Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Section 17200 permits a deceptive advertising claim based on an “Unlimited” plan even when a linked policy discloses usage limits, if consumers are likely to be deceived.

Chapman v. Skype, Inc. · filed 2013-10-04

Moreover, the fact that Skype ultimately discloses the limits in its “Fair Usage Policy” does not excuse its practice of labeling the plan “Unlimited” in its initial dealings with potential customers.

To sue under section 17200, a private plaintiff must show an economic loss—loss or deprivation of money or property—caused by the alleged unfair business practice.

Pet Food Express Ltd. v. Applied Underwriters Inc. · filed 2019-09-12

To establish standing to sue under the UCL, a plaintiff must: “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice alleged.” Id. at 323.

Section 17200 claims may proceed when the alleged injury is purely economic; the economic loss doctrine does not bar them.

Dawood v. Gamer Advantage LLC · filed 2022-08-04

The remainder of plaintiff’s claims do allow for recovery for purely economic loss under these circumstances, and therefore, they will not be dismissed.

Section 17200 unfair-business-practices claims are superseded by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act when the claims arise from conduct covered by trade-secret law.

Strategic Partners, Inc. v. Vestagen Protective Tech. Inc. · filed 2019-09-16

Vestagen’s unfair business practices counterclaim, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (UCL), and unjust enrichment counterclaim are superseded by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), see K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 958 (2009), and Vestagen’s proposed amendments to its complaint are either superseded by CUTSA or fail to state a claim.

Section 17200 claims based on conduct preempted by CUTSA cannot proceed, while independently pleaded claims may avoid preemption.

Symphony Risk Solutions Insurance Services, Inc. v. Perlite · filed 2024-12-13

Unlike in Strategic Partners, here, Symphony Risk’s Section 17200 claim implicates confidential information in a similar fashion as the intentional interference and duty of loyalty claims and is preempted by CUTSA. I likewise dismiss this claim, with leave to amend.

A § 17200 unfair competition claim is preempted by CUTSA when its allegations depend on misuse of the same trade secrets underlying a misappropriation claim, even if it also alleges passing off.

Valvetech, Inc. v. Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc. · filed 2019-09-26

Thus, the allegation that Aerojet copied and then passed off ValveTech’s design as its own necessarily depends on Aerojet’s misuse of ValveTech’s trade secrets, and therefore CUTSA preempts its unfair competition claims.

Section 17200 claims under the unlawful and unfair prongs are preempted by the CUTSA when they rest on the same trade secret misappropriation conduct.

Zoom Imaging Solutions, Inc. v. Roe · filed 2019-11-08

The CUTSA thus preempts this claim. ... Plaintiff’s claim here, like its CUTSA claim, relies on the access, download, and emailing of Zoom’s confidential information, and is therefore preempted under the CUTSA.

Section 17200 claims under the unlawful and unfair prongs are preempted by CUTSA when they rely on the same alleged trade secret misappropriation.

Zoom Imaging Solutions, Inc. v. Roe · filed 2020-01-30

The CUTSA thus preempts plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the unlawful prong of the UCL. ... Just as in the original complaint, the alleged unfair conduct in the FAC relies on the misappropriation allegations, so the CUTSA preempts this claim.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong cannot support a claim based on acts preempted by California’s trade secrets law.

Medimpact Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. IQVIA Holdings Inc. · filed 2020-08-27

Here, the UCL claim is based on the underlying causes of action for inducing breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional interference with a contractual relationship, (Dkt. No. 93, FAC ¶ 147), that the Court has held to be preempted by CUTSA. Therefore, those “unlawful acts” are also necessarily preempted by CUTSA.

Section 17200 unfair competition claims may be preempted by CUTSA when they rely on the same facts as a trade secret misappropriation claim.

Better Meat Co. v. Emergy, Inc. · filed 2023-04-26

However, UCL claims are not exempt from possible preemption.

Section 17200 claims based on unauthorized use of confidential information are preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

Truinject Corp. v. Galderma S.A. · filed 2024-09-13

Truinject’s UCL claim is pre-empted to the extent it relies on unauthorized use of confidential information.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, including representations or advertising likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Maeda v. Kennedy Endeavors, Inc. · filed 2019-09-19

California’s consumer protection laws all prohibit “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices.” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500; Cal. Civ. Code § 1770). They “prohibit ‘not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.’” Williams, 552 F.3d at 938 (alteration in original) (quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 250 (Cal. 2002), as modified (May 22, 2002) (quoting Leoni v. State Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 194 (Cal. 1985))). Any violation of the FAL necessarily violates the UCL. Ebner, 838 F.3d at 963. Notwithstanding their differences, California’s consumer protection statutes are all governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. ... Absent those types of elements, the Court finds that Defendant’s packaging—which only contains the word “HAWAIIAN” and Hawai‘i-related imagery—would not likely deceive a significant portion of the general public into believing that the Hawaiian Snacks are manufactured in Hawai‘i. The Court accordingly dismisses the California consumer protection claims as a matter of law.

Section 17200's fraudulent prong reaches misleading or even literally true product representations that are likely or tend to deceive reasonable consumers, and such deception allegations generally survive a motion to dismiss when plausibly pleaded.

Snarr v. Cento Fine Foods Inc. · filed 2019-12-23

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, broadly defined as including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” ... Whether the challenged representations are “deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision” at the motion to dismiss stage. ... Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims based on a failure to plead sufficient facts regarding the Products’ growing region or certification.

Section 17200 claims based on deceptive advertising survive a motion to dismiss when the allegations plausibly show that a significant portion of reasonable consumers could be misled.

Freeman v. Indochino Apparel, Inc. · filed 2020-03-11

Claims under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA concerning deceptive advertising are governed by a “reasonable consumer” standard. Under that standard, plaintiffs must plead facts showing that a “significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... If the court can determine from the facts alleged that no reasonable consumer would be so deceived, dismissal may be granted. ... The Court declines find, as a matter of law, that Indochino’s reference price representations would not mislead a reasonable consumer.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a consumer claim is plausibly stated when reasonable consumers are likely to be deceived by advertising.

Kimberly Banks v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. · filed 2021-05-03

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To state a cause of action under California’s consumer protection statutes, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that “reasonable consumers” are likely to be deceived by the advertising. ... The court concludes that Plaintiffs’ have plausibly alleged causes of action under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and deceptive-marketing claims require a showing that a reasonable consumer is likely to be misled.

In re: Nestle Boost Nutritional Drink Litigation · filed 2022-11-07

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “Under the consumer protection laws of California [and] New York, . . . claims based on deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a ‘reasonable consumer’ is likely to be misled by the representation.” ... Here, the court again finds that a reasonable consumer would not find the Boost Glucose Control product label to be misleading. ... In sum, plaintiffs previously failed to establish that a reasonable consumer would be misled by the Boost labels, and the TAC’s additional allegations do not lead to a different outcome. The court finds that plaintiffs still fail to establish that the Boost labels contain a misrepresentation that would mislead a reasonable consumer of the target group.

Section 17200 claims based on deceptive product labeling require allegations that a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived, and a UCL unlawful-prong claim dependent on FDCA violations is preempted.

Collyer v. Catalina Snacks Inc. · filed 2024-01-18

“Under the consumer protection laws of California[,] . . . claims based on deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a ‘reasonable consumer’ is likely to be misled by the representation.” ... “Plaintiff’s California statutory claims all fail on this basis and must be DISMISSED.” ... “Accordingly, to the extent Collyer’s claims rely on violation of the FDCA, they are preempted.” ... “The unlawful prong portion of Collyer’s UCL claim, most notably included in paragraph 67 of the Complaint, is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.”

Section 17200 prohibits deceptive advertising likely to mislead reasonable consumers; an unqualified environmental representation can be actionable rather than mere puffery.

Bohen v. Conagra Brands, Inc. · filed 2024-03-25

All of Plaintiffs’ deceptive advertising claims rest on the “reasonable consumer” standard. Therefore, Plaintiffs must plead that ConAgra’s labels “are likely to deceive reasonable consumers,” which “requires a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Therefore, the Court finds that “Good for the Environment” is actionable non-puffery and denies ConAgra’s motion to dismiss the various states’ consumer protection claims.

Under the UCL's deceptive-labeling standard, a plaintiff must show that the challenged statement tends to mislead a reasonable consumer, and at summary judgment must support that showing with admissible evidence.

In Re: Kind LLC "Healthy and All Natural" Litigation · filed 2024-05-02

To establish deception under the reasonable consumer standard at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must present admissible evidence establishing how the challenged statement – “All Natural” – tends to mislead reasonable consumers acting reasonably.

For deceptive-advertising claims under § 17200, advertising is actionable when it is actually misleading or has a capacity, likelihood, or tendency to deceive, judged by whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived.

Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark Corp. · filed 2024-07-17

California’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA require basic fairness in advertising and permit a civil remedy against those who deceive consumers. Those laws prohibit not only false advertising, but also advertising that is “either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” ... Claims under each of these statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard, which requires a plaintiff to “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the defendant’s marketing claims.

A UCL claim based on deceptive or misleading marketing requires allegations that a reasonable consumer is likely to be misled.

Hernandez v. Mimi's Rock Corp. · filed 2024-08-26

Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), “claims based on deceptive or misleading marketing must demonstrate that a ‘reasonable consumer’ is likely to be misled by the representation.” ... In sum, the Court concludes that Hernandez has not pled plausible claims for violations of the UCL, FAL, or CLRA, and it dismisses these claims with leave to amend.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and a UCL deception claim fails when the product label is not likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Garland v. The Kroger Co. · filed 2025-02-12

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... The Court finds Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the front label of the Product is “unambiguously deceptive to an ordinary consumer, such that the consumer would feel no need to look at the back label.” ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for failing to adequately plead that the Product label is likely to deceive reasonable consumers.

Section 17200 creates separate unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent-prong theories, and under its fraudulent prong advertising is deceptive when likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Levit v. Nature's Bakery, LLC · filed 2025-02-21

“The UCL creates a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. Each ‘prong’ of the UCL provides a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... “Under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL, conduct is considered deceptive or misleading if the conduct is ‘likely to deceive’ a ‘reasonable consumer.’” ... “In short, the Court finds that Levit has adequately pleaded, at this stage of the litigation, that Nature’s Bakery’s “wholesome” claims could deceive a reasonable consumer.”

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and deceptive advertising, and a false-advertising claim requires only likely deception of the public judged by an objective reasonable-consumer standard, with materiality and reliance generally susceptible to common proof.

Noohi v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc. · filed 2025-07-25

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” ... Accordingly, to state a claim under the UCL or the FAL “based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... Whether a statement is likely to deceive members of the public is decided by reference to an objective “reasonable consumer” standard. ... “Because materiality (and, hence, in this case reliance) may be proved by reference to an objective, reasonable consumer standard, reliance under the CLRA is generally susceptible to common proof.” ... The same is true as to whether a statement is likely to deceive “members of the public” under the FAL and UCL.

The fraudulent prong of California's Unfair Competition Law treats conduct as deceptive or misleading when it is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

REINKRAUT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2025-06-29

Under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL, conduct is considered deceptive or misleading if the conduct is “likely to deceive” a “reasonable consumer.” ... The defects in Medina’s pleading that the Court identified in the SAC remain uncured; while she points to specific promotional materials she viewed, she fails to establish that these materials were in any way likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Under the UCL, a product label is deceptive only if a reasonable consumer would likely be misled; an ambiguous front label is evaluated with the rest of the packaging, including the ingredient list.

Daniels v. Eagle Family Foods Group LLC · filed 2025-07-17

Given that the Product’s front packaging is not plausibly unambiguously deceptive, reversion to the packaging as a whole is appropriate. ... A reasonable consumer would not plausibly be misled by the Product for this reason.

Section 17200 treats an advertisement as likely to deceive when it could mislead a significant portion of the general public or targeted consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances.

Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. · filed 2003-01-17

“Likely to deceive” implies more than a mere possibility that the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner. Rather, the phrase indicates that the ad is such that it is probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.

The UCL’s unlawful prong makes violations of other laws actionable, so a derivative UCL claim fails when its underlying legal claims fail.

Hellenic Petroleum LLC v. Sacramento Energy Resources, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

The UCL’s “unlawful” prong “borrows violations of other laws . . . and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL,” and that “virtually any law or regulation – federal or state, statutory or common law – can serve as a predicate . . . .” ... When the underlying legal claim that supports a UCL claim fails, “so too will the [the] derivative UCL claim.” ... Hellenic’s opposition clarifies that its UCL claims is dependent upon his other causes of action. ... Because these causes of action fail, so too fails the UCL claim.

Section 17200 treats violations of other laws as independently actionable unlawful practices under the UCL.

Calsoft Labs, Inc. v. Panchumarthi · filed 2020-01-31

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see also Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). “Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). ... As explained above, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the CFAA. Therefore, Plaintiffs have, at a minimum, stated a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL. See Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 180 (“[S]ection 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.”).

Section 17200 creates separate unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent theories; a common-law breach of contract alone cannot support the unlawful prong, and UCL violations are remedied by restitution or injunction rather than damages.

Najarian Holdings LLC v. CoreVest American Finance Lender LLC · filed 2020-07-09

The UCL creates a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each “prong of the UCL [provides] a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... In a case cited by defendant, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit noted that a violation of the unlawful prong of § 17200 requires plaintiffs to allege that they were “engaged in a business practice ‘forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or court-made.’” 622 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838–39 (Ct. App. 1994)). The court stated, “a common law violation such as breach of contract is insufficient.” ... “The UCL limits the remedies available for UCL violations to restitution and injunctive relief . . . .” Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 130 Cal. App. 4th 440, 452 (Ct. App. 2005). ... The court agrees that plaintiffs cannot seek damages under the UCL and plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action fails to state a claim for that reason.

Section 17200's unlawful prong allows a UCL claim to rely on a predicate violation of another state, federal, or local law, including the CLRA or FAL.

Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc. · filed 2020-12-30

“[V]irtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate for an action under section 17200.” ... “Just as in Zeiger, plaintiff here has “stated claims for violations of the CLRA and FAL, so these claims may serve as predicate violations for a claim under the UCL’s ‘unlawful’ prong.” ... The court finds no reason to depart from those holdings and concludes that a CLRA or FAL violation properly falls into the category of a state, federal, or local law for this purpose. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim brought under the “unlawful” prong will be denied.

A UCL claim under the unlawful prong depends on an underlying substantive violation; if the predicate claims fail, the UCL claim fails as well.

Clark v. Westbrae Natural, Inc. · filed 2021-04-22

Because the Court has dismissed these latter claims, they cannot serve as a predicate for his UCL violation. See Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001) (holding that UCL claims under the unlawful prong “stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of action.”).

The UCL's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable under section 17200, allowing a plausible federal labeling violation to support a UCL claim.

Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC · filed 2021-08-09

The UCL prohibits business acts or practices that are “unlawful.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. As the California Supreme Court has explained, the unlawful prong of the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats [them] . . . as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 377, 383 (1992) (internal quotation omitted). “Virtually any law can serve as the predicate for a section 17200 action.” Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 965, 969 (1997). ... The Court finds that Ms. Nacarino has adequately alleged that the Product does not comply with Section 101.22(i), as she asserts that the Product’s flavoring does not derive exclusively from the vanilla plant and that its label does not include “with other natural flavor” in compliance with the prescriptive terms of Section 101.22(i)(1)(iii). ... The Court therefore DENIES Chobani’s motion to dismiss with respect to Ms. Nacarino’s claim under the UCL’s unlawful prong.

Section 17200 makes unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices actionable; its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws, and a derivative UCL claim fails when its underlying claim fails.

Mayen v. Cal Central Harvesting, Inc. · filed 2021-10-25

CCH argues that the UCL claim is derivative of the other claims alleged. Mayen does nothing to dispel that theory. Therefore, the Court will read the UCL claim as alleging only “unlawful” conduct based on violations of the AWPA and the Labor Code. Because the Court has found that the second, third, and parts of the eighth causes of action are plausibly pled, the Court will not dismiss the UCL claim to the extent it is based on violations of § 1197, § 226, and AWPA § 1832(a) and (c). However, all other causes of action have been dismissed. Therefore, there is no plausible UCL claim pled beyond the claims based on violations of § 1197, § 226, and AWPA § 1832. See AMN Healthcare, 28 Cal.App.5th at 950.

Section 17200's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable, so a UCL claim requires an underlying predicate violation.

The Upper Deck Company v. Flores · filed 2021-10-28

The UCL broadly prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each of these three adjectives captures “a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... Under the “unlawful” prong, “[t]he UCL ‘borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’” ... Because the FAC fails to allege an underlying violation to support its unlawful prong of the UCL claim, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL claim.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and its unlawful prong makes violations of other laws independently actionable.

Mueller v. Puritan's Pride, Inc. · filed 2022-01-04

The UCL defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The UCL’s unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4 163, 180 (Cal. 1999)). ... The Court need not decide that question because plaintiffs have ample grounds to maintain the UCL claim on the basis of violations of the CLRA.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, and the unlawful prong can borrow violations of other laws as independently actionable practices.

Cleveland v. Ludwig Institute for Cancer Research Ltd. · filed 2022-01-07

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Because the UCL is “written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” ... Under the “unlawful” prong, the UCL “‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as ‘unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Plaintiffs’ claim for unfair competition, therefore, also survives to the extent it is derivative of those claims. ... Plaintiffs may not rely on those claims as predicates for an unlawful prong UCL claim. ... For these reasons, the court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of Action, to the extent Plaintiffs’ claim is predicated on Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim under Labor Code § 1102.5(b) or retaliation claim under the FEHA. Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED in all other respects.

The UCL’s unlawful prong makes violations of other laws independently actionable, so a federal or state law violation can serve as the predicate for a § 17200 claim.

Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC · filed 2022-02-04

The UCL prohibits business acts or practices that are “unlawful.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. As the California Supreme Court has explained, the unlawful prong of the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats [them] . . . as unlawful practices independently actionable under section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 377, 383 (1992) (internal quotation omitted). “Virtually any law can serve as the predicate for a section 17200 action.” Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 965, 969 (1997). ... The test of reliance is not inherently based on objective standard. The reasonable consumer test of reliance is a requirement under the UCL’s unlawful prong only when it is an element of the predicate violation.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong permits violations of other laws to serve as predicates for a UCL claim.

Elevation Point 2 Inc. v. Gukasyan · filed 2022-02-03

The Court has determined that the FAC states claims for multiple violations of federal and California state law that may serve as predicates for an unlawful-prong UCL claim. ... Defendants’ alleged conduct is plausibly actionable under the unlawful prong of the UCL. The Motion to Dismiss as to EHP’s claim is denied.

The unlawful prong of § 17200 requires a plausibly pleaded predicate violation of another law.

Ramirez v. HV Global Management Corporation · filed 2022-06-14

A UCL unlawful claim fails where no predicate violation of the California Labor Code is plausibly pled.

The UCL’s unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws, but waiting-time penalties are not recoverable as UCL restitution.

Mayen v. Cal Central Harvesting, Inc. · filed 2022-08-22

The UCL’s “unlawful” prong “borrows violations of other laws . . . and makes those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL,” and “virtually any law or regulation — federal or state, statutory or common law — can serve as a predicate . . . .” ... With respect to waiting time penalties, CCH is correct that waiting time penalties under Labor Code § 203 are not recoverable as restitution under the UCL. ... dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

Section 17200's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and requires an underlying violation to support a UCL claim.

Williams v. What If Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-12-22

UCL provides an independent cause of action but requires an underlying violation because “[S]ection 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices.” See Davis v. HSBC Bank, 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 539–40 (Cal. 1999)). Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails because her underlying CIPA violation fails.

The UCL's unlawful prong treats violations of other statutes or common law as independently actionable unlawful business practices, so a wholly derivative UCL claim fails when its underlying claims fail.

Wilcox v. Harbor UCLA Medical Center Guild, Inc. · filed 2023-08-14

The UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each of these three adjectives captures a separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... A UCL claim under the unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats” them as unlawful business practices “independently actionable under section 17200.” ... Thus, to state a UCL claim, Plaintiff must plead a violation of another statute or common law. ... Because Wilcox’s UCL claim is wholly derivative of her other claims, all of which the Court has dismissed, the UCL claim is also dismissed.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and its unlawful prong permits a claim based on a violation of another statute or common law.

Chegg, Inc. v. Doe · filed 2023-11-07

California’s unfair competition law (the “UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). “The UCL ‘borrow[s] violations of other laws and treats’ them as unlawful business practices ‘independently actionable under section 17200.’” Oas v. Rama Cap. Partners, LLC, No. 820-CV01634-(MCS/ADS), 2020 WL 7786546, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2020) (quotation omitted). Therefore, a plaintiff can succeed on a UCL claim by establishing that the defendant violated another statute or common law. See Krantz v. BT Visual Images, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001) (UCL claims “stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of action”); see also Berryman, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1554 (“[A] violation of another law is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL's unlawful prong.”)

The UCL makes unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices independently actionable, and its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws as UCL violations.

Heck v. Amazon.com Inc · filed 2024-01-23

The “unlawful” prong of the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... The SAC pleads sufficient facts to state claims under Sections 17602(a)(1) and 17602(a)(2) of the ARL. ... But as to ARL Section 17602(a)(3), the SAC fails to state a claim because it presents only “threadbare recitals of the elements of [the] cause of action” to demonstrate that Plaintiff did not receive “an acknowledgement” from either Amazon or Audible that included the terms of the offer and the cancellation policy. ... Thus, as to ARL Section 17602(a)(3), the Court dismisses the UCL claim without prejudice.

Section 17200’s unlawful-prong claim fails when it relies on predicate legal violations that themselves fail as a matter of law.

Rubalcaba v. R&L Carriers Shared Services, L.L.C. · filed 2024-04-23

Plaintiff’s Tenth cause of action is for violations of the unlawful prong of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. But because the Court concludes that each of Plaintiff’s other claims for relief fail as a matter of law, his UCL claim – which relies on predicate legal violations – must fail as well. See Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Where “other claims fail, [the] UCL claims premised on ‘unlawful’ acts ha[ve] no basis and must also fail.” (citations omitted)). The Court accordingly GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

Under the UCL’s unlawful prong, a breach of express warranty alone is not an unlawful predicate, while an alleged implied-warranty violation may serve as a predicate for a UCL claim.

Condrashoff v. General Motors LLC · filed 2024-05-23

To the extent plaintiffs intend for their UCL claim to borrow from their claim of breach of express warranties in violation of the Song-Beverly Act, that too fails. ... However, to the extent plaintiffs intend for their UCL “unlawful prong” claim to be predicated on their claim of breach of implied warranties in violation of the Song-Beverly Act, that alleged violation could serve as a predicate for their UCL claim.

The UCL’s unlawful prong depends on liability for the underlying violation, so the claim rises or falls with that violation.

Pacific Steel Group v. Commercial Metals Company · filed 2024-06-28

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “[C]laims raised under the UCL’s unlawful prong rise or fall with the Court’s determination of liability with respect to the underlying violation.” GreenCycle Paint, Inc. v. PaintCare, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 438, 451 (N.D. Cal. 2017). ... Since the Court found that Pacific Steel’s Sherman Act claims survive summary judgment, it reaches the same conclusion as to the Cartwright Act and UCL claims.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices; its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable, while an unfair-prong claim requires particularized supporting facts.

Shahbaz v. Arista Networks, Inc. · filed 2024-10-01

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... However, the “unfair” prong cannot be invoked through a bare allegation; a plaintiff must state “with reasonable particularity” the facts supporting the claim. ... As to the “unlawful” prong, “[t]he UCL borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Without standing to bring a Yelp Law claim, a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a derivative claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL.

The UCL’s unlawful prong requires a predicate violation of another law; without a viable predicate, the UCL claim fails.

McBride v. PHH Mortgage Corp. · filed 2024-09-20

McBride must show a violation of another law as a predicate for the claim.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and misleading advertising; its unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and creates no independent cause of action.

Williams v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2025-05-14

To state a UCL claim, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 22, 2003) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). ... To state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, the alleged conduct must violate a “borrowed” law. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). No independent right to sue exists under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. Mejia v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 793 F. App’x 519, 521 (9th Cir. 2019). ... Here, Plaintiff points to the discrimination and harassment provisions under FEHA as the predicate for her claim under the unlawful prong. ... Because Plaintiff’s FEHA claims fail due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, any UCL claim predicated upon them also fail.

A properly pleaded violation of § 17043 can serve as the unlawful predicate for a UCL claim, so the court need not decide whether the conduct was also unfair at the pleading stage.

Sanas.AI Inc. v. Krisp Technologies · filed 2025-12-01

The properly alleged violation of § 17043 provides a predicate violation that would satisfy the unlawful prong of the UCL.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong claim fails when the claims supplying its predicate violations are dismissed.

Sidhu v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2022-11-22

Because the Court dismisses the predicate claims for Sidhu’s unlawful UCL claim, it also dismisses this claim.

Section 17200 does not support a claim that a manufacturer failed to notify retailers of a product’s sales tax status without facts establishing a duty to give that notice.

Littlejohn v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2018-07-13

The second amended complaint alleges one cause of action for breach of the alleged agreement and another cause of action alleging that Abbott's conduct violated Business and Professions Code, sections 17200 and 17500"by failing to adequately notify retailers, including Costco, that the sales tax status of Ensure had changed, was likely to change, and/or that the label or ingredients had changed." ... Moreover, no facts are alleged that would give rise to a duty on Abbott's part to advise retailers of the sales taxability of its products in the various jurisdictions in which *619the products are sold, or that would create a duty to customers paying sales tax reimbursement on their purchases of the product.

Section 17200 can cover a manufacturer's failure to disclose known, material product information even when the defect does not pose a safety concern.

Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 2015-07-22

Both Daugherty and Bardin do address disclosure of defects related to safety concerns in the context of CLRA and UCL claims. However, neither Daugherty nor Bardin preclude a duty to disclose material information known to a manufacturer and concealed form a consumer.

Section 17200’s fraudulent prong does not cover a failure to disclose lower-premium coverage options when there is no duty to disclose them.

Levine v. Blue Shield of California · filed 2010-11-05

Therefore, the Levines have not adequately stated a claim that Blue Shield committed a fraudulent business practice under the UCL.

Section 17200 reaches omission-based deceptive business-practice claims, but the plaintiff must show actual reliance for statutory standing; a manufacturer may owe a downstream vehicle owner a duty to disclose an unreasonable safety risk without a direct transaction.

Hamm v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

The UCL prohibits business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... This court concludes that under California law, a manufacturer has a duty to disclose a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk even if that manufacturer did not have a transactional relationship with the vehicle owner. ... More importantly, “[t]he California Supreme Court has held that, where the unfair competition or false advertising underlying a plaintiff's claim consists of a defendant’s misrepresentation or omission, the UCL. . . require[s] a plaintiff to establish actual reliance on the alleged misrepresentation or omission to establish statutory standing.”

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, but a UCL claim based solely on the same conduct as trade-secret misappropriation is preempted by CUTSA.

Wixen Music UK Ltd. v. Transparence Entertainment Group, Inc. · filed 2021-12-22

The unfair competition claim is based on the same acts of stealing Wixen’s client lists and poaching its clients. ... Thus, the unfair competition claim is preempted. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to dismiss this Claim with leave to amend the identified deficiency.

A UCL omission claim is foreclosed absent a duty to disclose, but the central-function rule did not bar this claim because the alleged defect related to the vehicle’s central function.

Bettles v. Toyota Motor Corporation · filed 2022-05-23

Absent a duty to disclose, Plaintiff’s CLRA [and] UCL . . . claims are foreclosed. ... Although Bettles has not alleged that the Vehicle is “incapable of use by any consumer,” he has adequately alleged that the defects in the HVAC system relate to a central function of the Vehicle. ... Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Bettles’s fourth and fifth claims on this basis.

Section 17200 permits a fraudulent-omission claim only when the defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted fact.

SHAAYA v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA LLC · filed 2022-06-29

Similarly, to succeed under the UCL on a theory of fraudulent omission, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted fact. ... Under California law, a manufacturer’s duty to disclose is analyzed the same under the CLRA and the UCL as it is for a common law fraudulent concealment claim. ... Thus, for the reasons stated supra section III(e), the Court finds that Freiburghouse has sufficiently alleged a duty to disclose the DPF Defect under the CLRA and the UCL. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts VII and VIII is denied.

Section 17200 claims based on fraudulent omission must plead with particularity the omitted fact, including the defendant's knowledge of the alleged defect, to satisfy Rule 9(b).

Sulligan v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-08-11

There can be no liability for a fraudulent omission claim under the majority of the state’s fraud or consumer protection laws, and certainly under the Rule 9(b) pleading standard, if Plaintiffs are unable to plead the ”what” of the alleged omission, namely, Ford’s knowledge of the Shutdown Risk defect. See e.g, Wozniak, 2019 WL 108845, at *3. As such, Counts 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 are dismissed.

At the pleading stage, a UCL claim based on allegedly misleading product advertising or omissions may proceed when the allegations plausibly show likely consumer deception and the defendant’s prior knowledge of the relevant risk.

In Re Laundress Marketing and Product Liability Litigation · filed 2024-03-05

Thus, the Class Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Defendant’s labeling and advertisement of its products as “non-toxic” was “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer” for purposes of their claims under the GBL, UCL, and FAL, and that Defendant made an “affirmation of fact or promise” — namely, that its products were not contaminated by harmful bacteria — for purposes of their claim for breach of express warranty. ... These allegations are sufficient for the claims brought under the GBL and UCL — especially where, as here, the relevant facts are exclusively in Defendant’s possession.

The UCL's fraud prong prohibits material misrepresentations and omissions likely to mislead a reasonable consumer, and a private plaintiff must identify what is false or misleading, plead reliance, and allege injury caused by that reliance.

Diep v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27

The CLRA, the MCPA, and the fraud “prong” of the UCL all prohibit material misrepresentations and omissions that have the effect of misleading a reasonable consumer. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-301. To state a claim under these statutes, a private plaintiff must clearly identify “what is false or misleading” about the defendant’s statement. Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2019); Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 250 A.3d 197, 215–19 (Md. 2021). A plaintiff must also plead reliance upon the defendant’s statement and allege an actual injury or loss caused by that reliance.

A UCL fraudulent-omission claim requires a duty to disclose when the defect presents a safety issue, is central to the product’s function, or satisfies a LiMandri factor.

In Re: Lindt & Sprüngli Dark Chocolate Litigation · filed 2024-09-06

The plaintiffs easily satisfy the standard, as they have plausibly alleged a safety issue, a defect that goes to the central function of the products, and at least one of the LiMandri factors.

A UCL claim based on the same allegations as a Cartwright Act claim is dismissed when the related Cartwright Act claim is dismissed.

Palladino v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2024-12-30

The Court finds no clear error with Judge Marutollo’s conclusion that Plaintiffs’ UCL claims should be dismissed with their Cartwright Act claims, and therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ UCL claims.

Section 17200 does not provide relief to a corporate plaintiff whose UCL claim is based on contracts involving neither the public generally nor individual consumers who are parties to the contracts.

Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. · filed 2007-06-18

In these circumstances, where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contracts, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.

Section 17200’s fraudulent prong does not support a claim based on a failure to disclose when there is no duty to disclose.

Berryman v. Merit Property Management, Inc. · filed 2007-05-31

Absent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL.

Section 17200 treats a supplement label’s failure to disclose a material increased risk of disease, including addiction, as misleading advertising.

J.J · filed 2025-10-16

Likewise, a label that omitted such a fact would be misleading under California and New York law. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (prohibiting “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising”); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (prohibiting “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business”). Indeed, Defendant’s failure to include an addiction disclosure in its labeling has “a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public,” because a reasonable consumer would not expect to suffer an increased risk of disease from taking the product.

Section 17200 does not require a violation of another statute to support an unfair competition claim.

Rufini v. CitiMortgage CA1/3 · filed 2014-05-28

CitiMortgage contends the court properly sustained the demurrer to this cause of action because Rufini failed to allege a “predicate act involving a violation of some other statute,” which it asserts is a prerequisite to liability under section 17200. Not so. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, which CitiMortgage cites for its view of the law, explains that, with limitations not relevant here, section 17200 imposes no such requirement.

Section 17200 does not support a claim based on backdated membership renewals for members who received benefits during the delinquency period or were told about the renewal practices.

Thompson v. Automobile Club of Southern California CA4/3 · filed 2013-06-07

If class members received benefits during the delinquency period or they were told about the Auto Club‟s renewal practices, they cannot maintain a cause of action under the UCL.

Section 17200 does not cover a homeowners association’s conduct of an election under its governing documents.

That v. Alders Maintenance Ass'n · filed 2012-06-15

In the published portion, we agree with defendant that in the present context, a homeowners association is not a “business” within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 does not prohibit a voluntary bar association’s unilateral refusal to sell its membership list, even if the refusal protects members from price competition.

Drum v. San Fernando Valley Bar Assn. · filed 2010-02-24

A voluntary bar association's unilateral refusal to sell its membership list to any particular buyer, even if the association's reason was to protect some of its members from price competition, is not an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice" under the UCL (§ 17200).

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, and an alleged UCL violation premised on FCRA violations can support an economic-injury allegation for standing.

Azeveda v. Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC · filed 2019-10-11

The UCL prohibits “unfair competition;” meaning “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the UCL because they violated “[f]ederal and California laws requir[ing] certain disclosures and proper authorization before conducting background checks and obtaining information from credit and background reports in connection with a hiring process.” Compl. ¶ 177. Plaintiff alleges this unlawful conduct amounted to “unfair competition.” See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 181–82. Plaintiff expressly alleges he “lost money or property as a result of the aforementioned unfair competition,” which includes both FCRA claims. Id. ¶ 181. Accordingly, while Plaintiff alleges only “bare procedural harm” in his FCRA causes of action, he has re-alleged that he suffered an economic injury from the violations within the UCL section of the Complaint.

Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, or misleading business practices and makes violations of other laws independently actionable by borrowing them.

Petconnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas · filed 2020-06-01

Here, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to state a UCL claim. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Its coverage is “sweeping, embracing anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 539 (Cal. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). By prohibiting unlawful practices, the UCL “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1012 (Cal. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ... Thus, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants violate the UCL by selling dogs bred for profit, misrepresenting those dogs as “rescues,” and facilitating the misrepresentation by using the names of the organizational Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ allegations offer enough specificity to state a claim and place Defendants on notice.

A UCL claim is substantially congruent to a Lanham Act trademark-infringement claim, so adequately stating trademark infringement also states a claim under the UCL.

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Shenzhen Usource Technology Co. · filed 2021-12-21

Finally, a UCL claim is “substantially congruent” to a Lanham Act trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. ... Because Plaintiffs have stated a claim for trademark infringement, the Court finds they have also stated a claim under the UCL.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and specified misleading advertising; a UCL claim requires a prohibited practice and resulting actual injury.

Zhang v. Twitter Inc. · filed 2023-08-23

To state a claim under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege an “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice” or “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. To succeed on a UCL claim under any of these theories, a plaintiff must establish the defendant engaged in one of the practices the statute prohibits and, as a result of the conduct, he or she suffered actual injury.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.

BirdDog Technology Limited v. 2082 Technology, LLC · filed 2024-03-11

Under the UCL, “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... It appears that plaintiffs bring their UCL claim under the fraudulent and unlawful prongs of the UCL. The Court finds that plaintiffs have adequately pled their UCL claim in the FAC. Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ UCL claim.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.

Pines v. Tomson · filed 1984-09-27

We hold, therefore, that the CYP is a “business establishment” within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§51, 51.5) and that its activities fall within the meaning of a “business practice” as that term is used in the “unfair competition” statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and a “business transaction” as that term is used in the “conspiracy against trade” statute (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16721).

A UCL plaintiff seeking relief must show an injury caused by the alleged misconduct, including that the plaintiff would not have bought the product but for the misrepresentation.

Clark v. The Hershey Company · filed 2019-11-15

The California consumer protection laws under which plaintiffs raises claims under allow remedies only to consumers who suffer an injury as a result of the alleged misconduct. ... Causation is also a necessary element under California law. Specifically, plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she would not have bought the product but for the misrepresentation.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; a private UCL plaintiff must show economic injury and causation to establish statutory standing.

Coffee v. Google LLC · filed 2021-02-10

Claim 1 alleges violation of California’s UCL, which in relevant part prohibits an individual or entity from engaging in any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it is violated where a defendant’s act or practice violates any of the foregoing prongs.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). A private person has statutory standing under the UCL only if he or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; see also Hawkins v. Kroger Co., 906 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2018). “A plaintiff is required to show some form of economic injury as a result of his transactions with the defendant.” Hawkins, 906 F.3d at 768. ... Google’s second argument is meritorious, however, as the complaint does not allege facts showing economic injury or causation, both of which are required for statutory standing.

The UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and allows restitution and injunctive relief, but private enforcement requires economic injury caused by the challenged practice.

K. v. Google LLC · filed 2023-08-01

California’s UCL “prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition,” which it defines as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... “Restitution and injunctive relief” are the only remedies available under the UCL, but they may be “cumulative” of other remedies. ... “While the substantive reach of [the UCL] remains expansive,” to establish standing to enforce the UCL’s provisions, a plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim.” ... Standing to bring a UCL claim therefore is “substantially narrower than federal standing under article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which may be predicated on a broader range of injuries.”

Section 17200 requires a consumer plaintiff to show economic injury caused by false advertising; costs from later contract disputes, litigation, or bankruptcy proceedings are too remote.

NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. Perlman · filed 2024-09-25

Perlman’s allegations fail to state a claim under the UCL or FAL. Simply put, the injury alleged – the resources expended in contract and insurance disputes, litigation, and bankruptcy proceedings – is too remote from NetJets’ advertising. Perlman does not allege an injury caused by his reliance on the false advertising. See Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 322, 246 P.3d at 885 (for claims under the UCL and FAL, a consumer must show that he suffered an economic injury that was caused by the false advertising).

The UCL's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws, but a plaintiff must show that economic injury was caused by the unfair business practice.

Granados v. City National Bank · filed 2024-09-27

While Plaintiff’s alleged injuries may constitute economic injury, Plaintiff must still satisfy the UCL’s causation element, which requires that a Plaintiff “show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice.” ... The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim with leave for Plaintiff to amend in accordance with the Court’s Order.

A § 17200 plaintiff must show economic injury caused by an unfair business practice; unauthorized interception for commercial gain causing lost potential sublicensee patronage sufficiently alleges those elements at the pleading stage.

Innovative Sports Management, Inc. v. Polanias · filed 2025-04-04

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. To bring a claim under section 17200, California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), a plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to quantify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011) (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intercepted the satellite broadcast without authorization to gain a commercial advantage or financial gain to Plaintiff’s detriment. Compl. ¶¶ 40–41. As a proximate result, Plaintiff suffered financial injury from being deprived of the patronage of potential sublicensees. Id. ¶ 44. The Court finds these allegations taken as true to be sufficient to plead a violation of section 17200.

Section 17200 does not require proof of actual injury to consumers or competitors or intent to injure them.

People Ex Rel. Van De Kamp v. Cappuccio, Inc. · filed 1988-05-10

Clearly under the Barquis and E. W.A.P. cases, an actual injury to the consuming public or competitors was not required to be proven as an element of the oifenses for which defendants were charged. ... Defendants’ argument that intent is an element which needed to be proven to establish a violation under section 17200 must therefore fail.

Section 17200 requires a causative link between the defendant’s business practice and the alleged harm to establish an unfair practice.

In Re Firearm Cases · filed 2005-02-10

The UCL provisions are not so elastic as to stretch the imposition of liability to conduct that is not connected to the harm by causative evidence.

A section 17200 foreclosure claim lacks causation when the challenged documents were recorded after the borrower had already defaulted.

Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC · filed 2017-02-01

Because the Kalnokis’ complaint largely rests on the allegedly fraudulent documents recorded during the foreclosure process--admittedly after they had already defaulted ([default in December 2009 due to health issues], [Notice of Default initiating foreclosure recorded April 2010])--they cannot establish causation for purposes of a Business and Professions Code section 17200 violation.

An alleged deprivation of property sufficient to show injury under the Elder Abuse Act can also establish injury for a claim under Section 17200.

Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. · filed 2017-06-02

Finally, we address the trial court's dismissal of the Mahans' four remaining causes of action (negligence, breach of fiduciary duty under Ins. Code, § 785 et seq.,25 fraud, and unlawful business practices under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 ) based on its conclusion that the Respondents had not deprived the Mahans of a property interest, and thus the Respondents had not "injured" the Mahans. For the reasons explained above in concluding the FAC adequately alleges "depriv[ation]" of "the property of an elder" for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, we conclude the court erroneously sustained the Respondents' demurrers as to these other causes of action. The analysis of injury is, in substance, the same.

A section 17200 claim sufficiently alleges injury when defendants’ conduct causes plaintiffs to transfer their own money into a trust, even if the trust pays the defendants.

Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. · filed 2017-08-23

Finally, we address the trial court's dismissal of the Mahans' four remaining causes of action (negligence, breach of fiduciary duty under Ins. Code, § 785 et seq.,27 fraud, and unlawful business practices under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 ) based on its conclusion that the Respondents had not deprived the Mahans of a property interest, and thus the Respondents had not "injured" the Mahans. For the reasons explained above in concluding the FAC adequately alleges "depriv[ation]" of "the property of an elder" for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, we conclude the court erroneously sustained the Respondents' demurrers as to these other causes of action. The analysis of injury is, in substance, the same.

A potential joint employer's liability under the unfair competition law must be assessed using the definition of employer applicable to that claim.

Turman v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty. · filed 2017-11-07

In addition, the trial court failed to address whether Parent might be a joint employer under the definitions of the term "employer" applicable to plaintiffs' claims under the unfair competition law, the tip misappropriation statute, and PAGA.

Section 17200 liability requires the defendant to participate in or control the unlawful practice.

People Ex Rel. Harris v. Sarpas · filed 2014-04-25

Liability under the UCL and FAL must be based on the defendant’s participation in or control over the unlawful practices found to violate section 17200 or 17500.

Section 17200 permits liability for misleading advertising and unfair business practices under ordinary agency principles.

People v. JTH Tax, Inc. · filed 2013-01-17

Since violations of the UCL “include any . . . unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the FAL]” (§ 17200), Ford Dealers establishes that persons can be found liable for misleading advertising and unfair business practices Under normal agency theory.

Section 17200 requires facts showing a defendant’s personal participation in and unbridled control over the unfair practice; a retailer cannot be held vicariously liable for the practice.

Taylor v. Costco Wholesale Corporation · filed 2020-10-08

The cases cited by both plaintiff and defendant all agree the Emery test applies, but differ in their assessments of what allegations are adequate to meet it. ... Bottom line, the complaint must contain some allegation of fact to show defendant’s “personal participation in the unlawful practices and unbridled control” over those practices. ... Because plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Costco personally participated in and exercised unbridled control over an unfair practice, the court GRANTS the motion.

Section 17200's UCL liability reaches statutory “persons”; a government entity that does not qualify as a “person” is not subject to the claim, while a nonprofit organization may be liable.

Lew v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2021-12-22

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 [ ] of the Business and Professions Code.” Bus. Prof. Code § 17200. ... California courts, however, have interpreted the statute’s narrow definition of “person” to mean that the legislature intentionally omitted government entities. ... Thus, the court finds that City does not qualify as a “person” under section 17201. The same cannot be said with respect to FCAM. FCAM is a separate entity that is subject to suit for its own misconduct regardless of whether it is characterized as a “de facto partner” or “agent” of City. Because FCAM is a non-profit organization, it is subject to liability under the UCL statute. As such, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is dismissed as to Defendant City.

The UCL does not generally treat government entities as statutory “persons,” while nonprofit organizations are subject to UCL liability.

Lew v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2022-01-06

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 [ ] of the Business and Professions Code.” Bus. Prof. Code § 17200. ... California courts, however, have interpreted the statute’s narrow definition of “person” to mean that the legislature intentionally omitted government entities. ... Thus, the court finds that City does not qualify as a “person” under section 17201. ... Because FCAM is a non-profit organization, it is subject to liability under the UCL statute.

Section 17200 permits UCL liability on an aiding-and-abetting theory only when the alleged aider knew the primary actor's conduct constituted a breach.

McCraner v. Wells Fargo & Company · filed 2022-03-30

UCL liability under such a theory requires allegations that Wells Fargo “kn[ew] [the Enterprises’] conduct constitute[d] a breach.” People v. Sarpas, 225 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1563 (2014). And as discussed above, the Complaint fails to allege that Wells Fargo knew the Enterprises were engaged in any misconduct toward Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs haven’t alleged that knowledge, their UCL claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 17200's Unfair Competition Law does not subject public entities or municipal corporations to UCL claims because they are not included as a "person" under the UCL.

Kajberouni v. Bear Valley Community Services District · filed 2022-04-21

Because Kajberouni seeks to hold the District liable for “unlawful business practices under violating Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et. seq.,” he clearly seeks to state a claim under the UCL, rather than the Unfair Practices Act. ... As the District argues, courts repeatedly determined public entities and municipal corporations are not “a person” under the UCL, and are not subject to UCL claims. ... Consequently, Kajberouni is unable to state a claim against the District under the UCL, and his seventh claim is dismissed.

Section 17200 does not impose vicarious liability; a defendant must personally participate in the unlawful practice or control it.

Lombard Flats v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. · filed 2023-10-05

The concept of vicarious liability has no application to actions brought under the [UCL].

Section 17200 requires allegations of personal participation or conduct to hold corporate officers and directors individually liable for unfair competition.

Reynolds v. Bement · filed 2003-07-23

Reynolds, however, has not convinced us that the officers and directors can be held liable as employers or that he has alleged personal participation or conduct that would make them liable under Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 claims seeking equitable relief in federal court require an allegation that the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law; monetary damages are adequate for an alleged product-defect overpayment injury.

In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation · filed 2020-10-13

This Court agrees with our fellow courts that under Sonner, Plaintiffs are required to allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law in order to seek injunctive relief. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law, as required to state a claim for equitable relief. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety and the remaining claims are dismissed to the extent they seek an injunction, restitution, or other equitable relief.

A plaintiff seeking equitable relief under the UCL must plead that legal remedies are inadequate.

In re California Gasoline Spot Market Antitrust Litigation · filed 2021-03-29

Plaintiffs do not plead that they have inadequate remedies at law and instead allege that “to the extent the Court ultimately deems inadequate the remedies at law that Plaintiffs request, Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to equitable relief such as restitution and injunctive relief pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17203.” (CCAC at ¶ 186.) But nowhere in the complaint do Plaintiffs allege that the three-fold damages they seek are inadequate or otherwise distinguish their request for restitution from their request for damages. (Id. at p. 46 ¶ E.) See Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 (finding that plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL and CLRA.”); ... Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is dismissed with leave to amend to the extent they have a good faith basis for alleging that they lack an adequate remedy of law.

Section 17200 permits a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief under the UCL for ongoing or future harm even when the plaintiff also seeks monetary damages for past conduct, if damages alone are inadequate.

Kryzhanovskiy v. Amazon.com Services, Inc. · filed 2022-06-29

At this early stage of the litigation, the court is unable to definitively conclude that plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law with respect to her UCL claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth cause of action will therefore be denied. ... Accordingly, plaintiff may seek equitable relief in the form of an injunction under the UCL, even if she also seeks monetary damages for past conduct. ... Based on the allegations of plaintiff’s FAC and the relevant caselaw, the court concludes that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support her claim that she and the putative class lack an adequate remedy at law because monetary damages alone would be insufficient to remedy the alleged ongoing harm. ... Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL claim for injunctive relief to the extent that claim is premised on alleged future harm.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, and restitution under the UCL in federal court requires traditional equitable principles, including an inadequate legal remedy.

Novalk, LLC v. Kinsale Insurance Company · filed 2022-12-09

The UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts that are deceptive, untrue, or misleading. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... The Ninth Circuit recently ruled that a federal court must apply traditional equitable principles before awarding restitution under California’s UCL. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 2020). “[W]e hold that the traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under the UCL…” Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 (emphasis added). ... Here, Plaintiff does not argue, in either its complaint or response to the motion, that Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law. This reason alone was identified in Sonner as sufficient for dismissal. Sonner, at 844. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief without prejudice.

Section 17200 permits a plaintiff to seek equitable relief only when the plaintiff lacks an adequate legal remedy, though equitable relief may be pleaded in the alternative.

Ramirez v. HV Global Management Corporation · filed 2023-01-19

For a district court to entertain a request for equitable relief, the plaintiff must have no adequate legal remedy. ... A plaintiff cannot state a claim for equitable relief “if the pleading does not demonstrate the inadequacy of a legal remedy.” ... A plaintiff may plead a claim for equitable relief in the alternative. ... The eighth cause of action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

A plaintiff seeking equitable relief under the UCL must adequately allege that remedies at law are inadequate; pleading equitable remedies in the alternative is insufficient.

Smith v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2023-02-17

Applying Sonner and Guzman, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that their remedies at law are inadequate. The Court reads Guzman’s discussion of “equitable jurisdiction” as precluding pleading equitable remedies in the alternative, as Plaintiffs do here. ... The Court thus DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they seek equitable relief, including Plaintiffs’ UCL claim in its entirety, without prejudice to pursuit in state court, as Guzman instructs.

A plaintiff cannot obtain equitable restitution under the UCL when it has an adequate remedy at law for the same harm.

Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC · filed 2022-11-15

“Under these principles, [a plaintiff] must establish that [it] lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL….”

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a plaintiff seeking equitable relief under the UCL must explicitly plead that legal remedies are inadequate.

MARSHALL v. PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC · filed 2023-03-30

A defendant violates the UCL by committing an act or practice that is “(1) unlawful, (2) unfair, (3) fraudulent, or (4) in violation of section 17500.” ... While, as the court noted, such alternative pleading is generally permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), “here the general rule is trumped in the narrow context of a California UCL claim in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sonner which explicitly held that for a UCL claim to go forward a plaintiff must explicitly plead the lack of an adequate remedy at law.” ... Therefore, in accordance with the rulings in Sonner and Hickman, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claim against Prestamos.

Section 17200 does not permit a purely derivative UCL claim for equitable relief when damages and penalties are available for the same underlying Labor Code violations and the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy.

Ramirez v. HV Global Management Corporation · filed 2023-07-06

For a district court to entertain a request for equitable relief, the plaintiff must have no adequate legal remedy. ... “Since Sonner, courts have consistently dismissed purely derivative UCL claims in wage-and-hour actions in which damages and penalties are available for the same underlying Labor Code claims.” ... The Court agrees with those other courts, and therefore Plaintiff cannot bring the UCL claim.

Section 17200 bars equitable restitution when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, so a UCL claim seeking only monetary relief may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Morgan v. Rohr, Inc. · filed 2023-07-07

Under California law, courts lack jurisdiction over a claim for equitable relief if there is an adequate remedy at law. ... Plaintiffs must establish that they lack an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL. ... To the contrary, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law vis-à-vis the damages they pursue under the California Labor Code. ... Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim under the UCL, and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

A UCL plaintiff alleging deceptive conduct must plead actual reliance and, when seeking equitable restitution for past harm, lack an adequate remedy at law.

Scheibe v. Livwell Products LLC. · filed 2023-07-07

Several courts including the Supreme Court of California have held that claims under California consumer protection laws require a showing of reliance in order to be sufficiently alleged. ... The Court therefore finds that when the Complaint is read as a whole, Plaintiff adequately pleads his reliance on the words “nothing artificial” in making his decision to purchase the Products. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion on this basis. ... A plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL and CLRA.”

A California Unfair Competition Law claim seeking equitable restitution requires the plaintiff to plead that they lack an adequate remedy at law.

IN RE: VANGUARD CHESTER FUNDS LITIGATION · filed 2023-11-20

We agree with Independent Trustees and Vanguard Defendants that Investors have failed to plead they do not have an adequate legal remedy. See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 845 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding plaintiffs claiming a UCL violation “must establish that [they] lack[] an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm”); see also Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC, 2023 WL 2727541, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2023) (acknowledging that courts have followed Sonner at the motion to dismiss stage, and dismissing plaintiffs’ UCL claims that were pled in the alternative to a breach-of-contract claim); see Hickman v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2022 WL 11021043, at *11 n.13 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2022) (dismissing, post-Sonner, a UCL claim pled in the alternative failed because “[p]laintiffs do not plead anywhere in the [a]mended [c]omplaint that they do not have an adequate remedy at law”). Therefore, we dismiss the California Investors’ UCL claims.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, and UCL restitution requires that the plaintiff lack an adequate remedy at law.

Belyea v. GreenSky, Inc. · filed 2023-12-15

California’s Unfair Competition Law defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Therefore, under the statute there are three varieties of unfair competition: practices which are unlawful, unfair or fraudulent.” ... “[T]he [Unfair Competition Law] provides only for equitable remedies.” ... Plaintiffs “must establish that [they] lack[] an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the [Unfair Competition Law].”

The UCL permits injunctive relief when monetary damages would not adequately protect against an unquantifiable future harm.

Bui-Ford v. Tesla, Inc. · filed 2024-02-20

A plaintiff may still seek injunctive relief under the UCL if monetary damages would not protect against an unquantifiable future harm. ... Just as past harms to the batteries are compensable with monetary damages, future harms to the battery through software updates should be equally quantifiable. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation of Tesla’s continuing practices in its plea for relief does not establish otherwise. ... The Court grants the motion to dismiss each Plaintiff’s UCL claim.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and permits restitution or injunctive relief, but a UCL plaintiff seeking restitution must plead that there is no adequate remedy at law.

McDowell v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. · filed 2024-03-29

Plaintiffs bring their first cause of action alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), which prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Under the UCL, a plaintiff may obtain restitution or injunctive relief for certain prohibited business practices. ... Accordingly, “the traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under the UCL.” ... UCL “plaintiffs are required, at a minimum, to plead that they lack an adequate remedy at law.” ... In other words, UCL plaintiffs must “allege some facts suggesting that damages are insufficient to make them whole.” ... Therefore, because Plaintiffs fail to plead the lack of an adequate legal remedy, the Court GRANTS Penske’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Section 17200 claims are subject to equitable jurisdiction only when the plaintiff alleges that all available legal remedies are inadequate.

Lyvette Grimes v. Ralphs Grocery Company · filed 2024-02-05

Because only equitable remedies are available for UCL claims, for the Court to have equitable jurisdiction over Grimes’s UCL claim, here, she must have alleged that all available legal remedies are inadequate. See Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). However, Grimes failed to allege that all available legal remedies are inadequate. Consequently, the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over her UCL claim. See Sonner.

Section 17200 broadly covers business practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent, but a plaintiff seeking UCL equitable relief must show no adequate legal remedy and standing for an injunction.

Tarkett v. USAA General Indemnity Company · filed 2024-06-10

To bring a claim for a violation of California’s UCL, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” ... An “unlawful” practice under the UCL is a business practice that “is forbidden by law.” ... An “unfair” practice is a business practice that “offends an established public policy or . . . is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... “A fraudulent business practice is one that is likely to deceive members of the public.” ... “The challenged conduct ‘is judged by the effect it would have on a reasonable consumer.’” ... “Unlike common law fraud, a [UCL] violation can be shown even without allegations of actual deception, reasonable reliance and damage.” ... “Absent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL.” ... Here, Plaintiff’s UCL claim seeks equitable relief in the form of restitution and injunctive relief. ... A plaintiff “must establish that []he lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL.” ... Plaintiff failed to do so here. ... Prospective injunctive relief under the UCL requires a plaintiff to show a “a real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury.” ... As such, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices as separate UCL theories, but a plaintiff seeking equitable relief under it in federal diversity jurisdiction must lack an adequate remedy at law.

Romani v. General Motors LLC · filed 2024-08-28

The UCL creates a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. ... Each “prong” of the UCL provides a “separate and distinct theory of liability.” ... For a plaintiff to obtain equitable remedies under the UCL in a diversity action in federal court, the plaintiff must establish that he lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Section 17200 requires a plaintiff seeking equitable restitution for past harm to establish that the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Haver v. General Mills, Inc. · filed 2024-10-11

In other words, a plaintiff “must establish that [they] lack[] an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL” (or FAL).

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and misleading advertising, and a plaintiff seeking UCL injunctive relief or restitution must show that he lacks an adequate remedy at law.

West v. PBC Management LLC · filed 2024-10-21

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. In order to secure injunctive relief or restitution under the UCL, a plaintiff must first establish that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2020).

The UCL provides only equitable remedies, so a plaintiff seeking UCL relief in federal court must plead that legal remedies are inadequate.

Hoard v. Capital One, N.A. · filed 2024-10-29

Because the UCL provides only for equitable remedies, plaintiffs bringing a UCL claim in a federal court must establish that they “lack[] an adequate remedy at law” before the court can award them the UCL’s equitable relief. ... Consequently, though the Court recognizes that not all district courts interpreting the UCL post-Guzman take this approach, courts within this district have regularly applied Sonner at the pleading stage and dismissed UCL claims on these grounds. ... Thus, because Plaintiff does not plead that she lacks a remedy at law, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES her UCL claim.

A UCL plaintiff seeking equitable relief must establish that the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Vo v. General Motors, LLC · filed 2024-11-14

Thus, in federal court, a plaintiff must establish that he lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing relief under the UCL. See Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844.

A UCL plaintiff seeking restitution or injunctive relief must show an inadequate remedy at law; an available damages remedy for the same conduct can defeat the UCL claim.

Cao v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2025-02-28

With respect to the requests for restitution and injunctive relief, the complaint makes no such allegation; that alone is fatal. ... The complaint also seeks damages under CITA for substantially the same conduct, Dkt. No. 31 ¶¶ 80-85; id. at ECF 23, which is an adequate remedy at law in lieu of restitution.

The UCL provides only equitable remedies, and a federal court lacks equitable jurisdiction over a UCL claim when the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy.

Bourgeois v. Pentec Health, Inc. · filed 2025-03-04

“[T]he UCL provides only for equitable remedies.” Hodge v. Superior Ct., 145 Cal. App. 4th 278, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). ... The Court accordingly finds that it lacks equitable jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s UCL claim and GRANTS the motion on this basis.

A plaintiff seeking equitable relief under § 17200 must allege that available legal remedies are insufficient.

Blurton v. Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc. · filed 2025-03-27

The UCL prohibits an entity from engaging in any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Courts have recognized, however, that plaintiffs who lack an adequate remedy at law must at least allege that the available legal remedies are insufficient in order to bring their claims for equitable relief under the UCL, CFAL, and CLRA. ... Accordingly, Blurton and the California Class have not pleaded an actionable claim under the UCL, CFAL, and CLRA, regarding their California state statutory claims seeking equitable relief which must be dismissed.

A plaintiff seeking equitable relief under § 17200 must show that legal remedies are inadequate, and a former employee lacks standing to seek an injunction against the employer.

Webb v. Rejoice Delivers LLC · filed 2025-04-01

A plaintiff suing under the UCL must establish the lack of adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm. ... Because Plaintiff’s UCL claim is predicated on the identical wage and hour violations alleged in Plaintiff’s first through eighth claims, Plaintiff has not and cannot allege that his legal remedies are inadequate. ... Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he lacks standing because he is no longer employed by Defendants. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Claim 9 is subject to dismissal.

Section 17200 permits equitable restitution in federal court only when the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Barrales v. Newell Brands Inc. · filed 2025-04-25

As a result, a plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL and CLRA.” Id. ... Guzman and Sonner make clear that district courts have equitable jurisdiction to grant equitable remedies such as restitution and disgorgement only where plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law.

A plaintiff seeking restitution or other equitable relief under the UCL in federal court must show that legal remedies are inadequate before the court may consider the equitable claim.

Prescott v. Saraya USA, Inc. · filed 2025-05-09

“[T]he traditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.” ... Thus, where monetary damages provide an adequate remedy, a federal court may not consider the merits of equitable claims for restitution, disgorgement, or injunctive relief. ... Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish they lack an adequate damages remedy before they can obtain equitable relief.

A private plaintiff seeking equitable relief under the UCL must plead that monetary damages are inadequate; alleged future harm to the public may satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

J.J v. Ashlynn Marketing Group, Inc. · filed 2025-07-01

To maintain a claim for equitable restitution under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law. ... “[P]ublic injunctive relief [is] a remedy available to private plaintiffs under the UCL[.]” ... Notwithstanding this, UCL plaintiffs seeking public injunctive relief must still plead that monetary remedies are inadequate under Sonner. ... These allegations are sufficient at this stage to adequately plead that Plaintiff C.B. lacks an adequate remedy at law to subdue the risk of future harm to the public. ... For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff C.B.’s UCL claim.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a plaintiff seeking equitable relief under it in federal court must plead that legal remedies are inadequate.

Lopez v. General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. · filed 2025-08-11

To obtain equitable relief pursuant to the UCL, a plaintiff must establish the inadequacy of a remedy at law as a prerequisite to such relief.

Section 17200 provides equitable relief only when the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law and therefore must plead the inadequacy of damages.

W.A. Call Mfg. Co., Inc. v. WiLine Networks Inc. · filed 2025-09-11

The UCL provides equitable relief only if no adequate legal remedy exists. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs must plead inadequacy). The plaintiffs do not plead the inadequacy of damages to address the harm, as discussed at the hearing. The claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL claim must adequately allege each defendant’s role in and personal participation in the unlawful practice.

Mikkelson · filed 2025-11-20

The FAC claims that defendants violated California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”) ... which defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . ..” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... For the reasons discussed above, the FAC fails to sufficiently plead the roles of each defendant and the relationships between the defendants. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the UCL claim therefore is granted to that extent.

Section 17200 permits out-of-state parties to invoke its remedies when they are harmed by wrongful conduct occurring in California.

Short v. Hyundai Motor America Inc · filed 2020-10-19

However, for the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, courts have recognized that “state statutory remedies may be invoked by out-of-state parties when they are harmed by wrongful conduct occurring in California.” ... Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants HMA and KMA are headquartered in California. ... Plaintiffs’ California-statute claims are all tied to statements or omissions in Defendants’ marketing of vehicles despite Defendants’ alleged knowledge of defects. ... The court finds that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, these facts are sufficient to plausibly allege that the actionable conduct occurred in California. Therefore, the non-California Plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims under the UCL, FAL, and CRLA, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims is DENIED.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and requires a nonresident plaintiff to allege that the unlawful conduct or resulting injury occurred in California to pursue a UCL claim.

VINCO VENTURES, INC. v. MILAM KNECHT & WARNER, LLP · filed 2021-09-27

In order to show that the non-resident Plaintiffs have standing to bring a UCL claim, they must allege that either the unlawful conduct or the resultant injury took place in California. ... Here, because Plaintiffs have alleged a viable trade libel claim against GWhitt, their UCL claim may proceed on the same theory. ... Taking the allegations as true, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded a violation of the UCL-based derivatively on their claim for trade libel against GWhitt. Accordingly, this claim may proceed and GWhitt’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Section 17200's unlawful prong requires a predicate violation of another law, and conclusory allegations do not state an unfair-prong claim under the applicable tests.

Wright v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. · filed 2020-11-20

The “unlawful prong” of the UCL “incorporates other laws to make them actionable.” Jordan v. Paul Fin., LLC, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2010). “Generally, a violation of almost any law may serve as a basis for a UCL claim.” Id. (quotation omitted). The court dismissed the negligence and unjust-enrichment claims, and thus, there are no predicate claims for an “unlawful” UCL claim. ... These conclusory allegations do not plead an “unfair” UCL claim under any of the three tests that courts apply. ... First, a public policy that is a predicate to an “unfair” UCL claim “must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.” Phipps v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV F 10–2025 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 302803, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (cleaned up). The plaintiffs do not allege that here. ... The court dismisses the UCL claim.

Section 17200 broadly defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and misleading advertising, and its three prongs are separate theories of liability that independently support relief.

County of Kern v. Tyler Technologies, Inc. · filed 2021-02-03

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, which Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code broadly defines as including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). Thus, to prevail on a claim under the UCL based on a business act or practice, a plaintiff must show that the act or practice in question is: (1) forbidden by law (“unlawful”), (2) more harmful than beneficial to the victim (“unfair”) or (3) likely to deceive members of the public (“fraudulent”). See Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability and therefore offers an independent basis for relief.

Section 17200 creates independent unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent theories of liability; deceptive conduct under its fraudulent prong is evaluated under the likely-to-deceive reasonable-consumer standard.

EIDMANN v. WALGREEN CO. · filed 2021-02-26

The UCL provides a cause of action for “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each of these “prongs” under the UCL creates an independent theory of liability. ... Conduct that is considered deceptive or misleading runs afoul of the FAL, CLRA, and fraudulent prong of the UCL when it is “likely to deceive” a “reasonable consumer.” ... Based on the foregoing, it is not plausible that a “significant portion of the general consuming public” would be misled to believe that Infants’ Product is specially formulated for infants. ... Therefore, Eidmann has failed to state a claim that Infants’ Product is misleading or deceptive under the FAL, CLRA, and fraudulent prong of the UCL.

Section 17200 allows a competitor to establish UCL standing by alleging economic injury caused by the challenged practice, without necessarily pleading its own reliance, and permits predicate Lanham Act or false-advertising violations to support the unlawful and unfair prongs, with false-advertising violations generally also supporting the fraudulent prong.

Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc. v. MiTek Inc. · filed 2021-04-05

“[U]nder the UCL, standing extends to ‘a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition’ ([Cal. Civ. Code] § 17204), while under the false advertising law, in materially identical language, standing extends to ‘any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of this chapter’ ([Cal. Civ. Code] § 17535).” ... Section 17200’s unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... The “unfair” prong of the UCL “prohibit[s] not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which[,] although is true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” ... Alleged violations of the Lanham Act and the FAL can serve as a predicate basis for a claim of unlawful and unfair practices under the UCL. ... Moreover, a violation of the FAL generally is also a violation of the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL. ... Because Simpson has stated claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act and the FAL, it has also stated a UCL claim under all three prongs.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and permits a UCL claim under any one of those disjunctive theories, including deceptive conduct likely to mislead reasonable consumers.

Sihler v. The Fulfillment Lab, Inc · filed 2021-04-07

California’s Unfair Competition Law generally prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “[A] plaintiff may proceed under the UCL on three possible theories. First, ‘unlawful’ conduct that violates another law is independently actionable under Section 17200. Alternatively, a plaintiff may plead the defendants’ conduct is ‘unfair’ within the meaning of the several standards developed by the courts. Finally, a plaintiff may challenge ‘fraudulent’ conduct by showing that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived’ by the challenged business acts or practices.” Stewart v. Screen Gems-EMI Music, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 938, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal citations omitted). “Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it is violated where a defendant’s act or practice violates any of the foregoing prongs.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012).

The UCL unlawful prong requires a violation of another law, and its unfairness prong requires conduct that meets the applicable injury, ethical, or public-policy standard.

Knowles v. Arris International Plc · filed 2021-05-14

the unlawful prong required violation of another law, and appropriately granted summary judgment because Plaintiffs’ other claims failed.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and permits claims under its distinct unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair prongs, which the court applied to the alleged privacy conduct.

Silver v. Stripe, Inc. · filed 2021-07-28

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... The “fraudulent” prong of the UCL “requires a showing [that] members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ... There are two standards for determining what is “unfair competition” under the UCL. ... Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion as to plaintiffs’ cause of action under the unfair prong of the UCL.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition as any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice, and violating any one of those prongs is sufficient.

Edleson v. Travel Insured International, Inc. · filed 2021-09-23

“The UCL broadly prohibits ‘unfair competition,’ defined as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice.’” Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 855 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). “Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it is violated if a defendant violates any of the unlawful, unfair or fraudulent prongs.” Id. (citing Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012)).

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; its unlawful prong requires an underlying violation of law, and its unfair prong reaches conduct that threatens an incipient antitrust violation, violates antitrust policy or spirit, or significantly threatens or harms competition.

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Dexon Computer, Inc. · filed 2021-12-09

The UCL broadly prohibits “unfair competition,” defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 855 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017). The “unlawful” prong requires an underlying violation of law. See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). Dexon has not plausibly alleged a violation of the antitrust laws, so it does not allege a UCL violation on that basis. See Jones v. Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Nor has Dexon pleaded a violation of the “unfair” prong. Dexon fails to sufficiently allege that any of Cisco’s conduct “threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999); see Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Link US, LLC, 2019 WL 6682838 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2019) (applying this test in the context of a reseller).

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, and under the applied balancing test conduct is unfair when its consumer harm outweighs its benefits; the court found the allegations sufficient to proceed for conduct after September 1, 2017.

Gilman v. Intel Corporation · filed 2022-01-26

California’s UCL is written in the disjunctive and “establishes three varieties of unfair competition–acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.” ... As discussed in the Court’s Opinion and Order resolving Intel’s first Motion to Dismiss, the Court applies the balancing test. ... This test asks whether the alleged practice “violates established public policy or if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” ... For the seven Plaintiffs who purchased computers after September 1, 2017, they have alleged enough facts at this stage of the proceedings to survive Intel’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a claim.

Section 17200 treats a business practice as unlawful when it violates another law, and a UCL unfairness claim here required allegations that the defendant’s prices were below its own costs.

Schrenk v. Carvana, LLC · filed 2022-02-28

An “unlawful” business practice under the UCL is a practice that violates any other law. ... To state a claim under the UCL, Plaintiff must allege facts that establish Defendants are “dealers” and are therefore subject to the allegedly violated California statutes.

The UCL’s unfair prong cannot survive when the alleged unfair practices entirely overlap with practices covered by the fraudulent and unlawful prongs and those other claims fail.

Gilman v. Intel Corporation · filed 2022-07-07

This alleged conduct, however, either is an omission, misrepresentation, or half-truth. It thus wholly overlaps with Plaintiffs’ UCL claim based on fraud, which the Court dismissed with prejudice. See Intel II, 2021 WL 1198299, at *10 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2021). “[C]ourts in this district have held that where the unfair business practices alleged under the unfair prong of the UCL overlap entirely with the business practices addressed in the fraudulent and unlawful prongs of the UCL, the unfair prong of the UCL cannot survive if the claims under the other two prongs of the UCL do not survive.” Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (2017) (citing cases). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim based on unfair practices is dismissed.

Section 17200 creates separate unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent theories of liability; a common-law breach of duty or fraud may serve as the predicate for the corresponding UCL prong.

CardStarter, Ltd. v. SundaeSwap, Inc. · filed 2022-10-05

The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... “Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, . . . [e]ach prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability[.]” ... Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for breach of contract; this averred violation of a common law duty is alone sufficient to serve as the “predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong.” ... Plaintiff has already stated a claim for common law fraud, the elements of which are more stringent than those under the UCL; it has, therefore, ipso facto stated a claim under the UCL’s fraudulent prong and the FAL.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, but the UCL cannot be used to condemn conduct the Legislature permits; here the court held the alleged loot-box conduct was not unfair because it was not unlawful gambling.

Mai v. Oy · filed 2023-01-03

Here, too, there is “complete overlap” between the conduct underlying Plaintiffs’ allegations of Supercell’s unlawful and unfair actions, and therefore Plaintiffs’ UCL claim for unfairness necessarily fails. Loot boxes do not constitute unlawful gambling under California law, and “courts may not use the unfair competition law to condemn actions the Legislature permits.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Supercell’s conduct is unfair in violation of the UCL.

The UCL's unlawful prong permits a claim based on an alleged violation of another law, while its unfair prong provides an independent and broad basis for relief.

Abeyta v. DMCG, Inc. · filed 2023-04-20

Abeyta has stated a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL by alleging violations of California Civil Code Sections 1799.91 and 1799.95. ... Abeyta has also stated a claim under the unfair prong of the UCL. The “unfair” prong of the UCL “offers an independent basis for relief” that “is intentionally broad, thus allowing courts maximum discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud.” ... DMCG’s safe harbor arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons stated in BBBB. ... The Court agrees with the analysis in BBBB and for the same reasons finds that DMCG has not shown that any safe harbor applies here.

Section 17200 defines unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices as separate UCL theories, requires economic injury caused by the practice for standing, and imposes additional requirements for the unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair prongs.

Marasigan v. MidFirst Bank · filed 2023-05-15

Under the UCL, “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The statute as written is disjunctive, and “[e]ach prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). ... There is a two-part test for standing under the UCL: a party must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011). ... “For claims based on the ‘fraudulent’ prong of the UCL, courts have held that the plaintiff must allege that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the purported misrepresentations.” ... “A defendant cannot be liable under § 17200 for committing unlawful business practices without having violated another law.” Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). ... “The UCL does not define the term ‘unfair.’ In fact, the proper definition of ‘unfair’ conduct against consumers ‘is currently in flux’ among California courts.” ... The California Supreme Court, in Cel-Tech, held that the balancing test was “too amorphous” and instead defined ‘unfair’ conduct as that which “threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” ... Courts in California are split on whether to apply the definition of unfair conduct from Cel-Tech in actions brought by consumers, or whether to apply the balancing test from South Bay. ... Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either test for the unfair prong.

The UCL’s unlawful prong requires a predicate legal violation and resulting economic injury, while its unfair prong includes conduct that threatens an incipient antitrust violation.

Colon v. NCAA · filed 2023-07-27

“To state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a predicate violation, and (2) an accompanying economic injury caused by the violation.” ... “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... “To show a business practice is unfair, the plaintiff must show the conduct ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as the violation or the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’” ... “Thus, Plaintiff Hacker has also adequately pled his UCL claim under the unfair prong as to the same alleged antitrust violations.”