11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101’s definitions treat a consumer debtor as an assisted person and the debtor’s attorney as a debt relief agency in this context.

Brianna Latrese Pratt · filed 2024-03-29(3), (12A)

The legislation regulates certain interactions between an “assisted person” and a “debt relief agency,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), (12A); Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232-33. In the context of the cases now before this Court, those terms refer to a consumer debtor and a consumer debtor’s attorney.

Section 101’s definitions of “assisted person” and “debt relief agency” cover consumer debtors and their attorneys in this context.

Shane Daniel Baur · filed 2024-03-29(3), (12A)

The legislation regulates certain interactions between an “assisted person” and a “debt relief agency,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), (12A); Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232-33. In the context of the cases now before this Court, those terms refer to a consumer debtor and a consumer debtor’s attorney.

Section 101(3) and (12A) define assisted persons and debt relief agencies to include, in this context, consumer debtors and their attorneys.

Shanelle Eula Times · filed 2024-03-29(3), (12A)

The legislation regulates certain interactions between an “assisted person” and a “debt relief agency,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), (12A); Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232-33. In the context of the cases now before this Court, those terms refer to a consumer debtor and a consumer debtor’s attorney.

Section 101(12A) treats an attorney who provides bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person for payment as a debt relief agency.

James Day · filed 2024-04-05(12A)

Further, because Mr. Day qualified as an “assisted person” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(3), Attorney Kakol and his Law Firm acted as a “debt ... relief agency” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A),28 which means that a written attorney client agreement was required by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(12A) defines a debt relief agency to include an attorney who provides bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person for payment, subject to exceptions.

Aguocha · filed 2024-10-21(12A)

As the bankruptcy court correctly concluded, (Docket Entry No. 13-1 at 103), Mr. Aguocha qualifies as a “debt relief agency” under 11 U.S.C. § 526. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (defining a “debt relief agency” as “any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration,” with a few exceptions); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 239 (2010) (“[A]ttorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons are debt relief agencies.”).

Section 101(12A) defines a debt relief agency to include a person who provides bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person for payment.

Shastal, Jr v. Recovery Law Group · filed 2025-09-17(12A)

The phrase “debt relief agency” means “any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, or who is a bankruptcy petition preparer under section 110 . . . .” 11 U.S.C. §101(12A). Recovery Law Group is, unquestionably, a debt relief agency and the Shastals are assisted persons.

The debt relief agency definition does not subject attorneys to the requirements of §§ 526, 527, and 528.

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States · filed 2006-12-07(12A)

If lawyers are placed within the ambit of § 101(4A), the placement conflicts with § 526(d)(2)(A). ... For these reasons, the Court finds §§ 526, 527 and 528 do not apply to attorneys.

Section 101(12A) includes a person who provides bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for payment within the definition of a debt relief agency.

In Re Casavalencia · filed 2008-06-05(12A)

Moreover, as a “debt relief agency” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A), that is, a person “who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable consideration,” Mr. Santos was enjoined under 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2) as follows: ... The falsehoods contained in the petition and schedules filed here were untrue and misleading and at least some of them (particularly including the Debtor’s nomenclature) would have been known to Mr. Santos “upon the exercise of reasonable care.” I find that Rule 9011 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 526(a)(2) provide the basis for the award of such sanctions.

Section 101(12A) defines debt relief agencies to include bankruptcy petition preparers.

Hills v. McDermott · filed 2012-11-09(12A)

Section 526(a)(2) prohibits debt relief agencies, ... including bankruptcy petition preparers, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A), from “mak[ing] any statement, or counsel[ing] or advis[ing] any assisted person or prospective assisted person to make a statement in a document filed in a case or proceeding under this title, that is untrue or misleading. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(2).

Section 101(12A) includes a firm providing bankruptcy assistance to a consumer debtor within the definition of a debt relief agency.

Demario A Baker · filed 2023-06-22(12A)

Section 526(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a debt relief agency, such as Mr. Jerome’s firm, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(3) & (12A), Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 239 (2010), shall not fail to perform any service the agency informed the assisted person or prospective assisted person it would provide in connection with a case or proceeding.

Section 101(14A) includes guardian ad litem fees incurred for a child’s support as a domestic support obligation, even when the debtor alone owes the fees directly to the guardian.

Kassicieh v. Battisti (In Re Kassicieh) · filed 2012-03-30(14A)

The Court follows the majority view and holds that Kassicieh’s debt to Battisti is a domestic support obligation as that term is defined in § 101(14A), and the debt is excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A)(A) requires a domestic support obligation to be owed to or recoverable by a qualifying family member or governmental unit; a debt owed solely to the debtor’s own divorce attorney does not qualify.

Berse v. Langman (In re Langnam) · filed 2012-02-06(14A)(A)

However, the threshold standard for nondischargeability of domestic support obligations under the Bankruptcy Code, as outlined in § 101(14A), requires that the debt be “owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or a governmental unit.” § 101(14A)(A). Ms. Lang-man’s debt to Ms. Berse does not meet this requirement. First, it is a debt that was incurred by Ms. Langman in furtherance of her own maintenance or support (or for that of her own children). Second, pursuant to Judge Sivilli’s Order establishing the lien, the debt is owed to or recoverable by Ms. Berse alone, not Ms. Langman or her children.

Section 101(14A)’s definition of a domestic support obligation includes divorce attorney fees awarded to balance a disparity in the parties’ incomes.

In Re the Marriage of Yates · filed 2006-06-29(14A)

A “domestic support obligation,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2000), includes debt that is in the nature of maintenance or support and is owed to a former spouse or child of the debtor under a separation agreement, divorce decree, property settlement agreement, or court order. ... We conclude that the award of attorney fees was in the nature.of a support obligation. Because a support obligation is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, husband remains obligated to pay this award, and we conclude that he has standing to challenge it.

Past-due child support owed to a debtor’s child qualifies as a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

In Re Covington · filed 2006-09-22(14A)

11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as: ... Based on the information in the proof of claim, to which no objection has been filed, it is clear that the $38,211.59 is a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A)(C) requires a domestic support obligation to be established by a qualifying agreement, decree, order, or determination by the time the court reviews dischargeability, even if establishment occurs after the bankruptcy petition.

Deemer v. Deemer (In Re Deemer) · filed 2007-01-24(14A)(C)

Allowing the debt to be “subject to establishment” postpetition does not remove the requirement that the debt be established by reason of a separation agreement, divorce decree, property settlement or order at the time of the Court’s review for purposes of dis-chargeability.

Section 101(14A) includes child support arrears in the definition of a domestic support obligation.

In Re Gellington · filed 2007-03-08(14A)

In the present case, the arrears at issue are child support obligations, which qualify as a domestic support obligation as defined under section 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) includes a court-ordered debt owed to or recoverable by a former spouse on a child support matter within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

In Re O'Brien · filed 2007-04-17(14A)

The Fee Award is a domestic support obligation in that it is a debt owed to or recoverable by Carlin on a child support matter and has been established by order of the probate court. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

A hold harmless obligation is not a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) when the separation agreement makes it a property division rather than support.

Schweitzer v. Schweitzer (In Re Schweitzer) · filed 2007-06-04(14A)(B)

Second, Deborah’s hold harmless obligation with respect to the Chase credit card is not a debt “for a domestic support obligation” that would be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5). A “domestic support obligation” as defined in § 101(14A) “means a debt that ... is ... in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” of the debtor’s spouse, former spouse, or child.

Section 101(14A) excludes attorney’s fees recoverable only by a law firm from the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Loe, Warren, Rosenfield, Katcher, Hibbs, & Windsor, P.C. v. Brooks (In Re Brooks) · filed 2007-07-19(14A)

As none of these, the Firm does not fall within the ambit of section 101(14A) and is not an entity to whom a “domestic support obligation” may be owed under section 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) includes a debt assumed to preserve a former spouse’s and child’s housing as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended the payment as support.

In Re Johnson · filed 2008-02-27(14A)

All of the circumstances taken together, including the intent of the parties, the financial circumstances of the parties at the time of entering into the Separation Agreement, and the function served by Mr. Johnson paying the Wachovia Debt, justify a finding that the obligation of Mr. Johnson to pay the Wachovia Debt is a DSO. The obligation to pay the Wachovia Debt is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,” and therefore constitutes a DSO that must be paid in full under the Debtors’ Plan.

Section 101(14A) includes attorneys’ fees awarded for violations of a child visitation order within a domestic support obligation when the fees are in the nature of support of the child.

Marvin v. Marvin · filed 2008-04-22(14A)

Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the attorneys’ fees were “in the nature of support of the child” and, thus, fit within the second criteria contained in the definition of “domestic support obligation” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) includes a government claim for food stamp overpayments used to support a debtor’s children within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development v. Ratliff · filed 2008-06-04(14A)(B)

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes Ratliffs debt to the Department for the overpayment of support, in the form of food stamps, falls within the ambit of the definition of a “domestic support obligation” under § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A)’s definition of “domestic support obligation” does not govern whether payments qualify for the spousal support exemption under § 522(d)(10)(D).

In re: Daniel W. Brown v. · filed 2008-06-11(14A)

In summary, while the court is not required to apply 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) in reviewing payments exempted under § 522, the court is still required under federal exemption law to make a factual determination as to whether an asset labeled as “alimony” is properly exempted under § 522(d)(10)(D).

Section 101(14A) includes a debt to a governmental unit for child care assistance provided to a debtor’s child within the definition of a domestic support obligation when the statutory criteria are met.

Wisconsin v. Schauer (In Re Schauer) · filed 2008-06-13(14A)

In this case, the debt is owed to a governmental unit; is in the nature of assistance provided by a governmental unit to a child of the debtor; was established by the governmental unit in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law; and has not been assigned to a nongovernmental entity.

Section 101(14A)(B) defines a domestic support obligation by whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. When a divorce decree expressly waives support, the party claiming otherwise must prove strong contrary indicia by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Re Boller · filed 2008-06-27(14A)(B)

In determining what constitutes debt “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” under § 101(14A), the case law construing pre-BAPCPA § 523(a)(5), which utilized the same language, is relevant. ... Conversely, the party who contends that the parties or the state court intended in the divorce decree to provide support where it has been expressly waived must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, strong indicia from the face of the decree or other finding by the state court to overcome evidence of an intent to waive the support.

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to satisfy all four statutory requirements, including that a debt for child support benefit a child of the debtor.

In Re Livingston · filed 2008-10-21(14A)

All four requirements must be met for an obligation to be considered a domestic support obligation ("DSO"). ... Because the Default Judgment is not a debt for the support of a "child of the debtor," it is not a DSO as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires courts to determine whether a debt is in the nature of support regardless of whether it is expressly labeled as support.

Ross v. Sperow · filed 2008-12-24(14A)(B)

Here, while the award of counsel fees was not explicitly characterized as a support obligation in Family Court’s order, “family court judges cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate future bankruptcy among the parties to a custody [or visitation] proceeding” (In re Maddigan, 312 F3d at 595), and our inquiry into whether the debt at issue is in the nature of support is undertaken “without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated” (11 USC § 101 [14A] [B]).

A late alimony payment penalty intended to ensure timely payment, rather than meet the former spouse’s needs, is not a domestic support obligation.

Smith v. Pritchett (Smith) · filed 2008-12-29(14A)

The late payment penalty cannot be considered in the nature of alimony or support.

Section 101(14A) defines court-ordered alimony or support owed to a former spouse as a domestic support obligation.

In Re Crum · filed 2009-02-20(14A)

Crum’s obligations to Randi Crum and their children satisfy the definition of a domestic support obligation under the Bankruptcy Code. ... Crum’s obligation is owed to a former spouse; is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of Randi Crum (and their children); was established under a court order; and has not been assigned.

A domestic support obligation must be owed to or recoverable by a person or entity listed in § 101(14A)(A)(i).

In Re Watson · filed 2009-03-11(14A)(A)(i)

A predicate for a “domestic support obligation” is that the debt is “owed to or recoverable by [a person or entity described in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(I) ].” Exhibits “A” and “B” attached to the claimant’s memorandum establish that the person/entity who sought, and was granted, the award of $2412.00 was Rappaport, a person not within the category of persons/entities described in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(I). The $2412.00 debt is thus “owed” to Rappaport, and is not within § 507(a)(1)(A) or § 101(14A)(A)(I) on the basis of to whom that debt is owed.

Section 101(14A) treats an obligation arising from a separation agreement as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to provide support rather than settle property.

In Re Siegel · filed 2009-03-13(14A)(B)

Ms. Siegel has not met her burden of proving that her claim is a domestic support obligation, and, accordingly, the debt- or’s objection to Ms. Seigel’s priority claim is ALLOWED.

The label in a divorce decree or agreement does not determine whether an obligation is a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

In Re Westerfield · filed 2009-03-13(14A)

The label used in the divorce decree or the parties’ agreement does not control whether the obligation is a domestic support obligation under bankruptcy law.

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to meet all four elements of the domestic support obligation definition; attorney fees awarded for litigation misconduct rather than support do not qualify.

In Re Lopez · filed 2009-04-17(14A)(B)

In order for a debt to be considered a domestic support obligation, it must meet all four requirements of section 101(14A). ... Because neither Florida law nor federal law supports Rodriguez’s claim that the fee award is a “domestic support obligation,” the proof of claim is not entitled to priority status.

Guardian ad litem fees can be a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) even when payable directly to the guardian ad litem, if the debt otherwise meets the definition.

Kelly v. Burnes (In Re Burnes) · filed 2009-05-04(14A)

I recognize that Kelly, as a guardian ad litem, is none of those persons or entities specifically listed, and that some courts have held that a guardian ad litem’s fees do not fit within the definition of “domestic support obligation” for that reason. ... I see no substantive difference between the 1988 Code’s “to a spouse, former spouse, or child” and BAPCPA’s “owed to or recoverable by ... a spouse, former spouse, or child.” Consequently, I see no basis to conclude that the Eighth Circuit would interpret § 101(14A) under BAPC-PA differently than it did § 523(a)(5) under the 1988 version of the Code.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, as determined by the parties’ intent.

In Re White · filed 2009-07-09(14A)(B)

The issue is whether this debt is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B). ... Therefore, Claim 8 is not for a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of support, regardless of how the divorce agreement labels it.

In RE McCOLLUM · filed 2009-09-08(14A)

In making a decision, the Court must look beyond any labels used by the parties and instead determine whether "at the time of its creation the parties intended the obligation to function as support or alimony." Id. ... Consequently, the Court finds the mortgage payments and car payments required by Debtor under the divorce agreement do not satisfy the requirements of a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A)(A) can cover fees owed to a child representative as a domestic support obligation even though the representative is not a listed payee.

Levin v. Greco · filed 2009-09-16(14A)(A)

This court adopts the uniform circuit court authority regarding the scope of the domestic support exception. Although none of the cases involved a child representative under Illinois law, there is no meaningful distinction for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code’s domestic support exception between a child representative and a guardian ad litem.

Section 101(14A) requires an obligation to a former spouse to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation; a fixed penalty intended to encourage timely alimony payments does not qualify.

Smith v. Pritchett (In Re Smith) · filed 2009-11-06(14A)

Thus, pursuant to the statute, for an obligation to a former spouse to be considered a DSO, it must actually be in the nature of support. ... While the tax treatment of the provision constitutes a factor favoring Pritchett, we are persuaded that the late fee was intended to encourage payment of alimony and was not itself alimony.

Section 101(14A)(A) limits domestic support obligations to debts owed to or recoverable by the listed family members and guardians; a debtor’s former daughter-in-law is not among them.

Tucker v. Oliver · filed 2010-01-07(14A)(A)

Section 101(14A) expressly defines the persons to whom the court-ordered, support related obligation must be owed for it to be a “domestic support obligation.” To qualify, the debt must be owed to or recoverable by “a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A). The undisputed facts make it clear that Ms. Tucker, as the former daughter-in-law of the debtors, is none of these.

Section 101(14A) includes child support owed to or recoverable by a spouse, child, or governmental unit in its definition of a domestic support obligation.

In Re Penaran · filed 2010-02-03(14A)

There is no dispute in this case that the past-due child support owed by Penaran is a domestic support obligation (DSO) as defined at § 101(14A). The Court con-eludes that an ample record exists for this Court to find that the debt is a DSO since the child support debt is either owed to or recoverable by the debtor’s spouse, child, or governmental unit.

Section 101(14A)(B) excludes a judgment reimbursing wrongly paid child support from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the repayment is not in the nature of support.

In Re Vanhook · filed 2010-03-24(14A)(B)

The Creditor has failed to establish that the Debtor’s underlying obligation to repay him is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support under § 101(14A)(B).

Section 101(14A)’s definition of domestic support obligation does not apply to bankruptcy cases filed before the provision was added to the Code.

Wallace v. Marble · filed 2010-03-31(14A)

Section 101(14A) is inapplicable to Marble’s case because it was added to the Code after Marble filed his case and in any event, does not change the meaning of the pre-BAPCPA § 523(a)(5).

Determining whether guardian ad litem fees are a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A) requires knowing the fee amount and each parent's liability.

Kassicieh v. Battisti (In Re Kassicieh) · filed 2010-04-02(14A)

Despite the parties’ stipulation in this case that the GAL fees are in the nature of support, the missing components — the amount and the parties’ relative liability for that amount — are necessary to enable the Court to determine whether the GAL fees qualify as a domestic support obligation under § 101(14A).

A debtor’s obligation to pay a former spouse’s attorney can be a domestic support obligation when the spouse remains liable for the fees, making the debt effectively owed to or recoverable by the spouse.

Aldrich v. Papi (In Re Papi) · filed 2010-04-30(14A)(A)(i)

Moreover, because the amount due and owing to the Plaintiff are “JUDY’s total fees and costs,” Judy will remain liable for the value of the Plaintiffs services rendered to her during the dissolution proceedings if the Debtor fails to pay. Thus, the Debtor’s obligation to pay the Plaintiff is, in effect, a debt “owed to or recoverable by” Judy.

Section 101(14A) treats marital debts owed to a former spouse as domestic support obligations only when they are in the nature of support rather than a property settlement.

In Re Deberry · filed 2010-04-30(14A)

After considering all relevant factors, the Court finds that only a portion of Mr. DeBerry’s obligation is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. The language of the Separation Agreement evidences the parties’ intent that only Mr. DeBerry’s obligation to pay one-half of the debts that were to be settled from the sale of the Real Property is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Section 101(14A) covers custody team fees owed to a county when the services protect a child’s best interests and are in the nature of child support.

County of LaCrosse v. Stevens (In Re Stevens) · filed 2010-05-17(14A)

The only element they dispute is whether the debt is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” ... Debts incurred pursuant to a statutory duty to act in the best interests of the child will almost inevitably be for support of a child, within the meaning of § 523(a)(5). ... The county carried its burden to show that the $3,993.67 Heather Stevens owes it is a non-dischargeable domestic support obligation under 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) can treat a grandchild as a debtor’s child for a domestic support obligation when state law gives the debtor parental rights and responsibilities for that child.

Epstein v. Defilippi (In Re Defilippi) · filed 2010-06-03(14A)

The only issue in dispute is whether Joe constitutes a “child of the debtor[s].” ... As far as the State of Maine and the Bankruptcy Code are concerned, the Defi-lippis are Joe’s parents and he is their child. The debt owed to the plaintiff is therefore excepted from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) treats an obligation to pay a former spouse’s joint debt as a domestic support obligation when the debtor agreed to hold the former spouse harmless and the obligation is in the nature of support.

In Re the Marriage of Weis · filed 2010-06-07(14A)

A “domestic support obligation” is defined as a debt that is 1) “owed to or recoverable by” a “former spouse” (among others), 2) that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” of such “former spouse,” and 3) that was established by a divorce decree or court order. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006). ... However, by assuming in the Agreement the obligation to pay the debt owed to the credit card companies and by agreeing to hold Weis harmless for the debt, Bergeron created a new debt that she owes Weis as a “former spouse.”

Section 101(14A) includes periodic alimony owed under a marital settlement agreement in the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Ginzl v. Ginzl (In Re Ginzl) · filed 2010-06-29(14A)

The payment obligation constitutes a domestic support obligation pursuant to the MSA and 11 U.S.C. Section 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) can treat fees payable to a former spouse’s attorney as a domestic support obligation when the former spouse remains liable for the fees and the award is in the nature of support.

In Re Andrews · filed 2010-07-12(14A)

Because of Mrs. Andrews’ remaining liability to Mock, the Debtor’s obligation to Mock may be deemed a debt owed directly to Mrs. Andrews, and as a former spouse, she is a payee named in the statute. ... Mock’s claim for attorney’s fees fulfills the four requirements set out under section 101(14A) as incorporated by section 507(a)(1) and is, therefore, entitled to priority treatment in the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan.

Attorney fees awarded in a child custody dispute can qualify as a domestic support obligation when they serve the children’s support.

Reissig v. Gruber (In Re Gruber) · filed 2010-07-12(14A)(B)

Accordingly, for these reasons, the Court finds that, for purposes of § 101(14A), the attorney fees at issue in this matter are in the nature of support. Consequently, the obligation qualifies as “a domestic support obligation” within the meaning of § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a debt to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Kennedy v. Kennedy (In Re Kennedy) · filed 2010-09-15(14A)(B)

A review of that definition shows that four, separate elements must be established for a debt to be considered a domestic support obligation. ... In the absence of any other proffered explanation the Court must therefore conclude that this obligation is based on the use of property and is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.

Section 101(14A)(D) excludes a debt from the domestic support obligation definition when a child and family investigator assigns it to a nongovernmental collector, even solely for collection, because the investigator is not among those permitted to make that assignment.

Liberty Acquisitions, LLC v. Cordova (In Re Cordova) · filed 2010-10-18(14A)(D)

The CFI is not, therefore, one of the enumerated parties under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... The “plain language” requires this Court to grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss this adversary proceeding.

A debt to a former spouse is a domestic support obligation when its substance provides support, even if a divorce court labels it a property settlement.

In Re King · filed 2010-10-25(14A)(B)

Although application of the Shaver and Combs factors leads to mixed results, I find that Marcus’s debt to Angel is in the nature of support. A bankruptcy court is to look to the nature of the obligation without regard to whether the debt is designated support or property settlement.

Section 101(14A)’s definition of domestic support obligation excludes equitable distribution.

In Re Clouse · filed 2010-12-28(14A)

Equitable distribution is not included within the definition of "domestic support obligations.”

Section 101(14A)(B) classifies an obligation as domestic support based on the function the award was intended to serve.

Phegley v. Phegley · filed 2011-01-25(14A)(B)

The BAPCPA amendments that added § 101(14A) and altered §§ 523(a)(5) and (15) did not change the standard for whether an obligation is in the nature of support. ... When deciding whether a debt should be characterized as one for support or property settlement, the crucial question is the function the award was intended to serve.

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to qualify as a domestic support obligation; a marital property distribution does not qualify.

In Re Clark · filed 2011-02-04(14A)

In order for the Debtor’s obligation to pay Mr. Clark $800 per month to be classified as a DSO, it must be (1) owed to or recoverable by Mr. Clark; (2) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; (3) established before the Debtor filed for bankruptcy relief by a separation agreement or divorce decree; and (4) not assigned other than for collection purposes. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that the $104,500 obligation of the Debtor to Mr. Clark is part of the equitable distribution award provided by the divorce judgment, not a DSO entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(1)(A).

Section 101(14A) includes attorney’s fees awarded to a former spouse’s counsel as a domestic support obligation when the fees protect child support and the former spouse remains liable for them.

Altman v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · filed 2011-03-21(14A)

The Court finds that the decisions of the First Circuit, and the unequivocal intention of and language used by the Probate Court compel the conclusion that the attorney’s fees are a DSO. The numerous decisions recognizing that under BAPCPA the award of attorney’s fees may be excepted from discharge as DSOs or under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) also support this conclusion. The award of the attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff did not extinguish Thatcher’s liability to the Plaintiff.

Section 101(14A)(A) excludes attorney fees payable to a third party from domestic support obligations when the former spouse cannot be liable for those fees.

In re Murphy · filed 2011-04-05(14A)(A)

In this situation, the debt in question cannot be deemed to be “owed to or recoverable by” the former spouse Stacey Murphy, within the meaning of the § 101(14A)(A) definition of “domestic support obligation,” because Stacey Murphy is not liable, and can never be liable, for the attorney fees in question.

A debt to a former spouse qualifies as a domestic support obligation only if it is actually in the nature of support, regardless of its label.

In Re Nelson · filed 2011-04-22(14A)

As relevant here, “domestic support obligation” is defined as a debt owed to a spouse or former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated!.]” § 101(14A). ... I conclude that the obligation debtor undertook to assume and pay the mortgage on the jointly owned home that he retained was not in the nature of support.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a debt to function as support for the person seeking to have it excepted from discharge; repayment of spousal support does not automatically qualify.

Taylor v. Taylor (In Re Taylor) · filed 2011-05-05(14A)(B)

Whether a debt constitutes a non-dischargeable domestic support obligation requires a determination that the debt is in the nature of support with respect to the party seeking to have the debt excepted from discharge, in this case, the creditor-spouse.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation by the debt’s intended function when it arose; the recipient’s later financial needs do not determine whether it is support.

Comstock v. Rodriguez (In Re Rodriguez) · filed 2011-05-27(14A)

Even when considering the parties’ future prospects for financial support, the relevant time period for determining whether a particular obligation constitutes a non-dischargeable domestic support obligation is the time that the obligation arose.

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

In Re Cooke · filed 2011-07-26(14A)

Since Judge Hill has already found that the debt arising from the Judgment and Decree of Dissolution does not constitute alimony, maintenance, or support the Court finds that Ms. Knox fails to satisfy the second element required by § 101(14A) and therefore, cannot qualify her claim as a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) includes interest on a domestic support obligation when applicable nonbankruptcy law provides for it.

In Re Anthony · filed 2011-08-03(14A)

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that N.J. Court Rule 5:7-5(g), made applicable to Debtor’s bankruptcy case by § 101(14A), entitles creditors to post-petition interest on pre-petition child support arrears.

Section 101(14A) includes mortgage and vehicle payment obligations in a domestic support obligation when the parties intended the payments as support.

In Re Krueger · filed 2011-09-19(14A)

The specific facts of this matter and a weighing of relevant factors applied thereto reveals that the scales tip strongly in favor of a finding that the mortgage obligation imposed by the Separation Agreement is in the nature of support, and sufficiently in the same direction regarding the vehicle obligation. Therefore, the Court finds that Creditor has met her burden of proof to establish that the obligations constitute DSOs.

Section 101(14A) treats a debt as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to function as support or alimony, regardless of its label.

In Re: Todd Benson, Todd Benson v. Benson · filed 2011-09-26(14A)

Thus, a debt is a domestic support obligation if the parties intended it to function as support or alimony, even if they called it something else.

Section 101(14A)(B) defines a domestic support obligation by the nature of the debt, regardless of how a divorce decree labels it.

In re Phile · filed 2011-09-27(14A)(B)

The labels used in a divorce decree do not control whether an obligation is a domestic support obligation under bankruptcy law.

Section 101(14A)(A) includes fees owed to a child representative within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

In Re Anderson · filed 2011-10-17(14A)(A)

The definition of “domestic support obligation” under § 362(b)(2)(B) is the same as under § 523(a)(5), as determined by analyzing § 101(14A)(A). As discussed above, domestic support obligations include debts owed to a Child Representative.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation by the substance of the debt, regardless of its label; repayment of child support paid by mistake is not support.

Bartos v. Kloeppner (In Re Kloeppner) · filed 2011-10-24(14A)

In determining whether Klo-eppner’s debt falls under one of these exceptions, the Court must look to the substance of the state court’s award to Bartos, not solely the label of that award. ... Second, Bartos’ award is not “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” Instead, it is the return of money that Bartos should never have paid Klo-eppner.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as a debt owed to or recoverable by a qualifying family member, in the nature of support, established by a qualifying agreement or order, and not assigned to a nongovernmental entity.

Hutton v. Ferguson (In re Hutton) · filed 2011-11-30(14A)

In sum, for the attorneys’ fees awards to meet the definition of a domestic support obligation, the awards must be (1) owed to or recoverable by a former spouse, (2) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, (3) established by an order of a court of record, and (4) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity.

Section 101(14A) includes a proper New York matrimonial attorney’s fee award based on a former spouse’s financial need as a domestic support obligation, even when the debtor must pay counsel directly.

In re Rogowski · filed 2011-12-21(14A)

Because a finding of financial need is required, this Court concludes that a proper award of matrimonial attorney’s fees under New York state law is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support,” thus satisfying the second element of a DSO claim under § 101(14A). ... Thus, this Court concludes that the Debtor’s obligation to pay Schonfeld’s Claim for CER’s matrimonial attorney’s fees pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce satisfies the definition of a DSO in § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) treats a debt as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to function as support, regardless of its label in a divorce agreement.

In Re Throgmartin · filed 2012-01-05(14A)

Indeed, the very definition of “domestic support obligation” in the Bankruptcy Code does not require an express designation of the obligation as “support.” ... Rather, a debt will be deemed in the nature of support or alimony if, at the time of its creation, the parties intended the debt to function as support or alimony. ... The Court concludes that the parties intended the obligation to function as support for Suzanne.

Section 101(14A) includes a divorce decree’s requirement to maintain life insurance for child support within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Perlis v. Perlis (In re Perlis) · filed 2012-01-10(14A)

The purpose of maintaining life insurance is to provide for child support payments. The Court therefore holds that the obligation is a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) can cover attorney’s fees payable directly to a former spouse’s lawyer when the legal services benefit the debtor’s child and are in the nature of support.

Zimmermann v. Hying (In re Hying) · filed 2012-01-25(14A)

The majority rule declines to construe § 523(a)(5) strictly and limit its application only to payment made directly to the former spouse. ... This court embraces that majority rule. ... These legal services were therefore performed for the benefit of both Kimberly and Jillian and were in the nature of support.

Section 101(14A) includes divorce-related attorney’s fees and payments for household bills as domestic support obligations when they are in the nature of support, regardless of how the order labels them.

In Re Lee · filed 2012-02-08(14A)

No matter the nomenclature used by the Family Court, an award of attorney fees in regard to a divorce proceeding is a debt in the nature of support.

Section 101(14A) includes an obligation to provide a former spouse with a home when the parties intended it to function as support.

Pylant v. Pylant (In Re Pylant) · filed 2012-03-14(14A)

In conclusion, this Court finds that the parties intended Debtor’s obligation to provide Norma with a replacement home to function as support. Accordingly, this obligation is a “domestic support obligation” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) and is thus nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

A debt owed to a governmental unit qualifies as a domestic support obligation only if it is for the support of the debtor’s spouse, former spouse, child, or the child’s parent.

Oregon v. Hickey (In re Hickey) · filed 2012-05-10(14A)(B)

The new definition of domestic support obligation makes it clear that the debt can be one held by a “governmental unit,” but it also provides at § 101(14A)(B) that even if held by a governmental unit, the debt must for the support of “such spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent.”

Section 101(14A) allows a debt payable to a third party to qualify as a domestic support obligation when the debt is in the nature of support; the creditor’s identity does not control.

In re Micek · filed 2012-05-21(14A)

In reaching this decision, he noted that most courts interpreting § 101(14A) have not deviated from the rationale expressed in pre-BAPC-PA caselaw that, in analyzing the dis-chargeability of debts payable to a third party, it is the nature of the debt, rather than the identity of the creditor, that controls. Id. at 450. This Court agrees with that majority.

Section 101(14A) includes a debt under an immigration affidavit of support as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to provide financial support to a former spouse.

Hrachova v. Cook (In re Cook) · filed 2012-06-19(14A)

A domestic support obligation is defined in § 101(14A) as a debt owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, whether or not so designated. ... The intent of the parties in signing the Affidavit of Support, in this case as reflected in the name of the agreement, clearly was to support plaintiff financially until she was able to support herself and avoid becoming a drain on the public benefit system.

Section 101(14A) includes custody-related attorney’s fees in the definition of a domestic support obligation when the fees serve a support function, regardless of how the award is labeled.

Louttit v. Armell (In re Louttit) · filed 2012-06-19(14A)

Specifically, the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) denotes that a “domestic support obligation” encompasses any debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support “without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated.”

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to a former spouse to be in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Fisher v. Santry (In re Santry) · filed 2012-09-04(14A)

Viewing the facts surrounding the divorce decree in the light most favorable to Debt- or, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the debt is a domestic support obligation with the meaning of §§ 523(a)(5), 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) requires a debt to be in the nature of support for the former spouse seeking to have it treated as a domestic support obligation.

Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor) · filed 2012-09-05(14A)

The distilled essence of § 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation as “a debt [ ] that is in the nature of [ ] support [ ] of such [ ] former spouse [ ].” In other words, as the bankruptcy court held, the Debt must be in the nature of support for Matthew to be excepted from Eloisa’s discharge under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) can include an attorney’s fee award as a domestic support obligation when the award functions as support for the debtor’s child, even if it arose outside a custody proceeding.

Lakeman v. Weed (In re Weed) · filed 2012-09-18(14A)

But, the statutory definition does not require an origin in a specific type of legal proceeding, on its face or by implication. Under the longstanding judicial construction of the words “in the nature of,” the focus has to be on the award itself, as it functions in relation to the needs and interest of the dependent person who is ostensibly “supported” by the operation of the award.

A lump sum award can be a domestic support obligation to the extent it replaces necessities intended for support, even if it is not labeled alimony or support.

In re Angelo · filed 2012-09-27(14A)(B)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Robinson Award was a domestic support obligation to the extent that it constituted compensation for Robinson’s tax refund ($1,100) and clothing (an unspecified portion of the remaining $6,400). The remainder is not a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) allows attorney’s fees from a custody dispute to qualify as a domestic support obligation when the fees are in the nature of support.

Rugiero v. Dinardo · filed 2012-10-10(14A)

Nothing in the statute precludes an attorney’s fee award from being treated as “in the nature of . . . support.”

Section 101(14A) excludes a divorce property settlement or division from the definition of a domestic support obligation.

In re Hutchens · filed 2012-10-04(14A)

A property settlement or division incurred in the course of a divorce does not fall under the new definition of a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

Woodward v. Ehrler-Nugent (In re Nugent) · filed 2012-12-20(14A)

As a result, this Court cannot conclude that the Obligations are “domestic support obligations” under §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A); therefore, the Obligations are not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) treats a payment to a former spouse as a domestic support obligation when it is in the nature of support, regardless of how the parties label it.

In re Ashby · filed 2013-01-23(14A)

Despite the nomenclature used by the parties the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of the former spouse. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the parties were married for 37 years and the Amended Property Settlement Agreement extended the maintenance until Deanna reached the age to qualify for full social security benefits.

Section 101(14A)(B) defines a domestic support obligation by whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, regardless of how it is labeled.

Steele v. Heard · filed 2013-02-04(14A)(B)

“Domestic support obligation” is a defined term meaning a debt owed to a former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support” of the former spouse “without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated.” ... Here, the undersigned agrees with the Bankruptcy Court that the record evidence strongly favors a conclusion that Heard and Steele intended the Pension Settlement to constitute a property settlement, such that it was not in the nature of support, alimony or maintenance.

Section 101(14A) excludes a debt dividing marital property from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the debt is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

In re Ludwig · filed 2013-02-25(14A)

As the Court finds that the obligation is not in the nature of alimony, support, or maintenance, Ms. Miller has failed to establish the necessary elements of a domestic support obligation under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) can cover court-ordered college expenses for an adult child when the obligation was intended to function as support.

In re Schumacher · filed 2013-05-20(14A)

This Court will, therefore, look to the parties’ intent and the practical function of the college-related expense to determine the nature of Debtor’s obligation. ... This Court will, therefore, treat the college-related expense as a domestic support obligation and, thus, a reasonable expense.

A domestic support obligation may become payable before, on, or after the bankruptcy petition is filed.

Young v. Young (In re Young) · filed 2013-06-10(14A)

A domestic support obligation can become payable “before, on, or after” the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2013). As a result, some obligations are due prepetition while others become due postpetition. The Code treats each differently.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations to include alimony or child support debts that accrue before, on, or after the bankruptcy petition.

DeSouza · filed 2013-06-14(14A)

The term “domestic support obligation” was introduced by BAPCPA, and is broadly defined to include a debt for alimony or child support that "accrues before, on or after” the petition date.

Section 101(14A)(B) covers payments that serve a former spouse’s support, even when they are advances from community property.

In re Efron · filed 2013-06-28(14A)(B)

For the reasons set forth below, this Court determines that the $50,000.00 monthly payment in controversy is a “Domestic Support Obligation” as defined in § 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(14A)(B) treats a mortgage obligation needed to keep a former spouse in the marital home as support, regardless of how the divorce agreement labels it.

In re Bub · filed 2013-07-22(14A)(B)

Bankruptcy Code section 101(14A), which defines a DSO as a debt owed to a spouse or former spouse that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, expressly directs that the “nature” of an obligation be determined “without regard” to how the obligation is characterized in the agreement giving rise to such obligation. Therefore, Rockstone’s argument that the characterization of the Claim in the Settlement Agreement governs the priority of the Claim in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case is incorrect. Because Alisa is unable to maintain the marital residence absent the Debtor’s agreement to pay his mortgage obligation on the residence, the obligation fits squarely within the definition of a DSO.

Section 101(14A)(B) covers a debt to a governmental unit for support payments attributable to a debtor’s child in foster care.

Hernandez v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services (In re Hernandez) · filed 2013-08-08(14A)(B)

The only issue on appeal is whether the debt owed to the DHHS is a debt in the nature of support of a child under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B). We hold that it is and affirm.

Section 101(14A)(B) covers a debt for child support payments a parent received while the government paid for that child’s foster care.

Hernandez v. Dept. of Health & Human Serv. · filed 2013-08-08(14A)(B)

The only issue on appeal is whether the debt owed to the DHHS is a debt in the nature of support of a child under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B). We hold that it is and affirm.

Section 101(14A) allows an attorney’s fee award in the nature of support to qualify as a domestic support obligation even when payable directly to the attorney.

McNeil v. Drazin · filed 2013-10-10(14A)

Accordingly, as long as an attorney’s fee award is in the nature of support under § 101(14A)(B), it qualifies as a domestic support obligation even if directly payable to the attorney.

Section 101(14A) treats a guardian ad litem for a child in custody litigation as a legal guardian for purposes of a domestic support obligation.

Rackley v. Rackley (In re Rackley) · filed 2013-10-18(14A)(A)(i)

The Court concludes that a guardian ad litem for a child in custody litigation is a legal guardian for purposes of section 101 (14A) and sections 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) includes a child-support debt under a marital settlement agreement in the definition of a domestic support obligation when the debt is in the nature of support.

In re Miller · filed 2013-11-14(14A)

For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, I find that the State Court’s determination of $18,360.00 of past-due child support and the Debtor’s ongoing payment obligation under the MSA to be in the nature of support and therefore, a DSO.

Section 101(14A)(A) excludes a debt owed to a debtor’s deceased spouse’s former spouse when she is not a listed payee and is not liable for the unpaid debt.

In re Ballinger · filed 2013-11-25(14A)(A)

It is clear that this debt does not fit within the enumerated definitions found in § 101(14A)(A). Perkins is not a spouse or former spouse of the Debtor. Perkins also does not fit within the Kline exception because Perkins is not liable for any of the $44,575.99 that is not paid by the Debtor. Therefore, the debt does not fit within the definition of a domestic support obligation because the debt cannot pass the first requirement of § 101(14A).

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a debt owed to a former spouse to be in the nature of support for that creditor spouse to qualify as a domestic support obligation.

Taylor v. Taylor · filed 2013-12-09(14A)(B)

Therefore, pursuant to the plain language defining “domestic support obligation,” the debt must be in the nature of support to the creditor-spouse – or in this case, the debt must be in the nature of support for Matthew.

In deciding whether an obligation is a domestic support obligation, the spouses’ relative incomes at the time of separation or divorce are an important factor.

Rockstone Capital LLC v. Metal · filed 2014-04-02(14A)(B)

Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court correctly recognized that an income discrepancy between husband and wife at the time of separation or divorce is an important factor to consider in deciding whether a debtor’s obligation to his former spouse represents a DSO.

A former spouse’s indemnification claim in the nature of a property settlement is not a domestic support obligation.

In re Coats · filed 2014-05-05(14A)

As the court observed during the May 1, 2014 hearing, however, the parties’ ultimate settlement embodied in the October 2013 Order did more than simply increase the amount of Dr. Styer’s monthly alimony payment to $5,500.00; it also addressed his “hold harmless” or indemnification claim against the Debtor under the JOD — a claim in the nature of property settlement rather than support.

A debt may be a domestic support obligation when it provides support, regardless of whether the state court labels it as support.

In re: James Thomas v. · filed 2014-06-03(14A)(B)

Bankruptcy courts are permitted to find a debt to be in the nature of support regardless of the label used by the state court.

Section 101(14A)(B) treats a furnace expense needed to maintain the family home as support, but excludes payments intended to satisfy joint marital debts.

In re Gambale · filed 2014-06-19(14A)(B)

Although not labeled as support in the initial Family Court order requiring the Debtor to make such payment, nor in the 2013 order on reconsideration of the Final Decree, the Court finds that the $900.00 debt for the furnace replacement is in the nature of support and therefore qualifies as a DSO under the Bankruptcy Code. ... The remaining $34,400.00 element of Ms. Laureyns’ claim, representing 86 bi-weekly payments of $400.00 owed from September 29, 2009, to March 2013, is not a DSO and therefore is not entitled to priority status under § 507(a)(1).

Section 101(14A)(A)(i) does not cover fees owed solely to a guardian ad litem when the debt is not recoverable by a listed family member.

Wischmeyer v. Bobinski (In re Bobinski) · filed 2014-09-09(14A)(A)(i)

The stipulated record establishes that any liability of Bobinski to Wischmeyer is solely the obligation of Steven D. Bobinski to Wischmeyer and is not within the scope of a debt “recoverable by” a person defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i).

Child support owed to a former spouse and in the nature of support is a domestic support obligation.

Garner v. Garner (In re Garner) · filed 2014-10-15(14A)

The obligations imposed on Mr. Garner for child support by the Final Decree are domestic support obligations. They are owed to his former spouse. They are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support based on the language in the Circuit Court’s memorandum.

Section 101(14A)(C) requires a domestic support obligation to be established or subject to establishment through an agreement, decree, court order, or governmental determination; statutory probate allowance provisions alone are insufficient.

In re Brown · filed 2014-10-17(14A)(C)

Section 101(14A)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly requires a creditor submitting a DSO claim to refer to provisions of an agreement, decree, court order, or governmental determination of the debt. The Applicant does not reference any of these in regard to Claim 137, and therefore Claim 137 does not meet the definition of a DSO claim. The Applicant’s reference to statutory provisions is simply insufficient under the plain language of Section 101(14A)(C) to establish a DSO.

Section 101(14A)(B) treats attorney’s fees owed to a former spouse for a child custody dispute as support when the fees were incurred for the child’s protection and best interest.

In re Beacham · filed 2014-10-22(14A)(B)

The only dispute is whether the attorney’s fees from the child custody proceeding are “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” under § 101(14A)(B). (ECF No. 52 at 3). The Court finds that the debt is in the nature of support. Accordingly, the debt is non-dischargeable.

Section 101(14A)(B) defines a domestic support obligation by whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, regardless of its label.

Coon v. Henderson (In re Coon) · filed 2014-11-24(14A)(B)

The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “domestic support obligation” as a debt owed to a former spouse of the debtor that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... of such former spouse, ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated[J” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B). ... Amounts owed by the Debtor pursuant to Section IV of the divorce decree are determined to be domestic support obligations.

Section 101(14A) treats a debt to a former spouse as a domestic support obligation when the debt is in the nature of support.

In re Cummings · filed 2014-12-12(14A)

When determining whether a debt is in the nature of support under section 101(14A), courts consider the factors set forth in decisions prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. ... Based on an application of the Sorah factors, the court concludes that the Creditor has satisfied her burden by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 101(14A) covers divorce maintenance that functions as support, but not attorney’s fees imposed as punishment for discovery misconduct.

Waller v. Waller (In re Waller) · filed 2014-12-29(14A)

James’s obligation to pay the Maintenance is a DSO under § 101(14A) and is nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(5) and 1328(a)(2). Ericka failed to prove that the award of attorney’s fees and costs award is in the nature of support. James’s obligation to pay $4,205 in attorney’s fees and costs is not a DSO and is a debt under § 523(a)(15); accordingly, the attorney’s fees and costs award is not excepted from a full compliance chapter 13 discharge under § 1328(a).

Section 101(14A)(B) makes the nature of an obligation, rather than the state court’s label, decisive in determining whether it is support.

Thomas v. Clark · filed 2015-01-08(14A)(B)

By the express terms of § 101(14A)(B), however, the state court’s label for an obligation does not determine whether the obligation is in the nature of support.

An obligation under a property settlement agreement to repay secured creditors may fall outside the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Denke v. PNC Bank, N.A (In re Denke) · filed 2015-01-23(14A)

The Debtor's obligation to assume primary responsibility for the repayment of the Notes held by the Secured Claimants under the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement ... is not in the nature of a Domestic Support Obligation under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) as that term is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A), but rather is a general, unsecured, non-priority obligation under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

Section 101(14A)(B) includes an obligation intended to replace spousal support when the obligation is in the nature of support.

Steele v. Wyly (In re Wyly) · filed 2015-02-19(14A)(B)

The Court concludes that the Investment Provision included in the Order Amending Judgment clearly establishes a debt that is in the nature of support in accordance with §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(14A) includes counsel-fee debt owed to a child’s legal guardians or responsible relatives when the debt is in the nature of support or maintenance.

Fields v. Kimmel (In re Kimmel) · filed 2015-03-04(14A)

Therefore this court finds that the Debt listed in Proof of Claim Number 5 filed by the plaintiffs in the bankruptcy case of Sarah R. Kimmel is a domestic support obligation as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(a)(14A) and that the Debt is nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).

A debt to a former spouse can be a domestic support obligation regardless of its label, and courts may consider evidence outside the separation agreement to determine its intended purpose.

Quinn v. Quinn · filed 2015-03-16(14A)(B)

In order to discern that intent, courts must necessarily go beyond the language of the separation agreement. ... For that reason, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in allowing Sharon to testify as to her intent in signing the separation agreement.

Section 101(14A) includes attorney’s fees for unnecessarily prolonged custody litigation as a domestic support obligation when the award compensates for harm to the children.

In re Trentadue · filed 2015-03-19(14A)

The debtor owes a duty to his children not to take on unnecessary litigation directed at them, so he has to pay for it when he does. The obligation in this case is a domestic support obligation entitled to priority.

A debt to a former spouse qualifies as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to function as support, regardless of its label.

Saggus v. Saggus (In re Saggus) · filed 2015-03-23(14A)(B)

A “domestic support obligation” is defined as “a debt owed to a former spouse of the debtor that is ‘in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... of such spouse, ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated[.]’ ” Coon, 522 B.R. at 361 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B)). ... It follows then that the debt was not intended as support for Amy, and is not a domestic support obligation protected from discharge by § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) includes attorney fees from a child custody dispute in a domestic support obligation when the award is in the nature of support.

In re Moser · filed 2015-05-13(14A)

As 'relevant here, a “domestic support obligation” (“DSO”) is defined as a debt owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated[.]” § 101(14A). ... Based on the evidence presented in this case and the state law on which the attorney fee award was based, I find that the state court’s attorney fee award is in the nature of support, and is therefore a DSO entitled to priority under § 507(a)(1)(A).

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; an express waiver of support can leave that requirement unproved.

Reynolds v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds) · filed 2015-05-18(14A)

As to the Plaintiffs § 523(a)(5) claims far more evidence would be required to determine whether the judgments are “in the nature of support.” ... Specifically, the Stipulation for Settlement, which the parties’ divorce decree incorporated, includes an explicit waiver of “maintenance and/or support,” i.e., alimony.

Section 101(14A)(B) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of support; an attorney fee award does not qualify merely because it arose in a custody dispute.

Koch v. Olsson (In re Olsson) · filed 2015-06-17(14A)(B)

The fact that the fee award arose in the context of a custody dispute does not automatically render it a support obligation.

Section 101(14A) includes a debt to a former spouse in the nature of support as a domestic support obligation, regardless of how the debt is labeled.

McLain v. McLain (In re McLain) · filed 2015-06-30(14A)

A DSO is defined to include a debt owed to a former spouse that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... The Court determines that David’s obligation to pay Penny the equalization payments provided for in paragraph 4 of Article II of the MSA, is a domestic support obligation that is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5) and that is entitled to priority treatment under section 507(a)(1).

Attorney fees awarded to compensate for overtrial in litigation over a child’s welfare can be in the nature of support under the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Trentadue v. Gay · filed 2015-08-31(14A)(B)

In short, the Court cannot identify any errors (let alone clear errors) in the bankruptcy court’s determination that the fee award was in the nature of support.

Section 101(14A) excludes a divorce settlement obligation from the definition of a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to divide property and debts rather than provide support.

Lawson v. Lawson (In re Lawson) · filed 2015-09-10(14A)

The Court concludes, after trial, the obligation of the Debtor was not one in the nature of support and is not a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation by its recipient, support purpose, source, and assignment status; mortgage payments can qualify when recoverable by a former spouse and intended as support.

Price v. Price (In re Price) · filed 2015-10-05(14A)

Four elements must be satisfied to establish a domestic support obligation claim under section 523(a)(5): 1) the debt must be “owed to or recoverable by” a governmental unit or a person with a specific relationship to the debtor such as a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor; 2) the underlying obligation must be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of such person; 3) the obligation must arise from an agreement, court order, or as otherwise defined; and 4) the debt must not be assigned to a nongovernmental entity unless voluntarily done. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... Because the Plaintiff has satisfied all four elements required to establish that the debt due under paragraph 7 of the Consent Order is a domestic support obligation, the Court finds the obligations contained in both paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Consent Order are nondischargeable domestic support obligations.

Section 101(14A)(A)’s payee requirement can be satisfied by guardian ad litem fees owed for services supporting a debtor’s children, even when the children are not the direct payees.

Wischmeyer v. Bobinski · filed 2015-12-15(14A)(A)

So, where a debtor incurs attorney’s fees in furtherance of a legal obligation to collect a debt in support of his child, that obligation-while not payable directly to his child — nevertheless satisfies the § 101(14A)(A) payee requirement. ... As such, his debt to Ms. Wischmeyer satisfies the domestic support exception’s payee requirement.

A divorce obligation is a domestic support obligation when it is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; the court classified the education fund and foreclosure avoidance reimbursements as support.

Lawrence v. Combs (In re Combs) · filed 2016-01-21(14A)(B)

The Court further finds'that the following obligations owed by the Debtor to Lawrence are also in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and will not be discharged even if the Debtor successfully completes his Chapter 13 Plan: (1) the Education Fund Réimbursement in the amount of $12,750.00; and (2) the Foreclosure Avoidance in the amount of $12,923.76.

A grandchild does not qualify as a debtor’s “child” under the domestic support obligation definition merely because the debtor is the grandchild’s guardian.

Raridon v. Carlson (In re Carlson) · filed 2016-01-25(14A)

The code neither contains an explicit reference to grandchildren of a Debtor nor defines “child.” ... Thus, upon fairly construing what facts are alleged and may be reasonably inferred from this pleading, the complaint cannot be found to plausibly allege that the Carlsons’ granddaughter is their “child” for purposes of Section 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; disputed evidence about the parties’ intent can prevent summary judgment on that issue.

Eury v. Eury (In re Eury) · filed 2016-01-29(14A)(B)

Upon review of the above standard, it is clear to this Court that given the subjective nature of the standard as well as the conflicting averments of the parties, any determination of whether Debtor’s obligations under the MSA are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support will require the Court to weigh the evidence presented.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations under federal law; a settlement agreement’s label does not determine whether an obligation is support.

Reynolds v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds) · filed 2016-02-12(14A)

As such, no "domestic support obligation”, as defined in § 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code arose. The Court reaches this conclusion acknowledging that the parties inserted a provision in the Settlement Agreement that the obligations are "intended to be maintenance and not dischargeable in any bankruptcy proceeding.” Such labels although perhaps instructive are not determinations of whether an obligation is a "domestic support obligation”, which is defined by federal law.

Section 101(14A) treats a divorce settlement as a domestic support obligation when the parties intended it to provide support at the time of settlement.

Matthew Banks Ashworth v. Ehrgott · filed 2016-02-22(14A)

Under Sternberg, the dispositive factor in determining whether a settlement is a domestic support obligation is the intent of the parties at the time of settlement.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation to include child support owed to a former spouse under a court order when the debt is intended as support and is support in substance.

Fox v. Kelly (In re Kelly) · filed 2016-04-01(14A)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “domestic support obligation” as a debt “owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor ... in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support ... of such spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated — by reason of applicable provisions of ... an order of a court of record.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... The facts not subject to genuine dispute establish that the debt created by the February 2014 Order is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) as a domestic support obligation.

A domestic support obligation can include mortgage, tax, insurance, and utility payments when the parties intended those payments to support a spouse.

Romano v. Romano (In re Romano) · filed 2016-04-08(14A)(B)

The Court also finds that the parties intended for Defendant to support Plaintiff through his payment of the mortgage, taxes, and homeowners’ insurance, as well as the oil, propane, electric and water bills. ... The Court finds that the maintenance payments fall within the well-established parameters of a domestic support obligation as defined under the bankruptcy code and are non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) includes court-ordered fees for a child’s guardian ad litem in a divorce proceeding within the definition of a domestic support obligation.

Bush v. Heimer (In re Heimer) · filed 2016-04-22(14A)

Attorney fees of child representatives, including a GAL, appointed for a debtor’s children in state court divorce action come within the scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “domestic support obligations,” and are therefore non-dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5).

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation to include support owed to a former spouse under a divorce decree.

State of Missouri v. Spencer · filed 2016-06-13(14A)

The support arrears debt at issue is a “domestic support obligation” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) because it is a debt owed to the former spouse of the debtor for spousal maintenance and child support pursuant to a June 1, 2001 marital dissolution judgment and decree.

A domestic support obligation must actually be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; calling a property settlement obligation support does not make it so.

Rosenblum v. Hardesty (In re Hardesty) · filed 2016-06-13(14A)

The parties cannot render a dis-chargeable obligation as non-dischargeable by calling the obligation something it is not. The Court must find that the obligation actually “is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). The Waiver Provision clearly forecloses any such finding.

Section 101(14A) covers the creditor’s $108,085 claim as a domestic support obligation.

In re Chamberlain · filed 2016-08-04(14A)

Consistent with the Court’s May 6, 2016 oral ruling, the Creditor’s claim is limited to $108,085, which amount is entitled to priority as a DSO under Sections 101(14A) and 507(a)(1)(A); and ... DENIES two of the objections contained in the Creditor’s Confirmation Objection to the Debtor’s Third Plan.

Section 101(14A) excludes a parent’s debt for a child’s juvenile detention from domestic support obligations when the detention’s principal purpose is public safety.

Rivera v. Orange County Probation Department (In Re Rivera) · filed 2016-08-10(14A)

Where the principal purpose of the County’s custody over Rivera’s son is public safety, not the son’s domestic well-being or welfare, the debt does not qualify as a domestic support obligation.

A debt to a former spouse is a domestic support obligation only if it is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, regardless of its label.

Edwards v. Colin (In re Colin) · filed 2016-08-16(14A)(B)

“The Bankruptcy Code defines the term ‘domestic support obligation’ as a debt owed to a former spouse of the debtor that is ‘in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... of such spouse, ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated[.j” Coon, 522 B.R. at 361 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B)). ... The debt Allen Colin owes Sara Edwards is not a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) can include divorce attorney’s fees payable directly to counsel as a domestic support obligation when the fees are in the nature of support.

in the Interest of H.D v. Jr. and B v. Children · filed 2016-08-26(14A)

The term “domestic support obligation” is defined to include a debt owed to a former spouse that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (14A) (2016). ... The trial court could have properly concluded the fee award was a debt in the nature of support under the bankruptcy code. As stated, nothing in the premarital agreement prohibited payment of the fees and they were authorized by the family code. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the attorney’s fees to be a domestic support obligation.

Section 101(14A) treats divorce attorney’s fees awarded based on a former spouse’s financial need as a domestic support obligation, even when payable directly to the attorney.

In re: Joseph M. Gately · filed 2016-11-15(14A)

This, in turn, constituted an award in the nature of spousal support for the purposes of §§ 523(a)(5) and 101(14A).

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation by its support function; a mortgage obligation treated as property division does not qualify.

Carter v. Carter (In re Carter) · filed 2017-03-18(14A)

A domestic support obligation is a debt to a former spouse, among others, that is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ... without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated[.]” See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). ... In this case, the traditional indicia of support suggest that the state court did not intend to create a support obligation. Accordingly, Alexandra’s obligation to hold Angela harmless on the post-decree monthly mortgage payments is DIS-CHARGEABLE.

Section 101(14A) defines a domestic support obligation to include court-ordered child support owed to a child’s parent.

In re Cascone · filed 2017-05-18(14A)

This case involves a domestic support obligation within the meaning of § 101(14A).

A child care subsidy overpayment owed to a governmental unit is a domestic support obligation when the subsidy covers actual child care costs and is in the nature of support.

In re Etnire · filed 2017-05-23(14A)

In straightforward language, a domestic support obligation includes a debt owed to or recoverable by a governmental unit. Mindy’s debt for overpayment of the child care benefits falls directly within this ambit. ... As a general matter, actual, reasonable and necessary child care expenses for a working parent are in the nature of support for a child.

Section 101(14A) does not treat a divorce-related property settlement as a domestic support obligation when the debt is not in the nature of support.

Roest v. Roest (In re Roest) · filed 2017-06-14(14A)

The court finds no genuine issue of material fact in support of the Defendant’s characterization of the Plaintiffs debt as a domestic support obligation within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14A) and 523(a)(5).

An attorney’s fee award imposed primarily as a sanction for conduct is not a domestic support obligation when it is not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.

O'Brien v. Skubic · filed 2017-07-21(14A)(B)

Because the First Order is unclear as to how much consideration was given to the financial needs of the parties, and because the underlying statute did not even require the Superior Court to consider such, pursuant to Strickland and 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A), this Court makes its own determination as to whether the Fee Award is a DSO. Based on this Court’s own simple inquiry into what the Superior Court considered in making the Fee Award, it appears that the Superior Court must have given great weight to the other factors it mentioned, which would include the numerous instances of wrongful conduct by the Debtor asserted by Skubic, and therefore this Court finds that the Fee Award is primarily a sanction for the Debtor’s conduct, was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and is thus not a DSO.

Section 101(14A) requires a domestic support obligation to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support; attorney fees from later litigation do not qualify merely because the dispute arose during a divorce.

Crowder v. Wilbur (In re Wilbur) · filed 2017-07-27(14A)

The fact that the Defamation Complaint may have been based on incidents that occurred during the course of Defendant’s and Ms. Riley’s estrangement and divorce does not mean that any fees awarded in subsequent litigation are in the nature of support when there is no indication in the Defamation Order that they were intended as support.

Section 101(14A) defines domestic support obligations to include qualifying debts established by a divorce judgment.

In re LaForce · filed 2017-09-06(14A)

This Court finds that the Judgment of Divorce is a domestic support obligation within the meaning of the Code,... and is thus entitled to the most favorable treatment and paramount consideration-when it comes to determining what constitutes Debtor’s estate.