Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Section 17200’s unlawful-practice theory requires a violation of another law.

Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court · filed 2003-04-17

Scripps has not engaged in unlawful competition by violating another law. As we discussed above, Scripps has not violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Cartwright Act.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong requires a plaintiff to identify and substantiate a violation of statutory, regulatory, or decisional law.

Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America · filed 2004-01-28

On appeal, Bernardo again fails to identify any statutory, regulatory or decisional law that Planned Parenthood allegedly violated. We thus conclude that Bernardo failed to meet her burden of stating and substantiating a legally sufficient claim of unlawfulness.

Section 17200 permits an unfair competition claim based on conduct that supports claims for harassment, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. · filed 2005-06-01

As to the unfair competition cause of action, Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... Because Macdonald showed a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for harassment, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is also probable she will prevail on her unfair competition cause of action.

Section 17200’s unlawful business practice claim requires an underlying statutory violation.

In Re Vaccine Cases · filed 2005-11-28

Thus as to both groups of defendants, no statutory violation provided the “unlawful .. . business act or practice” to form the basis for a UCL violation. Therefore plaintiffs had no UCL cause of action, and we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the UCL cause of action as to all defendants.

Section 17200 treats violations of other laws committed as business practices as unlawful competition.

People v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY · filed 2006-08-02

Business and Professions Code sections 17200 to 17208 prohibit unfair competition, including unlawful business practices. ... In this sense, an unlawful business practice “borrows” violations of other laws and treats the violations as unlawful business practices when committed pursuant to business activity.

Section 17200 treats a violation of the Insurance Code’s premium disclosure requirement as an unlawful business practice without requiring proof that the practice was also fraudulent or unfair.

Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2008-12-09

Because we conclude Troyk met his burden to show Farmers committed an unlawful business practice under the UCL, we need not, and do not, address the two alternative bases for unfair competition under the UCL (i.e., whether Farmers also engaged in fraudulent or unfair business practices).

An unlawful business practice is sufficient under section 17200; the court need not also decide whether the practice is fraudulent or unfair.

Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. · filed 2009-03-10

Because we conclude Troyk met his burden to show Farmers committed an unlawful business practice under the UCL, we need not, and do not, address the two alternative bases ... for unfair competition under the UCL (i.e., whether Farmers also engaged in fraudulent or unfair business practices).

Section 17200’s unlawful prong requires actual reliance when the alleged unlawful conduct is based on misrepresentations.

Durell v. Sharp Healthcare · filed 2010-04-19

In this case we conclude that to have standing to bring a claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, in which the predicate unlawful conduct is based on misrepresentations, as here, the reasoning of Tobacco II is equally applicable and actual reliance is an element of the claim.

Section 17200 treats violations of the Narcotics Abatement Law and the Public Nuisance Law as unlawful business practices.

People ex rel. Trutanich v. Joseph · filed 2012-03-26

Plaintiff presented admissible evidence that violations of the Narcotics Abatement Law and the Public Nuisance Law occurred at Orgánica’s premises. Such violations constituted unlawful business practices prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 permits a violation of another law to be independently actionable as unfair competition.

Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP · filed 2013-10-31

By defining “unfair competition” to include any unlawful act or practice, the UCL permits violations of other laws to be treated as independently actionable as unfair competition.

Section 17200 requires a plaintiff alleging an unlawful business practice to plead facts showing a violation of an underlying law.

Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack · filed 2014-02-11

To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong covers cash wage payments made without paying the associated payroll taxes.

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. · filed 2015-01-27

Plaintiff‟s allegations that Insomniac and Ventures made cash payments of wages without paying the payroll taxes associated with those wages were sufficient to state a violation of the UCL under the unlawful prong of that statutory scheme.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong permits a claim based on deceptive debt collection that violates the FDCPA.

Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-03-12

Chase walked this perilous path, and plaintiffs have accordingly alleged enough of a misrepresentation or deception to get past a demurrer on an FDCPA claim, and hence their UCL and Rosenthal Act claims as well.

Section 17200 treats a business practice as unlawful when it violates a predicate law.

CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 LLC v. Bradley · filed 2015-04-02

A practice is unlawful under the UCL where it violates a predicate law.

Section 17200 permits an alleged TILA violation to serve as the unlawful business practice underlying a UCL claim.

Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2017-03-13

Ivanoff‟s complaint alleged the Bank‟s violation of TILA constituted an unlawful business practice, an appropriate basis for her UCL claim.

A section 17200 claim based on unlawful business practices can proceed when the complaint adequately states a predicate claim.

Turner v. Seterus, Inc. · filed 2018-09-24

We have concluded that plaintiffs' third amended complaint adequately states causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, wrongful foreclosure and negligence. Based on that conclusion, we likewise conclude that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

Section 17200’s unlawful prong covers business practices that violate statutory or regulatory law.

Edd King v. National General Insurance Company · filed 2025-05-05

To state a claim under the unlawful prong, a plaintiff must allege facts that show that a defendant’s business practice—or conduct which can be characterized as a business practice—violates the law, including statutory or regulatory law.

Section 17200 applies to California Labor Code violations occurring in California but not to allegedly unlawful conduct occurring outside California that injures nonresidents.

Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation · filed 2008-11-06

We hold that § 17200 does not apply to allegedly unlawful behavior occurring outside California causing injury to nonresidents of California.

Section 17200 does not apply extraterritorially to impose liability on Kansas defendants for conduct occurring in Kansas.

GemCap Lending I, LLC v. Pertl · filed 2019-12-16

Finally, GemCap alleges that all defendants violated California’s Business and Professions Code section 17200, which includes a prohibition against “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. While GemCap alleges that its business is based in California, Davis is licensed in Kansas. Moreover, the alleged conduct that GemCap complains of took place in Kansas. Consistent with the holdings of California courts in analogous circumstances, this court is unwilling to impose liability for violation of a California statute on Kansas defendants for Kansas conduct in a Kansas proceeding. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 598 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that “extraterritorial application of the U[nfair] C[ompetition] L[aw] is improper where non-residents of California raise claims based on conduct that allegedly occurred outside of the state”); Nw. Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1989) (“We ordinarily presume the Legislature did not intend the statutes of this state to have force of operation beyond the boundaries of the state.”). Consequently, the court grants Davis’s motion to dismiss Count XII against Davis and Van Osdol.

Section 17200 standing can be established by alleging injury in fact from reliance on deceptive advertising, and out-of-state parties may invoke the statute for harm caused by wrongful conduct in California.

Gaby's Bags, LLC v. Mercari, Inc. · filed 2020-12-25

This allegation tethers plaintiff’s alleged harm to Mercari’s headquarters in California, and is sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. ... Having now sued under California’s consumer protection statutes, and sufficiently alleging that it suffered injury in fact as a result of relying on Mercari’s allegedly deceitful ads (Dkt. No. 178-2 at ¶¶ 49–50, 59, 66, 77–79, 85–86), plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to confer standing under Section 17200 and Section 17500.

Section 17200 et seq. applies to multistate-class claims for anticompetitive conduct that occurred in California.

In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust Litigation · filed 2022-11-28

The UCL also applies to claims by the multi-state class for anticompetitive conduct by Google that occurred within California. See Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 224-25 (1999).

Section 17200 does not support a non-California resident's claim when none of the alleged misconduct or injury occurred in California.

Zamfir v. Casperlabs, LLC · filed 2022-10-25

With respect to the UCL specifically, section 17200 does not support claims by non-California residents where none of the alleged misconduct or injuries occurred in California.

The UCL can be invoked by an out-of-state plaintiff harmed by wrongful conduct, including misrepresentations, occurring in California.

Bryan v. Del Monte Foods, Inc. · filed 2023-07-25

“The UCL makes actionable any ‘unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” ... “Nevertheless, “state statutory remedies may be invoked by out-of-state parties when they are harmed by wrongful conduct occurring in California.” ... “Accordingly, the UCL and FAL claims are not subject to dismissal for failure to allege a purchase in California.”

Section 17200 does not support a claim by a non-California resident when none of the alleged misconduct or injury occurred in California.

Quan v. BAM Trading Services, Inc. · filed 2024-05-13

With respect to the UCL specifically, Section 17200 does not support claims by non-California residents where none of the alleged misconduct or injuries occurred in California.

Section 17200 is presumed not to apply when the liability-creating conduct occurs outside California.

LINDQUIST v. NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. · filed 2024-09-11

“[T]he determinative factor in California’s presumption against extraterritoriality is the location of the conduct.” ... “if the liability-creating conduct occurs outside of California, California law generally should not govern that conduct.” ... Because the misconduct occurred outside of California, the UCL does not apply. ... The Court concludes that the California plaintiffs’ allegations that NCB’s conduct in Pennsylvania caused them to suffer an injury is not enough to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of California law. ... Therefore, the California plaintiffs’ UCL claim against NCB will be dismissed.

Section 17200 et seq. reaches unlawful business conduct originating in California, but it does not allow damages or restitution for a price difference that cannot be traced to money acquired by the defendant.

Campbell · filed 2025-12-01

“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the UCL in full force … the UCL reaches any unlawful business act or practice committed in California.” ... “Because plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the tortious conduct at issue originated in California, they have alleged facts sufficient to assert that the UCL might apply to that conduct.” ... “Damages are not recoverable under the UCL.” ... “That amount “cannot be traced to any particular funds in [defendants’] possession” and is instead better understood as a form of damages. Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 947–48.” ... “But because the sole theory of recovery they have pleaded in the second amended complaint is not available under the UCL, their existing complaint fails to state a UCL claim.”

Section 17200's UCL cannot constitutionally be applied to out-of-state misconduct without sufficient California contacts, such as an affirmative act directed toward or occurring in California; harm suffered in California alone is insufficient.

United Cargo Management, Inc. v. Carlton III Blair; Worldlog · filed 2026-02-23

Cases finding sufficient contact to invoke California law counsel that some affirmative act directed towards, or occurring in, California is necessary to apply the UCL within constitutionally permissible limits. ... The Amended Complaint does not contain any facts that link this alleged misconduct with California, save for the inference that UCM suffered harm in California. ... As such, the court finds that UCM has not alleged conduct that creates sufficient contact with California to justify application of either the UCL or the FAL to the Worldlog Defendants. The court therefore grants the Worldlog Defendants’ motion to dismiss UCM’s UCL and FAL causes of action.

Section 17200 does not reach nonresidents’ FLSA overtime claims for work in other states merely because the employer decided in California to classify them as exempt.

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. · filed 2011-06-30

Accordingly, that Oracle‟s decision to classify its Instructors as exempt was made in California does not, standing alone, justify applying the UCL to the nonresident plaintiffs‟ FLSA claims for overtime worked in other states.

California’s unfair competition law does not apply extraterritorially; nonresident plaintiffs must allege that the challenged conduct occurred in California.

Aghaji v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2016-05-31

In addition to alleging facts sufficient to show violations of Regulation X and Regulation Z, plaintiffs who are not California residents must also allege facts to show that the alleged violations occurred within California, because California‟s unfair competition law does not apply extraterritorially.

Section 17200 does not apply to overtime work performed outside California by nonresident employees of a California employer based solely on an FLSA violation.

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. · filed 2011-12-13

[6] Plaintiffs Evich and Burkow argue that § 17200 applies to alleged violations of the FLSA outside of California. The California Supreme Court held: “Business and Professions Code section 17200 does not apply to overtime work per- formed outside California for a California-based employer by out-of-state plaintiffs in the circumstances of this case based solely on the employer’s failure to comply with the overtime provisions of the FLSA.” Id. at 1209. The Court’s answer to Oracle’s state-law argument is conclusive.

A § 17200 claim alleging that billing statements or coupon books deceptively misrepresent how student-loan interest is calculated is treated as an improper-disclosure claim and is expressly preempted by the HEA’s disclosure provision.

Chae v. Slm Corporation · filed 2010-01-25

We conclude that 20 U.S.C. § 1098g applies to, and thus precludes, several of the plaintiffs’ state law claims. Two of the plaintiffs’ Unfair Competition Law claims allege that Sallie Mae employs “unfair” and “fraudulent” business practices by using billing statements and coupon books that trick borrowers into thinking that interest is being calculated via the installment method when Sallie Mae really uses a simple daily calculation. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims challenging the language in Sallie Mae’s billing statements and coupon books are restyled improper-disclosure claims, and are therefore subject to express preemption under 20 U.S.C. § 1098g.

Section 17200 broadly defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and deceptive or misleading advertising, but a claim still requires evidence supporting one of those theories.

The Sub Corporation, Ltd. v. Best Buy Co. Inc. · filed 2010-02-11

The district court properly granted summary judgment on California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq, California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which it broadly defines as including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Sub Corp’s complaint does not specify whether Sub Corp is asserting a claim for unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair business practices. The district court correctly concluded that summary judgment is appropriate given the absence of evidence supporting a claim under any one of these theories.

The UCL's unfairness theory requires proof of an actual or threatened impact on competition when based on an incipient antitrust violation or the policy or spirit of antitrust laws.

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Vision Service Plan · filed 2010-07-26

Aspex also alleges that VSP’s conduct is “unfair” under the UCL because it threatens an “incipient” antitrust violation and violates the “policy or spirit” of the antitrust laws. Aspex’s claim fails because it has not offered “proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.” Cel-Tech Commuc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999). The record reveals that VSP’s motivation behind its disputed decision is to end the litigation with Aspex, not to monopolize the frames market or impede competition. Moreover, there are nearly 450 other companies who compete with Aspex and VSP’s subsidiaries in the frames market. VSP’s decision may be bad news for Aspex’s business, but not necessarily for competition. See id. at 544 (“Injury to a competitor is not equivalent to injury to competition; only the latter is the proper focus of antitrust laws.”). Even assuming VSP’s conduct was aimed at pushing Aspex out of the frames market entirely, any conclusion on this record that this result would diminish competition in the relevant market would be speculative.

Section 17200 permits a state-law unfair competition claim that borrows its substantive standard from the FLSA, and the FLSA does not preempt that claim.

Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc. · filed 2010-09-27

California Business and Professions Code § 17200 permits recovery for “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” ... We therefore hold that FLSA does not preempt a state-law § 17200 claim that “borrows” its substantive standard from FLSA.

Section 17200 claims challenging allegedly deceptive “No Preservatives” labeling are not preempted by the FDCA, but injunctive relief on the UCL claim is unavailable where the plaintiff lacks Article III standing.

Ashour v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC · filed 2020-09-18

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated various California statutes in labeling their products as containing “[n]o [p]reservatives,” and should be enjoined from using this descriptor. Compl. ¶¶ 71, 84, 94. ... The primary flaw in Defendants’ argument, therefore, is that Plaintiff’s state law claim that Defendants deceptively labeled their beverages as containing “[n]o [p]reservatives” does not conflict with the federal requirement, which only mandates identifying the preservative. ... Based on the pleadings, there is no obstacle between state and federal law. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims regarding labeling on the basis of federal preemption is DENIED. ... For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED only to the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on Counts I, II, and III, Plaintiff’s claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, the CLRA, and California’s False Advertising Law.

A UCL claim based on a dietary-supplement label is not automatically preempted merely because the label makes structure-function claims; the plaintiff may amend to allege extra-label evidence supporting an implied-disease claim.

Kroessler v. Cvs Health Corporation · filed 2020-10-09

The district court erred in concluding that the FDCA preempts Kroessler’s state law causes of action simply because CVS’s glucosamine-based supplements present only structure/function claims, and erred in dismissing the complaint without granting Kroessler leave to amend to add allegations regarding an implied disease claim.

Copyright preemption bars a UCL claim based on reproducing, performing, or misappropriating works within the Copyright Act's exclusive rights, while a claim based on inducement fails when no valid agreement was breached.

Yellowcake, Inc. v. Morena Music, Inc. · filed 2021-03-02

Because the Court finds that the acts of reproducing, performing, and “misappropriating” are actions covered by § 106, the UCL claims against Yellowcake and Colonize are preempted by the Copyright Act.

A California Unfair Competition Law claim based on imposing protein-labeling requirements beyond those required by FDA regulations is preempted by the FDCA.

Brown v. The J.M. Smucker Company · filed 2022-08-12

On this basis, Plaintiff brings causes of action under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act ... and Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) ... By arguing that the nutrient content claim must be calculated using one of Plaintiff’s preferred methods, Plaintiff attempts to use California state law to impose requirements that the FDA does not, which violates the FDCA’s preemption provision. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are preempted, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 17200 claims are preempted by ERISA when they arise from the administration of an ERISA-covered benefit plan.

Vang v. Geil Enterprises Inc. · filed 2023-04-28

Finally, Plaintiff brings his third cause of action under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, alleging that the defendant(s) withheld benefits and “back dat[ed] a notice required by law to be provided to [him]” regarding when he could withdraw from his ESOP account. (Compl. at 3, 20–21.) This claim, as currently pleaded, is preempted by ERISA. ... Plaintiff’s UCL claim arises out of the alleged improper withholding of benefits and the “back dating a notice required by law to be provided to [him]” regarding when he could withdraw from his ESOP account. (Compl. at 20–21.) Because these allegations are directly related to the administration of the ESOP, the claims are preempted by ERISA.

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a UCL claim cannot rest solely on breach of contract, and an omission-based claim about a federal credit union’s fee practices may be preempted.

Vue v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union · filed 2023-09-29

As a threshold matter, PFCU is correct (see Doc. 11-1 at 14) that allegations of breach of contract cannot, on their own, provide a basis for a UCL claim. See Dillon v. NBCUniversal Media LLC, No. CV 12-09728 SJO AJWX, 2013 WL 3581938, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (collecting cases). ... No matter which prong Plaintiff purports to bring her claim, it is still a “state law claim[] regarding a federal credit union’s failure to disclose certain fee practices,” and therefore, it is preempted. ... Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of misrepresentation by omission are preempted and cannot be maintained. Thus, the motion on this basis is GRANTED without leave to amend.

A UCL claim based on reproducing and distributing the plaintiff’s own online videos is preempted by the Copyright Act when it seeks rights equivalent to copyright rights.

Yu v. ByteDance Inc. · filed 2023-07-13

Thus, to the extent that the first cause of action alleges that ByteDance violated Yu’s rights to reproduce and distribute his own online videos, that claim is equivalent to an action for copyright infringement.

A UCL unlawful-prong claim based on copyright infringement is preempted by the Copyright Act.

Andersen v. Stability AI Ltd. · filed 2023-10-16

As an initial matter, plaintiffs cannot tie their unlawful prong UCL claim to purported copyright violations. Those claims are preempted by the Copyright Act.

A UCL claim based on state-law causes of action that are preempted by copyright law must also be dismissed.

DOE 1 v. GitHub, Inc. · filed 2024-01-22

Finally, Defendants argue that to the extent that Plaintiffs’ unfair competition claim is predicated on their state law claims for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic relations, unjust enrichment, and negligence, it must also be preempted. The Court agrees. When the underlying claims are dismissed on preemption grounds, a UCL claim predicated on the same causes of action must be dismissed as well. See Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding plaintiff’s UCL claim preempted where it was “based solely on rights equivalent to those protected by the federal copyright laws.”); Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (same).

The UCL imposes an independent requirement prohibiting unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, which can make a related claim preempted by the FCRA.

Hicks v. Trans Union, LLC · filed 2024-02-09

However, the Unfair Competition Law does impose an independent requirement or prohibition; namely, it prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”

A § 17200 (UCL) claim based on an insurer’s failure to pay according to ERISA plan terms is preempted by ERISA, while claims based on independent obligations may survive preemption.

Cleanquest, LLC v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company · filed 2024-12-02

The Court also concludes that Cleanquest’s UCL claim is preempted under ERISA. Some UCL claims survive ERISA preemption when they are “based on independent obligations owed to” the plaintiff. ... However, Cleanquest’s UCL claim is plainly based upon Defendants’ refusal “to pay for services in accordance with the terms and conditions of the applicable plans/policies.”

Section 17200 prohibits unfair or unlawful business practices, but a UCL claim regulating a federal credit union's account fees is preempted and cannot proceed.

King v. Navy Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-08-01

Although King offers an Olympic level of verbal gymnastics to argue that the UCL transcends § 701.35(c)’s preemption clause, we agree with the district court—and every other court to confront this issue—that all state laws that regulate account fees—general, specific, or otherwise—have no application to federal credit unions.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a claim based solely on copyright infringement is preempted when it adds no qualitatively different conduct.

Kozina v. Jackson · filed 2025-08-19

The FAC also alleges an unfair competition/trade practices claim pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 based on Defendant’s alleged infringement. ... Therefore, not only is default judgement on the unfair competition claim improper, but this claim should also be dismissed without leave to amend.

A UCL claim based on California Sherman Law violations is expressly preempted when it challenges drug content or labeling approved by the FDA and would impose requirements different from or additional to federal requirements.

Leonard v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2025-09-29

Finally, Plaintiff argues that her UCL claim, which is based on a violation of the California Sherman Law, cannot be preempted because the Sherman Law incorporates all FDCA requirements. ... However, ... challenging the FDA-approved content and label as adulterated and deceptive under California law—even California law that incorporates the FDCA—is still an attempt by Plaintiff to impose a requirement that is different from or in addition to the federal requirement. ... Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims expressly preempted under Section 379r(e).

A § 17200 unfair-competition claim based on encouraging or inducing copyright infringement is preempted by the Copyright Act.

Comeback Media, Inc. v. Particle Media · filed 2025-10-30

Comeback specifically alleges the “lax and inadequate verification process,” which allows “bad actors to easily obtain verified status and monetize stolen content, constitutes an unfair business practice.” SAC ¶ 169 (emphasis added). Because the allegations Comeback relies on “involve the encouragement or inducement of copyright infringement,” the Copyright Act preempts Comeback’s unfair competition claim. See Ryan v. Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 417 F. App’x 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 17200 reaches unlawful business acts or practices committed in California, but does not cover conduct occurring entirely outside California.

Trilogy Federal, LLC v. Civitasdx LLC · filed 2025-09-16

Defendants have not stated a claim under the UCL or FAL for the simple reason that those statutes only cover conduct that occurred in California. The UCL “reaches any unlawful business act or practice committed in California.”

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and misleading advertising as unfair competition.

Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc. · filed 1995-12-08

The question with which we are faced here, however, is whether plaintiff’s lawsuit for fraud, negligent misrepresentation (which is, of course, a species of fraud), and unfair and deceptive business practices in effect regulates the “operations” of a savings association. We conclude that it does not.

Section 17200 cannot be used to challenge Medicare provider cost reporting and reimbursement because federal law preempts state regulation of that field.

Congress of California Seniors v. Catholic Healthcare West · filed 2001-02-28

But it does not follow that the Union can pursue its Medicare-based claims under section 17200— because the Union’s attack on CHW’s cost reporting and the resulting reimbursement to CHW is preempted by federal law.

Section 17200 permits claims against a federally chartered savings association based on generally applicable contract and deceptive-practice duties when those claims affect lending only incidentally.

Gibson v. World Savings & Loan Assn. · filed 2002-12-24

Resolution of the UCL claim here involves state laws of general application that affect lending only incidentally. Therefore, the trial court erred by concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims were federally preempted.

Section 17200 claims challenging a federal savings and loan association’s payoff-demand fax fees are preempted by federal law.

Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. · filed 2003-01-23

We agree that federal law has preempted the claims under section 2943 of the Civil Code and section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code and that the other causes of action were properly rejected.

A UCL action based on alleged violations of generally applicable labor and employment laws is not facially preempted by the FAAAA merely because it is brought against a motor carrier.

People Ex Rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. · filed 2014-07-28

Thus, we hold that the FAAAA does not facially preempt the People’s UCL action in this case.

Section 17200 does not support a claim challenging cable rate hikes from adding a small number of channels to an existing service tier when federal regulation preempts that claim.

Fischer v. Time Warner Cable Inc. · filed 2015-02-23

With Doyle as a guide, we conclude that Regulation section 76.981 is a proper exercise of the FCC’s regulatory authority and preempts appellants’ UCL claim.

An injunctive relief claim under section 17200 is not arbitrable.

Hoover v. American Income Life Insurance · filed 2012-05-16

Certainly, the injunctive relief claim under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) is not arbitrable.

Section 17200 claims seeking broad public injunctive relief are not exempt from arbitration under the Broughton-Cruz rule because the FAA preempts that rule after Concepcion.

Kilgore v. KeyBank, National Ass'n · filed 2012-03-07

We hold that the Broughton-Cruz rule does not survive Concepcion because the rule “prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim” — claims for broad public injunctive relief. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. Therefore, our statement in Davis — that Broughton and Cruz prohibit the arbitration of public injunctive relief claims in California — is no longer good law. See 485 F.3d at 1082.

Before the 2004 standing changes, a private for-profit plaintiff that suffered no injury could sue to obtain relief for others for a § 17200 violation.

Canyon View Estates v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2012-03-19

In a claim for violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, a reasonable attorney would have viewed Homeside, a lender to mobile home tenants, as a proper representative in protecting tenants and lenders from Canyon View’s alleged misconduct.

A UCL class claim cannot proceed where establishing unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct requires individualized evidence of class members’ reliance or other circumstances.

Avritt v. Reliastar Life Insurance · filed 2010-08-12

Given the varying experiences of each of the members of the putative class, it is unlikely that any misconduct could be uniformly established as to all purchasers. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification on the Avritts’ UCL claim.

Section 17200’s unfairness prong does not give courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts.

Roots Ready Made Garments Co., W.L.L. v. Gap, Inc. · filed 2010-11-29

“does not give the courts a general license to review the fairness of contracts.”

Section 17200 claims are subject to California’s single-publication rule, which can bar them as untimely.

Yeager v. Bowlin · filed 2012-09-10

The district court concluded that the single-publication rule bars as untimely Yeager’s claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and California’s False Advertising Act, id. § 17500. We agree.

Section 17200 permits a UCL claim based on a Cartwright Act violation even when the purchases occurred outside California, so long as the defendant’s related conspiratorial conduct in California was more than slight or casual and applying California law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.

At&t Mobility Llc v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes · filed 2013-02-14

We focus on Plaintiffs’ claims under the California Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700–16770 (Cartwright Act or Act), but the principles articulated herein apply equally to Plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (UCL). ... We reverse the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims under the Cartwright Act and the UCL. We remand to the district court for it to make an individual determination consistent with this opinion with respect to each Defendant as to whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient conspiratorial conduct within California, that is not “slight and casual,” such that the application of California law to that Defendant is “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”

A UCL claim based on allegedly unfair contract terms accrues when the contract is formed, and continuous accrual or the discovery rule does not preserve an untimely claim absent a recurring wrongful act or delayed discoverability.

Sultan Hameed v. Ihop Franchising Llc · filed 2013-03-28

Hameed contends that the district court erred in dismissing as time-barred his UCL claim related to the Equipment Lease. The district court correctly found that the claim accrued in 1998 when the contracts were formed. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1196 (2013). The theory of continuous accrual does not apply because there is no allegation of a recurring wrongful act. Unlike Aryeh, where the plaintiff alleged that each individual payment included an unfair charge, see id. at 1200, here, Hameed’s contention is that the contractual terms are unfair. The discovery rule also does not excuse Hameed’s untimeliness because a reasonable person in his position would have discovered the alleged unfairness of the contract’s terms at the inception of the contract. Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 88 (Cal. 1999). Hameed has also not alleged a continuous violation because the alleged unfairness stems not from a course of conduct, but from the terms of the initial contract. Aryeh, 55 Cal. 4th at 1198. The UCL claim is therefore time-barred.

A claim under the Unfair Competition Law requires allegations of actions constituting a business practice.

Tecza v. University of San Francisco · filed 2013-06-25

We also agree that Tecza failed to state a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Even assuming that Tecza’s complaint should be read to allege that this claim is based on USF’s violation of policies in its handbooks, Tecza has failed to allege any actions by USF that would constitute a business practice. Cf. Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n of Oakland, Inc., 496 P.2d 817, 831 (Cal. 1972) (in bank). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Tecza’s California Unfair Competition Law claim.

Section 17200's unfair-competition prohibition does not permit a deceptive-marketing claim where a reasonable consumer would not likely be deceived by the product's labeling.

Cheramie v. Hbb, LLC · filed 2013-11-18

The reasonable consumer standard applies to Cheramie’s statutory claims, Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008), and forecloses them, for his complaint makes it impossible for him to demonstrate that a reasonable consumer was “likely to be deceived” by the Lazy Cakes product in the manner alleged, id. at 938-39. The complaint alleges that the Lazy Cakes packaging describes the product as a relaxation agent, discloses the presence and quantity of melatonin in each serving and the relevant serving size, and warns consumers about the risk of drowsiness. More tellingly, he admits that research regarding the safety and side effects of melatonin consumption and the proper dosage is inconsistent and inconclusive. Under the facts as alleged, Cheramie has not stated a plausible claim of deception. Cheramie’s statutory claims were properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to have standing to maintain a UCL claim based on alleged fraud.

Adesokan v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2014-07-02

Dismissal of Adesokan’s claim alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, was proper because Adesokan lacked standing to maintain a UCL claim based on the alleged fraud.

Section 17200 et seq. makes violations of other state and federal laws independently actionable as unfair competitive practices, but a UCL claim cannot impose derivative liability when the underlying conduct did not violate those laws.

Piñon v. Bank of America, NA · filed 2014-01-21

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., makes violations of other state and federal laws “independently actionable as unfair competitive practices.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Because we conclude that the issuers’ conduct did not violate the National Bank Act or the DIDMCA, there is no derivative liability under the Unfair Competition Law.

Section 17200 generally limits relief under California's Unfair Competition Law to injunctive relief and restitution.

Nick Makreas v. the Moore Law Group, A.P.C. · filed 2014-07-03

The district court properly dismissed Makreas’s unfair competition claim because Makreas failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he sought injunctive relief, or that defendants obtained money or property from him as a result of their alleged misconduct, warranting restitution. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockhead Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943-45 (Cal. 2003) (explaining that under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, relief is generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution, and defining restitution); see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (injunctive relief is “unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again”).

Section 17200's statutory right to seek public injunctive relief cannot be waived in all forums, but an arbitration agreement remains enforceable when it permits bilateral arbitration of public-injunctive claims.

Kramer v. Avis · filed 2020-03-27

The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGill clarified that “a provision in any contract—even a contract that has no arbitration provision—that purports to waive, in all fora, the statutory right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, or the false advertising law is invalid and unenforceable under California law.” McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 962 (emphasis in original). However, the “McGill rule leaves undisturbed an agreement that both requires bilateral arbitration and permits public injunctive claims.” Blair, 928 F.3d at 829. ... In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC plainly seeks public injunctive relief and that the Arbitration Provision permits Plaintiff to pursue such relief in arbitration. Blair, 928 F.3d at 829; McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 945. Hence, the Arbitration Provision is not invalid as against California public policy.

Section 17200 permits public injunctive relief aimed at preventing deceptive practices directed at the general public, even when the relief benefits a subset of the public and the plaintiff only incidentally.

Snarr v. Hrb Tax Group, Inc. · filed 2020-12-09

Under California law, public injunctive relief is relief “that has ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public.” ... By contrast, “[r]elief that has the primary purpose or effect of redressing or preventing injury to an individual plaintiff—or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff—does not constitute public injunctive relief.” ... The relief sought in this case would affect allegedly deceptive practices that aim to lure members of the public to use and pay for HRB’s services, and the relief will benefit Snarr only incidentally.

The UCL authorizes public injunctive relief, which an injured individual may seek in an individual lawsuit without acting as a private attorney general.

Dicarlo v. Moneylion, Inc. · filed 2021-02-19

The UCL, FAL, and CLRA all authorize public injunctive relief. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17535; Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(2); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1162, 1164 (Cal. 2003). Thus, any contract that bars public injunctive relief in both court and arbitration is invalid. McGill, 393 P.3d at 94; see Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2013).

Section 17200 provides for public injunctive relief against false or misleading advertising, and a plaintiff’s right to seek that relief cannot be waived through an arbitration agreement.

Brown v. Madison Reed, Inc. · filed 2021-08-30

By seeking to enjoin Madison Reed from continuing its false and misleading advertising to the general public, Brown requests a public injunctive relief that is similar to the relief sought in McGill. See McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 954–55 (finding CLRA, UCL, and FAL provide for public injunctive relief, and therefore a plaintiff’s right to seek an injunction pursuant to these laws cannot be waived through an arbitration agreement, where plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant bank from falsely advertising its “credit protector” plan); see also Blair, 928 F.3d at 831 n.3 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs had not sought a public injunction because the plaintiffs sought “to enjoin future violations of California’s consumer protection statutes, relief oriented to and for the benefit of the general public”).

Section 17200 et seq. permits injunctive relief to prevent unlawful business practices, but relief benefiting only a discrete group and requiring individualized inquiries is not non-waivable public injunctive relief under the McGill rule.

Hodges v. Comcast Cable Communications · filed 2021-12-23

At least some (but not all) of these requested forms of relief seek forward-looking prohibitions against future violations of law. But as we have explained, that alone is not enough to classify the remedy as public injunctive relief within the meaning of the McGill rule. And unlike the public injunctive relief sought in McGill, Broughton, and Cruz, these requests on their face stand to benefit only Comcast “cable subscribers”—i.e., by definition they will only benefit a “group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff.” McGill, 393 P.3d at 90; see also Capriole, 7 F.4th at 854, 2021 WL 3282092, at *13; Clifford, 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 278. There is simply no sense in which this relief could be said to primarily benefit the general public as a more diffuse whole.

Section 17200 et seq. permits public injunctive relief primarily benefiting the general public, including an injunction against false advertising to the public.

MacClelland v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless · filed 2022-07-01

“[T]he statutory schemes set out in ‘the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law’ are explicitly designed to provide for ‘public injunctive relief’ that is ‘[b]y definition’ ‘primarily for the benefit of the general public.’” ... Here, the FAC seeks this “paradigmatic example” of public injunctive relief: to enjoin Verizon from falsely advertising the prices of its wireless service plans to members of the general public via public injunctions under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA—the very same statutes and type of relief at issue in McGill.

Section 17200 does not permit a UCL injunction that seeks to resolve an insurer's merits-based coverage dispute and obtain monetary benefits.

Cook v. State Farm General Insurance Company · filed 2022-11-09

Here, by contrast, the relief plaintiffs seek is the resolution of a merits issue, namely, whether the losses they claim are covered by their respective policies and, if so, their entitlement to monetary benefits thereunder. ... Consequently, plaintiffs' proposed claim is not a claim cognizable under § 17200.

Section 17200 does not allow an arbitration agreement to waive a plaintiff’s right to seek a public injunction, but an injunction aimed primarily at employees is not a public injunction.

Prostek v. Lincare Inc. · filed 2023-03-21

It is true that an arbitration agreement (or any other contract) cannot waive a plaintiff’s right to seek a UCL public injunction in any forum. ... A public injunction is an injunction that “by and large benefits the general public and that benefits the plaintiff, if at all, only incidentally and/or as a member of the general public.” ... Here, the Court does not find that the prohibition against public injunctive relief applies. ... Therefore, the Arbitration Agreement does not violate McGill’s prohibition against waiving public injunctions. ... Second, injunctive relief that primarily redresses or prevents injury to an induvial plaintiff or to a group of individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff is not public injunctive relief. ... Thus, since the UCL injunction requested in the Complaint is not a public injunction, the McGill rule does not apply.

A UCL claim seeking only injunctive relief may be dismissed when damages would make the plaintiff whole.

River Supply, Incorporated v. Oracle America, Inc. · filed 2024-02-16

River Supply contends only that the UCL claim should not be dismissed because it asks for an injunction. Nothing suggests that damages won’t make River Supply whole. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. 971 F.3d 834 (2020). The court dismisses the UCL claim.

Section 17200 broadly prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a plaintiff seeking UCL injunctive relief must plead the required equitable-remedy prerequisites, including irreparable injury and inadequate legal remedies.

Phantomalert v. Apple Inc. · filed 2025-01-10

That leaves one final claim: PhantomALERT’s assertion that Apple violated California’s Unfair Competition Law. The UCL prohibits business practices that constitute “unfair competition,” which is defined in relevant part as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “The broad scope of the statute encompasses both anticompetitive business practices and practices injurious to consumers.” Chavez v. ... Thus the Court concludes that PhantomALERT has failed to adequately state a claim for injunctive relief.

Under the UCL, an injunction aimed at ending deceptive advertising and correcting misleading representations is public injunctive relief because it benefits the general public rather than redressing an individual plaintiff’s injury.

Bow v. Cebridge Telecom CA, LLC · filed 2022-02-02

First, it is evident to the Court that Plaintiffs’ requests that Defendants cease false advertising practices and disclose to current subscribers its actual internet speeds and that its current infrastructure does not support such speeds are requests for public injunctive relief.

A claim for public injunctive relief under section 17200 is inarbitrable; the remaining claims and noninjunctive remedies must be arbitrated when covered by an arbitration agreement.

Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross · filed 2000-09-07

Coast Plaza’s requests for injunctive relief for the benefit of the public at large as a remedy under the two statutory schemes are the only requests for relief that are inarbitrable.

A section 17200 claim for public injunctive relief is not arbitrable because an arbitrator lacks power to grant that relief; the claim must be heard in court.

Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net · filed 2000-11-06

Finally, we conclude that under Groom and Broughton, the public injunctive relief cause of action is not arbitrable since it is beyond the arbitrator’s power to grant the relief requested and thus must be severed from the other arbitrable claims and adjudicated in a judicial forum.

A claim for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public under section 17200 must be severed from arbitrable claims.

Groom v. Health Net · filed 2000-08-09

The same reasoning applies to Groom’s cause of action on behalf of the general public to enjoin Health Net’s allegedly unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200. Groom’s claims for injunctive relief on behalf of the general public pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200 must therefore be severed from disposition of the arbitrable claims.

Section 17200 claims seeking public injunctive relief, along with restitution ancillary to that relief, must be heard in court rather than arbitration.

Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. · filed 2001-10-31

Put another way, there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the public protection purposes of Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500, as well as the restitution provision of the CLRA. ... Our holding in this case is a narrow one: Where, as here, a restitution claim is ancillary to injunctive relief sought under a statutory scheme whose primary purpose is to protect the public by punishing wrongdoing and deterring future violations, rather than to compensate individual plaintiffs, the restitution claim is not subject to arbitration, but must be tried along with the claim for injunctive relief in a court of law.

A section 17200 claim seeking an injunction to protect the general public from deceptive business practices is inarbitrable under the circumstances addressed by the court.

Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. · filed 2003-04-24

We also consider whether Broughton’s holding on the inarbitrability of CLRA public injunctions should be extended to include claims to enjoin unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. and to enjoin misleading advertising under Business and Professions Code section 17500 et seq. We conclude that Broughton should be extended to such claims, at least under the circumstances of the present case.

Restitution and disgorgement claims brought under Section 17200 are arbitrable.

Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc. · filed 2004-01-08

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject plaintiffs’ contentions that the arbitration clause violates the requirement in the VLA that every agreement in an automobile lease be contained in a single document (Civ. Code, § 2985.8, subd. (a)), and that the restitution and disgorgement claims brought under Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500 are inarbitrable.

An injunctive relief claim under § 17200 is not arbitrable.

Zavala v. Scott Brothers Dairy, Inc. · filed 2006-09-28

Certainly, plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claim under the unfair business practices act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) is not arbitrable.

Section 17200 cannot be used to bypass the Revenue and Taxation Code’s procedures for resolving disputes over the taxability of retail sales.

Loeffler v. Target Corporation · filed 2014-05-01

We conclude that the tax code provides the exclusive means by which plaintiffs’ dispute over the taxability of a retail sale may be resolved and that their current lawsuit is inconsistent with tax code procedures. As explained, the consumer protection statutes under which plaintiffs brought their action cannot be employed to avoid the limitations and procedures set out by the Revenue and Taxation Code.

A UCL claim seeking private injunctive relief is arbitrable if the arbitration agreement is otherwise valid and enforceable.

Clifford v. Quest Software Inc. · filed 2019-07-23

Because the Broughton - Cruz rule does not apply to claims for private injunctive relief, a plaintiff's request for private injunctive relief under the UCL is arbitrable, assuming the arbitration agreement is otherwise valid and enforceable.

Section 17200 permits claims under its unlawful and fraudulent prongs based on adequately pleaded misleading loan disclosures.

Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. · filed 2011-08-10

Based on our analysis of plaintiffs’ common law fraud claim, we conclude plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a section 17200 claim under the unlawful and fraudulent prongs.

Section 17200 permits a borrower to pursue an unfair-competition claim against a lender when the complaint plausibly alleges unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices during the loan-modification process.

Patterson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2014-10-08

However, in light of our recent analogous decision in Compton v. Countrywide Financial Corp., __ F.3d __, No. 11-17158, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 14977 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2014), it appears that the district court prematurely dismissed Patterson’s claim under the California Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, because Patterson adequately alleged a plausible claim that defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent business practices during her loan modification process. ... Accordingly, we remand to allow Patterson to pursue her § 17200 claim.

Section 17200 does not provide a claim based solely on presenting differently colored products at different prices when their identical ingredients and amounts are listed on the packages.

Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2016-04-25

The fatal flaw in all of Boris’ claims is his assertion that the mere fact of the proximate presentation of the two products with their different colors and prices is sufficient to run afoul of those laws, even though the ingredients and their amounts are listed on the packages. ... In short, as pled the complaint regarding price and color failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

For a competitor’s UCL claim under the unfair prong, “unfair” means conduct that threatens an incipient antitrust violation, violates the policy or spirit of antitrust law with comparable effects, or significantly threatens or harms competition.

The Distance Learning Company v. The Maynard Group · filed 2020-06-04

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not satisfy the Cel-Tech tethering test. In Cel-Tech, the California Supreme Court explained that “a practice may be deemed unfair even if it is not specifically proscribed by some other law.” 20 Cal. 4th at 180. The California Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that in “determin[ing] whether the challenged conduct is unfair within the meaning of the unfair competition law[,] courts may not apply purely subjective notions of fairness.” Id. at 184. Thus, “[w]hen a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s ‘unfair’ act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Id. at 187.

Section 17200 permits a UCL claim based on unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business conduct, and the court may allow an unfair-practices claim to proceed when the plaintiff alleges qualifying harm and standing.

Orosco v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2020-08-20

“To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show either an (1) unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, or (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” ... Because the requirements are phrased in the disjunctive, a practice may be unfair or deceptive even if it is not unlawful, or vice versa. ... An act is “unfair” under the UCL if it significantly threatens or harms competition, even if it is not specifically proscribed by another law. ... To prove a claim under the unfair or fraudulent prongs, a plaintiff “must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived by the practice.” ... However, defendants do not address whether plaintiffs’ claim for “unfair” practices is sufficiently pled. ... Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ UCL claim is DENIED.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a plaintiff need allege only one of those three theories to plead a claim.

Upstrem, Inc. v. BHFO, Inc. · filed 2021-05-21

“California’s unfair competition statute prohibits any unfair competition, which means ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’ ... ‘This tripartite test is disjunctive and the plaintiff need only allege one of the three theories to properly plead a claim under section 17200.’ ... However, Plaintiff states throughout its Complaint that Defendant “engaged in unfair business acts and practices,” providing Defendant with adequate notice of its alleged violation of the “unfairness” prong. ... The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for Unfair Competition under California Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, but a derivative UCL claim fails when the predicate conduct is not actionable.

Serge Haitayan v. 7 Eleven, Inc. · filed 2021-09-08

The other two remaining claims in Plaintiffs’ complaint in Case No. CV 17-7454 DSF (ASx)(Haitayan I), are state claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, which prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” See dkt. 222 at 5-6, 15; dkt. 283 at 17. These claims are derivative of Plaintiffs’ substantive claims. Dkt. 283 at 5. Because Plaintiffs’ predicate section 2802 claim fails, their UCL claims fail as a matter of law. See Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff cannot state a UCL claim if the predicate conduct relied upon is not actionable).

A Section 17200 claim fails when it is predicated on other claims that fail.

Clark v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-11-12

Seventh, the UCL claim is predicated on other claims and thus fails.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices beyond merely anticompetitive conduct, and a UCL claim must identify the challenged acts with sufficient specificity.

S&J Logistics, Inc. v. United National Insurance Company · filed 2024-04-26

The UCL defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “The UCL is not confined to ‘anti-competitive’ business practices,” but rather “extend[s] the meaning of unfair competition to anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Alch v. Sup. Ct., 122 Cal. App. 4th 339, 401 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass’n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 111 (1972). ... This assertion is conclusory and vague allegations because it fails to apprise the defendants of the actions at issue. ... Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action under the UCL.

A section 17200 unfair-competition claim may survive a motion to dismiss when it is substantially congruent with surviving Lanham Act claims.

Shake 'N Buns, Inc. v. California Burger Express, Inc. · filed 2024-06-05

Because Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 is “substantially congruent” with Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims (which this Court has determined survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss), Count 4 of Plaintiff’s complaint likewise survives.

Section 17200 treats unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices and misleading advertising as separate UCL theories, and a plaintiff must allege facts identifying and supporting the challenged unfair practice; UCL damages are unavailable.

Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC · filed 2024-06-11

“Unfair competition” includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). ... While Floyd alleges he “was harassed and forcibly removed from Planet Fitness on multiple occasions” and that he “never committed a serious infraction,” he fails to address the unfair business practice Saber engaged in, nor does he allege any facts to support that the practice was “unfair” under any of the tests described above. ... Further, to the extent Floyd seeks damages under the UCL, they are unavailable as recovery is limited to injunctive relief and restitution. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203; Cel-Tech Commc’ns, 20 Cal. 4th at 179 (explaining that “prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution . . . . Plaintiffs may not receive damages, much less treble damages, or attorney fees.”).

A UCL claim based on a business's failure to provide statutory warranty coverage is dismissed when the complaint does not plausibly allege that the disputed part was covered or that a qualifying defect occurred.

Berghuis v. Ford Motor Company, Inc. · filed 2024-10-07

A business may violate the UCL if its actions are either unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. ... Although the Court must accept as true all factual allegations that Plaintiff avers in her SAC, Plaintiff’s allegations as related to her UCL claim are not factual. Rather, they are speculative and amount to legal conclusions. The Court holds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. ... Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim that Ford violated California’s Unfair Competition Law when it refused to warrant the transmission clutch under the California Emissions Warranty is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Section 17200 covers business practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent; in omission-based UCL claims, the plaintiff must plead the omission with particularity, actual reliance, and a cognizable injury.

Strong v. LifeStance Health Group Incorporated · filed 2025-01-28

California’s UCL provides a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent. ... UCL claims based on nondisclosure like Yick’s are subject to Rule 9(b)’s particularity standard. ... This requires allegations identifying the “the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” ... This particularity standard applies to the requirement that Yick plead “actual reliance on the . . . omissions at issue.” ... Yick has adequately alleged actual reliance. ... Construed in the light most favorable to Yick, she has alleged she suffered “benefit of the bargain” damages by paying more than she otherwise would have paid. That is sufficient.

Section 17200 reaches unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices; for an omission-based fraudulent UCL claim, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the omission contradicted a representation or involved a fact the defendant had a duty to disclose.

Lopez v. Mead Johnson Nutrition Company · filed 2025-03-24

The UCL makes actionable any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... “To plausibly allege a fraudulent omission, the omission must either (1) ‘be contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant,’ or (2) ‘an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.’” ... Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead Defendants had a duty to disclose the presence of Heavy Metals in the Infant Formulas. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fraud-based UCL claim and CLRA and FAL claims are DISMISSED.

Section 17200 permits a UCL claim based on an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, but a claim under the unlawful prong requires violation of another law and creates no independent right to sue.

Snow · filed 2026-01-05

To state a UCL claim, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 22, 2003) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). ... To state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL, the alleged conduct must violate a “borrowed” law. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). ... No independent right to sue exists under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. Mejia v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 793 F. App'x 519, 521 (9th Cir. 2019). ... Thus, the court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's UCL claim.

Section 17200 can support a claim against a lender based on an allegedly discriminatory home daycare lending policy.

Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. · filed 2007-06-12

Plaintiffs have stated a claim for intentional source-of-income discrimination under FEHA; section 12955, subdivision (e) cannot be read so narrowly as to make it applicable only to tenants or potential tenants seeking rental housing. Plaintiffs have further stated a FEHA claim for disparate impact discrimination. Moreover, we hold that Project Sentinel alleged sufficient facts for standing to assert a FEHA claim. Finally, we conclude that Sisemore has stated a viable claim under the UCL (second cause of action).

For deceptive marketing claims under section 17200, the time to sue starts when a reasonable person would have discovered the factual basis for the claim.

Broberg v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2009-03-02

At least in the context of unfair competition claims based on a defendant’s allegedly deceptive marketing materials and sales practices, which is simply a different legal theory for challenging fraudulent conduct and where the harm from the unfair conduct will not reasonably be discovered until a future date, we believe the better view is that the time to file a section 17200 cause of action starts to run only when a reasonable person would have discovered the *921factual basis for a claim.

Section 17200 requires a private UCL claimant to allege that they lost money or property as a result of the alleged unfair business practice.

In re: Anton Andrew Rivera and Denise Ann Rivera · filed 2014-11-24

To establish their right to pursue their UCL claim, the Riveras needed to allege, among other things, that they lost money or property “as a result of” the alleged unfair business practice. Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310, 321-22 (2011).

A private plaintiff has standing under the Unfair Competition Law only if the plaintiff has lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.

In Re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation · filed 2015-11-10

The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, on the basis that, under the statute, “private standing is limited to any ‘person who . . . has lost money or property’ as a result of unfair competition.”139 Likewise, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code § 502, on the basis of § 502’s requirement that a suit may only be brought by one who has “suffer[ed] damage or loss by reason of a violation.”140 As discussed above in connection with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the complaint fails to show damage or actual loss. Accordingly, the dismissal of these claims was proper.

A UCL plaintiff must show that an alleged misrepresentation caused the loss of money or property underlying the claim.

McMahon v. Take-Two Interactive Software · filed 2018-12-20

To bring a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq., a plaintiff must show that they lost money or property “as a result of” the alleged misrepresentation.

Section 17200 permits injunctive relief for an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice only when the plaintiff satisfies the related injury-in-fact and lost-money-or-property requirement under section 17204.

LegalForce RAPC Worldwide P.C. v. Demassa · filed 2019-12-16

To be entitled to injunctive relief under § 17200, a plaintiff must establish the defendant has engaged in an "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice," see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, and that the plaintiff "has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition," see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Here, even assuming defendant has engaged in an unlawful practice, specifically, the unauthorized practice of law, plaintiff has not offered any evidence to demonstrate it has lost money or property as a result thereof, and, consequently, has failed to show it is entitled to relief under § 17200.

Section 17200 requires a plaintiff to allege that an unfair or unlawful practice caused the plaintiff to lose money or property.

Key v. BMW of North America, LLC · filed 2020-06-10

The SAC, however, fails to cure the above-noted deficiencies. Key alleges therein she has lost money or property because the "Diagnostic Tools" in her vehicle are of "diminished value" due to BMW's refusal to allow her to "retrieve all of the data," which data, Key alleges, has value. ... Although Key contends she has successfully cured the noted deficiencies by "reframing the allegations . . . to focus on the loss of the value of the Diagnostic Tools instead of the value of the data" (see Pl.'s Opp. at 1:25-28), her current claim is, in essence, based on the same harm on which she previously relied, specifically, her lack of access to the data.

A § 17200 claimant must prove that it lost money or property; without that proof, the claim fails.

The Vineyard House, LLC v. Constellation Brands U.S. Operations, Inc. · filed 2021-01-26

The elements of the state law count for trademark infringement13 (Fourth Claim), unfair competition14 (Fifth Claim) and Section 17200 of California Business and Professions Code15 (Sixth Claim) overlap with that of the federal claim. ... However, with respect to the Sixth Claim, while the Court finds the first element satisfied for the same reasons referenced above, Constellation failed to provide any evidence that it lost money or property. This claim fails for lack of proof.

A UCL plaintiff must show an injury in fact involving lost money or property; disclosure of personal information alone is insufficient without specific allegations of its economic value.

Mastel v. SA · filed 2021-07-15

To establish standing under the UCL, a plaintiff “must establish that [he] (1) suffered an injury in fact and (2) lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204)). Mastel has failed to satisfy the UCL’s standing requirement because he has not alleged any economic injury as a result of defendants’ conduct. ... Numerous courts have held that disclosure of personal information alone does not constitute economic or property loss sufficient to establish UCL standing, unless the plaintiff provides specific allegations regarding the value of the information.

A private UCL plaintiff must show injury in fact, lost money or property, and causation, which may be established when defective disclosures caused the plaintiff to spend money on services he did not intend to purchase.

Morrell v. WW International, Inc. · filed 2021-07-27

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “A person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition” has a cause of action under the UCL. Id. § 17204; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 889-91 (Cal. 2011). ... To state a claim under the UCL, a plaintiff “must allege that the defendant’s misrepresentations were an immediate cause of injury-causing conduct.” In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 40 (Cal. 2009). ... However, the plaintiff has alleged that he lost money as a result of the defendant’s alleged violations of the FAL and UCL, because he has alleged that he was unaware of the automatic renewals for his subscription as a result of WW’s defective disclosures. He alleges that these allegedly defective disclosures caused him to spend money on services he never intended to purchase. Compl. ¶¶ 85, 97. ... Accordingly, the facts pleaded are sufficient to allow a cause of action under the UCL and FAL, respectively, based on alleged violations of the ARL.

A private UCL plaintiff must show economic injury—loss or deprivation of money or property—to have standing.

Mai v. Oy · filed 2021-09-20

UCL and CLRA standing requires the plaintiff suffer “a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury.”

A private UCL plaintiff must allege injury in fact and lost money or property to have statutory standing.

Jones v. Regents of the University of California · filed 2022-04-18

As discussed above, the FAC shows that Plaintiff did not pay for services from UCSF Dental Clinic, nor does she allege that she received any treatment from Roykh. The Court grants the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim.

A private UCL plaintiff must allege lost money or property caused by the violation; loss of a legally protected privacy interest alone is not economic injury.

Baron v. Syniverse Corporation · filed 2022-10-07

These allegations fail to adequately allege a loss of money or property due to Syniverse’s alleged UCL violations.

The UCL permits a private plaintiff to sue only if the plaintiff suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of unfair competition.

Gonzalez v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2023-01-17

Gonzalez’s UCL claim fails for lack of statutory standing. The UCL limits “standing in a section 17200 action to certain specified public officials and to ‘any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of . . . unfair competition.’” Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 620–21 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 14, 2008). The FAC, however, does not allege any “economic injury” stemming from Rushmore’s allegedly unlawful conduct.

A private California Unfair Competition Law plaintiff must show an Article III injury plus a direct loss of money or property; lost time and risk of future harm alone do not suffice.

Tate v. EyeMed Vision Care, LLC · filed 2023-09-29

California’s unfair competition law imposes a heightened injury requirement for non-state actors bringing suit. Dugas, 2016 WL 6523428, at *11. On top of an Article III injury in fact, the statute requires plaintiffs to show they specifically suffered a deprivation of money or property as a prerequisite to suit. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. ... She alleges she has suffered various intangible injuries including loss of time13 and risk of future harm, but these are not sufficient under the statute. Dugas, 2016 WL 6523428, at *11. Because she does not allege that she has lost money or property, Whittom fails to state a California Unfair Competition Law claim upon which relief can be granted.

A UCL plaintiff must show injury in fact and loss of money or property caused by the unfair competition; alleging only lost time is insufficient.

Rogozinski v. Reddit, Inc. · filed 2024-01-12

Mai v. Supercell Oy, 648 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (holding “[a] person has statutory standing only if he or she ‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition’”) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204). ... An assertion one spent time one otherwise would not have spent does not suffice to plead the requisite element. ... Accordingly, Rogozinski’s UCL claim, to the extent based on Reddit’s “engag[ing] in a practice of asserting trademark rights in the brand names of subreddits,” is subject to dismissal.

Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices, but a plaintiff must show injury in fact and loss of money or property caused by the practice to have standing.

Wysocki v. ZoomInfo Technologies Inc · filed 2024-03-15

“Unfair competition” means “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The California Supreme Court has held that § 17200 “defines ‘unfair competition’ very broadly, to include ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.’” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 742 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barquis v. Merchant Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (1972)). “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, the UCL permits injured consumers to ‘borrow’ violations of other laws and treat them as unlawful competition that is independently actionable.” In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2014). To have standing to bring suit pursuant to § 17200, a plaintiff must “make a twofold showing: he or she must demonstrate injury in fact and a loss of money or property caused by unfair competition.” Susilo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1195–1196 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Kellogg, the Plaintiff representative for California, asserts no loss of money or property caused by ZoomInfo’s conduct. The complaint devoid of economic injury, the Plaintiffs do not have standing under the UCL and ZoomInfo’s motion to dismiss that claim is GRANTED.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices; a private plaintiff alleging misrepresentations must show injury and lost money or property, including actual reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.

Lee v. Foris Dax, Inc. · filed 2025-04-10

To assert a UCL claim, a private plaintiff needs to have “suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” ... Where, as here, the alleged misconduct involves misrepresentations, the plaintiff “must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well-settled principles regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions.” ... Lee does not have standing to bring her claims under the unfair or fraudulent prongs of the UCL because, unlike the plaintiff in Anderson, Lee cannot show that she relied on Crypto.com’s allegedly misleading or deceptive statements. ... That is not enough for Lee to bring this claim on her own behalf, even if she did suffer injury to her community property. ... Since Lee has failed to state a claim under the Elder Abuse Act (the law upon which her unlawful UCL claim is based), she cannot meet the standard set under the unlawful prong of the UCL.

Section 17200 restitution must be supported by substantial evidence and restore the status quo by returning funds in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.

Ewert v. Ebay, Inc. · filed 2015-01-26

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief under the UCL and FAL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500. Rather than seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction on their UCL and FAL claims, plaintiffs sought monetary restitution under the same pro rata refund theory. Unlike damages, restitution is designed “to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1149 (2003). However, a restitution award under the UCL and FAL “must be supported by substantial evidence.” Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 700 (2006). On summary judgment, eBay offered evidence through its expert that a pro rata refund was an improper measure of restitution, and plaintiffs failed to counter eBay’s evidence with any evidence of their own. Without such evidence, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a factual basis supporting an award of restitution under their pro rata theory.

Under the UCL, restitution generally measures the difference between the price paid and the actual value received; damages cannot be recovered.

Akinmeji v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. · filed 2019-07-31

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq, “is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.” ... Ultimately, then, in the present case the proper measure of restitution is the difference between the total price paid and the value of goods received.

Under the UCL, a consumer cannot obtain restitution for an alleged overpayment when the insurer charged a Department of Insurance-approved rate and the consumer received the full value of the policy, even if deception induced the purchase.

Alaei v. Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) · filed 2021-03-25

Any partial refund must comport with the enabling statute, Business & Professionals section 17204 which provides that the Court may award restitution “as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Cal. Bus & Prof 17204. ... To the extent Plaintiff is seeking restitution on the basis that he overpaid for his policy, there is a presumption that the rate is not excessive because the policy was set by the Department of Insurance based on the services covered. Ins. Code. 186105; MacKay, 188Cal.App.4th at 1448-49. ... In addition, in order to award restitution to Plaintiff, the Court must ask whether Defendants have obtained something which they are not entitled to keep. Day v. AT&T Corp., 63 Cal.App. 4th 325, 340 (1998)(“[t]he offending party must have obtained something to which it was not entitled and the victim must have given up something which he or she was entitled to keep.”) However, a consumer who purchases a comprehensive policy that does not include collision coverage, “obtains the full value of what was paid for and therefore has given up nothing, regardless of whether he or she was improperly induced to purchase the [policy] in the first place.” ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the UCL.

Section 17200 permits equitable restitution for unrefunded insurance premiums allegedly obtained through unlawful practices, but withheld policy benefits are damages and are not recoverable as UCL restitution.

Allen v. Protective Life Insurance Company · filed 2023-03-22

The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice[.]” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Each prong of the UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability. ... At least as to Allen’s claims regarding unrefunded premiums, restitution permits a plaintiff to demand return of monies thereby obtained through such practices. ... However, Protective is correct that Allen cannot recover unpaid benefits via restitution: courts have expressly found that the payment of policy benefits are “damages” and therefore not recoverable under the UCL. ... Protective’s motion is therefore GRANTED without leave to amend insofar as Allen seeks restitution for withheld policy benefits and DENIED on all other grounds.

For a UCL restitution claim, recovery is measured by the difference between the amount paid and what a reasonable consumer would have paid without the fraudulent or omitted information, using willingness-to-pay rather than market value.

Mier v. Cvs Health · filed 2023-07-28

“[I]n calculating restitution under the UCL and FAL, the focus is on the difference between what was paid and what a reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of purchase without the fraudulent or omitted information.” Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court correctly concluded that restitution is measured by willingness-to-pay rather than market value.

Courts may deny restitution of legal fees under section 17200 when a law corporation registered late and clients neither relied on its corporate status nor suffered injury from the delay.

Olson v. Cohen · filed 2003-04-19

A UCL action is equitable in nature, and the court may consider equitable factors in deciding which, if any, remedies authorized by the UCL should be awarded. ... Nor has appellant shown a reasonable basis for restitutionary relief. Although appellant seeks a forfeiture of all fees collected from Corp, there is no allegation that any client relied upon the existence of a corporate entity in seeking legal services or was injured by the delay in registration.

Section 17200 does not provide restitution of rent that a landlord remained entitled to collect despite violating a rental registration ordinance.

Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel · filed 2014-04-17

Moreover, plaintiff did not request an injunction, and, because LAMC section 151.05, subsection A. does not disentitle a landlord to rent for a period during which the landlord is not in compliance with LAMC section 151.05, subsection A., plaintiff was not entitled to restitution, which is the monetary remedy provided by section 17200. (See Zhang v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 369.)

Section 17200 permits restitution of payments a plaintiff made because of unfair practices, but not money paid by a third party in which the plaintiff has no ownership interest.

Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2015-06-01

However, with respect to Hambrick’s claim to recover money paid by the unidentified health care service plan to HCP under a capitation agreement, this is not recoverable by Hambrick as restitution because this is not money in which Hambrick has an ownership interest or that was “lost by a plaintiff.”

Private plaintiffs generally cannot recover Labor Code penalties as restitution under section 17200.

Noe v. Superior Court · filed 2015-06-01

Labor Code penalties are generally not recoverable as a form of UCL restitution.

A UCL claim seeking restitution for misrepresented earnings statements fails when the payroll provider is not alleged to have benefited from the misrepresentations.

Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC · filed 2016-11-04

Furthermore, to the extent the UCL claims rely on the misrepresentations in appellant‟s earnings statements, as alleged in connection with the negligent misrepresentation claim, the claims fail for want of any allegation that ADP derived a benefit from the misrepresentations supporting a restitutionary recovery.

A UCL claim seeking restitution must allege that the plaintiff has an ownership interest in money or property received by the defendant.

Roman · filed 2025-12-11

Because Plaintiff concedes he has not alleged that “money or property” was taken from him to support a claim for restitution, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the restitution claim under the UCL.

Section 17200 covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts, but a UCL claim requires a causal connection between the challenged conduct and the plaintiff’s economic injury.

Aniel v. ETrade Bank CA!/2 · filed 2015-03-12

We conclude that our case is like Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 497. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the causation element because she defaulted on the loan which triggered the nonjudicial foreclosure before any alleged wrongdoing by the Bank.

Section 17200 standing requires economic injury caused by the challenged unfair business practice; a plaintiff lacks standing when the same harm would have occurred regardless of the defendant’s compliance with the law.

Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2017-06-15

To have standing to assert a Section 17200 claim, the plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 885 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff fails to satisfy this causation requirement if he or she would have suffered “the same harm whether or not a defendant complied with the law.” Daro v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 729 (Ct. App. 2007). ... Therefore, they do not have standing to pursue a claim under the UCL.

Section 17200 covers California unfair-competition claims that are substantially congruent with the corresponding federal unfair-competition claims, so a plaintiff who does not plausibly allege the federal claim likewise does not plausibly allege the state claim.

Mintz v. Subaru of America, Inc. · filed 2017-12-12

As Mintz also acknowledges, her claims for California trademark infringement and dilution under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 14245 and 14247 and for California unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 are “substantially congruent” with her claims for trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition under federal law. Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, because Mintz does not plausibly allege these claims under federal law, she also does not plausibly allege her claims under California state law.

Section 17200 defines UCL unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and misleading-advertising claims are judged under the reasonable-consumer standard.

Brown v. Starbucks Corporation · filed 2019-09-03

The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ... Plaintiff’s claims for misleading advertising under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard. ... Under this standard, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’”

Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and generally affords prevailing plaintiffs only injunctive relief and restitution.

Infanzon v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2019-11-06

The UCL bars “unfair competition,” which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Section 17200 defines ‘unfair competition’ very broadly, to include ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... However, “under the UCL, prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144 (2003) (internal citation, quotation marks and alteration omitted); accord Zhang v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 4th 364, 371 (2013) (“Prevailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”) ... Because the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the available legal remedies are inadequate, or state the basis for equitable ones, the UCL claim is not sufficiently pleaded. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the UCL claim, with leave to amend.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, including competitor conduct that significantly threatens or harms competition.

Cisco Systems Inc v. Link US, LLC · filed 2019-12-06

The UCL prohibits “unfair competition,” which includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 855 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). To adequately plead a claim under the UCL’s unfair prong, a direct competitor must allege “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.”

Section 17200 covers business practices that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent; in competitor cases, the unfairness prong requires a threat to competition, and a fraudulent-omission claim requires a contrary representation or a duty to disclose.

Snapkeys, LTD v. Google LLC · filed 2020-03-04

“California’s UCL provides a cause of action for business practices that are (1) unlawful, (2) unfair, or (3) fraudulent.” ... “For an omission to be actionable under the UCL, ‘the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.’” ... “In competitor cases, a business practice is ‘unfair’ only if it ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’” ... “Snapkeys’ allegations are even weaker than that in Levitt because Snapkeys fails to allege any harm to competition but merely focuses on harm to itself, which is insufficient to state a claim under the “unfair” prong of the UCL.”

Section 17200 unfair competition is substantially congruent with Lanham Act trademark infringement, and the ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks.

Mikuni Ginko, Ltd. v. Feng Chen Buffet, Inc. · filed 2020-05-05

“An action for unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. is substantially congruent to a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act.” Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under both, the ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks.” Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the elements of a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, Plaintiffs have also adequately alleged the elements of their unfair competition claim.

Section 17200 defines unfair competition to include unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, which are separate UCL categories.

CZ Services, Inc. v. Express Scripts Holding Company · filed 2020-07-30

The California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. These are separate categories of constitutive acts for UCL purposes. Cel-Tech Commc’ns., Inc v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999).

Section 17200's unfair prong requires allegations that a challenged practice threatens an antitrust violation or significantly harms competition in the market as a whole, and a plaintiff invoking its fraudulent prong must personally rely on the deceptive statement.

Snapkeys, LTD v. Google LLC · filed 2020-10-30

Under the UCL, “a business practice is ‘unfair’ only if it ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.’” ... Thus, in order to allege a UCL unfair prong claim, Snapkeys must allege harm to the market as a whole, not just harm to itself. ... As the decisions following In re Tobacco II Cases make clear, a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim under the UCL’s fraudulent prong unless the plaintiff herself relied on the statements.

Section 17200 broadly covers unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and permits restitution for unpaid wages; accordingly, a UCL claim may proceed based on meal and rest period violations under Labor Code § 226.7.

Howell v. Leprino Foods Company · filed 2021-01-19

The UCL generally prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The scope of the UCL’s “coverage is sweeping, embracing anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” ... Notwithstanding the broad scope of coverage, remedies under the UCL are limited to injunctive relief and restitution. ... Unpaid wages are generally recoverable as restitution under the UCL because they “are as much the property of the employee who has given his or her labor to the employer in exchange for that property as is property a person surrenders through an unfair business practice.” ... The Court will do the same here, and also adhere to its determination in Bates that a UCL claim may be based on violations of § 226.7. Thus, the Court will deny Leprino’s motion to the extent that Howell may pursue a UCL claim based on meal and rest period allegations.

Section 17200 permits a corporate plaintiff to challenge unfair business practices only when it alleges the required connection to the public, consumers, or competition; conclusory allegations and a failed underlying fraud theory do not state a UCL claim.

Aton Center, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois · filed 2021-02-16

“[N]otwithstanding the wide range of conduct that can be deemed ‘unfair’ within the meaning of section 17200, . . . in cases involving allegations of unfairness under the UCL”, “where a UCL action is based on contracts not involving either the public in general or individual consumers who are parties to the contract, a corporate plaintiff may not rely on the UCL for the relief it seeks.” ... In this case, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to infer that Plaintiff is either Defendant’s competitor or consumer. ... The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 against Defendant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The UCL's unfairness prong does not always require pleading a Sherman Act violation, but a competitor must allege conduct that threatens or harms competition.

Meta Platforms, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd. · filed 2021-02-19

“Although a plaintiff need not always allege a Sherman Act violation to state a UCL claim based on “unfair” conduct, BrandTotal’s allegations here are not sufficient. ... Accordingly, Facebook’s motion is GRANTED as to BrandTotal’s counterclaim under the “unfair” prong of the UCL. Because BrandTotal could conceivably amend to allege harm to competition, whether tracking the elements of a Sherman Act claim or by some other means, the Court grants leave to amend this claim.”

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a claim under its unlawful prong rises or falls with the underlying claim serving as its predicate.

The Upper Deck Company v. Panini America, Inc. · filed 2021-04-13

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each of these three adjectives captures a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). A UCL claim based on the unlawful prong rises or falls with the underlying claim. See Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 1185 (2012) (a UCL cause of action under the “unlawful” prong fails if a statutory predicate is not stated); Wolski v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 127 Cal. App. 4th 347, 357 (2005) (holding that a UCL claim rises or falls with the underlying claim on which it is predicated). Accordingly, because the Court DENIES dismissal of the claims on the first, fourth and fifth claims, the Court DENIES dismissal of the UCL claim based on these claims.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts and misleading advertising, and makes fraudulent concealment actionable under the UCL.

West Pacific Electric Company Corporation v. Dragados/Flatiron · filed 2021-04-19

The California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising,” and makes fraudulent concealment actionable under the statute. ... Because the court has identified genuinely disputed issues of material fact as to WPEC’s first and third claims, the court also finds that the granting of summary judgment in favor of DFJV as to WPEC’s UCL claim is not warranted.

Section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices, and a derivative claim must plead the supporting facts with reasonable particularity.

VibrantCare Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Deol · filed 2021-04-26

California’s UCL statute prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Count Two, the UCL claim, is derivative in nature and the plaintiff “must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Rezente, 2010 WL 5129293 at *5 (citing Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 612, 619 (1993). The Complaint alleges that the UCL claim is based on the Defendant’s misappropriation of trade secrets. Thus, to the extent that this claim is based on the same facts as the trade secrets claim, it is preempted by CUTSA. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count Two with leave to amend.