation is a domestic support obligation under the Bankruptcy Code.

A divorce decree debt can qualify as a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) when it is owed to a former spouse and is in the nature of support, regardless of its property division label.

Simmons v. Simmons · filed 2025-06-09(14A)

Plaintiff, Julie Simmons, has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the unpaid balance of $117,838.73 of the Owelty Note dated November 19, 2019, in the original principal amount of $290,000.00 made by Defendant, Mark Edward Simmons, as Maker, to Plaintiff, as Payee, constitutes a domestic support obligation as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) includes a divorce judgment’s child-support order in the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Nathan Huiras · filed 2025-07-03(14A)

At the conclusion of that hearing, the court found, “[b]ased on the debtor’s testimony and the other evidence presented”, that Nathan “has not satisfied the confirmation requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(8)” because he is not current on post-petition child-support payments required by the final divorce judgment, which is a “domestic support obligation” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. §101(14A).

Section 101(14A) includes a divorce attorney’s fee award as a domestic support obligation when it supports a spouse, even if the award is payable directly to the attorney.

Abramson v. Wilson · filed 2025-07-08(14A)

In view of the State Court’s findings and the legal authority under which it entered the Fee Order, it is clear that the award of attorney’s fees to Abramson is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

A debt can be a domestic support obligation when it is payable directly to a former spouse’s lawyer but is substantively owed to the former spouse.

Fabrizio Law Firm, c/o Alexandra L. Condon v. Donnelly · filed 2025-07-18(14A)

The term “domestic support obligation” is defined under the Code as a debt “owed to or recoverable by … a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or a governmental unit.” 11 U.S.C. § 101 (14A)(emphasis added). ... This Court finds Debtor’s argument unavailing. ... In sum, although the Fee Award is payable to Fabrizio, it is an obligation the Debtor owes to his former spouse.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; an equitable distribution obligation does not qualify.

Larry Christopher Sprecher · filed 2025-09-19(14A)

Based on the evidence presented at the August Hearing, the Court finds upon consideration of the language of the Divorce Agreement, the financial circumstances of the parties at the time they executed the Divorce Agreement, and the function of the Divorce Agreement Obligation that the parties intended the Divorce Agreement Obligation to serve as equitable distribution. The Court therefore concludes that the Kirklin Debt does not qualify as a priority claim under § 507(a)(1) and that § 523(a)(5) cannot support a finding of nondischargeability.

A divorce debt intended as equitable distribution rather than support is not a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

Kirklin v. Sprecher · filed 2025-09-19(14A)

Based on the evidence presented at the August Hearing, the Court finds upon consideration of the language of the Divorce Agreement, the financial circumstances of the parties at the time they executed the Divorce Agreement, and the function of the Divorce Agreement Obligation that the parties intended the Divorce Agreement Obligation to serve as equitable distribution. The Court therefore concludes that the Kirklin Debt does not qualify as a priority claim under § 507(a)(1) and that § 523(a)(5) cannot support a finding of nondischargeability.

Section 101(14A) includes attorney’s fees awarded for enforcing child support obligations as domestic support obligations, even when the fees are payable to the attorney.

Timothy Bagley · filed 2025-10-29(14A)

The Family Court was correct in determining that the $12,870.00 fee award to Ms. Grady is indeed a DSO within the parameters of § 101(14A)(A) and (B). Requiring Mr. Bagley to pay for the attorney fees Ms. Crosson incurred in pursuit of the court-ordered Support Obligations is “in the nature of support” of their minor child.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations by their support function, regardless of whether the debt is expressly labeled as support.

Garry Wright · filed 2025-10-29(14A)

“Domestic support obligation” is a defined term in the Bankruptcy Code that covers all obligations in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent without regard to whether the debt is expressly so designated. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... Finally, with respect to the specific matters before it, the Court finds that considering the overdue Schedule A, Schedule B, and possibly Schedule C expenses, there is no doubt that the Debtor owes Ms. Wright and his children at least $55,000 of domestic support.

Section 101(14A) includes a former spouse’s right to life and health insurance, and compensation for its loss, as a domestic support obligation when the coverage is in the nature of support.

In re De St. Germain · filed 2025-11-20(14A)

This Court finds that the health and life insurance coverage, although not termed “alimony” is nonetheless in the “nature of support”. ... Analysis of the relevant Benson Factors supports finding that the Judgment constitutes a domestic support obligation.

Whether a divorce award is in the nature of support depends on more than the state court’s terminology.

Steven K. Bailey · filed 2026-02-02(14A)(B)

The bankruptcy court’s initial decision correctly recognized that the determination of whether an award in a divorce decree is in the nature of support is not solely dependent on the terminology used by the state court.

Section 101(14A) requires an obligation to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation; a state court’s support label does not control.

Kenneth Brewster · filed 2026-05-05(14A)

Upon consideration of the record and the factors set forth in Jn re Gianakas, the Court finds that the obligation underlying Proof of Claim No. 8 is not a domestic support obligation within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). Rather, it constitutes an allocation of marital debt arising from the Parties’ divorce.

A payment obligation in a divorce decree qualifies as a domestic support obligation only if it is in the nature of support; an obligation that is part of a property settlement does not qualify.

Stewart · filed 2026-05-06(14A)

The Code defines “domestic support obligation” or “DSO” as a debt that is “owed to or recoverable” by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor; that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such spouse, former spouse, or child . . . without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated”; and that arose before, on, or after the order for relief by reason of a “separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... The label assigned by the parties in their settlement agreement, while not necessarily dispositive, does indicate the 2013 Ford truck payment was part of ... a property settlement, not support.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation by the nature of the debt; a divorce order’s label is relevant but does not decide whether the debt qualifies.

Springer · filed 2026-05-27(14A)

Although courts look beyond the label to examine whether a debt is a domestic support obligation, the language and substance of the Divorce Order are factors courts consider in determining whether a debt is a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, regardless of its label.

Traci Eileen Hoult · filed 2026-06-12(14A)(B)

Under the three Trentadue factors, I find that the state court did not intend to impose an obligation in the nature of maintenance, alimony, or support in ordering Hoult to repay Hefner. Instead, it intended to provide Hefner with a collectible judgment to compensate for Hoult’s conversion of his benefits. The debt therefore is not a DSO.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations to include child and spousal support claims and interest on those debts.

Burnett v. Burnett (In Re Burnett) · filed 2011-07-20(14A)

Ms. Burnett's claims for child and spousal support, as well as interest thereon, are classified under the Bankruptcy Code as "domestic support obligations." See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (defining "domestic support obligation").

Section 101(14A) covers domestic support obligations regardless of whether they are established before, on, or after the bankruptcy order for relief.

In re Cohen · filed 2015-10-05(14A)

When read together with Section 101, the Support Exception of Section 362(b) explicitly excepts from the automatic stay actions taken to establish or modify orders for domestic support obligations without regard to timing or finality of the order or judgment.

Section 101(14A) does not treat an award for support during unmarried cohabitation as a domestic support obligation.

Harshaw v. Harshaw · filed 2022-02-23(14A)

The parties stipulated in the bankruptcy court that the arbitration award was not a domestic support obligation for purposes of § 523(a)(5), and for good reason; as a non‐spouse, Anne does not meet the statutory requirements under the facts identified by the arbitrator. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (defining “domestic support obligation” for purposes of § 523(a)(5)).

A business that offers its services only to referring physicians does not offer them to the general public and is not a health care business under this definition.

In Re 7-Hills Radiology, LLC. · filed 2006-08-31(27A)(A)

7-Hills does not offer anything to the general public. Instead, it offers its services and facilities to referring physicians only. This limitation of its business to referring physicians takes it out of the definition of health care business.

Section 101(27A) does not classify a business that has stopped treating patients as a health care business.

In Re Banes · filed 2006-11-16(27A)

It does not appear, therefore, that Congress intended for § 101(27A) to apply to health care businesses that were not continuing to treat patients during the pendency of their bankruptcy cases.

Section 101(27A)(A) requires a health care business to be primarily engaged in offering facilities and services to the general public; providing administrative support to physicians with ancillary laboratory services does not qualify.

In Re Medical Associates of Pinellas, L.L.C. · filed 2007-01-03(27A)(A)

Accordingly, it is clear that the Debtor was not primarily engaged in offering facilities and services to the general public and does not satisfy the second prong of the test for a “health care business.”

Section 101(27A) defines a public health care district that offers hospital and skilled nursing services to the general public as a health care business.

In Re Valley Health System · filed 2008-01-11(27A)

Neither party disputes the fact that the District meets the definition of a "health care business" under § 101(27A). The District is a public entity. It is engaged primarily in offering to the general public facilities and services, which include services at three hospitals and a skilled nursing facility. The District's facilities and services are offered to the public for the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or disease, and the District's facilities and services are offered to the public for surgical care, drug treatment, psychiatric care, or obstetric care.

Section 101(27A) defines a clinic offering the public diagnosis and treatment of physical injury, deformity, or disease through injections as a health care business.

In Re Starmark Clinics, LP · filed 2008-04-04(27A)

The court concludes that Debtor is a health care business within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(27A).

Section 101(27A) includes a physician-owned cancer treatment practice in the definition of a health care business.

In Re North Shore Hematology-Oncology Associates, P.C., Debtor · filed 2008-12-11(27A)

Based on the Bankruptcy Code’s definition and the business conducted by Debtor, this Court finds that Debtor is a health care business.

Section 101(27A) includes a licensed continuing care facility that provides residential and medical services within its definition of a health care business.

In Re Plaza De Retiro, Inc. · filed 2009-08-13(27A)

The Debtor has a Home Health Care License and is licensed as a Skilled Nursing Facility. Debtor is a “health care business” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(27A).

Section 101(27A)(B) includes general and specialized hospitals in the definition of a health care business.

Thomas Health System, Inc. and THS Physician Partners, Inc. · filed 2020-04-06(27A)(B)

The term “health care business” includes “any general or specialized hospital . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(27A)(B). ... First, it is clear the Debtors are a health care business for purposes of § 333(a)(1).

Section 101(27A) includes an outpatient dental practice that performs surgical treatment such as root canals within the definition of a health care business; inpatient services are not required.

Sameh H. Aknouk, Dental Services, P.C. · filed 2023-03-03(27A)

Because the Debtor meets all the required elements of the Pinellas test and because a plain reading of section 101(27A) indicates there is no inpatient services requirement, the Debtor here qualifies as a health care business.

Section 101(27A)(A) includes outpatient diagnostic imaging centers whose services are used for diagnosis or treatment in the listed areas of clinical care; inpatient services are not required.

In re Unique Third Avene LLC · filed 2026-01-08(27A)(A)

Outpatient radiology and imaging centers such as the Debtors’ facilities plainly qualify as institutions within the meaning of § 101(27A)(A).

Section 101(13A) includes a mobile home in the definition of a debtor’s principal residence regardless of its attachment to real property.

In Re Shepherd · filed 2006-11-17(13A)

Section 101(13A) was enacted to extend application of the anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2) beyond its “real property” limitation to include “residential structure[s]” such as condominiums, cooperatives, mobile homes, or trailers. Whether the creditor does nor does not hold a security interest in the real property upon which the structure might be located is immaterial.

Section 101(13A) includes a mobile home in the definition of a debtor’s principal residence even if it is not attached to the land, extending protection against modification when the creditor has perfected liens on both the home and the land.

In Re Davis · filed 2007-05-24(13A)

Summarily stated, we agree with the In re Shepherd decision that § 101(13A) and § 1322(b)(2) can not be reconciled, that it is appropriate to consider the legislative history of this Code change, and that the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to broaden the scope of § 1322(b)(2) by adding the new definition in § lORlSA). ... In the present case, because Green Tree has a perfected lien on both the real property and the mobile home, we conclude that Green Tree has a claim secured only in real property that is the Debtors’ principal residence, and therefore, that it is protected by the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2).

Section 101(13A) includes manufactured homes in the definition of a debtor’s principal residence, but that definition does not extend § 1322(b)(2)’s antimodification protection to a home treated as personal property under state law.

In Re Coleman · filed 2007-08-02(13A)

I further agree with the In re Herrin court that § 101(13A) and § 1322(b)(2) can be read in a manner that gives meaning to every word in both statutes. ... If the manufactured or mobile home is considered to be personal property under applicable state law, the antimodification provision would not apply.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor’s principal residence to include a mobile home even if it is personal property, but does not remove the separate real property requirement in Section 1322(b)(2).

Moss v. GreenTree-Al, LLC · filed 2007-09-24(13A)

Imposing the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” on Section 1322(b)(2) results only in the unstartling proposition that property can be a debtor’s principal residence even if it is personalty, but it cannot be subject to the no-modification provision unless it is realty.

Section 101(13A) includes manufactured homes in the definition of a debtor’s principal residence, but does not remove § 1322(b)(2)’s separate real-property requirement.

In Re Oliveira · filed 2007-10-12(13A)

The fact that various types of residential structures may now constitute a debtor’s principal residence under the broad definition supplied by § 101(13A) does not change the unambiguous statutory requirement imposed by § 1322(b)(2) that a claim must be secured by an interest in real property in order to qualify for the anti-modification protection.

Section 101(13A)(A) defines a debtor’s principal residence without requiring attachment to real property, but does not extend Chapter 13 anti-modification protection to personal property.

Shepherd v. EMC Mortgage Corp. (In Re Shepherd) · filed 2008-02-06(13A)(A)

This court concludes that § 101(13A)(A), though applicable to § 1322(b), does not alter the requirement that the property in question be real property in order for the anti-modification provision to apply.

Section 101(13A)(B) includes manufactured and mobile homes in the definition of a debtor’s principal residence but leaves their classification as real or personal property to state law.

Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Coleman (In Re Coleman) · filed 2008-08-25(13A)(B)

The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(B) includes manufactured and mobile homes, but is silent as to whether manufactured and mobile homes are real or personal property. Therefore, we look to the applicable state law to determine whether the debtors’ property is real or personal.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor’s principal residence independently of whether the structure is real property.

Ennis v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In Re Ennis) · filed 2009-02-25(13A)

Not only does the "debtor’s principal residence" definition avoid defining "real property," but the definition also makes clear that whether a structure is a principal residence is independent of whether it might be real property.

Section 101(13A) defines “debtor’s principal residence” throughout the Bankruptcy Code, but a mobile home must still be real property to qualify for § 1322(b)(2)’s protection against modification.

Reinhardt v. Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance, Inc. · filed 2009-04-29(13A)

The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in § 101(13A) applies to the entire Code, and the definition contains no language that exclusively limits its application to the anti-modification context.

Section 101(13A) defines a debtor’s principal residence to include a mobile home regardless of whether it is attached to land, but does not make the home real property for purposes of § 1322(b)(2).

Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance v. Reinhardt · filed 2009-04-29(13A)

The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in § 101(13A) applies to the entire Code, and the definition contains no language that exclusively limits its application to the anti-modification context. Thus, the extra limitation that the “real property” requirement imposes on the anti-modification provision does not create an internal contradiction; it simply limits the new definition’s immediate applicability in states like Ohio, or until Congress finds other statutory uses for the definition.

Section 101 does not define real property, so state law determines whether a manufactured home is real property.

Elaine M. Mills · filed 2019-05-31

The Code does not, however, provide a definition of the key phrase in this provision: real property. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. In order to assess whether and when a manufactured home qualifies as real property, the court must look instead to state law.

Section 101(21) defines farming operation broadly, but leasing farmland without bearing the risks of farming does not make the landowner a farmer.

In Re Gibson · filed 2006-11-27(21)

While the use of the word “includes” indicates that section 101(21) is not meant to be an exhaustive definitional list, to be considered a farmer a debtor must be engaged in an activity that subjects the debt- or to the risks traditionally associated with farming.

Section 101(21)’s open-ended definition of “farming operation” includes both raising hogs from farrow to finish and custom hog feeding.

In Re Knudsen · filed 2008-06-12(21)

Thus, as a general matter, “the debtor’s farming operation” is broad enough to encompass both a farrow-to-finish hog operation, the Knudsens’ original operation in and prior to 2004, and a custom hog-feeding operation, the Knud-sens’ reorganized operation, as both constitute “raising of ... livestock.”

Section 101(21)'s definition of a farming operation includes raising livestock, including hog farming.

Knudsen v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2009-09-16(21)

To understand the meaning of "farming operation," we look to 11 U.S.C. § 101(21). ... Here, the Knudsens engaged in a "farming operation," as they have operated a hog farm since the early 1990s.

A nursery that grows and cultivates plants for sale can qualify as a farming operation under the totality of the circumstances.

In Re Teolis · filed 2009-10-26(21)

Based upon the totality of the circumstances present in this case, the Debtors’ business constitutes a “farming operation” for the purposes of Chapter 12.

Section 101(18) can include a debtor who temporarily works off the farm after a forced displacement but intends to continue farming.

In re Ellis · filed 2012-07-03(18)

Debtor’s temporal interlude of working off farm arising from a forced displacement does not supplant her ongoing intention to continue farming to which she testified, nor should it foreclose under the circumstances presented her access to pursue a chapter 12 proceeding.

Section 101(21) requires a farming operation to involve the debtor’s own farming activity; work related to another’s farm does not qualify.

In re Malden Brook Farms, LLC · filed 2012-07-20(21)

Another key factor is that the activity must be related to the debtor’s farming activity. A debtor’s activity, even if typically considered farming, is not a farming operation within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code if it is related to the farming business of another.

Section 101(18)(A) can include a debtor who has liquidated most farm assets but remains involved in farming and intends to resume operations.

David L. Mongeau and Jennifer L. Mongeau · filed 2021-10-22(18)(A)

The Court rejects the contention that the fact Debtors undertook an orderly liquidation process prepetition compels the conclusion that they are no longer “engaged in a farming operation.” Shifts in farming, even dramatic ones, are anticipated by the Code.

Section 101(21) does not include horse boarding, breeding a stallion, horse training, horse appraisal, and seasonal riding instruction as a farming operation when those activities provide services rather than produce crops or livestock.

Barbara Giordano-Leonaggeo · filed 2023-05-24(21)

Here, Debtor boards horses, breeds her stallion, trains horses, appraises other people’s horses, and provides seasonal instruction. None of these activities are similar to activities required to produce crops or livestock. The Debtor is largely providing a service similar to those in the Cluck and McKillips cases.

Section 101(34) gives “insured credit union” the meaning assigned by the Federal Credit Union Act.

Cago, Inc. v. Slade (In Re Slade) · filed 2012-03-15(34)

Bankruptcy Code § 101(34) states that the term “insured credit union” has the meaning given it in section 101(7) of the Federal Credit Union Act (the “FCÚA”). ... CAGO does not claim to be chartered as a credit union under state or federal law.

Section 101(22)(A) defines a financial institution to include a commercial bank acting as a customer’s agent or custodian in connection with a securities contract.

Brandt Ex Rel. the Estates of Plassein International Corp. v. B.A. Capital Co. (In Re Plassein International Corp.) · filed 2007-04-20(22)(A)

The term “financial institution” is defined under the Bankruptcy Code as “a Federal Reserve bank or an entity that is a commercial or savings bank ... when any such Federal Reserve bank ... or entity is acting as agent or custodian for a customer ... in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A). This requirement is satisfied when a leveraged buyout payment is made by wire transfer. ... Here, there is no dispute that the payments to the Shareholders were made by Fleet Bank, a financial institution, to other financial institutions in order to settle securities transactions, namely, Packaging’s purchase of stock of the Target Companies.

Section 101(22)(A) includes a commercial bank within the definition of a financial institution.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Verizon Communications Inc. · filed 2012-09-14(22)(A)

Second, Mellon Bank is a financial institution within the meaning of Section 101(22)(A).

Section 101(22) includes commercial and savings banks within its definition of a financial institution.

AP Services LLP v. Silva · filed 2012-11-07(22)

The statute defines a financial institution as, inter alia, “a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, [or] savings and loan association ....”... Defendants argue that the transactions are protected by the safe harbor because the settlement payments were made to the Silvas’ banks. Defendants are correct.

Section 101(22)(A) defines a financial institution to include a commercial bank such as Wells Fargo Bank.

Rushton v. Bevan · filed 2014-01-23(22)(A)

These payments were made both by, and to, at least one financial institution under 11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A)— Wells Fargo Bank. Because the payments were settlement payments, made by or to a financial institution, they fall within the safe harbor of § 546(e).

Section 101(22)(A) includes commercial banks in the definition of a financial institution.

Krol v. Key Bank National Ass'n (In re MCK Millennium Centre Parking, LLC) · filed 2015-04-30(22)(A)

Section 101(22)(A) clearly states that a commercial bank is a financial institution. ... Applying the text as written, the Court finds that the Transfers were made by and to a financial institution.

Section 101(22)(A) uses the ordinary meaning of “customer” rather than limiting the term to Section 741’s specialized definition.

In Re: Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation · filed 2019-12-19(22)(A)

Although Section 741 of the Code provides a specialized definition of “customer” for certain purposes, see 11 U.S.C. § 741(2), the relevant section for these purposes, Section 101(22), plainly states that its definition of “customer” is not limited by Section 741’s definition, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(22)(A) (defining “financial institution” to include certain entities when such entities are “acting as agent . . . for a customer (whether or not a ‘customer,’ as defined in section 741)”).

Section 101(22)(A) includes a bank’s customer as a financial institution when the bank acts as the customer’s custodian in connection with a securities contract.

Kelley v. Safe Harbor Managed Account 101, Ltd. · filed 2020-10-06(22)(A)

Section 101(22) of the Code defines “financial institution” to include “an entity that is a commercial or savings bank” and when a bank “is acting as agent or custodian for a customer . . . in connection with a securities contract” the customer also qualifies as a “financial institution.” ... It is undisputed that Wells Fargo (1) is a commercial bank and (2) was acting as custodian for Arrowhead, its customer. Accordingly, Arrowhead is a “financial institution” under § 546(e).

Section 101(22)(A) includes banks in the definition of “financial institution.”

SunEdison Litigation Trust v. Seller Note, LLC · filed 2020-11-02(22)(A)

Accordingly, the January 2015 Transfer was made to Wilmington Trust, a financial institution, in connection with the 2014 PSA, a securities contract.

Section 101(22)(A) treats a bank’s customer as a financial institution when the bank acts as the customer’s agent in connection with a securities contract; “customer” is not limited to the definition in section 741(2).

Fairfield Sentry Limited (In Liquidation) v. Amsterdam · filed 2020-12-14(22)(A)

Under the definition of “financial institution,” quoted supra, a customer of a financial institution such as a bank is also deemed to be a financial institution if the bank acts as the customer’s agent in connection with a securities contract. Bankruptcy Code § 741(2) defines the term “customer” for use in stockbroker liquidations under subchapter III of chapter 7, but Bankruptcy Code § 101(22)(A) specifies that the term “customer” is not limited to section 741(2)’s definition when determining whether an entity is a financial institution.

Section 101(22) includes a bank’s customer as a financial institution when the bank acts as the customer’s agent in connection with a securities contract.

In Re: Boston Generating, LLC · filed 2021-09-13(22)

BostonGen is a financial institution within the meaning of Section 101(22).

A bank customer qualifies as a financial institution for a transfer only when the bank acts as the customer's agent for that transfer in connection with a securities contract.

In Re: Nine West LBO SEC. Litig. · filed 2023-11-27(22)(A)

To satisfy that link, the plain language of § 101(22)(A) indicates that courts must look to each transfer and determine "when" a bank "is acting as agent" for its customer for a transfer, assuming, of course, the transfer is made in connection with a securities contract.

A debtor qualifies as a financial institution under Section 101(22)(A) when a bank acts as its agent in connection with a securities contract.

In Re: Boston Generating, LLC · filed 2024-09-19(22)(A)

Second, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that BosGen and EBG each constitute a “financial institution” under Section 101(22)(A). ... Under these facts, BONY indisputably acted as an agent for BosGen and EBG in connection with their Tender Offer.

Section 101(47) covers contracts to sell and repurchase mortgage loans as repurchase agreements, but excludes severable mortgage loan servicing rights.

Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp. (In Re American Home Mortgage, Inc.) · filed 2008-01-04(47)

The Court finds that, under the plain meaning of section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code, the contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage loans in this case is a repurchase agreement under the statute and the safe harbor provisions of sections 555 and 559 of the Bankruptcy Code are applicable. The Court further finds, however, that the servicing of mortgage loans is not protected under the safe harbor provisions because: (i) under applicable law, the portion of the contract providing for the servicing of the mortgage loans is severable from the portion of the contract providing for the sale and repurchase of mortgage loans; and (ii) the portion of the contract for servicing mortgage loans is neither a “repurchase agreement” nor a “securities contract” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(47)(A)(v) treats credit enhancements as repurchase agreements, subject to a damages limit measured under § 562; that limit does not apply when the repo participant seeks no damages.

Miller v. Bear Stearns & Co. (In re Homebanc Mortg. Corp.) · filed 2018-08-14(47)(A)(v)

As to the Trustee's first argument, the extent to which credit enhancements qualify as repurchase agreements entitled to safe-harbor protection is "not to exceed the damages ... measured in accordance with section 562." 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(v). ... Thus, I agree with the Bankruptcy Court's holding, at summary judgment, that § 562 does not apply because Bear did not seek damages.

For a married individual debtor sharing a household with a nonfiling spouse, the spouse’s income is included in the means test calculation.

In Re Stocker · filed 2008-05-14(39A)

The non-filing spouse’s income is included in the means test calculation, pursuant to Line 2c of Form 22A and 11 U.S.C. Section 101(39A), where the debtor filed an individual bankruptcy case, is married, and the debtor and spouse maintain a joint household.

Section 101(39A) defines median family income using Census Bureau figures for the debtor’s state and household size.

In re Banks · filed 2016-02-09(39A)

Median family income is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(39A) and reported by the Bureau of the Census in the most recent year. ... Debtors listed their household size as three and, based on their current monthly income compared to the median family income for Illinois and family size, he is a below median debtor.

Section 101(18)(A) counts income passed through from a debtor’s farming partnerships toward the farm income required for Chapter 12 eligibility.

In re Perkins · filed 2016-12-22(18)(A)

Debtor had to personally pay income tax for this pass through income and it would be inequitable to not allow this income to be included for eligibility requirements. Debtor’s farm income meets the eligibility requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 101(18).

Sections 101(5) and (12) allow a loan that creates a right to repayment to support a debt claim, but an equity contribution does not.

Patel v. Shubh Hotels, LLC (In re Shubh Hotels Pittsburgh LLC) · filed 2012-07-24(5), (12)

If the Advances are characterized as “loans” giving rise to a debt, Shubh Hotels would have a right to repayment of debt, thereby supporting its Claim. ... When using these factors as a framework for evaluating the instant matter, it is clear that the Advances are properly characterized as equity contributions and not loans.

Section 101’s definitions of claim, debt, equity security, and equity security holder support a bankruptcy court’s authority to classify purported debt as equity based on its substance.

Menotte v. NLC Holding Corp. (In Re First NLC Financial Services, LLC) · filed 2008-10-01

Textual support for recharacteri-zation may be found in §§ 105(a) and 726 of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as in § 101’s definitions of “claim”, “equity security”, “equity security holder”, and “debt”.

Property commonly conveyed with a debtor’s principal residence can include an adjoining lot used for the home’s sole driveway, even if the lot could be developed separately.

Rose v. US Bank N.A. · filed 2023-12-12(27B)(A)

The frequency that a homeowner purchases two lots, one of which can be developed for separate sale, is irrelevant to determining whether Lot 14 constitutes property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area where Lot 19 is located.

Section 101’s definitions of “debtor’s principal residence” and “incidental property” do not resolve whether a rental unit in a multi-unit dwelling is part of the debtor’s principal residence.

In Re PIcchi · filed 2011-04-11(13A), (27B)

Thus we are not inclined to agree that the definitions of "debtor's principal residence" and "incidental property" are clear and unambiguous. More importantly, we reject the suggestion that these definitions, when combined and inserted into § 1322(b)(2), cure the ambiguity in the anti-modification clause.

Section 101 includes rents as incidental property within a debtor’s principal residence.

Didlake v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. (In Re Didlake) · filed 2011-06-29(13A), (27B)

The Court finds that under §§ 101(13A) and 101(27B) the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” includes rents.