D.C. Code § 13-423

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires the plaintiff’s claim to arise from the defendant’s business contacts with the District.

Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corporation · filed 1996-11-25(a)(1)

Additionally, the plaintiffs have not shown how this purported “large amount of business” in the District is related to their employment discrimination claims.

When jurisdiction rests only on § 13-423, the claim must arise from the defendant’s contacts with the District of Columbia.

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Pena · filed 1998-06-03(b)

The Court finds that, despite Plaintiffs’ characterization of the visits as “in furtherance of CROET’s DOE grant”, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims arise from these contacts. Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the leases and subleases between the DOE and CROET for property in ORR; attendance at conferences and meetings regarding other recycling projects do not meet the “arising from” standard.

Section 13-423(b) permits a claim based on long-arm jurisdiction only if the claim arises from the acts supporting that jurisdiction.

Poling v. Farrah · filed 2001-01-30(b)

Mr. Poling has failed to show how these contacts relate to the $100,000 investment that forms the basis of his complaint. Under the District of Columbia long-arm statute, unless the acts regarding the real estate transaction relate to his claim for relief, those contacts cannot support an exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 13-423 requires a qualifying connection to the District of Columbia and limits jurisdiction to claims arising from the acts on which jurisdiction is based.

Bancoult v. McNamara · filed 2003-03-10(a), (b)

With regard to the first prong of the inquiry, personal jurisdiction is not applicable under the District of Columbia long-arm statute- because the jurisdictional allegations and affidavits do not show that the plaintiffs’ claims arise from DCDM’s transacting business, contracting to supply services, or causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 13-423(a), (b).

Section 13-423(b) permits personal jurisdiction only for claims arising from the defendant’s conduct in the District of Columbia.

Sieverding v. American Bar Ass'n · filed 2006-07-17(b)

Because the plaintiffs’ claims have nothing to do with the defendants’ conduct in the District of Columbia, this court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 13-423(b) requires the claim to arise from the defendant’s District contacts; a contact occurring after the alleged injury cannot satisfy that requirement.

World Wide Minerals Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstahn · filed 2000-09-27(b)

The Long Arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423(b), requires that the claim arise from the contacts alleged. It would be impossible for the injury to arise from a contact occurring months later. Therefore, this court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Nukem on the basis of the alleged meetings at the embassy.

When personal jurisdiction rests solely on § 13-423, a claim must arise from the defendant’s particular transaction of business in the District.

World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan · filed 2002-08-02(b)

The statute makes clear that, where jurisdiction is predicated solely upon the long-arm statute, “only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted.” Id. § 13-423(b). Thus, personal jurisdiction under this theory “is limited to claims arising from the particular transaction of business” in the District.

Section 13-423(b) requires a significant connection between the claim and the defendant’s business transaction in the District of Columbia.

Gowens v. Dyncorp · filed 2001-02-16(b)

The Court finds that plaintiff has not met his burden as to either “specific” (under the long-arm statute) or general jurisdiction. ... These purported reasons do not persuade ... the Court that plaintiffs claims — that a DynCorp official fraudulently represented to him his ability to receive a per diem, breached the contract and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by denying him per diem compensation, and wrongfully discharged him — have a significant connection to the contract to perform aerospace services that DynCorp executed with the federal government.

Section 13-423(b) requires a claim based solely on the section to arise from the defendant’s qualifying conduct in the District; business conducted after the injury cannot establish jurisdiction over that claim.

Gluck v. Ansett Australia Ltd. · filed 2001-12-14(b)

Even if defendant had begun to transact business in the District of Columbia after the alleged accident, those business transactions could not have given rise to an accident that would have pre-dated their occurrence. Both the plain language of D.C.Code § 13-423 and the case law interpreting the provision make it clear that any discovery that post-dates the accident can not serve as a basis for jurisdiction under § 13-423.

Section 13-423(b) limits personal jurisdiction based on the section to claims arising from the defendant’s listed acts.

Papst v. Konica-Minolta Photo Imaging, Inc. · filed 2008-12-11(b)

Subsection (b) qualifies the reach of the statute by noting that “[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.” ... KMPI does not allege that specific jurisdiction applies — that the underlying patent dispute between Papst and KMPI arises out of or relates to Papst’s contacts with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 does not provide specific jurisdiction over claims arising from conduct outside the District when no other statutory basis connects the claims to the District.

Azamar v. Stern Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2009-10-14

The claims of these plaintiffs do not afford the Court specific jurisdiction because they arise from activity outside of the forum, and do not otherwise "bring the case within ... the scope of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423." Kopff, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 81.

Section 13-423(a)(4), read with subsection (b), does not require a claim arising from an out-of-District act that causes injury in the District to also arise from the defendant’s additional District contacts.

Etchebarne-Bourdin v. Radice · filed 2009-10-22(a)(4), (b)

We hold that the nexus requirement under subsection (b), as applied to the basis for jurisdiction set out in subsection (a)(4), does not require that the claim arise from what we consider to be independent “plus factors.”

Section 13-423(b) requires a claim to arise from the District conduct relied on to establish personal jurisdiction.

Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Institute, International & Unity Resources Group, L.L.C. · filed 2010-02-05(b)

More importantly, any claim for relief under the D.C. long-arm statute must “aris[e] from” the act or acts conferring jurisdiction over the defendant.

Section 13-423(b) permits jurisdiction based solely on the long-arm statute only for claims arising from the acts that establish jurisdiction.

McIntosh v. Gilley · filed 2010-11-30(b)

First, McIntosh’s allegations that David & Linda Gilley visited the District, telephoned Amanda Gilley, and that AKG transacted business in the District do not pertain to McIntosh’s libel claim. Therefore, under D.C. Code 13-423(b), such allegations cannot independently create personal jurisdiction over David & Linda Gilley.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim against a nonresident defendant to arise from the defendant’s conduct in the District of Columbia; unrelated business or services there do not suffice.

Kissi v. Panzer · filed 2009-10-23(a)

Although EMC and Panzer may have transacted business or contracted to supply services in the District of Columbia, it does not appear that either has done so with respect to the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s causes of action.

Section 13-423(b) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s acts in the District that are used to establish personal jurisdiction.

Estate of Marani Awanis Manook v. Unity Resources Group · filed 2010-02-26(b)

More importantly, any claim for relief under the D.C. long-arm statute must “aris[e] from” the act or acts conferring jurisdiction over the defendant. D.C.Code § 13-423(b). ... Plaintiffs have alleged no legitimate and substantial connection between the acts that occurred in Iraq and this District to form a basis for jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(2) do not support specific jurisdiction based on District business or service contracts when the claims do not arise from that business.

Bond v. ATSI/JACKSONVILLE JOB CORPS CENTER · filed 2011-09-20(a)(1), (a)(2)

Second, even if Messrs. Owens and Hayes have engaged in such business, such that they would be subject to the District’s long-arm statute for “transacting any business in the District of Columbia,” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1), or “contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia,” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(2), plaintiffs claims have nothing to do with that business. Specific jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be based on those contacts.

Section 13-423(b) permits specific jurisdiction only when the claim arises from the defendant’s qualifying conduct in the District.

McDaniel v. Feditc LLC, Federal It Consulting · filed 2011-11-18(b)

Although plaintiff may be correct that FEDITC contracts to supply services in the District of Columbia, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her retaliation claim is in any way related to the business that FEDITC currently conducts in the District.

Section 13-423 permits jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District only when the claim arises from that business.

Marshall v. I-Flow, LLC · filed 2012-04-20(a)(1), (b)

In other words, Plaintiff’s claim must arise from Defendant’s transacting of business here. ... Even if all of this is true, Plaintiff does not explain what connection these activities have to her claim here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires the plaintiff’s claims to arise from the defendant’s business transacted in the District.

Janod, Inc. v. Echo Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2012-09-10(a)(1)

The Court therefore refuses to find that the delivery of the final episodes to Nat Geo in Washington, D.C. is the action out of which Janod’s claims arise. There are no allegations that any actions related to the Participant Agreement or the breach thereof occurred in the District of Columbia. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showing that the actions giving rise to its claims occurred in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s business in the District; unrelated advertising does not establish personal jurisdiction.

Myers v. Holiday Inn, Inc. · filed 2013-01-16(a)(1)

For jurisdiction to be conferred upon this court, the plaintiff’s claim must also “arise out of” the transacted business. ... Thus, the plaintiff’s claim did not arise out of the defendant’s alleged business in the District; the two are unrelated.

Section 13-423(b) limits specific jurisdiction to claims arising from the acts that provide the basis for jurisdiction.

Geier v. Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C. · filed 2013-02-08(b)

The Geiers’ argument does not comport with the D.C. long-arm statute, which expressly limits specific jurisdiction to claims arising from the enumerated acts.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction based on business transacted in the District only for claims arising from the defendant’s District contacts.

American Action Network, Inc. v. Cater America, LLC · filed 2013-09-30(a)(1)

Because section 13-423(a)(1) is limited by section 13-423(b), the Court may only consider defendant contacts from which the plaintiff’s specific claims arise.

When jurisdiction rests solely on Section 13-423, subsection (b) permits only claims arising from the acts that support jurisdiction.

Shaheen v. Smith · filed 2013-11-13(b)

More importantly, and as set forth above, even if the defendants’ contacts with the government were enough to constitute regular business in the District or a persistent course of conduct in the District, § 13-423(b) specifies that the tortious act must arise from those contacts.

Section 13-423(b) permits specific jurisdiction only for claims arising from the defendant’s qualifying District of Columbia acts.

Okolie v. Future Services General Trading & Contracting Company, W.L.L. · filed 2015-04-21(b)

Even if both sets of contacts could be considered, they fail to satisfy the requirement that the facts giving rise to the cause of action “aris[e] from” the minimum contacts that form the basis for personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim for relief to arise from the defendant’s qualifying contacts with the District of Columbia.

Fawzi v. Al Jazeera Media Network · filed 2017-08-11(a)

More importantly, however, none of Fawzi’s claims for relief arise out of these newly asserted D.C. contacts—which primarily concern Al Jazeera USA, and occurred years after the harms he allegedly experience in Egypt. He thus fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements of due process or D.C.’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires a claim to have a sufficient connection to the defendant’s business transactions in the District.

Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp. · filed 2017-11-13(a)(1)

Although it is a close call, the Court finds that Sharp is unable to show that Hisense's contacts with the District have the requisite nexus to the instant suit.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s District contacts for those contacts to support specific jurisdiction.

Robo-Team Na, Inc. v. Endeavor Robotics · filed 2018-04-26(a)

Endeavor’s government contracting activities would not form a basis for specific jurisdiction in this case because Robo-Team’s claims do not arise from these activities.

Section 13-423 permits jurisdiction over a claim based on District business transactions only when the claim arises from those transactions.

Graphic Communications Conference / International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 285m v. McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc. · filed 2018-11-29(b)

Finally, Local 285M’s specific invocation of section 13-423 as the basis for its contention that this Court has personal jurisdiction over M&E (and thus that M&E “resides” in the District of Columbia) is unavailing, because it is clear beyond cavil that section 13-423 does not authorize the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over M&E with respect to the claims at issue here.

Section 13-423(b) requires a specific-jurisdiction claim to arise from the defendant’s relevant District contacts.

Allen v. Addi · filed 2021-09-22(b)

And because none of these alleged connections relate to the subject of this litigation, there is no basis for specific personal jurisdiction. See § 13–423(b).

Section 13-423(a) permits specific personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a nonresident defendant’s qualifying conduct in the District.

Edwards v. Best Buy Co., Inc. · filed 2021-09-27(a)

A plaintiff must “make two showings... that specific jurisdiction comports with the forums long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a), and does not violate due process.” Id. (internal citation omitted). ... Here, Mr. Edwards’s claims against Best Buy do not arise from or relate to the business it conducts in D.C., which includes one store. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that it is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Edwards’s claims against Best Buy.

Section 13-423(b) permits a claim based on the District’s long-arm statute only when the claim arises from the acts establishing jurisdiction.

Vuyyuru v. Bank of North America, Inc. · filed 2022-04-14(b)

But where “jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon [D.C.’s long-arm statute], only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.” Id. § 13-423(b) (emphasis added). ... Without more, it would contravene the Due Process Clause and the text of the District’s long-arm statute to exercise in personam jurisdiction as to VCR.

Section 13-423 permits specific jurisdiction only over claims arising from the defendant’s conduct in the District.

Winmar Construction, Inc. v. Esf Inc. · filed 2023-02-06(b)

Even if true, this alleged “business” could not serve as a basis for specific jurisdiction under § 13-423, as that statute only authorizes personal jurisdiction when the “claim for relief aris[es] from” the defendant’s conduct in D.C.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim to arise from qualifying conduct in the District; unrelated oversight activities do not establish personal jurisdiction.

Nwosu v. Bolduc · filed 2024-03-10(a)

Nwosu’s “claim[s] for relief” do not “aris[e] from” the Conference’s oversight activities.

Section 13-423(b) requires a claim to arise from the defendant’s District of Columbia contacts before those contacts can support personal jurisdiction.

Reeve v. Monex Inc. · filed 2024-07-29(b)

Instead, Reeve must allege that the acts giving rise to her specific claims against Lyumkis took place while they were working in the District of Columbia. At no point does Reeve make such allegations.

Section 13-423(b) requires a claim to arise from the District contacts used to establish personal jurisdiction.

Plastics Industry Association, Inc. v. Bonta · filed 2025-04-07(b)

Under both, a plaintiff’s suit must “aris[e] from” the jurisdiction-conferring contacts. D.C. Code § 13-423(b).

Section 13-423 allows specific jurisdiction only over claims arising from the defendant’s qualifying contacts with the District.

Juselis v. Arlington Management Employees · filed 2026-03-05(b)

This is also the case under the District’s long-arm statute: “When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon” the District’s long-arm statute, “only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in [the statute] may be asserted against [them].” D.C. Code § 13-423 (emphasis added); see also Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Zhu, 2004 WL 1249788, at *2. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that it does not have specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants Manos and Arlington because Juselis’s claims against the Defendants do not arise out of their contacts with the District.

Section 13-423 permits specific jurisdiction over officers who voluntarily lead a D.C. nonprofit and allegedly injure it through conduct in the District.

Bronner v. Duggan · filed 2017-03-31

Taken together, given that the allegedly injurious acts occurred at a meeting in the District of Columbia and Individual Defendants voluntarily assumed leadership roles in the District of Columbia organization they allegedly injured, the Court finds that each Individual Defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into a District of Columbia court to answer for alleged wrongdoing in connection with their roles in the boycott resolution. And, because the Court finds specific jurisdiction over each defendant, the Court need not limit its analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims to activity that took place within the District of Columbia. See Daley, 26 A.3d at 728 (citing D.C. Code § 13-423).

Section 13-423 does not establish personal jurisdiction over corporate officers individually based on business they conduct or acts they take on behalf of the corporation.

Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc. · filed 1981-01-26(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)

There is no allegation that they conducted any business as individuals, and as a result, sections (a)(1) and (a)(4) of the Long-Arm Statute are not available to plaintiff as a basis for jurisdiction. ... Thus jurisdiction cannot be conferred by section (a)(3).

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation solely because its subsidiary is authorized to do business in the District of Columbia.

Martin-Trigona v. Acton Corp. · filed 1984-12-13(a)(1)

Sections 422 and 423 do not provide that personal jurisdiction may attach on a parent corporation merely because one of its subsidiaries is authorized to do business in the District.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction based on transacting business in the District only when the conduct is undertaken in the person’s individual capacity, rather than as official business for an employer.

Pollack v. Meese · filed 1990-03-28(a)(1)

Furthermore, there is no merit to the argument that personal jurisdiction could be based on the transacting of any business in the District of Columbia. The law is clear that a persistent course of conduct may be deemed to constitute the transaction of business for the assertion of personal jurisdiction only if that persistent conduct is undertaken in that person’s individual capacity rather than an official capacity conducting business for his employer.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits a court to attribute a corporation’s District contacts to an officer who is more than an employee and therefore falls outside the fiduciary shield doctrine.

National Community Reinvestment Coalition v. NovaStar Financial, Inc. · filed 2009-06-22(a)(1)

Thus, Anderson is not transacting any business in his personal capacity that would subject him to subsection (a)(1) of the long-arm statute, but absent the fiduciary shield doctrine, the Court can attribute NFI and NMI’s connections with the District of Columbia to Anderson. ... Given the similarities between Anderson and the officers in Covington, Anderson falls under the “more than an employee” exception to the fiduciary, shield doctrine.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not establish personal jurisdiction over a corporate employee based solely on acts performed for the corporation.

Farouki v. Petra International Banking Corp. · filed 2011-09-20(a)(1)

Mr. Farouki has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that personal jurisdiction exists over defendant Mr. Old under D.C.Code § 13 — 423(a)(1) for any of the counts in the Amended Complaint, nor has he alleged an alternative basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Old. The Court will therefore uphold the corporate shield and grant Mr. Old’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

Section 13-423 requires a corporate officer’s own contacts with the District to support personal jurisdiction; jurisdiction under subsection (a)(4) also requires one of its specified additional connections to the District.

Mouzon v. Radiancy, Inc. · filed 2015-03-30(a)(1), (a)(4)

Plaintiffs have not satisfied subsection (a)(1) of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, and jurisdiction is not proper under this prong of the statute. ... Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that suggest that any of the three “plus factors” are applicable to Rafaeli. Accordingly, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Rafaeli pursuant to subsection (a)(4) of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not permit a subsidiary’s District of Columbia business contacts to be attributed to its parent based on ownership alone.

Leitner-Wise v. Clark · filed 2018-12-26(a)(1)

Under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, this Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction “over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code. § 13-423(a)(1). ... Without any factual allegation permitting the attribution of LWDI’s contacts with the District of Columbia to Southern Gun, this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Southern Gun.

Section 13-423 requires an out-of-state corporate employee’s own D.C. contacts to support personal jurisdiction when the claims arise from those contacts.

Urquhart-Bradley v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 2019-06-19

In other words, regardless of a corporation’s D.C. activities, non—D.C.-based employees can only be sued in D.C. for claims arising from their own transactions, contracts, property, actions, or relationships within D.C. See D.C. Code § 13-423.

Sections 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(2) do not establish personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer based solely on company business and contacts with the federal government.

Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-09-14(a)(1), (a)(2)

Indeed, Plaintiffs have not pointed to single act that Scott Torres has taken in a non-corporate capacity and/or one that is not in some way connected to the federal government, and thus, their attempt to justify this Court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over him under sections 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(2) fails.

Section 13-423(a)(6) covers guaranty agreements as contracts to insure an underlying obligation.

United States v. Rollinson · filed 1986-02-28(a)(6)

The statute confers jurisdiction over persons who “eontract[] to insure ... any ... contract,” and thus contemplates precisely the secondary liability that arises from a guaranty agreement. Accordingly, although the statute fails specifically to name contracts of guaranty, such contracts fall within its scope as a matter of substance if not nomenclature.

Section 13-423(a)(1) or (6) permits personal jurisdiction over guarantors whose contracts guarantee payment on a note to be performed at a District of Columbia bank.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Donnell · filed 1991-08-26(a)(1), (a)(6)

These contracts guarantee a promissory note between NBW and FMS which is governed by District of Columbia law and which was to be performed by rendering payment to NBW at its District of Columbia office. ... Having found that jurisdiction over the defendants is proper pursuant to D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) or (6), the Court must next determine whether the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction comports with due process.

Section 13-423(a)(2) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who agrees to provide services to a District resident in the District.

COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M. · filed 1995-09-15(a)(2)

In addition, the Court finds that the “contracting to supply services” provision, by its own terms, would not cover Fin-shipyards’ conduct because it only applies to a non-resident who injects itself into the District by agreeing to provide some service to the resident in the District.

Section 13-423(a)(2) requires the alleged injury to result from a contract to supply services in the District of Columbia.

Pease v. Burke · filed 2008-03-07(a)(2)

The plain language of the long-arm statute, however, provides that the alleged injury must result from a contract to supply services in the District of Columbia, not outside of the District of Columbia, and plaintiff has not alleged facts to support such a finding.

Section 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(2) require a basis to find that the defendant transacted business or contracted to supply services in the District.

Knowledgeplex, Inc. v. Metonymy, Inc. · filed 2008-09-05(a)(1)-(2)

Here, however, the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof, has not demonstrated that the defendant “solicited the business relationship” or that “the contract calls for the performance of work within the District.” ... Furthermore, the subcontract specifically requires that the defendant “shall perform work at [the defendant’s] offices in California,” Subcontract, Statement of Work at 4, and nothing in the record indicates other contact with D.C. or an intent to supply services in D.C.

Section 13-423(a)(6) permits personal jurisdiction over claims arising from a contract to insure a person or risk located in the District of Columbia at the time of contracting.

Malveaux v. CHRISTIAN BROTHERS SERVICES · filed 2010-11-30(a)(6)

Moreover, D.C.’s long-arm statute explicitly provides for personal jurisdiction over claims arising from a person’s “contracting to insure ... any person ... or risk ... located ... within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting____” D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(6). Therefore, it appears that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Christian Brothers by virtue of its agreement to provide insurance for Sister Philomena in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(6) does not categorically exclude a statutory guarantor that stands in the shoes of an insurer that contracted to cover a District risk.

Walter E. Campbell Company v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. · filed 2013-08-13(a)(6)

Accordingly, since the Court must construe any legal uncertainties in favor of WECCO, the Court cannot say that there is no possibility that a D.C. court would find that the “contracting to insure” clause of the D.C. long-arm statute covers PCIGC here.

Section 13-423(a)(6) reaches a claim with a clear relationship to a contract insuring a person located in the District.

Vantage Commodities Financial Services I, LLC v. Assured Risk Transfer Pcc, LLC · filed 2018-08-06(a)(6)

Here, Vantage’s claim against the ... reinsurers has a clear relationship to the reinsurers’ contracts with ART. It therefore arises from the Reinsurer Defendants’ contracts to insure a person in the District and falls within the scope of the District’s long-arm statute.

Subsection (a)(6) reaches claims with a discernible relationship to a contract insuring a person located in the District, even when the plaintiff’s rights under that contract are disputed.

Vantage Commodities Fin. Servs. I, LLC v. Assured Risk Transfer PCC, LLC · filed 2018-08-06(a)(6)

Here, Vantage's claim against the reinsurers has a clear relationship to the reinsurers' contracts with ART. It therefore arises from the Reinsurer Defendants' contracts to insure a person in the District and falls within the scope of the District's long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction based on a contract to supply services in the District only when the contract obligates the defendant to provide services there.

B3dc Navy Yard, LLC v. Epoch Design Group, Inc · filed 2020-02-24(a)(2)

The contract, therefore, did not obligate Catalyst to supply any services within the District as required by the long-arm statute; accordingly, no jurisdiction can arise from it.

Section 13-423 requires facts showing business transactions or service contracts in the District and a claim arising from those contacts to establish personal jurisdiction.

Reiffer v. Aet Limo, LLC · filed 2020-08-04(a)(1)–(2), (b)

But Reiffer neither alleges in the Complaint nor otherwise proffers any facts to support these allegations or to explain how his claim “ar[ose] from” these purported dealings, D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1), (b).

Section 13-423(a)(2) permits personal jurisdiction over a person or commercial entity for a claim arising from its contract to supply services in the District of Columbia.

National Voter Contact, Inc. v. Versace · filed 1986-06-18(a)(2)

The complaint alleges sufficient facts to support personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 13-423 permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state conspirator based on another conspirator’s act in the District when that act furthers the conspiracy and the resulting injury occurs in the District.

Dorman v. Thornburgh · filed 1990-06-14(a)(3)

Based on the principles of agency law, under the long-arm statute this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who have no direct contacts with the District of Columbia if the plaintiff alleges that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed in the District of Columbia by any member of the conspiracy and the resulting injury to the plaintiff occurred in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(3) permits a plaintiff to rely on a co-conspirator’s act in the District to establish jurisdiction if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the conspiracy, the defendant’s participation, and an act in furtherance of it.

Jin v. Ministry of State Security · filed 2004-09-09(a)(3)

The next step of the analysis requires the court to determine whether the defendant’s coconspirators committed specific acts within the forum, subject to the District of Columbia longarm statute and in furtherance of the conspiracy. ... At this stage of the proceedings, therefore, the court determines that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pled acts by purported co-conspirators in the District of Columbia.

A plaintiff seeking conspiracy jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(1) or (a)(3) must plead particular facts showing the conspiracy.

FC Investment Group LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd. · filed 2008-06-20(a)(1), (a)(3)

Whether their “conspiracy” jurisdiction claim is based on subsection (a)(1), as the district court assumed, or subsection (a)(3), as they now argue, it is without merit. Under both subsections they are obligated to plead with particularity facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy between Titan and IFX.

Section 13-423 requires particularized allegations of a conspiracy to establish personal jurisdiction over an alleged co-conspirator.

3m Company v. Boulter · filed 2012-02-02

3M has failed to meet its burden to plead a conspiracy between the Porton Defendants and the Davis Defendants with particularity.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits a co-conspirator’s District contacts to support personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff pleads the conspiracy, the defendant’s participation, and an act in the District that furthered it.

EIG Energy Fund XIV, L.P. v. Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. · filed 2017-03-30(a)(1)

To attribute the forum contacts of one co-conspirator to another co-conspirator, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the existence of a civil conspiracy . . . , (2) the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy, and (3) an overt act by a co-conspirator within the forum, subject to the long-arm statute, and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(3) do not confer personal jurisdiction over an alleged nonresident coconspirator without facts showing a conspiracy and an act in furtherance of it in the District of Columbia.

North v. Smarsh, Inc. · filed 2017-08-22(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege both the existence of a conspiracy and acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy within the District of Columbia, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Smarsh under either D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1) or (a)(3).

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires specific allegations of a conspiracy, the nonresident defendant’s participation, and an overt act in the District furthering the conspiracy to establish conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction.

jane/john Does 1-144 v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc. · filed 2018-01-11(a)(1)

To prevail on a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction under Section 13-423(a)(1) of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, plaintiffs must allege: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the nonresident’s participation in or agreement to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy within the forum’s boundaries. ... This single assertion about one meeting at the Department of Justice does not create a basis for personal jurisdiction in this District under the District of Columbia long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) permits conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction only when the plaintiff alleges specific facts connecting the defendant to acts in the District of Columbia.

Shao v. Roberts · filed 2019-01-17(a)

Here, Shao has failed to allege specific facts beyond “bare assertions” to meet her burden of establishing that each of the moving defendants purposefully availed themselves of the District of Columbia by conspiring with D.C.-based defendants, and the Court thus cannot properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants.

Section 13-423(a)(1) does not support jurisdiction based on a co-conspirator’s conduct when the alleged conspiracy is insufficiently connected to the injuries in the suit.

Ofisi v. Bnp Paribas S.A. · filed 2019-03-19(a)(1)

The Court will reject the identical argument in the context of Rule 4(k)(2), see infra Part I.A, however, and therefore rejects jurisdiction under the long-arm statute for the reasons described there—namely, that plaintiffs have insufficiently pled that Al Shamal and BNPP were involved in any conspiracy relevant to the injuries underlying this action.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires particularized allegations that a defendant joined a conspiracy connected to acts in the District; an attorney-client relationship alone does not establish that agreement.

Stonehill v. Central Intelligence Agency · filed 2025-08-18(a)(1)

Critically, the Court declines plaintiff’s invitation to infer an agreement to enter a civil conspiracy from the mere allegation of an attorney-client relationship. That fact alone simply cannot supply a prima facie showing that Spoltore contemplated unlawful conduct in concert with the members of the alleged conspiracy. ... The Court thus finds personal jurisdiction lacking and dismisses the claims against Spoltore.

A news organization’s District office used solely to gather news does not establish a persistent course of conduct supporting personal jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(4).

Shirlington Limousine & Transportation, Inc. v. San Diego Union-Tribune · filed 2008-07-24(a)(4)

Recognition of the primacy of the news-gathering exception compels this Court’s conclusion that it lacks authority under the Long-Arm Statute to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 13-423 requires sufficient factual allegations to establish personal jurisdiction; a bare assertion of a defendant’s political ties to the District is insufficient.

Committee for a Free Namibia v. South West Africa People's Organization · filed 1982-12-16

Even if diversity jurisdiction exists in this case, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirements of D.C. Code § 13-423. Plaintiff baldly asserts that defendant’s political ties to this jurisdiction satisfy those requirements.

The 1974 version of § 13-423 did not authorize personal jurisdiction over the appellant in this child-support action.

Ausbrooks v. Ausbrooks · filed 1985-06-06

The long-arm statute in existence in 1974 did not authorize the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over appellant. See D.C.Code § 13-423 (1973).

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over a nonresident with virtually no contact with the District of Columbia.

Martin-Trigona v. Shiff · filed 1984-12-13

Any basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant Shiff must be pursuant to the District of Columbia “long-arm statute,” D.C.Code § 13-423 (1981), ... consistent with due process limitations contained in the United States Constitution. Plaintiff cannot begin to meet these requirements because it is plain from the unrefuted affidavit submitted in defendant’s motion to dismiss that Mr. Shiff has had virtually no contact with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only to the extent due process allows; contacts initiated by a District resident that are too minimal to satisfy due process do not suffice.

Sol Salins, Inc. v. Sure Way Refrigerated Truck Transportation Brokers, Inc. · filed 1986-06-11

In prior decisions, we have held that personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute may be exercised to the fullest extent due process permits. ... Because we conclude that the contacts in the single transaction before us do not provide sufficient “minimum contacts” with the District of Columbia, other transactions of a similar nature offer little assistance in fulfilling the requirements of due process.

Section 13-423 does not confer personal jurisdiction over individuals to whom none of its long-arm provisions apply.

Martin v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 1992-02-21

Furthermore, the individual defendants are not subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court. They do not reside or work in the District of Columbia, and none of the provisions of the D.C. long-arm statute apply to them.

Section 13-423(a)(1)-(4) does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when no District business, service contracts, or injury in the District is alleged.

Deutsch v. United States Department of Justice · filed 1995-04-03(a)(1)-(4)

The District of Columbia long arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. ... Because these Defendants are not alleged to conduct any business or make any contracts for services in the District of Columbia and because no injury is alleged to have been suffered in the District of Columbia, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when they are not alleged to conduct business or contract for services in the District and no injury is alleged to have occurred there.

Robertson v. Merola · filed 1995-08-08(a)(1)-(4)

Because these Defendants are not alleged to conduct any business or make any contracts for services in the District of Columbia and because no injury is alleged to have been suffered in the District of Columbia, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when no District business, contracts for services, or injury in the District is alleged.

Marshall v. Reno · filed 1996-02-01(a)(1)-(4)

The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. ... Because these defendants are not alleged to conduct any business or make any contracts for services in the District of Columbia and because no injury is alleged to have been suffered in the District of Columbia, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on specified District of Columbia business, contracts, or tortious injury; without those contacts, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction.

Risley v. Hawk · filed 1996-02-15(a)(1)-(4)

The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. ... The plaintiff fails to allege that these defendants conduct any business or make any contracts for services in the District of Columbia. Nor did the plaintiff allege that he suffered any injury in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the claim arises from specified conduct or injury connected to the District of Columbia.

Meyer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 1996-05-24(a)(1)-(4)

The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C.Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. ... The plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant Krebbs conducted any business or made any contracts for services in the District of Columbia. Nor does the plaintiff allege that he was harmed in any way in the District of Columbia by Krebbs. As a result, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant Krebbs.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim arising from specified conduct or injury in the District of Columbia to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Meyer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 1996-09-10(a)(1)-(4)

The plaintiff does not allege that Jones entered into any business transactions or contracts in the District of Columbia. Nor does the plaintiff allege any injury that he incurred in the District of Columbia because of the defendant Jones.

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when their contacts with the District of Columbia do not bring them within the long-arm statute.

Charles v. Kelly · filed 1992-04-23

The Court divines no such contacts which could bring the Washington State defendants within the reach of the D.C. long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a)(1)–(4) requires a plaintiff to show qualifying District of Columbia contacts before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.

Jones v. City of Buffalo · filed 1995-10-13(a)(1)–(4)

In this ease, the Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the above-described Defendants had contacts with the District of Columbia, as defined by D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1) — (4). Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that the Long Arm statute applies, and the Court therefore does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, none of whom reside or maintain their principal place of business in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(1) and (a)(4) provide distinct grounds for personal jurisdiction that must be addressed independently when both are implicated.

International Union of Electrical, Salaried, Machine, & Furniture Workers v. Taylor · filed 1995-12-28(a)(1), (a)(4)

Two separate provisions of the statute are implicated here, subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(4). See note 1, supra. On remand the court should address both, for they present different issues that must be addressed independently.

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when no District of Columbia business, contract for services, or injury is alleged.

Meyer v. Reno · filed 1996-01-04(a)(1)-(4)

Because these defendants are not alleged to conduct any business or make any contracts for services in the District of Columbia and because no injury is alleged to have been suffered in the District of Columbia, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff fails to establish any of its listed grounds for jurisdiction.

Hilska v. Jones · filed 2003-06-18(a)

The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction is grounded in any of the several bases set forth under the District’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) requires a plaintiff to show qualifying business, services, or tortious conduct connected to the District to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Naegele v. Albers · filed 2005-01-03(a)

The court agrees with the defendant that the statute does not confer this court with jurisdiction over Michaelson. The court concludes that the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof, has failed to show that the defendant transacted any business in the District, contracted to supply services in the District, caused tortious injury to him in the District, or that the defendant caused a tortious injury to him outside of the District but nevertheless solicits business or derives a substantial income from services rendered in the District.

Section 13-423 requires facts showing that a nonresident defendant’s conduct falls within the District’s long-arm jurisdiction.

Rogers v. Washington Fairmont Hotel · filed 2005-08-22

Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would actually place Ms. Clark within the reach of the D.C. long-arm statute.

Section 13-423 requires a factual basis connecting each nonresident defendant to the District before the court may exercise personal jurisdiction based on conduct.

Murphy v. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP · filed 2004-09-27

The Court finds that the plaintiffs’ complaint and subsequent pleadings fail to put forth any specific basis for personal jurisdiction over twenty of the twenty-one individual defendants. ... Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants’ motion on the issue of personal jurisdiction as to all individual defendants except for Robert C. Morris, Jr., who appears to have been served with summons in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a)(5) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a trust holding a security interest in District property when the claim arises from that interest.

Johnson v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2001-4 · filed 2006-08-04(a)(5)

Thus, the Trust’s holding a security interest in the property from which this dispute arises allows the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Trust pursuant to the D.C. long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) requires a factual basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on conduct connected to the District.

Gasplus, L.L.C. v. United States Department of Interior · filed 2006-12-08(a)

Under D.C.’s lóng-arm statute, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s ... D.C.Code § 13-423(a). ... GasPlus concedes that, at the present time, it lacks sufficient information to assert facts upon which this Court could base personal jurisdiction over Mr. Baracker. Pl.’s Resp. at 25. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice all claims against Mr. Baracker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a) does not give D.C. courts personal jurisdiction over federal employees merely because their agency is headquartered in the District, and its tort-injury grounds require an injury in the District.

Simpson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2007-08-02(a)

The mere fact that these defendants are employees of the BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District, does not render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the courts of the District of Columbia. ... Regardless of whether these defendants acted in or outside of the District of Columbia, plaintiff suffered no injury here. Accordingly, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants Dodrill, Bitten-bender and Cook in their individual capacities.

Section 13-423 requires factual allegations connecting the claim to business transacted in the District or tortious injury in the District to support specific personal jurisdiction under those grounds.

ROZ Trading Ltd. v. Zeromax Group, Inc. · filed 2007-09-28(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)

As the Amended Complaint does not proffer specific factual allegations that Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of business transacted in or out of tortious injury in the District of Columbia, the Court concludes that Zeromax GmbH is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction under D.C.Code § 13-423.

Section 13-423(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction over a federal employee in her individual capacity merely because her agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia.

Walton v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-02-05(a)

The mere fact that Ms. Jones is an employee of the BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District, does not render her subject to suit in her individual capacity in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident officers whose alleged tortious acts occurred outside the District and who have no other District contacts.

Ibrahim v. District of Columbia · filed 2008-03-12(a)

I have no personal jurisdiction over federal officers whose alleged tortious actions occurred in Pennsylvania, and who do not appear to have any other contacts with the District of Columbia. See D.C.Code § 13-423(a) (providing jurisdiction over non-residents only where they transact business or contract to do so in the District, or cause an injury in the District); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (requiring “minimum contacts”).

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident federal employees merely because their agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia.

Hazel v. Lappin · filed 2009-05-15(a)

The mere fact that these defendants are employees of the BOP, which is headquartered in this district, does not render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 does not establish personal jurisdiction over federal employees sued individually merely because their agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia.

Thornberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-03-07(a)

The mere fact that these defendants are employees of BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District of Columbia, does not render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over federal employees in their individual capacities merely because their agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia.

Johnson v. United States · filed 2008-12-11(a)

The plaintiff does not allege that these defendants transact any personal business in the District of Columbia. ... The mere fact that defendants Joseph, Miller, Wilkes, Herbik, Whiget, and Ordonez are employees of the BOP and the BOP headquarters are located in the District of Columbia does not alone render them subject to suit in their individual capacities in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident BOP employees merely because the agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia, where the complaint alleges no qualifying conduct or injury there.

Scinto v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2009-03-30(a)

The Court concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants White, Stansberry, McClintock and Holt because the District of Columbia long-arm statute does not provide for jurisdiction over these defendants.

Section 13-423 does not provide personal jurisdiction when no relevant contacts connect the parties or events to the District of Columbia.

Black v. City of Newark · filed 2008-03-10

Second, even if Newark could be considered a statutory “person,” the District’s long-arm statute does not apply because there are no relevant contacts between the parties to the Complaint or the events described therein and the District of Columbia, and no such contacts are alleged in the Complaint.

Section 13-423 does not permit personal jurisdiction over an individual employee based solely on the employer’s contacts with the District of Columbia.

Cornell v. Kellner · filed 2008-03-25(a)

However, this contact is insufficient to support assertion of personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. The Court may not assert jurisdiction over an individual defendant solely based on actions taken pursuant to his employment.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state federal employee solely because her agency is headquartered in the District of Columbia, where the plaintiff suffered no injury there and alleged no qualifying contacts.

Ballard v. Holinka · filed 2009-02-27(a)

The mere fact that Holinka is an employee of the BOP, which is headquartered in this district, does not render her subject to suit in her individual capacity in ... the District of Columbia. ... Regardless of whether this defendant acted in or outside of the District of Columbia, plaintiff suffered no injury here. The Complaint is devoid of factual allegations supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her based on her purposeful or repeated contacts with this forum, and there is no showing that Holinka could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. For these reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Holinka.

Section 13-423(a) requires facts supporting a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Hantzis v. Grantland · filed 2009-04-01(a)(1)-(4)

Plaintiff has not stated any facts to support this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ms. Grantland under the District of Columbia's long-arm statute.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose business in the District gives rise to a claim or whose acts in the District cause tortious injury there.

Navab-Safavi v. Broadcasting Board of Governors · filed 2009-09-03(a)(1), (a)(3)

Because these defendants transacted business in the District within the meaning of § 13—423(a)(1), they had sufficient contact to provide the Court with personal jurisdiction over them. ... In the alternative, the Court has jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants pursuant to § 13-423(a)(3).

Section 13-423(a) provides no basis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when the alleged facts have no connection to the District of Columbia.

Kroos v. Sbk Stiftung Braunschweigischer Kulturbestiz · filed 2010-01-28(a)

If defendant is a private entity, the alleged facts reveal absolutely no connection to the District of Columbia and, thus, provide no basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.

Section 13-423(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction when the complaint alleges no defendant contacts with the District of Columbia.

Kurtz v. USA · filed 2011-04-26(a)

Moreover, the plaintiff has not pled an adequate basis to assert specific personal jurisdiction over the named defendants under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. The complaint does not allege that any of the defendants have contacts with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from specified conduct connected to the District of Columbia; an appeal to the interest of justice alone is insufficient.

Gomez v. Aragon · filed 2010-04-15(a)

This allegation is insufficient to provide any basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants whose alleged acts or omissions occurred outside the District of Columbia and had no effect there.

Morris v. United States Probation Services · filed 2010-07-16(a)

This argument does not create a basis for personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. None of the alleged acts or omissions by the named probation officers took place in the District of Columbia or had any effect in the District of Columbia. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the probation officers.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the claim arises from business the defendant transacted in the District of Columbia and exercising jurisdiction is fair.

Barbieri v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC · filed 2010-07-21(a)(1)

Under D.C. Code § 13^423(a)(l), specific jurisdiction can be established if the plaintiff can “demonstrate that (1) the defendant transacted business in the District of Columbia; (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the District; (3) the defendant had minimum contacts with the District; and (4) the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ... Given that the “plaintiffs complaint alleges causes of action based solely on acts occurring or [anticipated] to occur within the state of California” and that the plaintiff has not shown “that the [Superior Court] has engaged in any activity in the District of Columbia,” this Court must dismiss the claim against the Superior Court because there is no authority to exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over that defendant.

Section 13-423(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the claims do not arise from their qualifying conduct in the District of Columbia.

Sandy v. Connelly · filed 2010-08-30(a)

They are not alleged to have transacted business, contracted to supply services, or caused a tortious injury in the District of Columbia. The long-arm statute, then, offers no basis for the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

Section 13-423(a) does not provide specific personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleges no relevant business, service contract, or tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Gomez v. Aragon · filed 2010-09-25(a)

Moreover, the plaintiffs have not pled an adequate basis to assert specific personal jurisdiction over the named defendants under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. There is no allegation in the complaint that any of the acts constituting the “insurrection” occurred anywhere other than in New Mexico. The plaintiffs do not claim that the insurrection arose from the defendants’ conduct in transacting business or contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia, nor do they claim the existence of a tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim to arise from qualifying business, services, or tortious conduct connected to the District of Columbia.

Rossmann v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC · filed 2011-03-25(a)

Plaintiffs claims do not arise out of any transaction or contract to supply services in the District of Columbia, and no tortious conduct is alleged to have occurred here.

Section 13-423(a) requires a basis tied to the defendant’s conduct in the District, such as business transactions, service contracts, or conduct causing tortious injury.

Atwal v. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC · filed 2011-05-23(a)

Moreover, Atwal’s complaint does not plead an adequate basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. The complaint does not allege that Atwal’s claims arise from the defendants transacting business or contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia. There are no allegations in the complaint that the harms of which Atwal complains arose from conduct that occurred in the District of Columbia, or that Atwal suffered a tort in the District of Columbia, or that LLNS regularly does business here.

Section 13-423(a)(1) requires facts showing that the defendant transacted business in the District, while subsection (a)(4) requires regular or persistent District contacts for tortious injury caused by conduct outside the District; sporadic visits do not suffice.

Dean v. Walker · filed 2010-12-23(a)(1), (a)(4)

As plaintiff fails to allege any facts to the contrary, ... the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish long-arm jurisdiction under § 13-423(a)(l). ... As none of these contacts relate to the allegations contained in this lawsuit, the Court finds that such sporadic contact is simply insufficient to establish a “regular” or “persistent” course of conduct in the District of Columbia as required by § 13-423(a)(4).

Section 13-423(a) requires a plaintiff seeking personal jurisdiction to allege acts connecting the defendant to the District of Columbia.

Parker v. United States Department of Education · filed 2011-05-04(a)

Plaintiff has not carried his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over any Defendant, nor has he alleged any “specific acts connecting [a] defendant with the forum.” First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For example, Plaintiff never claims that any Defendant is domiciled in the District of Columbia, nor does he assert that the D.C. long-arm statute is satisfied here. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a).

Section 13-423(a) permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the claim arises from conduct covered by the statute’s listed grounds.

Kurtz v. United States · filed 2011-04-26(a)

The complaint does not allege that any of the defendants have contacts with the District of Columbia. ... There are also no allegations in the complaint that the harms of which the plaintiff complains arose from the defendants’ conduct in transacting business or contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia, nor are there allegations of a tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) requires facts connecting a nonresident defendant or the claim to the District of Columbia before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction.

Coleman v. Coleman · filed 2013-04-17(a)

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) requires facts connecting a nonresident defendant’s conduct to the District; the plaintiff’s District residence alone does not establish specific jurisdiction over events in West Virginia.

Brooks v. Harris · filed 2011-09-06(a)

Plaintiff has simply not pled any jurisdictional facts or made any argument to show that this case falls under any provision of the District’s long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) requires a plaintiff seeking specific jurisdiction to show that the defendant’s conduct falls within a listed category.

Mazza v. Verizon Washington, Dc, Inc. · filed 2012-03-29(a)

The Court finds that Mazza has not met his burden of establishing a basis for specific jurisdiction under any of the relevant categories set forth in the long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) does not support specific jurisdiction when the claims concern conduct outside the District and the only alleged District contact is an unsupported conspiracy allegation.

Shibeshi v. United States of America · filed 2012-12-27(a)

A brief look at the pleadings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Plaintiff’s allegations about these Defendants relate to employment at the colleges in Arkansas and Kentucky and the lawsuits he filed in those states. Once again, his only mention of these Defendants in connection with the District of Columbia is his sweeping conspiracy allegation.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim to arise from a listed District contact; an unsupported conspiracy allegation does not establish specific jurisdiction.

Shibeshi v. United States of America · filed 2013-01-25(a)

A brief look at the pleadings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Plaintiff’s only mention of Defendant in connection with the District of Columbia is his sweeping conspiracy allegation. See Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 39. ... Specific jurisdiction, therefore, is also lacking.

Section 13-423(a) does not provide specific jurisdiction when the alleged conduct has no connection to the District of Columbia.

Ibn-Hameed v. Maddren · filed 2013-01-31(a)

A brief look at the pleadings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Defendants are all Pennsylvania officials who, to the extent Plaintiff has been injured at all, allegedly acted in Pennsylvania to, e.g., kidnap Plaintiff, seize his vehicle, and maintain a militia that caused him duress. ... There is no connection to or allegation about the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 permits specific personal jurisdiction only when a claim arises from a defendant’s qualifying conduct connected to the District of Columbia.

Halim v. Donovan · filed 2013-02-15

Second, the Second Amended Complaint alleges no facts suggesting that Griffin – either in his individual or official capacity – transacted business, contracted to supply services, or caused tortuous injury in the District of Columbia, or has any interest in real property located in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) requires a claim to arise from a nonresident defendant’s qualifying conduct connected to the District; an unsupported conspiracy allegation does not establish specific jurisdiction.

Shibeshi v. United States of America · filed 2013-03-01(a)

A brief look at the pleadings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Plaintiff’s only mention of Defendant in connection with the District of Columbia is his sweeping conspiracy allegation. See Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 39. ... Specific jurisdiction, therefore, is also lacking.

Section 13-423(a) requires a factual basis connecting a nonresident defendant, directly or through an agent, to District conduct giving rise to the claim.

Blount v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc. · filed 2013-03-18(a)

D.C. Code § 13-423(a) provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction "over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from" the person's engaging in one or more enumerated activities in the District of Columbia, including "transacting any business" and "contracting to supply services." ... On this evidence, the Court cannot conclude that there is an adequate factual basis for exercising specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 13-423(a) permits specific jurisdiction when a claim arises from a defendant’s qualifying contacts with the District of Columbia; without such contacts, specific jurisdiction is unavailable.

Ghaffari v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-04-05(a)

The filings demonstrate that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Again, Plaintiff makes no allegation in his Complaint or Opposition that Phelan had any contacts – either related to this claim or otherwise – with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 permits specific personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from covered conduct in the District or another constitutionally sufficient basis; employment by an agency headquartered there alone is insufficient.

Scott v. Conley · filed 2013-04-09

Scott has not alleged that Schultz, Jett, Lockett, or Cozza-Rhodes meet any of the enumerated requirements of the D.C. long-arm statute such as transacting business or supplying services in the District. Moreover, he has not suggested that these defendants committed tortious injury and regularly do or solicit business here.

Section 13-423(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from specified conduct connected to the District of Columbia.

Lance v. Wilson · filed 2011-09-09(a)

Plaintiff establishes no basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant under the District’s long-arm statute.

Subsection (a)(1) requires a plaintiff seeking personal jurisdiction over an employee sued individually to show the employee’s own contacts with the District; acts solely within the scope of employment do not suffice.

Caldwell v. Romero · filed 2012-03-02(a)(1)

When seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) of the D.C. long-arm statute over an employee or officer of a company who is being sued in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must establish that the employee’s personal contacts with the forum are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, in contrast to acts or contacts carried out solely in the course of employment.

Section 13-423(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants without facts connecting their business, services, or the alleged injury to the District.

Clay v. Blue Hackle North America, LLC · filed 2012-11-30(a)

Unfortunately, plaintiffs establish no basis for this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Blue Hackle Group, BHIL, Blue Hackle LTD or BHME in this case under the District's long-arm statute.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state official merely because he enforces, outside the District, a policy issued there.

Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2013-02-15(a)

D.C. Code § 13-423(a). None of these provisions appear applicable. ... It cannot be said that Patterson transacts business, contracts to supply services, causes any injury to Plaintiff, or otherwise avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 requires sufficient allegations of a nonresident defendant’s conduct in the District of Columbia to support personal jurisdiction.

Tall v. Credit Protection Ass'n · filed 2011-09-16

Comcast of Potomac is not a resident of the District of Columbia, and appellant did not allege sufficient facts to show that Comcast of Potomac performed actions in the District of Columbia sufficient to warrant the district court’s assertion of jurisdiction over it.

Section 13-423(a) does not permit personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when the complaint alleges no business, services, or tortious injury connected to the District of Columbia.

Donnelly v. Sebelius · filed 2012-03-30(a)

The complaint alleges no facts suggesting that Murphy transacted business, contracted to supply services, or caused tortuous injury in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 does not reach proposed defendants when the complaint alleges no connection between their conduct or the plaintiffs’ injuries and the District of Columbia.

S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol · filed 2012-04-16

As the ATS “contains no long-arm provision of its own,” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 9, and the Proposed Amended Complaint contains no allegations linking either Plaintiffs’ injuries or the proposed individual defendants’ conduct with the District of Columbia such that these officials could be reached by the District’s long-arm statute, see D.C. Code § 13-423, this Court would have jurisdiction over the individual officials only if service was authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Section 13-423(a) does not permit specific personal jurisdiction over defendants with no contacts with the District of Columbia.

Arp v. Superior Court of the State of Washington · filed 2013-03-20(a)

A brief look at the filings demonstrates that no specific jurisdiction exists here either. Again, Plaintiffs make no allegation in their Complaint or Response that Defendants had any contacts – either related to this claim or otherwise – with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the plaintiff shows no qualifying business activity or tortious injury in the District.

Hardy v. Joseph I. Sussman, P.C. · filed 2013-07-12(a)

The plaintiff does not show that the District’s long-arm statute applies or that the non- resident defendant has minimum contacts with the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 requires a basis for specific personal jurisdiction, such as transacting business, contracting to supply services, or causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Conant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-02-14

The Complaint alleges no facts suggesting that these Defendants transacted business, contracted to supply services, or caused ... tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 does not authorize specific jurisdiction over defendants when the complaint alleges no District of Columbia business, services, tortious injury, or other District contacts by them.

Segelstrom v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2014-11-21

The Complaint alleges no facts suggesting that these Defendants transacted business, contracted to supply services, or caused tortious injury in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423(a) permits specific jurisdiction only when the defendant’s conduct satisfies one of its listed grounds.

Terry v. First Merit National Bank · filed 2014-12-17(a)

Because Plaintiff failed to allege any conduct satisfying any of the prongs of section 13-423(a), this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 13-423(a) requires alleged conduct within one of its listed categories to establish specific jurisdiction.

Terry v. Dewine · filed 2014-12-17(a)

Because Plaintiff failed to allege any conduct satisfying any of the prongs of section 13-423(a), this Court lacks specific jurisdiction over the Franklin County Defendants.

Section 13-423(a) provides grounds for personal jurisdiction based on specified connections to the District of Columbia, including business, services, tortious injury, and real property.

Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-07-29(a)

The Canens cannot satisfy any of the bases available for long-arm jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 13-423(a). Sheriff Rogers (1) does not transact business in the District of Columbia; (2) has not contracted to supply services to this jurisdiction; (3) did not cause tortious injury in the District of Columbia; (4) did not cause tortious injury outside the District of Columbia while regularly engaging in or soliciting business here; and (5) does not have an interest in any real property in the District of Columbia that is a part of this dispute.

Section 13-423(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction only when the claim arises from business transacted in the District.

North v. Smarsh, Inc. · filed 2015-12-04(a)(1)

Since “Smarsh’s protocols and processes relating to the Southridge and Ocean Cross archiving and subscription services were not set up in the District of Columbia,” see Page Decl. ¶ 3, it cannot be that Plaintiffs’ spoliation claims arise out of any business transacted in the District.

Section 13-423 permits specific personal jurisdiction only when the defendant’s connection to the District of Columbia satisfies the long-arm statute and due process.

Dougherty v. United States · filed 2016-01-19

In the absence of such contacts, this Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) a provision of the District’s long arm statute authorizes jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction “accords with the demands of due process.” Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828; see also D.C. Code § 13-423 (2015). ... Here, Plaintiff has failed to articulate—either in his complaint or his response to their motions—a single fact that establishes any connection between these defendants and the District of Columbia. As such, this Court can assert neither general nor specific jurisdiction over these defendants.

Section 13-423(a) requires facts connecting a nonresident defendant’s business, services, tortious injury, or other qualifying conduct to the District before a D.C. court may exercise personal jurisdiction.

Mensah-Yawson v. Raden · filed 2016-03-21(a)

Nor does the Court identify a single factual allegation to show that the Donora Defendants contracted to supply services or caused tortious injury in the District of Columbia by any act committed here. And the final basis for application of the long-arm statute is equally unsupported. Plaintiff not only fails to allege that the Donora Defendants caused tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act committed outside of the District, but also fails to allege that these Defendants have engaged in any conduct connected to this forum. ... The Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, and their motion to dismiss on this ground will be granted.

A party seeking personal jurisdiction under § 13-423(a) must demonstrate that the District’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over the defendant.

Liu v. Hopkins County Sulphur Springs · filed 2016-08-05(a)

Nor did appellant demonstrate that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over the appellees under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423(a).

Section 13-423(a) does not provide personal jurisdiction over defendants who lack the requisite contacts with the District of Columbia.

Cunningham v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2013-08-21(a)

The Court agrees that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute is inapplicable to these Defendants and that they lack the requisite minimum contacts to warrant the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.

Section 13-423 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims arising from specified conduct connected to the District of Columbia, including doing business, contracting to supply services, or causing tortious injury there.

Amr v. Commonwealth of Virginia · filed 2014-07-15(a)

Nor has Amr pled an adequate basis to assert personal jurisdiction over either the Commonwealth of Virginia or Judge Payne under the District of Columbia long-arm statute. There is no allegation that either committed any act or caused any harm in the District of Columbia.

Section 13-423 cannot provide personal jurisdiction when the plaintiffs affirmatively plead that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction.

Simon v. Republic of Hungary · filed 2014-05-09

The plaintiffs also affirmatively plead that Defendant RCH “is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction,” FAC ¶ 86, thus precluding exercise of personal jurisdiction under the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423.

Section 13-423(a) requires a qualifying connection to the District for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Stankevich v. Kaplan · filed 2016-01-15(a)

In this case, it is clear that personal jurisdiction is inapplicable under D.C.’s long-arm statute for' defendants Kaplan and MC because neither has ever — for the purposes of this litigation — set foot in D. C, caused harm in D. C, or conducted business of any kind that relates to or affects D.C. or its any of its residents.

Section 13-423(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4) require, respectively, claim-related business in the District, a tortious act and injury in the District, or an injury in the District plus persistent local conduct or substantial local revenue.

Forras v. Imam Rauf · filed 2016-02-12(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)

The plain text of subsection (a)(1), however, focuses on where the defendant undertook the challenged (business) actions, not where the plaintiff felt the injury, and the Plaintiffs’ argument does nothing to suggest that Bailey himself transacted his challenged legal (or any other) business in the District. ... Second and similarly, with respect to subsection (a)(3), the complaint makes no plausible allegation that Bailey’s tortious “act or omission” was undertaken in the District. ... The statute requires both an injury inside the District, and that “the defendant engages in some persistent course of conduct or derives substantial revenue from the District.” Moncrief, 807 F.2d at 221.