Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1

Section 52.1(a) requires threats, intimidation, or coercion, but does not require violence or a threat of violence.

Moreno v. Town of Los Gatos · filed 2008-02-21(a)

California law on the issue is admittedly murky, but our best interpretation of the law as it currently stands is that section 52.1 does not require violence or threat of violence.

Section 52.1 permits a civil claim when intimidation interferes with constitutional rights, and evidence of an officer approaching with a drawn gun and shooting near the plaintiffs can create a triable question of intimidation.

Bailey v. County of San Joaquin · filed 2009-11-16

There is, however, a question of fact as to whether defendant intimidated plaintiffs. ... Thus, defendants motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs Section 52.1 claim is denied.

Section 52.1 requires allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion by the defendant or its representative.

Clifford v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2014-08-01

The district court properly dismissed Clifford’s Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 claim against the University because Clifford failed to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion by any University representative.

Section 52.1(a) does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from those inherent in an intentional constitutional or statutory violation.

D.V. v. City of Sunnyvale · filed 2014-08-14(a)

Section 52.1 does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation independent from the threats, coercion, or intimidation inherent in the alleged constitutional or statutory violation.

Section 52.1 permits a claim based on an unreasonable seizure when the alleged violence is not inherent in the seizure.

Gregory v. City of Vallejo · filed 2014-10-28(a)

As in Bender, where the court found pepper spraying of an unresisting plaintiff was “in no way inherent in an arrest,” 217 Cal.App.4th at 978, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 204, here, a reasonable jury could find the shooting and killing of Belle was in no. way inherent in seizing Belle.

Section 52.1(j) requires a threat made through speech alone to threaten violence; threatening or coercive conduct can support a claim without an allegation of violence.

Doe v. City of San Diego · filed 2016-07-29(j)

Where the alleged threat is accomplished by speech alone, the Bane Act requires “a showing that the speech itself threatens violence.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j). However, by alleging threatening and coercive conduct, Plaintiff alleged more than spoken threats. This is sufficient to allege interference with her constitutional rights by “intimidation or coercion.”

Section 52.1 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion; a failure to intervene does not satisfy that requirement.

Hernandez v. City of San Jose · filed 2017-03-14(a)

Therefore, the Court holds that the City Defendants’ failure to intervene does not- constitute threats, intimidation, or coercion under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs when officials knowingly deprive a prisoner of a right through inherently coercive and threatening acts; separate threats or coercion need not be alleged.

Lapachet v. Cal. Forensic Med. Grp., Inc. · filed 2018-06-01(a)

Plaintiffs bringing Bane Act claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs must only allege prison officials "knowingly deprived [them] of a constitutional right or protection through acts that are inherently coercive and threatening," such as housing a prisoner in an inappropriate cell, failing to provide treatment plans or adequate mental health care, and failing to provide sufficient observations.

Section 52.1 does not require a plaintiff to plead threats separate from the underlying constitutional violation.

Victoria v. City of San Diego · filed 2018-09-05

However, despite the fact that Victoria need not plead threats separate from the constitutional violation, Victoria's SAC is still inadequately pled.

Section 52.1(a) permits a claim when officers threaten arrest or pepper spray to interfere with a person’s exercise of legal rights.

Cooley v. The City of Los Angeles · filed 2019-08-05(a)

In the first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that they themselves were told by LAPD officers to leave the area during the cleaning or be arrested. FAC ¶ 30. Cooley also specifically alleges that LAPD officers told her that she would be arrested or pepper sprayed if she did not step back from the area. Id. ¶ 32. The Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for violation of the Bane Act.

A Bane Act claim based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs does not require coercion separate from that inherent in the alleged indifference.

Estate of Gerardo Cruz-Sanchez v. United States of America · filed 2019-09-17

Here, Plaintiffs do not need to allege coercion separate from the coercion inherent in that deliberate indifference in order to state a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires facts showing threats, intimidation, or coercion to support a Bane Act claim based on communications.

Camfield v. Bd. of Redondo Beach Usd · filed 2019-09-18(b)–(c)

The district court correctly dismissed the Camfields’ Bane Act claim because they “fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts that Defendants’ communications contained ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’” See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)–(c).

Section 52.1 requires facts showing threats, intimidation, or coercion that interfere with the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights.

Camfield v. Bd. of Redondo Beach Usd · filed 2020-01-27(b)–(c)

The district court correctly dismissed the Camfields’ Bane Act claim because they “fail[ed] to plead sufficient facts that Defendants’ communications contained ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’” See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)–(c).

Section 52.1(b) permits a claim when allegations support a reasonable inference that a defendant interfered with protected rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Coleman v. Shasta County · filed 2020-02-05(b)

Such allegations support a reasonable inference that Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’ rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

An unlawful arrest involving excessive force can satisfy § 52.1’s coercion requirement and support a Bane Act claim.

Valenzuela v. San Diego Police Department · filed 2020-02-18

As such, under Bender, Plaintiff has alleged a viable claim for relief under § 52.1.

A Section 52.1 claim fails when the plaintiff produces no evidence of a cognizable threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Larios v. Lunardi · filed 2020-03-05(c)

Because Plaintiff failed to produce evidence of threat, intimidation, or coercion, Defendants are entitled to judgment on the Bane Act claim under both of Plaintiff’s theories of constitutional liability. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim in its entirety.

Section 52.1(b) requires plausible allegations that the defendant interfered or attempted to interfere with the exercise of constitutional rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Robles v. City of Berkeley · filed 2020-07-10(b)

Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim was properly dismissed for similar reasons, as Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the UC officials interfered or attempted to interfere, “by threat, intimidation, or coercion,” with Plaintiff’s exercise of constitutional rights.

Section 52.1 requires a plausible allegation of threats, intimidation, or coercion; an offer to consider pain medication if a prisoner withdraws a health care appeal, standing alone, is insufficient.

(PC) Burton v. Arya · filed 2020-07-24(a)

Moreover, plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under California Civil Code § 52.1, also known as the Bane Act. ... Plaintiff does allege that Dr. Arya offered to consider providing plaintiff pain medications if plaintiff withdrew his health care appeal, such statement, standing alone, fails to raise an inference of threats, intimidation or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires a predicate rights violation accompanied by threats, violence, or coercion.

Kidwell-Bertagnolli v. County of Sonoma · filed 2020-08-20

Even if these allegations were enough to satisfy the requirement for a predicate constitutional violation—which they are not based on the unlawful arrest and excessive force since Plaintiffs have not pled Section 1983 claims based on either—Plaintiffs have failed to show that the constitutional violation was accompanied by threats, violence, or coercion.

Section 52.1(a) covers interference or attempted interference with constitutional or state statutory rights by threat or intimidation.

Criswell v. Boudreaux · filed 2020-09-02(a)

As noted above, the court has found the declarations from several inmates to be compelling evidence that defendant has interfered, or at least attempted to interfere, by threat and intimidation with the exercise of their constitutional rights and state statutory rights.

A Bane Act claim requires facts showing intentional conduct or acts that are inherently coercive and threatening.

Flores v. County of Fresno · filed 2020-07-28(a)

The court disagrees and finds that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged any intentional conduct or acts that are inherently coercive and threatening on the part of Corizon as required to state a cognizable Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 does not treat a city’s citations and threatened tax lien as actionable coercion under the Bane Act.

Baldwin Park Free Speech Coalition v. City of Baldwin Park · filed 2020-09-15

Putting aside the question of violence, plaintiffs’ allegations here fail to allege that the City’s citations and threatened tax lien amount to coercion that is actionable under the Bane Act as a matter of law.

Section 52.1 permits a claim when an officer’s threat to seize property coerces a person to stop exercising a constitutional right.

Cuviello v. City of Vallejo · filed 2020-11-16

Officer Koutnik’s alleged actions against the backdrop of the unconstitutional ordinance allow the court, at this stage, to find that “coercion” under the Bane Act occurred here.

Section 52.1 requires plausible facts showing that threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered with a legal right; a conclusory allegation of threats is insufficient.

Joseph v. Koh · filed 2020-12-08(a)

The added allegation that he was threatened with “guns” and violence to destroy his property/trees is also conclusory and fails to support a plausible claim that he was forced to do anything he was not required to do under the law.

Speech alone does not support a Section 52.1 claim without a threat of violence.

Richter v. Ausmus · filed 2021-02-16(k)

Richter’s allegations do not meet the standard for actionable speech set out by the Bane Act as she has not alleged that Kasaine or Low made any threats of violence against her. Her allegation that Low pressured her to sign the time waivers at risk of her disability application being cancelled is not the sort of conduct necessary to support a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion; an alleged failure to protect a prisoner does not suffice without them.

Gibson v. County of Orange · filed 2021-03-08

Furthermore, Gibson nowhere alleges that Robinson or Barnes threatened, intimidated, or coerced her. The Court need not delve into the intricacies of the Bane Act in the absence of any allegations whatsoever of threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1’s threats, intimidation, or coercion requirement can be satisfied by an officer’s alleged unjustified violence, unlawful detention, and unreasonable search and seizure.

Najarro v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-03-19

These alleged acts of unjustified violence, unlawful detention, and unreasonable search and seizure violated Plaintiffs’ civil rights and were committed by “threat, intimidation, or coercion.”

Section 52.1 does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the underlying constitutional violation when the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights; recklessness can establish that intent.

J.H. v. County of San Mateo · filed 2021-04-16

But section 52.1 does not require a showing of threats, intimidation, or coercion separate and apart from the underlying constitutional violation; the coercion inherent in the violation is sufficient so long as the defendant acted with the specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which can be proven through a showing of recklessness.

A Bane Act claim based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs must plead facts showing a threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Lowe v. California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2021-05-11(b)

This Court is ultimately more persuaded by Defendants’ position that claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs must plead facts showing a threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with constitutional or statutory rights; a rights violation alone is insufficient.

(PC) Burton v. Jimenez · filed 2021-05-18

Claim Six rests on the same sparse factual allegations that are stated in support of Claim Five, alleged here to violate California Civil Code § 52.1. ECF No. 1 at 11-12. That statute, known as the Bane Act, serves as a state law remedy for constitutional or statutory violations accomplished through intimidation, coercion, or threats. ... There are no allegations here of conduct amounting to threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires interference or attempted interference with rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Raiser v. San Diego County · filed 2021-07-09

On claims based on the Bane Act, Mr. Raiser has failed to establish an essential element to the claim, which is that Detective Rossall interfered with Mr. Raiser’s rights (or attempted to) “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.”

Section 52.1 does not impose liability for failure to intervene absent threats, intimidation, or coercion by the defendant.

Arellano v. Guldseth · filed 2020-10-30

Plaintiff cannot state a Bane Act claim against Defendant Roberts for failure to intervene, at least in the absence of the “threats, intimidation, or coercion” by Roberts, which are not alleged in the Complaint.

Section 52.1 does not treat a city’s citations and threatened tax lien as actionable coercion under the Bane Act.

Baldwin Park Free Speech Coalition v. City of Baldwin Park · filed 2021-02-17

Putting aside the question of violence, plaintiffs’ allegations here fail to allege that the City’s citations and threatened tax lien amount to coercion that is actionable under the Bane Act as a matter of law.

Section 52.1 requires allegations of intentional conduct or acts that are inherently coercive and threatening; allegations disputing the adequacy of medical treatment do not suffice.

Flores v. County of Fresno · filed 2021-08-02(a)

Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard are insufficient to allege any intentional conduct or acts that are inherently coercive and threatening on the part of Corizon as required to state a cognizable Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires factual allegations that interference with protected rights was carried out by threats, intimidation, or coercion; a conclusory allegation of duress is insufficient.

Meyer v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-10-21

Allegations of interference carried out by threats, intimidation, or coercion are thus central elements of a Bane Act claim. In their FAC, Plaintiffs do not allege threats, intimidation, or coercion from any of the Defendants.

Section 52.1 permits a claim based on allegations that police kettling, projectiles, and tear gas interfered with a person’s exercise of constitutional rights.

Sanderlin v. City of San Jose · filed 2022-03-29(b)-(c)

The Court finds that Ms. Sanderlin’s Bane Act claim is adequately pled at this juncture. ... These allegations include being subjected to kettling by two lines of police officers “with officers from each line each telling her to go in the opposite direction,” resulting in her allegedly “unreasonable detention.” ... At this juncture, these allegations are sufficient to state a Bane Act claim, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

Section 52.1 requires a connection between the alleged threat or coercion and the plaintiff’s exercise of rights.

Yates v. East Side Union High School District · filed 2021-08-18

Even assuming that Williams made a potentially threatening remark to her mother during a meeting to the effect that Haley Yates and Oliver “could be cited with distributing child pornography,” Dkt. No. 102, Ex. L at 35, it had no connection to an exercise of rights by Haley.

Section 52.1 requires threat, intimidation, or coercion; allegations of deliberately indifferent failure to protect an employee do not satisfy that requirement without more.

Polanco v. State of California · filed 2022-05-16

Without more, allegations of deliberately indifferent failure to protect an employee do not amount to a “threat, intimidation, or coercion.”

Section 52.1(b) does not require coercion separate from the underlying rights violation.

Shoar v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2022-10-17(b)

Nothing in the language of the statute requires the coercion element to be separate from the underlying constitutional violation.

Section 52.1 does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion to be independent from the alleged constitutional violation.

Whyte v. City of San Diego · filed 2022-12-07

But the Ninth Circuit and California Court of Appeal have explicitly rejected that argument, “explaining that the text of [§ 52.1] does not require that the offending ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ be independent from the constitutional violation alleged.”

A Bane Act claim based on a federal constitutional violation may rely on the same allegations to show both deprivation of a right and threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Porter v. Solano County Sheriff's Office · filed 2022-12-21

Thus, when a Bane Act claim is based on an alleged federal constitutional violation, as here, plaintiffs may rely on the same allegations, that defendant deprived them of a constitutional right and threatened, intimidated or coerced them under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1’s coercion prong can support a claim based on alleged interference with a hotel guest’s quiet enjoyment of his room.

Wescott v. Beresford Corporation · filed 2022-04-08

As to Calvin DOE’s alleged interference with the quiet enjoyment of his hotel room, Wescott’s Bane Act claim survives Section 1915 review under the coercion prong.

A sufficiently pleaded claim of deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious medical needs can also satisfy the Bane Act’s coercion requirement at the pleading stage.

Pries v. City of Antioch · filed 2023-02-10(a)

In the context of our constitutional claim requiring deliberate indifference beyond mere negligence, the inquiries coalesce. ... Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a Bane Act claim given the sufficiency of his Section 1983 claim.

Section 52.1 requires interference with state or federal rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Joseph v. City of San Jose · filed 2023-02-13(b)

In this regard, as explained herein, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence at all that might indicate that he suffered any interference whatsoever with any of his state or federal constitutional rights. Similarly, Plaintiff has also failed to offer any evidence that he has been the victim of any form of threat, coercion or intimidation.

Section 52.1’s threats, intimidation, or coercion requirement is not met when the alleged coercion is inherent in the alleged constitutional violation.

Farber v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2023-05-24(b)

The Bane Act claim fails because the “coercion [wa]s inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an overdetention in County jail, [so] the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ is not met.”

Section 52.1 does not require coercion separate from the alleged constitutional violation when the violation itself involves excessive force.

Estate of Charles Chivrell v. City of Arcata · filed 2023-09-26

But the Bane Act does not require the “threat, intimidation or coercion” element of the claim to be “transactionally independent” from the constitutional violation alleged.

Section 52.1 requires a threat of violence or conduct amounting to intimidation or coercion; a threatened water shutoff, silence, and pressure to buy property were insufficient.

Gelber v. City of Willits · filed 2023-10-23

Plaintiff’s allegations Defendants “threatened” to disconnect his water if he didn’t produce a deed or title policy, “intimidated” him by ignoring him, and “intimidated and coerced” him into making an offer to Deutsche Bank to purchase the property, are insufficient to state a Bane Act claim.

A Bane Act claim must allege specific facts supporting threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Langham v. City of Union City · filed 2023-12-04(b)

But Plaintiff does not elaborate on the manner in which he alleges that the officers treated him with threats, intimidation, or coercion. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim with leave to amend to allege specific facts in support of the claim of intimidation.

Section 52.1(b) requires interference with a legal right accompanied by coercion; a claim fails when the defendants did not coerce the plaintiffs.

Estate of Decedent Lolomania Soakai v. City of Oakland · filed 2023-11-28(b)

The statute “require[s] an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998). Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Individual Defendants coerced them.

Section 52.1 requires facts showing that a defendant used threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with a legal right; conclusory allegations do not state a claim.

(PC) Crane v. Lopez · filed 2024-03-22(a)

However, the SAC is devoid of facts, even liberally construed, that reflect the use by any Defendant of threats, intimidation, or coercion to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights.

Section 52.1 requires facts showing threats or violent acts used to interfere with a protected right.

Estate of Gregory Martinez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2024-03-26

First, Plaintiffs’ do not allege any facts that indicate Defendants used threats or committed violent acts to interfere with Martinez’s Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Section 52.1 permits a claim when threats, intimidation, or coercion plausibly interfere with constitutional rights and cause harm.

Bess v. Barroso · filed 2024-04-03

Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, which authorizes suit against anyone who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment” of rights secured by the state or federal Constitutions. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 permits a damages action against a person who interferes with rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion; an agreement allegedly signed under coercion is relevant to that claim.

Bissat v. City of Visalia · filed 2024-04-17(b), (c)

Similarly, the Bane Act provides a private right of action to plaintiffs for damages against any person, whether acting under color of law or not, who interferes with or attempts to interfere “by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment” of their rights under the laws of the United States or California. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1(b), (c).

A Bane Act claim requires allegations that the plaintiff was threatened, intimidated, or coerced.

Milton v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CTF- Soledad · filed 2024-04-23

While Incident Plaintiffs may have been exposed to such threats, the complaint is devoid of allegations demonstrating that the COVID-19 Plaintiffs who were not present for the July 2020 incident were threatened, intimidated, or coerced in any way. Without any “alleged contact between any Defendant and any Plaintiff,” Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim cannot survive.

Section 52.1(b) does not require a separate threatening, intimidating, or coercive act when the alleged constitutional violation is inherently coercive.

Young v. Custer. · filed 2024-05-06(b)

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, under the Bane Act, the offending threat, intimidation, or coercion need not be independent from the coercion associated with an alleged constitutional violation that is inherently coercive.

Section 52.1(b) does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the alleged constitutional violation in an excessive-force claim.

Hulet v. County of Tuolumne · filed 2024-08-12(b)

Contrary to defendants’ argument, under the Bane Act the offending threat, intimidation, or coercion need not be transactionally independent from an alleged constitutional violation.

Section 52.1 requires evidence of threats, intimidation, or coercion, with violence or otherwise, to sustain a Bane Act claim.

Joseph v. City of San Jose · filed 2024-09-11

Summary judgment was proper on Joseph’s ninth claim, violation of the California Bane and Ralph Civil Rights Acts, because he admitted under oath that Defendants-Appellees did not threaten, intimidate, or coerce him, with violence or otherwise.

Section 52.1 does not require a plaintiff to plead violence or a threat of violence for a Bane Act claim based on an unconstitutional search.

Lund v. Datzman · filed 2024-09-23

Based on the limited arguments before the Court, City Defendants fail to persuade the Court that violence or a threat of violence is necessary to plead a Bane Act claim based on an unconstitutional search.

Section 52.1’s threats, intimidation, or coercion element can be satisfied by excessive force during an unlawful arrest.

Piombino v. City of Fresno · filed 2024-12-02(b)

As Piombino alleges she was subjected to excessive force during the unlawful arrest, Piombino has sufficiently alleged that her constitutional rights were violated through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1’s coercion element can be satisfied by alleged force used to tackle or incapacitate a person.

Quintanar v. County of San Diego · filed 2025-01-14

There is no question that “tackling” Ms. Quintanar or incapacitating Mr. Quintanar (with force) raises the specter of coercion.

A private person’s threat to summon law enforcement can, in some circumstances, constitute coercion under the Bane Act.

Sutton v. California Department of Parks and Recreation · filed 2025-01-17(b)

While the Court recognizes that many such cases involve a situation in which a law enforcement officer directly threatens a person with arrest, the Court finds that a threat to summon law enforcement by an individual who is not him- or herself a member of law enforcement can sometimes be similarly coercive.

Section 52.1 does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion independent of the alleged constitutional violation.

Spriggs v. City of San Diego · filed 2025-02-12

Because the Bane Act does not require Mr. Spriggs to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion independent from the constitutional violation alleged, the City’s motion to dismiss the claim will be denied.

Section 52.1 requires allegations that a defendant used threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with protected rights.

Calaceto v. Richardson Bay Regional Agency · filed 2025-06-16

Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting any Defendant threatened, intimidated, or coerced her.

Section 52.1 requires threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention.

Maldonado v. Boudreaux · filed 2024-11-27(a)

A number of California court decisions make clear that a plaintiff must allege threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention to recover under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires specific facts showing threat, intimidation, or coercion to state a Bane Act claim.

Sanchez · filed 2025-10-20

The Court finds Plaintiff’s claim under the Bane Act, stating no specific facts regarding threat, intimidation, or coercion, insufficient to state a claim.

Section 52.1 requires threats or coercion beyond that inherent in a search or detention; excessive force may satisfy that requirement.

Duncan · filed 2025-11-19

A plaintiff in a search-and-seizure case must allege threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention or search in order to recover under the Bane Act. ... An allegation of excessive force may satisfy the coercion requirement. ... The Court finds Plaintiff states a claim in Count IX.

Section 52.1 requires evidence that a person interfered with protected rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Moller v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2026-06-25

The Bane Act creates a cause of action against a person if that person “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Moller, there is no evidence in the record that Breunig was threatened, intimidated, or coerced even while allegedly detained. Deputy Fite telling Breunig to “get out” of the vehicle, after Breunig repeatedly requested to exit the vehicle and threatened to defecate if he were not allowed to do so, cannot be reasonably interpreted as a threat or coercive action.

Section 52.1 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion involving an affirmative act; a failure to act alone does not state a claim.

E.M. v. California Department of Education · filed 2025-07-08

Since Plaintiffs allege only that Defendants failed to act rather than a specific act to deprive E.M. of her or her parents’ constitutional rights, they certainly do not allege that Defendants did so through “threats, intimidation, or coercion.”

Section 52.1 does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation separate from those inherent in an alleged rights violation when defendants act intentionally rather than negligently.

Mann v. County of San Diego · filed 2015-11-23

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ position more persuasive. ... Subsequently, the majoritymf courts interpreting Venegas and its progeny have concluded that where defendants act intentionally ' rather than negligently, § 52.1 does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation independent from, the threats, coercion, or intimidation inherent in the alleged constitutional or statutory violation.

Section 52.1 does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation separate from an intentional violation of constitutional or statutory rights.

Steward v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2020-03-02

In addition, courts have held that where a defendant’s actions are intentional, the Bane Act does not require threats, coercion, or intimidation independent from those inherent in the alleged constitutional or statutory violation.

When a Section 52.1 claim rests solely on speech, the plaintiff must show that the speech threatened violence.

Martin v. County of San Diego · filed 2009-10-23(j)

Nothing in subsequent California cases, however, calls into question the proposition that under the plain language of § 52.1(j), where a violation is premised solely upon speech, the plaintiff must demonstrate the speech threatened violence.

Section 52.1(j) permits speech alone to support a Bane Act claim only when it threatens violence and causes a reasonable fear of violence against the person or their property.

Herrera v. AllianceOne Receivable Management, Inc. · filed 2016-03-17(j)

First, speech alone cannot support a Bane Act claim unless the speech threatens violence against a person, and that person “reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will- be committed against them or their property ....” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j).

Section 52.1(k) requires a claim based on speech to show a threat of violence, reasonable fear that it will be carried out, and the speaker’s apparent ability to carry it out.

Roberts v. Levine · filed 2019-10-31(k)

Plaintiff does not allege that Anjali Levine or Louise Stokes threatened violence, that Plaintiff reasonably feared violence would be committed against him or his property, and that Anjali Levine and Louise Stokes had the ability to carry out any threatened violence.

Section 52.1(k) requires a threat of violence when a Bane Act claim is based on speech alone.

N.Y. v. San Ramon Valley Unified School District · filed 2019-11-06(k)

As a threat of violence is only required when a Bane Act claim is based on "speech alone," the Administration Defendants, with the exception of Schmitt and Reimann, have failed to show the Seventh Cause of Action is subject to dismissal.

Section 52.1(j) does not permit a Bane Act claim based on speech alone unless the speech threatens violence, the person threatened reasonably fears violence, and the speaker has the apparent ability to carry out the threat.

(PC) Wells v. Gonzales · filed 2020-09-21(j)

Nevertheless, it is true that the Bane Act explicitly states that “speech alone is not sufficient to support” a § 52.1 action, unless the “speech itself threatens violence” and the person against whom the threat is directed “reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence ... will be committed” and that “the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” ... Thus, plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is premised solely on alleged speech by defendant Gonzales. Accordingly, the court will decline to adopt the findings and recommendations with respect to plaintiff’s Bane Act claim and will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim.

Section 52.1(k) allows speech alone to support a Bane Act claim only when it threatens violence against a specific person who reasonably fears the threat will be carried out and the speaker appears able to do so.

Smith v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 2020-10-28(k)

Under Section 52.1(k), speech alone is insufficient to state a claim except if the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person, and that person reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the person threatening violence has the apparent ability to carry out the threat.

Section 52.1 requires speech alone to threaten violence to satisfy its threat, intimidation, or coercion requirement.

Partanen v. Western United States Pipe Band Association · filed 2021-11-04(b)–(c)

Speech alone does not satisfy the threat, intimidation, or coercion requirement unless the speech threatened violence.

Section 52.1(k) permits a claim based on speech alone when the speech threatens violence and the plaintiff reasonably fears that violence will follow.

Aaron v. Target Corporation · filed 2023-12-01(k)

Speech alone does not support a Bane Act claim unless the speech itself threatens violence, and a plaintiff reasonably fears that because of the speech, violence will be committed against them.

Section 52.1(k) does not permit a claim based solely on speech threatening job loss rather than violence.

Borrello v. Respironics California, LLC (P) · filed 2023-09-14(k)

Even under the assumption that Philips’ vaccine policy was unlawful, the only actions by Defendants which Borrello alleges violated the Bane Act concern speech threatening job loss, not violence.

Section 52.1(k) does not support Bane Act liability for statements that were not directed at the plaintiff and did not cause her to fear violence.

Walker v. Martinez · filed 2024-06-17(k)

The Court does not consider either of these statements to constitute a threat, intimidation, or coercion under the Bane Act. Indeed, these statements are better classified as “speech alone” pursuant to § 52.1(k). Plaintiff has failed to plead that (1) this speech was directed towards her in any way, or (2) because of this speech, Plaintiff believed violence would be committed against her or that the DSG employees had the apparent ability to carry out any threat against her.

Section 52.1(k) requires speech alone to threaten violence and cause reasonable fear of violence to support a Bane Act claim.

(PC) Taylor v. Koubong · filed 2024-08-27(k)

The Bane Act makes clear that “[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to [the Act], except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence ... and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(k). Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Koubong threatened to retaliate against any inmate who filed a grievance does not demonstrate that defendant Koubong threatened violence.

Section 52.1's apparent-ability requirement can be met when a person reasonably appears able to carry out a threat, even if that person lacks actual authority to do so.

Bolbol v. Rowell Ranch Rodeo, Inc. · filed 2024-08-22

But his argument reads the word “apparent” out of the statute. Just because Hart did not, in fact, have the authority to arrest the plaintiffs does not mean that the plaintiffs could not, in the moment, reasonably perceive him as having such authority.

Section 52.1(k) permits speech alone to support a Bane Act claim only when it threatens violence and the person threatened reasonably fears violence against them or their property.

Friedman v. City of Fairfax · filed 2024-08-23(k)

The Bane Act makes clear that “[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to [the Act], except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence . . . and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(k). None of the examples of Defendants’ speech cited by Plaintiff threaten violence.

Section 52.1(k) requires speech alone to threaten violence against a specific person or group to support a Bane Act claim.

Salcido v. City of Mountain View · filed 2025-05-06(k)

Because Plaintiff only alleged that Takeuchi “repeatedly demanded that Defendant Kamei ‘call the captain,’” with no accompanying actions, he must show that this demand itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of persons.

Section 52.1(k) requires speech alone to threaten violence to support a Bane Act claim.

Segui v. Stromfors · filed 2025-06-27(k)

The Court agrees with Verner that the alleged statements about sending Plaintiff to a wilderness therapy program do not constitute a threat of violence for purposes of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 supports a claim based on interference with federal or state civil rights, including speech and seizure rights.

Bolbol v. City of Daly City · filed 2010-11-17(a)

As previously discussed, plaintiffs evidence supports a finding that Kranz violated plaintiffs federal First Amendment and state Liberty of Speech rights and presents an issue of material fact whether he violated her civil rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, state unlawful seizure law and Cal. Pen.Code § 236. Because a violation of each of these rights supports a violation of section 52. 1, summary judgment as to plaintiffs section 52.1 claim is denied.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff suing a private party over Fourth Amendment rights to allege that the party used threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with the plaintiff’s assertion of those rights against government officers.

Ennis v. City of Daly City · filed 2010-11-22

Accordingly, in order to show that Carson violated section 52.1 based on Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff must plead facts supporting an inference that Carson interfered by threats, intimidation or coercion with plaintiffs assertion of his Fourth Amendment rights as against the City officers.

Section 52.1(a) does not support a Bane Act claim based on an arrest when there was no unlawful interference with liberty.

Gillis v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2014-03-04(a)

Appellants’ claims under the Bane Act cannot proceed because there was no unlawful interference with appellants’ liberty.

Section 52.1 requires interference with a statutory or constitutional right as a predicate for liability.

Rocha v. County of Tulare · filed 2015-12-17

Nor did the district court err in dismissing Rocha’s claims under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, because interference with a statutory or constitutional right is a necessary predicate for Bane Act liability.

Section 52.1 requires a violation of a civil or constitutional right; a Bane Act claim cannot be maintained without one.

M. v. County of San Mateo · filed 2020-01-09(a)

... plaintiff’s claim under the Bane Act – requiring a violation of a civil or constitutional right – cannot be maintained.

Section 52.1 requires a violation of a civil or constitutional right for a Bane Act claim to proceed.

Juricich v. County of San Mateo · filed 2021-01-29(a)

Based on the analysis above holding that Juricich did not suffer a deprivation of a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment, the claim under the Bane Act – requiring a violation of a civil or constitutional right – cannot be maintained.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim based on alleged deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs that interferes with his Eighth Amendment rights.

Clines v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-08-03

Here, Plaintiffs have pled facts alleging Defendants’ interfered with Decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights by unnecessarily holding him in custody despite his obvious need for medical care. (FAC ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs further allege the currently unknown jail staff were deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s serious medical needs. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs have thus pled facts sufficient to state a Bane Act Claim.

A Bane Act claim must identify the state or federal right with which the defendant interfered or attempted to interfere through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Williams v. Rancho Cordova Police Dept. · filed 2021-09-08

While Plaintiff may sufficiently allege “threats, intimidation or coercion,” it is unclear to the Court with which “state or federal constitutional or legal right” Defendants allegedly interfered or attempted to interfere.

Section 52.1(b) permits a private action against a state actor who interferes with the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures through threats, intimidation, or coercion, even if the state constitutional provision does not itself provide a private right of action.

Toman v. Glomboske · filed 2021-12-27(b)

Plaintiffs explicitly base their Bane Act claims on the violation of their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures—rights guaranteed to them by Cal. Const. Art. I, § 13. Thus, even if that California constitutional provision itself did not allow for a private right of action, the Bane Act does. Any state actor who interferes or attempts to interfere with the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures right by means of threats, intimidation, or coercion is subject to liability under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires proof of an underlying constitutional violation for an excessive force claim.

Williamson v. City of National City · filed 2022-01-24

California’s Bane Act requires proof of an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 52.1 covers interference with rights secured by federal or California statutes as well as their constitutions.

Doe v. County of Sacramento · filed 2022-09-15(b)

Defendants’ argument that the Bane Act is limited to constitutional violations, whereas Plaintiffs’ claims are brought only under the aegis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute, thus appears to run counter to the language of the Bane Act itself, which clearly extends to both constitutional and statutory violations at both the state and federal level.

Section 52.1 permits a claim based on the denial of medical care in violation of the California Constitution.

The Estate of Carlos Escobar Mejia v. Archambeault · filed 2022-08-03

However, Plaintiffs claim also alleges failure to provide or facilitate medical care under California Civil Code § 52.1 and the California Constitution against other Defendants, which is an independent basis for relief that may be adjudicated under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires interference with a right secured by federal or state law; a claim based solely on constitutional rights fails when those rights were not violated.

Wood v. City of Sacramento · filed 2023-01-25(a)

The Tom Bane Act gives rise to a claim when “a person . . . whether or not acting under the color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion” with a right secured by federal or state law. ... Because plaintiff’s constitutional rights have not been violated, she cannot maintain a Tom Bane Act claim.14 Accordingly, defendants will be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Tom Bane Act claim.

Facts sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim at screening are sufficient to support a Bane Act claim.

(PC) Wilkins v. Heslop · filed 2023-04-10

Facts which support a First Amendment retaliation claim on screening are sufficient to support a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 covers intentional interference with the right to file grievances when officers use excessive force to retaliate.

(PC) Anderson v. Vangerwen · filed 2023-09-07

Regarding the February 22 incident, plaintiff alleges that defendants Page, Van Gerwen, Dorstad, Schritter, Hurte, Jurkiewicz, and Mason intentionally interfered with his First Amendment right to file grievances by using excessive force against him. On these grounds, too, plaintiff has adequately pleaded a Bane Act violation.

Section 52.1 requires interference or attempted interference with the plaintiff’s exercise of a constitutional or statutory right.

Ward v. Koenig · filed 2023-10-23

Defendant Koenig’s authorization of the raid was not an interference, or an attempt to interfere, with Plaintiff’s exercise of a constitutional or statutory right. Plaintiff does not allege that he was exercising, attempting to exercise, or intending to exercise, any constitutional right at the time of the raids.

Section 52.1 requires an underlying statutory or constitutional violation; without one, the Bane Act claim fails at summary judgment.

Sacrament Collective Pentecostal Church, Inc v. County of Santa Cruz · filed 2023-10-31

Where there is no underlying statutory or constitutional violation, summary judgment must be granted on Bane Act claims.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim based on an attempt to interfere with constitutional rights even when no actual interference occurred.

Huemer v. Santa Cruz County Animal Shelter Foundation · filed 2024-06-13(b)-(c)

On the first element of a Bane Act claim, for the reasons discussed in section III.B. above, the Court concludes that Defendants did not actually interfere with Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights; nevertheless, under the terms of the Bane Act, an “attempt[] to interfere” with a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is sufficient.

A Bane Act claim against a defendant fails if the plaintiff does not adequately allege an underlying constitutional violation by that defendant.

Estate of Christopher Temple v. County of Placer · filed 2024-08-09

As discussed above, the court has concluded that plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege an underlying constitutional violation against defendant Woo. Therefore, plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim against that defendant will also be dismissed.

A Section 52.1 claim may be dismissed with leave to amend when the plaintiff gives only limited discussion of the rights allegedly violated and does not oppose dismissal.

Poe · filed 2026-01-12

Absent argument from Plaintiff opposing dismissal and based on the limited discussion of which rights were violated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the cause of action under the Bane Act is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Section 52.1 claims may proceed when factual disputes remain over whether defendants violated Fourth Amendment rights through coercion or force.

Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit · filed 2011-05-10(a)

Given the court’s conclusions above that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether defendants violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights and whether defendants did so through the use of coercion and force, summary judgment as to this claim is DENIED.

Section 52.1 does not require proof of threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from an underlying constitutional violation.

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-05-29

Therefore, this Court finds that § 52.1 does not require a showing of “threats, intimidation, or coercion” separate and distinct from an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 52.1 may cover deliberate, spiteful excessive force causing physical injury during an otherwise lawful arrest.

Davis v. City of San Jose · filed 2014-09-24

Having carefully considered the holdings in Shoyoye and Bender, which apply the California Supreme Court’s holding in Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1 (2004), the Court finds that the Bane Act may extend to claims of deliberate and spiteful harm where the allegations, taken as true, demonstrate physical beating and injury in support of a claim for deprivation of one’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

Section 52.1 permits an excessive force claim even when the plaintiff does not challenge the detention itself.

Boarman v. County of Sacramento · filed 2014-10-21

Here, because plaintiff is alleging excessive force rather than challenging the propriety of the detention itself, her Bane Act claim survives.

Section 52.1 does not require evidence of threats, intimidation, or coercion independent of an alleged constitutional violation based on excessive force.

Garlick v. County of Kern · filed 2016-03-08(a)

Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, this Court has found that if a plaintiff makes factual allegations showing a constitutional violation based on excessive force, a plaintiff need not, in addition, introduce independent evidence showing threats, intimidation, or coercion.

A Bane Act claim based on excessive force does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the force itself.

Lawrence v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2017-06-15(a)

Instead, the Court now follows the holding of the majority of courts in the Northern District of California: a plaintiff asserting a Bane Act claim based on excessive force need not prove threats, intimidation, or coercion independent of the excessive force.

Section 52.1 does not require coercion separate from the force used in an intentional Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

Orr v. Plumb · filed 2018-03-12(a)

“[T]he majority of federal district courts in California have held that ‘[w]here Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or excessive force claims are raised and intentional conduct is at issue, there is no need for a plaintiff to allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the seizure or use of force.’” Simmons v. Super. Ct., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 894 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Dillman v. Tuolumne County, No. 1:13-CV-00404 LJO, 2013 WL 1907379, at *21 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013)). We agree.

Section 52.1 claims based on a police officer’s use of force require proof that the force was unreasonable.

Koistra v. Cnty. of San Diego · filed 2018-04-19

Because there is an issue of fact as to whether Deputy's Vail's conduct was reasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment once Koistra surrendered, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the battery and section 52.1 causes of action but GRANTS summary judgment on these causes of action based on Deputy Vail's initial use of the canine.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate the right to be free from unreasonable seizure in an excessive force claim; a factual dispute over that intent can preclude summary judgment.

S.T. v. City of Ceres · filed 2018-08-30(a)

Whether there was a specific intent to violate Thompson's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure as necessary for a Bane Act claim is also dependent on the resolution of the genuine dispute of fact which prevents the grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the state law claim under the Bane Act is DENIED.

A section 52.1 excessive force claim survives summary judgment when the parallel § 1983 excessive force claim presents triable issues.

Wallisa v. City of Hesparia · filed 2019-03-20

Accordingly, because defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim, they are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 permits an unlawful-arrest claim when the defendant acted with specific intent to violate the right against unreasonable seizure; separate coercion beyond the arrest is unnecessary.

Pierce v. Cnty. of Marin · filed 2018-02-14(a)

Where a claim arises from an unlawful arrest, the plaintiff can meet the coercion requirement of the Bane Act by showing specific intent to violate the plaintiff's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, rather than by showing "something beyond the coercion 'inherent' in the wrongful detention." ... This Court finds the reasoning in Cornell persuasive, and that the present facts are distinguishable from Shoyoye , which did not involve a claim of an illegal arrest. ... Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 52.1 does not require coercion separate from the alleged excessive force, but it requires specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.

Robert Reese, Jr. v. County of Sacramento · filed 2018-04-23

Thus, based on the weight of this new state authority, and our obligation to consider the California Court of Appeal’s thorough analysis of its own law, we draw two conclusions as to the necessary showing for an excessive force claim under the Bane Act. First, the Bane Act does not require the “threat, intimidation or coercion” element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged. Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382–83. Second, the Bane Act requires a “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Id. at 384.

Section 52.1 can support a claim when officers use coercive questioning to make an arrestee appear to match another person’s warrant description.

Gant v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-11-24(a), (b)

Given these circumstances, a trier of fact could conclude that the officers’ quick, insistent questioning was intended to coerce Ventura into stating that he was 5'11". We therefore reverse the district court’s order granting the Chino defendants’ summary judgment motion on Ventura’s Bane Act claim.

In an excessive force claim under § 52.1(a), a plaintiff need not show threats, intimidation, or coercion separate from the rights violation, but must show specific intent to violate the right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

Rivera v. Cater · filed 2019-10-11(a)

While plaintiffs do not need to show “threat, intimidation or coercion” independent from the rights violation to prevail in an excessive force case, they must show a “specific intent to violate the arrestee’s rights to freedom from unreasonable seizure.”

Section 52.1 can reach an unlawful arrest accompanied by excessive force when the force supplies coercion beyond the detention itself.

Hampton v. San Joaquin County Sheriffs Department · filed 2020-07-08

Where “an arrest is unlawful and excessive force is applied in making the arrest, [however], there has been coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself—a violation of the Bane Act.” Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 (2013) (internal citations omitted). As the Bender court noted, the Bane Act may apply if there was a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. Given the discrepancies in the evidence and for the same reasons already set forth above, Defendants’ request for summary judgment as to the Sixth Cause of Action is also DENIED.

Section 52.1 excessive force claims have essentially the same elements as § 1983 excessive force claims.

Williamson v. National City · filed 2020-09-03(c)

The elements of a § 52.1 excessive force claim are essentially identical to those of a § 1983 excessive force claim.

Section 52.1’s coercion requirement is satisfied when a defendant unlawfully arrests a person and uses excessive force.

McDonald v. County of Sonoma · filed 2020-12-11(a), (b)

Coercion therefore exists, for the purpose of a Bane Act violation, when a defendant unlawfully arrests and uses excessive force against a suspect.

Bane Act excessive force claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.

Hill v. City of Fountain Valley · filed 2021-07-13

Claims for excessive force, both under § 1983 and the Bane Act, battery, and assault are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.

Section 52.1 does not require proof of coercion beyond that inherent in an underlying excessive force violation.

Carr v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-09-17

Indeed, relying on numerous California court precedents and its own prior decisions, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated that, “in excessive force cases, . . . § 52.1 does not require proof of coercion beyond that inherent in the underlying violation.” Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, Defendants’ argument “that Plaintiff is missing the element of intentional interference of his rights by threats, intimidation or coercion” is, quite simply, incorrect.

Section 52.1 requires coercion beyond that inherent in an allegedly wrongful arrest or detention.

Worthy v. City of Berkeley · filed 2021-11-23

Plaintiff neither identifies evidence in the record of coercion in support of his claim under Cal. Civ. Code. § 52.1, nor does he address the cases that hold that coercion inherent in the alleged wrongful arrest or detention is insufficient to sustain a claim under § 52.1. He cites nothing beyond the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 6.

Section 52.1 allows unlawful confinement to satisfy the coercion element of a Bane Act claim when the same conduct supports a false imprisonment claim.

Youngers v. Management & Training Company · filed 2022-04-01

Using the same logic in the tort context, the act of unlawfully confining and transporting Ms. Hernandez can be the foundation for both her false imprisonment claim and the coercion element of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 does not require an act of coercion distinct from the alleged rights violation.

Stewart v. Pecsi · filed 2022-09-30

Additionally, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to allege a distinct act of coercion is without merit because the Bane Act requires no such distinct act.

A Section 52.1 claim based on alleged excessive force can survive summary judgment when material facts about that force remain disputed.

Woodral v. County of Stanislaus · filed 2023-02-16

Because Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is, at a minimum, predicated on the same facts as their excessive force claim, and genuine disputes of fact exist with respect to that claim, summary judgment cannot be granted. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim.

A § 52.1 claim based on excessive force has similar requirements to an excessive force claim and fails when that claim lacks merit.

Hill v. City of Fountain Valley · filed 2023-06-01

The district court did not err in dismissing Stephen’s state-law claims for assault, battery, and a § 52.1 violation. All these claims have similar requirements as an excessive force claim. See, e.g., Cornell v. City & Cnty.. Of San Francisco, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 382 (Ct. App. 2017); Koussaya v. City of Stockton, 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 760–61 (Ct. App. 2020). And because his excessive force claim lacks merit, these state-law claims must fall by the wayside as well.

For a Bane Act claim based on intentional unreasonable seizure or excessive force, a plaintiff need not allege coercion separate from that inherent in the seizure or use of force.

Bradley v. City of San Diego · filed 2025-01-02

Moreover, Plaintiff is not required “to allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the seizure or use of force” when a “Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or excessive force[] claim[] [is] raised and intentional conduct is at issue.” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1052–53 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 934 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015)).

Section 52.1 does not require threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct from the underlying Fourth Amendment seizure.

Terrell v. City of Brentwood · filed 2025-09-08

The Court accordingly rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff does not allege any “threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct from the underlying seizure itself.”

Section 52.1 supports a claim based on allegations that store security guards detained a customer on the basis of race and used threats of violence to accomplish their purposes.

Nathalie Van v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2014-07-24

Construed liberally, Van’s complaint states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; California’s Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; and California’s Ralph Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7. She essentially alleges that Wal-Mart’s security guards targeted and detained her and her son on the basis of race and, as part of their race-based investigation, (1) refused to allow her to purchase the Lego toy, (2) barred Van from shopping at any Wal-Mart in the future, (3) and used threats of violence to accomplish their purposes.

Section 52.1 requires interference with a constitutional or statutory right accompanied by actual or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Campbell v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2014-12-15

To prevail on a Bane Act claim, thus, Plaintiffs must make two showings: (1) Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) that interference was accompanied by actual or attempted threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff to allege interference or attempted interference with a legal right by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Inman v. Anderson · filed 2018-02-27

In order to state a claim under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must allege "(1) interference with or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion."

Section 52.1 requires intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal right through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

(PS) Mackintosh v. Lyft, Inc. · filed 2019-11-01

A plaintiff bringing a claim pursuant to the Bane Act must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires interference with a legal right accompanied by coercion.

D.T. v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit System · filed 2019-11-08(a)

The Bane Act requires “an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.”

Section 52.1 permits a sufficiently pleaded claim for wrongful arrest, detention, and imprisonment.

Soler v. San Diego, County of · filed 2019-12-04

Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful arrest, detention, and imprisonment brought pursuant to California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, is adequately pleaded.

A Section 52.1 excessive force claim requires a constitutional violation and specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights; intent may be inferred from the circumstances.

Strong v. City of Vallejo · filed 2020-07-22

Thus, to succeed on this claim, plaintiff must show (1) that defendant Tonn violated his constitutional rights using excessive force, and (2) that Tonn had a specific intent to violate those rights.

Section 52.1 requires allegations that each defendant interfered or attempted to interfere with a federal or California right through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Williams v. City of Pleasanton · filed 2021-09-02(a)

The Eighth Cause of Action under the Bane Act is DISMISSED with leave to amend so that Williams can allege what acts each VCMC Defendant took against her that interfered or attempted to interfere with her rights under federal or California law through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires an alleged violation of a protected right and specific intent to violate that right.

G. v. City of Lafayette · filed 2022-10-28(b)-(c)

This claim fails because the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Black violated their constitutional rights nor that he had the specific intent to do so.

Section 52.1 requires facts showing deliberate or spiteful interference with a constitutional right through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Garrick v. Garrick · filed 2023-06-21

First, the complaint is devoid of facts showing that Defendants committed egregious interferences with Garrick’s constitutional rights by way of threats, intimidation, or coercion of a deliberate or spiteful nature.

Section 52.1 requires qualifying interference with a protected right and resulting harm; a treatment delay without a violent act or harm does not state a claim.

Swanson v. County of Contra Costa · filed 2023-09-29

The cancellation of Plaintiff’s colonoscopy because Plaintiff had not complied with the colonoscopy preparation instructions was not a violent act and, as discussed above, Plaintiff ultimately received the colonoscopy, and the three-week delay in having Plaintiff’s colonoscopy did not cause Plaintiff harm.

A Bane Act claim requires factual allegations of interference with a protected right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient.

(PC) Warzek v. Valley State Prison · filed 2023-03-27(b)

However, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory language is not sufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act against any of the Defendants.

A Bane Act claim against a government official requires the elements of a § 1983 claim plus specific intent to violate a constitutional right.

Galindo v. City of San Francisco · filed 2024-02-27(b)-(c)

“The elements of a Bane Act claim are essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the added requirement that the government official had a ‘specific intent to violate’ a constitutional right.”

Section 52.1 requires interference with rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion and specific intent to violate those rights.

Duncan v. County of Humboldt · filed 2024-06-27(b)-(c)

To state a Bane Act claim, Plaintiff must allege 1) interference with her rights by “threat, intimidation, or coercion” and 2) County Defendants’ specific intent to violate her rights.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff alleging intimidation to plead specific facts supporting that claim.

Langham v. City of Union City · filed 2024-02-06(b)

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim with leave to amend to allege specific facts in support of the claim of intimidation.

Section 52.1 requires threats, intimidation, or coercion and specific intent to violate a protected right; the coercion need not be separate from the underlying constitutional violation.

Velasquez, Jr. v. City of Hayward · filed 2024-11-13

There are two elements to a Bane Act claim. First, there must be a “threat, intimidation, or coercion,” although that element need not be “transactionally independent” from the underlying constitutional violation alleged. Id. at 1043. Second, “the Bane Act requires ‘a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.’” Id. (quoting Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 799–800 (2017)).

Section 52.1(a) requires interference with a federal or state right by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with specific intent to violate that right.

Tamrat v. Singh · filed 2025-05-29(a)

California’s Bane Act protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out “by threat, intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)). A plaintiff making a Bane Act claim must show the defendant acted with a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s right to freedom from the state or federal violation. Id. at 1043-44. Liberally construed, plaintiff has stated a cognizable Bane Act claim against Singh.

Section 52.1 covers interference with rights secured by state or federal law through threat, intimidation, or coercion, and requires specific intent to violate the protected right.

Tamrat v. Mercardo · filed 2025-06-04(a)

California’s Bane Act protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out “by threat, intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)). A plaintiff making a Bane Act claim must show the defendant acted with a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s right to freedom from the state or federal violation. Id. at 1043-44. Liberally construed, plaintiff has stated a Bane Act claim against both named defendants.