11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(11) defines a custodian to include a receiver appointed outside bankruptcy over a debtor’s property.

Thomas G. Gialamas · filed 2020-09-21(11)

Receiver Stark appears to squarely fit the statute’s definition of a “custodian,” that is “a receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under” title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11) does not treat an escrow agent as a custodian when the agent holds property to resolve a dispute between two parties rather than administer the debtor’s property for creditors generally.

DeFlora Lake Development Associates, Inc. v. Hyde Park, a Wisconsin Limited Partnership · filed 2021-04-29(11)

Escrow agents are generally not considered “custodians” under § 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code because they are not “engaged in the general administration of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors.” ... Wrobel is not a “custodian” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(11)'s definition of custodian includes a person who held and preserved the debtor's records before and after the bankruptcy petition.

In re Genesis Gas & Oil Colorado, LLC · filed 2025-10-20(11)

The categories of custodians listed in § 101(11) are meant to be descriptive rather than exhaustive.7 ... Here, Kimmel had the Records, which are property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, prior to the petition date, and has continued to preserve and store them.10 As such, Kimmel is a custodian and is entitled to an administrative expense claim pursuant to § 503(b)(3)(E) for the actual and necessary expenses of storing and preserving the Records.

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” covers a debtor who farms.

Augustine v. United States (In Re Augustine) · filed 1980-10-30(17)

Peter Augustine is a farmer as defined in 101(17), 11 U.S.C. § 101(17).

Section 101(17) requires a debtor to have derived more than 80% of the prior year’s gross income from farming to qualify as a farmer.

In Re Johnson · filed 1981-08-20(17)

In an involuntary case whether debtor is a farmer is a factual question to be pled and proven under 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) that more than 80% of his prior year’s gross income was so derived.

Section 101(17) defines a debtor who was farming when the petition was filed as a farmer for purposes of available exemptions.

Central National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Liming (In Re Liming) · filed 1982-09-02(17)

At the time of his petition filing the debtor was a farmer as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) so as to qualify for exemptions allowed by law.

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” does not govern whether a debtor may avoid a lien on farming tools under Section 522(f).

Matter of Decker · filed 1983-11-21(17)

The definition of “farmer” contained in Section 101(17) is inapplicable to Section 522. For purposes of Section 522, the debtor need only prove that he is legitimately engaged in a trade which regularly uses the specific tools or implements being exempted.

Section 101(17) defines a farmer by income from farming in the preceding taxable year, regardless of whether the person is still farming when the petition is filed.

Potmesil v. Alexandria Production Credit Ass'n · filed 1984-09-18(17)

We merely point out that § 101(17) plainly speaks in terms of the “preceding” taxable year without any mention of a person’s status at the time the petition is filed. We do not see why we should look at appellants’ status at anytime other than when the statute calls for.

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” applies where the Bankruptcy Code uses that word; it does not determine whether a debtor practices farming for lien avoidance under § 522(f).

In Re LaFond · filed 1984-12-20(17)

The Court concludes that Congress intended that the definition of “farmer” at § 101(17) was to be applied only where the word “farmer” itself was used in the Bankruptcy Code as, for instance, in 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).

Section 101(17)'s income test establishes farmer status, but a debtor who does not meet it may still qualify based on farming activity or an intent to resume farming.

Middleton v. Farmers State Bank of Fosston · filed 1985-01-18(17)

This definition is not all inclusive. It simply created an irrebutable presumption that if the debtor satisfies the definition contained in § 101(17) he is a farmer.

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” does not control whether a debtor may avoid a lien on farming tools under § 522(f)(2)(B).

Flick v. United States Through Farmers Home Admin. · filed 1985-03-06(17)

We will affirm the bankruptcy court’s holding that the definition of “farmer” in § 101(17) is not controlling for purposes of the “tools of the trade” avoidance provision.

Section 101(17)’s 80 percent income test does not determine whether a debtor is a farmer for purposes of lien avoidance under § 522.

Production Credit Ass'n of St. Cloud v. LaFond · filed 1985-07-08(17)

The language of § 522 does not expressly require application of § 101 definitions to lien avoidance procedures. ... This court agrees and refuses to apply such a restrictive definition without express direction from Congress.

Income from an IRA funded with prior years’ farming income does not count as farming income when determining whether a debtor is a farmer.

Matter of Wagner · filed 1985-09-23(17) and (18)

Income from the distribution of a personal retirement accounts “IRA” funded by income in prior years is not income from farming, but rather income from investment.

Sections 101(17) and 101(18) exclude proceeds from farm equipment sales and rent paid without exposure to farming risks from income from a farming operation.

Armstrong v. Corn Belt Bank · filed 1985-12-11(17), (18)

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court’s findings that the sale of farm equipment and the rental income are not “income from a farming operation” pursuant to section 101(17) is AFFIRMED.

Section 101(17) requires more than 80 percent of a debtor’s gross income to come from a farming operation it owns or operates to qualify as a farmer.

In Re Dakota Lay'd Eggs · filed 1986-02-07(17)

Differentiation of the source of DCFs income in the foregoing fashion indicates that 69.68% of gross income for the 1984-85 taxable year was derived from a farming operation owned or operated by DCI. Accordingly, DCI has failed to meet the specifically mandated percentage requirement of section 101(17) and, for purposes of section 303(a), is not a farmer. It may be placed in involuntary Chapter 7 providing the remaining elements of section 303 are met.

Section 101(17)’s definition of farmer is conclusive only when another Bankruptcy Code provision specifically mentions a farmer; it does not determine lien avoidance under § 522(f)(2)(B).

In Re Schuette · filed 1986-03-05(17)

Section 522(f) refers to a debtor, not a farmer, therefore, the definition of farmer found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) should not be determinative for the purpose of avoiding a lien under § 522(f)(2)(B).

Section 101(17)'s definition of “farmer” applies only where the Bankruptcy Code uses the word “farmer”; it does not determine who is engaged in farming under section 522(f).

Production Credit Association of St. Cloud v. LaFond · filed 1986-05-14(17)

The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court's holding that "Congress intended that the definition of 'farmer' at Sec. 101(17) was to be applied only where the word 'farmer' itself was used in the Bankruptcy Code, as, for instance, in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 303(a)." ... We find this view well supported by the language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the case law and by the policy behind section 522 which is "to give debtors a fresh start." Augustine v. United States, 675 F.2d 582, 584 (3d Cir.1982).

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” applies where the Bankruptcy Code uses that word; it does not determine whether a debtor is engaged in farming under § 522(f).

Production Credit Ass'n of St. Cloud v. LaFond (In re LaFond) · filed 1986-05-14(17)

The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s holding that “Congress intended that the definition of ‘farmer’ at § 101(17) was to be applied only where the word ‘farmer’ itself was used in the Bankruptcy Code, as, for instance, in 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).” ... We find this view well supported by the language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the case law and by the policy behind section 522 which is “to give debtors a fresh start.” Augustine v. United States, 675 F.2d 582, 584 (3d Cir.1982).

Section 101's definition of “farmer” does not control whether an implement is used in a debtor's trade for lien avoidance.

In Re Liming · filed 1986-07-29(17)-(18)

Further, the statutory definition of "farmer" in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(17)-(18) is not controlling for purposes of the tool of the trade provisions.

Section 101(17) uses the federal income tax meaning of gross income to determine whether a debtor meets the 80 percent farming-income test.

In the Matter of William W. Wagner, Debtor-Appellant · filed 1986-12-11(17)

Yet, on balance, the interpretation that will best carry out Congress’s purposes in the Bankruptcy Code is that gross income for purposes of the farmer’s exemption has the same meaning as in the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 101(17) defines family farmer eligibility for Chapter 12 by reference to debt and farm income requirements.

In Re Henderson · filed 1987-02-13(17)

After reviewing the testimony of each of the debtors, it is the opinion of this Court, that the debtors each meet the threshold requirements for eligibility under Chapter 12.

Section 101(17) excludes farmers whose aggregate debts exceed $1.5 million on the petition date from Chapter 12 relief.

In Re Stedman · filed 1987-03-02(17)

As of February 12, 1987, the date of the Debtors’ Chapter 12 petition, their indebtedness was $1,544,103.43. Thus, the Debtors indebtedness exceeded $1,500,000.00 and they were ineligible for Chapter 12 relief at that time.

Section 101(17) excludes payment for custom farm services on another’s crop from farming-operation income when the service provider does not bear the inherent risks of farming.

In Re Hampton · filed 1987-03-05(17)

The court therefore finds that the income derived from the custom contract was not income from a farming operation. Adding the income from the custom contract to the debtors’ other non-farm income exceeds 50% of the debtors’ total income for the tax year preceding the filing of this case. The debtors are therefore not qualified for relief under Chapter 12.

Section 101(17)(A) measures the $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit for an individual family farmer as of the petition date.

In Re Orr · filed 1987-03-23(17)(A)

11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) does not state as of what date the aggregate debts are determined for purposes of the $1,500,000 limitation. The court will use the petition date of January 9, 1987, to make that determination in this case.

Section 101(17)’s family farmer income test uses income from the preceding taxable year; a settlement omitted from that year’s tax return cannot count as farm income.

In Re Nelson · filed 1987-04-17(17)

Therefore, whether or not the tax laws would consider the settlement as income in 1985 is irrelevant: debtors’ farm income for 1985 is presumptively reflected by their 1985 income tax return declarations. Because debtors did not declare the settlement as income on their 1985 tax returns, the Court holds it cannot be considered as farm income for purposes of the 50% test.

Section 101(17)’s family farmer income test includes rental income from farmland and equipment when the rental arrangement is intertwined with the family’s farming operation.

In Re Rott · filed 1987-04-20(17)

Moreover, the Debtors in working with their son in an attempt to save the farm, are so intertwined as a family farm operation, that the rental income must be characterized as income from a farming operation in determining the Debtors’ eligibility for Chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(17)(A) excludes debtors from the family farmer definition when they were only minimally engaged in farming in the preceding year, sold all their farmland before filing, and do not intend to resume farming.

In Re Tart · filed 1987-04-23(17)(A)

Based on this legislative history and the definition of “family farmer” as an individual “engaged in a farming operation,” this court holds that the debtors in this case who were, at most, ... only minimally engaged in farming during the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which their petition was filed, who had sold all their farmland prior to the filing of their petition, and who do not intend to resume any farming operations, do not qualify for relief under chapter 12.

Section 101(20) includes breeding, raising, and selling horses as a farming operation, but excludes fee-based training and showing services.

In Re McKillips · filed 1987-04-27(20)

Here, of the various aspects of the Debtors’ business, only the breeding for purposes of horses to be sold, the raising of horses for sale, and the actual sale of the colts or horses constitute farming operations. ... The Debtors are, for a fee, providing a service, not producing a farm product.

Section 101(20) gives a nonexclusive definition of farming operation that can include an integrated horse and dairy operation.

In Re Wolline · filed 1987-04-28(20)

The term “farming operation” as used in 11 U.S.C. § 101(20), contains examples of the types of activity intended to be encompassed. That list is not inclusive. It is illustrative only and includes “ranching” and “raising of livestock.” Although this debtor’s operation does not completely fall within either of these particular categories, it is closely related to “ranching” and “raising of livestock.” In view of this and because the debtor also operates a dairy farm, his overall operation constitutes a “farming operation.”

Section 101(17)’s definition of “farmer” does not apply when determining whether a debtor may avoid a lien under § 522(f).

Meadows v. Farmers & Merchants National Bank of Stanley (In Re Meadows) · filed 1987-04-29(17)

The court agrees with the Meadows and the holding in In re LaFond, 45 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr.D.Minn.1984) that the definition of "farmer” laid out in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) was not intended for use in proceedings under § 522(f).

Section 101(17)(B) requires a corporate family farmer to have at least 80 percent of its aggregate non-contingent, liquidated debts arise from its farming operation; debts assumed to acquire farmland do not qualify.

Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance v. S Farms One, Inc. (In Re S Farms One, Inc.) · filed 1987-04-30(17)(B)

An examination of the facts in this case, in light of the definitions and requirements of the Code, leads the Court to the conclusion that this Debtor does not qualify as a family farmer within the meaning and requirements of section 109. This Debtor has no history of engaging in the agricultural business. The limited number of debts that this Debtor has did not arise out of farming operations, but were assumed as part of the acquisition of the property.

Section 101(17)(A) does not allow spouses to divide their joint debts between separate cases to meet the Chapter 12 family farmer debt limit.

In Re Johnson · filed 1987-05-01(17)(A)

This Court having carefully studied the provisions of Chapter 12 finds no justification in any of the Chapter 12 Code provisions or the legislative history to support the separate filings by the husband and wife family farmers in this case in order to circumvent the debt limitations set out in § 101(17)(A).

Section 101(20) includes income from hauling neighbors’ cattle when that work is part of the debtor’s ranching operation.

In Re Guinnane · filed 1987-05-05(20)

I conclude from the testimony that the hauling of cattle for third parties is tied directly to the efficiency of the Debtors’ farming operation because it aids and constitutes a part of the Debtors’ ranching operation.

Section 101(17) excludes a corporate landlord that only negotiates cash leases and collects rent from the definition of “family farmer.”

In Re Mary Freese Farms, Inc. · filed 1987-05-08(17)

A cash rent corporate landlord of a farm, who contributes nothing more to the farm operation than negotiating the lease and collecting the rent is not a “family farmer” as defined by § 101(17) of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act.

Section 101(20) includes hay cutting under a 50/50 share crop arrangement within the definition of a farming operation.

In Re Martin · filed 1987-05-11(20)

The Debtors, in this instance, are conducting a farming operation squarely within the definition of 101(20), which is the “production” of crops.

Sections 101(17) and (18) count proceeds from the sale of farm equipment as farming income but exclude rent paid up front for farmland when the owner bears no farming risk.

In the Matter of Bernard Armstrong, Debtor-Appellant · filed 1987-05-14(17), (18)

We hold the sale of the farming equipment should have been considered as received from the farming operation, reversing the ruling of the lower tribunals on this item. However, we affirm the lower courts' ruling that the rental income and interest from the farm account was not received from the farming operation.

Section 101(18) allows a qualifying family farmer to use regular annual income from any source to fund a Chapter 12 plan, if the income is sufficiently stable and regular.

In Re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc. · filed 1987-05-19(18)

Thus, I find that a family farmer who otherwise qualifies under § 101(17) may be a family farmer with regular income within the meaning of § 101(18) if it can show it will have regular annual income, from whatever source, that is sufficiently stable and regular to fund the plan.

Section 101 treats a debt from settling a dispute over farmland as arising out of a farming operation when the settlement directly preserves the debtor’s farm.

Matter of Rinker · filed 1987-05-22(17)(A), (20)

Again, whether it be in the context of a sale, a lawsuit, a settlement of a lawsuit, or the effectuation of a will, the focus of the inquiry is on the subject matter of the proceeding in question. To the extent a debt arises out of such a proceeding and the subject matter of the proceeding falls within the definition of farming operation under section 101(20), the section 101(17)(A) criterion will have been satisfied.

Section 101(18) permits a Chapter 12 family farmer’s regular annual income to include non-farm income contributed by individual partners if it is sufficiently stable and regular to fund the plan.

In Re Hoskins · filed 1987-05-28(18)

In the Chapter 12 proceeding, if a debtor has sufficiently stable and regular income, be that income from farming operations or from non-farming sources such as contributions from the individual partners, the debtor should be able to have his plan confirmed.

Section 101(17)(A) requires individual Chapter 12 debtors to have received at least 50% of their gross income from farming operations in the year before filing.

In Re Lawless · filed 1987-05-29(17)(A)

It was admittedly conceded by counsel for debtors that they did not receive 50% of their gross income, in the year preceding the filing of the petition, from farming operations. That is a sine qua non for relief under Chapter 12. (11 U.S.C. Section 101(17)(A)).

Section 101(17)(A) requires an individual and spouse to receive more than half their gross income from a farming operation in the taxable year before filing to qualify as family farmers.

In Re Welch · filed 1987-05-29(17)(A)

“Family Farmer” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) requires that an individual and spouse receive more than fifty-percent of gross income from a “farming operation” in the taxable year immediately preceding the year of filing the petition. The facts above demonstrate these debtors are family farmers within the definition of the code at the time of filing, whether it be in 1986 or 1987.

A corporation does not qualify as a family farmer when its shareholders merely lease farmland to a tenant and receive rent rather than conduct the farming operation.

Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc. (In Re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc.) · filed 1987-06-05(17)(B)

The debtor is not eligible for relief under chapter 12 because its shareholders do not “conduct a farming operation” within a reasonable interpretation of the term as it is used in the definition of a corporate family farmer.

Section 101(17)'s $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit for a family farmer is measured as of the bankruptcy petition date.

In Re Labig · filed 1987-06-08(17)

Section 101(17) is silent regarding the appropriate date to determine the amount of debt for purposes of the $1,500,000 limitation, but this court believes it reasonable to use the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Section 101(17)(A) measures family farmer eligibility using income from the taxable year before filing; agricultural program payments and proceeds from selling farm machinery count as farm income.

In Re Shepherd · filed 1987-06-16(17)(A)

As there is no ambiguity in the definition section, the Court should use the Debtors’ gross income from farming operations in 1985. ... Returning to the question of the proper characterization of the ASCS program payments, under the standard set forth above, they are properly considered farm income. ... Next, turning to the question of the proceeds from the sale of the farm machinery, they are also properly considered farm income.

Section 101(17) uses the federal tax definition of gross income to determine whether a debtor receives more than half of their income from farming.

In Re Pratt · filed 1987-06-24(17)

The rationale of the Wagner case is likewise applicable to Section 101(17) of the 1986 Act, and thus requires an application of the IRS Code definition of gross income as an eligibility test for a family farmer.

Section 101(20) does not treat merely marketing and storing crops as a farming operation.

Matter of Haschke · filed 1987-06-26(20)

This Court does not believe that mere marketing and storing of crops constitutes “production or raising of crops” pursuant to § 101(20).

Section 101(17)(B)(ii) excludes debt on a partner’s principal residence from the 80% farm debt calculation, but not from the $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit.

In Re Henderson Ranches · filed 1987-07-01(17)(B)(ii)

I conclude the single residence dwelling exception is applicable only to the 80% farm debt requirement and is not applicable to the $1,500,000.00 total debt limitation.

An individual who merely leases farmland is not engaged in a farming operation and does not qualify as a family farmer under § 101(17)(A).

In Re Cobb · filed 1987-07-08(17)(A)

The, mere leasing of farm land does not qualify an individual to be a family farmer as contemplated by the family farmer provisions of the 1986 Act.

Section 101(17)(A) counts estate tax debts incurred to preserve an inherited farm as debts arising out of a farming operation.

In Re Roberts · filed 1987-08-24(17)(A)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the debts which resulted from the death of the Debtor’s mother arise out of a farming operation for purposes of 11 U.S.C. Sections 101(17)(A) and 101(20).

Section 101(20) does not treat a separate business cleaning other farmers’ chicken houses and selling fertilizer as the debtor’s farming operation.

Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. McNeal · filed 1987-08-26(20)

Even under the broad criteria adopted in Guinnane, the chicken house cleaning and fertilizer sales do not qualify as farming operations as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(20).

Cash rent from farmland can count toward the family farmer income threshold based on the circumstances of the debtor’s farming operation.

In Re Easton · filed 1987-09-10(17)(A)

This Court believes that the cash rent received from rental of part of the farm to the next generation of the Easton family should be included in the farm income.

Section 101(17)(A) counts debt secured by non-farm property as arising out of a farming operation if the funds were borrowed for and used in farming; the debtor bears the burden of showing both.

In Re Douglass · filed 1987-09-11(17)(A)

To summarize then, debts secured by non-farm property may still “arise out of a farming operation” if they were actually procured for and used in the farming operation, but the burden of showing that purpose and that use rests upon the debtor.

Section 101(17)'s definition of farmer does not apply to exemption and lien avoidance issues.

In re Smith · filed 1987-09-25(17)

It is important to note that the definition of farmer under 11 U.S.C. section 101(17) is not applicable to exemption and lien avoidance issues.

Section 101’s definition of farmer does not apply to exemption and lien avoidance issues.

In re Clausen · filed 1988-01-11

It is important to note that the definition of farmer under 11 U.S.C. section 101 is not applicable to exemption and lien avoidance issues.

Section 101(19)’s definition of farmer does not determine whether a debtor may exempt farm equipment as tools of the trade under section 522(f).

South Atlantic Production Credit Ass'n v. Jones (In Re Jones) · filed 1988-06-10(19)

For purposes of section 522(f), the Debtor does not have to prove that he meets the section 101(19) definition of farmer to exempt farm equipment as his tools of the trade. He only needs to prove that he is legitimately in the trade using those tools.

Section 101(17)(A) defines a family farmer in part by a $1,500,000 aggregate debt limit and a requirement that at least eighty percent of aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts arise from farming.

In Re Edwards · filed 1988-06-10(17)(A)

Clearly, therefore, in June 1987, debtors did not meet the definition of “family farmer” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A), which limits aggregate debts to $1,500,000 and requires that not less than eighty percent of the aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts arise out of their farming operation. Three months later, by virtue of the discharge in the Chapter 7 case, debtors met both of these requirements and, presumably, the gross income requirement contained in the same provision as well.

A corporation qualifies as a family farmer only if the qualifying family or its relatives conduct the farming operation.

In Re Garako Farms, Inc. · filed 1988-12-16(17)(B)

The key words in this case are “and such family or such relatives conduct the farming operation.” ... The Debtor has failed to convince this Court that the Debtor is a family farmer as is required under Bankruptcy Code Section 101(17)(B) and therefore the Debtor failed to prove that the plan complies with the provisions of Chapter 12 and other provisions of Title 11 as is required in Bankruptcy Code Section 1225(a)(1) and therefore confirmation of said plan is denied.

A land lessor may qualify as a family farmer when the lessor plays a significant role in crop production on the rented land.

State Bank of Towner v. Edwards (In re Edwards) · filed 1991-02-04(17)(A)

We agree with the district court that the Edwards are family farmers as defined by section 101(17)(A). ... There was evidence that the Edwards had a significant role in the crop production taking place on their rented land.

Section 101(20) permits a corporation continuing an individual's farming business with the same assets to count that individual's prior-year farming income when determining whether it is a farmer.

In Re KZK Livestock, Inc. · filed 1992-11-24(20)

The issue is whether, under the statutory definitions, and the “continuity of interest” rule discussed above, this Court can consider the farming income of Kendall Knowles in 1990, as attributable to the Debtor, a corporation. ... Because courts have concluded that Congress intended the term “gross income” be used in its tax sense, this Court finds it would be inappropriate to disregard the “continuity of interest” principle which is so well-recognized in tax law.

Section 101(20)'s definition of “farmer” does not determine eligibility for Minnesota's farm machinery exemption.

In Re Zimmel · filed 1995-09-01(20)

11 U.S.C. § 101(20), does not determine qualification of individuals for the exemption provided by Minn.Stat. 550.37, Subd. 5.

Section 101(20) counts a debtor’s share of a joint venture’s gross farming income toward the 80 percent threshold for qualifying as a farmer.

In Re Bli · filed 2004-04-27(20)

There can be no doubt in this case that if these Debtors’ shares of the gross income of the venture, contrary to the position of the UST, are attributed to them, they meet the 80% test of 11 U.S.C. § 101(20). ... Rather, the essence and thrust of the provision involves whether it is the Debtor’s effort and activity which produces the crops and whether the debtor’s efforts are primarily devoted to it, not the type of organization through which the farming operation or those efforts are carried on. ... By reason of the foregoing, the Court concludes that each of the Debtors is a “farmer” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of precluding conversion of their Chapter 11 eases to Chapter 7 cases.

Section 101(20) uses the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of gross income to determine whether a debtor qualifies as a farmer.

In Re Fonke · filed 2004-06-17(20)

Since gross income is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, this Court equates gross income under § 101(20) with the definition of gross income contained in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 101(20) treats a corporation as a farmer when more than 80 percent of its income comes from a farming operation.

Franzen v. Nonstock · filed 2004-12-16(20)

In sum, we conclude that Corn-Pro was engaged in a farming operation. Since all its income was from that farming operation, it is a farmer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

A corporation can be engaged in a farming operation through independent contractors acting on its behalf when it is significantly involved in raising livestock.

Cooperative Supply, Inc. v. Corn-Pro Nonstock Cooperative, Inc. (In Re Corn-Pro Nonstock Cooperative, Inc.) · filed 2004-12-16(21)

The fact that they were paid as independent contractors, and not as employees, does not alter the fact that they were acting for the corporation. In that capacity, they oversaw the care of the animals, physically checked on the animals, arranged for the purchase and marketing of the animals, ordered at least some of the feed, gave some of the vaccinations, and hired transportation for moving the hogs to slaughter. Corn-Pro, therefore, is not a passive investor; instead, it had significant involvement in the raising of the livestock, the sale of which generated all of its income.

A person qualifies as a farmer when more than 80 percent of their gross income in the preceding taxable year came from a farming operation they owned or operated.

Rinehart v. Sharp (In Re Sharp) · filed 2007-01-22(20)

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record indicating that any order buying that Sharp did for Goll would have reduced the eighty percent income requirement and thereby disprove Sharp’s statement that he was a farmer as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(18)(A) limits family farmer status to individuals whose aggregate debts do not exceed $3,544,525.

McKinnon v. Prime South Bank (In Re McKinnon) · filed 2007-09-24(18)(A)

Debtor does not qualify as a "family farmer” entitled to chapter 12 relief because his aggregate debts total $4,169,140 which exceeds the statutory maximum of $3,544,525 as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)(A).

Section 101(20) defines a farmer by requiring more than 80 percent of gross income in the relevant taxable years to come from a farming operation.

Lakefront Investors LLC v. Clarkson · filed 2012-10-26(20)

The Debtors in this case are not farmers, as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, because they did not receive more than 80 percent of their gross income during the relevant taxable years from a "farming operation.”

Section 101(18)(A) requires a family farmer’s qualifying farming debts to be at least 50% of aggregate debts and farming income to exceed 50% of gross income in the specified tax years; gravel sales do not count as farming.

In re Carter · filed 2017-05-11(18)(A)

While the Debtor satisfies the first three elements of § 101(18)(A), the Debtor does not satisfy the final two elements and, thus, is not eligible for Chapter 12 relief.

Section 101(20) counts income from a debtor’s own farming toward its 80% requirement, but excludes income from reselling agricultural products produced by others.

Mosher v. Herrell · filed 2020-10-27(20)

But the test for § 101(20) concerns only the source of a debtor’s income.

Section 101(20) requires more than 80% of a person’s gross income in the preceding taxable year to come from a farming operation to qualify as a farmer; income from processed poultry products does not count.

Pure Prairie Poultry, Inc. · filed 2025-02-05(20)

Because the movants have not shown that at least 80% of Pure Prairie’s 2023 income came from the sale of eggs—or other farm products in an “unmanufactured state”—the Court concludes that Pure Prairie is not a “farmer” and may be the subject of an involuntary proceeding.

Section 101(20) requires a debtor to have received more than 80 percent of its gross income from a farming operation during the taxable year immediately before filing to qualify as a farmer.

Elfand Organization LLC · filed 2025-11-20(20)

Section 1112(c) states that a case cannot be converted to chapter 7 if the debtor is a “farmer,” but a debtor is not a “farmer” for this purpose unless the debtor received more than 80 percent of its gross income from a farming operation during the taxable year immediately preceding the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 101(20). At oral argument the Debtor’s counsel acknowledged that he had no evidence that the Debtor could qualify as a “farmer” under this definition.

Section 101 does not define “executory contract,” so courts look to case law for its meaning.

Record Company, Inc. v. Bummbusiness, Inc. (In Re Record Company, Inc.) · filed 1981-01-09

“Executory contract” is not defined in either § 101 or § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, nor was there a statutory definition in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

Section 101(31) treats the initial filing as the only petition in a bankruptcy case.

In Re Garland Corp. · filed 1981-01-21(31)

Despite some printer’s insistence on entitling their forms “Petitions”, there is only one petition in any case and that is the initial petition, 11 U.S.C. § 101(31).

Section 101(36) defines “petition” to include an involuntary petition that commences a bankruptcy case.

Manson Billard, Inc. v. Hoffman Industries Inc. (In Re Manson Billard, Inc.) · filed 1988-02-25(36)

The term “petition” as used in this section includes the date of the filing of an involuntary, which “commences” a case. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). Thus, read together, § 101(36) and § 348(a) suggest that debtors’ decision to convert did not change the date of filing or the date of commencement, both of which were the date on which the involuntary was filed.

Section 101(36) uses “case” in its definition of “petition” to include a proceeding converted from one relief chapter to another.

Workmans Forest Products, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. (In re Workmans Forest Products, Inc.) · filed 1988-01-22(36)

Secondly, given the express intention of 11 U.S.C. § 348(a) that the date of the filing of a petition not change as a result of a change in relief, it is clear that the word “case” as used in the definition of petition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(36) is used in a general sense as including any of the relief chapters mentioned.

Section 101(42) defines a petition as a filing that commences a bankruptcy case; a filing by a debtor barred under § 109(g) is not a petition.

In Re Hollberg · filed 1997-04-30(42)

Thus, any document labeled “petition” that such a debtor files during the 180-day bar of a § 109(g) dismissal is not the filing of a petition as defined in § 101(42) and thus gives rise to no automatic stay under § 362(a).

Section 101(42) defines a petition as the filing that commences a bankruptcy case; converting the case does not create a second petition.

In Re Carter · filed 2001-03-23(42)

That is, there is only one “petition” per bankruptcy case. It is noted that a subsequent conversion from a chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) is accomplished by filing a “notice of conversion” pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017(f)(3).

Section 101(42) defines a petition as a filing under sections 301, 302, 303, or 304 that commences a case under Title 11; a complaint invoking section 304 does not qualify.

Blackwell v. Rio Management, Inc. (In Re Blackwell for the Estate of I.G. Services Ltd.) · filed 2001-06-21(42)

A “petition” is defined as a “petition filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 304 of [Title 11], as the case may be, commencing a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) (emphasis added). If we were to conclude that a complaint properly “commenced a case” under title 11, a party could simply file a complaint against another party in a bankruptcy court without either party first filing a petition for bankruptcy relief — making a shambles of jurisdiction analysis. A complaint alleging jurisdiction under § 304 is not a substitute for an actual § 304 petition.

Section 101(42) defines a petition to include an involuntary petition filed under section 303.

In Re Tanzi · filed 2002-12-19(42)

There is no authority for reading such a distinction into the statute. In fact, the term “petition” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) as a “petition filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 304 of this title.”

Section 101(42) defines “petition” to include filings that commence voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy cases.

Tanzi v. Comerica Bank-California (In Re Tanzi) · filed 2003-08-11(42)

Likewise, the Code’s definition of “petition” does not differentiate between involuntary and voluntary filings, simply providing that “ ‘petition’ means petition filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 304 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title ....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42).

Section 101(42) defines a bankruptcy petition by reference to the provisions for commencing a case; a document filed by someone ineligible to be a debtor does not qualify.

In Re Salazar · filed 2006-03-29(42)

Section 101(42) defines a petition as a "petition filed under section 301, 203, 303, or 304 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42). To attribute legal significance to misnomered documents (i.e., those filed not by someone eligible to be a debtor) is to remove the meaning of the statute.

Section 101(42) defines a bankruptcy petition as a filing that commences a case, even if the filer is ineligible for relief.

Adams v. Zarnel · filed 2010-08-26(42)

Thus, a petition filed under §§ 301, 302, or 303 both “operates as a stay,” id. § 362(a), and commences a bankruptcy case, id. § 101(42).

Section 101(42) includes a petition filed under former § 304 among petitions that commence a bankruptcy case.

Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd. v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2011-04-12(42)

The Bankruptcy Code also defines “petition” as a “petition filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 304 of this ... title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) (emphasis added). The statutory language is clear: a § 304 proceeding is a case for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1334(b).

Section 101(42) defines “petition” to include a chapter 15 petition, whose filing date can start the § 553(b) look-back period.

Charles Russell, LLP Ex Rel. Awal Bank, BSC v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (In Re Awal Bank, BSC) · filed 2011-08-04(42)

As noted above, Bankruptcy Code § 101(42) defines “petition” as a “petition filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 1504 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42). Thus, “petition” as used in § 553(b) and quoted above, includes the chapter 15 petition date as the relevant date for the start of the look-back period.

Section 101(42) includes a chapter 15 petition in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “petition”.

In Re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd. · filed 2011-08-26(42)

Section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that chapter 1 (which includes § 108) applies in a case under chapter 15, and § 101(42) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended in 2010, provides that the term “petition” includes a petition filed under chapter 15. ... The thorough and convincing analysis in that case is adopted here. The foreign representatives are entitled to confirmation as to the availability of § 108 relief in this chapter 15 case.

Section 101(42) defines a petition as a filing under the listed Bankruptcy Code provisions that commences a bankruptcy case.

In re Zavala · filed 2014-01-03(42)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “petition” as a “petition filed under section 301, 302, 303 and 1504 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42). The Application was filed under Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 683.40. See Dkt. 27, Exh. 203. Therefore, the Application was not a petition for purposes of LBR 9011-2(a).

Section 101(42) defines “petition” to include an involuntary petition filed under § 303.

Troutman Enterprises v. Dinsmore & Shohl · filed 2007-01-26(42)

The triggering date for computation of the preference period under § 547 and for avoidance of fraudulent transfers under § 548 is the date of the filing of the petition, not the date of entry of an order for relief. Emerson v. Maples (In re Mark Benskin & Co.), 161 B.R. 644, 650-51 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993); Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. (In re Workmans Forest Prods., Inc.), 82 B.R. 551, 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(42) (defining “petition” to include an involuntary petition filed under § 303).

Section 101 defines “person” to include an individual, who may therefore seek Chapter 11 relief.

Matter of Woodhouse · filed 1981-05-20(30)

Further, 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) defines “person” as follows: “(30) ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit” Emphasis the Court’s. Hence, an “individual” as defined under the Bankruptcy Code is not prohibited from seeking relief under Chapter 11 as well as Chapter 7, based upon the facts presented herein.

Section 101’s definitions of “debtor” and “person” do not make a partnership or corporation an “individual debtor” for the earnings exception in § 541(a)(6).

B & W Enterprises, Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In Re B & W Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1982-04-13(12), (30)

An “individual debtor”, when the definitional sections are reconciled, is a debtor who is an “individual”, not a single or sole individual, partnership or corporation.

Section 101(35) includes a corporation that sells health care devices within the definition of a person.

Larson v. Kreisers, Inc. (In Re Kreisers, Inc.) · filed 1990-04-18(35)

The bankruptcy statute’s definition of a person in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) does not exclude a corporation organized to sell health care devices. A person, for Chapter 7 purposes, includes a corporation such as Kreisers.

Section 101(35) excludes a decedent’s estate from the definition of “person” for filing a bankruptcy petition, but does not bar reopening the debtor’s existing Chapter 11 case after death.

In Re Walters · filed 1990-05-02(35)

Of the two positions available, this Court adopts the view that a case may be reopened for the limited purpose of determining the validity of liens despite the death of the debtor. Reopening the case cannot hinge solely on whether or not the debtor now meets the Bankruptcy Code’s narrow definition of a debtor.

Section 101’s definitions of “insider” and “person” distinguish individuals from partnerships and corporations, supporting the conclusion that “individual” excludes those entities.

Snug Enterprises, Inc. v. Sage (In Re Snug Enterprises, Inc.) · filed 1994-06-13(31), (41)

Although “individual” is not defined specifically in the bankruptcy code, the court may infer from other definitions in the code that “individual” does not include partnerships or corporations. The bankruptcy code’s definition of “insider” differentiates between individuals, partnerships and corporations. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). The code’s definition of “person” makes the same distinction. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).

Section 101(41) excludes a real estate trust from the definition of “person,” making it ineligible to be a debtor under § 109(a).

In Re AMA Corp. · filed 1995-01-04(41)

On the eve of the sale, the real property was transferred from a real estate trust to a corporation because the real estate trust is not eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) defines "person” to "include[] individual, partnership, and corporation....” ... Section 109 does not allow an “entity” to be a debtor.

Section 101(31) distinguishes individuals from corporations, partnerships, and municipalities; an individual under the Bankruptcy Code is a natural person.

Rainwater v. Alabama (In Re Rainwater) · filed 1999-04-16(31)

Although the Bankruptcy Code fails to define an individual, § 101(31) lists the four separate categories of “insiders” as: (1) an individual; (2) a corporation; (3) a partnership; and (4) a municipality. The intent of the Bankruptcy Code is evident in alluding to the fact that an individual should be defined not as an entity, but rather as a natural person, a being, or a physical bodily person.

Section 101(41) does not treat a limited liability company as an individual for chapter 13 eligibility.

In Re McCormick · filed 2008-02-08(41)

Based on the Court’s interpretation of Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(41) and 109, a limited liability company is not eligible to file under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code because it is not considered to be an individual under the Code.

Section 101(41)’s definition of “person” excludes a decedent’s estate, so an estate cannot be a Chapter 7 debtor.

Howard Jackson Jr Estate · filed 2025-08-14(41)

The Bankruptcy Code and Eleventh Circuit authority make clear that an “estate” may not a debtor in chapter 7.

Section 101(14)(C) requires a disinterested professional to have no interest materially adverse to the estate or a class of creditors or equity holders.

Doug Gross Construction, Inc. · filed 2024-06-13(14)(C)

Here, Lippes Mathias is disinterested under the test established by 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C) because it does not represent Mr. Knowles in any respect.

Section 101(14) excludes counsel from the definition of a disinterested person when its ongoing representation of a major equity holder creates an actual conflict in negotiating the debtor’s reorganization plan.

Enviva Inc. · filed 2024-05-30(14)

The Court does find, however, that V&E’s connections with Riverstone, with no ethical walls (indeed, with the impossibility of erecting an ethical wall), render V&E not disinterested within the meaning of Section 327(a) of the Code.

Section 101(14)(C) permits prior adverse alignments in related cases to support a finding that proposed counsel has a materially adverse interest.

The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation · filed 2024-02-09(14)(C)

Coupled with their prior adverse alignments in related cases, the Court determines that a potential conflict of interest exists here. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(C) (person may have materially adverse interest “for any other reason”).

Section 101(14) defines a disinterested person to exclude creditors, equity security holders, insiders, and people with interests materially adverse to the estate.

FTX Trading, Ltd. v. · filed 2024-01-19(14)

First, an examiner must be “disinterested” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), which means a “creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider,” or anyone with “an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate” cannot be appointed to conduct a Section 1104(c) investigation.

Section 101(14)(A) excludes creditors, equity security holders, and insiders from the definition of a disinterested person.

United States Trustee v. Stone Fox Capital LLC (In re Stone Fox Capital LLC) · filed 2017-09-18(14)(A)

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A), a disinterested person “is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider[.]” ... Here, even if Debtor had sought court approval to employ Attorney Joseph, approval cannot be granted. Attorney Joseph initially identified himself as a creditor, continues to identify himself as the sole equity security holder, and is clearly an insider.

Section 101(14) defines a disinterested person to exclude someone with an interest materially adverse to the estate or creditors because of a relationship with the debtor.

In re Sun River Energy, Inc. · filed 2015-08-13(14)

The only issue is whether the Firm could have an interest materially adverse to the estate, creditors, or equity security holders by reason of a direct or indirect relationship to the Debtor. However, both the Trustee and his Firm come to this case as strangers and objective third parties. Other than the Trustee’s appointment as the estate’s fiduciary, neither he nor his Firm have any direct or indirect connection to the Debtor. Accordingly, the Firm meets the second requirement of § 327(a).

Section 101(14) excludes a person with an interest materially adverse to the estate from the definition of a disinterested person; speculation about a possible fraudulent-transfer recovery did not establish such an interest here.

In re Chardon, LLC · filed 2015-09-02(14)

A “disinterested person” for purposes of Section 327 is one who: ... (C) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason. ... Neither the U.S. Trustee nor FirstMerit have presented more than speculation to support this argument.

A third party’s payment of a bankruptcy professional’s retainer does not automatically make the professional disinterested; courts consider all the circumstances to decide whether the payment creates a disqualifying interest.

Waldron v. Adams & Reese, L.L.P. (In Re American International Refinery, Inc.) · filed 2012-03-29(14)

Thus, we now adopt the totality of the circumstances approach for deciding whether third-party payment of a retainer creates a disqualifying interest.

Section 101(13) permits the same person to serve as trustee for related estates despite an intercompany claim when the trustee has no personal interest or present conflict.

Hassett v. McColley (In Re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.) · filed 1982-02-05(13)

Though 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) expands and modifies in some respects its antecedents, I have determined that those changes do not affect the vitality of those cases decided under the prior law (the statute or rule) that address the issues within. ... The fact that Hassett as Chapter 11 trustee of OPM is a creditor of Cali or that Hassett as Chapter 11 trustee of Cali owns the stock of OPM does not prevent Hassett from being disinterested or constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.

Prior representation of a creditors’ committee does not, by itself, prevent counsel from being a disinterested person under § 101(13).

Matter of Codesco, Inc. · filed 1982-04-01(13)

Since the Anderson firm is not disqualified by any of the specific relationships delineated under 11 U.S.C. § 101(13), PAC predicates its objection to the trustee’s retention of the Anderson firm on the catch all clause “or for any other reason.” ... Thus, the only conflict that this court sees on the horizon is a proper one between PAC and the trustee, and not a disqualifying conflict between the Anderson firm and this estate.

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a person whose relationship with a controlling shareholder gives that person an interest materially adverse to the estate or equity holders from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1982-04-13(13)(E)

5. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E) states that a “disinterested person” means a person that “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph, or for any other reasons.” 6. Finley Kumble, by reason of its relationship with City and GDV, has an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate and to the common stockholders.

Section 101(13) excludes an attorney from being a disinterested person when prior representation creates an interest materially adverse to the debtor’s estate.

In Re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc. · filed 1982-05-27(13)

We hold further that because of their prior representation of Stein and Silverman, A&L has an interest materially adverse to the estate of the debtor.

Section 101(13)(D) excludes a person who is or was a debtor’s director or officer within two years before the petition from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re Leisure Dynamics, Inc. · filed 1983-02-04(13)(D)

11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(D) clearly indicates that individuals who are or have been directors or officers within two years before the filing of the petition are not “disinterested persons.”

Section 101(13)(A) excludes creditors, equity security holders, and debtor insiders from the definition of a disinterested person; section 101(25)(B) includes the debtor’s officers and directors among insiders.

In Re Leisure Dynamics, Inc. · filed 1983-08-01(13)(A), (25)(B)

The term “disinterested person” is defined in section 101(13)(A) as a person who is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider of the debtor. Under section 101(25)(B), insiders include officers and directors of the debtor. Accordingly, under section 327(a), a person can serve as an attorney to the trustee only if (1) he is not a security holder, creditor or director of the debtor and (2) he does not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate.

Section 101(13)(E) defines a disinterested attorney as one without an interest materially adverse to the estate, its creditors, or its equity security holders.

In Re Iorizzo · filed 1983-09-23(13)(E)

For our purposes, a “disinterested” attorney is defined by the Code to be an attorney who “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E).

Section 101(13)’s definition of a disinterested person excludes a law firm when one of its associated lawyers is an insider of the debtor, regardless of that lawyer’s position in the firm.

In Re Michigan Interstate Ry. Co., Inc. · filed 1983-10-05(13)

That may be formally correct, but this Court is of the opinion that the “insider” characteristics of one lawyer associated with the firm, whether he or she be an associate, a special partner, or a capital partner, are sufficient to strip the firm of its claim to disinterestedness.

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a debtor’s general partner from the definition of a disinterested person when the partner’s interest is materially adverse to creditors.

In Re Hempstead Realty Associates · filed 1983-11-17(13)(E)

Manifestly, Mr. Baker’s interest in the debtor as a general partner bars him from qualifying as a “disinterested person” within the meaning of Code § 101(13).

A general allegation of adverse interest or an appearance of favoring a creditor is insufficient to disqualify counsel as interested.

In Re Olson · filed 1983-12-23(13)(E)

However, much more than a general allegation of adverse interest or “appearance of being on TOEI’s side in the courtroom” would be necessary, in the Court’s view, to affirm the disqualification of counsel who, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, “have been tireless advocates” on behalf of the debtors.

Section 101(13)(D) excludes a debtor’s officer or director from the definition of a disinterested person, even if the role is ceremonial.

Matter of Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. · filed 1984-07-11(13)(D)

Baran’s role as an officer and director of the debtor corporation destroys his “disinterested” status, a plain requirement for his employment as an attorney for the debtor in possession. His testimony that his role was uncompensated, largely “ceremonial” and undertaken as a “convenience” to facilitate the signing of documents and the recordation of corporate minutes is irrelevant as, even if totally correct as descriptive of his duties in those capacities, there is no latitude provided in the Bankruptcy Code for such activities.

Section 101(13)(A) excludes an equity security holder from the definition of a disinterested person regardless of the size of the stock interest.

In Re Anver Corp. · filed 1984-07-11(13)(A)

Further, the Code’s definition of disinterested is non-conditioned on a requirement of a substantial stock interest but merely an equity interest, and Congress has shown its knowledge of the difference and ability to distinguish between “any” and “substantial.”

Under § 101(13)(E), a conflict makes counsel non-disinterested only if it is materially adverse to the estate, creditors, or equity security holders.

In Re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc. · filed 1984-12-14(13)(E)

The question is not whether a conflict exists, but whether that conflict is materially adverse to the estate, creditors, or equity security holders. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E). In the context of the present case, counsel’s representation of University Block was not so materially adverse as to warrant withholding approval of their appointment as debtor’s counsel.

Section 101(13)'s definition of a disinterested person is not exhaustive.

In Re Roberts · filed 1985-02-04(13)

The implication of this statement is that the Section 101(13) list of “disinterested” persons is exhaustive. But this is not true.

An attorney whose representation of related bankruptcy estates is limited to their parallel interests can qualify as a disinterested person.

In Re H & S Transportation Co. · filed 1985-02-08(13)

The requirement of disinterestedness is adapted from § 158 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and is now in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (West 1979). ... This court holds that, with one exception, the applicant represented interests parallel with those of the H & S estate and thus, by representing the trustee in a limited capacity, avoided any conflict of interest.

A professional’s mistaken belief that it holds a debtor stock warrant can create an adverse interest that affects its disinterested status.

In Re Daig Corp. · filed 1985-03-25(13)(E)

In the present case, Merrimac’s belief, as projected through its president and sole shareholder, Mr. Stahl, that it possessed a valid, approved, and exercisable warrant created the risk that it would render consulting services in a manner calculated to increase the value of the warrant at the expense of all other interests.

Section 101(13)(D) excludes a debtor’s officers from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re GHR Energy Corp. · filed 1985-07-20(13)(D)

McCabe/Gordon must be disqualified pursuant to the definition of disinterested person for they are officers of the debtor.

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a trustee’s attorney from the definition of a disinterested person when the attorney’s personal interest conflicts with the estate’s interests.

In Re Porter · filed 1985-08-29(13)(E)

This Court is of the opinion that Sheeran holds a personal interest in conflict with the interests of the estate and, thus was not disinterested within the meaning of § 101(13) and should be disqualified from any further representation of the trustee.

A prepetition creditor holding a mortgage that secures attorney’s fees does not qualify as a disinterested person under § 101(13).

In Re Pierce · filed 1985-10-11(13)(A) and (E)

Unfortunately, Mr. McEwen does not qualify as a “disinterested person”. He was a prepetition creditor of these estates, and he held a mortgage on the Debtors’ real property to secure payment of prepetition and post-petition services. This placed him in an untenable position adverse to both the Debtors and the other interests in the cases.

Section 101(13) defines a disinterested person as someone without a materially adverse interest arising from a relationship or connection with the debtor.

In Re Whitman · filed 1985-08-02(13)

A disinterested person is one that does not have a materially adverse interest to the estate by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to or connection with the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13); Id., at 308.

An infinitesimal stockholding does not necessarily prevent a debtor’s attorney from being a disinterested person if it does not color the attorney’s independent judgment.

In Re O'Connor · filed 1985-09-20(13)(A)

While we believe that under the proper set of facts a de minimus ownership interest could satisfy the test of “disinterestedness”, the matter at bar involves even less than a de minimus interest; it involves an interest that can only be characterized as infinitesimal. We conclude that counsel satisfies the “disinterestedness” test.

Section 101(13)(A) excludes a creditor, including a contingent creditor, from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re Inslaw, Inc. · filed 1985-11-14(13)(A)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), Milbank is disqualified from representing the Debtor (“Inslaw”) as Inslaw’s counsel in this case because Milbank is not a “disinterested person” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). ... Thus, Milbank is at least a contingent creditor of Inslaw, as a result of this commercial transaction between them.

Section 101(13) excludes a creditor from the definition of a disinterested person, even without an actual conflict of interests.

In Re Estes · filed 1986-01-16(13)

It is obvious that just the opposite would be true if there is any redundancy in the statute, because the term “disinterested persons” excludes a ... “creditor” whether or not there is any conflict of interests.

Section 101(13) defines the disinterestedness required of estate counsel; dual representation may create a disqualifying conflict of interest.

Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood · filed 1986-03-28(13)

The Bankruptcy Code requires that an attorney who would be employed by the debtor's estate must be disinterested and may not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate. 11 U.S.C. Secs. 101(13), 326 (1984). ... Consequently, on remand of this single issue, the bankruptcy court should made such additional findings and conclusions, on an enlarged record if necessary, in order to elucidate whether Bryant's admitted dual representation created a legally disabling conflict of interest.

Section 101(13)(D) excludes a person employed by the debtor within two years before the petition from the definition of a disinterested person.

O'Donnell v. Washington Post (In Re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc.) · filed 1986-03-06(13)(D)

11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(D) defines “disinterested person” as someone who, among other things, “is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor ...” The Bankruptcy Judge determined, from the evidence before him that Mr. Thyden had been so employed and was therefore not a “disinterested person.” While I cannot say that such a determination was clearly erroneous, the Bankruptcy Judge further ruled that the trustee’s action should be dismissed due to the interest.

Section 101(13)(E) defines a disinterested person to exclude counsel whose simultaneous representation of a debtor’s general partners creates a potential interest adverse to the estate.

In Re McKinney Ranch Associates · filed 1986-06-19(13)(E)

“Disinterested person” is defined in section 101(13) to include a person that “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate ... by reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor ... or any other reason.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E). ... The representation of McKinney’s general partners on matters relating to this case is a potential conflict with the estate within the scope of section 327, and disqualified Applicant from appointment as counsel for the debtor until the adverse representation terminated.

Section 101(13)(E) treats an attorney’s lien on a debtor’s property as a materially adverse interest that prevents the attorney from being disinterested.

In Re Martin · filed 1986-07-15(13)(E)

There appears to be no prior case which holds that a lien on a debtor’s property is a materially adverse interest to the debtor for purposes of the employment of counsel. However, this Court is satisfied, after examining the potential conflicts enumerated by the Bankruptcy Court, that such is the case, although the Court is troubled by the following arguments which might support the opposite result.

A professional who holds a prepetition creditor claim is not a disinterested person under § 101(13)(A).

In Re Gray · filed 1986-09-15(13)(A)

It is clear in this case that Seid-man & Seidman, a creditor as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(9), holds an “interest adverse to the estate”, and is not a “disinterested person” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A).

Section 101(13)(A) excludes a creditor from the definition of a disinterested person.

Pierce v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1987-01-27(13)(A)

Although McEwen’s argument is not without merit, the intent of the statute is clear; if a professional is a creditor, then that person is not disinterested under 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) and is subject to disqualification under Section 327(a).

Section 101(13)(A) excludes creditors from the definition of a disinterested person.

In re Pierce · filed 1987-02-19(13)(A)

Although McEwen's argument is not without merit, the intent of the statute is clear; if a professional is a creditor, then that person is not disinterested under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(13) and is subject to disqualification under Section 327(a).

A plan funder’s participation and funding alone do not establish that debtor’s counsel is not disinterested under § 101(13).

Matter of Commodore Corp. · filed 1987-02-27(13)

After carefully reviewing all the evidence and papers submitted, the court concludes there has been no showing LB & B is not disinterested as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) and § 328.

Section 101(13)(A) excludes a creditor from the definition of a disinterested person, and the court applied that definition to an attorney who was a partner in a creditor partnership.

In Re Ochoa · filed 1987-03-27(13)(A)

Code § 101(13)(A) defines a “disinterested person” as one who “is not a creditor, an equity security holder or an insider” of the debtor. ... The fact that Dennis O’Hara, Esq. was a partner in a partnership creditor holding a judgment lien against the Debtor, brings O’Hara within the prohibition of Code § 327(a).

Section 101(13)(A) excludes creditors from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re Frederick Petroleum Corp. · filed 1987-04-17(13)(A)

“Disinterested person,” as specifically defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A), is “a person that — is not a creditor”. Therefore, it is clear that SEOR, as the holder of secured and unsecured claims against this estate, cannot so qualify.

A lawyer with no prior debt owed by the debtor is not disqualified as a creditor under the definition of “disinterested person” merely because current or future representation will generate fees.

In Re Larry T. & Cynthia J. Martin D/B/A a & W Drive-In Restaurant & Martin's Exxon, Debtors. Appeal of Larry T. & Cynth · filed 1987-04-17(13)(A)

It stands to reason that the statutory mosaic must, at the least, be read to exclude as a “creditor” a lawyer, not previously owed back fees or other indebtedness, who is authorized by the court to represent a debtor in connection with reorganization proceedings — notwithstanding that the lawyer will almost instantaneously become a creditor of the estate with regard to the charges endemic to current and future representation.

Section 101(13)(E) does not disqualify counsel for prior representation alone; the conflict must be materially adverse to the estate, creditors, or security holders.

In Re Quakertown Glass Co., Inc. · filed 1987-05-07(13)(E)

Many courts have held that under Section 101(13)(E), it is not sufficient to merely identify a conflict of interest arising from prior representation but the moving party must demonstrate that the conflict must be materially adverse to the estate, its creditors or security holders. ... The facts in the instant case do not support allegations of materially adverse conflicts of interest.

Section 101(13) excludes a pre-petition creditor from the definition of a disinterested person, making a law firm with that status ineligible to represent a Chapter 11 debtor in possession.

In Re Roberts · filed 1987-06-08(13)

A law firm which is a pre-petition creditor does not meet the “disinterested person” criteria set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) and, therefore, is disqualified from representing a Chapter 11 debtor in possession.

Section 101(13)(E) requires a strict but fact-specific assessment of whether an interest would color a professional’s independent judgment and impartiality.

In Re Jartran, Inc. · filed 1987-08-04(13)(E)

However, while the test of disinterestedness is to be applied rigidly, it cannot be applied blindly. The appropriate query is whether counsel possesses an interest “such as would color the requisite independent judgment and impartial attitude.”

A creditor is an interested person under § 101(13)(A).

In Re Statewide Pools, Inc. · filed 1987-09-21(13)(A)

As a creditor, Tilberry by definition, is an “interested” person. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A).

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a person with an interest materially adverse to the estate from the definition of a disinterested person.

Petralex Stainless, Ltd. v. Bishop Tube Division of Christiana Metals (In Re Petralex Stainless, Ltd.) · filed 1987-10-15(13)(E)

Disqualification is also possible if the attorney or firm has interests “materially adverse” to the estate or its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E). ... But we couple it with Hennessy’s current role as an insider, and the incredible confusion as to who actually speaks for the debtor, ... to find that ML & B has an interest “materially adverse” to the estate.

Section 101(13) excludes a creditor from the definition of a disinterested person.

In Re Flying E Ranch Co. · filed 1988-01-11(13)

The Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes an interest which is “adverse to the estate.” It does, however, expressly define a “disinterested person” as a person that is not a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13).

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a lawyer from the definition of “disinterested person” when the lawyer’s relationships create interests materially adverse to the estate.

In Re Sixth Avenue Car Care Center · filed 1988-01-11(13)(E)

The Code does not define “adverse interest,” but does define explicitly “disinterested” in Section 101(13). It is there specified, in pertinent part, that “disinterested person” means a person that “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect relation to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker... .or for any other reason;” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E). ... Here, in the view of this Court, there are a number of factors which individually might have placed the Firm in the position of being adverse, or representing interests adverse to the estate, thereby, making the Firm not disinterested.

Section 101(13)(E) excludes a person with an interest materially adverse to the estate from the definition of a disinterested person, even if that person has not acted on the interest.

In Re Paolino · filed 1987-12-11(13)(E)

Given the definition of “disinterested” in section 101(13)(E), either a trustee or his or her counsel must be disqualified where it holds an interest adverse to the estate whether or not it acts to advance that interest. The definition of disinterestedness in the Code covers not only actual impropriety, but the appearance of impropriety as well.

Section 101(13)(E) permits a creditor’s attorney to qualify as a disinterested person when acting for the trustee with the trustee’s consent and the court’s approval.

Chittenden Trust Co. v. Sebert Lumber, Co. (In Re Vermont Toy Works, Inc.) · filed 1987-12-23(13)(E)

Under these circumstances, we see no reason why this intervening Trustee cannot permit a creditor’s attorney, at the creditor’s expense and with the Court’s approval, to proceed where the Trustee may also defend. We hold, that for the limited purposes of this proceeding, Sebert’s attorney meets the “disinterested person” test of 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E) and 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and (c).

Section 101(13)(E) excludes counsel from the definition of a disinterested person when representing both a corporate debtor and its shareholder-creditor creates an actual conflict adverse to the estate.

In Re Star Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1988-01-22(13)(E)

This court finds that Cole, Schotz by representing SBI as a debtor-in-possession and also representing Shenfeld, an individual who is both a debtor and creditor of SBI, represents an interest adverse to the estate and is not a disinterested person within the terms of § 101(13)(E).

Section 101(13) treats a debtor’s lawyer as having a materially adverse interest that disqualifies the lawyer from serving as trustee.

In Re Colony Press, Inc. · filed 1988-01-27(13)

If the trustee cannot employ the debtor’s lawyer to represent him in conducting the case because the debtor’s lawyer is not a disinterested person, the lawyer himself cannot act as trustee, for the same reason. Congress could have made this clearer by expressly excluding the debtor’s lawyer in § 101(13), as was done under § 158 of Chapter X of the old Act.

Section 101(13) does not automatically disqualify an attorney as a disinterested person merely because the attorney becomes a creditor through compensable bankruptcy work; the nature of the attorney’s interest matters.

In Re Automend, Inc. · filed 1988-04-08(13)

This Court agrees that use of a per se rule excluding attorneys who are creditors of the debtor would be an over-broad interpretation of § 327(a) and § 101(13).