Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Section 17200 claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations and, here, accrued in 1995.

Boracchia v. Biomet, Inc. · filed 2009-10-09

Whether Bo-racchia waived these claims by failing to argue them in their opening brief on appeal, see Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.2003), or whether the claims are barred by the statute of limitations (as the district court correctly held, both claims are subject to four-year statutes of limitation and accrued in 1995), the claims were properly dismissed.

A California UCL claim has a four-year limitations period, and the discovery rule can postpone accrual when the plaintiff could not reasonably discover the alleged wrongdoing.

Benanav v. Healthy Paws Pet Insurance LLC · filed 2021-09-23

Parties agree that claims under Washington’s CPA and California’s UCL have four-year statute of limitations periods such that any claims that arose before March 19, 2016 are time-barred. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.120; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. ... Under California law, the discovery rule of accrual postpones accrual of a claim until “the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” ... The rule delays accrual only when a plaintiff “has no reason to suspect wrongdoing and cannot discover his or her claims with reasonable diligence.” ... Having considered Benanav’s allegations that the modest premium increases made Healthy Paws’ alleged misrepresentations difficult to detect and the unresolved factual question as to when the insurer disclosed the pet age factor in its rate filing, Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden at this stage to show that Benanav’s claims were tolled under the discovery rule. It therefore declines to dismiss Benanav’s claims as time-barred at this stage.

The discovery rule does not delay accrual of a Section 17200 unfair competition action.

Snapp & Associates Insurance Services, Inc. v. Robertson · filed 2002-02-01

The “discovery rule,” which delays accrual of certain causes of action until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of facts giving rise to the claim, does not apply to unfair competition actions.

Section 17200 claims arising from an attorney’s professional obligations are subject to the limitations period in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6(a).

Foxen v. Carpenter · filed 2016-11-03

Section 340.6(a) is the more specific statute, codifying a statute of limitations for all claims, except actual fraud, against attorneys arising from their professional obligations. Section 340.6(a) therefore applies to plaintiff’s unfair business practices claim. The claim is time-barred for the reasons explained in part 1 above.

Section 17200 claims sounding in fraud require a plaintiff to allege actual reliance at the pleading stage to establish statutory standing.

Bishop v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2016-06-06

The district court erred by concluding that the SAC failed to allege facts sufficient to establish statutory standing under California’s unfair competition law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., false advertising law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. ... At this preliminary stage of the action, Bishop sufficiently alleged actual reliance, which he was required to do under each of his theories because his claims sound in fraud.

A non-consumer plaintiff may bring a false-advertising claim under § 17200 without alleging its own reliance if it alleges a sufficient causal connection between the challenged advertising and its economic injury.

Lona's Lil Eats, LLC v. DoorDash, Inc. · filed 2021-01-18

Based on these reasons, the Court agrees with the minority view. A non-consumer plaintiff can allege false advertising claims under the UCL and FAL without alleging its own reliance, as long as the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient causal connection. In this case, Lona’s has alleged an economic injury caused by DoorDash’s allegedly misleading or false advertising. That is sufficient for standing under the UCL and FAL.

Section 17200 allows a competitor alleging fraudulent false advertising to proceed without pleading its own reliance, if it alleges injury and loss of money or property caused by the alleged misrepresentations.

Jerome's Furniture Warehouse v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2021-04-20

The Court finds the reasoning in Allergan USA persuasive and concludes that a competitor plaintiff need not allege actual reliance on the defendant’s alleged fraudulent statements. Instead, Plaintiff need only allege that it lost money or property as a result of the alleged misrepresentations.

A UCL plaintiff alleging deceptive misrepresentations or omissions must show actual reliance to establish causation and standing, including by alleging that the plaintiff saw and reviewed potentially disclosing materials before purchase.

Turner v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2022-02-14

To have standing, “Plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury that was caused by [] conduct that allegedly amounts to a violation of” the UCL. ... Furthermore, “actual reliance is required to demonstrate causation for purposes of Article III standing when the plaintiffs assert that their injury is the result of deceptive misrepresentations or omissions.” ... Plaintiff must allege that he saw and reviewed materials that could have contained the allegedly omitted disclosure (i.e., that iPhones contained an embedded ability to consume cellular data or that iOS 13 “activated” this ability) before he purchased his iPhone in 2018. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim for lack of standing with leave to amend.

A UCL plaintiff alleging misrepresentation must show actual reliance to establish statutory standing.

Silver v. BA Sports Nutrition, LLC · filed 2022-04-29

“Since the passage of Proposition 64,12 a plaintiff must allege actual reliance in order to have standing to pursue UCL ... The Court agrees with BA Sports that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony shows that they did not rely on and were not deceived by any alleged misrepresentations as to “superior hydration.”

A fraud-based UCL claim requires reliance on the alleged misrepresentation; without alleging that the plaintiff saw and relied on the statement, the claim fails.

Murray v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2023-02-27

Without such allegations, Plaintiff does not plead reliance.

Section 17200 reaches unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but the UCL safe harbor bars claims based on conduct affirmatively permitted by statute.

Ebner v. Fresh, Inc. · filed 2016-09-27

In California, unfair competition claims are subject to the safe harbor doctrine, which precludes plaintiffs from bringing claims based on “actions the Legislature permits.” ... To fall within the safe harbor, the challenged conduct must be affirmatively permitted by statute – the doctrine does not immunize from liability conduct that is merely not unlawful. ... To the extent the FAC challenges the Sugar label’s accurate net weight statement, this claim is barred by the safe harbor doctrine. ... Because Fresh complied with federal and state law requiring a net weight statement on Sugar’s label, this conduct cannot form the basis of an unfair competition claim. Cal-Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 973 P.2d at 541–42.

The UCL safe-harbor doctrine bars claims based on conduct that another statute expressly permits.

Fitzpatrick v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2018-03-13

The district court also properly concluded that the California safe harbor doctrine bars Fitzpatrick’s claims under California’s consumer protection statutes, where the amended version of § 17533.7 expressly makes lawful the labeling of products that contain certain amounts of foreign-sourced ingredients as “Made in the USA.” See Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he safe harbor doctrine . . . precludes plaintiffs from bringing claims based on ‘actions the Legislature permits.’”) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 542 (Cal. 1999)).

Section 17200 does not allow a UCL claim to challenge conduct that California law clearly permits under the safe-harbor doctrine.

Dinan v. SanDisk LLC · filed 2020-01-22

Under the California Supreme Court’s holding in Cel-Tech Communications, “courts may not use the unfair competition law to condemn actions the Legislature permits.” ... The Court agrees. ... Accordingly, the decimal definition of “giga” is “recognized and shall govern” transactions in California under California Business and Professions Code § 12313. ... In sum, the Court holds that using the decimal meaning of gigabyte is clearly permitted by the California Legislature. Plaintiffs’ claims under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL are therefore barred by the safe harbor doctrine, and must be dismissed.

Section 17200 does not permit courts to condemn as unfair a business practice that the Legislature has expressly permitted; this safe-harbor rule protected the challenged labeling.

Dinan v. Sandisk LLC · filed 2021-02-10

[C]ourts may not use the unfair competition law to condemn actions the Legislature permits.

Section 17200 does not impose liability on wholesalers and retailers for conduct expressly exempted by section 12602.

Hobby Industrial Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Younger · filed 1980-01-24

There is nothing in section 17200 et seq. which reimposes the liability on wholesalers and retailers which is expressly excluded by section 12602.

Section 17200 does not permit an unfair business practice claim against conduct that another statute expressly authorizes.

Lazar v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1999-02-17

The UCL does not apply if the Legislature has expressly declared the challenged business practice to be lawful in other statutes.

Section 17200 does not impose liability for conduct pursued in good faith under a statute authorizing it, even if the statute is later held invalid.

Olszewski v. ScrippsHealth · filed 2001-08-29

We conclude that, under Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th 163, 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527, a private party statutorily authorized to engage in specified conduct does not incur liability under the UCL for pursuing in good faith the conduct authorized by that legislative enactment, even though a court later determines the statute suffers from some infirmity.

Section 17200 does not make conduct actionable when the Legislature has permitted it.

California Medical Ass'n v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. · filed 2001-12-05

Where, as here, the Legislature has permitted certain conduct, “courts may not override that determination” by declaring such conduct to be actionable under Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 does not shield an insurer from an unfair business practice claim when the challenged conduct has not been deemed legally permissible.

Kapsimallis v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2002-12-19

In addition, in light of Prudential-LMI, this is not a case where the defendant can escape liability under Business and Professions Code section 17200 because “conduct that the courts have deemed to be permissible . . . cannot be deemed ‘unfair’ under the unfair competition law.”

Section 17200 does not allow an unfair business practices claim based on conduct expressly permitted by state statutes while they were in effect, even if those statutes are later held federally preempted.

Olszewski v. Scripps Health · filed 2003-06-02

We also reject plaintiffs contention that sections 14124.791 and 14124.74 do not provide a safe harbor from her UCL claim because our finding of preemption should apply retroactively. ... We therefore conclude that sections 14124.791 and 14124.74 create a safe harbor protecting defendant from plaintiffs claim of unfair business practices.

Section 17200 does not support an unfair competition claim against a health care service plan for delegating payment responsibility to a contracting medical provider when another statute expressly permits that delegation.

California Emergency Physicians Medical Group v. PacifiCare · filed 2003-09-05

This provides a safe harbor for health care service plans. For that reason, Emergency Physicians cannot state a cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 does not reach conduct permitted by a valid administrative regulation that provides a safe harbor.

Yabsley v. Cingular Wireless, LLC · filed 2009-08-19

Regulation 1585 has the "force and effect" and the "dignity" of a statute. Therefore, it may, and does, provide a safe harbor to Cingular.

A claim under § 17200 based on alleged fraud must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s particularity requirement.

1617 Westcliff LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2017-04-03

Westcliff’s claim for unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., required compliance with Rule 9(b) because it was based on defendants’ alleged fraud. See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009).

Section 17200 treats each UCL prong as a separate theory of liability, and a UCL claim based on fraud fails when the underlying fraud claim is not adequately stated.

UCP Biosciences, Inc. v. American Screening LLC · filed 2020-08-06

“Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... “UCP’s claim under the UCL is predicated on their fraud and misrepresentation claims. ... Because the UCP fails to state a claim for fraud, it also fails to state a claim under the UCL. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss UCP’s seventh claim for violation of the UCL with leave to amend.”

A section 17200 claim based entirely on alleged federal antitrust and Lanham Act wrongdoing falls when those underlying federal claims fail.

Novation Ventures, LLC v. the J.G. Wentworth Co. · filed 2017-10-19

That is because, as the district court decided, in this case as pled, any claimed unlawfulness, unfairness, or fraud13 was based entirely on the alleged federal antitrust and Lanham Act wrongdoing. Thus, the California Unfair Competition Law claim fell along with the federal claims.

A § 17200 claim based on alleged wage violations is preempted only insofar as it relies on a preempted overtime claim; it may proceed insofar as it rests on non-preempted violations.

Landaverde v. Kinkisharyo International, L.L.C. · filed 2020-10-06

The Tenth Cause of Action alleges a violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 based on the other state law violations alleged in the Complaint. ... For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED-IN-PART and the Fifth through Tenth Causes of Action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend to present allegations not premised on overtime compensation violations in the First Cause of Action that are preempted. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED-IN-PART as to the Fifth through Tenth Causes of Action to the extent those claims do not rely on the First Cause of Action.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or deceptive business practices and permits an independent action based on another law, but a plaintiff cannot use it for Labor Code violations without showing an inadequate legal remedy.

Hassell v. Uber Technologies, Inc. · filed 2021-06-21

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 generally prohibits business practices that are unlawful, unfair, or deceptive. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. A practice is unlawful if it is forbidden by law. Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1170 (2002). Given that, § 17200 “creates an independent action when a practice violates some other law.” Id.

A UCL claim based on alleged statutory violations fails when the underlying statutory violations are dismissed.

Kabasele v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc. · filed 2022-01-26

Plaintiff’s fourth claim alleges that the above-described statutory violations are unfair business practices, as defined by the California Business and Professions Code § 17200. As discussed above, the underlying statutory violations will be dismissed, and therefore, plaintiff’s Unfair Competition Law claim will also be dismissed.

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices—including alleged California wage-and-hour violations—as unfair competition that may support UCL recovery.

Owino v. Corecivic, Inc. · filed 2022-06-03

Because plaintiffs can recover for almost all of the alleged violations under the UCL, the district court properly rejected CoreCivic’s argument against certification as predicated on “a distinction without a difference.” ... We agree with the district court that Owino and Gomez are typical of the class they are seeking to represent and their allegations, if true, fit within the statutes they invoke.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, but a plaintiff cannot recast a failed breach-of-contract claim as an unfair-competition claim.

Aids Healthcare Foundation v. Apexus, LLC · filed 2024-08-21

California’s UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. As we held in Caltex Plastics, AIDS Healthcare is “prohibited from ‘bootstrap[ping]’ an unfair-competition claim using a failed breach-of-contract claim, because ‘[p]ermitting such recovery would completely destroy the principle that a third party cannot sue on a contract to which he or she is merely an incidental beneficiary.’” 824 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177, 185 (Ct. App. 2007)). AIDS Healthcare’s current and proposed allegations stem exclusively from Apexus’s failure to meet its express and implied obligations under the Prime Vendor Agreement. Additionally, and regardless of whether § 340B “preempt[s] States from maintaining state-law fraud claims,” Astra, 563 U.S. at 120 n.5 (taking no position on preemption), AIDS Healthcare does not allege any violations of § 340B. Indeed, AIDS Healthcare concedes that Apexus has distributed drugs and provided medications at or below the § 340B price ceiling, as § 340B requires. Thus, AIDS Healthcare has failed to state a plausible unlawful- or unfair-competition claim.

Section 17200 et seq. requires an allegedly anti-competitive statement to be factual rather than merely an expression of opinion.

Board of Forensic Document Examiners v. American Bar Association · filed 2018-02-22

The relevant counts are premised on the laws of Illinois, California, Ohio, New York, and North Carolina (depending on where each individual Plaintiff lives). But each unfair competition statute requires that the allegedly anti-competitive statement be a factual statement, not an expression of opinion.

Section 17200 permits a CLRA violation to serve as the predicate for an unlawful business practice claim.

Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores Cal. · filed 2018-01-30

Therefore, we conclude Gutierrez has stated a cause of action for an unlawful practice that is actionable under the UCL because (1) she has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for a violation of the CLRA and (2) restitution is a type of relief available under both statutes.

A section 17200 claim based solely on a failed tort claim cannot survive summary judgment when it rests on the same conduct.

Local TV, LLC v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County · filed 2016-09-02

Here, as alleged against LTV, the sole factual basis for the section 17200 claim is the same as for the misappropriation tort discussed in section II above. Plaintiffs seek the precise monetary damages that they seek in the misappropriation cause of action. Because summary judgment in favor of LTV was proper on the cause of action that the section 17200 claim “borrows,” summary judgment is likewise warranted on the unfair business practices claim.

A sufficiently pleaded wrongful foreclosure claim can support a claim for unfair business practices under section 17200.

Glaski v. Bank of America CA5 · filed 2013-07-31

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Glaski’s fourth cause of action has stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. It follows that Glaski also has stated claims for quiet title (third cause of action), declaratory relief (fifth cause of action), cancellation of instruments (eighth cause of action), and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (ninth cause of action).

Section 17200 permits UCL claims based on violations of Labor Code sections 351 and 450 even though those statutes provide no private right to sue.

Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. · filed 2009-01-22

We further hold, although section 351 and Labor Code section 450 contain no private right to sue, that they nonetheless serve as predicates for suits under the UCL.

Section 17200 allows violations of federal, state, and local law to serve as predicates for an unlawful practice claim.

Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. · filed 2009-06-11

Violations of federal as well as state and local law may serve as the predicate for an unlawful practice claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200.

The UCL’s unlawful prong permits a claim based on an alleged violation of another law, treating that violation as an independently actionable unlawful practice.

Sandoval v. Pharmacare US, Inc. · filed 2018-04-05

Therefore, PharmaCare’s alleged failure to obtain approval of IntenseX as an OTC aphrodisiac drug under 21 C.F.R. § 310.528 creates a basis for a claim under the UCL’s unlawful prong.

The UCL's unlawful prong makes violations of other laws independently actionable by borrowing those violations.

Sansone v. Charter Communications, Inc. · filed 2019-09-18

California’s Unfair Competition Law provides civil remedies for “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... The statute’s “unlawful” prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices; under its unlawful prong, it borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable, so a UCL claim derivative of failed underlying claims also fails.

Vega v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Asilomar, Inc. · filed 2020-07-29

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... Under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, “section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Where a plaintiff cannot state a claim under the “borrowed” law, they cannot state a UCL claim either, as such claims rise and fall together. ... But because their UCL claim is entirely derivative of their first seven claims, which are all being dismissed, plaintiffs’ UCL claim must fail with them. Accordingly, plaintiff’s UCL claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and misleading advertising, and it makes violations of other laws independently actionable as unlawful practices.

Petconnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas · filed 2021-11-08

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Its coverage is “sweeping, embracing anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... By prohibiting unlawful practices, the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to state a UCL claim. ... Plaintiffs allege that the Moving Defendants violated the UCL by brokering non-rescue dogs and transporting non-rescue dogs labeled as “Pet Connect Rescue” dogs to California pet stores for sale. ... Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Moving Defendants participated in an unlawful fraudulent scheme are sufficiently clear and specific to place the Moving Defendants on notice. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claims.

Section 17200 prohibits business acts or practices that are fraudulent, unfair, or unlawful, and its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws as independently actionable UCL practices.

Williams v. Tesla, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28

The UCL prohibits business acts or practices that are (1) fraudulent, (2) unfair, or (3) unlawful. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; In re Sony Grand Wega KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV Television Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2010). As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Defendant had pre-sale knowledge of the alleged defect and therefore fails to plausibly allege claims for fraudulent or unfair business practices under the UCL. Plaintiff’s claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL is derivative of his CLRA, FAL, and fraudulent concealment claims. See Wilson, 668 F.3d at 1145-46 (“An action under the UCL’s unlawful prong ‘borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’”) (citing Cel-Tech Commc’ns Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999)). Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under those laws, his claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL also fails.

Section 17200 separately prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices; under the unlawful prong, it borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable, so a plaintiff who cannot plausibly plead the underlying violations cannot maintain the UCL claim.

Turner v. Real Time Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-10-24

The UCL’s “coverage is sweeping, embracing anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” ... The UCL provides a separate theory of liability under each of the three prongs: “unlawful,” “unfair,” and “fraudulent.” ... Under the unlawful prong, the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the UCL’s unlawful prong by breaching their contract (both Defendants), FAC ¶ 65, as well as violating Cal. Civ. Code § 2924c–d (both Defendants), id. ¶ 65, RESPA (Defendant RTR), id. ¶ 67, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (both Defendants), id. ¶ 68. As explained above, Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded claims for breach of contract and violations of California Civil Code § 2924c–d and RESPA. And as will be discussed below, he similarly fails to state a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s UCL claim with leave to amend.

Section 17200 allows a UCL claim to borrow violations of other laws and treat business activity involving those violations as independently actionable unlawful practices subject to UCL remedies.

The People Of The State Of California v. HomeAway.com, Inc. · filed 2023-03-14

An action under the UCL may “borrow[] violations of other laws and treat[] these violations, when committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” ... That Plaintiff’s UCL claim “borrows” the substance of the Ordinance does not make Defendant’s alleged business practices any less unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (prohibiting “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice”).

The UCL’s unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable.

Kim v. Blue Triton Brands · filed 2024-01-23

“The unlawful prong of the UCL ‘borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices,’ which the UCL then ‘makes independently actionable.’”

The UCL’s unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable.

Milliken v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2024-06-20

The “unlawful” prong of the UCL “‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.”

The UCL’s unlawful prong requires a predicate violation and accompanying economic injury, and it borrows violations of other laws as independently actionable unlawful practices.

Deerpoint Group, Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC · filed 2024-08-23

To state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a predicate violation, and (2) an accompanying economic injury caused by the violation. ... By proscribing any unlawful business practice, the UCL borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.

A derivative UCL claim fails when its predicate statutory claim fails, because the UCL borrows violations of other laws.

RG Abrams Insurance v. The Law Office of C.R. Abrams · filed 2025-04-15

virtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under section 17200. ... when a statutory claim fails, a derivative UCL claim also fails.

A UCL claim based on the same acts as failed underlying claims must allege a viable predicate unlawful act; without one, the claim fails.

Kenney v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2025-05-23

the plaintiff has not adequately alleged any predicate unlawful acts.

Virtually any federal, state, or local law can serve as a predicate for an unlawful-prong UCL claim.

Ma v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2025-08-01

virtually any law—federal, state or local—can serve as a predicate for a claim under California’s UCL.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong permits a UCL claim based on violations of another statute and requires the plaintiff to plead a separate unlawful offense.

Lee v. Foris Dax, Inc. · filed 2025-09-05

“The unlawful prong of the UCL borrows violations from other statutes or common-law causes of action and means anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... To assert a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead some separate unlawful offense.

An unlawful-prong UCL claim requires a sufficiently pleaded predicate violation.

Haney, Inc. v. Bioresearch · filed 2025-09-25

a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law. ... to state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead a predicate violation.

Section 17200 permits a private unfair competition claim based on violations of insurance licensing laws unless those laws bar the claim or the defendant is privileged or immune.

Stevens v. Superior Court · filed 1999-10-18

To summarize, the UCA allows nearly any law or regulation to serve as its basis unless the predicate statute explicitly bars a private right of action, or the defendant is otherwise privileged or immune.

A UCL claim based on a Talent Agencies Act violation remains subject to the Act’s one-year limitations period.

Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP · filed 2009-02-20

These are fundamental parts of the TAA and the assertion of any claim based on a violation of its provision, but pursued under the UCL, is necessarily burdened by this one-year limitations period.

Section 17200 permits an unlawful business practice claim based on a consumer loan alleged to be unconscionable under Financial Code section 22302.

De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. · filed 2018-08-13

So Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action by basing their UCL claim on the allegation that the interest rate on CashCall’s consumer loans of at least $2,500 rendered the loans unconscionable under section 22302.

In a UCL class action, individual class members need not prove reliance on allegedly misleading statements; the relevant standard is whether members of the public are likely to be deceived.

Bradach v. Pharmavite, LLC · filed 2018-05-17

Under California law, class members in CLRA and UCL actions are not required to prove their individual reliance on the allegedly misleading statements. Instead, the standard in actions under both the CLRA and UCL is whether “members of the public are likely to be deceived.”

For UCL fraud claims based on product labeling, reliance, causation, and damages may be established by common proof when the alleged misrepresentation was uniform and material.

DENNIS LYNCH v. TROPICANA PRODUCTS, INC. · filed 2019-06-19

For UCL and CLRA claims, this means Plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that uniform misrepresentations were made to the class[] and (2) that the misrepresentations were material.”

A UCL labeling class can satisfy predominance when class members were exposed to the same allegedly deceptive packaging, relied on it in purchasing, suffered economic harm, and seek common equitable relief.

Hale v. Manna Pro Products, LLC · filed 2020-07-06

All class members share in their exposure to the allegedly deceptive packaging, acted on that allegedly deceptive packaging by purchasing a product they would not have otherwise purchased, were harmed through loss of money expended during the transaction, and all seek common equitable and declaratory relief. These allegations satisfy the predominance standard here.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and permits a class-wide reliance presumption for absent members when deceptive information was broadly disseminated.

Aliff v. Vervent, Inc. · filed 2023-01-11

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. It is a broad remedial statute that permits an individual to challenge wrongful business conduct “in whatever context such activity might occur.” ... To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must establish he or she suffered an injury “as a result of” the defendant’s conduct. ... In the context of class actions, the California Supreme Court interpreted the UCL “to mean that named plaintiffs, but not absent ones, must show proof of ‘actual reliance’ at the certification stage.” ... Thus, relief under the UCL may be available to absent class members “without individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury[.]” ... This evidence is sufficient to trigger the reliance presumption under the UCL, such that absent class members need not individually establish “deception, reliance and injury[.]”

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and UCL relief does not require individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury.

Chapman v. General Motors LLC · filed 2023-03-31

The UCL defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act of practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... And the California Supreme Court has unequivocally held that “relief under the UCL is available without individualized proof of deception, reliance[,] and injury.” In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d at 35. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim depends on proof co-extensive with Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim regarding the alleged design defect, what GM knew or did not know, and what it disclosed to consumers. The Court concludes that common issues will predominate with respect to Plaintiffs’ UCL claim, so this claim will be certified.

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, deceptive, untrue, and misleading business practices as unfair competition, and in a class claim based on misrepresentations reliance may be presumed only when the defendant broadly disseminated the material misrepresentations to all plaintiffs.

Tershakovec v. Ford Motor Company, Inc. · filed 2023-07-07

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Courts applying California law have held that a presumption of reliance may be appropriate for statutory claims, but only when “the defendant so pervasively disseminated material misrepresentations that all plaintiffs must have been exposed to them.” ... So far as we can tell, the district court never considered whether that precondition to the presumption’s application obtained here. On remand, the court must therefore determine whether plaintiffs have established that Ford “pervasively disseminated” material misrepresentations.

Section 17200’s unfairness prong requires conduct tied to an underlying constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision, or conduct that threatens or violates antitrust law or its policy.

Wilson v. Hynek · filed 2012-06-20

Under that test, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s “conduct is tethered to an[] underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law.” (Durell, at p. 1366.)

A consumer cannot state an unfairness claim under Section 17200 when the alleged injury could reasonably have been avoided.

Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC · filed 2009-11-19

Because Davis reasonably could have avoided the alleged injury, it is unnecessary to address the other elements of the section 5 test. We conclude Davis has not stated, and cannot state, a claim under the unfairness prong of the UCL. (§ 17200.)

Under the UCL's unfair prong, a plaintiff must show that the alleged unfairness is tethered to legislative policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or injurious to consumers; there was no sufficient nexus here to the anti-slavery policy, and nondisclosure of information the defendant had no duty to disclose was not substantially injurious, immoral, or unethical.

Sud v. Costco · filed 2018-07-20

To bring a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must show either that the supposed unfairness is “tethered” to a legislative policy, or that it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or injurious to consumers. Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). Here, the plaintiffs identify the anti-slavery policy of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) as the relevant legislative policy. But in Hodsdon we held that “there is not a close enough nexus” between the UNDHR and the failure to include disclosures on product labeling. 891 F.3d at 867. We also held that “failure to disclose information [the defendant] had no duty to disclose in the first place is not substantially injurious, immoral, or unethical.” Id. The plaintiffs have not stated a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL.

The UCL's unfair-prong claim cannot rest solely on alleged harmful effects of loot boxes when existing statutory law does not plainly prohibit them; policy remedies belong to the legislature.

Taylor v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2022-01-04

Plaintiffs contend these allegations of the harmful effects of loot boxes are sufficient to support claims under the “unfair” prong of the UCL and under the CLRA and common law unjust enrichment, even without any clear violation of existing statute. Plaintiffs’ own allegations that legislative bodies have been addressing, and are continuing to consider, policy issues allegedly presented by loot boxes, however, undermines their argument that courts should step in. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, existing statutory law does not plainly prohibit “loot boxes.” If plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the harmful affects of loot boxes are accurate, the public interest likely lies in seeking legislative remedies. Plaintiffs’ attempt to stretch the “unfair” prong of the UCL to reach the alleged conduct is unavailing.

Section 17200’s unfair-competition prohibition does not permit courts to condemn conduct the Legislature permits, and its unfair prong cannot rest only on a plaintiff’s subjective view that lawful conduct is harmful or immoral.

Coffee v. Google LLC · filed 2022-01-10

Moreover, “courts may not use the unfair competition law to condemn actions the Legislature permits.” ... “If plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the harmful [e]ffects of loot boxes are accurate, the public interest likely lies in seeking legislative remedies.” ... “Plaintiffs’ attempt to stretch the ‘unfair’ prong of the UCL to reach the alleged conduct is unavailing.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim under the unfair prong is subject to dismissal to the extent it is based on Plaintiffs’ subjective view that Loot Boxes are harmful.

Section 17200 does not by itself permit judicial intervention in complex economic policy when an unfair practice claim rests on a public policy.

Wolfe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance · filed 1996-06-17

We need not decide that issue, however. Assuming for discussion’s sake only that appellant can state a cause of action for unfair trade practices based on the public policy embodied in Proposition 103, as in Grocers, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at page 218, that by itself does not permit unwarranted judicial intervention in an area of complex economic policy.

A UCL plaintiff must prove that a challenged advertisement is false or misleading by a preponderance of the evidence, but at summary judgment need only show a genuine dispute of material fact that could meet that burden at trial; the usual summary-judgment rules apply.

Sonner v. Schwabe North America · filed 2018-12-26

Under California law, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a challenged advertisement is false or misleading under the UCL and CLRA. ... Therefore, to defeat summary judgment, Sonner need only produce evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy the preponderance of the evidence burden at trial. ... We see no reason to diverge from the usual summary judgment rules for UCL and CLRA claims.

Section 17200 permits a private false-advertising claim based on affirmative proof that advertising is false or misleading, but it does not provide a private action resting only on lack of substantiation.

Pizana v. Sanmedica International LLC · filed 2019-09-30

Although defendant attacks the FAC as only discussing the six ingredients in the Product individually rather than as a formula and as conflating the Product’s advertised ability to increase HGH levels with the health benefits associated with HGH, defendant fails to address the allegations of plaintiff’s entire FAC in context. Construing the factual allegations in the FAC in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court can conclude that low doses of orally administered amino acids (a category that includes defendant’s Product) categorically cannot increase HGH levels by 682%, and, even if the Product could, such elevated levels cannot be sustained a period long enough to yield any of the purported benefits associated with HGH. Because defendant marketed its Product as being able to significantly increase HGH and prominently trumpeted that HGH is associated with a myriad of health benefits, a consumer could put two and two together to reasonably assume that defendant’s Product would yield the benefits associated with HGH. Hence, Plaintiff has sufficiently plead falsity, not lack of substantiation. Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of substantiation theory will therefore be denied.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.

Buddy Webster v. Guitars · filed 2020-04-16

Unfair competition in California includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on Webster’s false advertising and unfair competition claims because the statements he relies on were not false or misleading. The videos Webster relies on contained his own statements regarding his involvement in the creation of the DFH, and his involvement is not disputed. None of the videos stated that Webster was promoting or selling the DFH reissues. One of the videos shows Webster promoting his own signature guitar—the Buddy Blaze ML—and another shows him comparing his model with the DFH. Thus, the videos accurately show Webster describing his part in the history of the DFH, which he has used to his own advantage to sell his own model. The statements in these videos do not become misleading, nor do they imply that he endorses or benefits from the sale of the DFH reissues, simply because they appear near Dean’s advertisements of DFH reissues. Therefore, Webster did not present sufficient evidence to support his unfair competition and false advertising claims, and we affirm the district court’s ruling as to these claims.

Section 17200's fraud prong reaches advertising that may mislead reasonable consumers even if literally true, and whether an ad is deceptive ordinarily cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Sultanis v. Champion Petfoods USA, Inc. · filed 2021-08-03

The California Supreme Court has recognized ‘that [the CLRA, FAL, and UCL] prohibit not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which [,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood, or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.’ ... In other words, “[t]he relevant question is not what [the term “free-run chicken”] mean[s], but rather what [it] mean[s] to reasonable consumers, which cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.” ... How Canadian authorities define the term “free-run chicken” is therefore irrelevant to establish, as a matter of law, whether that term is false or misleading to American consumers like Ms. Sultanis.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and deceptive advertising, and a false no-artificial-preservatives label plausibly states a UCL claim when the product allegedly contains an artificial preservative.

Squeo v. Campbell Soup Company · filed 2024-10-22

Likewise, the UCL prohibits engaging in “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s] and [disseminating] unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To state a claim under the four consumer-protection statutes at issue, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant’s conduct would mislead a reasonable consumer. ... Plaintiffs satisfy that standard here—they allege that the chips’ packaging represents that the chips do not contain artificial preservatives and that the chips nevertheless do, in direct contravention of that representation, contain an artificial preservative. At the pleading stage, those allegations suffice. ... In sum, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ four consumer-protection claims as insufficiently pled.

Section 17200 supports a false-or-misleading advertising claim based on evidence attacking the truth of the advertised claim; California law does not let a private plaintiff pursue only a demand that the advertiser substantiate it.

Hamzeh v. Pharmavite LLC · filed 2025-02-26

The “FDCA requires manufacturers to have substantiation for their structure/function claims,” but “California law prohibits private plaintiffs from demanding that advertisers substantiate their claims.” ... Nevertheless, “just because California law prohibits private plaintiffs from forcing defendants to substantiate their advertising claims . . . does not mean California law prohibits those plaintiffs from attacking defendants’ substantiation.” ... Plaintiff does not assert that Pharmavite’s label lacks sufficient scientific support: rather, she alleges that Pharmavite’s label claim is entirely false such that it misleads consumers. ... Plaintiff’s complaint clearly challenges the alleged falsity of Pharmavite’s label. That challenge may also, necessarily, implicate Pharmative’s obligation to substantiate its label claims. Under these circumstances, such an implication—whether explicit or implicit—does not warrant dismissal.

In a representative unfair competition action challenging advertising, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the advertising is false or misleading.

National Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2003-04-22

We conclude there is no basis in California law to shift the burden of proof to a defendant in a representative false advertising and unlawful competition action.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, but a breach of contract alone cannot satisfy the statute's unlawful prong.

Ndulue v. Fremont-Rideout Health Group · filed 2019-05-01

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Rideout on Ndulue’s claim that Rideout violated California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, which prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act. ... Because a breach of contract cannot satisfy the “unlawful” prong of California’s UCL, Rideout is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

A common-law breach of contract alone does not support a UCL claim under the unlawful prong.

Dameron Hospital Assoc. v. GEICO Indemnity Co. · filed 2025-06-24

violations for breach of contract do not offend the UCL, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under this prong are not viable.

Section 17200 allows a private unfair competition claim based on an unlawful business act even when the law making the act unlawful provides no private cause of action.

Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court · filed 1999-10-07

Under Business and Professions Code section 17200 any unlawful business act constitutes unfair competition and a private cause of action can be based on the unlawful act even if the predicate law does not provide for a private cause of action.

Section 17200 proscribes both unlawful and unfair business practices, but an unlawful-practice claim requires an underlying violation of another law.

Maui Jim, Inc. v. SmartBuy Guru Enterprises · filed 2019-05-10

Count V of SBG’s second amended counterclaim asserts violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 et seq. ... The UCL proscribes both “unlawful” and “unfair” business practices, and a claimant “can only assert an ‘unlawful’ practice insofar as it can assert violations of other laws.” ... As we have dismissed SBG’s Cartwright Act claim, we also dismiss Count V. ... For the reasons stated above, we do so with prejudice.

Section 17200 separately prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts or practices, and its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws as independently actionable unfair-competition claims.

Vega v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Asilomar, Inc. · filed 2019-10-31

California’s Unfair Competition Laws (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... Under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, “section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”

Section 17200 bars unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts; an unlawful-prong claim requires alleging a violation of another law, and violations of other laws can independently support it.

Catherine v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A · filed 2020-03-03

California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. § 17200 incorporates other laws and treats a violation of those laws as an unlawful business practice independently actionable under California state law. ... “In order to state a claim for a violation of [§ 17200], a plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed a business act that is either fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair.” ... “To state a claim for an ‘unlawful’ business practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must assert the violation of some other law.” ... Here, the other causes of action asserted in the amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the complaint’s § 17200 claims also fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices as separate forms of unfair competition and requires a plaintiff proceeding under the unlawful prong to identify the predicate law and facts supporting its violation.

Outlaw Laboratory, LP v. DG in PB, LLC · filed 2020-05-29

“Because Business & Professions Code § 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” ... “Any federal, state or local law can serve as a predicate for an unlawful business practice action.” ... “Thus, the UCL incorporates violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices independently actionable under the UCL.” ... “Outlaw, however, does not “identify the particular section of [any] statute that was violated” by the Stores’ sale of the Rhino Products or “describe with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the violation.” ... “Accordingly, Outlaw fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong.”

Section 17200 provides three independent grounds for liability: unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.

Ruiz v. Owlet Baby Care · filed 2020-06-01

California’s Unfair Competition Law “provides a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent.” ... Each of these three “‘prongs’” provides an “independent ground for liability.” ... “The unlawful prong of the UCL ‘borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices,’ which the UCL then ‘makes independently actionable.’” ... “A business practice is unfair within the meaning of the UCL if it violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” ... “A fraudulent business practice is one which is likely to deceive the public.” ... The “same standard” thus governs claims under both the CLRA and the fraudulent prong of the UCL.

Section 17200 creates three separate UCL theories—unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent—and a false-advertising claim can support the unlawful prong.

RingCentral, Inc. v. Nextiva, Inc. · filed 2020-07-17

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see also Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). “Because Business and Professions Code section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 180. “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, Nextiva has stated a claim for false advertising. Thus, its UCL claim based upon the unlawful prong survives as well. Accordingly, the Court DENIES RingCentral’s motion to dismiss Nextiva’s unfair competition claim.

The UCL's unlawful prong makes business practices that violate other laws actionable, but claims based on copyright infringement are preempted while claims premised on viable interference claims may proceed.

Oracle America, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. · filed 2020-08-20

The UCL’s “unlawful prong” makes business practices that violate other laws actionable. CRST Van Expedited, Inc v. Werner Enters., 479 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment was proper for the UCL claims predicated on infringement because the Copyright Act preempts such claims.4 Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is no longer viable for the UCL claims premised on the IICR and IIPEA claims in light of our foregoing conclusions. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Panasonic Corp., 747 F.3d 1199, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014); CRST Van Expedited, 479 F.3d at 1107.

Section 17200 creates UCL liability through unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practices, including unlawful conduct borrowing violations of other laws and fraudulent conduct likely to deceive the public.

Maroon Society, Inc. v. Unison Consulting, Inc. · filed 2020-08-26

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, deceptive or misleading advertising, and any act prohibited under certain chapters of the California Business and Professional Code. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West). There are three ways to bring a cause of action under the UCL: (1) alleging unlawful conduct that violates another law; (2) alleging fraudulent conduct likely to deceive members of the public; and (3) alleging unfair conduct relating to an actual or threatened impact on competition. ... The “unlawful” prong borrows violations of other laws and treats them as an unlawful practice. ... Under the fraudulent prong, “it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Common law elements of fraud, such as actual falsehood, knowledge of falsity, and a victim’s reliance on the false statements, are not required to show a violation of the UCL. Id.

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and borrows violations of other laws as independently actionable unfair-competition claims.

Casper Sleep Inc. v. Nectar Brand LLC · filed 2020-09-23

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “In contrast to its limited remedies, the unfair competition law’s scope is broad.” Cel-Tech Comm’s, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). “Section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “These claims are substantially congruent to claims made under the Lanham Act.” L.A. Taxi Coop., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 852, 860 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under § 17200, the UCL reaches unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, but omission theories fail without a duty to disclose, and a plaintiff must adequately plead the defendant’s knowledge of the defect.

In re Samsung Galaxy Smartphone Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation. · filed 2020-12-24

Plaintiffs also bring a claim under California Unfair Competition Law, which prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Plaintiffs assert a UCL claim under all three prongs. SAC ¶¶ 92–98. As set forth below, Plaintiffs have failed to plead knowledge, and thus, the UCL claim is dismissed in its entirety. ... A “fraudulent” business act or practice within the meaning of the UCL is one that is likely to deceive members of the public. ... Hence, “absent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL.” ... “the failure to disclose a fact that a manufacturer does not have a duty to disclose, i.e., a defect of which it is not aware, does not constitute an unfair . . . practice.” ... Consequently, Plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead Defendants’ knowledge of the defect is fatal to their claim of “unfairness” as well. ... In sum, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ have failed to adequately plead their UCL claim and DISMISSES this cause of action WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices; an unlawful-practice claim requires alleging a violation of some other law.

(PS) Ponthieux v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2021-01-21

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. § 17200 incorporates other laws and treats a violation of those laws as an unlawful business practice independently actionable under California state law. Chabner v. United Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000). “In order to state a claim for a violation of [§ 17200], a plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed a business act that is either fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair.” Levine v. Blue Shield of California, 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1136 (2010). Moreover, “To state a claim for an ‘unlawful’ business practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must assert the violation of some other law.” Welenco, Inc. v. Corbell, 126 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2015); see also Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[S]ince the court has dismissed all of Plaintiff’s predicate violations, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the unlawful business practices prong of the UCL.”).

Section 17200's unlawful prong permits a UCL claim when the defendant's conduct allegedly violates other statutes, and normal agency principles may make a property manager liable for the principal's proscribed acts.

Zeff v. Greystar California, Inc. · filed 2021-02-18

Plaintiffs state a plausible claim under the UCL’s “unlawful” prong because, as discussed supra, they have already stated a plausible claim that Greystar violated Civil Code §§ 1671 and 1950.5 through unlawful late fee penalties and security deposit practices. Because Greystar’s conduct allegedly violates these two provisions of the Civil Code, that same conduct suffices to state a plausible UCL claim under the “unlawful” prong. And, because Greystar’s alleged wrongdoing is proscribed by these two statutes, they may be held liable for their “wrongful” conduct as an agent under Civil Code § 2343.

Section 17200 broadly covers business practices forbidden by law, including failure to pay wages, and permits restitution of unpaid wages but generally not penalties.

Hansber v. Ulta Beauty Cosmetics, LLC · filed 2021-10-05

The UCL generally prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The scope of the UCL “is sweeping, embracing anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (internal marks and quoted source omitted). Relevant here, “any business act or practice that violates the Labor Code through failure to pay wages is, by definition (§ 17200), an unfair business practice.” Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 178 (2000). Notwithstanding its broad scope of coverage, however the UCL limits available remedies to injunctive relief and restitution. Clark v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th 605, 610 (2010). ... The Court disagrees. Earned wages that are due and payable under the Labor Code are recoverable as restitution under the UCL. Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 178 (explaining that unpaid wages are restitutionary because they “are as much the property of the employee who has given his or her labor to the employer in exchange for that property as is property a person surrenders through an unfair business practice”). In light of the rulings above regarding the proper characterization of § 226.7(c) payments as wages, this accounts for each basis on which Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is made.

Section 17200 makes an unlawful business act independently actionable under the Unfair Competition Law, but a private plaintiff must have lost money or property as a result of the challenged practice.

Del Rosario v. Yakte Properties, LLC · filed 2022-01-27

That section permits lawsuits against “any unlawful” business act or practice. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. It “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As Yakte correctly argues, however, private plaintiffs can pursue claims under section 17200 only if they have lost money or property as a result of the challenged business practice. See Mem. at 11; see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.

Section 17200 consumer-deception claims apply the reasonable-consumer inquiry: whether the defendant’s marketing would likely mislead a reasonable consumer.

Locklin v. Strivectin Operating Company, Inc. · filed 2022-03-23

Although the statutes differ slightly, the basic inquiry is the same: Would the defendant’s marketing likely mislead a reasonable consumer?

Section 17200 makes violations of other federal or California laws independently actionable under the UCL’s unlawful prong, and its unfair prong supplies a separate basis for liability; a UCL claim fails here because the plaintiff showed neither a predicate-law violation nor unfair conduct.

Budowich v. Pelosi · filed 2022-06-23

Budowich’s final two counts invoke California’s Unfair Competition Law. The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s] and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. For those readers not on the West Coast, “[e]ach prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability; thus, the ‘unfair’ practices prong offers an independent basis for relief” from the “unlawful” prong. Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Here, Count VIII alleges that JPMorgan violated the UCL’s “unlawful” prong, while Count IX alleges a separate violation of the “unfair” prong. The Court takes them up in turn.

An independent UCL claim cannot proceed when the challenged activities are lawful under antitrust laws.

Caccuri v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC · filed 2022-07-15

Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is derivative of their Sherman Act claims, and because the Sherman Act claims are not adequately pled, the UCL claim must be dismissed.

Section 17200 makes unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices independently actionable through borrowed violations of other laws, but private remedies are generally limited to injunctions and restitution, so penalties under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 cannot serve as UCL predicates.

Meraz-Valencia v. Westlake Royal Roofing, LLC · filed 2023-03-16

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The UCL “‘borrows’ violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.” ... However, “although the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited.” ... “In a private unfair competition law action, the remedies are ‘generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.’” ... Having found that plaintiff’s third cause of action for failure to provide meal breaks was not sufficiently alleged, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim to the extent it is based upon that particular violation of the California Labor Code is granted. ... California Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 are not cognizable predicate violations for a UCL claim because the remedies afforded by those provisions “are penalties, not restitution”.

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent acts as separate UCL theories, and an unlawful act may be based on violating another law.

(PS) Kan v. Verdera Community Assoc. · filed 2023-04-13

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) generally prohibits (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, and (3) fraudulent acts or practices. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong . . . is a separate and distinct theory of liability . . . offer[ing] an independent basis for relief.” Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). An action is unlawful under the UCL and independently actionable if it constitutes a violation of another law, “be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made.” Nat'l Rural Telecommunications Co-op. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 20030) (quoting Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838–39 (1994)).

The Unfair Competition Law provides equitable remedies such as disgorgement or restoration, not damages, so a general liability policy covering only damages does not cover a UCL claim on that basis.

Aram Logistics v. United States Liability Insurance Company · filed 2024-01-31

USLI also argues that there is no potential for coverage under the Policy for Diakon’s UCL claim because damages are not an available remedy for claims brought pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (Doc. No. 15 at 20.) The Court agrees. Under California law, the available remedies for a UCL claim, which include (1) the “disgorgement of money that has been wrongfully obtained” or (2) an “order restoring money which may have been acquired by means of unfair competition,” are not within the scope of coverage provided by a general liability insurance policy. Bank of the W., 2 Cal. 4th 1254 at 1266 (citations omitted). Indeed, the parties do not dispute that “damages are not available under [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §] 17203.” Id. (Doc. No. 15 at 20; Doc. No. 16 at 13.) Here, the Policy only provides coverage for “damages” because of a “personal and advertising injury.” (USLI Policy at 16.) The Diakon Action does not allege an “advertising injury” nor can the Davis deposition testimony create the potential for coverage under the UCL cause of action. Accordingly, there are no “damages” potentially arising within the scope of coverage of the Policy for the UCL claim asserted against Aram.

Section 17200 reaches business acts or practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent, and under its broad unfair-practices standard, unauthorized commercial use of copyrighted works may qualify as unfair.

Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc. · filed 2024-02-12

“A business act or practice may violate the UCL if it is either ‘unlawful,’ ‘unfair,’ or ‘fraudulent.’ Each of these three adjectives captures ‘a separate and distinct theory of liability.’ ... Under the unfair prong of the UCL, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works to train ChatGPT without Plaintiffs’ authorization. ... Assuming the truth of Plaintiffs’ allegations - that Defendants used Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works to train their language models for commercial profit - the Court concludes that Defendants’ conduct may constitute an unfair practice. Therefore, this portion of the UCL claim may proceed.

Section 17200 treats unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices as separate theories; a competitor's unfair-prong claim requires harm or threatened harm to competition, the unlawful prong requires violation of another law, and the fraudulent prong requires particularized fraud pleading.

3D Systems, Inc. v. Wynne · filed 2024-03-12

Each of these UCL prongs—“unfair,” “unlawful,” and “fraudulent”—constitutes “a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... When a business sues a direct competitor for unfair business practices under the UCL, “unfair” means “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” ... The UCL’s “unlawful” prong requires the “violation of another law.” ... The UCL’s “fraudulent” prong is subject to the “heightened pleading standards” for fraud claims. ... Accordingly, Intrepid fails to state a claim under any of the UCL’s three prongs, and the motions to dismiss Intrepid’s UCL-related counterclaim and third-party claim are granted.

The court held that Google’s antitrust violations established the UCL’s unlawful prong and that its conduct also violated the unfair prong.

Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC · filed 2024-10-07

Consequently, the Court concludes that Epic has prevailed on the UCL claim against Google under the unlawful and unfair prongs. Judgment will be entered in favor of Epic.

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, with separate UCL theories; the unlawful prong independently makes violations of other laws actionable, and an unlawful-prong claim must plead particularly how the facts violate the borrowed statute.

Baton v. Ledger SAS · filed 2025-02-06

The law’s scope is “broad.” ... The UCL’s prongs on “unlawful,” “unfair” or “fraudulent” practices give rise to separate and distinct theories of liability. ... “The ‘unfair’ prong of the UCL creates a cause of action for a business practice that is unfair even if not proscribed by some other law.” ... Under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, violations of state or federal law are “unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... To succeed on bringing a claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, Plaintiffs must “plead with particularity how the facts of this case pertain to that specific statute.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately plead claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs under the UCL. The motion to dismiss those prongs of the UCL claim is DENIED.

Section 17200 bars business activities that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent, and a UCL claim under the fraudulent or unfair prongs requires allegations of misleading statements or conduct.

Epicrew USA v. Capital Asset Exchange and Trading, LLC · filed 2025-05-13

The UCL bars companies from engaging in business activities that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Epicrew raises claims under the “fraudulent” and “unfair” prongs.3 Compl. ¶ 102. Epicrew’s claim under the fraudulent prong fails for the same reason that Epicrew’s other fraud-based claims fail. And Epicrew’s claim under the unfair prong fails because Epicrew relies on “deceptive business practices,” Opp’n at 9, and Epicrew has not alleged any misleading statements or conduct. Thus, the Court DISMISSES the UCL claims.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; its unlawful prong reaches practices forbidden by any law, and equitable relief requires the plaintiff to show no adequate remedy at law.

Edwards v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2025-07-31

The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]” and “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. Plaintiffs may pursue claims under any or all of three theories: the “unlawfulness,” “fraudulent,” or “unfairness” prongs. ... Because the UCL provides only for equitable remedies, plaintiffs bringing a UCL claim in a federal court must establish that they “lack[ ] an adequate remedy at law” before the court can award them the UCL's equitable relief. ... The unlawful prong prohibits “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... Consumers may “borrow” violations of other laws for purposes of establishing UCL liability.

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and permits a sufficiently alleged violation of another statute to support the unlawful prong.

White · filed 2025-12-08

The UCL is a consumer protection statute that broadly prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each of these three adjectives captures ‘a separate and distinct theory of liability.’” ... The unlawful prong “‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Thus, a plaintiff states a claim under the unlawful prong by sufficiently alleging a violation of another statute. ... White’s allegation that BMO violated Regulation E is sufficient to state a claim under the UCL.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, including practices that violate another law under its unlawful prong.

Banse · filed 2025-12-30

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair[,] or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The statute is “violated where a defendant’s act or practice violates any of the [UCL’s] prongs.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff may pursue a claim under California’s UCL via any or all of three prongs: the “unlawful” prong, which bars practices that are forbidden by any other law; the “unfair” prong, which bars unfair conduct; and the “fraudulent” prong, which bars practices that are likely to deceive the public. In re Toyota RAV4 Hybrid Fuel Tank Litig., 534 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Here, Plaintiff brings claims under the unlawful and unfair prongs. ... Because the Court has found Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim under 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 and the TILA, Plaintiff has also stated a claim under the unlawful prong as to those claims.

The UCL’s unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws, while a competitor’s unfair-prong claim requires harm to competition rather than merely injury to the competitor.

Owner.com · filed 2026-01-16unlawful prong; unfair prong

Section 17200’s unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable. ... For business competitor UCL claims, the alleged unfairness must be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.

Section 17200’s Unfair Competition Law treats a violation of another law, here Labor Code § 2802(a), as an unlawful business practice and applies its four-year limitations period to the resulting claim.

Kooiman v. Siwell, Inc. · filed 2022-06-23

California law prohibits the commission of unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200; Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). ... The California Supreme Court has held that the four-year UCL statute of limitations applies even if the borrowed statute for an unlawful prong claim has a shorter limitations period. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 178-79 (2000); Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1303-04 (S.D. Cal. 2014). ... As explained above, Capital Mortgage violated California Labor Code § 2802(a) by failing to reimburse Kooiman’s business expenses. Applying the UCL’s four-year statute of limitations, Kooiman is entitled to the disgorgement of the retained business expenses incurred after February 11, 2016.

The Unfair Competition Law provides equitable remedies, including restitution, but does not itself authorize damages or attorney’s fees.

Mandel v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP · filed 2025-02-27

The UCL “does not itself authorize an award of damages or attorney’s fees.” ... This is because the equitable remedies of the UCL are not exclusive; they “are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” ... That is to say, in California, restitution is itself an adequate remedy under the UCL.

Section 17200 treats violations of the Cartwright Act as unlawful business practices.

BWI Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. · filed 1987-03-11

Violations of the Cartwright Act are also unlawful business practices under the unfair competition statutes.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.

Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. · filed 1983-12-22

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint states a cause of action for injunctive relief and restitution under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.).

Section 17200 makes a broker’s trading ahead actionable as an unlawful business practice when it violates federal mail fraud law.

Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. · filed 2000-04-27

In fact, since trading ahead constitutes the crime of mail fraud under federal law, it is actionable under the UCL, which borrows other law, including federal law, to define the “unlawful” practices that are UCL violations.

Section 17200 makes a broker’s trading ahead actionable as an unlawful business practice when it violates federal mail fraud law.

Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. · filed 2000-05-26

In fact, since trading ahead constitutes the crime of mail fraud under federal law, it is actionable under the UCL, which borrows other law, including federal law, to define the "unlawful" practices that are UCl violations.

Section 17200 does not treat conduct permitted under the Colgate doctrine as unfair.

Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2001-10-29

We need not decide whether the Cel-Tech test applies in the present action by a consumer because we conclude as a matter of law that conduct that the courts have determined to be permissible under the Colgate doctrine cannot be deemed "unfair" under the unfair competition law.

Section 17200 permits an unlawful business practice claim based on violations of a federal statute whose private damages remedy was repealed when Congress preserved consistent state law remedies.

Rose v. Bank of America · filed 2013-08-01

When Congress repealed section 4310, foreclosing private actions for damages under TISA, it left section 4312 intact, expressly permitting private actions under state laws consistent with TISA. Thus, the abolition of the TISA remedy does not amount to a bar against UCL claims.

Section 17200 treats violations of other laws as independently actionable unlawful practices under California’s unfair competition law.

Matilock, Inc. v. Pouladdej · filed 2020-06-15

California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. encompasses California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”). ... The scope of this law is broad: rather than proscribe specific practices, “section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”

Claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened particularity requirements when they are based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations.

In re Fyre Festival Litigation · filed 2019-07-10

Unlike for New York’s General Business Law, to plead claims under these statutes, plaintiffs must meet the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.

A UCL claim grounded in fraud must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements.

Cullen v. Shutterfly Lifetouch, LLC · filed 2021-05-19

Plaintiffs CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims must satisfy this pleading requirement because they are grounded in fraud.

Under § 17200’s fraudulent-practice theory, a complaint must plead factual allegations or specifically identify omissions, misrepresentations, or nondisclosures under a heightened pleading standard.

In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation · filed 2021-11-08

Yet, the proposed complaint is devoid of any factual allegations or any specific reference to any “omission,” “misrepresentation,” or “non-disclosure” as is required by a heightened pleading standard for the “fraud” theory under the UCL.

A UCL claim sounding in fraud must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.

Saloojas, Inc. v. CIGNA Healthcare of California, Inc. · filed 2022-10-06

Where a complaint “sounds in fraud”—because it alleges a “unified course of fraudulent conduct and rely entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of that claim”—claims under the UCL are also subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s pleading requirements.

A fraud-based UCL claim is subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.

Buksbaum v. Boar's Head Provisions Co., Inc. · filed 2025-08-01

Plaintiffs’ claims sound in fraud, and are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

A UCL claim based on alleged misrepresentations must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity requirement, including alleging what is false about each relied-on statement and why it is false.

Testone · filed 2025-12-17

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claims, each of which is based on Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations about the healthy nature of its products, sound in fraud and are subject to the heightened pleading standard. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b), but grants Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her pleading to satisfy Rule 9(b) and address the deficiencies identified in previous paragraph. For each misrepresentation that Plaintiff identifies as being one she relied upon, she must also allege what is false about the statement, and why it is false.

A UCL claim must identify with reasonable particularity the conduct alleged to violate one of the statute’s separate prongs.

Movahedi · filed 2025-12-29

A cause of action under the UCL must state with reasonable particularity the conduct that was allegedly unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent.

Claims under California's Unfair Competition Law were untimely, and the discovery rule did not save them.

Olson v. Farmers New World Life Ins. · filed 2019-08-07

With regard to Olson’s claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.41, et seq., and the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, dismissal on grounds that her claims were not timely filed and the discovery rule does not save her claims is affirmed for essentially the reasons given by the district court.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising, and fraud-based claims under it must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.

SAUER v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2020-03-31

The UCL prohibits ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”’ Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2018), order clarified, No. 16-CV-07244, 2018 WL 1156607 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018), and on reconsideration, 2020 WL 664033 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2020) (citing § 17200). Under both statutes, claims sounding in fraud, like those asserted here, are subject to the heightened pleading standards in Rule 9(b).

A UCL claim based on consumer deception or nonfunctional slack fill must plausibly allege the applicable theory; conclusory allegations that slack fill is nonfunctional and that statutory safe harbors do not apply are insufficient.

Buso v. ACH Food Companies, Inc. · filed 2020-04-20

Likewise, to violate the UCL, there must be a showing of “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. California’s UCL state specifically prohibits any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act of practices.” Id. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims, to the extent they are based on the Reasonable Consumer Deception Theory, with prejudice. ... However, the Court disagrees. The complaint does not allege facts to support the conclusion that the slack fill is nonfunctional, nor facts to allege the safe harbors do not apply. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims, to the extent they are based on the Nonfunctional Slack Fill Theory, without prejudice.

A UCL label claim requires evidence that reasonable consumers were likely to be materially misled; a label is deceptive when it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect, even if not literally false.

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Incorporated · filed 2020-03-24

A label is deceptive if it is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material respect, even if it is not literally false.

Section 17200 bars unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a UCL deception claim requires a probability that a significant portion of reasonable consumers could be misled; truthful packaging plus ingredient disclosure did not satisfy that standard here.

Cheslow v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Company · filed 2020-04-08

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “these [three] California statutes are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test.” ... “Under the reasonable consumer standard, [plaintiffs] must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... The reasonable consumer test requires more than a mere possibility that defendant’s product “might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” ... Rather, the test requires a probability “that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... In sum, given the lack of affirmative deceptive statements combined with an ingredient list that dispels any confusion about the actual content of the product, the court finds that plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims all fail to state a claim as a matter of law.

A UCL plaintiff must show that the defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff’s injury-producing conduct; classwide reliance may be presumed when the material representation was made to all class members, but not when exposure is uncertain.

Racies v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC · filed 2020-05-04

Reliance is an “essential element of both the UCL and CLRA and is ‘proved by showing that the defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff’s injury-producing conduct.’” Dkt. No. 148 at 7 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (2009)). At the class certification stage, the Court found that because the material representations were made to all class members, Plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of reliance. Id. at 6–7. However, because of Plaintiff’s candid admission that he can’t honestly say whether he was exposed to the alleged misrepresentations that were the basis of the class being certified, Plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption of classwide reliance.

The UCL’s unfair and unlawful prongs do not require a plaintiff to plead reliance when the claims are not predicated on fraud.

Vianu v. AT&T Mobility LLC · filed 2020-06-11

First, they do not have to allege reliance for the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the UCL because these claims are not predicated on fraud.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL claim based on misleading statements requires plausible allegations that the plaintiff relied on the statements and was induced to part with money or property.

Appel v. Boston National Title Agency, LLC · filed 2020-06-10

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled they relied on Boston National’s representations, which induced them to enter into the agreement and then deposit escrow funds. The Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss these claims.

Section 17200 claims may rely on a presumption that absent class members relied on an alleged misrepresentation when class membership establishes exposure; exposure matters to class-certification predominance only to establish reliance.

Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest · filed 2020-03-23

We conclude only that, in UCL cases, (1) exposure is relevant to predominance, but only to establish reliance, and (2) a district court does not err per se by not considering the class-membership question under the predominance prong.

A UCL claim grounded in fraud must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, and the plaintiff must plausibly allege that a significant portion of reasonable consumers is likely to be deceived.

Andrade-Heymsfield v. Danone US, Inc. · filed 2019-08-14

Plaintiffs’ UCL, CLRA, and FAL claims are grounded in fraud and must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). ... Under this standard, plaintiffs must show that “members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Rather, it requires a probability “that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably under the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead deception and the UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims with respect to the “Naturally Energizing,” “Maximum Calcium Absorption,” and “nutrition in every sip” statements are DISMISSED with prejudice.

The UCL has separate unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs; a fraudulent-prong claim requires likely deception and Rule 9(b) particularity, while an unfair-prong claim must plead substantial consumer injury.

Banton v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · filed 2020-07-01

California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. The three aforementioned “prongs” each maintain a distinct theory of liability and basis for relief.

Section 17200 permits a deceptive-practices claim only when the defendant made statements that would mislead a reasonable consumer; third-party media statements alone do not establish the defendant’s misrepresentation.

Fitzpatrick v. Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 2022-10-28

Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails because she has not identified any promise or misleading statements by Defendant that would lead a reasonable consumer to believe he or she had a right to a waiver or refund of fees. None of the statements set forth in Plaintiff’s SAC constitute concrete promises for relief or would mislead a reasonable consumer into believing relief was guaranteed. Nor can Plaintiff rely on third-party statements in media reports to establish some sort of misrepresentation on Defendant’s part. Given the lack of identification of some sort of deceptive statement by Defendant, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is also DISMISSED.

Section 17200 requires actual reliance for UCL claims based on misrepresentation, but UCL claims not based on misrepresentation do not require actual reliance and an unlawful-prong claim may rest on an underlying violation of another law.

Appel v. Boston National Title Agency, LLC · filed 2019-08-15

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... For a fraudulent business practices claim, the UCL mandates that the plaintiff demonstrate “actual reliance” upon the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission. ... Without reliance, Plaintiffs cannot plead a claim under the “fraudulent prong” of the UCL. Further, because Plaintiffs’ claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL stems from the same allegations, Plaintiffs’ lack of reliance also necessitates dismissal of the claim. ... Any remaining UCL claims that are not predicated on misrepresentation do not require the pleading of “actual” reliance. ... The UCL “provides a cause of action for violations of any other law as an unlawful practice.”

California’s Unfair Competition Law requires a plaintiff to demonstrate reliance, or the defendant’s intent to generate reliance, on allegedly deceptive conduct.

Daly v. McFarland · filed 2020-12-11

The claims for relief under various state statutes fare no better under the predominance inquiry. Like common law fraud, California’s False Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law, and Illinois’s Consumer Fraud Act all require plaintiff to demonstrate reliance (or defendant’s intent to generate reliance) on the allegedly deceptive conduct, raising the same aforementioned individual issues. Cocroft v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 796 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2015); Hobbs v. Brother Intern. Corp., No. 15-cv-1866, 2016 WL 4734394, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2016); In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 306 (2009).

UCL claims based on deceptive advertising require pleading and proof of actual reliance; a plaintiff must allege that the misrepresentation was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct.

Starr v. VSL Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2020-12-28

All three of these statutes require a plaintiff to plead actual reliance.

Section 17200 permits a breach of contract to support a UCL claim only when the breach also involves unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct, and a UCL claim requires plausible detrimental reliance.

Guerrero v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2023-03-30

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Like in North Carolina and Texas, “a breach of contract claim cannot form the basis for a UCL claim without additional unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct.” Conder v. Home Savings of Am., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903, 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“A breach of contract may form the predicate for Section 17200 claims, provided it also constitutes conduct that is unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, “[t]o bring a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law,” plaintiffs must “plausibly allege[] detrimental reliance.” McMahon v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 745 F. App’x 786, 786 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Ellis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2016 WL 5815733, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (“To prevail on [a] . . . fraud-based UCL claim, plaintiffs must establish detrimental reliance . . . .”). Therefore, the California UCL claim fails for the same reasons that doom the claims brought under the North Carolina UDTPA and the Texas DTPA.

A § 17200 claim based on omission requires the plaintiff to show that the nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the injury-producing conduct and a substantial factor in the decision.

CRAFT v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2024-12-23

“To prove reliance on an omission, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff's injury~producing conduct.” A plaintiff need only prove that the omission was a substantial factor in his decision by simply showing first “that, had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of it” and second, he would have “behaved differently.”

The fraudulent prong of § 17200 requires actual reliance on a misrepresentation and economic injury caused by that reliance.

Georgion v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2025-08-18

The CA UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which is defined to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “When the ‘unfair competition’ underlying a plaintiff’s UCL claim consists of a defendant’s misrepresentation, a plaintiff must have actually relied on the misrepresentation, and suffered economic injury as a result of that reliance, to state a claim for relief.” ... Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to state a claim under the CA UCL’s fraudulent prong because plaintiffs do not allege actual reliance on any purported misrepresentations or nondisclosures on the part of defendant. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the “fraudulent” prong of the CA UCL.

For a fraud-based UCL claim based on misrepresentation, a competitor-plaintiff must allege its own reliance; alleging only consumer reliance is insufficient.

Nifty Technologies, Inc. v. Mango Technologies, Inc. · filed 2025-07-01

Because those well-settled principles counsel against authorizing third-party reliance to serve as the basis for a fraud-based UCL claim, the Court concludes that California law requires a competitor-plaintiff to allege its own reliance.

A § 17200 claim is adequately pleaded when its predicate negligence claim is adequately pleaded.

Akins v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2019-09-06

This Court determined above that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded their negligence claim; therefore, Plaintiffs’ section 17200 claim is adequately pleaded as well. (See ECF No. 28 at 14.) Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this cause of action is DENIED.

A UCL claim fails when it lacks a viable predicate for the unlawful prong, particularized fraud allegations for the fraudulent prong, and a distinct basis for the unfair prong.

Chie v. Citigroup, Inc. · filed 2021-02-18

The court dismisses the UCL claim too. There are no predicate claims supporting a claim under the UCL’s unlawful prong, the plaintiffs did not plead fraud with particularity and thus did not plead a claim under the UCL’s fraudulent prong, and any claim under the UCL’s unfair prong ... overlaps completely with the fraudulent prong.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and misleading advertising, with separate UCL prongs that can reach food labels likely to deceive consumers.

Beckman v. Arizona Canning Company, LLC · filed 2019-09-09

California’s UCL prohibits “unfair competition” which includes any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see also Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the statute is violated where a defendant’s act or practice is (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, (3) fraudulent, or (4) in violation of section 17500 (“FAL”)). Each “prong” of the UCL provides a separate and distinct theory of liability. Id. ... The Court, having found the alleged facts sufficient to support a plausible inference that the challenged label is likely to deceive the reasonable consumer, finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to support a claim under the FAL, as well as the unlawful and fraudulent prongs of the UCL. Id. ... The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL applying the balancing test. ... Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations meet the Cel-Tech tethering test and are sufficient to state a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL .

Section 17200 establishes independent unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent-practice or misleading-advertising prongs, so a plaintiff need establish only one; conduct may be unfair or deceptive even if it is not unlawful, and vice versa.

The People of the State Of California v. H and R Block, Inc. · filed 2020-02-11

To state a UCL claim, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Lippit, 340 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). A plaintiff need only establish a violation of the UCL under one of these three prongs, as each operates independently from the others. See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). Section 17200 prohibits practices that are unfair or deceptive, even if they are not found unlawful or vice versa.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and misleading advertising, and a UCL claim must satisfy at least one of those three prongs.

So v. HP, Inc. · filed 2023-07-17

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The California Supreme Court has clarified that the UCL, because it is “written in the disjunctive,” prohibits three separate types of unfair competition: (1) unlawful acts or practices, (2) unfair acts of practices, and (3) fraudulent acts or practices. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999); accord Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). To plead a UCL claim, a plaintiff’s allegations must show that a defendant’s conduct violates one of these three “prongs.” Id.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, with each prong constituting a separate theory of liability; UCL claims based on deceptive advertising are evaluated under the reasonable-consumer standard.

Hawkins v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2025-02-13

The UCL prohibits business practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each prong under the UCL provides a separate theory of liability.

The UCL’s unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent prongs are separate and distinct theories of liability.

Smith v. Intel Corporation · filed 2025-08-15

Each prong—unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent—constitutes a separate and distinct theory of liability.

The UCL’s disjunctive structure creates three varieties of unfair competition: unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practices.

Williams v. American Arbitration Association, Inc. · filed 2025-08-22

Because the UCL is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.