11 U.S.C. § 101

Section 101(37) does not treat an agreement identifying only property the debtors no longer own as a security interest in their after-acquired real estate.

In Re Porter · filed 1980-11-28(37)

We conclude that the judgment note, the side collateral pledge agreement and the judgment revival, taken individually or together, do not constitute a security interest in the debtors’ after-acquired property within the meaning of the Code.

Section 101(37) defines a consensual lien created by an agreement, which excludes tax liens.

In Re Frost · filed 1982-04-20(37)

A security agreement is a consensual lien created by an agreement, 11 U.S.C. § 101(37), and thus a tax lien is not cut off under § 552(a).

A lien arising from the docketing of a confessed judgment is not a security interest under § 101(37) because the charge against property was not created by agreement.

In Re Carr · filed 1982-02-23(37)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a “security interest” is defined as a “lien created' by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1979). ... The charge against property was created by the docketing of the confessed judgment with the Prothono-tary of the state court, and at no time before. ... In conclusion, we are not persuaded that the lien held by the Bank in this case is a security interest; under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bank’s lien can only be classified as a “judicial lien.”

A lease is a security agreement under § 101(36) when applicable state law treats it as creating a security interest.

Matter of Elliott · filed 1982-03-24(36)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "security agreement" as an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). The legislative history of that section indicates that Whether a consignment or a lease constitutes a security interest under the Bankruptcy Code will depend on whether it constitutes a security interest under applicable State or local law. ... Accordingly, I find that the document through which the debtor has acquired possession of the subject matter goods is a purchase money security agreement despite its designation on its face as a lease.

Section 101(37) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, including a real property mortgage even when it is junior to a judicial lien.

Brown v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. · filed 1982-11-30(37)

Of particular relevance to the present matter is the section 101(37) broad definition of “security interest” as a “lien created by an agreement” (emphasis supplied). The Senate Report indicates that the term not only encompasses security interests (and the agreements creating them) covered by the Uniform Commercial Code but also includes real property mortgages.

Section 101(37) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; state law determines whether a lease creates one.

In Re Niemi · filed 1982-12-06(37)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “security interest” as a lien created by agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). It does not define “lease”. However, the legislative history states that state .or local law should be applied in determining whether a lease constitutes a security interest under the Bankruptcy Code. ... Based on the inclusion of a provision requiring the lessee to bear the loss or receive the gain on disposition of the vehicles, the language in paragraph 20 which suggests that an option to purchase or right of first refusal is given to the lessee, and the other indicia of sale noted above, the court finds that the agreements entered into between Universal and the debtors were intended as security interests.

Section 101(37) includes liens created by agreement as security interests even when a judgment makes them enforceable.

Wicks v. Wicks · filed 1982-12-20(37)

The term security interest should be construed liberally to include all liens created by agreement regardless of the method or means employed to make them enforceable either between the parties or against the world.

Section 101(27) excludes a mortgage from the definition of a judicial lien because a mortgage is created by agreement rather than legal process.

In Re Baerwald · filed 1983-02-14(27)

Section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(27), defines a “judicial lien” as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” A mortgage does not fit within this definition and is, therefore, not a judicial lien, as even Baerwald so concedes. Rather, a mortgage is a security interest under the Bankruptcy Code in that it is a lien created by agreement.

Section 101(37) treats an assignment of accounts receivable as a security interest when it creates a lien by agreement.

First National Bank of Lafayette v. Texas Tri-Collar, Inc. (In Re Texas Tri-Collar, Inc.) · filed 1983-05-17(37)

Since this type of assignment constitutes a lien, First National’s interest is a lien created by agreement, or a “security interest”. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101 treats the FmHA’s mortgages as security interests under the Bankruptcy Code.

In Re Engstrom · filed 1983-10-07(36), (37)

The FmHA’s mortgages are security interests under the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 101(36)(37).

Section 101(37) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement, which excludes a statutory tax lien.

In Re Mitchell · filed 1984-03-12(37)

However, the exception in § 1322(b)(2) regarding the principal residence is limited to a “security interest” which is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) as a “lien created by an agreement”. Since the IRS lien is a statutory rather than a consensual lien, it can be properly modified.

Section 101(39) classifies a maritime lien arising automatically by force of statute as a statutory lien, which cannot also be a security interest.

Harrison v. St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. (In Re H & S Transportation Co.) · filed 1984-12-26(39)

Since the maritime lien arises automatically and by force of statute, it clearly falls within the Code definition of a statutory lien. ... A statutory lien is not consensual and cannot be a security interest.

A lien created by an agreed property settlement is a security interest even when the agreement is recorded in a divorce decree.

In Re Maus · filed 1985-05-06(43)

In this case the parties entered into a verbal property settlement agreement which was recorded in the divorce decree. Thus the lien was brought into existence as ... a result of an agreement which in fact means it was created by a security interest (11 U.S.C. § 101(43) and therefore, was not a judicial lien.

Section 101(43) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement; a statutory tax lien is not a security interest.

In Re Venable · filed 1985-04-19(43)

The term “security interest” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(43) to mean “lien created by an agreement.” Manifestly, the City’s tax lien is statutory and not consensual and, therefore, may be modified.

Section 101(43) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; a lien awarded by a court without an agreement is a judicial lien under § 101(30).

Younger v. Ford (In Re Ford) · filed 1985-07-15(43)

At the outset, this court notes that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 clearly defines a security interest and unequivocally limits such interest to a lien created by agreement. (Emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. Section 101(43). The state court characterized this creditor as possessing by judicial fiat a security interest. However, as there was no agreement between the parties to create a lien, the Bankruptcy Code defines the creditor’s status in this case as, at best, that of a creditor holding a judicial lien. 11 U.S.C. Section 101(30).

Section 101(15) treats a stock option right to purchase shares as an equity security interest.

Matter of Baldwin-United Corp. · filed 1985-08-30(15)

WMAC admits that the stock option portion of the plan consists of a five year right, vested in full from the date of the option, to purchase a fixed amount of Baldwin stock and therefore falls under § 101(15). (Ct.Doc. 14-8 at 2) This is our conclusion as well. We hold therefore that claims to exercise the stock option portion of the Plan (as opposed to the cash option right) are properly classified as equity security interests.

A lien created by a divorce settlement agreement is a security interest even when the agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree.

In Re Shands · filed 1985-10-10(43)

In this case the parties entered into a property settlement, with the advice and consent of counsel, which was recorded in the August 12, 1983 order and incorporated in the divorce decree. “Thus the lien was brought into existence as a result of an agreement which in fact means it was created by a security interest (11 U.S.C. § 101(43)) and therefore, was not a judicial lien.”

Section 101(43) includes real estate mortgages in the definition of “security interest.”

In Re Gorman · filed 1986-03-03(43)

The Bankruptcy Code is in accord with the State law, defining the term “security interest” to include real estate mortgages. 11 U.S.C. § 101(43).

Section 101(42) defines a security agreement as one that creates or provides for a security interest; a terminable lease with no debt to secure is not a security agreement.

Shamrock Rental Co. v. Huffman (In Re Huffman) · filed 1986-08-20(42)

A “security agreement” is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as an “agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(42). ... Similarly, because of the terminability of the Lease-Purchase Agreement here, the Debtor has not agreed to pay a “sum certain” for the use of the range. Thus, there is no debt which could be secured.

Section 101 treats an agreement creating an interest in property to secure a debt as a security interest and lien; an assignment of future rents qualifies when state law treats that right as real property.

In Re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc. · filed 1987-12-21(33), (45)

As a result, we hold that the Bank had a security interest in real property within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(45), entitling it to a lien on the real property of Tavern within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(33).

A mortgage lien created by agreement remains a security interest after the mortgage merges into a foreclosure judgment.

Matter of Brunson · filed 1988-01-28(45)

Therefore, it remains a “security interest” within the meaning of Section 101(45), and continues to be protected by Section 1322(b)(2) from being modified by the chapter .13 plan.

Section 101(45) includes an agreement treated as a security interest under the U.C.C. as adopted by the state whose law controls.

In re Puckett · filed 1988-02-01(45)

A fair construction of the Bankruptcy Reform Act's definition of "security interest" recognizes that Congress intended for an agreement to be considered a security interest for the purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act if it is a security interest under the U.C.C. as adopted by the state whose substantive law controls.

Section 101(44) requires a security agreement to create a security interest; an unsecured agreement and a later judgment lien do not qualify.

In Re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1988-03-25(44)

Neither the original unsecured obligation nor the judgment lien fit within the scope of “security agreement” as used in the House of Representatives Debate and defined by the Code.

Section 101 defines indentures, liens, and securities broadly enough to include secured notes and bonds whose maturity dates and interest rates a Chapter 11 plan may modify.

In Re Crane Automotive, Inc. · filed 1988-06-28(27), (33), (43)(A)

“Indenture” is defined to include a “mortgage, deed of trust, or indenture under which there is outstanding a security, ... [or] a claim secured by a lien on any of the debt- or’s property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1987). “Lien” is defined very broadly to mean a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1987). And finally, “security” includes a note and a bond. 11 U.S.C. § 101(43)(A)(i) and (A)(iv) (1987). From the foregoing, it is clear that Congress intended to allow a Chapter 11 debtor to modify both the maturity date and the rate of interest on the underlying obligation in order to implement a plan of reorganization.

A mortgage granted by agreement is a security interest securing a claim against the debtor’s residence.

In Re Russell · filed 1988-08-09(45)

A security interest is defined as a “lien created by an agreement.” ... Clearly, in the case at bar, the mortgage held by the Lomas & Nettleton Company qualifies as a claim secured only by a security interest in the Debtors’ principal place of residence.

Section 101 treats an assignment of rents that secures a debt as a security interest even if the instrument purports to make an absolute assignment.

In Re Camelot Associates Ltd. Partnership · filed 1989-03-27(45)

While the instruments purport to be an absolute assignment, they constitute a "security interest” under bankruptcy law. Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(45), a “security interest” is a "lien created by an agreement”; under 11 U.S.C. § 101(33), in turn, a "lien” is a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt ...” (emphasis added).

Section 101 treats mortgages and land contracts as security interests.

Matter of Cooper · filed 1989-03-22(33), (45)

This court rejects the Debtors’ argument that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) applies only to mortgages. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(33) and (45), a “security interest” includes both mortgages and land contracts.

Section 101(45) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, so a lien imposed by a default judgment without the parties’ agreement is not a security interest.

In re Ray · filed 1989-08-28(45)

Accordingly, the express lien granted to Mrs. Ray was not created by agreement and does not constitute a security interest as defined in Section 101(45).

Section 101(45) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, including a mortgage lien that survives a foreclosure judgment.

In re Daniels · filed 1989-07-07(45)

Since the default order does not terminate the mortgage, Fleet never received a judgment lien but rather maintains its prior lien. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code such “lien [s] created by agreement” are “security interest [s]” under 11 U.S.C. § 101(45). The default order therefore did not alter Fleet’s security interest in the debtor’s residence.

Section 101(45) defines a security interest as consensual, excluding mechanics’ and judgment liens.

Cardinal Industries, Inc. v. Buckeye Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In Re Cardinal Industries, Inc.) · filed 1989-08-18(45)

Such an interpretation, however, would require that the term “security interest” be used in a sense which is different from the consensual basis for such interest as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101’s definition of a judicial lien does not include a lien created by an earlier agreement merely because a later judgment recognizes and permits enforcement of it.

In Re Goodwin · filed 1990-04-12(32)

A judicial lien means one “obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. section 101(32). A security agreement means “a lien created by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. section 101(44). The Harlans did not obtain their lien on the items at issue by judgment of the state court, but by the Bond the Debtor gave earlier in the proceeding. ... The Harlans’ lien, therefore, is a security interest, and the fact that the state court judgment later recognized the lien and empowered the Harlans to enforce it does not change its character to a judicial lien.

Section 101(45) treats a lien created by agreement as a security interest.

In Re Willowood East Apartments of Indianapolis II, Ltd. · filed 1990-04-30(45)

Because Lincoln’s lien was created by agreement, it is also a security interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 101(45).

A seller who retains title solely to secure payment of the purchase price has a security interest under § 101(45).

Matter of Mueller · filed 1990-12-06(45)

Both parties acknowledge that there was an oral contract of sale between plaintiff and debtor and both agree as to the terms of the contract. Further, there is no question that plaintiff retained the title to the trailers solely to secure payment of the purchase price. Therefore, I conclude that plaintiff has a security interest in the trailers. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) and 11 U.S.C. § 101(45).

Section 101(51) includes a home mortgage lien in its definition of a security interest even after a foreclosure judgment, because the lien remains the product of the mortgage agreement.

First National Fidelity Corp. v. Ruth Perry, Robert M. Wood, Trustee · filed 1991-10-08(51)

The Code defines a security interest as a “lien created by an agreement”, 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). ... Thus, we hold that a New Jersey home mortgage lender retains a security interest for the purposes of § 1322(b)(2) following the entry of a foreclosure judgment.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, excluding a nonconsensual interest arising under a tax statute.

Matter of Sabec · filed 1992-02-25(51)

A “security interest” is defined to be a “lien created by an agreement”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (emphasis added). ... Because Chvala’s interest is not a security interest as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, even though his interest has attached only to the Debtor’s principal residence, the anti-modification provision in § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is inapplicable.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which excludes a judicial lien created by court action.

McDonough v. Plaistow Cooperative Bank (In Re McDonough) · filed 1994-03-29(51)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “security interest” as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). A judicial lien is not a lien created by an agreement. It is a lien created by court action.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as one created by agreement between the parties, excluding statutory tax liens.

DeSarno v. County of Allegheny · filed 1994-05-13(51)

By definition, “secured interests” are those created by an agreement between the parties; thus making them voluntary or consensual. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51).

A lease intended to secure a debt may be a security agreement under § 101(50).

In Re KAR Development Associates, L.P. · filed 1994-08-05(50)

The inescapable conclusion is that using the principles of analysis suggested in the legislative history under § 502(b)(7), the lease is only part of a transaction that was intended to be a security agreement.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; a judgment lien does not meet that definition.

IN RE: Lillie Johns · filed 1994-10-20(51)

Perry, referring to the Code, defines a security interest "as a lien created by an agreement" 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). It is clear that a judgment lien is not "created by agreement."

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which includes a valid mortgage lien on property and its assigned rents.

In Re D'Anna · filed 1995-01-26(51)

A “security interest” is defined for bankruptcy purposes as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). ... Accordingly, under the Bankruptcy Code, the Association has a valid and enforceable hen (and security interest) on the mortgaged premises and the rents derived from that property.

A security interest is a lien created by agreement; an agreement that creates no such lien does not qualify.

Western Pocono Estates, Inc. v. Miskowski (In re Miskowski) · filed 1995-03-22(51)

A security interest is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien created by an agreement”. 11 U.S.C. § 101. Such security interest is plainly not present in the documents at issue.

A lien created by agreement is a security interest, even when a later divorce decree incorporates the agreement.

Naqvi v. Fisher · filed 1995-12-29(51)

As evidenced by statutory definition, a judicial lien is distinguished from a security interest based upon the method by which the lien is created, and not based upon the method by which it is enforced.

Section 101(51) does not cover a vehicle seller who neither retains possession nor obtains a signed security agreement.

In Re Seal · filed 1996-02-16(51)

The court holds that Rosenberg is not the holder of a security interest in the vehicle within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51).

A security interest under § 101(51) is a lien created by agreement between the parties, so a tax lien imposed without such an agreement is not a security interest.

In Re Catron · filed 1996-05-08(51)

Neither does the IRS in this case claim a security interest in property of Debtor as there is no indication that any hen claimed by the IRS was created by an agreement between the parties. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51).

A security interest is a lien created by agreement; a nonconsensual judgment lien does not qualify.

In Re Allard · filed 1996-05-09(51)

First, the Court holds that Great Southern’s § 1322(b)(2) objection is not well founded and is overruled because it does not hold a “security interest” in the Property as defined by § 101(51). Great Southern holds a non-consensual judgment lien encumbering the Property, not a hen created by an agreement like a mortgage or trust deed.

Section 101 defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement and a statutory lien as one arising by force of statute; a tax lien arising under state law is not a security interest.

Rankin v. Desarno · filed 1996-07-30(51), (53)

The Bankruptcy Code defines "security interest" as "a lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C. 101(51) (emphasis added). ... Because plaintiffs' tax liens arose under state statute, and not from a consensual or voluntary agreement with the taxpayer defendants, we concur in the bankruptcy court's ruling that those liens are not "security interests" for purposes of 1322(b)(2).

A security interest is a lien created by agreement; a provision allowing a lender to apply an insurance premium refund to a loan does not itself create one.

In Re Surber · filed 1997-05-19(51)

In Section 101(51), a security interest is defined as a “lien created by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). Debtors’ agreement with City Loan specifies that the lender’s sole security is a mortgage on debtors’ real property. (City Loan’s Supplemental Br. in Supp. of Obj. to Confirmation Ex.A p. 2). If additional security had been intended it would have been specified in the agreement. The boilerplate language included in the security agreement’s cancellation of insurance provisions is insufficient to create a lien.

A condominium assessment lien agreed to by the parties is a security interest even when state law also provides for it.

In Re Robinson · filed 1997-10-29(53)

We conclude that the Association’s lien is a security interest agreed to by the parties and provided for by statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(53).

Statutory tax liens are not security interests under § 101.

In Re Marfin Ready Mix Corp. · filed 1998-04-28(51), (53)

In addition, statutory tax liens do not constitute “security interests.”

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement, which may be implied from the circumstances of a voluntary transfer.

In Re Hryniewicz · filed 1998-06-18(51)

The Code defines a security interest as a “lien created by an agreement,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51), and a judicial lien as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(36). ... The court finds an agreement by implication from the circumstances of the transfer. ... The court concludes that Wilson possesses a perfected security interest in the stock.

Section 101 defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement and a lien as a charge against or interest in property securing an obligation.

In Re Martin · filed 1999-01-29(37), (51)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a “security interest” as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). A “hen” is defined as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” § 101(37). ... There are no written agreements which would create a hen in the traditional sense. In addition, Mr. Highsmith did not have physical possession of the notes. Hence, Highsmith’s claim is merely unsecured, and the court so holds.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, including an assessment lien under a restrictive covenant that binds later purchasers.

In Re Perry · filed 1999-07-02(51)

A security interest is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a “hen created by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). ... Therefore, because the restrictive covenant is considered an agreement under Texas law and the Debtor is bound by that agreement, the restrictive covenant constitutes a security interest in Debtor’s primary residence.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; the agreement need not create an enforceable lien.

In Re Larios · filed 2001-03-22(51)

The Code broadly defines a security interest as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). The Code defines a lien as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). The Bankruptcy Code definition of “security interest” does not restrict the term’s meaning to the Uniform Commercial Code definition of security interest stated in Article 9, § 9-203 and Article 1, § 1-201(37). Although § 101(51) states that there must be an agreement purporting to create a lien, it does not state that the lien must be enforceable. Therefore, the Court must look to the language in the agreement.

Section 101(51) treats a mortgage lien created by agreement as a security interest, even after a foreclosure decree.

Nichols v. BJ Fox Enterprises, Inc. (In Re Nichols) · filed 2001-08-24(51)

Armstrong’s interest in Parcel C to secure payment of the debtor’s purchase money note to her, or her “lien,” was not obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process, but rather arose as a result of the agreement between the debtor and Armstrong. Accordingly, as defined by § 101(51), Armstrong’s lien is a “security interest,” and § 522(f)(1)(A) does not apply.

Section 101(50) excludes a nonconsensual judicial lien from the definition of a security interest.

In Re Tumminello · filed 2001-10-15(50)

The lien stripping prohibition on claims secured by real property contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) is not applicable here because James' claim in the real estate is not secured by a security interest as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. A security interest under the Bankruptcy Code is defined as an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50). Because a judicial lien is non-consensual, it is not an agreement that creates a security interest.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement, which excludes an involuntary tax lien.

In Re Williams · filed 2002-02-20(51)

While it is true that a Chapter 13 plan may not modify the rights of holders of secured claims secured only by a security interest in the real property that is the debtors’ principal residence, the County has neglected to note that 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) defines “security interest” as a lien created by an agreement. This type of security interest is most often seen in the form of a note secured by a deed of trust in California. A “security interest” does not include an involuntary tax lien affixed by the County.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which excludes a judicial lien.

In re Daraee · filed 2002-04-15(51)

The term security interest is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien created by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). A judicial lien is not created by agreement. Thus, § 1322(b)(2) would be inapplicable even if PTCU’s judgment lien attached only to the debtor’s principal residence.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement.

Tax 58 v. Froehle (In Re Froehle) · filed 2002-12-06(51)

This case involves the Debtor's residence, but the prohibition in § 1322(b) against modifying the rights of a claim secured only by a security interest in such residence is not applicable to judicial liens such as the one held by Tax 58 in this case because the lien was not created by agreement.

A mortgage reduced to a prepetition foreclosure judgment remains a security interest because foreclosure does not diminish the creditor’s rights.

In Re Carr · filed 2004-11-30(51)

Although a judgment lien is not a “lien created by an agreement” as that phrase is used to define “security interest” at 11 U.S.C. § 101(51), a majority of courts has concluded that a mortgage reduced to a prepetition foreclosure judgment is a security interest, and remains protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2). ... A creditor’s rights would not logically be reduced by seeking to enforce them by judicial foreclosure.

A security interest is a lien created by agreement; mortgage terms can create one in escrow funds.

Thomas v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Thomas) · filed 2006-06-13(37), (51)

A security interest is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a “lien created by an agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). Additionally, a lien is defined as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37). ... An examination of the document establishes that Countrywide’s mortgage included a security interest in the escrow funds.

Section 101’s definition of a security agreement includes a deed of trust that creates a mortgage lien and assigns rents as additional security.

In Re Spears · filed 2006-07-19(50)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “security agreement” as an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. The term “security interest” is defined as a lien created by an agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 101. ... The terms of the deed of trust here satisfy the definition of a security agreement for purposes of section 552(b)(1).

Section 101(51) excludes statutory tax liens from the definition of a security interest.

Johnson v. Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury of the United States (In Re Johnson) · filed 2008-04-16(51)

Note also that the home mortgage exception does not apply to the present case because a “security interest” does not include a statutory tax lien.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; a transferred tax lien created by statute is not a security interest.

In Re Sheffield · filed 2008-07-02(51)

RETax’s lien is not a “security interest” because it was not created by an agreement. The transfer of the tax lien was consensual, but the creation of the tax lien was not. Texas property tax liens arise by statute.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement; the lien can be a security interest even if it is unperfected.

Noland v. HSBC Auto Finance, Inc. (In Re Baine) · filed 2008-09-09(51)

However, a creditor obtains a security interest in property, and becomes “secured” with respect to the property, by entering into a security agreement. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (defining “security interest” as a “lien created by an agreement”).

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, excluding a tax lien created by operation of law.

In Re Cortner · filed 2009-02-04(51)

A security interest is a “lien created by agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). In this instance, the tax lien is an involuntary lien created by operation of law and, therefore, § 1322(b)(2) would not prevent a modification or a cramdown of the interest rate owed to the Creditor.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which includes a consensual mortgage lien.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma · filed 2015-10-22(51)

“A mortgage is a consensual lien [or security interest] since it is created by agreement.”57 This is exactly the case here – to finance the purchase of the Property, Debtors executed a note and granted a lien against the Property.

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement, which excludes a tax lien.

Phifer v. City of Milwaukee (In re Phifer) · filed 2016-03-11(51)

Even though the City’s tax lien is secured solely by the Debtor’s principal residence, the tax lien does not qualify as a “security interest” under the Bankruptcy Code, and the restriction on modification of residential real estate liens does not apply to the City’s lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51) (security interest means lien created by agreement).

Section 101(51) defines a security interest as a lien created by an agreement; a tax lien or tax deed does not qualify.

In re Washington · filed 2016-06-20(51)

Nor is the anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2) applicable because a tax lien (or in this case a tax deed) is not a security interest.

Section 101(51) includes a mortgage within the definition of a security interest.

Guillermo David Navarro · filed 2020-05-29(51)

A mortgage is a security interest under the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(53) defines a statutory lien to exclude a security interest; a deed of trust that merely preserves a transferred tax lien does not create a separate lien.

Patricia Ann Reed · filed 2021-09-24(53)

Rule 3002.1 applies only to claims that are secured by a security interest, as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, in the debtor’s principal residence. Ovation’s claim is secured by a statutory lien created by the Texas Tax Code which is enforceable against the Debtor’s homestead under Texas law. Statutory liens, as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, expressly exclude security interests and are not subject to Rule 3002.1.

Section 101(37) treats a lien voluntarily created by agreement as a security interest, even when a court approves the agreement.

Lucas v. Fayette (In Re Lucas) · filed 1982-07-09(37)

Absent such an agreement, the court would not have granted the lien. Because this agreement was the essential element in the creation of the lien, I would hold that it falls within the definition in 11 U.S.C. § 101(37).

Section 101(42) defines a security agreement as one that creates or provides for a security interest; applicable state law determines whether a purported lease does so.

In Re Opelika Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1986-05-09(42)

For the reasons set forth below, the court, having reviewed the memoranda and documents submitted by the parties, holds that the Agreement in question, although denominated a lease, is, in actuality, a security agreement.

Section 101 defines a security interest as a lien created by agreement and a lien as an interest in property securing a debt or obligation; the court applied those definitions in distinguishing a true lease from a financing arrangement.

In Re DWE Screw Products, Inc. · filed 1993-03-17(37), (51)

A security interest is defined as a lien created by agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51). A lien is defined under 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) as a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or obligation. These definitions encompass all manner of financing devices. ... Consequently, this Court finds that the “Lease Agreement” between HCCIC and Debtor is a true lease and not a financing arrangement.

Section 101(51) excludes a tax purchaser’s claim from the definition of a security interest because the claim is not created by agreement.

Gan B, LLC v. Sims · filed 2017-06-13(51)

As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, a tax purchaser’s claim is not even properly considered “a security interest because it was not created by agreement.”

Section 101(11)(A) includes a receiver appointed in a nonbankruptcy proceeding in the definition of custodian; a creditor that was not appointed receiver does not qualify on that basis.

MBMK Property Holdings, LLC v. WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, As Trustee · filed 2024-06-25(11)(A)

Custodian is defined at §101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code to include a “receiver or trustee of any property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title.” ... Here, the Receiver was appointed by the Pennsylvania courts, not Wilmington Trust. Section 543(b)’s requirements therefore do not apply to Wilmington Trust.

Section 101(11)(A) includes a state court receiver of a debtor’s property in the definition of custodian.

In re Packard Square LLC · filed 2017-10-13(11)(A)

And the parties agree that a state court receiver is a “custodian” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 543. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A) (“The term ‘custodian’ means ... receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title[.]”); ... Therefore, the Receiver McKinley is a custodian under, and subject to, § 543.

Section 101(11)(C) includes a state court receiver in the definition of a custodian.

In re 29 Brooklyn Avenue, LLC · filed 2015-08-21(11)(C)

A state court receiver is a “custodian” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, as defined in § 101(11).

Section 101(11)(C) treats a sheriff executing a judgment writ against a debtor’s property as a custodian.

In re Tallerico · filed 2015-06-30(11)(C)

When a Sheriff executes a writ in a judgment enforcement matter, the Sheriff becomes a “custodian” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. That is, the Sheriff acts as a receiver or agent appointed under applicable law that is authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a judgment lien against such property.

Section 101(11) treats a receiver appointed by a state court as a custodian.

In re Franklin · filed 2012-08-15(11)

A receiver appointed by a state court is a “custodian” subject to § 543(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11)'s definition of custodian excludes a trustee administering a retirement plan for its beneficiaries.

In re Bell · filed 2012-07-30(11)

This definition does not encompass a trustee who is administering a retirement plan for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.

Section 101(11) does not treat a debtor’s joint venturer as a custodian merely because of that relationship.

Seitz v. 6130 West, LLC (In re Joey's Steakhouse, LLC) · filed 2012-06-14(11)

The Defendants are not alleged to have any such status other than joint venturer with the Debtor. They are neither receiver, assignee nor trustee. For that reason, no claim for an accounting under § 543 can be stated and leave to amend this count will be denied.

Section 101(10)(C) defines a custodian to include a secured creditor holding property repossessed through self-help enforcement of a security interest.

ABD Federal Credit Union v. Williams (In Re Williams) · filed 1980-10-21(10)(C)

A secured creditor such as ABD, holding property repossessed from a debtor by virtue of its exercise of self-help enforcement of a security interest, is under this definition a custodian.

Section 101(10)(C) includes a secured creditor holding property repossessed under a security agreement within the definition of a custodian.

In Re Gunder · filed 1980-12-31(10)(C)

A secured creditor holding property repossessed from a debtor under authority granted in a security agreement appears clearly covered under the definition of a custodian.

Section 101(10)(C) does not treat a secured creditor that repossesses property for its own benefit as a custodian.

Flournoy v. City Finance (In Re Lewis) · filed 1981-06-25(10)(C)

To fall within the definition Congress saw a third party taking charge of property for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors, and not a repossessing secured creditor acquiring possession of property for its own benefit.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a court-appointed receiver within the definition of a custodian.

Matter of Left Guard of Madison, Inc. · filed 1981-05-08(10)(A)

Schoenherr, as a court-appointed receiver, is admittedly a custodian as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) and therefore is entitled to compensation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(E).

Section 101(10) includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors in the definition of a custodian.

In Re Marichal-Agosto, Inc. · filed 1981-07-28(10)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) an assignee for the benefit of creditors is included within the definition of a “custodian.”

Section 101(10) excludes an attaching creditor acting solely for its own benefit from the definition of custodian.

In Re Meyer's Inc. · filed 1981-10-09(10)

This argument cannot be sustained for an attaching creditor is neither a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed to take charge of the debtor’s property for purposes of enforcing a lien against it or administering it for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors. A creditor acting for his own benefit, is not within the ambit of the intent of Congress in defining a custodian. Congress intended that definition to apply to a third party acting, not for the benefit of one creditor, but rather for the benefit of all creditors.

Section 101(10) includes the IRS as a custodian when it seizes a debtor’s property to enforce a tax lien.

Ray Heid, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service (In Re Ray Heid, Inc.) · filed 1981-07-31(10)

The Court holds that the IRS is a “custodian” as defined by § 101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, as meaning: “trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under contract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general administration of such property for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). The government or the IRS is nowhere excluded from this definition.

Section 101(10) requires a custodian holding a debtor’s property to have rights that displace the debtor’s proprietary rights.

In Re B. D. International Discount Corp. · filed 1981-11-25(10)

The right of a “custodian” to retain or hold property must be in derogation of the debtor’s proprietary rights to the property in order to satisfy the custodial requirements of the statute.

Section 101(10)(A) includes a state court appointed wage earner receiver in the definition of custodian.

In Re Gomes · filed 1982-04-02(10)(A)

The definition of custodian includes those functions which are substantially similar to those of a state receiver or trustee.

Section 101(10) defines a state court appointed receiver as a custodian who acts for all creditors.

In Re CCN Realty Corp. · filed 1982-04-16(10)

Although the bank regards the state court appointed receiver as its custodian, such is not the case. A custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) functions for all of the creditors and is charged with protecting the interests of the entire creditor body.

Section 101(10)(C) does not treat a secured creditor who repossesses property by self-help as a custodian.

Flournoy v. City Finance of Columbus, Inc. · filed 1982-06-14(10)(C)

We conclude, then, that a secured creditor who repossesses property by self-help is not a "custodian" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(10)(C) and 543(b).

An IRS tax levy does not make the IRS a custodian under § 101(10) for turnover purposes.

Debmar Corp. v. United States (In Re Debmar Corp.) · filed 1982-07-19(10)

The Trustee asserts that the IRS is a custodian of the funds paid to it and should return them pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 543. However, the definition of custodian in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) belies that argument. This Court finds Judge Friendly’s discussion of this point in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144, 148-149 (2d Cir. 1982), to be both persuasive and complete, and this Court concludes that the IRS is not a custodian subject to the turnover provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 543.

Section 101(10)(b) includes an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors in the definition of custodian.

Rosenberg v. Friedman (In Re Carole's Foods, Inc.) · filed 1982-11-04(10)(b)

Title 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) defines ... “custodian” as including an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the Debtor’s creditors.

Section 101(10) excludes a housing administrator whose duties to creditors are merely incidental to correcting conditions dangerous to public health and safety from the definition of custodian.

Matter of Kennise Diversified Corp. · filed 1983-10-21(10)

This court concludes that the 7A Administrator is not a custodian as that term is defined for the reason that a 7A Administrator’s responsibilities to creditors are merely incidental to his obligation to act in the landlord’s stead to correct the conditions inimical to public health and safety alleged in the petition.

A secured creditor that has repossessed its collateral is not a custodian under Section 101(10).

In Re Riding · filed 1984-12-05(10)

A secured creditor that has repossessed its collateral is not a custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10) includes an administrative receiver who takes charge of a debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors, even if the receiver holds title to them.

Matter of Cash Currency Exchange, Inc., Debtors. Cash Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Donald C. Shine, Receiver · filed 1985-05-21(10)

Congress defined the term broadly to include third parties who have taken charge of the debtor’s assets for the general benefit of creditors. ... The Director’s receiver falls within this broad class of prepetition liquidators.

A debtor’s principal shareholder is not a custodian under § 101(10) merely because he allegedly holds estate keys and records.

In re La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd. · filed 1985-06-05(10)

The exceptions for Bankruptcy Rules 2017 and 6002 do not apply because Goldstein is not the Debtor’s attorney, nor is he a custodian, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10) does not treat an employer withholding wages under a wage deduction summons as a custodian when the employer is not acting as a liquidator or trustee.

In Re McCary · filed 1986-03-26(10)

3. Stauffer is not a “custodian” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10) defines “custodian”; when a defendant is not alleged to be a custodian, a turnover claim falls under § 542 rather than § 543.

H & H Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Karloff (In Re H & H Beverage Distributors, Inc.) · filed 1986-09-24(10)

We believe that the Debtor's claim properly falls within 11 U.S.C. § 542 instead of § 543, as there is no allegation that the Defendant is a "custodian,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10) defines a custodian as someone acting for the benefit of all creditors, rather than a creditor pursuing its own claim.

In Re Budget Uniform Center, Inc. · filed 1987-03-24(10)

A custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) functions for all of the creditors and is charged with protecting the interests of the entire creditor body.

Section 101(10) includes a court-appointed escrow agent holding a debtor’s funds for distribution to creditors within the definition of custodian.

Matter of DeLancey · filed 1987-09-03(10)

As an escrow agent appointed by the Court of Common Pleas for purposes of distribution of the funds, the Juniata Valley Bank was a "custodian" of property of the estate.

Section 101(10) includes entities that administer a debtor’s assets for the general protection of its creditors, even if they are not liquidating those assets.

In Re Redman Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1988-12-21(10)

Section 101(10) is sufficiently broad to include not merely pre-petition liquidators of a debtor’s property but, also, those entities, like EME, who administer the assets of a debtor for the general protection of its creditors.

Section 101(10) treats a receiver holding a debtor’s funds as a custodian.

In re Leonard · filed 1989-01-13(10)

The receiver is a “custodian” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) and the funds in his possession, although subject to the judgment lien of Mr. Axberg and Mr. Loge, are still property of the estate.

Section 101(10)'s definition of custodian does not include the IRS when it holds property under a tax levy.

Kirk v. United States (In Re Kirk) · filed 1989-04-27(10)

Section 543 is not applicable inasmuch as the IRS does not fall within the definition of custodian as comtemplated by the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10) does not make a parent company’s receiver the debtor’s custodian merely because the receiver holds the parent’s stock in the debtor.

In Re Miami General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1989-05-04(10)

Chapter 631 does not permit the conclusion that the Receiver was also the receiver for MGH and therefore a custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).

Section 101(10)(A) defines a custodian as a receiver or trustee of the debtor’s property appointed in a proceeding outside Chapter 11.

State, Department of Insurance, Division of Rehabilitation & Liquidation v. Govaert (In Re Miami General Hospital, Inc.) · filed 1990-02-02(10)(A)

Under Section 101(10)(A) a “custodian” is any receiver or trustee of debtor’s property appointed in a proceeding not under Chapter 11. Appellant admits no order of the court appointed it custodian, thus it is not a custodian under that definition.

Section 101(10)(A) treats a state court receiver as a custodian for purposes of turnover under § 543(b).

In re Willowood East Apartments of Indianapolis II, Ltd. · filed 1990-04-30(10)(A)

A state court receiver is a custodian for the purposes of this subsection. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A).

Section 101(10) defines a custodian to include both a receiver and an assignee for the benefit of creditors as distinct categories.

In Re Northgate Terrace Apartments, Ltd. · filed 1990-06-04(10)

Under 11 U.S.C. § 543(d)(2), Congress also did not determine that a receiver was the same as an assignee for the benefit of creditors. Rather, the definition of a custodian explicitly includes both a receiver and an assignee for the benefit of creditors.

Section 101(10)(C) defines custodian broadly enough to include a court-authorized agent holding recovered preferences for creditors, even though the agent was appointed after the petition.

In Re NTG Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-08-27(10)(C)

Although custodians for purposes of section 101(10) are usually pre-petition liquidators of property, the statutory definition is not so limited.

Section 101(10)(C) includes a district clerk who holds a debtor’s cash deposit to secure payment of a judgment pending appeal.

Vescovo v. First State Bank (In Re Vescovo) · filed 1990-11-08(10)(C)

The Court concludes that Dixon is a custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C).

Section 101(10)(C) includes a credit counseling service as a custodian when it holds a debtor’s payments in trust under a contract for the benefit of creditors.

Logan v. Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Central Ohio, Inc. (In Re Lee) · filed 1991-04-17(10)(C)

Although this Court finds that CCCS is not an agent, it does find that CCCS is a trustee and hence a “custodian” for purposes of § 101(10).

Section 101(11)(C) defines a custodian to include a receiver appointed in a state court mortgage foreclosure action.

In Re Snergy Properties, Inc. · filed 1991-08-23(11)(C)

A receiver appointed in a state court mortgage foreclosure action is a “custodian” within the meaning of that term, as expressed in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(C).

Section 101(11) requires a custodian to administer a debtor’s assets generally for the benefit of creditors; a bank holding funds under a narrow escrow agreement does not qualify.

In Re Camdenton United Super, Inc. · filed 1992-05-29(11)

The language of all three subsections require that, to be considered a custodian, an entity must be engaged in the general administration of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors.

Section 101(11) includes a state court receiver within the definition of a custodian.

Matter of Willows of Coventry, Ltd. Partnership · filed 1993-05-07(11)

A state court receiver constitutes a custodian. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

A state court receiver of a debtor’s property is a custodian under § 101.

Paren v. Noneman (In Re Paren) · filed 1993-06-10(11)(A)

Noneman was a “custodian” of Debtors’ property at the time Debtors’ bankruptcy was filed and is thus subject to 11 U.S.C. § 543. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining custodian to include a “receiver ... of any property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title”).

A sheriff who receives garnished wages and deducts execution costs is not a custodian under § 101(11).

In Re Dencklau · filed 1993-08-17(11)

The court must approve the expenses after notice and a hearing, however, and the sheriff does not come within the definition of a custodian under 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11)(A) treats a receiver holding a debtor’s property as a custodian.

In Re Cornwall Paper Mills Co. · filed 1994-07-13(11)(A)

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a receiver is a custodian of the debtor’s property and is required to “deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held by or transferred to such custodian ...” 11 U.S.C. § 543(b); 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A). Thus, at the commencement of the Chapter 11 case, the receiver was obligated to restore to Cornwall, as a Debtor in possession, any property of the Debtor including its interest in the lease.

Section 101(11) defines a custodian to include a probate estate administrator holding crop sale income that belongs to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

White v. Stults (In Re White) · filed 1994-08-08(11)

Even though the Administrator of the Opal Stanza Estate presently holds the money in question, the Court finds that he is merely a custodian as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) and, as such, should be compelled to turn over the crop sale income from the years 1989 and 1990 to the Debtors’ bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(11)(A) includes state court receivers within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of custodians.

In Re 245 Associates, LLC · filed 1995-11-09(11)(A)

State court receivers are “custodians” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(10) includes a receiver appointed by a state court in the definition of a custodian.

French Bourekas Inc. v. Turner · filed 1996-05-08(10)

There is no question that a receiver appointed by a state court is clearly a “custodian” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(10); ... Therefore, Turner is the custodian of Lorraine’s property.

Section 101(11) includes a state court-appointed receiver within the definition of “custodian.”

In Re Koula Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 1996-05-30(11)

A state court-appointed receiver is a “custodian” subject to Section 543.

Section 101(11)(C)’s definition of custodian does not include a Chapter 7 trustee.

In re Rodolitz Holding Corp. · filed 1996-09-06(11)(C)

Second, Congress never intended a Chapter 7 trustee to be included under section 101(11)(C). Rather, compensation of Chapter 7 trustees is governed under sections 326 and 503(a).

Section 101(11) includes an authorized de facto receiver within the definition of custodian even if the receiver failed to post a required bond.

In Re Lake Region Operating Corp. · filed 1997-04-14(11)

The definition of custodian is not limited to a duly qualified receiver, but encompasses a trustee who is “authorized” to take charge of such property for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.

Section 101(11) includes certain receivers appointed outside bankruptcy in the definition of “custodian.”

Adams v. Hartconn Associates, Inc. (In Re Adams) · filed 1997-09-10(11)(A), (C)

The definition of "custodian” in the Bankruptcy Code includes a "receiver ... of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title,” and a “receiver ... under applicable law ... that is appointed or authorized to take charge of properly of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A), (C).

Section 101(11) includes a sheriff who takes charge of a debtor’s property to enforce one creditor’s lien; the sheriff need not hold it for all creditors.

Skinner v. First Union National Bank (In Re Skinner) · filed 1997-09-23(11)

Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of custodian requires that a custodian hold property for the benefit of all the debtor’s creditors. ... From all of the above, the Court concludes that the Sheriff is a custodian for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section 101(11)(A) includes a receiver appointed in a state court proceeding within the definition of “custodian.”

Cambio v. G-7 Corporation, 96-0705 (1998) · filed 1998-02-11(11)(A)

In fact, a review of the Bankruptcy Code proves that the Legislature anticipated the existence of state court receiverships. First, by definition, the term "custodian" is defined as a "receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 101 (11)(A).

Section 101(11)(A) includes a receiver appointed outside bankruptcy to hold a debtor’s property in its definition of custodian.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Churchill Securities, Inc. (In Re Churchill Mortgage Investment Corp.) · filed 1998-06-30(11)(A)

The standards governing the Receiver’s reimbursement are those applicable to bankruptcy custodians. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A) (“Custodian means — [a] receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title.”).

Section 101(11)’s definition of custodian excludes these four recipients of payments.

Burtch v. Hydraquip, Inc. (In Re Mushroom Transportation Co.) · filed 1998-11-12(11)

Section 543 could not be applicable to this proceeding because it applies only against a "custodian,” a term defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). None of the definitions of custodian could apply to these four defendants.

Section 101(11) excludes a trustee who holds property under a shareholder trust without an appointment in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, a general assignment for creditors, or a purpose of enforcing a lien or administering property for creditors.

Churchill Technology, Inc. v. Cribari (In re Churchill Technology, Inc.) · filed 1999-07-13(11)

Wendy A. Cribari was designated as trustee by the CUSA Trust Agreement, and not in the context of any “case or proceeding” outside bankruptcy. Thus, she is not a custodian under the first of the three categories that section 101(11) identifies. Nor does she fulfill the second of the stated categories, in that she is assignee not under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, but under a trust for the benefit of designated stockholders. Finally, Ms. Cribari fails to fulfill the definition in part C of section 101(11). Although she was appointed under a contract to take charge of property, such appointment was not for the purpose of enforcing a lien against the shares of stock or for the purpose of the general administration of that stock for the benefit of creditors. Nothing in the record indicates even the existence of a lien. The trust inures not to the benefit of creditors, but to the benefit of stockholders.

Section 101(11)(C) includes a bankruptcy trustee and administrator within the definition of “custodian.”

United States v. Dennis · filed 2001-01-08(11)(C)

The trustee and administrator are "custodians" under the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(C).

Section 101(11) includes a receiver holding bankruptcy estate property within the definition of “custodian,” despite its reference to “property of the debtor.”

In Re Indian Motocycle Co., Inc. · filed 2001-08-03(11)

The Court recognizes that § 101(11) and § 543 refer to “property of the debtor” and not to “property of the estate.” However, in light of the definition of property of the estate as including “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” § 541(a), it is clear that both §§ 101(11) and 543 apply. The Receiver’s status is well within the definition of a “custodian” of bankruptcy estate property and it is obligated to return that property to the Trustee, pursuant to § 543(b)(1).

Section 101(11) excludes former corporate managers from the definition of custodian when they were not receivers, trustees, general assignees, or appointed to administer property for creditors or enforce a lien.

DePaola v. Hollingsworth (In Re Transportation Management Inc.) · filed 2002-04-12(11)

They are not, and never were, “custodians” for purposes of this section. Specifically, they were not appointed trustee or receiver in any case; they were not assignees under a general assignment for the benefit of TMI’s creditors; nor were they appointed to enforce a lien against TMI or to administer the property of TMI for the benefit of creditors.

Section 101(11) excludes an attorney acting solely as a debtor’s legal counsel from the definition of custodian.

Dionne v. Colvin (In Re Moore) · filed 2004-07-29(11)

From the evidence presented, the Court must conclude that Defendant was not a custodian for the purposes of § 542(a). Defendant was acting solely as Debtor’s legal counsel in a state court action, and not in any capacity as an agent for the Debtor or Debtor’s creditors as described in § 101(11).

Section 101(11) defines a custodian as a third person appointed under non-bankruptcy law to manage a debtor’s assets.

In re Freeman · filed 2005-06-01(11)

In their Motion, the Debtors cited to 11 U.S.C. § 543 as authority for their Motion for Turnover. This section, however, deals solely with ''custodians,” which under the definition set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) will only involve a third-person appointed under non-bankruptcy law to manage a debtor’s assets.

Section 101(11)(C) includes a receiver appointed or authorized to take charge of a debtor’s property for the benefit of creditors in its definition of custodian.

Sovereign Bank v. Schwab · filed 2005-07-06(11)(C)

Under the bankruptcy code, a receiver is a custodian “that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor . . . for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(C).

Section 101(11) includes a state-court appointed receiver within the definition of a bankruptcy custodian.

In Re Weldon F. Stump & Co., Inc. · filed 2005-11-08(11)

By way of the filing of the petition, Ms. Fugée, by operation of law, became a “custodian” for purposes of bankruptcy law, and thus subject to the duties set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 543. See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

A former receiver who separately remains the debtor’s managing member after a bankruptcy filing is not a custodian under § 101(11).

Adams v. Marwil (In Re Bayou Group, L.L.C.) · filed 2007-02-02(11)

As previously discussed, this court appointed Marwil as a receiver and as the exclusive managing member of Bayou; his corporate governance powers are not derived from his receivership. Therefore, upon causing Bayou to file its bankruptcy petition, Marwil’s receivership ended and he immediately became the managing-member of a debtor-in-possession.

Section 101(11)(B) includes an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors in the definition of “custodian.”

In Re Automotive Professionals, Inc. · filed 2007-06-12(11)(B)

The definition of “custodian” explicitly includes “assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(B): ... Consequently, assets in the possession of the assignee must be turned over to the trustee and are part of API’s bankruptcy estate.

A debtor in possession is not a custodian under § 101(11).

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Byers · filed 2008-12-17(11)

The fact that the receiver becomes, by operation of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-in-possession once a bankruptcy petition is filed is critical because a debtor-in-possession is not a “custodian” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and therefore is not required to deliver the debtor’s assets to the trustee. ... There is no conflict, then, with 11 U.S.C. § 543, because a debt- or-in-possession is not a custodian within the meaning of the statute.

Section 101(11)(C) includes a garnishee bank that has restrained a debtor’s funds within the definition of custodian.

In Re Atlas Shipping A/S · filed 2009-04-27(11)(C)

That definition encompasses a garnishee bank that has restrained the debtor’s funds.

Section 101(11) defines an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors as a custodian.

In Re Tys, Inc. · filed 2010-02-05(11)

Thus, the Court shall construe his requests for compensation in his capacity as a custodian only. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) ("The term 'custodian' means ... assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors....”).

Section 101(11)(A)'s definition of “custodian” includes a receiver administering the debtors’ accounts receivable.

In Re West Coast Interventional Pain Medicine, Inc. · filed 2010-08-12(11)(A)

Clearly, Martin Goldberg is a “custodian” under that section, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(A).

Section 101(11) defines a custodian and does not include a bank merely holding a debtor’s deposit accounts.

Bucchino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In Re Bucchino) · filed 2010-09-29(11)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is not a custodian within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11)'s definition of “custodian” does not include debtors ordered to turn over property of their bankruptcy estate.

Brubaker v. Jensen (In Re Brubaker) · filed 2011-01-06(11)

A turnover of property may be obtained from “an entity” so long as it is “other than a custodian.” Debtors were not “custodians” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and therefore may be ordered to turn over property of the bankruptcy estate.

Section 101(11)(C) includes an agent authorized to take charge of a debtor’s property to enforce a lien within the definition of custodian.

In re Youngquist · filed 2013-12-06(11)(C)

Under the Douglas County, Kansas District Court Order of Sale, BFC was a custodian for Debtor’s Douglas County properties, including Villa 26 Apartments and Four Wheel Drive. BFC was the agent of Peter Pratt, the receiver appointed by the Texas court, and was given charge over the properties for the purpose of enforcing the judgment lien arising from the filing of the Texas judgment against Debtor and his daughter in Douglas County, Kansas District Court.

Section 101(11) defines a receiver as a custodian under the Bankruptcy Code.

In re 29 Brooklyn Avenue, LLC · filed 2016-04-27(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines a receiver as a “custodian.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11) includes a state-court-appointed receiver of a debtor’s assets within the definition of custodian.

In re Bullitt Utilities, Inc. · filed 2016-09-01(11)

BCSD is a “custodian” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(11).

Section 101(11) defines custodians to include specified receivers, trustees, assignees, and agents; debtors controlling their own property do not qualify.

Veluchamy v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2018-01-12(11)

The Bankruptcy Code defines “custodian” as (A) a “re- ceiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, ap- pointed in a case or proceeding not under this title” ... 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). Obviously the senior Veluchamys are not custodians for purposes of the exception in Section 542(a).

Section 101(11) excludes entities holding tax protest funds under state law for purposes other than administering the debtor’s assets for creditors.

TTC Illinois Incorporated and TTC Holdings Incorporated · filed 2020-06-24(11)

Neither the State Treasurer nor IDOR is a custodian of the protest monies fund with a duty to turn over those funds to TTC when the case was filed or to Oak Point now under §543(b)(1).