Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Section 17200 defines unfair competition as unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL claim may proceed by adequately pleading any one of those three prongs.

California Crane School, Inc. v. Google LLC · filed 2024-03-21

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, which means “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. When assessing a UCL claim, courts consider each of three prongs—unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair—to determine whether a practice constitutes unfair competition, and “a claim that sufficiently pleads any of these prongs survives a motion to dismiss.” MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F.Supp.3d 1087, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The unlawful prong requires a predicate legal violation (e.g., a Sherman Act or Cartwright Act violation), the fraudulent prong requires a showing of fraudulent conduct pleaded with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and the unfair prong requires a showing of substantial injury not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that could not have been reasonably avoided by consumers. Id. at 1098.

Section 17200 requires adequately pleaded facts supporting the UCL's fraudulent, unfair, or unlawful prong; the unlawful prong depends on a sufficiently pleaded predicate violation and cannot be used to evade Proposition 65's notice requirements.

Hayden v. Bob's Red Mill Natural Foods, Inc. · filed 2024-04-16

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has failed to plead an actionable claim under the CLRA and the UCL’s fraudulent prong since he has not adequately alleged (1) that the Representations are misleading, or (2) that Defendant has a duty to disclose the cadmium levels of the products. The Court agrees. ... Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the UCL’s unfair and unlawful prongs. The Court agrees that these claims are insufficiently pled, and will dismiss them. ... Plaintiff cannot rely on his warranty claim or CLRA claim as predicate violations of the UCL’s unlawful prong given that he has not pled sufficient facts to support those claims.

Section 17200 requires an unfair-prong claim to identify a distinct unfair practice or actionable omission, and an unlawful-prong claim to rest on facts supporting another cause of action.

Smith v. Intel Corporation · filed 2024-08-15

But the Court is not persuaded that the complaint reflects this distinction. ... Accordingly, since it does not adequately allege either a distinct, unfair practice or an actionable omission, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to allege conduct supporting a claim that Intel engaged in unfair conduct. See Intel II, 2021 WL 1198299 at *11. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim. ... Plaintiffs can only survive a motion to dismiss claims brought under this prong if they plead sufficient facts to support another cause of action. See Moran v. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 5th 1131, 1142 (2016). Since they have not, their UCL unlawful prong claim cannot survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Where “other claims fail, [the] UCL claims premised on ‘unlawful acts ha[ve] no basis and must also fail.”).

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices; its unlawful prong requires an underlying statutory or common-law violation, while private individuals may obtain restitution or injunctive relief but not damages or attorney fees.

Lawrence v. Cenlar F.S.B. · filed 2024-09-05

Plaintiffs allege a violation of the UCL, which prohibits “unfair competition,” which is “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act of practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “A business act or practice may violate the UCL if it is either ‘unlawful,’ ‘unfair,’ or ‘fraudulent,’” as “[e]ach of these three adjectives captures ‘a separate and distinct theory of liability.’” Rubio v. Cap. One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010). To plead a violation of the “unlawful” prong, a plaintiff must plead a violation of another statute or common law. Shumake v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. CV16-4296-CA(AGRX), 2017 WL 1362681, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017). To plead a violation of the “unfair” prong, a plaintiff must allege a business practice that “‘offends an established public policy’ or is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’” McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 509, 530 (1984)). To allege a violation of the “fraudulent” prong, “it is only necessary to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Buller v. Sutter Health, 160 Cal. App. 4th 981, 986 (2008). “The UCL, while broad in scope, is limited in remedies. Private individuals . . . may win restitution or injunctive relief, but they cannot obtain damages or attorney fees.” De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 966, 983 (2018) (citations omitted).

Section 17200 is violated when a defendant’s act or practice satisfies any one of its unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent prongs, and a UCL claim predicated on a failed underlying law also fails.

Vashisht-Rota v. Ottawa University · filed 2024-09-30

California prohibits unfair competition by means of “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (emphasis added). “Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it is violated where a defendant’s act or practice violates any of the foregoing prongs.”

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts or practices, and each prong provides an independent theory of liability.

Ottesen v. Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2024-12-23

California’s UCL “prohibits any unfair competition, which means ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” ... “Each of the three ‘prongs’ under the UCL – (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, and (3) fraudulent – creates an independent theory of liability.” ... A plaintiff may bring a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL if the defendant’s conduct is “likely to deceive members of the public.” ... In addition, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a duty to disclose, Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1557 (2007), as well as reliance, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 328 (2009). ... Ottesen has thus stated a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL. ... Next, Ottesen’s “unlawful” claim under the UCL relies upon violations of the FDCA and California’s Sherman Law. ... The Court thus finds that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a claim for relief under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. ... Here, because the Court has already found that Ottesen adequately alleges conduct that is misleading and fraudulent, the same conduct also meets either of the applicable ‘unfair’ standards both as conduct that inflicts harm to consumers without any justifiable utility and conduct that “violates a particular public policy—prohibitions against fraud” under the Sherman Law.

The UCL claim may proceed where conduct accompanying allegedly permitted nonpayment is not clearly authorized, and TVPA violations and coercive forced-labor practices support its unlawful and unfair prongs.

Ruelas v. County of Alameda · filed 2025-02-20

Even if the California Penal Code operated to “make lawful” the nonpayment of compensation to non-convicted detainees (a conclusion the Court need not and does not make), the Penal Code does not make lawful the threats, coercion, and exploitation that the SAC alleges. ... So too here: the California Penal Code’s provision regarding compensation to non-convicted detainees does not “clearly permit” Aramark’s failure to provide compensation coupled with the threatening and coercive conduct alleged in the SAC. ... The California Supreme Court’s and Ninth Circuit’s subsequent rulings on the Labor Code claim do not disturb the viability of Plaintiffs’ TVPA claim or its sufficiency as a predicate violation for Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. For that reason, the Court declines to dismiss the “unlawful” prong of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. ... That alleged conduct “offends established public policy” as reflected in the TVPA and Bane Act. ... Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the “unfair” prong of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.

Section 17200 requires a UCL plaintiff to allege economic injury caused by the challenged violations; its unlawful prong makes violations of other laws independently actionable, and an unsupported unfair-prong theory fails.

Martinez v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2025-04-30

A claim arising under the UCL requires “that plaintiffs suffered an economic injury and that the alleged injury was a result of the violations.” ... Here, plaintiff gives no indication that the foreclosure sale is still pending or that his house has been sold yet. ... Plaintiff has therefore not alleged a cognizable economic injury under the UCL. ... The “unlawful” prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... Because each of plaintiff’s other claims will be dismissed, the UCL fails to the extent it is asserted under the “unlawful” prong. Moreover, plaintiff provides no authority indicating that he states a claim under the UCL’s “unfair” prong. ... Accordingly, the sixth claim will be dismissed.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong requires a sufficiently pleaded predicate-law violation, while its unfair prong requires a plausibly alleged substantial injury that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits and could not reasonably have been avoided.

Erickson v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation · filed 2025-07-28

The unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable.” ... “Accordingly, to state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead a predicate violation.” ... To invoke the unfair prong, a plaintiff must plausibly allege her “injury is substantial, is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury the consumer[] [herself] could reasonably have avoided.” ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the remaining claims under the UCL’s unlawful and unfair prongs.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and misleading advertising, and its unlawful prong requires a violation of another law.

Lewis v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc. · filed 2025-08-08

To state a UCL claim, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 22, 2003) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). ... To state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, the alleged conduct must violate a “borrowed” law. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012). No independent right to sue exists under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. Mejia v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 793 F. App’x 519, 521 (9th Cir. 2019).

Section 17200 permits out-of-state parties to invoke its remedies only when wrongful conduct harming them occurred in California; a deceptive claim must satisfy Rule 9(b), an unfair claim must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions, and an unlawful-prong claim cannot rest solely on a common-law violation.

In re Wells Fargo Mortgage Modification Litigation · filed 2025-11-18

Where, as here, a § 17200 claim is based on assertedly fraudulent conduct, whether a "false representation" or a theory of "nondisclosure," the plaintiff must plead the claim in conformity with Rule 9(b). ... To the extent plaintiffs contend Wells Fargo undermined policies underlying HAMP, plaintiffs must establish such policies are "tethered to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions," ... Moreover, an "'unlawful' prong" claim cannot be based on a "common law violation," such as breach of contract. ... Accordingly, to the extent Count Six is based on the unlawful prong, Count Six is subject to dismissal.

Section 17200 claims require proof of reliance, or of the defendant’s intent to generate reliance, on the allegedly deceptive conduct.

In re Fyre Festival Litigation · filed 2020-12-01

The claims for relief under various state statutes fare no better under the predominance inquiry. Like common law fraud, California’s False Advertising Law and Unfair Competition Law, and Illinois’s Consumer Fraud Act all require plaintiff to demonstrate reliance (or defendant’s intent to generate reliance) on the allegedly deceptive conduct, raising the same aforementioned individual issues.

A UCL plaintiff must show harm caused by the challenged conduct, and a presumption of reliance may not arise when class members received materially disparate information.

McGhee v. North American Bancard, LLC · filed 2022-05-25

However, the presumption of reliance will not arise in every UCL case. ... “For example, it might well be that there was no cohesion among the members because they were exposed to quite disparate information from various representatives of the defendant.” ... Thus, common questions would not predominate as to what messages the purported class members were exposed to.

A plaintiff asserting a UCL claim based on an affirmative misrepresentation must plead that the misrepresentation was a substantial factor in the plaintiff's decision-making process.

KIMBALL v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2023-08-28

A plaintiff must establish that the misrepresentation “was a substantial factor in [her] decision making process” to sufficiently plead reliance under the CLRA and UCL. ... Plaintiff, however, still fails to include an appropriate level of detail to substantiate her claims. For example, Plaintiff does not point to any specific statements in any of the documents, plead when she reviewed these documents, or indicate that any statement was a substantial factor that led to her purchase. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an affirmative misrepresentation claim in the Amended Complaint.

California’s Unfair Competition Law does not apply to a claim arising from a service-contract purchase made in Pennsylvania when the relevant transaction occurred there.

Shuman v. SquareTrade Inc. · filed 2020-12-18

Accordingly, the Court finds that based on the facts alleged in the FAC, and particularly, the fact that Shuman purchased the service contract from which his UCL Claim arises in Pennsylvania, Shuman cannot assert a claim under California’s UCL. Therefore, the Court dismisses Claim Five with prejudice.

California's UCL does not govern alleged unfair practices occurring wholly in Kansas when California has no connection to the parties or conduct.

Carson v. Kramer & Frank, P.C. · filed 2021-03-15

The place of the wrong here is clearly Kansas, not California.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and misleading advertising, and a corporate plaintiff cannot pursue contract-based unfairness under it without alleging that it is a competitor or consumer.

Aton Center, Inc. v. Regence Blue Shield of Washington · filed 2021-02-16

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) “prohibits ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” ... “In prohibiting any unlawful business practice, the UCL borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.” ... “where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.” ... In this case, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to infer that Plaintiff is either Defendant’s competitor or consumer. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 against Defendant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

A corporate plaintiff bringing a contract-based UCL unfairness claim must allege that it is a competitor or consumer and must plead facts supporting the challenged unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practice.

Aton Center, Inc. v. Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon · filed 2021-02-16

where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.

Section 17200 does not apply to a contract-based action that involves neither the general public nor individual consumers who are parties to the contracts.

HSM Holdings, LLC v. Mantu I.M. Mobile LTD. · filed 2021-03-10

Despite this broad scope, Section 17200 is inapplicable for an action “based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contracts.” Linear Tech. Corp., 152 Cal. App. 4th at 135; see also O.F.I. Imports Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 2016 WL 5376208, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016) (Section 17200 “does not reach claims based on bilateral contracts between commercial entities capable of protecting their own interests.”). Plaintiff does not claim that Defendants’ conduct harmed the general public or any individual consumers.

A corporate plaintiff cannot use the UCL to obtain relief for a contract-based dispute between commercial parties when the alleged practices do not harm the public or individual consumers.

SOMERS v. QVC, INC. · filed 2021-09-23

Where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks. ... Plaintiffs have not put forward evidence that QVC’s alleged conduct caused harm to the public or consumers, as Plaintiffs have not claimed that the public was deceived in any way or forced to pay higher prices for nutrition supplements. Rather, this is a dispute between commercial parties over their economic relationship. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim fails and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count V.

Section 17200's UCL claim could proceed insofar as it was based on conduct under the distributor agreement while termination remained factually disputed, but not insofar as it was based on rejecting an unaccepted purchase order.

Quanergy Solutions, Inc. v. EOS Australia PTY LTD · filed 2025-09-09

Otherwise, to the extent Quanergy’s UCL claim is based on the Agreement, because there is a dispute of material fact regarding termination, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to the UCL claim.

Section 17200 does not provide UCL relief to a corporate plaintiff for contract disputes involving neither the public in general nor individual consumers.

Linear Technology v. Applied Materials · filed 2007-06-18

In these circumstances, where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and misleading advertising, and a UCL claim may be based on showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived without proving actual reliance.

Roley v. Google LLC · filed 2021-03-22

The UCL prohibits ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Unlike common-law fraud claims that focus on the victim’s reliance or damages, the UCL focuses on the perpetrator’s behavior: ‘to state a claim under either the UCL . . . it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009)), abrogated by Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL claim based on advertising may proceed when a significant portion of reasonable consumers could be misled.

Appel v. Boston National Title Agency, LLC · filed 2021-09-17

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice,” see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, ... “[T]o state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law . . . ‘it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” ... “‘Likely to deceive’ . . . indicates that the ad is such that it is probable that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” ... Because there exist genuine disputes material fact as to whether Defendant falsely advertised that it was licensed as an escrow agent and to do business in California and as to whether Plaintiffs relied upon this representation, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ UCL and FAL claims.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices and requires a UCL misrepresentation claim to show that the challenged misrepresentations are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

Shepardson v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee for Bungalow Series IV Trust · filed 2024-07-03

The UCL at § 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To establish a claim under the FAL and UCL a plaintiff must show “that the defendant’s claimed misrepresentations are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.” Stein Mart, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 (citing Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)). ... Plaintiff alleges US Bank violated the UCL because it (1) represented in monthly statements that if Plaintiff “timely and properly paid the monthly payment claimed due that the loan would be current, and thus the loan would not be foreclosed on;” (2) brought “foreclosure actions against similarly situated borrowers;” (3) wrongfully imposed costs, fees, and interest to his balance; and (4) kept more of a payment on his principal balance than was due. ... First, as addressed above, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a promise by US Bank that it would not pursue default and foreclosure on Plaintiff’s property. The claim therefore fails here under a heightened pleading standard. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is dismissed with leave to amend.

The UCL primarily preserves fair business competition, a traditional state responsibility, and its application is not barred by the foreign-affairs doctrine absent more-than-incidental conflict with federal foreign policy.

Xianhua v. Oath Holdings, Inc. f/k/a/Yahoo! Inc. · filed 2021-04-29

Second, the UCL addresses a traditional state responsibility. Specifically, the UCL’s main purpose is the “preservation of fair business competition.” See Cel-Tech. Commc’ns Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). The preservation of fair business competition is a traditional state responsibility, which states have long regulated. See Gingery, 831 F.3d at 1230 (concluding that the construction of a monument fell within a traditional state responsibility because “[g]overnments have long used monuments to speak to the public”) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Defendants have not contended that the “real purpose” of the UCL is to regulate foreign affairs. Cf. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 964 (“Though [the state statute] purports to regulate property, an area traditionally left to the states . . . [the state statute’s] real purpose is to provide relief to Holocaust victims and their heirs.”).

Section 17200 unfair-competition claims are substantially congruent with Lanham Act claims, so a § 17200 claim based on the same deficient allegations was dismissed along with the Lanham Act claim.

Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equipment, Inc. · filed 2022-02-09

X-Body asserts similar competition claims under state law. See Second Am. Countercl. ¶¶ 107–114 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 and Ore. Rev. Stat. 646.607). The Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991)). ... The ninth and tenth counterclaims are dismissed.

Section 17200 provides an unfair-competition claim that is substantially congruent with a Lanham Act trademark-infringement claim, so adequately pleading trademark infringement suffices to plead the state claim.

Lolicel (PTY) Ltd. v. Stanmar International [USA] Inc. · filed 2023-04-27

Further, regarding Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action, the Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” ... “Because these claims are substantially congruent, if Plaintiff has sufficiently pled claims for trademark infringement, it too has sufficiently pled a claim for unfair business practices.” ... For the same reasons that Plaintiff fails to state a trade dress infringement claim, Plaintiff’s claim for unfair competition also fails. ... Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion as to the claims for federal unfair competition and false advertising and unfair competition under Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 with leave to amend.

A plaintiff who establishes a Lanham Act unfair-competition claim sufficiently states a parallel California UCL claim.

Restoration Hardware, Inc. v. Alimia Light · filed 2024-08-26

Thus, because RH has demonstrated a Lanham Act claim, it has sufficiently stated a UCL claim.

Section 17200 claims based on the same conduct as Lanham Act claims are substantially congruent with those federal claims and survive dismissal when the Lanham Act claims survive.

Novo Nordisk A/S v. Goglia Nutrition, LLC · filed 2025-09-08

The Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” Cleary v. News Corp., F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994). As such, if claims relying on the exact same factual conduct survive dismissal under the Lanham Act, they survive under California Competition Law.

A California UCL claim based on trademark-related conduct shares the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion requirement.

Glydways, Inc. v. Glyd · filed 2025-10-23

All these claims generally share one common core requirement—that the infringer’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion.

A California Unfair Competition Law claim under § 17200 is substantially congruent to a Lanham Act trademark-infringement claim, so analogous state claims are evaluated under the same standards.

Gibralter, LLC, et al. v. DMS Flowers · filed 2025-09-11

Similarly, a cause of action under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (“UCL”), is “substantially congruent” to a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. ... Here, because the standards of the aforementioned state law claims mirror the standards required to state a claim for the analogous federal claims, Plaintiffs’ state law claims for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution fail for the same reasons as the federal claims as set forth above.

Section 17200 claims are substantially congruent with Lanham Act claims and may be analyzed under the same trademark-infringement framework, including ownership and likelihood of confusion.

Restoration Hardware, Inc. v. Sichuan Wei Li Tian Xia Network Technology Co., Ltd · filed 2023-04-05

“Actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” ... “Thus, the Court analyzes these two claims together.” ... “Thus, given RH establishes ownership over the marks and likelihood of confusion, RH meets its burden to plead “facts sufficient to establish and succeed upon its claims” for trademark infringement and unfair competition.”

Section 17200 trademark unfair competition claims are substantially congruent with Lanham Act claims and receive the same analysis.

Wunderwerks, Inc. v. Dual Beverage Company LLC · filed 2021-12-06

Regarding plaintiff’s state law claims (3) and (4), the Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California business and Professions Code 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.”

Section 17200 unfair competition claims based on trademark infringement are substantially congruent with Lanham Act claims.

Trove Brands, LLC v. TRRS Magnate LLC · filed 2025-03-11

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” ... Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the California unfair competition claims.

Section 17200 establishes independent unlawfulness, unfairness, and fraud theories; UCL plaintiffs may obtain only restitution or injunctive relief, and class-wide restitution must have a measurable, evidence-supported basis that can be calculated on a class-wide basis.

NEALE v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2021-07-15

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. California courts have interpreted this language to authorize three independent bases for recovery: unlawfulness, unfairness, and fraud. ... Prevailing plaintiffs under the UCL are limited to restitution or injunctive relief. ... Still, restitution “must be of a measurable amount to restore to the plaintiff what has been acquired by violations of the statutes, and that measurable amount must be supported by evidence.” ... Plaintiffs have therefore failed to demonstrate predominance as to their UCL claims.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and restitution requires that the defendant obtained something to which it was not entitled while the plaintiff gave up something it was entitled to keep.

Boobuli's LLC v. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company · filed 2024-01-24

The UCL “prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). ... The essential conditions of a claim for restitution under § 17200 are that (1) the defendant obtained something to which it was not entitled and (2) the plaintiff gave up something which he or she was entitled to keep. ... Because State Farm did not acquire and keep anything to which it was not entitled, nor withhold something from Boobuli’s, Boobuli’s cannot recover restitution for its UCL claim.

When an unfair competition claim seeks restitution for improperly denied insurance benefits, liability requires an individual assessment of each insured’s claim.

Newell v. State Farm General Insurance · filed 2004-04-26

Thus, the individualized assessments necessary for the breach of contract and bad faith causes of action also are necessary to establish liability for unfair competition.

Section 17200 can cover competitor claims targeting the market effects of allegedly unlawful business practices despite tangential securities ties, but a claim based on foreign securities transactions fails absent allegations bringing those transactions within the governing federal and state laws.

BBAM Aircraft Management LP v. Babcock & Brown LLC · filed 2024-03-25

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 provides from the outset that “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” ... In all, the Bowen holding that “securities transactions are not covered under the UCL bars lawsuits based on deceptive conduct in the sale and purchase of securities, nothing more.” ... Where, as here, Defendants’ counterclaim is based on the effect of Plaintiff’s actions on the consumer market, the UCL claim may not be precluded by the conduct’s tangential ties to securities transactions.

The UCL exclusion for securities transactions reaches deceptive conduct in the sale or purchase of securities, but not related business practices outside those transactions.

Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. · filed 2007-05-30

... its holding that securities transactions are not covered under the UCL bars lawsuits based on deceptive conduct in the sale and purchase of securities, nothing more.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a plaintiff seeking UCL equitable relief must plead that legal remedies are inadequate and, for prospective injunctive relief, an imminent future injury.

Porcu v. Geico General Insurance Company · filed 2024-08-09

To bring a claim for a violation of California’s UCL, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” ... A plaintiff “must establish that []he lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL.” ... Plaintiff, however, failed to do so here. ... The UCL claim is therefore dismissed on this ground. ... Prospective injunctive relief under the UCL requires a plaintiff to show a “a real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury.” ... Plaintiff here fails to plead any facts showing an immediate threat of a future injury that is certainly impending. ... The UCL claim is therefore dismissed on this ground as well.

A UCL plaintiff must show that legal remedies are inadequate to obtain restitution or disgorgement for past harm, but may pursue injunctive relief aimed at preventing future harm.

Castillo v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2025-07-01

However, Plaintiff is correct that “monetary damages for past harm are an inadequate remedy for the future harm that an injunction under California consumer protection law is aimed at.” Zeiger v. WellPet LLC, 526 F. Supp. 3d 652, 687 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Accordingly, although Plaintiff is not entitled to seek restitution or disgorgement based on her UCL and FAL claims, the Court declines to dismiss those equitable claims in their entirety and will allow them to proceed seeking injunctive relief.

Section 17200 permits restitution for unpaid wages, but equitable restitution in federal court is available only when legal remedies are inadequate.

Slater · filed 2025-10-14

Slater alleged a claim for restitution of unpaid overtime wages and equal pay under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. ... It is also true that Slater may obtain equitable restitution in federal court only if her legal remedies are inadequate. ... Slater did not demonstrate that an award of backpay for lost overtime wages would in any way be inadequate, or that restitution would provide a more complete remedy.

Section 17200 permits a claim for declaratory relief challenging a hospital lien that the hospital lien statute does not authorize.

Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West · filed 2003-02-25

We hold only that, based on the pleadings before the trial court, appellant has stated a cause of action for declaratory relief under the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200) and the judgment against him, dismissing this action, was erroneous.

Courts may abstain from granting restitution and disgorgement under section 17200 when those remedies would interfere with a complex administrative scheme.

Shamsian v. Department of Conservation · filed 2006-02-07

The trial court properly exercised its discretion to abstain from employing the remedies available under the unfair competition law. ... For the court at this point to issue restitution and disgorgement orders against the corporate defendants would interfere with the department’s administration of the act and regulation of beverage container recycling and potentially risk throwing the entire complex economic arrangement out of balance.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a UCL fraudulent-omission claim requires pleading an omission or misrepresentation, reliance, and damages.

Grausz v. The Hershey Company · filed 2024-08-15

California’s UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... To state a fraudulent omission or misrepresentation claim under the UCL, FAL, or CLRA, a plaintiff must plead (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) reliance, and (3) damages.

Section 17200 permits a UCL claim to proceed at the pleading stage when a fraudulent omission is sufficiently alleged, even if affirmative misrepresentations are not sufficiently pleaded.

Boldt v. Caesarstone USA Inc. · filed 2024-12-24

While the Court finds that the alleged omission is sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ UCL, CLRA, and fraud by omission claims against Caesarstone on its own, to the extent Plaintiffs are relying on affirmative misrepresentations by IKEA or Caesarstone to support their claims, the Court does not find those to have been sufficiently pleaded.

Under the UCL, restitution generally reflects the difference between the price paid and the product's reasonable value, but a full refund may be available when the product had no value to the plaintiff.

Hawkins v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2024-08-23

Hawkins is correct that restitution damages are generally calculated by focusing “on the difference between what was paid and what a reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of purchase without the fraudulent or omitted information.” Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2015). However, a plaintiff may recover the full purchase price if the product has no value to the plaintiff. “‘A full refund may be available in a UCL case when the plaintiffs prove the product had no value to them’ because ‘the price paid minus the value actually received equals the price paid’—zero.” Panera Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-CV-01271-RS, 2016 WL 1535057, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2016) (citing In re Tobacco Cases II, 240 Cal. App. 4th 779, 795 (2015)).

The UCL permits restitution, and a full refund may be available when plaintiffs prove the product had no value.

LeGrand v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 2025-08-12

The UCL, FAL, and CLRA “authorize a trial court to grant restitution to private litigants asserting claims under those statutes.” ... Under California law, “[a] full refund may be available in a UCL case when the plaintiffs prove the product had no value.”

The UCL provides equitable relief rather than contract damages, and a plaintiff must lack an adequate legal remedy to obtain restitution for past harm.

Aegis Senior Communities LLC v. UKG Inc. · filed 2024-09-04

UCL claims cannot be based on contract breaches and cannot seek contract damages. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Serv., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). Aegis seeks to claw money from UKG that it purportedly paid (or failed to pay) to others, including the “fees paid to defend itself from the class actions.” FAC ¶ 187. But Aegis cannot attempt to recoup money it paid to third parties under the UCL. Moreover, Aegis fails to plead that it lacks an adequate remedy at law, nor could it given that it asserts multiple legal claims seeking monetary damages arising out of the same conduct. Cf. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844.

Section 17200 claims under the Unfair Business Practices Act do not permit damages.

Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-07-25

As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, damages are not available for claims under the Unfair Business Practices Act. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1266 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545].)

Section 17200 does not require proof of damages; damages are not recoverable on an unfair business practice claim.

Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia · filed 2002-11-25

This argument does not apply to the unfair business practice claim (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 170 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527] [damages are not recoverable on that cause of action]), and does not defeat the cause of action for abuse of process.

Section 17200 can support claims involving insurance ratemaking, but it cannot be used to challenge a rate approved by the Department of Insurance.

MacKay v. Superior Court · filed 2010-10-06

It therefore follows that, to the extent it is alleged that an act which violates the ratemaking chapter also violates another law applicable to business generally, such as Business and Professions Code section 17200, an action under the latter statute may proceed. ... We have concluded that Insurance Code section 1860.1 precludes a challenge to an approved rate brought under laws outside the Insurance Code.

Section 17200 permits an insurer’s conduct that breaches the implied covenant of good faith to also constitute an unfair business practice, and factual disputes supporting the bad-faith claim can preclude summary judgment on the UCL claim.

Monahan Pacific Corporation v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America · filed 2024-09-04

Summary judgment is denied for the claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Conduct by an insurer that constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith “may also constitute an unfair business practice under section 17200.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1105 (1996) (emphasis in original), abrogated on other grounds by Cal-Tech Comms., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (Cal. 1999); see also Zhang v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 4th 364, 380-82 (2013). As discussed, the Court finds there are material disputes of fact in connection with Monahan’s bad-faith claim, insofar as it is based on allegations relating to replacement-cost and demolition-cost benefits. Consequently, that same disputes of fact exist in connection with Monahan’s UCL claim, precluding judgment at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 17200 restitution is an equitable remedy, and in federal court it requires showing that the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law.

Edd King v. National General Insurance Company · filed 2025-08-29

Restitution under the UCL is an equitable remedy. ... Under these principles, Plaintiffs must establish that they lack “an adequate remedy at law” before securing restitution for past harm under the UCL.

Section 17200 permits an unfair business practice claim against an insurer that issues separate vehicle policies but refuses to allow an insured to waive uninsured motorist coverage for fewer than all vehicles, if that refusal is proved.

Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2001-11-20

The same conclusion does not apply, however, to those insurers that issued separate policies for each of an insured’s multiple vehicles, but nonetheless refused to permit any waiver that did not include all of the insured’s vehicles. ... We have no trouble concluding, given our review of the authorities discussed above, that such conduct, if proven, would constitute an unfair business practice actionable under the UCL.

Section 17200 does not make an insurer’s use of replacement cost less depreciation to adjust property claims, without more, an unlawful or unfair business practice.

Community Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Security Insurance · filed 2001-10-04

We conclude that plaintiff’s complaint does not state an “unlawful business practice” under the UCL because the simplistic legal formulation of the claim mischaracterizes the holding in Jefferson and fails to take into consideration the safeguard of the appraisal process provided by the Legislature within Insurance Code section 2071. ... Nor can we conclude that a practice by one or more carriers of using the “replacement cost less depreciation” valuation is an “unfair practice.”

Section 17200 does not allow an insured to pursue an unfair competition claim by relabeling an insurer’s alleged claims handling misconduct covered by the Unfair Insurance Practices Act.

Textron Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2004-06-18

Under the foregoing cases, merely alleging these purported acts ... constitute unfair business practices under the unfair competition law is insufficient to overcome ... Moradi-Shalal.

Section 17200 permits a claim based on an Insurance Code violation unrelated to ratemaking.

Krumme v. Mercury Insurance · filed 2004-10-29

A claim predicated on a violation of the Insurance Code not related to ratemaking may thus be framed as a claim under the UCL.

Section 17200 permits an insured to bring a UCL claim against an insurer based on independent statutory or common law duties, even when the same conduct also violates the UIPA.

Zhang v. Superior Court · filed 2013-08-01

We hold that Moradi-Shalal does not preclude first party UCL actions based on grounds independent from section 790.03, even when the insurer‟s conduct also violates section 790.03.

The UCL does not apply to a voluntary member association's noncommercial data-security dispute unless the dispute arises from the sale of goods.

Keown v. International Association of Sheet Metal Air Rail Transportation Workers · filed 2024-09-19

As for the UCL, both state and federal courts in California have found it inapplicable to voluntary member associations unless the dispute arises from the sale of goods. ... Because SMART’s purported failures to “implement and maintain reasonable security and privacy measures” is not alleged to have arisen from the sale of goods, Angus’s UCL claim would similarly fail. ... Therefore, application of any of these laws would “produce the identical result as D.C. law,” so there is no true conflict and D.C. law applies by default. ... Because SMART is a nonprofit and Angus’s claim does not “aris[e] from the purchase or sale of consumer goods or services,” the DCCPA, like the CCPA and UCL, does not provide a cause of action. D.C. Code § 28–3905(k)(5). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts 5 and 6 of the amended complaint.

Section 17200's unlawful prong borrows violations of other laws and makes them independently actionable, so adequately pleaded CLRA or FAL violations can also support a UCL claim.

Calderon v. Kate Spade & Company, LLC · filed 2020-03-05

California’s UCL proscribes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The unlawful prong of the UCL borrows from other laws and makes them independently actionable. Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1233 (2007). Thus, violations of the CLRA and FAL also constitute violations of the UCL. See Rael v. New York & Co., Inc., No. 16-cv-369-BAS(JMA), 2017 WL 3021019, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 2017) (“Because the Court finds Plaintiff adequately alleges a violation of the FAL and the CLRA, Plaintiff also adequately alleges a violation of the UCL ‘unlawful’ prong.”)

Section 17200 permits violations of the Unruh Act to be prosecuted as acts of unfair competition.

Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28

As in the case of the Mobilehome Parks Act under consideration in McKale, neither the Unruh Act nor any other statute expressly provides that violations of the Unruh Act may not be prosecuted as acts of unfair competition.

Section 17200 treats violations of statutory prohibitions against discrimination in insurance sales as unfair business practices.

Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Low · filed 2002-01-16

Also relevant is the law dealing with unfair business practices codified in Business and Professions Code section 17200. This section defines as unfair competition any unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices. Virtually any state, federal or local law can serve as the predicate act to constitute an unfair business practice. (Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 89.) Therefore, any violation of the statutory prohibitions against discrimination in the sales of insurance (§§ 679.71 & 11628) would constitute an unfair business practice.

Section 17200 permits an unfair competition claim based on a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violation unless federal law preempts the claim.

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2001-10-24

Thus, there is no express bar to predicating an unfair competition action on 15 United States Code section 78dd-2. Such an action would be barred only if it is preempted by the federal statute.

Section 17200 makes violations of other laws independently actionable as unfair competition.

Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. · filed 2003-03-03

Section 17200 “borrows” violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.

Section 17200 provides a separate remedy for unfair business practices based on violations of other laws; a UCL action does not merely enforce the underlying law.

Solus Indus. Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty. · filed 2018-02-08

As explained below, under state law, actions under the UCL or FAL are not considered to be a means of enforcing the law claimed to have been violated; rather, they provide a remedy for economic damage suffered as a result of violations of a wide array of other laws.

Section 17200 provides an independent basis for an unfair competition claim based on alleged Labor Code section 204 violations, even when no separate section 204 claim remains.

Countrywide Financial Corp. v. Bundy · filed 2010-08-06

Thus, Business and Professions Code section 17200 provides an independent basis for potential liability apart from Labor Code section 204.

An unfair competition claim based on unpaid wages survives summary adjudication when the underlying wage claim remains viable.

Gomez v. Lincare, Inc. · filed 2009-04-03

Because we have concluded, ante, that Lincare failed to meet its initial burden of proof on the motions for summary adjudication regarding the driver’s overtime exemption defense, the cause of action for unfair competition based on Lineare’s alleged failure to pay plaintiffs for the hours worked survives.

Section 17200 permits a derivative unfair-competition claim based on an alleged § 2923.5 violation to proceed when the underlying statutory claim is sufficiently pleaded, and foreclosure jeopardy can establish standing.

Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-08-06

As a derivative claim based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply with Cal Civ. Code § 2923.5, the Barrionuevos’ § 17200 claim rises and falls along with that underlying cause of action. Having already determined that Plaintiffs’ § 2923.5 claim was pled with enough specificity and factual support to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ § 17200 claim is likewise sufficiently pled under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 17200's UCL claim may be adequately pleaded when it is based on the same counterfeit-mark conduct supporting trademark-infringement and false-designation claims.

Adobe Systems Incorporated v. Nwubah · filed 2020-06-23

Courts typically analyze claims for federal trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and violations of the UCL together. See, e.g., Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Dafang USA, LLC, 2019 WL 7841862, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Tanvir, 2017 WL 2986219, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2017) (“The first, second, and fifth claims [for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and violations of the UCL] share the same analysis . . . .”). ... As a result, “[b]ecause the trademark-infringement, unfair-competition, and business-practices causes of action share the same analysis, [Defendant] has properly stated all three claims.” Tanvir, 2017 WL 2986219, at *4.

A UCL claim based on alleged fraudulent conduct must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity requirement, and an alleged purchase induced by misrepresentation can constitute economic injury sufficient for standing.

Minkler v. Apple, Inc. · filed 2014-08-20

An allegation that the plaintiff would not have bought a product but for the purported misrepresentation has been found to be an economic injury sufficient to create standing under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately alleged an economic injury sufficient to create standing for her UCL, CLRA and FAL claims. ... When a plaintiff alleges a course of fraudulent conduct and relies upon that for the basis of her claim, the claim is said to be “grounded in fraud” or to “sound in fraud” and must meet the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. ... Because Plaintiff has not pled with particularity the circumstances surrounding Apple’s fraudulent behavior, she has failed to meet the 9(b) pleading standards for her claims sounding in fraud and the Court will dismiss the CLRA, FAL, and UCL counts against Apple.

Section 17200 requires a plaintiff pursuing a fraud-based UCL claim to prove reliance, including a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the purchase; exposure to a statement alone is insufficient.

Young v. Cree, Inc. · filed 2021-10-12

Claims 1 through 4 of the ACAC arise out of the UCL, FAL, CLRA, and common law fraud. ... Because these claims sound in fraud, Young is required to allege and prove reliance, among other elements. ... As relevant here, the element of reliance requires evidence of the existence of a causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s purchase of the product at issue; that causal connection exists where the plaintiff would not have purchased the product in the absence of the alleged misrepresentation. ... Young’s testimony that he saw or read certain statements by Cree when he purchased the products at issue is not enough, without more, to show a causal connection between them and his purchase of the LED bulbs. Exposure to an alleged misrepresentation is not the same thing as relying on the alleged misrepresentation. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that claims 1 through 4 fail for lack of evidence of reliance. The Court GRANTS Cree’s motion for summary judgment as to these claims.

Section 17200 does not require a plaintiff to show consumer reliance at the pleading stage of a false advertising claim.

Eli Lilly and Company v. Adonis Health, Inc. · filed 2025-09-24

Second, at this stage, Lilly need not show consumer reliance.

A UCL plaintiff seeking equitable relief must allege that available legal remedies are inadequate.

SDLA Courier Service, Inc. v. Unlimited Capital, LLC · filed 2024-09-06

Because only equitable remedies are available for a UCL claim, for the Court to have equitable jurisdiction over the UCL claim, here, Plaintiffs must allege that all available legal remedies are inadequate. ... Here, SDLA and Goodman failed to allege that all available legal remedies are inadequate. Consequently, the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over the UCL claim.

A deceptive labeling claim under section 17200 fails when the labels clearly disclose the product’s ingredients and no reasonable consumer would be misled.

Simpson v. Kroger Corp. · filed 2013-09-25

Our case is similar. The labels on the products here clearly informed any reasonable consumer that the products contain both butter and canola or olive oil. This was plain on both the top and side panels of the tubs in which the products are sold. No reasonable person could purchase these products believing that they had purchased a product containing only butter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

Section 17200 reaches deceptive product labeling when the alleged representation is plausibly likely to deceive reasonable consumers; here, the artificial-preservative theory survived dismissal, while the artificial-flavor theory was dismissed without prejudice.

Wilson v. Smartfoods, Inc. · filed 2025-05-05

To state a claim under any of the state consumer protection statutes, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that PepsiCo’s labeling is “likely to deceive reasonable consumers.” ... With respect to their artificial preservative claim, Plaintiffs have done enough to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ... Plaintiffs’ claims with respect to their artificial flavor theory are dismissed without prejudice as are all their claims related to the Movie Theater Butter Popcorn variety. PepsiCo’s motion is otherwise denied.

Section 17200 covers misleading product labeling, and evidence that ingredient amounts varied dramatically can establish a probability of success on an unfair competition claim.

Nagel v. Twin Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2003-05-22

The unfair competition law prohibits any unlawful, unfair, deceptive or misleading business practice. ... The evidence offered by Nagel was sufficient to establish a probability he would prevail on the merits of his claims. Accepting all admissible evidence as true and indulging in every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence, the trial court properly found Twin Labs' statements were either false or likely to be misleading to a reasonable consumer.

A UCL claim that is entirely derivative of a tortious-interference claim superseded by CUTSA is likewise dismissed as superseded.

Auris Health, Inc. v. Noah Medical Corporation · filed 2023-11-03

Auris’s Section UCL claim against Noah is entirely derivative of the tortious interference claim. FAC §] 274-79. Accordingly, the Court also dismisses Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action.

A Section 17200 claim cannot be dismissed as superseded by CUTSA before the court can determine which allegations, if any, involve valid trade secrets.

Genasys Inc. v. Vector Acoustics, LLC · filed 2022-11-01

Without knowing which allegations—if any—contain valid trade secrets, the Court is not able to determine whether those claims are preempted by CUTSA. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Section 17200.

Section 17200 permits an injunction against palming off another’s designs as one’s own when the conduct presents a sufficient threat of future violation.

Gladstone v. Hillel · filed 1988-08-15

Similarly, the decree may enjoin the use of respondent’s jewelry as a plug in a direct molding process in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17300 or the “palming oif” of respondent’s designs as appellants’ own in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. There was evidence tending to prove that several items of jewelry were directly molded from pieces that Gladstone had fabricated. The evidence of “palming off” was slight—a few apparent copies retained his signature-—-but appellants’ conduct displayed a pattern of wrongfully using Gladstone’s molds and designs which represented a sufficient threat of violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 to justify a decree which includes an injunction against future violation of that statute.

Section 17200 does not let a plaintiff maintain an unfair competition action to bypass the bar imposed by Moradi-Shalal after settling the underlying claim.

Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Superior Court · filed 1990-01-04

Though the issue is one of first impression, we have no difficulty in deciding the Business and Professions Code provides no toehold for scaling the barrier of Moradi-Shalal. The facts at bench are indistinguishable from those in Moradi-Shalal. To permit plaintiff to maintain this action would render Moradi-Shalal meaningless. This we have neither the power nor the desire to do. Plaintiff’s action is, therefore, barred.

Section 17200 broadly defines unfair competition and allows a court to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine before deciding an action under the section.

Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court · filed 1992-04-06

Instead, as with section 1861.03, subdivision (a), we conclude the Unfair Practices Act, and Business and Professions Code section 17205 in particular, discloses no legislative intent to preclude a court from exercising discretion under the primary jurisdiction doctrine before entertaining a civil action under section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code.

Section 17200 does not allow a plaintiff to avoid the litigation privilege by pleading a claim for injunctive relief under the unfair competition law.

Rubin v. Green · filed 1993-04-05

Finally, we hold that plaintiff may not avoid the bar of section 47(b) by pleading his claim as one for injunctive relief under the unfair competition statute.

The litigation privilege does not bar a section 17200 unfair competition claim against an attorney when the plaintiff was not a party to the litigation underlying the claim.

American Products Co. v. Law Offices of Geller, Stewart & Foley · filed 2005-12-16

Here, APC was not a party to any of the litigation that underlies its unfair competition claim against the Geller defendants. ... Because we find that the litigation privilege does not apply in this case, the evidence before the trial court fails to support summary judgment in favor of the Geller defendants.

Section 17200 does not create an exception to the litigation privilege for enforcement actions brought by governmental entities.

People Ex Rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. · filed 2008-02-01

We conclude neither source provides authority for an exception to the litigation privilege for enforcement actions brought by governmental entities under the UCL.

Section 17200 claims based on conduct specifically prohibited by a borrowed statute are excepted from the litigation privilege when that statute is more specific than the privilege and the two are irreconcilable.

The People v. Persolve, LLC · filed 2013-08-15

Where, as here, the “borrowed” statute is more specific than the litigation privilege and the two are irreconcilable, unfair competition law claims based on conduct specifically prohibited by the borrowed statute are excepted from the litigation privilege.

Section 17200 remedies remain available alongside Insurance Commissioner enforcement when insurance industry conduct violates applicable law.

Manufacturers Life Insurance v. Superior Court · filed 1995-06-01

Rather, the Legislature intended that rights and remedies available under those statutes were to be cumulative to the powers the Legislature granted to the Insurance Commissioner to enjoin future unlawful acts and impose sanctions in the form of license and certificate suspension or revocation when a member of the industry violates any applicable statute, rule, or regulation.

Section 17200 applies to title insurers’ conduct unrelated to rate setting; the Insurance Code does not displace those UCL claims.

Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. · filed 1998-09-23

We conclude that the Insurance Code does not displace the UCL except as to title insurance company activities related to rate setting.

Section 17200 does not treat an insurer’s refusal to pay medical benefits to persons injured away from the insured premises as unfair competition when those persons have not established that an insured caused their injuries.

Shaolian v. Safeco Insurance Company · filed 1999-04-09

Since we have held that persons who were injured away from an insured’s premises must prove an insured caused their injuries, thus precluding their status as third party beneficiaries under the medical coverage provisions, Safeco’s conduct in regard to such persons, as alleged in the ninth cause of action, did not constitute a violation of the unfair competition laws.

Section 17200 does not support a claim to recover premiums charged at rates approved by the Insurance Commissioner.

Walker v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY · filed 2000-01-19

Under these circumstances, there is simply no violation of the law to support a Business and Professions Code section 17200 claim for disgorgement of premiums.

A government entity is not a “person” subject to an unfair business practices claim under Section 17200.

Janis v. California State Lottery Commission · filed 1998-11-30

Government entities, such as CSL, are not included in this definition of person. ... Consequently, Janis’s unfair business practices and misleading advertising claim under Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500 fails as a matter of law.

Section 17200 is sufficiently definite to provide a public policy basis for a wrongful discharge claim involving refusal to use deceptive lease sales tactics.

McFetters v. Amplicon, Inc. · filed 2000-07-17

In our view, section 17200 is sufficient for that purpose. ... In any case, it is unlikely that an employer could fail to understand that the type of tactics encouraged by Amplicon to induce unsuspecting customers into signing its leases would fall within the definition of "unfair business practices" contained in section 17200.

Section 17200 is a civil regulatory law governing business competition, so Public Law 280's criminal jurisdiction does not authorize its enforcement against a tribal member's on-reservation conduct.

People ex rel. Becerra v. Huber · filed 2018-09-25

Unlike the Directory Act and the Fire Safety Act, we view the third cause of action for violation of the UCL as a claim founded on a civil/regulatory law and thus outside Public Law 280's grant of criminal jurisdiction.

Section 17200 claims cannot provide an alternative basis for a court to hear a matter over which another tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction.

Koszdin v. State Compensation Insurance Fund · filed 2010-07-06

Where jurisdiction over subject matter is exclusive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 claims do not provide an alternative basis for the court to hear such claims.

Section 17200 does not let a plaintiff avoid a jurisdictional bar by pleading a claim under the unfair competition law.

Eckert v. BAY AREA CELLULAR TELEPHONE CO. · filed 2001-05-16

Although not raised specifically by plaintiffs, we conclude that the fact this action is brought under section 17200 of the UCL (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq.) rather than directly under section 2106 is a distinction without a difference, at least for jurisdictional purposes.

Section 17200 does not treat conduct as unfair for restraining competition and harming consumers when antitrust law deems that conduct reasonable and permissible.

Chavez v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2001-10-29

Instead we hold that conduct alleged to be “unfair” because it unreasonably restrains competition and harms consumers, such as the resale price maintenance agreement alleged here, is not “unfair” if the conduct is deemed reasonable and condoned under the antitrust laws.

A claim that a practice is unfair under section 17200 based on public policy must tie that policy to a specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.

Gregory v. Albertson's, Inc. · filed 2002-12-20

Moreover, where a claim of an unfair act or practice is predicated on public policy, we read Cel-Tech to require that the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be "tethered" to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.

Section 17200 does not allow a private plaintiff to use redevelopment law’s policy against blight to compel the marketing of a vacant shopping-center leasehold as an unfair practice.

Gregory v. Albertson's, Inc. · filed 2002-12-20

The statutory scheme of the Community Redevelopment Law, however, provides only one remedy for the phenomenon of blight condemned by Health and Safety Code section 33035—public participation in a redevelopment project. We do not think it provides any authority for the courts to balance these policies outside this statutory context by fashioning a private remedy through the use of the unfair competition law to affect a single leasehold in a shopping center.

When a direct competitor invokes section 17200’s unfair-practices provision, the alleged conduct must threaten or harm competition in a manner tied to antitrust law; injury from ordinary competition is insufficient.

Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. · filed 2006-04-26

They were therefore direct competitors. “When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” ... The first amended complaint alleges no conduct even remotely approaching a violation of an antitrust law or the policy or spirit of antitrust laws. Indeed, the gist of Stevenson’s claim is competitive, not anticompetitive, conduct by Insignia. ... Accordingly, the first amended complaint does not adequately allege that Insignia violated section 17200.

Section 17200 claims based on alleged violations of Civil Code section 1770, subdivision (a)(14), are not barred by the parol evidence rule.

Wang v. Chevrolet · filed 2002-03-21

Inasmuch as the Wangs’ claim for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 incorporates the allegations of a violation of section 1770, subdivision (a)(14), we conclude that the parol evidence rule does not bar their section 17200 claim for the same reasons set out in part I.A. above.

Section 17200 covers age discrimination in violation of the FEHA as unfair competition, for which an employer may be enjoined under the UCL.

Herr v. Nestlé U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2003-06-12

By a parity of reasoning, age discrimination likewise implicates unfair competition. It is self-evident that older workers, who have worked their way up the ranks, frequently are more highly compensated than their younger colleagues. Thus, an employer that practices age discrimination may have an unfair competitive edge over employers that comply with the FEHA. Therefore, an employer which engages in age discrimination in violation of the FEHA is subject to a prohibitory injunction under the UCL.

Section 17200 does not require a mortgage lender to give its rate sheet or available interest rates directly to a borrower who deals with a mortgage broker and has no direct contact with the lender.

Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. · filed 2003-06-17

The fact that SCME did not provide Byars with its wholesale rate sheet or inform Byars of the available interest rates does not tend to establish a violation of section 17200 by SCME since the undisputed evidence shows Byars dealt with a mortgage broker; he did not have any direct contact with SCME.

Section 17200 permits each discrete unlawful business act to count as a separate violation, including each unlawful lease and each collection of unauthorized rent.

People Ex Rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. · filed 2003-09-09

Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in calculating the number of statutory violations based on defendants’ actions as well as the number of affected tenants. First, each unlawful act was a separate, discrete event.

Section 17200 permits suit against a federally chartered production credit association because it is a person under the unfair competition law.

Frazier Nuts, Inc. v. American Ag Credit · filed 2006-08-02

We conclude that Secured Lender is a “person” and not a public entity for purposes of the unfair competition law. As a result, Secured Lender is subject to suit under Business and Professions Code section 17200.

An individual who participates in, directs, manages, or controls companies’ unlawful debt-relief practices can violate Section 17200.

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Consumer Advocacy Center Inc. · filed 2023-07-07

By reason of the facts and violations described in Paragraphs 17-19, 21-22, and 30, and by Defendant Wen’s participation, direction, management, or control of the Student Loan Debt Relief Companies, Defendant Wen violated the UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

A section 17200 claim is equitable and carries no right to a jury trial, even when it requires proof of underlying Labor Code violations or the employer asserts an affirmative defense.

Hodge v. Superior Court · filed 2006-11-29

We conclude no jury trial is warranted. The gist of the section 17200 cause of action is equitable and the relief sought is equitable even though plaintiffs could have requested damages for the same violations, even though the employer has asserted an affirmative defense, and even though the UCL cause of action will require proof of the underlying Labor Code violations.

A section 17200 claim is equitable, so the defendant has no right to a jury trial even when the claim rests on an underlying Labor Code violation.

Hodge v. Superior Court · filed 2006-11-29

In determining AON’s right to a jury trial, the trial court should have considered the gist of the UCL claim, not the gist of the Labor Code violation. ... Because those remedies are solely equitable, AON is not entitled to a jury trial.

A section 17200 unfair competition claim is equitable, so an error concerning a jury demand on legal claims does not require reversal of the judgment on that claim.

Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. · filed 2017-01-31

The court’s error in striking plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial on their legal claims thus does not require reversal of the judgment as to the equitable claims, including the claims to set aside the foreclosure and for unfair competition.

In a government enforcement action asserting a Section 17200 claim, the right to a jury trial extends to liability; the trial court determines statutory penalties and equitable relief.

Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty. · filed 2018-06-13

We now grant petitioners' request for extraordinary relief, in part, concluding the "gist" of the statutory causes of action asserted against them are legal, thereby giving rise to a right to jury trial. However, following the approach taken by the *471United States Supreme Court in Tull v. United States (1987) 481 U.S. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 ( Tull ), we also conclude the right to jury trial extends only to the issue of liability and that the amount of statutory penalties, as well as whether any equitable relief is appropriate, is properly determined by the trial court.

Section 17200 does not allow an unclean-hands defense to defeat a UCL claim based on a statutory violation.

Ticconi v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance · filed 2008-02-27

However, the equitable defense of unclean hands is not available in this UCL action based on violation of statutes, namely, sections 10113, 10381.5, and 10384.

Section 17200 does not allow an unclean hands defense to defeat a UCL claim based on statutory violations.

Ticconi v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins. Co. · filed 2007-12-04

However, the equitable defense of unclean hands is not available in this UCL action based on violation of statutes, namely, sections 10113, 10381.5, and 10384. Courts have long held that the equitable defense of unclean hands is not a defense to an unfair trade or business practices claim based on violation of a statute.

Courts may abstain from granting UCL relief when adjudication would require them to assume regulatory functions better handled by an agency.

Alvarado v. Selma Convalescent Hospital · filed 2007-08-01

Adjudicating this class action controversy would require the trial court to assume general regulatory powers over the health care industry through the guise of enforcing the UCL, a task for which the courts are not well equipped.

Courts may abstain from granting relief under section 17200 when deciding a challenge to service fees would require them to resolve complex pricing issues within the CPUC’s authority.

Willard v. AT&T Communications of California, Inc. · filed 2012-03-06

It was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that judicial review of AT&T’s fees for nonpublished service and unlisted service is inappropriate and overseeing service fees is best left to the CPUC.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition but does not itself prohibit conduct or support a claim for violating its definition.

Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. · filed 2011-11-29

However, Business and Professions Code section 17200 does not actually prohibit any conduct. It is merely definitional.10 No cause of action can be stated for violating a statutory definition. An action for unfair competition must refer to one of the sections following Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 does not impose vicarious liability for unfair practices; liability requires personal participation in and unbridled control over those practices.

Perfect 10, Inc. · filed 2007-07-03

Emery found that an “unfair practices claim under sec- tion 17200 cannot be predicated on vicarious liability. . . . A defendant’s liability must be based on his personal participa- tion in the unlawful practices and unbridled control over the practices that are found to violate section 17200 or 17500.” Id. at 960 (internal citations omitted). ... Emery is dispositive of Perfect 10’s claims that the Defendants are secondarily liable under California unfair competition and false advertising laws and the district court properly dismissed them.

Section 17200 unfair competition claims are preempted when they rest on rights protected by the Copyright Act.

Crafty Productions, Inc. v. Fuqing Sanxing Crafts Co. Ltd. · filed 2019-12-05

Thus, the allegation that this action also forms an unfair competition claim is likewise preempted.

A Section 17200 claim premised on copyright infringement fails where the complaint does not plead a separate passing off theory.

Astral IP Enterprise Ltd. v. HorizonMatrix · filed 2026-01-14

Without reaching the question of whether this “passing off” theory would avoid preemption, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not plead such a theory. A claim for “passing off” one’s goods as those of another is grounded in trademark law, and Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim is plainly premised on Defendant’s alleged copyright infringement rather than any trademark infringement. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a claim for unfair competition.

Section 17200 permits UCL recovery for alleged California wage and hour violations even when the corresponding Labor Code claims may be time-barred.

OWINO V. CORECIVIC, INC. · filed 2022-12-20

Because plaintiffs can recover for almost all of the alleged violations under the UCL, the district court properly rejected CoreCivic’s argument against certification as predicated on “a distinction without a difference.”

A Section 17200 claim has a sufficient California nexus when the complaint alleges intrastate effects from the challenged conduct.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. · filed 2023-11-20

Merck is correct that the consumer protection laws of these states likely require some allegation of intrastate conduct to state a claim. ... Plaintiff’s allegations of intrastate effects are therefore sufficient to support these consumer protection claims.