D.C. Code § 23-110

Section 23-110(c) allows a court to deny a post-conviction motion without a hearing when the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Stewart v. United States · filed 2012-01-19(c)

The question whether a hearing is required for a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ... On the contrary, we are of the opinion that viewed in the context of the record as a whole, Stewart’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the failure to file a notice of appeal is palpably incredible, and that on this record, Stewart’s allegation that he directed his attorney to appeal, even if true, does not entitle him to relief.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial of a motion without a hearing when the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Patterson v. United States · filed 2012-02-16(c)

Specifically, a hearing is not necessary “[w]hen ‘the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’ ” D.C.Code § 23-110(c); Freeman, supra, 971 A.2d at 201.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial without a hearing when the motion and record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Thomas v. United States · filed 2012-04-12(c)

The resolution of a § 23-110 motion requires a hearing “[ujnless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is enti-*474tied to no relief.” D.C.Code § 23-110(c). ... Without addressing the other grounds relied upon by the trial court,7 we affirm the denial of appellant’s motion because he would not have been able to show that his trial counsel’s conduct caused substantial prejudice.

Section 23-110 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the allegations would warrant no relief even if true.

Meade v. United States · filed 2012-07-26

Although a general presumption exists in favor of an evidentiary hearing in cases involving a collateral attack on a conviction, no hearing is required under Rule 32(e), D.C.Code § 23-110, or the IPA “where defendant’s motion consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true.” ... We conclude, however, that her letter “would merit no relief even if true.”

Section 23-110 presumes that a motion will receive a hearing unless the movant could not establish facts warranting relief.

Bethea v. United States · filed 2017-09-28

Because we conclude that the presumption in favor of holding a hearing on claims brought under § 23-110 has not been rebutted, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 23-110(c) requires an evidentiary hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

BELLINGER v. UNITED STATES. · filed 2015-11-25(c)

The statute itself states that the court “shall” grant a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”

Section 23-110 requires an evidentiary hearing unless the claims are palpably incredible, vague and conclusory, or would not warrant relief even if true.

JAYVON R. WHITE v. UNITED STATES. · filed 2016-09-01

“We will affirm the trial court‟s denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing only if the claims (1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief.” ... In sum, based on the record now before us, we cannot say that Mr. White‟s claim is “palpably incredible.” We conclude that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion.

Section 23-110 does not require an evidentiary hearing when the movant identifies no disputed material fact and the alleged facts, even if true, would not warrant relief.

Dickerson v. Dist. of Columbia · filed 2018-04-19

Accordingly, under circumstances like those here, where appellant fails to “identify any material factual issue that require[s] an evidentiary hearing to resolve,” a hearing is unnecessary.

Section 23-110(c) allows a court to deny a hearing when the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

RALPH L. CLARK, JR. v. UNITED STATES · filed 2016-04-21(c)

But, despite the fact that a defendant is entitled to make foolish judgments about pleading guilty and going to trial, we are not obliged under § 23-110 to honor the irrational over the rational. ... Having concluded that Clark has not shown Strickland prejudice from counsel‟s alleged deficiency, we must say that any need for a hearing on the deficiency allegations is now moot.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing when the motion and case record do not conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Dorsey v. United States · filed 2020-02-27(c)

Given the presumption in favor of hearings on § 23-110 motions, we think the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied a hearing on the ground that appellant did not “proffer sufficient evidence” to raise an issue of whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant was not in good faith.

Section 23-110(c) permits denial of a motion without an evidentiary hearing when the defendant would not be entitled to relief even if the alleged facts were true.

Cordell Smith v. United States · filed 2019-03-14(c)

A § 23-110 motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing where the claims presented would not entitle the defendant to relief even if they are factually true; “if no genuine doubt exists about the facts that are material to the motion, the court may conclude that no evidentiary hearing is necessary.”

Section 23-110 generally favors a hearing, but a court may deny one when the motion and record conclusively show no entitlement to relief.

St. John v. United States · filed 2020-05-14(c)

Although there is a presumption for holding a hearing under D.C. Code § 23-110, appellant’s claim is less than middling. For the reasons stated in previous sections of this opinion, we hold that his claims are based on vague and conclusory allegations, not one of which warrants any relief to appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing for appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the denial of relief.

Section 23-110(c) generally requires a hearing on a motion, but a hearing is unnecessary when the record conclusively shows the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Parker & Jenkins v. United States · filed 2021-04-22(c)

Despite the trial court’s abuse of discretion, reversal is not required here because we are satisfied that appellant Jenkins did not suffer prejudice that would have resulted in a different outcome and thus, a remand for a hearing is not warranted.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Barrie v. United States · filed 2022-08-11(c)

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing on a § 23-110 motion “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”

In § 23-110 proceedings, Rule 8 does not let a movant use an affidavit or other hearsay documents in place of admissible evidence at an evidentiary hearing.

Thompson v. United States · filed 2024-09-05

Simply put, it cannot be that a § 23-110 movant can obtain a hearing, put on the testimonial evidence they wish from other witnesses (and cross-examine any government witnesses), and then avoid subjecting themselves to the crucible of adversarial testimony by presenting their testimony via affidavit and other hearsay documents.

Section 23-110(c) generally requires a hearing unless the claim is vague and conclusory, palpably incredible, or would merit no relief even if true; the existing record does not create a separate exception.

Shepherd v. United States · filed 2023-06-22(c)

But where there is a § 23-110 motion before the court, there are, as explained above, only three legitimate reasons for denying a § 23-110 hearing: if the claims are (1) vague and conclusory, (2) palpably incredible, or (3) would merit no relief even if they were true.

Section 23-110(c) requires a hearing unless the motion and case record conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.

Sanders v. United States · filed 2025-02-06(c)

When a defendant files a Section 23-110 motion, the motions court must hold a hearing “[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” D.C. Code § 23-110(c). ... As explained supra, however, Mr. Sanders does not present facts that could entitle him to relief in any regard. ... We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Mr. Sanders’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

Section 23-110 does not require a hearing on vague and conclusory claims, which also fail to show cause for delay.

Brown v. United States · filed 2018-03-29

We have held claims that are so “vague and conclusory,” like the speculative claims made by Brown, that they do not require a hearing under § 23-110 also fail to show cause for delay.

Section 23-110(d) permits a court to decide a motion without producing the prisoner, but the prisoner’s presence may be required to resolve a decisive factual dispute fairly.

Arrington v. United States · filed 2002-08-15(d)

D.C.Code § 23-110(d) provides that "[a] court may entertain and determine [a § 23-110] motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.” ... In this case, however, we conclude that the defendant’s' presence was required in order to assure the fair and effective resolution of a potentially dispositive issue of fact.

Section 23-110 is a limited collateral remedy and is not a substitute for direct review.

Fields v. United States · filed 1983-05-11

In reaching our conclusion, we view as one of the most influential factors the limited nature of the § 23-110 motion. ... Like its federal counterpart, § 23-110 is not designed to be a substitute for direct review.

Section 23-110 requires a defendant who omitted an available claim on direct appeal to show cause for the omission and resulting prejudice before raising it on collateral attack.

Head v. United States · filed 1985-01-11

Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure. ... Because appellant has made no showing of cause for failure to present the subject of the present motion on direct appeal, his contention here is foreclosed.

Section 23-110 does not permit a collateral challenge to an indictment without a showing of cause and prejudice.

Byrd v. United States · filed 1986-02-03

Furthermore, collateral attack pursuant to § 23-110 is inappropriate for a challenge to the indictment where, as here, there is no showing of cause and prejudice.

Section 23-110 permits a prisoner to raise a claim rejected on direct appeal when intervening authority supports the claim.

Kirk v. United States · filed 1986-06-05

We conclude that our rejection of appellant’s merger argument on direct appeal does not preclude him from raising the same claim, citing intervening authority, by way of a subsequent § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110 generally does not permit a court to reconsider an issue already decided on appeal unless special circumstances exist.

Doepel v. United States · filed 1986-06-24

The doctrine is dispositive of the appeal before us. ... Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the § 23-110 motion.

Prospectively, a § 23-110 movant who knew or should have known the grounds for an ineffective assistance claim during a direct appeal must show cause and prejudice if the claim was not raised while that appeal was pending.

Shepard v. United States · filed 1987-12-02

We now hold that, if an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at that time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court’s consideration of appellant’s claim. ... Our holding that a showing of cause and prejudice is a prerequisite to this court’s review of an appellant’s claim where there has been such a procedural default, however, is prospective.

Section 23-110(b) does not allow delay and prejudice to the government, by themselves, to bar a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ramsey v. United States · filed 1990-01-19(b)

After evaluating these competing themes, we conclude that lapse of time and prejudice to the government cannot, by themselves, bar a § 23-110 motion seeking to withdraw a guilty plea based on alleged ineffectiveness of counsel.

A claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression generally requires a § 23-110 collateral proceeding and an appropriate trial court record, absent extraordinary circumstances.

Simpson v. United States · filed 1990-06-22

In the specific class of cases like the one now before us — a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial attorney’s failure to file a motion to suppress tangible evidence — we go further and hold, prospectively, that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, such claims will not be regarded as sufficiently substantiated unless a collateral proceeding has been instituted in the trial court and an appropriate record has been made.

Section 23-110 permits a defendant who has not yet had a direct appeal to raise an ineffective-assistance claim by motion in the trial court.

Thomas v. United States · filed 1991-02-26

Appellant may file a motion under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989). ... Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987) (ineffective assistance claim is to be raised on direct appeal or it is waived absent a showing of good cause), would not bar the filing of such a motion by appellant since he has yet to have a direct appeal.

A § 23-110 challenge to the manner in which a sentence was imposed is subject to Rule 35’s 120-day limit.

Holland v. United States · filed 1990-12-19

Since such a challenge goes to the manner in which the sentence is imposed, and not to the legality of the sentence itself, appellant’s motion, filed more than 120 days after sentencing, is time barred.

An unappealed denial of a § 23-110 motion does not waive issues properly raised on direct appeal.

Boyd v. United States · filed 1991-01-07

To attach any more significance to her failure to appeal the denial of the § 23-110 motion would penalize her for an unsuccessful collateral attack. Given this court's holding that "§ 23-110 is not designed to be a substitute for direct review," Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985), it would be strange to treat as waived issues properly raised on direct appeal simply because they had also been raised in a previous collateral attack motion.

Section 23-110 does not provide relief for claims already resolved on direct appeal when the movant fails to show cause for presenting new evidence later and prejudice.

Moore v. United States · filed 1992-05-12

Finally, appellant’s contention that the motions judge erred in denying relief under D.C.Code § 23-110 is meritless. The motions judge properly relied on Head, supra, 489 A.2d at 451. The issues raised in appellant’s motion were identical to those resolved by the court in his direct appeal. To the extent appellant submitted “new” evidence — an article on pedophilia, excerpts from a manual of mental disorders, and the Gallacher affidavit — he failed to show cause for not presenting such evidence in connection with his direct appeal or to demonstrate prejudice.

Section 23-110(e) permits the trial court to decline to consider a second or successive motion seeking similar relief for the same prisoner.

Vaughn v. United States · filed 1991-12-09(e)

D.C.Code § 23-110(e) provides that the trial court “shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” ... The trial court was under no obligation even to consider these repeated claims.

Section 23-110(e) permits denial of a successive motion when the prisoner failed to raise an available claim in earlier motions and shows no cause or prejudice for the omission.

Matos v. United States · filed 1993-09-02(e)

Appellant’s failure to raise in any of his three prior motions the ground on which he now seeks to vacate his sentence justifies the denial of his fourth motion under Head and Frady.

A defendant seeking to vacate a sentence after sentencing under § 23-110 must show manifest injustice and an abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.

Eldridge v. United States · filed 1992-12-30

In order to prevail on a post-sentence motion either to withdraw a guilty plea under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 32(e), or to vacate sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110, appellant must show that he suffered “manifest injustice,”4 and that the trial court’s refusal to grant his motion was an abuse of discretion.

A presentence Rule 33 motion does not make a later § 23-110 motion second or successive under subsection (e), even when both seek similar relief.

Junior v. United States · filed 1993-11-29(e)

In other words, for the provisions of § 23-110(e) to be invoked, the first motion must be a post-conviction motion under § 23-110 before the later post-conviction motion under § 23-110 can be deemed a “second or successive motion.” Appellant’s § 23-110 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction was his first post-conviction attack and his first motion under § 23-110. While the relief he sought, based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, was similar, motions under Rule 33 and § 23-110 are not motions for similar relief under § 23-110(e).

Section 23-110(e) does not bar a successive motion when the earlier hearing was conducted without counsel to whom the movant was entitled.

Brown v. United States · filed 1995-03-30(e)

For that reason we conclude that the first hearing was a nullity and may not serve as a bar to a successive § 23-110 petition.

Section 23-110(e) does not bar a counseled motion as successive when the prisoner’s earlier pro se claims were denied without prejudice.

James v. United States · filed 1998-10-08(e)

Thus, the § 23-110 motion filed by new counsel should not have been denied as “successive.”

A later § 23-110 motion is not precluded as successive when the earlier denial is affirmed without prejudice to consideration of the claim on its merits.

Sullivan v. United States · filed 1998-11-05(e)

Our affirmance, however, is without prejudice, so that any subsequent § 23-110 motion appellant may file is not precluded as “successive,” based on the denial of the § 23-110 motion at issue in this appeal.

Section 23-110(e) allows a court to decline to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief.

Williams v. United States · filed 2000-10-05(e)

Given the explicit provision of § 23-110(e) and our holding in Lee, however, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to entertain Williams’ second motion.

Section 23-110(e) permits a court to decline a second or successive motion for similar relief; a prisoner raising claims omitted from the first motion must show cause and prejudice.

Thomas v. United States · filed 2001-05-17(e)

Indeed, the “abuse of writ” doctrine precludes consideration of “claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding,” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); and § 23-110(e) states that, “the court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” ... Furthermore, we agree with the *825trial court’s conclusion that he has not sustained his burden to show cause and prejudice.

Section 23-110 collateral relief does not encompass a belated request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Yancey v. United States · filed 2000-06-15

At the § 23-110 hearing, appellant made a belated contention seeking the remedy of a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Appellant claimed, in this respect, that his codefendant would exonerate him. Since a collateral attack proceeding is not a catch-all for all remedies, it is clear that the assertions made were beyond the purview of the relief sought.

A defaulted claim in a § 23-110 motion ordinarily requires a showing of cause and prejudice, but that requirement does not apply when the motion is properly treated as a Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Brown v. United States · filed 2002-04-04

We now hold that the cause and prejudice showing normally required for a defaulted claim in a § 23-110 motion is not required when the motion properly is viewed as a Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Section 23-110 generally bars collateral claims that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the prisoner shows cause and prejudice.

Wu v. United States · filed 2002-05-23

Section 23-110 is not a substitute for a direct appeal. ... Wu could have raised all of these claims on direct appeal or in his first motion filed pursuant to § 23-110, instead of only in his second and third motions. ... Therefore, the claims are procedurally barred, and the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Wu’s motions.

Section 23-110(e) permits a court to deny a successive motion without a hearing when it raises a similar claim and the movant shows no cause and prejudice for omitting it from the first motion.

Dobson v. United States · filed 2003-01-23(e)

Because the second motion stated an identical legal basis for relief — ineffective assistance of trial counsel — and because Dobson demonstrates no cause for and prejudice from his failure to raise this ineffective assistance claim in his first 23-110 motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second motion without a hearing.

A claim omitted from an earlier § 23-110 motion is procedurally barred unless the movant shows cause and prejudice.

Washington v. United States · filed 2003-11-06

We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that appellant was procedurally barred from asserting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to meet the "cause and prejudice" standard.

A second § 23-110 motion raising a new claim is not successive, and counsel’s failure to raise that claim in the first motion does not bar it while the direct appeal is pending.

McCrimmon v. United States · filed 2004-07-08(e)

The second motion was not “successive” because it raised a new claim. ... We conclude, therefore, that the failure of first appointed counsel on appeal to raise the conflict issue did not bar appellant from presenting it in his second § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110(e) permits denial of a second ineffective assistance motion without a hearing when it repeats the same legal claim based on new allegations and the prisoner shows no cause and prejudice.

Bradley v. United States · filed 2005-08-25(e)

But the fact that his second claim of ineffective assistance is based on acts or omissions by counsel that were not alleged in the first motion does not affect our conclusion that the second motion is “successive,” as that term is used in the statute. Only the factual allegations in the second motion are new; the legal claim in the second, ineffective assistance, is the same as in the first.

Section 23-110 provides a post-trial motion to vacate a sentence through which a defendant can develop a record for an ineffective-assistance claim.

Oliver v. United States · filed 2003-09-11

The generally accepted method of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a post-trial motion to vacate sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110 (2001), which can enable a record to be made that may explain the reasons underlying counsel’s actions before and during trial.

A § 23-110 motion attacking the voluntariness of a guilty plea is adjudicated under Rule 32(b)’s manifest injustice standard.

Ramos v. United States · filed 2004-01-22

A motion brought pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 attacking the voluntariness of a guilty plea is to be adjudicated under the “manifest injustice” standard of Rule 32(b) of the Superior Court’s Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Section 23-110 requires a D.C. prisoner to bring an ineffective-assistance claim by motion in Superior Court.

Brown v. Queen · filed 2009-04-02(g)

Insofar as plaintiff is alleging that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(e) permits a court to decline a successive motion that adds new facts to a legal claim raised in an earlier motion.

Richardson v. United States · filed 2010-12-02(e)

A second § 23-110 motion asserting new factual allegations to prove the same legal claim advanced in the first § 23-110 motion is a “successive” motion.

Section 23-110 cannot substitute for direct appeal; a defendant who omitted an available claim must show cause and prejudice to raise it on collateral review.

Long v. United States · filed 2012-02-02

As “[sjection 28-110 is not designed to be a substitute for direct review,” id., we cannot agree that Mr. Long’s “motion remains ripe for resolution” on collateral attack.

Section 23-110 provides a motion in Superior Court to challenge a conviction on constitutional grounds.

Patock v. U.S. Department of the Interior · filed 2012-07-06

To the extent that plaintiff is challenging the legislation under which he was convicted as contrary to the Second Amendment, his available remedy is by motion pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110 filed in Superior Court.

Section 23-110 permits a prisoner to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in a motion in Superior Court.

Ceasar v. United States of America · filed 2013-04-26(a)

An ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may be brought in a motion under § 23-110.

Section 23-110 does not cover claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, so a federal court may consider those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Waters v. Lockett · filed 2013-07-25

Since a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not reviewable under D.C. Code § 23-110, this ground for relief is properly before the Court for consideration under “the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”

Section 23-110 is the appropriate procedure for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and permits an evidentiary hearing to develop facts outside the direct appeal record.

Littlejohn v. United States · filed 2013-08-29

We pause to note that not only was Littlejohn entitled to challenge his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in a collateral attack, but that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are in fact more appropriately brought in a separate § 23-110 motion to vacate rather than on direct appeal.

Section 23-110 does not cover claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Blount v. United States of America · filed 2014-09-26

A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel falls outside the scope of D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of an actual innocence claim that is available under Section 23-110.

Earle v. United States · filed 2013-09-16(g)

Besides, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Earle’s actual innocence claim -- whether asserted as a “gateway” claim to federal court review or as a “stand-alone” claim -- because “either claim” is available under D.C. Code § 23-110, Ibrahim v. United States, 661 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and, therefore, is foreclosed by Section 23-110(g).

Section 23-110(a) permits a due process claim based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial.

Reed v. United States of America · filed 2014-04-07(a)

The government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial is a viable due process claim under D.C. Code § 23-110(a).

A movant who delays raising a claim under § 23-110 until after direct appeal must show cause for the delay and resulting prejudice; the court found both for this Napue claim.

Gary Gathers & Keith Mitchell v. United States · filed 2014-10-23

Otherwise put, in bringing a subsequent attack in a § 23-110 motion for collateral relief, the movant must establish cause for the failure to raise the claim at the time of direct appeal as well as resulting prejudice.

After resentencing produces a new judgment, a prisoner may file a § 23-110 motion challenging the sentence or underlying conviction without the motion being barred as second or successive.

Colie L. Long v. United States · filed 2017-07-20(e)

Further, we follow the majority of the federal appellate courts in applying this judgment-based understanding to the full extent of its logic, and hold that, after being resentenced and receiving a new judgment, a prisoner may file a § 23-110 motion attacking either his sentence or underlying conviction without running afoul of the bar on second or successive motions.

A claim available on direct appeal may be raised in a § 23-110 motion only if the movant shows cause for not raising it earlier and resulting prejudice.

Fadero v. United States · filed 2018-03-22

Consequently, he may only assert the claim in this § 23-110 proceeding if he can establish cause for and prejudice from his failure to make the argument previously.

A trial judge has discretion to decline to apply a procedural bar to a § 23-110 motion.

Arrington v. United States · filed 2020-09-24

... and the rules governing § 23-110 motions give discretion to trial judges, like the trial judge in this case, to decline to invoke a procedural bar.

A supplement to a § 23-110 motion adequately raises an ineffective-assistance claim when it repeatedly alleges that counsel failed to investigate a lead to an exonerating witness.

Greene v. United States · filed 2022-08-04

The counseled supplement to Greene’s § 23-110 motion repeatedly argued that trial counsel’s failure to investigate Johnson’s lead and track down Wallace amounted to ineffective assistance. ... Greene more than adequately presented the argument for the trial court’s consideration. The court simply failed to rule on it.

Section 23-110 motions raising Napue violations use the Chapman materiality standard and receive no additional harmless error review under Brecht.

Redmond, Jr. v. United States · filed 2025-07-31

For all these reasons, we hold that Napue violations that are raised in a post-conviction motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 are reviewed for materiality under Chapman v. California and are not subject to any further review for harmless error under Brecht v. Abrahamson.

A Section 23-110 motion is not procedurally barred when the defendant shows cause for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the error.

Parker v. United States · filed 2025-08-14

Parker has demonstrated that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of the instructional error. We hold that the trial court erred in denying his Section 23-110 motion as procedurally defaulted.

Section 23-110(e) permits a court to treat a motion as successive when it asserts a ground for relief previously denied on the merits, even if it uses different legal or factual arguments.

Terrell v. United States · filed 2025-07-10(e)

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion was successive. In doing so, we adopt the rule articulated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) and clarify that a motion may be deemed successive under Section 23-110 when the movant asserts an identical ground for relief as that which they asserted in a previous motion even if they make different ... legal or factual arguments.

Section 23-110(e) allows a court to deny a successive motion that seeks relief on the same ground as a prior motion denied on the merits, even if the later motion uses different legal or factual arguments.

Terrell v. United States (Amended Opinion) · filed 2026-01-15(e)

In doing so, we adopt the rule articulated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) and clarify that a motion may be deemed successive under Section 23-110 when the movant asserts an identical ground for relief as that which they asserted in a previous motion even if they make different legal or factual arguments.

Section 23-110(e) treats a motion as successive only when it raises claims previously denied on the merits; new claims may be raised subject to the abuse of the writ doctrine.

Austin v. Miner · filed 2007-05-24(e)

A section 23-110 motion is successive under section 23-110(e) only when it raises claims that are similar or identical to those raised and denied on the merits in a prior motion, see Bradley v. United States, 881 A.2d 640, 645 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1319 (U.S. 2006). New claims may be raised as permitted by the more generous abuse of the writ doctrine, id. at 646.

Requests for counsel to pursue § 23-110 relief should be docketed as § 23-110 motions even when they state no grounds for relief.

Jenkins v. United States · filed 1988-10-06

On the other hand, ... all such communications should be docketed, but, in every case, the request for counsel should be deemed sufficiently reflective of a request for § 23-110 relief as well — even if none is articulated at the time — that the question of appealability of a denial of counsel is not presented in isolation.

To obtain review of issues based on a § 23-110 proceeding, a party must appeal the denial of the motion; otherwise, review is limited to issues based on the trial record.

Hall v. United States · filed 1989-06-16

Appellant, however, has not filed a notice of appeal from the denial of her § 23-110 motion. We emphasize that unless a party appeals from the denial of such a motion, the only issues properly before this court are those the party raises on the basis of the record of trial.

When a hearing on a § 23-110 motion is required, the trial court must appoint counsel; otherwise, it may appoint counsel in its discretion.

Doe v. United States · filed 1990-12-07

Considering the nature of these standards for hearings, it is not surprising that few cases will require the appointment of counsel when no § 23-110 hearing is required under Pettaway. When a hearing is required, however, the appointment of counsel by the trial court is obligatory. Even when the matters advanced by a movant do not appear to require a hearing, the trial court has the discretion to appoint counsel to aid movant in marshalling and presenting a request for relief.

A § 23-110 motion seeking to withdraw a guilty plea may be treated as a motion under Rule 32(e).

Wilson v. United States · filed 1991-06-05

We treat appellant’s motion to vacate his sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110 as a motion under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 32(e) to withdraw a guilty plea.

Section 23-110(c) places the duty to notify the government on the court when the motion and record do not conclusively show that relief is unavailable.

Newton v. United States · filed 1992-07-07(c)

In this case, once the trial court realized that, pursuant to § 23-110(c), it was the court’s obligation to serve notice on the government, the court sought to correct its erroneous order — an action which appellant now challenges.

Section 23-110 permits a trial judge to deny discovery of materials outside the scope of an ineffective-assistance claim.

Johnson v. United States · filed 1992-11-03

Accordingly, under the limited circumstances here, where the materials sought did not fall, within the scope of the challenge to trial counsel under § 23-110, and in view of the undisputed fact found by the trial judge that PDS “had been extremely helpful and forthcoming” with successor counsel, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the discovery motion.

A trial court lacks jurisdiction to vacate a conviction under § 23-110 while a direct appeal is pending; an order doing so is a nullity.

Russell v. United States · filed 1997-10-23

We note that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate Russell’s October 13 convictions while his direct appeal was pending. Its order purporting to do so is therefore a nullity.

A motion under § 23-110 may be made at any time, and the relief sought determines whether a motion falls under the section.

Taylor v. United States · filed 2000-09-21(b)

Rather, despite Taylor’s own representation to the contrary, we understand Taylor’s motion to be before the court pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, a motion which may be made “at any time.” D.C.Code § 23-110(b)(20002). The nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought and not by its caption or what a party represents the motion to be.

A court should decide a § 23-110 motion on the papers filed when counsel delays supplementing it, rather than deny the motion for that delay alone.

Hudson v. United States · filed 2002-01-17

Rather, the proper course for the trial court when met with what it appeared to consider excessive requests by counsel to defer consideration of the motion was to reject them and decide the motion on the merits as presented in the papers filed.

When appellate counsel files a second § 23-110 motion while the direct appeal is pending, a timely request to appeal its denial requires the trial court to vacate and reenter the denial if counsel fails to perfect the appeal.

Pearsall v. United States · filed 2004-09-30

If the trial court finds that Pearsall made a timely request, the court must vacate and reenter its earlier order denying the second § 23-110 in order to allow Pearsall to note a timely appeal in accordance with Williams.

Recorded oral findings entered on the docket can adequately document the denial of a § 23-110 motion for appellate review.

Williams v. United States · filed 2005-06-30

We hold that the trial court’s recorded oral findings, entered on the docket, are sufficient in this case to meet the requirements of law, and affirm.

Section 23-110 permits a court to treat a habeas corpus petition as a motion to vacate sentence when that is the only way the court can consider it.

Graham v. United States · filed 2006-01-30

We therefore conclude that the trial court committed no error in treating appellant’s habeas corpus petition as a motion to vacate his sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110. Appellant was in no way harmed by the court’s recharacterization of his petition; indeed, that was the only way in which the court could have considered the petition at all.

Denial of a § 23-110 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Rivera v. United States · filed 2008-01-31

We review the denial of a § 23-110 motion for an abuse of discretion.

A judge who presided over a bench trial receives appellate deference when deciding a § 23-110 ineffective-assistance claim after hearing the evidence and arguments.

Stevens v. United States · filed 2008-03-13

We believe that the same deference applies in a case, such as this one, where a judge in a bench trial who heard and ruled on all the evidence also presides over a collateral attack on the verdict for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and hears all the evidence and arguments proffered at a hearing on the motion for new trial.

A prisoner’s letter responding to the denial of trial transcripts does not count as a § 23-110 motion when it does not seek relief under the section.

Hardy v. United States · filed 2010-02-25

We conclude that Mr. Hardy’s Letter is not properly characterized as a motion filed under D.C.Code § 23-110, and hence, we deem it unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments as to whether Pettaway applies to abusive motions, or whether the trial judge was required to give the Castro warnings before re-characterizing the Letter as a motion under § 23-110.

Denial of a § 23-110 motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Kigozi v. United States · filed 2012-06-14

We review a trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.

A defendant whose trial counsel also represented him on direct appeal is not barred from filing a § 23-110 motion after the appeal ends.

DeAngelo Coderro Terry & Billy A. Robin v. United States · filed 2015-04-30

However, because Robin’s trial counsel also represented him on appeal, appellant is not barred from filing an appropriate § 23-110 motion after the resolution of this appeal.

A trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal determinations reviewed de novo.

GARDNER v. UNITED STATES · filed 2016-06-23

We review a trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion for abuse of discretion, Wright v. United States, 979 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C. 2009), assessing the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and determinations on questions of law de novo, Jenkins v. United States, 870 A.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C. 2005).

Section 23-110 provides a trial-court motion to develop the record when a Brady claim first raised on appeal cannot be reviewed on the existing record.

MENENDEZ v. UNITED STATES. · filed 2017-03-02

Because the record is insufficient for appellate review of the Brady claim, we decline to consider this second issue until after a D.C. Code § 23-110 motion has been filed in the trial court and a suitable record has been compiled for appellate review.

A trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Blackmon v. United States · filed 2019-09-12

This court reviews a trial court’s denial of a § 23-110 motion for abuse of discretion.

An ineffective-assistance claim raised in a pre-sentencing Rule 33 motion for a new trial is evaluated as if it were a § 23-110 motion.

Smith v. United States · filed 2023-02-02

Although Mr. Smith presented his ineffective-assistance arguments in a pre- sentencing motion for new trial under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 33, we will evaluate it “as if it were a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110.” Johnson v. United States, 585 A.2d 766, 769 (D.C. 1991).

Section 23-110 motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal determinations de novo.

Faltz v. United States · filed 2024-07-11

We review a Section 23-110 motion for abuse of discretion, evaluating the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.

A § 23-110 motion can develop the record on ineffective-assistance claims during a direct appeal when the appellate court delays entry of judgment to permit its filing.

Proctor v. United States · filed 2025-09-18

We further stay our entry of judgement for 30 days, allowing Mr. Proctor the opportunity to develop the record on those arguments through a properly filed § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110 does not require appointed counsel when the court properly decides the motion without a hearing.

Hanna v. United States · filed 1995-10-12

The court has no obligation to appoint counsel to represent a defendant on a § 23-110 motion when the court properly determines that the motion can be decided without a hearing.

A prisoner seeking counsel to pursue a § 23-110 motion must show grounds that would entitle the prisoner to a hearing on the motion.

Kyle v. United States · filed 2000-09-14

To prevail on the application, appellant is required to satisfy the same criteria that would entitle him to a hearing on the § 23-110 motion.

Section 23-110 does not require appointment of counsel when the movant fails to state adequate grounds for relief.

Shorter v. United States · filed 2001-12-06

Nor is the appointment of counsel required where the appellant fails to state adequate grounds for relief under § 23-110.

Section 23-110 permits post-conviction discovery, but a court may deny it when the prisoner’s allegations are speculative and give no reason to believe further facts would establish a right to relief.

Brown v. United States · filed 1999-02-18

As the trial court found, Brown’s theory, and the support for it, was speculative. Carter gave no basis of personal knowledge for the key portion of her affidavit. Thus, there was no reason to believe that, if the facts were fully developed, Brown would be entitled to relief. Accordingly, the denial of post-conviction discovery was not error.

Disclosure of defense work product in a § 23-110 ineffective-assistance proceeding waives its protection only for that proceeding, so the prosecution cannot use it at a retrial, even for impeachment.

Waters v. United States · filed 2023-09-28

And a defendant does not surrender the work product privilege by vindicating their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, except in the limited context of that collateral proceeding itself.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when an adequate local remedy is available; the ability to seek recall of the appellate mandate for ineffective appellate counsel prevents a finding that the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Reyes v. Rios · filed 2006-05-23(g)

Even if petitioner has failed to file a motion to recall the mandate, the availability of such a course precludes the finding of inadequacy or ineffectiveness required to support his petition in this Court.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when a Section 23-110 motion is available unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective; an unsuccessful motion alone does not meet that exception.

VOID-EL v. Haynes · filed 2006-07-25(g)

Moreover, even if Void-El unsuccessfully pursued his challenge under Section 23-110, this failure would not itself be sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacy or ineffectiveness required to support jurisdiction here.

Section 23-110(g) permits federal habeas review only when the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective; unsuccessful prior motions alone do not make it so.

Hatch v. Jett · filed 2009-03-04(g)

His lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110 does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110 bars a federal challenge to a District of Columbia sentence unless its remedy is inadequate or ineffective; denial of requested relief alone does not make it so.

Plummer v. Fenty · filed 2009-04-01(g)

Appellant may not challenge his District of Columbia sentence in federal court unless his remedy under D.C.Code § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective, which appellant has not shown. See Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 725-*826 (D.C.Cir.1986) (per curiam). The § 23-110 remedy, however, is not considered inadequate or ineffective simply because the requested relief has been denied. See id. at 727.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review after the Superior Court denies relief unless the local motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the prisoner's detention.

Boyd v. Warden, FCC Coleman -Usp II · filed 2009-04-09(g)

He has not claimed, and it does not appear, that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Therefore, his habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review after the Superior Court denies relief unless the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the prisoner's detention.

Parker v. Bledsoe · filed 2009-04-13(g)

He has not claimed, and it does not appear, that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Therefore, his habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the pending motion denied as moot.

An unsuccessful motion under § 23-110 does not make the Superior Court remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Phillips v. United States · filed 2009-04-29(g)

Petitioner's lack of success in any previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction orsentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review unless the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective; an unsuccessful motion alone does not make it so.

Mehalic v. Owens · filed 2009-06-04(g)

A prisoners lack of success in his attempt to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-11O(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court prisoner's collateral challenge unless the motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Williams v. Martinez · filed 2008-06-18(g)

Petitioner has been denied relief under § 23-110. He has not claimed, and it does not appear, that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Therefore, his habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) requires a D.C. Superior Court prisoner to seek relief by motion in Superior Court unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Hill v. Warden · filed 2009-01-27(g)

And again, the Court concludes that challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when a Superior Court prisoner has not shown that a § 23-110 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Hill v. Middlebrooks · filed 2009-01-27(g)

Petitioner has not claimed, and it does not appear, that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Therefore, his habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) limits federal habeas relief for D.C. Superior Court prisoners to cases where the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of their detention.

Jackson v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-02-10(g)

"Consequently, although prisoners sentenced by state courts may resort to federal habeas corpus after exhaustion of their state remedies, a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Id. at 726 (intemal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 23-110(g) directs a Superior Court prisoner to seek relief through a Superior Court motion and bars federal habeas review unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Hill v. Middlebrooks · filed 2009-03-24(g)

And again, the Court concludes that challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court conviction unless the prisoner shows that the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Hill v. Warden, FCC Coleman 1 · filed 2009-04-02(g)

D.C. Code §23-1 lO(g). Petitioner has not provided a basis for finding his local remedy inadequate. This Court therefore lacks authority to entertain the petition.

Section 23-110 requires a prisoner challenging a D.C. Superior Court sentence to seek relief by motion in that court unless the remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Whalen v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia · filed 2009-04-09(g)

Petitioner is essentially challenging the sentence imposed by the Superior Court in 1981 following the Supreme Court’s remand. However, challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court conviction unless the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Little v. Sniezek · filed 2009-05-12(g)

Because the petition reveals no basis for finding Mr. Little’s local remedy inadequate or ineffective, this Court lacks authority to entertain the habeas petition.

An adverse ruling on a § 23-110 collateral attack does not make the remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Long-El v. Fenty · filed 2009-01-05

Even if petitioner unsuccessfully had mounted a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence under D.C.Code § 23-110, that remedy is neither inadequate nor ineffective because the presiding judge ruled against him.

Section 23-110 is not an inadequate or ineffective remedy merely because a prisoner cannot relitigate issues in the District of Columbia courts.

Pinkney v. United States of America · filed 2009-02-03

That Petitioner is foreclosed from relitigating these issues in the District of Columbia courts does not render the remedies under D.C. Code § 23-110 inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) does not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective merely because a prisoner’s earlier collateral attacks failed.

Reigle v. Winn · filed 2009-02-10(g)

A prisoner’s lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Prior unsuccessful motions under § 23-110 do not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Kinard v. United States · filed 2009-02-12(g)

A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-11 O(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

An unsuccessful motion under § 23-110 does not make that remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Quigley v. Holt · filed 2009-03-23(g)

A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-11O(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review for a prisoner eligible to seek relief by motion in Superior Court unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention.

Brown v. Levi · filed 2009-06-30(g)

Petitioner has not claimed that his remedy by motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. The Court therefore concludes that this action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review after the Superior Court denies relief unless the prisoner shows that the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Watson v. Middlebrooks · filed 2009-09-28(g)

Watson’s instant habeas petition2 does not demonstrate that a motion under § 23-110 is, or was, inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of petitioner’s conviction and detention. Therefore, his habeas petition before this court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110 is the post-conviction remedy for a D.C. Superior Court prisoner, who may seek federal habeas relief only if that remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Warren v. Bledsoe · filed 2009-10-19(g)

Because Warren was convicted in the District of Columbia, his sole post-conviction remedy lies under D.C.Code § 23-110, and he may not proceed with a federal habeas petition unless the § 23-110 remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review unless the prisoner shows that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Evans v. Daniels · filed 2009-12-07(g)

In short, this court cannot entertain Evans’ habeas petition unless he demonstrates that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective. As Evans has not sought relief under § 23-110 and has not demonstrated that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction, this court does not have jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review unless the Superior Court remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Nelson v. Holder · filed 2010-01-08(g)

Petitioner does not demonstrate that the remedy available to him in the Superior Court is an inadequate or ineffective means to challenge his current custody. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice.

Section 23-110(g) permits a federal challenge to a District of Columbia conviction only when its remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Evans v. Daniels · filed 2010-02-04(g)

Appellant may not challenge his District of Columbia conviction in federal court unless his remedy under D.C.Code § 23-110(g) is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review after denial of a local motion unless the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective; an unsuccessful motion alone does not meet that exception.

Wooden v. United States · filed 2010-04-27(g)

His argument is meritless, as a petitioner’s lack of success in any previous attempt to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this local remedy inadequate or ineffective.

An unsuccessful § 23-110 motion does not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Miles v. United States · filed 2010-05-17(g)

A prisoner’s lack of success in his previous attempt to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective See Wilson v. Offz`ce ofthe Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995).

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review for a District of Columbia prisoner unless the Superior Court remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Greely-Bey v. Wainwright · filed 2010-08-11(g)

lt is settled that "a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention"’ ... Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice.

Prior unsuccessful motions under § 23-110 do not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Chatmon v. United States · filed 2009-07-16(g)

A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Prior unsuccessful motions under § 23-110 do not make the Superior Court remedy inadequate or ineffective for federal habeas review.

Cunningham v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-08-26(g)

A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-11 O(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110 requires collateral challenges to D.C. Superior Court convictions to be brought in that court unless the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective; denial of relief alone does not make it so.

Corley v. United States Parole Commission · filed 2009-08-26

The mere denial of relief by the local court does not render the local remedy inadequate or ineffective, ... and the plaintiff here has not claimed or demonstrated here that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention. Accordingly, to the extent that this action constitutes a collateral attack on his Superior Court conviction and sentence, this court must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal review of claims that were or could have been raised in a Superior Court motion unless that remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Branch-El v. United States of America · filed 2010-03-02(g)

This court does not have jurisdiction to entertain claims that were or could have been presented to the Superior Court on a § 23-110 motion, unless the petitioner can show that his remedy under § 23-110 is "ineffective or inadequate to test the legality of his conviction." D.C. Code § 23-11O(g).

Section 23-110 directs challenges to D.C. Superior Court convictions, sentences, or fines to Superior Court.

Seitu v. Pan · filed 2010-06-01

Petitioner’s challenge to the Superior Court convictions, sentences or fines is not properly brought in this Court – he must instead file a motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when the local motion remedy is adequate and effective; losing in the local courts does not make that remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Richardson v. Whitehead · filed 2009-09-16(g)

Petitioner's lack of success in the local courts, however, does not render the local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), and petitioner has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate. This Court therefore lacks authority to entertain the petition.

Repeated denials of relief do not make the § 23-110 motion remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Taylor v. Bledsoe · filed 2009-11-20(g)

A remedy is not ineffective or inadequate just because it produces the same result to the same request for relief. Plaintiff has not shown that the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective; rather, he has shown only that his legal arguments have consistently been found to lack merit.

Section 23-110(g) does not permit federal habeas review merely because a prisoner was unsuccessful in seeking relief through a Superior Court motion.

Tolliver v. Cross · filed 2009-11-27(g)

A prisoner's lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) permits federal habeas review only when the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective; losing a local collateral challenge does not make the remedy inadequate.

Blunt v. Schultz · filed 2009-12-17(g)

Petitioner's lack of success in those courts, however, does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), and petitioner has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate.

Denial of relief by the District of Columbia courts does not make the remedy under § 23-110 inadequate or ineffective.

Wright v. Stansberry · filed 2010-01-07(g)

Denial of relief by the courts of the District of Columbia does not render inadequate or ineffective the remedy provided by D.C.Code § 23-110.

Section 23-110(g) does not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective merely because a prisoner’s collateral challenges were unsuccessful.

Finch v. United States · filed 2010-05-05(g)

The petitioner’s lack of success in those courts, however, does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garrz`s v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d at 727 ; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756-58 (6th Cir. l999) (citing cases), and petitioner has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review unless the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective; denial of local relief alone does not make it so.

Richardson v. Stephens · filed 2010-08-10(g)

Petitioner cannot avail himself of this forum merely because his prior attempts in the District of Columbia courts to vacate or set aside his conviction have been denied.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when the local motion remedy is adequate and effective; repeated denials of relief alone do not make that remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Eldridge v. Davis · filed 2010-08-25(g)

Petitioner's lack of success in those courts does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective, see Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d at 727; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,756-58 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), and he has provided no other basis for finding the local remedy inadequate.

Prior denials of § 23-110 motions do not make the local remedy inadequate or ineffective for purposes of federal habeas review.

Hunter v. Middlebrooks · filed 2010-10-05(g)

Petitioner cannot avail himself of this forum to bring a due process claim or what the Court construes as an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, see Pet. at 20, merely because his prior attempts in the District of Columbia courts to vacate or set aside his conviction have been denied.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review when a prisoner could have raised the claims through a local motion; an unsuccessful motion does not make that remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Hiligh v. Quintana · filed 2010-10-18(g)

But a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of the D.C Court of Appeals,2 see Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1150 (1995), and a petitioner’s unsuccessful attempt to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render the local remedy inadequate or ineffective.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court sentence unless a § 23-110 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Richardson v. Berkebile · filed 2009-11-02(g)

Because the petitioner has not shown that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his conviction and detention, the habeas petition before this Court must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) permits federal habeas review of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims because a section 23-110 motion cannot raise those claims.

Williams v. Martinez · filed 2009-11-13(g)

Thus, because the Superior Court lacks authority to entertain a section 23-110 motion challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel, that section is, by definition, inadequate to test the legality of Williams’s detention. Accordingly, section 23-110 does not bar Williams’s habeas petition.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a D.C. Superior Court prisoner's collateral challenge unless the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Crawford v. Drew · filed 2009-12-30(g)

In any case, the petition does not claim that a motion under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of petitioner's detention. Accordingly, this habeas petition will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of a Superior Court prisoner’s claim when the local motion remedy was adequate and effective to test the legality of detention.

Joyner v. O'Brien · filed 2010-01-15(g)

Hence, Joyner has not shown that the remedy § 23-110 affords is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas petition and will dismiss it.

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review of claims that were or could have been raised in a Superior Court § 23-110 motion unless the prisoner shows that remedy was ineffective or inadequate to test the conviction’s legality.

Johnson v. Stansberry · filed 2010-01-29(g)

This court does not have jurisdiction to entertain claims that were or could have been presented to the Superior Court on a § 23-110 motion, unless the petitioner can show that his remedy under § 23-110 is "ineffective or inadequate to test the legality of his conviction." D.C. Code § 23-1 l0(g). Because the petition does not claim or demonstrate that Johnson’s § 23-110 remedy was ineffective or inadequate, these claims will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 23-110(g) allows a prisoner to challenge a D.C. Superior Court conviction through a § 2241 petition only if the § 23-110 remedy is inadequate or ineffective.

Jasper Dockery v. Driver · filed 2010-02-03(g)

These challenges are to the propriety of his convictions; thus Dockery must demonstrate the remedy provided by D.C. Code § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective to raise his claims in a section 2241 petition.

Section 23-110(g) bars a D.C. Code offender from seeking federal habeas relief unless the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention.

Kamara v. Keffer · filed 2011-05-27(g)

She cannot avail herself of this federal forum absent a showing that the local remedy is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [her] detention." Byrd v. Henderson, 119 F .3d 34,36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting D.C. Code § 23-11O(g)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986).

Section 23-110(g) bars federal habeas review unless the local motion remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the prisoner’s detention.

Bonilla v. Wainwright · filed 2011-07-22(g)

In the absence of any argument or allegation that the 23-110 motion was an inadequate or insufficient means for testing the legality of the conviction, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.