Cal. Civ. Code § 1714

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by willful acts or lack of ordinary care, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent contribution.

Tucker v. United Railroads · filed 1916-01-17

This quotation merely restates the principle embodied in section 1714 of the Civil Code which is, in part, as follows: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own lack of ordinary care.

Robinson v. Clemons · filed 1920-03-22

The Civil ■ Code, section 1714, in defining negligence and contributory negligence, uses this language: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for all injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” ... The court was justified by the evidence in making a finding that there was no want óf ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff in approaching the crossing at twelve to fifteen miles per hour.

Section 1714 permits a defendant to assert contributory negligence as a defense, subject to other applicable law.

Milosevich v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. · filed 1924-09-17

Section 1714 of the Civil Code provides for the defense of contributory negligence. ... Therefore, by virtue of said section 1714 of the Civil Code, this defense, in so far as it affects the rights of the employer, the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation, is available to the defendant in this action unless there is some provision contained in the Workmen’s Compensation and Insurance Act of 1917, as amended in 1919, which either directly or indirectly deprived the defendant of the right to interpose the same. ... We are, therefore, of the opinion that by the terms of the act of 1917, as amended in 1919, the defendant was precluded from interposing as a defense in this action the contributory negligence of the employer, and that it was not error on the part of the court to sustain the objection to the introduction of evidence in support of this defense.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, except to the extent the injured person caused the injury through willfulness or lack of ordinary care.

Kelley v. Hodge Transportation System · filed 1925-12-11

Indeed, no other rule is consistent with section 1714 of the Civil Code, wherein it is declared that every one is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care ‘except so far as the latter has, wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.’ ”

Section 1714 does not create or limit the defense of contributory negligence and is silent on whether that defense applies in wrongful death actions.

Buckley v. Chadwick · filed 1955-10-07

Another misconception appears to be that section 1714 of the Civil Code creates, and by its language limits, the defense of contributory negligence. (See 42 Cal.L.Rev. 312.) But the defense of contributory negligence is not of statutory creation.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their property or person, subject to the injured person's willful or negligent contribution.

Smith v. Johnson · filed 1957-06-20

To constitute actionable negligence three elements must occur: (1) The legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) proximate causation between the breach and the injury. (Lozano v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 70 Cal.App.2d 415, 420 [161 P.2d 74]; 6 Cal.Jur.2d 630.) Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights (Civ. Code, § 1708) and every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 treats a plaintiff's willful conduct and lack of ordinary care that bring about an injury as exceptions relevant to liability and contributory negligence.

Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course · filed 1969-05-16

Under the terms of Civil Code section 1714, this doctrine relates to the "willful" conduct of the plaintiff bringing about his injury. ... The exception of Civil Code section 1714 usually is construed to relate to contributory negligence, where one "by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself." ... It has been held that Civil Code section 1714 does not limit the defense of contributory negligence.

Section 1714 states the basic rule of negligence and a contributory negligence defense modified by last clear chance, but does not prevent judicial adoption of comparative negligence.

Li v. Yellow Cab Co. · filed 1975-03-31

(5) Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 1714 of the Civil Code was not intended to and does not preclude present judicial action in furtherance of the purposes underlying it.

Section 1714(a) permits attributing fault to an injured plaintiff only when the plaintiff’s conduct substantially caused the injury.

Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-06-17(a)

The statutory definition of negligence provides, in relevant part, that every person is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill except so far as the latter has brought the injury upon himself or herself. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd.(a).) ... In this case, the County failed to present evidence that Randy’s marijuana use was a substantial factor in causing his injuries.

Section 1714 does not permit recovery when defendants were not negligent or the injured person’s negligence contributed to the injury.

Bradford v. Brock · filed 1934-07-20

This instruction was contrary to the provisions of Civil Code, section 1714, and section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ... on which this action was in part predicated. It told the jury in effect that defendants were liable even though they had not been guilty of negligence and even though deceased had been guilty of contribiitory negligence, and is obviously erroneous.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care unless the injured person willfully or negligently brought the injury upon themself.

Bryant v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. · filed 1917-04-04

Indeed, no other rule is consistent with section 1714 of the Civil Code, wherein it is declared that every one is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care “except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon him self.” (Italics ours.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, subject to the injured person's own willful or careless conduct.

Wessling v. Southern Pacific Co. · filed 1931-09-01

Indeed, no other rule is consistent with section 1714 of the Civil Code, wherein it is declared that every one is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care ‘except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.’

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary skill in managing property or person.

Becker v. IRM Corp. · filed 1985-04-29(a)

[5] NEGLIGENCE Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) establishes the fundamental principle of negligence liability, providing: "Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary skill in the management of his property or person, ..." Rejecting the prior distinctions made by the common law as to invitees, licensees, and trespassers, the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 111 et seq. held that the fundamental rule was applicable to the liability of owners and occupiers of land. (7) The fundamental principle is applicable to the landlord's liability to the tenant, and the landlord owes a tenant a duty of reasonable care in providing and maintaining the rented premises in a safe condition.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property; ordinary care is what a person of ordinary prudence would use in similar circumstances.

Smith v. Whittier · filed 1892-07-12

The Civil Code, section 1714, makes every one responsible “ for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property”; and “ordinary care ” is that which every person of ordinary prudence takes of his own concerns, or would employ under similar circumstances.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, subject to the injured person's own wilful or careless conduct.

Buttrick v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. · filed 1927-10-17

Indeed, no other rule is consistent with section 1714 of the Civil Code, wherein it is declared that everyone is responsible for any injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care, “except so far as the latter has, wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 sets the negligence standard by asking what an ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances, with unusual circumstances modifying its application.

Fouch v. Werner · filed 1929-06-24

The standard of care employed in section 1714 of the Civil Code, the purport of which was given in the last-quoted instruction, is a mere adoption of Baron. Alder son’s familiar definition of the term negligence as it appears in the celebrated' case of Blyth v. Birmington Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 784. It accepts as the test the standard of an ordinarily prudent man under normal circumstances, and leaves it for the jury to determine what such an individual would do under such circumstances.

Section 1714 makes a person liable for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, while the injured person's lack of ordinary care can limit recovery.

Rivera v. Goodenough · filed 1945-10-22

This contention is based on the somewhat awkward phraseology of section 1714 of the Civil Code. That section provides that everyone is liable “for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or shill . . . except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” (Italics added.) In spite of the difference in the language of the section in referring to the degree of care required of the plaintiff and defendant it is well settled that the conduct of the plaintiff is governed by the same standards as are applicable to defendants. (See cases collected 19 Cal.Jur., p. 577, footnote 10.) Any other rule would be discriminatory and unsound.

Section 1714 ordinarily measures care by what a prudent or reasonable person would do under like circumstances.

Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District · filed 1947-01-31

The standard of care to which ordinarily one must conform is usually that of the ordinarily prudent or reasonable person under like circumstances. (Civ. Code, 1714; ... Rest., Torts, 283.) But the proper conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations may become settled by judicial decision or be prescribed by statute or ordinance.

Section 1714 requires people to use ordinary care or skill.

Gootar v. Levin · filed 1930-11-20

In instruction 38 appellant takes exception to the use of the word “skill” where the court used the phrase “ordinary care or skill”. This instruction was given in the exact language of section 1714 of the Civil Code. This code section may be inaptly drawn, but there was no error in giving the instruction.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent contribution.

Peccolo v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1937-03-29

Indeed, no other rule is consistent with section 1714 of the Civil Code, wherein it is declared that everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care “except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 requires drivers on private roads to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring others.

Sills v. Forbes · filed 1939-06-06

If used in connection with travel on a private road, it summarizes some of the provisions of section 1714 of the Civil Code. We have reached the conclusion that under the facts of this case each driver owed the other, and Forbes owed plaintiff, the duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid injury, and that Forbes was liable to plaintiff for damages cause by his negligence.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care, and the care required varies with the danger involved.

Holmes v. Southern California Edison Co. · filed 1947-02-10

While section 1714 of the Civil Code makes a person responsible for injury caused by “want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property,” ... what is ordinary care must vary with the circumstances.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own wilful or careless contribution.

Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc. · filed 1950-06-13

Many cases, and particularly the more recent ones, have in fact applied the general doctrine of negligence embodied in section 1714 of the Civil Code rather than the common-law rigid categories test.

Section 1714 requires reasonable care toward persons whose presence the defendant knew or should have known about.

Fernandez v. American Bridge Co. · filed 1951-05-21

The California rule seems to be that, regardless of the status of a plaintiff as licensee, trespasser or invitee, where defendant knew, or should have known, of plaintiff’s presence, the duty of reasonable care was owed to him. ... In the case before us the negligence of defendant was active and not passive.

Section 1714 requires everyone to use ordinary care when managing property to avoid injuring others.

Jaehne v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1951-07-27

Everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by want of ordinary care in the management of his property. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 requires ordinary care to identify dangers and take proper precautions.

Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co. · filed 1954-01-29

The italicized portion of the instruction states the law incorrectly, since plaintiff could have been charged with negligence not only if she was aware of the danger present and did not take proper precautions to avoid it, but also if, in the exercise of ordinary care, she should have been aware of that danger and failed to take such precautions. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Blodgett v. Dyas (B. H.) Co., 4 Cal.2d 511 [50 P.2d 801]; see Rest., Torts, §§ 463, 464, 466.)

Section 1714 requires a person to use ordinary care or skill in managing property to avoid injuring others.

Staggs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. · filed 1955-09-20

In the instant action, the first question to be determined by the jury is not the status of the infant plaintiff, which is immaterial under the uncontroverted facts, but what was the “ordinary care or skill” in the operation and management of its train in the locale of the accident required of defendant, considering all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the knowledge of defendant’s agents and trainmen that members of the public, adults and children, were likely to be there at that time. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 requires each person to use toward others the care that the circumstances require.

Copfer v. Golden · filed 1955-09-26

Children of tender years have no foresight and scarcely any apprehensiveness of danger, a circumstance which those owning instrumentalities potential for harm must bear in mind; for it is every individual’s duty to use toward others such due care as the situation then and there requires. (Civ. Code, §1714.)

Section 1714 requires each person to use the care toward others that the circumstances require.

Edler v. Sepulveda Park Apartments · filed 1956-05-21

Children of tender years have no foresight and scarcely any apprehensiveness of danger, a circumstance which those owning instrumentalities potential for harm must bear in mind; for it is every individual’s duty to use toward others such due care as the situation then and there requires. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or conduct.

Johnson v. Nicholson · filed 1958-04-16

Everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or oneself.

Hall v. MacCo Corp. · filed 1961-12-22

Everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person. (Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or one's person, subject to the injured person's own willful or careless conduct.

Rowland v. Christian · filed 1968-08-08

It bears repetition that the basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. The factors which may in particular cases warrant departure from this fundamental principle do not warrant the wholesale immunities resulting from the common law classifications, and we are satisfied that continued adherence to the common law distinctions can only lead to injustice or, if we are to avoid injustice, further fictions with the resulting complexity and confusion. We decline to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications. [5b] The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.

Section 1714 requires a landlord to use ordinary care in managing the landlord's property.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Titus · filed 1968-09-06

But the Hanson doctrine relates to a landlord's liability to his tenant; we are concerned with the landlord’s duty to himself to use ordinary care in the management of his property. (Civ. Code, §1714.)

Section 1714's general negligence rule does not govern municipal liability under the 1923 act.

Pittam v. City of Riverside · filed 1932-12-05

“Section 1714 of the Civil Code of this state lays down the law that ‘everyone is responsible not only for the result of his wilful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, wilfully, or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.’ ... The law of general negligence, except in so far as we have already indicated, has no application to this case, and the quoted instructions as requested by respondent should not have been given by the court.

Section 1714 defines negligence and applies its rule to the issues presented by the pleadings and evidence.

Rohar v. Osborne · filed 1955-05-31

When the instructions given are viewed in the light of the foregoing code section and section 1714 of the Civil Code defining negligence, it is manifest that instructions based on the provisions of these sections were proper in that both code sections constitute the law of this state and are applicable to the issues presented by the pleadings and raised by the evidence in the case at bar (Monroe v. East Bay Rental Service, 111 Cal.App.2d 574, 575, 576 [245 P.2d 9]).

Section 1714 imposes liability based on whether a property possessor acted reasonably in managing the property, while a plaintiff’s status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee is not determinative.

Mezerkor v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1968-09-26

More recently in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561], the court has rejected traditional classifications insofar as the occupier of land is concerned. It concluded, “The proper test to be applied to the liability of 'the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.” (69 Cal.2d at p. 119.) It follows that any designation of the relationship of the parties in this action as lessor and lessee, owner and operator, seller and purchaser, or supplier and independent com-tractor should not be conclusive in establishing the duty of care on either party.

Section 1714 establishes the general duty to use due care as an element of actionable negligence.

Evans v. Ohanesian · filed 1974-05-14

Legal duty to use due care, a breach of that duty, and proximate causation linking the breach with the injury to plaintiff could reasonably be inferred from evidence in the record at the time the nonsuit was granted. (Civ. Code, § 1714; United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.3d 586 [83 Cal.Rptr. 418, 463 P.2d 770]; Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, 67 Cal.2d 232 [60 Cal.Rptr. 510, 430 P.2d 68]; Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal.App.2d 687 [58 Cal.Rptr. 792]; Galanis v. Mercury Internate Ins. Underwriters, 247 Cal.App.2d 690 [55 Cal.Rptr. 890]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) § 488 at p. 2749.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, unless the injured person willfully or negligently caused the injury.

Commercial Standard Insurance v. Bank of America · filed 1976-04-12

On the whole, however, we conclude that the balance of these policy considerations falls in favor of imposing a duty upon Bank to exercise reasonable care. Civil Code section 1714 provides: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” “[I]t is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.” (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 112.) Public policy does not clearly support an exception to the statutory rule in the case at bench.

Section 1714 requires people to use ordinary care to prevent injuries caused by their conduct.

Keene v. Wiggins · filed 1977-04-25

The fundamental principle is all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]) and any departure from this principle involves the balancing of a number of considerations, namely: ... (g) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113).

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their property or person.

George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez · filed 1979-05-14(a)

An analysis of whether a duty is owed by a defendant to a particular plaintiff must begin with a recognition of the policy embodied in Civil Code section 1714 which states in part: “(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his wilful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, . . .”

Section 1714 governs a land possessor’s liability for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property, without fixed duties based on visitor classifications.

Fitch v. LeBeau · filed 1969-10-30

The traditional classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee have been abrogated. In actions involving liability of the possessor of land, section 1714 of the Civil Code governs; it provides that everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by reason of his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property.

Section 1714 permits a finding that a land possessor failed to use ordinary care when a foreseeable vehicle hazard threatens patrons; the adequacy of precautions may be a question of fact.

Barker v. Wah Low · filed 1971-08-27

It is sufficient to note then in this case the circumstances permit a finding that the injuries, and the resulting death for which the plaintiffs seek compensation, were occasioned by the defendants want of ordinary care or skill in the management of their property (see Civ. Code, § 1714). The chance that a vehicle would strike a patron at the service counter, unless precautions were taken, was foreseeable. Whether the precautions taken were adequate, and the extent of the hazards from which it was reasonable to require the possessors of the land to furnish protection, are questions of fact.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or one's person, subject to the injured person's own willful or careless conduct.

Gordon v. Strawther Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1969-05-29

Section 1714 of the Civil Code provides: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury on himself. ...”

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by willful acts or a lack of ordinary care, subject to its contributory fault exception.

Mahoney v. Corralejo · filed 1974-01-24

Civil Code section 1714 provides: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the title on compensatory relief.” That statute simply codifies the common law dichotomy of intentional torts and negligence.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent contribution.

U. S. Financial v. Sullivan · filed 1974-01-29

Civil Code section 1714 provides: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the. management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. . . .” “[I]n the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.”

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, but an actionable claim requires a legal duty owed to the injured party.

Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. · filed 1974-12-13

Plaintiffs assert that this cause of action sounds in tort and is based on a violation of a statutory obligation owed to them by defendants pursuant to Civil Code sections 1708 and 1714. We do not agree for the same reasons hereinbefore set forth relating to plaintiffs’ first cause of action based on an alleged violation of section 3523. In order to constitute an actionable tort, there must be a legal duty owed by a defendant to the one injured, for, in the absence of such a duty, any damage caused is injury without wrong. (Wilson v. Union Iron Works Drydock Co., 167 Cal. 539 [140 P. 250].) Under the facts of this case, defendants, owed no legal duty to plaintiffs.

Section 1714 establishes the general rule of tort liability, subject to judicial limits distinguishing actionable from non-actionable losses.

Suter v. Leonard · filed 1975-03-05

In delineating the extent of a tortfeasor’s responsibility for damages under the general rule of tort liability (Civ. Code, § 1714), the courts must locate the line between liability and non-liability at some point, a decision which is essentially political.

Section 1714 states a general rule of negligence liability for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent conduct.

Adams v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. · filed 1975-07-21

In Rowland v. Christian the court set forth Civil Code section 1714 as the fundamental rule of negligence liability in California, ... rejecting common law rules which had traditionally limited the liability of land possessors. The court referred to the duty-of-care concept as a “departure from [the] fundamental principle” voiced in Civil Code section 1714 (69 Cal.2d at p. 112). Like Dillon, the Rowland decision relegated duty determinations to a secondary, rejective role. Nothing in the language, purpose, or history of Civil Code section 1714 confines it to suits against land possessors. Indeed, Rowland v. Christian refers to the real estate cases as “One of the areas” where the courts had departed from the fundamental concept of section 1714. (69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) Later decisions explicitly or implicitly recognize section 1714 as a general principle of negligence liability in California. (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 821 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226]; Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 865 [106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212]; Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 177, fn. 2 [101 Cal.Rptr. 908, 496 P.2d 1276]; Holliday v. Miles, Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 396, 400-401 [72 Cal.Rptr. 96].)

Section 1714 makes a landlord's liability for negligence depend on the reasonable person standard and the circumstances creating the risk.

Golden v. Conway · filed 1976-03-01

“In light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the trial court was incorrect in employing instructions based on the superseded common law rules instead of on section 1714 of the Civil Code. This was reversible error inasmuch as the plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed on every theory of the case that was supported by the evidence, including negligence. [Citation.]” ... The tenant was entitled to have the jury determine whether the heater was negligently installed as indicated by the testimony of the tenant’s engineer. If it was, and that negligence was the proximate cause of the fire and destruction of the tenant’s goods, the landlord should be vicariously liable for the negligence of the contractor.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Bernhard v. Harrah's Club · filed 1976-03-02

The fact then, that in the case at bench, section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code is not applicable to this defendant in Nevada so as to warrant the imposition of civil liability on the basis of its violation, does not preclude recovery on the basis of negligence apart from the statute. Pertinent here is our observation in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 118-119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]: “It bears repetition that the basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property.”

Section 1714 imposes liability for injury caused by a person's lack of ordinary care or skill.

Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California · filed 1976-07-01

In the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], Justice Peters recognized that liability should be imposed "for injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill" as expressed in section 1714 of the Civil Code.

Section 1714 states the common law rule of contributory negligence, which the court holds has been judicially modified into comparative negligence for government tort liability.

Levine v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1977-03-28

The definition of nuisance which is included in section 3479 is declaratory of the common law in the same manner as the rule of contributory negligence which is stated in section 1714. ... We thus conclude that the rule of Li v. Yellow Cab Co. applies to government tort liability founded in negligence. Hence, the public entity may not rely upon the defense of contributory negligence as a total bar to liability.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by failing to use ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Evans v. Thomason · filed 1977-08-29

In light of the landlords’ admitted notice and knowledge of the serious consequences, the trial court could only conclude that the landlords did not exercise ordinary care in the management of their property and, therefore, violated their statutory duty under Civil Code section 1714.

Section 1714 requires a land possessor to act as a reasonable person in managing property in light of the probability of injury to others.

Levy-Zentner Co. v. SOUTHERN PAC. TRANSPORTATION · filed 1977-11-09

Southern Pacific, without citation of authority, argues for an exception to the general rules of liability of Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], set forth as follows, at page 119: “The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others. . . .” (Also in accord, Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc., 35 Cal.App.3d 796 [111 Cal.Rptr. 122], which applied Rowland v. Christian in a landlord/tenant context.) ... Southern Pacific’s economic assumption of risk argument is without support in law or policy.

Section 1714 makes a person liable for reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by failing to exercise reasonable care.

Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl · filed 1978-01-06

(3) The courts of this state have followed the general rule that a person is liable for the reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care. ( Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 [115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669]; Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316]; Hilyar v. Union Ice Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 30, 36 [286 P.2d 21]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 310, 317 [282 P.2d 12]; Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by their lack of ordinary care or skill.

American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court · filed 1978-02-09

This result follows from Civil Code section 1714’s declaration that “[ejvery one is responsible ... for an injuiy occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill....”

Section 1714 makes people responsible for injuries caused by their want of ordinary care or skill and supports a duty of care when harm is reasonably foreseeable.

Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc. · filed 1978-04-04

While plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongful acts by defendants appear to be weak, under the principle of both wilful and negligent liability as set forth in section 1714 of the Civil Code and under the concept that reasonable foreseeability of harm can create a duty of care, we concluded that the plaintiffs can plead an actionable wrong against defendants.

Section 1714 requires negligent tortfeasors to compensate people injured by their failure to exercise ordinary care.

Sun'n Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank · filed 1978-07-20

Our strong policy favors fault-based liability; negligent tortfeasors must compensate persons injured by their failure to exercise ordinary care. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian (1968) supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112.)

Section 1714 imposes a duty of care on possessors of premises toward people on them, with status as only one factor.

Morehouse v. Taubman Co. · filed 1970-03-18

In this regard, it is to be noted that the duties concerned under the common law and Civil Code section 1714 and those stated in Labor Code sections 6401, 6402, 6403 and 6404 in some degree overlap. ... The possessor of premises has a duty of care toward those upon them. Their status is only one factor.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or person, subject to the injured person's willful or negligent contribution.

Campodonico v. State Auto Parks, Inc. · filed 1970-08-25

The nature of that duty has been clarified, simplified, and stated succinctly by the Supreme Court in the relatively recent case of Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.Sd 496], as follows: “... The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.”

Section 1714 requires land possessors to act reasonably in view of the probability of injury, with their standard of care and the reasonableness of their conduct decided by the jury.

Martin v. Barclay Distributing Co. · filed 1970-12-28

Both defendant’s standard of care under section 1714 and the reasonableness of its conduct are jury questions.

Section 1714 requires a property owner to use reasonable care to protect customers from harm caused by others.

Slater v. Alpha Beta Acme Markets, Inc. · filed 1975-01-02

Defendant’s standard of care under section 1714, the foreseeability of harm, and the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct are questions for the trier of fact.

Section 1714 requires a person charged with negligence or contributory negligence to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

Lucas v. Southern Pacific Co. · filed 1971-08-06

The duty of one charged with negligence or contributory negligence is to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 111-112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 310, 317 [282 P.2d 12]; Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) pp. 153, 207.)

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Bartholomew v. Klingler Co. · filed 1975-12-22

“It bears repetition that the basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property.”

Section 1714 makes a person liable for injuries caused by failing to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

O'HARA v. Western Seven Trees Corp. · filed 1977-12-13

Generally, a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 1714; ... Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) ... An analysis of the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113, shows that there is potential liability here. ... It was error to sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action.

Section 1714's ordinary-care rule applies to owners and suppliers of personal property as well as occupiers of land.

Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. · filed 1972-05-17

See also Civil Code section 1714, providing that "Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself...." Although Rowland, supra, pertained to the liability of one occupying real property, the same rule would apply in measuring the liability of an owner or supplier of personal property.

Section 1714 generally imposes no duty to maintain property on someone who neither owns it nor has the right to control or manage it.

Marshall v. United Airlines · filed 1973-11-02

Liability for the negligent maintenance of property arises from the rule expressed by Civil Code section 1714 stating, as relevant, “Everyone is responsible, ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of care or skill in the management of his property . . . .” ... In the absence of or other special circumstances, there can be no duty to maintain property, and hence no liability for its negligent maintenance, where there is no ownership or right of control or management of the property.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property.

Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties · filed 1978-12-06

Everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. (Civ. Code, § 1714.) ... In the case at bench, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom show that Ambrose knew bicycles were ridden at the Belmont Shopping Center, and that pedestrians also were present on the premises. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said, as a matter of law that the possibility of a bicyclist striking a pedestrian was so "remote and unexpected" that an ordinary man should not reasonably have foreseen it. The foreseeability of such an accident thus was a question of fact, and the evidence permits a finding that the chance of a bicyclist striking a pedestrian, unless precautions were taken, was foreseeable.

Section 1714 generally makes people liable for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing their property, subject to recognized exceptions.

Farmer v. Union Oil Co. · filed 1977-11-14

The Rowland criteria are expressed as follows: "A departure from this fundamental principle [of a duty of care under Civ. Code, § 1714] involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with the resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]" (69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113.) ... All things being considered, we conclude that the criteria expressed in Rowland v. Christian, supra , do not compel the repudiation of the fireman's rule. Furthermore, under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are bound to apply the rule in the instant case.

Section 1714 establishes California's foundational rule of negligence liability for injuries caused by a person's lack of ordinary care or skill.

Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp. · filed 1979-06-15

First: Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 111-112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], reminds us that the foundation principle of California negligence liability is section 1714 of the Civil Code: “Eveiy one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. . . ,”

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by that person's lack of ordinary care, while limiting recovery when the injured person contributed to the injury through lack of ordinary care.

Lantis v. Condon · filed 1979-07-23

Additionally, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 822, the Supreme Court summarized two fundamental precepts which are embodied in Civil Code section 1714: “The first is that one whose negligence has caused damage to another should be liable therefor. The second is that one whose negligence has contributed to his own injury should not be permitted to cast the burden of liability upon another.” To hold that Anne’s damages for loss of consortium must be proportionately reduced by the amount of contributory negligence attributable to her husband would violate these principles.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by lack of ordinary care and does not distinguish among personal, property, and financial injuries.

J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory · filed 1979-08-13(a)

In addition, this holding is consistent with the Legislature’s declaration of the basic principle of tort liability, embodied in Civil Code section 1714, that every person is responsible for injuries caused by his or her lack of ordinary care. (See Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 119.) That section does not distinguish among injuries to one’s person, one’s property or one’s financial interests. Damages for loss of profits or earnings are recoverable where they result from an injury to one’s person or property caused by another’s negligence. Recovery for injury to one’s economic interests, where it is the foreseeable result of another’s want of ordinary care, should not be foreclosed simply because it is the only injury that occurs.

Section 1714 makes persons liable for injury caused another through want of ordinary care.

Chameleon Engineering Corp. v. Air Dynamics, Inc. · filed 1980-01-24

It is the policy of this state to hold persons liable for injury caused another through “want of ordinary care.” (Civ. Code, § 1714.) Thus, imposing liability promotes the prevention of future harm.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or person, subject to specified exceptions.

Stoiber v. Honeychuck · filed 1980-02-05(a)

We do not write upon a clean slate in deciding whether public policy today calls for an exception to the liability principle articulated in section 1714 insofar as the landlord-tenant relationship; other courts and legal commentators have paved the way. ... Manifestly, under the reasoning of Green and Rowland and assuming appropriate pleadings of fact, a tenant may state a cause of action in tort against his landlord for damages resulting from a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill.

Fisher v. Morrison Homes, Inc. · filed 1980-08-12

Moreover, we must adhere to the maxim, embodied in Civil Code section 1714, that “everyone is responsible. . .for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill .. .. ”

Section 1714 makes every person responsible for the consequences of negligent conduct.

Parker v. Morton · filed 1981-04-03

This rule derives from several well-recognized legal principles all of which foster the public policy of encouraging persons to conduct themselves with reasonable care: that every person should be responsible for the consequences of his negligent conduct (Civ. Code, § 1714; see generally, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 816-817 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393]); that as between tortfeasors who contribute to a loss each shall bear the loss in proportion to his fault (see American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court, supra, 94 Cal. App.3d 347; Herrero v. Atkinson, supra, 227 Cal. App.2d at p. 75; Niles v. City of San Rafael (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 230, 238-239 [116 Cal. Rptr. 733]); and that an injured person must himself take reasonable action to mitigate his damages ( Pretzer v. California Transit Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 202, 208-209 [294 P. 382]; see Rest.2d Torts, § 918; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 870, p. 3158).

Section 1714 makes a defendant liable for the cost of special medical care when the defendant's negligence proximately causes the child's need for that care.

Turpin v. Sortini · filed 1982-05-03

If, as alleged, defendants' negligence was in fact a proximate cause of the child's present and continuing need for such special, extraordinary medical care and training, we believe that it is consistent with the basic liability principles of Civil Code section 1714 to hold defendants liable for the cost of such care, whether the expense is to be borne by the parents or by the child.

Section 1714 supplies the general principles of negligence used to determine whether defendants are liable.

Paige v. North Oaks Partners · filed 1982-08-09

Whether defendants are liable to plaintiffs should be determined not by this statute but by general principles of negligence. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 118-119; Beard v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at pp. 136-141.)

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Potts v. Halsted Financial Corp. · filed 1983-05-05

“[T]he basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone is responsible for an injury caused to another by his want or ordinary care or skill in the management of his property.”

Section 1714, subdivision (a) establishes liability for injuries caused by failing to exercise reasonable care.

Myers v. Quesenberry · filed 1983-06-27(a)

MICRA did not change the applicability or scope of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) as between the public and the medical profession.

Section 1714 makes a person liable for injuries caused by failing to use ordinary care in managing property.

Swanberg v. O'MECTIN · filed 1984-06-19

In California, it has long been the law that a person may be liable for injuries resulting from his failure to use ordinary care in the management of his property. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 372 [182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822].)

Section 1714 makes a defendant liable when failing to act reasonably contributes to causing the plaintiff's injury.

Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc. · filed 1984-11-28

The general rule of negligence law in California is that a defendant is liable whenever his failure to act in a reasonable manner contributes to causing the plaintiff’s injury. (See Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113; Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 163 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151].)

Section 1714 imposes liability for injury caused by a failure to use ordinary care when the defendant owed the injured person a legal duty and breached it proximately.

Hooks v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group · filed 1980-06-25

Civil Code section 1714 provides that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. However, the law requires more than a mere failure to exercise care and a resulting injury. There must be a legal duty to exercise care under the circumstances, owed to the person injured, and a breach of that duty must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.

Section 1714 requires a land possessor to act as a reasonable person in managing property in view of the probability of injury to others.

Jamison v. Mark C. Bloome Co. · filed 1980-11-25

“... .The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.”

Section 1714 establishes a general duty of care toward people foreseeably endangered by one's conduct and the risks it makes unreasonably dangerous.

Rosales v. Stewart · filed 1980-12-11

It is a general principle that one owes a duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by one’s own conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166].)

Section 1714(a) imposes liability for injury caused by a person's lack of ordinary care or skill.

Megeff v. Doland · filed 1981-08-31(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) is California’s expression of policy in this regard, imposing liability “for an injury occasioned to another by [one’s] want of ordinary care or skill .... ”

Section 1714 establishes a general duty of care unless public policy clearly requires an exception.

Lipson v. Superior Court · filed 1982-05-17(a)

In addition, it has long been established in California that all persons owe a duty of care to avoid injury to others unless public policy clearly requires that an exception be made. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); ... Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].)

Section 1714 establishes a presumption of duty based on ordinary care and permits exceptions only when public policy clearly supports them.

Elam v. College Park Hospital · filed 1982-05-27

Our analysis of whether Hospital owed the disputed duty to Elam commences with the fundamental policy embodied in Civil Code section 1714, providing liability for injuries to another caused by one’s failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. (See Hooks v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d 435, 443; George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 963, 967.) “Duty” is thus presumed, as “no .. . exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.”

Section 1714 requires persons to exercise due care toward others, and Standard Oil satisfied that duty by disclosing known information about latent dangers.

Felburg v. Don Wilson Builders · filed 1983-04-27

In our view, present law does not designate the vendor or transferor of real property as one to which the doctrine of strict liability in tort applies. We deem that Standard Oil acted reasonably and responsibly, and discharged its duty to act with care toward all other persons (Civ. Code, § 1714) when it disclosed what information it had concerning latent dangers in the oil field to developer Wilson and cautioned that there might be areas of danger for which no records were available, considering the length of time—since 1924—the oil field had been in operation.

Section 1714 makes negligence liability depend on a duty of care owed to the injured person or class.

Gomez v. Ticor · filed 1983-08-01

Liability founded upon a claim of negligence cannot exist unless a duty of care is owed by the alleged wrongdoer to the person injured or to the class of which the injured person is a member. (Rodriguez v. Bethlehem (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382, 399 [115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669]; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 generally requires ordinary care to avoid injuring others but does not by itself establish a legal duty in a particular case.

Lundy v. California Realty · filed 1985-07-30(a)

It is true of course that Civil Code section 1714 embodies the public policy of this state and in a very general sense imposes a duty upon every person to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to every other person. However, plaintiff’s conclusion that Civil Code section 1714 establishes the existence of a legal duty on the part of the defendant in a particular case is incorrect.

Section 1714 establishes the general rule that all persons must use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct, subject to clearly supported exceptions.

Wickline v. State of California · filed 1986-07-30

Civil Code section 1714, derived from the common law, reads in pertinent part as follows: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.” ... Applying those standards to the facts in issue in this matter causes this court to conclude that appellant’s contentions are well taken and that it is absolved from liability in this case as a matter of law.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person, unless an applicable statutory exception applies.

Ektelon v. City of San Diego · filed 1988-04-25

Linvill relies on the fundamental principle of tort law that everyone is responsible for an injury occasioned by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, and in the absence of a statutory provision declaring an exception to this fundamental principle, no exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy. (Id. at p. 198, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], and Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 363 [178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121].) ... We agree with the analysis in Linvill. An upstream landowner has no absolute right to protect his land from floodwaters by constructing structures which increase the downstream flow of water into its natural watercourse, but is instead governed by the ordinary principles of negligence.

Section 1714 requires responsibility for injuries caused by a person's lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person.

Mora v. Baker Commodities, Inc. · filed 1989-05-17

Civil Code section 1714 codifies this negligence standard of care and reads in pertinent part: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, . . .”

Section 1714(a) requires landowners and occupiers to exercise ordinary care in managing their property.

Davert v. Larson · filed 1985-01-03(a)

The law is well settled that an owner or occupier of land is required to exercise ordinary care in the management of his property and the breach of such duty constitutes actionable negligence. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); see generally, Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358 [178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121]; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 567, p. 2834.) This rule applies “unless public policy clearly requires that an exception be made.” (Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 372 [182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822]).

Section 1714 requires a negligence plaintiff to establish a duty of care owed to the injured person; the mental health providers had no duty to notify the gun seller or the Department of Justice of a former patient’s suicidal tendencies.

Katona v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1985-09-11(a)

In order for plaintiffs to prevail they must establish that defendants owed a duty to them, and not to the public generally or to some amorphous group of third parties.

Section 1714 generally requires everyone to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct.

Ballard v. Uribe · filed 1986-04-03

In California, the general rule is that all persons have a duty "`to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct....'" ( Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561] (citations omitted); Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person.

Preston v. Goldman · filed 1986-07-14

In Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], we discussed under what circumstances a departure from the general rule laid down in Civil Code section 1714 might be appropriate. That section provides that "(a) Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person...." A decision not to apply that principle "involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." ( Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to exceptions assessed by balancing relevant considerations.

Leakes v. Shamoun · filed 1986-12-03(a)

Civil Code section 1714 provides: “(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person.” The principle embodied in this code section serves as the foundation of our negligence law. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) Any exception to the duty set forth in section 1714 involves the balancing of a number of considerations: “[T]he major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Id., at p. 113.)

Section 1714 requires a landowner to exercise reasonable care concerning natural conditions of the land.

Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water District · filed 1988-11-23

Clearly, the District had a duty to exercise reasonable care concerning the natural condition of its land. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, supra, 30 Cal.3d 358, 370-371.) However, unless the District breached this duty, it cannot be seen to have committed an act, let alone a tortious act. Therefore, since the accumulation of debris cannot be attributed to the District’s own affirmative intentional conduct, the basis for the District’s alleged nuisance liability would have to be negligence, that is, the District’s negligent failure to remove the debris.

Section 1714 requires landowners to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to persons on their premises.

Edwards v. California Sports, Inc. · filed 1988-12-28

The fundamental inquiry is whether the duty of a landowner to exercise reasonable care in preventing injury to persons on the premises (Civ. Code, § 1714) required such measures. ... The question then is a narrow one, i.e., did defendant’s duty of due care require it to design and construct its building in a manner that would thwart plaintiff’s derring-do? We think not.

Section 1714 makes people responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care, subject to policy-based departures when no duty is found.

Thai v. Stang · filed 1989-10-18

In the typical negligence action, a determination that there is no duty giving rise to liability is essentially a conclusion that the weight of public policy warrants a departure from Civil Code section 1714.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their property or person.

People v. Phillips · filed 1985-05-22(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part, “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his wilful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person. ...” (See generally Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 750 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701].) This duty applies to drivers.

Section 1714(a) makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a failure to use ordinary care, subject to the injured person's willful or negligent contribution.

International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp. · filed 1986-02-20(a)

California Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. ...” Our Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496] adopted such a concept. “California cases have occasionally stated a similar view: ‘All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct.’ [Citations.] Although it is true that some exceptions have been made to the general principle that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances, it is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 112.)

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person.

Linvill v. Perello · filed 1987-02-10

We find that a departure from the principle of tort law as codified in Civil Code section 1714, and an adoption of the respondents’ narrow view of the requirement of reasonableness is not warranted. Whether the landowner has acted reasonably is a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all the circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of harm which results, the purpose or motive with which the landowner acted, and all other relevant matter. (See Keys v. Romley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 396, 410 [50 Cal.Rptr. 273,412 P.2d 529].)

Section 1714(a) generally makes a person liable for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing property or one's person.

Wylie v. Gresch · filed 1987-04-27(a)

Here, by contrast, the dog was kept by strangers to the landlords on premises over which the landlords had no control. Therefore, the complaint alleged no facts which would give rise to liability under Civil Code section 1714 or the cases construing it.

Section 1714 makes a person liable for injuries caused by failing to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.

Lopez v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1987-07-09

Thus, any “duty” analysis begins “with the fundamental policy embodied in Civil Code section 1714, providing liability for injuries to another caused by one’s failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.”

Section 1714 makes persons responsible for injuries caused by their want of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Talbott v. Csakany · filed 1988-03-15

These factors, firmly ensconced and refined in California jurisprudence since being defined in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496], are predicated on the legislative declaration of public policy for this state articulated in Civil Code section 1714 that all persons are responsible for an injury caused another by their want of ordinary care or skill in the management of their property.

Section 1714 bars a cause of action against an alcoholic beverage provider for injuries caused by intoxication rather than by serving the alcohol.

Andrews v. Wells · filed 1988-09-12

In Civil Code section 1714 and Business and Professions Code section 25602, the Legislature abrogated a cause of action against the provider of an alcoholic beverage by declaring that intoxication rather than serving alcohol is the proximate cause of injuries caused by or to an intoxicated person.

Section 1714 makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by willful acts or a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person.

Platts v. Sacramento Northern Railway · filed 1988-10-28(a)

Moreover, there is a strong public policy to fix liability upon those responsible for the damage. Civil Code section 1714 provides that “[e] very one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person . . . .” (Subd. (a); see also Lee v. Takao Bldg. Development Co., supra, at pp. 568-569.) ... Preston v. Goldman, supra, relied upon by Northern, is itself a departure to the general rule laid down by Civil Code section 1714, supra.

Section 1714(a) establishes the fundamental principle of negligence liability and makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary skill in managing property or person.

Krawitz v. Rusch · filed 1989-04-18(a)

“Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) establishes the fundamental principle of negligence liability, providing: ‘Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary skill in the management of his property or person, . . .’

Section 1714’s general duty of care yields to public policy when police bring a family member to a suicidal standoff to help secure a surrender; the officers have no duty to prevent emotional distress from witnessing the crisis.

Allen v. Toten · filed 1985-10-02(a)

We begin our analysis with a statement of the underlying concept of duty in tort law: "[I]t has long been established in California that all persons owe a duty of care to avoid injury to others unless public policy clearly requires that an exception be made. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].)" ( Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 372-373 [182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822], fn. omitted.) ... We therefore hold there is no tort liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in bringing a family member to the scene of a threatened suicide because peace officers, as a matter of public policy, have no duty to prevent that person from witnessing what is obvious, potential and inherent in all such crises.

Section 1714 requires a land possessor to act reasonably in view of likely injury, but imposes no duty to protect a customer from a criminal attack the possessor could not reasonably anticipate.

Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. · filed 1985-11-22

In so holding, the court reaffirmed the fundamental rule of possessor's liability articulated almost two decades ago in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]: "The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative." ... (1b) It is beyond dispute that under these well established principles, defendants in our case were under no duty to protect plaintiff from the sudden attack of a ruthless youth gang.

Section 1714 establishes the general rule that people are liable for failing to act reasonably.

Hucko v. City of San Diego · filed 1986-03-31

Everyone should be obliged to act reasonably. (See Civ. Code, § 1714; ...).

Section 1714 does not impose a duty on an airline to protect passengers from another traveler’s luggage in a common airport concourse the airline does not control.

Gray v. America West Airlines, Inc. · filed 1989-03-29

The basic rule of liability for negligent maintenance of property is stated in Civil Code section 1714, “Everyone is responsible, ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property . . . .” ... Guided by this authority, we conclude the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law America West owed no duty to Mrs. Gray to protect her against a risk equally obvious to both, since the showing of the extent of America West’s control over the concourse area did not justify the imposition of a duty based on foreseeability of this type of accident.

Section 1714(a) imposes a general duty of ordinary care, including on property owners managing their premises.

Jefferson v. Qwik Korner Market, Inc. · filed 1994-09-29(a)

All persons have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others from their conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) “This general rule requires a property owner to exercise ordinary care in the management of his or her premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.”

Section 1714 requires people to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct.

Brunelle v. Signore · filed 1989-10-31

The general rule in California is that all persons have a duty “ ‘to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.’ [Citations.]” (Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112; Civ. Code, § 1714; see. Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6 [224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624].)

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property.

Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. · filed 1989-11-28(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property. . . .” In order to state a cause of action for negligence, plaintiff must state facts showing that defendant had a duty to plaintiff, that the duty was breached by negligent conduct, and that the breach was the cause of damages to the plaintiff. ... We find the trial court correctly held as a matter of law that defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to provide fencing or some other means of confinement to the subject premises. If defendant had no duty of due care to plaintiff, then plaintiff’s cause of action in negligence must fall and the motion for summary judgment, in this respect, was properly granted.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused to another by the person's lack of ordinary care or skill.

Doe v. Roe · filed 1990-03-23

In determining whether a duty should be imposed, the courts are guided by the basic principle expressed in Civil Code section 1714 that everyone is responsible for injury occasioned to another by his own want of ordinary care or skill. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166].) Departures from this rule are warranted only by balancing a number of policy considerations, including the foreseeability of the harm suffered, the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care. (Ibid.)

Section 1714(a) makes vehicle owners responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care in managing their property.

Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Paseman · filed 1990-04-20(a)

We begin with the general duty of care imposed by Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), applicable to owners of motor vehicles: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property . . . .”

Section 1714(a) requires landowners to exercise ordinary care in managing their premises to avoid exposing people to an unreasonable risk of harm.

McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co. · filed 1990-05-08(a)

Instead, a landowner now is subject to the general duty of ordinary care: the duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, subject to public policy limits on the duty of care.

Ahern v. Dillenback · filed 1991-11-06(a)

In the typical negligence action, a determination that there is no duty giving rise to liability is essentially a conclusion that the weight of public policy warrants a departure from Civil Code section 1714. ... Nothing in the record indicates that the Aherns had a special relation with any of the defendants. Hence, as a matter of law, the defendants did not owe the requisite duty to the Aherns to sustain their cause of action for negligent procurement of insurance. (189 Cal.App.3d at p. 954.)

Section 1714(a) requires everyone to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others.

Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. · filed 1992-04-10(a)

All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others. ... (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) This general rule requires a property owner to exercise ordinary care in the management of his or her premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Rowland, supra, at p. 119; Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 371 [178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121]; BAJI No. 8.00 (7th ed. 1986).)

Section 1714 generally requires people to use due care to avoid injuring others and permits liability for careless conduct that causes injury.

Knight v. Jewett · filed 1992-08-24

As a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 establishes California’s general duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by one’s conduct.

Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. v. Superior Court · filed 1993-01-11

In California, the general rule is that all persons have a duty ‘ “to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct. . . .”’ (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97,443 P.2d 561] (citations omitted); Civ. Code, § 1714.) ... We conclude that Avis’s conduct of parking its cars in a negligently attended lot with keys in the ignitions did not create a duty to control the conduct of a thief.

Section 1714(a) requires everyone to use ordinary care to prevent injuring others through their conduct.

Nichols v. Keller · filed 1993-05-24(a)

All persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent injury to others from their conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 810].)

Section 1714 requires all persons to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their conduct.

Jackson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. · filed 1993-07-12

“. . . [E]very case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36]; Civ. Code, § 1714.)

Section 1714 requires every person to exercise due care in conducting their affairs.

Selden v. Dinner · filed 1993-07-14

Like every other person in the state, Dinner was duty bound to act with due care in conducting his affairs. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.) However, recovery for emotional distress caused by a breach of this fundamental duty has been carefully limited.

Section 1714 establishes a general duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by one's conduct, subject to limits on duties to control or warn about others.

Koepke v. Loo · filed 1993-09-22

... While, as noted, one must always use “ordinary care” so as to avoid “injury ... to another” (Civ. Code, § 1714), the common law establishes a different rule in terms of the control of others. As a general rule, “. . . one person [owes] no duty to control the conduct of another [citations], nor to warn those endangered by such conduct . . . .” ... Accordingly, we find that the facts of this case imposed no duty upon Loo to take any further action to communicate with Koepke, even though Loo became aware of a change in circumstances which might cause peril to Koepke. Therefore, having no duty, Loo’s failure to warn Koepke was not negligence, even though Loo might reasonably be found to have anticipated possible peril to Koepke when Logan retook possession of his gun.

Section 1714(a) requires an occupier of real property to use ordinary care in managing the property.

Lompoc Unified School Dist. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA CTY. · filed 1993-12-15(a)

The occupier of real property owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in the use and management of his or her land. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].)

Section 1714, subdivision (a), requires a possessor of land to exercise ordinary care in managing the property.

Scott v. County of Los Angeles · filed 1994-07-29(a)

In addition, the landlord in Pamela B. had only the general duty imposed upon a possessor of land to exercise ordinary care in the management of his property. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 118-119 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].)

Section 1714(a) establishes a general duty of care to avoid injuring others unless public policy requires an exception.

Portillo v. Aiassa · filed 1994-08-25(a)

Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person . . . .” Courts have interpreted this statute as establishing that individuals owe a duty of care to avoid injury to others unless public policy mandates an exception.

Section 1714 makes a cattle owner responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care in managing cattle, including on public highways.

Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. · filed 1994-11-09

We conclude that Dye Creek has a duty of ordinary care to plaintiffs under Civil Code section 1714, and that Dye Creek has not shown it satisfied that duty as a matter of law.

Section 1714 requires people to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured by their conduct.

Bryant v. Glastetter · filed 1995-02-23

“The general rule in California is that all persons have a duty ‘ “to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.” [Citations.]’ (Rowland v. Christian [1968] 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Civ. Code, § 1714; see Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6 . . . .) ... We have concluded that under the circumstances presented here Glastetter had no duty to protect decedent from the possibility of injury resulting from the negligence of another, ... and we hold that the trial court correctly sustained Glastetter’s demurrer without leave to amend.

Section 1714(a) makes people responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care, subject to the injured person's own fault.

Romito v. Red Plastic Co. · filed 1995-09-07(a)

In the typical negligence action, a determination that there is no duty giving rise to liability is essentially a conclusion that the weight of public policy warrants a departure from Civil Code section 1714.

Section 1714, subdivision (a) requires landowners to exercise ordinary care in the use and management of their land.

Medina v. Hillshore Partners · filed 1995-11-21(a)

In California, a landowner owes a duty to exercise ordinary care in the use and management of his or her land. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R. 496].) "Normally, the duties do not extend to persons outside the land, e.g., on adjacent land or on the highway. [Citations.]" (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 898, p. 268.) Absent a special relationship, the landowner has no duty to protect members of the public against criminal activities occurring on a public sidewalk or street. (E.g., Donnell v. California Western School of Law (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 715, 719-720 [246 Cal. Rptr. 199] [law student attacked on sidewalk while leaving defendant's premises].)

Section 1714 requires people to use reasonable care to avoid injuring others and permits liability for careless conduct that causes injury.

Regents of University of California v. Superior Court · filed 1996-01-10

As a general rule, persons have a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.) “In order to determine the boundaries of the duty to prevent injury to others in any given case, we consider several factors, including the foreseeability of the harm, the degree of certainty of injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with the resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance.” (See Scott v. Chevron U.S.A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 510, 515; and Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].)

Section 1714 requires property owners and occupiers to exercise reasonable care to maintain premises in a safe condition.

Marquez v. Mainframe · filed 1996-02-16(a)

Following the path of analysis blazed for us in Neighbarger, we start with the general principle that an owner or occupier of property such as Visa owes a duty of reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Donohue v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 658, 665 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 148].)

Section 1714 imposes a general duty of care to avoid causing injury through careless conduct.

Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious & Cultural Center · filed 1996-03-11

As a general rule, persons have a duty of care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. (Civ. Code, § 1714; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496].) The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk as defined by the court in Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, acts as a limitation to this general rule, recognizing that in certain situations the nature of the activity at issue is such that the defendant does not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff to act with due care.

Section 1714 requires property owners and managers to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions that expose tenants to unreasonable risks of harm.

Curties v. Hill Top Developers, Inc. · filed 1993-04-16

Hill Top, as a property owner or manager, was required to use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on its property in order to avoid exposing tenants such as Curties to unreasonable risks of harm. (Civ. Code § 1714; Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 315; See Harper, et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) Assumption of Risk § 21.1, pp. 204-206.)

Section 1714 makes people responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to clearly supported exceptions.

Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California · filed 1990-07-27

The Wickline court correctly concluded that the public policy as expressed in the Welfare and Institutions Code and title 22 of the California Administrative Code constituted an exception to the usual standard of tort liability specified in Civil Code section 1714. As will be noted, no such statutory and regulatory scheme is present in the case at bar and the general rule of tort liability set forth in Civil Code section 1714 must apply to the parties in this case.

Section 1714 makes a person potentially liable for injuries caused by failing to exercise ordinary care, subject to a legal duty and its breach.

Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-09-30

Thus, while Civil Code section 1714 provides that a person may be liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, the law requires more than a mere failure to exercise care and resulting injury. There must be a legal duty owed to the person injured. It is the breach of that duty that must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. The determination that a duty of care exists is an essential prerequisite to liability founded on negligence. (Hooks v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 435, 443 [165 Cal.Rptr. 741].) In fact, since it is the breach of that duty which must be the causal factor in the injury alleged, duty must be found before causation or injury can even be considered.

Section 1714, subdivision (a), makes everyone responsible for injuries caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent contribution.

Christensen v. Superior Court · filed 1991-12-02(a)

In determining liability for negligence, we begin always with the command of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a): “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 makes landowners responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care or skill in managing their property.

Seaber v. Hotel Del Coronado · filed 1991-12-02

The general rule in California, as codified in Civil Code section 1714, is that all landowners are responsible for an injury caused to another by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of their property.

Section 1714(a) makes a person responsible for injuries caused by their lack of ordinary care or skill, subject to the injured person's own willful or negligent contribution.

Burgess v. Superior Court · filed 1992-07-09(a)

Our starting point in determining liability for negligence is the rule set forth in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a): “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”

Section 1714 sets the general rule of tort liability and requires courts to draw the line between liability and nonliability.

Bro v. Glaser · filed 1994-02-24

Thus, in an effort to respond to the invitation, implied in Andalón, we shall prescribe, as an aid in deciding emotional distress cases based on negligence, a two-pronged test for use in screening the cases and then for locating that line between liability and nonliability in those cases.

Section 1714 makes a person responsible for injury caused by a lack of ordinary care or skill in managing property or person.

Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. · filed 1994-09-09(a)

We have already noted that, in pertinent part, section 1714, subdivision (a), of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very one is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person...." This concise statutory pronouncement imports the concept of both duty and breach. The mandate of this duty is to act with ordinary care and skill in the management of one's property and person. Breach of that duty occurs when a want of ordinary care in such management causes an injury. The result is liability, i.e., "responsibility." Thus, consideration of the seven Rowland factors can only occur if it first be determined that there is a duty present and that it has been breached.